UNIT 6 ANCIENT INDIAN CONCEPT AND

NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
Structure
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Objectives
6.3 Materialism: Orthodox and Heterodox Philosophical Views of Knowledge
6.4 Pramana (Source of Knowledge - Nyaya)
6.4.1 Number of Pramana

6.5 Theory of Knowledge: Issues Raised

6.6 Concept and Nature of Knowledge - Gyana Yoga
6.6.1 Gyana Yoga
6.6.2 The Jain Theory of Judgement
6.6.3 Buddhist Theory of Causation
6.7 Common Features of the Ancient Theory of Knowledge and its Relevance and
Implications for Education
6.8 Pramanas and their Implications for Education
6.9 Let Us Sum Up
6.10 Unit-end Activities
6.1 1 Points for Discussion
6.1 2 Suggested Readings
6.13 Answers to Check Your Progress

6.1 INTRODUCTION
Philosophy is, in general, an interpretation of man and nature and its basis lies in the
analysis, assessment and exposition of the process of knowledge. The word for
philosophy in Sanskrit, viz., Darsanam, denotes that it is the science of 'thinking-
-
consideration' 'vicSraslstram'. Its contents are not mere speculation in regard to
the duttes of man or the varieties of life.
In India, there are six orthodox schools of philosophy which recognize the authority of
Vedas as divine revelation. Those who did not recognize this authority were the Jains,
Buddhists (heterodox) and materialists. The question of knowledge, its sources, validity
and their trueness were discussed by these different schools of philosophy in great
length. -
Epistemology as a branch of philosophy centers around questions like 'What is
knowledge?', 'What are the different sources of knowledge?', 'What is truth?',
'What is valid knowledge?', 'Is knowing different from knowledge?' and so on.
Many more questions of this kind that are related to knowledge have been addressed
by both orthodox and heterodox schools of philosophy.
There is much divergencepf opinion among Indian philosophers concerning the nature
and scope of Pramlna (source of knowledge). The number of Pramlnas also is a
topic on which wide differencesof view exist among the schools. Most Indian Logicians,
however, agree to accept three of them -perception (Pratyaksa), inference (Anumlna)
and verbal testimony (Sabda) among the six pramhas. We shall discuss them in
sequel: the epistemological considerations of materialists, orthodox and heterodox
schools of philosophy and the validity of knowledge according to each school and their
educational implications.
 Ancient lndian Concept and
6.2 OBJECTIVES Nature of Knowledge

I After going through this unit, you should be able to:

I
explain different Pramanas;
differentiate between the theories of knowledge of orthodox and heterodox schools
, of philosophy;
cxplain the interpretations of anumiina by different schools;
I
I iclentify the valid source of knowledge;

I relate the theory of causat~onto theory of momentanness;

\tat? the"I lm~tationsof theory of knowledge propounded by chiirvaka school of
philosophy;
explain Syadviida as the theory ot judgