Labov PrinciplesLinguisticMethodology 1972
Labov PrinciplesLinguisticMethodology 1972
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to Language in Society
ABSTRACT
Less than twenty years divide us from the time when the study of methods was
the reigning passion of American linguistics; yet the status of methodology has
fallen so fast and so far that it now lies in that outer, extra-linguistic darkness
where we have cast speculation on the origin of language and articles about slang.
It cannot be denied that the pursuit of methods was carried on with a certain
willful blindness to both theory and practice; there was a time when methods
cast in the canonical form of tough-mindedness and symmetry were elevated to
the status of ritual texts, though they were seen even then to be hopelessly
impractical. But even if methodology is no longer an O.K. word in linguistics, we
have no choice but to use it again. It is an open secret that the rough and ready
exploitation of grammatical intuitions has run its course from exhilaration to
despair. A more reflective approach to the problem of intersubjective knowledge
is needed if our arguments are to mirror anything but our own polemical
intent.
In our exploration of the use of language in the secular world, we find that
methods have steadily grown in theoretical importance: first as a necessity, then
as an art, and now as a route towards the development of a theory of speaking. A
course in secular linguistics must focus first on the act of speaking and methods
for observing it. But it should also include training in the several methods of
historical and synchronic linguistics, making use of the texts, elicitations, and
intuitions which are the mainstay of the scholarly world. This paper will present
some of the principles that govern the gathering of empirical data, in both the
secular and scholastic places of linguistics. The principles will be stated with a
G 97
[I] 'To interrelate these analyses, it is necessary to understand that these are not competing
theories, but rather complement each other in the description of sentences. It is not that
grammar is one or another of these analyses, but that sentences exhibit simultaneously
all of these properties' (Harris 1965: 365).
98
some question as to whether it has actually resolved any important issues (Lakoff
1970).
Here linguistics is in a position to benefit from the example of the developed
sciences. Scientific methodology can be thought of as the reverse procedure:
trying to prove to yourself that you are wrong. That is, methodology is careful
and conscientious search for error in one's own work, following Karl Popper's
principle that the best theories are the easiest to disconfirm (1959). To be right
means that you have finally abjectly, hopelessly failed to prove yourself wrong.
It is dangerous to assign this responsibility to anyone else, for no one will have
the same vested interest in this pursuit as you do.
This kind of methodological self-criticism leads to a continual refinement of
our methods, introducing safeguards, reliability tests, cross-checks, typical of the
scientific attitude which can profitably be practised even at the pre-scientific
stage where we now find ourselves. But such methodological rigor is often justi-
fiably identified with the dead end of a worn-out approach. By the time the
methods are perfected, the most important work has often been done, and the
methodologists continue oblivious to this fact, proceeding on the hopelessly
unrealistic program that everything which can be described should be. At this
point, we find cropping up a second kind of methodology, a revolutionary critic-
ism which identifies new problems and fundamental faults in the older methods
which cannot be repaired.
A new methodology with new kinds of data is then called for. But if new data
has to be introduced, we usually find that it has been barred for ideological
reasons, or not even been recognized as data at all, and the new methodology
must do more than develop techniques. It must demolish the beliefs and as-
sumptions which ruled its data out of the picture. Since many of these beliefs are
held as a matter of deep personal conviction, and spring from the well-established
habits of a lifetime, this kind of criticism is seldom accomplished without hard
feelings and polemics, until the old guard gradually dissolves into academic
security and scientific limbo.
We might approach the various methods available to linguistics by looking at
the activity of the linguists themselves, according to where they can be found. In
this search, we would find linguists working in the library, the bush, the closet, the
laboratory, and the street, and might so name each sub-division of the discipline.
But in this analysis we will take a different approach and examine the raw mater-
ials gathered by each variety of linguistics, distinguishing each linguist by his
product: texts, elicitations, intuitions, experiments, and observations. A full discus-
sion of the experimental method would carry us beyond our present scope;
some methodological problems in the application of controlled experiments to
verbal behavior are given in Labov I969. This paper will consider principles of
methodology centering about the use of tests, elicitations, intuitions, and observ-
ations of the vernacular.
99
TEXTS
The fundamental methodological fact that historical linguists have to face is that
they have no control over their data. Texts are produced by a series of historical
accidents; amateurs may complain about this predicament, but the sophisticated
historian is grateful that anything has survived at all. The great art of the
historical linguist is to make the best of this bad data - 'bad" in the sense that it
may be fragmentary, corrupted, or many times removed from the actual pro-
ductions of native speakers. He relies first of all on the canons of critical scholar-
ship - by-laws and safeguards against human fallibility and corruptibility. The
most important of these is reference - the act of making the original texts available
for the inspection of others who may have other biases and prejudices. In in-
sisting on the checkability of data, historical linguists are considerably ahead of
the average descriptive linguist. The historian tries to bring us as close to his
data as he can, while the descriptive linguist keeps us many times removed.
Between the reader and the native speaker there are interposed the training,
skills and theoretical orientation of the linguist; rarely is an effort made to bridge
this gap by publishing tapes or protocols.
The chief methodological principle of historical linguistics remains the
NEOGRAMMARIAN HYPOTHESIS:
IOO
[2] The term 'uniformitarian' is borrowed from geology, where it signifies the now generally
accepted principle of Hutton that processes now taking place around us - weathering,
sedimentation, volcanism, etc. - are the same as those that have operated in the past to
produce the geological record.
[3] Even if local observers had reported that die and day were 'the same' at that time, it
would not follow that they were in fact the same and would not prevent these word
classes from following their opposing paths without disruption. Recent research on
sound change in progress shows that native speakers do not perceive consistent second-
formant differences which effectively separate word classes in natural speech. See
Labov (I97oa) and below.
IOI
FIGURE I. Routes followed by falling (lap) nuclei and rising (tense) nuclei in sound
changes in progress.
ELICITATIONS
102
native intuition to defend his grammar, nor can he hope to seize the flow of
natural conversation until long past the usual stages of language learning and
reporting. Few anthropological linguists learn a language well enough to make
much use of the conversational data of the street and the marketplace. The normal
procedure is to transcribe texts - often traditional folk lore - to elicit translations
of sentences from bilingual informants, present minimal pairs and ask for
'sames' and 'differents'. It would be idle to criticize these methods because they
are limited; by such techniques, Boas and Sapir enriched tremendously the
range of data available to a linguistic theory which had been largely based on
texts and normative handbooks of a narrow group of European language families.
Yet a calm view of our current field techniques should make it evident that this
data is also normative, modified by conscious reflection and governed by cultural
norms of right and wrong, good and bad language. Many American linguists
assumed at first that such norms existed only in literary cultures, but in one of
the most candid and penetrating examples of self-criticism on record, Bloomfield
(I927) showed how mistaken he had been in this respect.
To the extent that there is a disjunction between norms and the pattern of
everyday speech, the traditional field approach will yield a rough and necessarily
imperfect first approach to the language. The minimal pair test or commutation
test, long considered the soundest of all behavioral tests, is a dramatic example of
this limitation. In our recent work on sound change in progress, we find that
minimal pairs can be doubly defective. It has been observed before that native
speakers can make distinctions in minimal pairs that they do not make in actual
speech; normative responses often preserve fanciful, archaic or mythical distinc-
tions. But it was not realized that native speakers can fail to recognize or register
distinctions which they regularly make in natural speech (Labov 197oa): their
self-reports often reflect the patterns of younger speakers rather than their own,
or blur regular phonetic distinctions that are too subtle to withstand the glare of
conscious examination.
The chief methodological principle here is that the linguist must be fully aware
of the nature of his data. A realistic methodology would not insist that he
abandon all description until he can trade insults with the man in the street or
dispute local theology in the full flood of an enlightened scepticism. But if the
linguist recognizes the existence of these higher levels of competence, he can use
his developing grasp of the language on second or third trips to the field to
locate the differences between norms and behavior; by doing so, he would
deepen the value of his original observations for an increasingly dynamic and
secular linguistic theory.
The courses infield methods taught in our linguistics departments are of course
quite domesticated; they are more garden variety than field. But their well-
informed informants provide students with their only serious practice in trans-
cription and analysis. The exercises of our traditional texts are even more
103
removed from the data of a secular linguistics, but the work they demand is
honest work. To the everlasting credit of structural linguistics, it took the
student seriously, and tried to give him all the help it could. Gleason (I96i),
Pike (1947) and Nida (949) assumed that the student they were addressing was
going to bring back some important data from the field, and they were anxious
to teach him the essential skills of phonetic transcription, segmentation, allo-
phonic grouping, recognition of conditioned variants, minimal pairs and com-
mutation tests. The success of this approach is evident in the best of the Cali-
fornia dissertations and SIL reports.
However, the formal methodology which grew out of the structuralist tradition
was alarmingly unrealistic. It fully deserved the criticism which Chomsky
turned on 'discovery procedures'. Although it is hard for us to believe it today, a
number of students took seriously the contention of Bloch and Harris that one
could analyze a language by beginning at the phonetic level without reference to
the meanings of the words.4 There was an unstated and informal methodological
principle that gained currency and influenced practice which we can call the
PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENTIAL IGNORANCE: the less the linguist knows about a langu-
age, the more accurate (objective? scientific?) his description will be. It is unlikely
that the theory of ignorance will ever be fully developed, since the questions we
ask today demand deep rather than shallow knowledge. But granted that the
linguist could apply his technical skills of segmentation and classification in a
reliable way, would the results be valid? What would a test of validity be in such
a procedure?
The kind of methodology reflected in the discovery procedures of the I940S
and 5os has little relation to the principles to be presented here. We do not see
reflected therein the careful concern with sources of error, the search for new
kinds of data, for convergent and confirming perspectives which is our concept of
methodology.
At a number of points throughout this discussion the phrase 'sources of error'
has been used, and it will be helpful to specify the kinds of error we are talking
about. There are of course errors of measurement, of memory, or of calculation,
all of which can be avoided by careful attention to procedures. Tests of reliability
help us to check such errors and eliminate them. But we are more concerned with
a different type of error which stems from a misapprehension of the nature of the
data. The data which may be cited as evidence of some underlying construct
such as a linguistic rule, when it may in fact be largely the product of many
factors and represent no single property at all. If the errors of misapprehension or
the contextual factors neglected are local (such as interaction with a particular
interviewer) we will obtain a loss of reliability when others repeat the work. But
[4] John Street informs me (personal communication) that under the influence of Bloch he
once spent many months trying to do a phonetic transcription of Mongolian before he
understood the meanings of any of the words. The attempt did not succeed.
104
if they are general (such as neglecting the tendency to report norms rather than
behavior) we may obtain reproducible results which are still erroneous in their
application to the theoretical problem. In order to detect and eliminate such
results, we need tests of validity.
Unfortunately, we do not find any concept of validity in the methodology
developed by descriptive linguistics to elicit linguistic data. The seriousness of
descriptive intent was offset by a fashionable and aimless relativism in theory. A
simple, commonsense adherence to the search for intersubjective agreement will
reject such defensive manoeuvers. It seems reasonable for anthropological
linguists to be guided by the growing concern within anthropology to reduce the
role of the observer and let their methods be as transparent as possible; and so
arrange matters that their own training, skills, and limitations be cancelled in the
final analysis. This is of course only a goal to be aimed at, not a practice to be
achieved, but it reflects a definition of validity which we will explore in a later
section: that our descriptions should apply to the language which was spoken
before we arrive and will still be spoken after we leave.
INTUITIONS
There is no doubt that Chomsky is responsible for the most important metho-
dological revolution in our field. He directed a withering criticism at the extreme
behavioral approach which denied the existence of mental constructs and
rejected intuitive evidence out of hand. Chomsky and his students have demon-
strated the existence of a vast, seemingly inexhaustible supply of data which the
linguist can draw from his own knowledge of language. The richness of the
results is beyond dispute. We know much more about English, and about
language in general than we knew before and this achievement will stand
whether or not the current form of generative theory survives in a recognizable
form.
The question remains as to whether generative grammar has any methodology
beyond the decision to exploit intuitions of grammaticality to the full. To begin
with, we should note that this strategy depends upon the successful exploitation
of the SAUSSURIAN PARADOX. Saussure argued (I962: 321) that the linguist must
concentrate upon the social aspect of language, langue, which is conceived as so
general that it is in the possession of every speaker. It follows that one can in-
vestigate langue by asking anyone about it, even oneself, which is what Chomsky
proceeded to do. On the other hand, the individual details of parole can be
ascertained only through a social survey in the midst of the population. The
SAUSSURIAN PARADOX, then, is that the social aspect of language can be studied
through the intuitions of any one individual, while the individual aspect can be
studied only by sampling the behavior of an entire population.
The development of generative grammar has brought about a steady enrich-
I05
ment of this intuitive data. Chomsky's early response to criticisms of the gram-
matical-ungrammatical opposition was to suggest an ordered scale of gram-
maticality (I96I), but in further developments each writer has followed his own
bent. As judgments became more refined, several intermediate designations
began to appear: in addition to ungrammatical '*', we observe questionable '?',
questionably ungrammatical '?*', and outstandingly ungrammatical '**'. In
addition, the kinds of intuitions to be cited as evidence were steadily enlarged.
(i) The original judgments of grammaticality (well-formedness) naturally
included, (2) judgments of ambiguity, and (3) judgments of correct paraphrase.
But even from the outset we also note claims for (4), judgments of sameness or
difference of sentence type, and (5) intuitions about immediate constituents
(Chomsky I96I). A new emphasis on the theory of markedness has brought
the citation of (6), native intuitions on marked and unmarked status. Finally,
there are the most powerful of all kinds of intuition, (7) feelings that a given
theory is the right one, or that another solution is 'counterintuitive'.
It is unfortunate that this proliferation of the intuitive data has not been
accompanied by a methodological concern for the reduction of error, or a search
for intersubjective agreement. The weaknesses of intuitive studies in this respect
are known to all of us, but not everyone knows what to do about it without
abandoning the advances we have made. Originally, Chomsky hoped that the
area of agreement on judgments of grammaticality would be so large that the
disputed areas could easily be resolved by following the general pattern. But this
has not worked out in practice. The search for critical arguments has driven
almost everyone to the use of examples which command no agreement at all. As
one of countless examples, I cite Jackendoff's article on 'Quantifiers in English'
(1968). Among the sentences given as grammatical without question we have
The three of the men that you met yesterday have not left yet and Of the men, the
three you met yesterday have not left yet. Chomsky himself has found it impossible
to avoid arguments based on admittedly personal judgments. In his paper
'Remarks on nominalizations' (1970) he cites pairs such as our election of 7ohn
(to the presidency) vs. *our election of John (to be) president and notes: 'Reactions
to these sentences vary slightly: [these] represent my judgments.' He then adds,
'Given such data, . . ' and proceeds with the argument. By 'data' he does not
mean the disagreements, but rather the evidence of his own decisions. As
valuable and insightful as such arguments may be, they cannot alone lead to the
sure sense of right and wrong that we have raised as our ultimate goal. To achieve
intersubjective knowledge, we will probably have to limit ourselves to intuitions
of types (I)-3) above, and refrain entirely from citing the intuitions of the
theorist himself as evidence. Any serious consideration of sources of error must
hold such data as the most suspect unless it coincides with other sources.
Nevertheless, linguists continue to use uncheckable examples and defend them
by asserting that they are only discussing their own dialect. If 'my dialect'
io6
means no more than 'people disagree with me', it is certainly an illegitimate and
unworthy escape from serious work. Perhaps the most alarming symptom of
this retreat into the theorist's introspections is that it is no longer considered
proper to doubt such intuitive data. At one meeting after another, such questions
have been shrugged off as speakers refer impatiently to their own dialects as the
only relevant source of evidence. As a result, one seldom hears questions about
data any more.
A number of generative grammarians are now actively investigating the nature
of syntactic dialects, most importantly Guy Carden. Carden has discovered
implicational relations among dialect differences in the interpretation of negatives
and quantifiers (I970). By demonstrating that a given interpretation of quantifiers
with negatives implies the forn of tag questions and other sentence types,
Carden has given meaning to the concept of syntactic dialect. He has also given
considerable attention to reliability (personal communication). He has examined
I25 cases where an informant was asked the same question in a second interview
and found
no change 99
change 20 (9 interview errors, 2 systematic pressure changes,
9 apparently random)
possible change 6 (where identical responses might have been coded
differently)
Given this degree of reliability, we must agree that the investigation of other
peoples' intuitions is on a sound footing; at the same time, Carden recog-
nizes that there is a problem of explaining and controlling the changes that
occur.
Other studies of informant judgments indicate that we are dealing with a
statistical phenomenon, at least as usually carried out. The studies of grammat-
ical acceptability by Quirk and his associates confirm our informal observations
that it is rare to find IOO per cent agreement or disagreement on any sentence.
Investigations of judgments on tag questions and other syntactic issues carried
out by Lehiste and by Wedge & Ingemann (1970) showed that such data is
variable and shifting in the extreme. We can find implicational relations within
the flux of responses (see Elliott, Legum & Thompson 1969), if we are prepared
for a certain number of irregularities. There may be emerging a whole new
calculus of variations in the study of intuitive judgments. However, there has
been no success so far in replicating regular patterns in such variation (Postal
I968; Labov 197ob, and Heringer's disagreement with Carden I968). In general
we must observe that it is the nature of language to produce categorical judgments,
and we should not forget that it is usually the difficult and disputed areas that
have been investigated. But when we enter variable areas, it appears that in-
tuitive judgments are less regular than behavior. We seem to move quickly
I07
OBSERVATIONS
There is obviously something odd in placing observations last in the types of data
used by linguists. But the observation of natural speech is in fact the most
difficult of all the methods discussed so far. Texts, elicitations and intuitions are
much more accessible, more easily segmented and classified; yet the wealth of
linguistic description and theory which has been built upon such data still
remains to be interpreted in its relation to language as a vehicle of communica-
tion in everyday life. In the gathering of elicitations and intuitions, there is no
obvious sense in which the work can be described as valid. If another linguist
obtains the same judgments from native speakers or from his own introspec-
tions, then we can say that the method is reliable. But reliability by itself does not
help us in developing a sound theory of language in the sense that we intend.
Very often the linguist is actually producing his own phenomena.5 He has
therefore created a further problem of relating these artifacts to natural
language.
What would it mean for elicitations or intuitions to be valid? One might
[5] As linguists increase their familiarity with the philosophy of ordinary language, there is
a growing tendency to use 'thought-experiments' as a means of manufacturing data.
Thus Jerry Morgan develops an idea about time machines (credited to McCawley)
as a means of producing data about the reflexive. What would an investigator, sitting in a
time machine, say if he saw an image of himself slapping himself? According to Morgan,
he could report 'I slapped myself'. 'If new me reaches out from the time machine and
slaps his younger counterpart, I can report it by "I slapped myself ". But if old me reaches
into the time machine and slaps new me, I cannot report it by "I slapped myself"'
(I969:55). If Morgan should succeed in getting reliable responses to such thought-
experiments, then he would have the problem of relating these responses to language as
we have conceived it here.
io8
9og
[6] Some of the most recent developments in recording which are important for the study
of natural interaction are actually setbacks (possibly temporary) in fidelity. Cassette
tape-recorders running at I} inches per second cannot give us the frequency response to
capture all of the relevant acoustic properties of the speech signal. But their small size,
low cost, and inconspicuousness can hardly be discounted in the pursuit of naturalistic
observations. There have been advances in the insulation of built-in condenser micro-
phones from motor noise which are of some importance for fieldwork of this sort,
and it is likely that the combination of stereo separation with equipment of this type
will be a further step of consequence for the study of natural groups.
IIO
[7] Over the past several years, I have collected a number of questions from academic
audiences which presuppose or imply this moral stance. E.g. 'Under what pretext do you
speak to these people?' One professor asked me, 'How do you insinuate your way into
these groups?' and a little later his wife asked, 'How do you accost them?' Pretext,
accost and insinuate appear to share a feature of [-propriety] which I have tried to
elucidate in the general formulation above.
[8] It is not only subordinate adult dialects which are governed by this principle. Language
forms used by children are non-standard dialects which are generally considered
incorrect, and one can expect that the direct elicitation of data from children is not
easily related to their actual production. It is a general finding that formal experiments
and elicitations from children show a linguistic competence which is below that dis-
III
112
H II3
In constructing such questions, one must turn back to the basic sociolinguistic
conundrum: 'Why does anyone say anything?'1O There are three content themes
which have the greatest force for evoking speech from the broadest range of
speakers: (i) death and the danger of death, including any form of physical
violence (fights, accidents, sickness, operations); (2) sex and all of the machinery
for interaction between the sexes (proposals, dating, household negotiations);
(3) moral indignation (e.g. 'Did you ever get whupped for something you didn't
do?') Beyond such general considerations, there are a vast array of local issues,
humor and gossip which the field worker must seize as a by-product of partici-
pant-observation. Questions in specific local areas are constructed by a feed-
back technique which progressively assumes more as the field worker knows
more.1" An initial question. 'Do you play the numbers?' would thus give way to
'Did you ever hit big?' In talking to deer hunters, an initial question such as
'Where do you aim?' would give way to 'Is it worth trying a rump shot?' As the
outsider gradually becomes an insider, the quality of the speech obtained and the
speaker's involvement in it rises steadily. A field worker who stays outside his
subject, and deals with it as a mere excuse for eliciting language, will get very
little for his pains. Almost any question can be answered with no more informa-
[Io] That is, the study of methods involves us in basic questions of discourse analysis.
Naive approaches to eliciting speech rely heavily upon questions which superficially
force responses. Experimental methods used to assess the verbal competence of children
also utilize direct questions and obtain systematically misleading data. Further analysis
of the factors which lead children and adults to speak inevitably involve us with a con-
sideration of the actions being performed, and the underlying propositions about the
role of the speaker and addressee. Such considerations form the foundation of a study of
discourse which distinguishes sequencing rules from rules of interpretation which carry
us from 'what is said' to 'what is done'.
[iI] Such methods are similar to the techniques used by anthropologists in forming
questions which reflect the categories and vocabulary of the native culture (Black &
Metzger I965). But the extreme formality which has been used in the approaches
reported so far may give misleading results if there is a significant disjunction between
norms and behavior.
114
tion than was contained in it. When the speaker does give more, it is a gift,
drawn from some general fund of good will that is held in trust by himself and
the field worker. A deep knowledge implies a deep interest, and in payment for
that interest the speaker may give more than anyone has a right to expect. Thus
the field worker who can tap the full linguistic competence of his subjects must
acquire a detailed understanding of what he is asking about, as well as broad
knowledge of the general forms of human behavior.
Beyond the interview. The individual interview will remain as the foundation
of our investigations, since only there do we control the large bulk of speech and
the complex structures needed for the study of grammar. But the methods just
described for overriding the constraints of the formal interview are only sub-
stitutes for the real thing, and give us only fragments of the vernacular.
A more systematic approach to recording the vernacular of everyday life is to
allow the interaction of natural peer group itself to control the level of language
produced. The techniques used here are from the original work done by Gumperz
in Hemnes, Norway (I964) where he recorded the interaction of closed and
open networks of members of the community. The investigators provide the
initial setting, but gradually recede from the situation; the effect of recording is
never wholly absent, as our principles would predict, but it is largely overridden
by other factors - the same as those which operate in everyday life. Such tech-
niques were further developed in our work with adolescent peer groups in South
Central Harlem (Labov, Cohen, Robins & Lewis I968: I, 57). Though group
sessions give us the basic standard by which we can calibrate our other work,
they do not usually provide us with enough linguistic data on each individual. It
is possible to feed back some of the same interactive mechanism to interviews
with one or two speakers, if the interviewers are members of the same com-
munity. There are great differences in the techniques available to insiders, in the
quality of interaction, and in the type of information obtained, as compared to
the best interviews done by outsiders. Insiders cut deeper; but at the same time,
they are more limited in the range of speakers they can deal with. Since they have
a fixed location within the community, many members cannot speak to them as
freely as they would to a stranger. Narratives told to insiders tend to be more
fragmentary, less well-formed than those told to outsiders. The outsider can be
seen as a blunt instrument, a useful tool for all kinds of rough work, while the
insider can penetrate more deeply in a narrower range. No serious study of a
speech community should be planned without including both kinds of invest-
igators from the outset.
The kind of long-term observation just described would be most important in
studies of the acquisition of language. No such studies have been carried out yet
with a natural play group as the focus; the family has been the only target of
attention. Within that matrix, there has been considerable progress in the kinds
of observations that have been made, with increasing attention paid to the
II5
Interviewer: Do you think there's a natural life span for people, or is it possible
there's a way for you to live longer and longer?
Henry Sr: [head of household, 59] Yep. They're gonna do that. They're provin'
that every day.
Mrs Henry: [55] [overlapping] They are livin' longer and longer. People are
livin' longer. And that's health, you know. Back then, I don't see how they
lived as long as they did . . . back - years ago.
Both husband and wife respond together with the same point of view. The
interviewer finds that he has touched a live issue in the family as he is cut off
and the conversation proceeds on its own momentum. All five family members
join in as the theme moves to the familiar issue of the old ways versus the
new.
II6
Until Bill entered the picture, sex was not the issue here. But Bill picks up
"woman" from Henry Sr and makes it the main point; his wife laughs at his
familiar stance. Mrs. Henry gives a straight answer, but when Bill keeps on
woman-baiting, she picks up a cue from her husband and carries the day with
a crushing reply.
This conversation then continued for another five minutes without any inter-
vention of the interviewer. Bill and Henry Sr engaged in a long argument on
which was harder work-using a sledge hammer in the old days, or using a
pneumatic hammer today. The family members put themselves on display,
showing us their immediate concerns, their mode of argument, their system of
values, and the grammatical structure of their everyday language.
As we move away from the individual interview, our data is less complete, but
closer to the language of everyday life. Another step in that direction can be
taken through RAPID AND ANONYMOUS OBSERVATIONS. Here we may know very
little about the speakers, but we can observe a great many of them, and the effect
of the interview situation is nil. The survey of (r) in New York City department
stores (Labov I966a: III) provides one such model, and others have been devel-
oped in work with the telephone, asking directions, or street corner observation.
More recently we have used such techniques to observe the use of Spanish on
Harlem streets and check the birth place of those who use the language there.
Such rapid and anonymous studies have built-in sources of error, but the error is
complementary with that of interviews. When the two kinds of data converge,
we have in effect partialled out the effect of experimental and observational error.
There remains a residual and almost insoluble problem - the rarity of many
grammatical forms. It will no doubt always be necessary to extend our observa-
tions with intuitions. Yet we are only beginning to learn how to enrich the data of
natural conversation by minimal intervention. When we fully understand the use
of a given grammatical form, we are then able to elicit it in conversation without
using it ourselves, and without seeming to do anything odd or artificial. This has
117
been done only for a small number of items, such as the prete
future, and present perfect, and relative clauses. In general, we can say that the
future study of language in context will depend heavily upon the development of
means of enriching the data of natural conversation.
CONVERGENCE
i i8
data for confirming and interpreting old data is directly proportional to the
differences in the methods used to gather it.
Despite the fact that we have a variety of methodological approaches, the
unity of linguistics is not hard to conceive. It is not necessary for everyone to use
the same methods - indeed, it is far better if we do not. Otherwise we would not
benefit from the complementary principle. The unification of linguistics must
necessarily proceed from the understanding of linguists that the field need not be
defined to fit their personal style, but can expand to a broad attack on the com-
plexity of the problem. Data from a variety of distinct sources and methods,
properly interpreted, can be used to converge on right answers to hard questions.
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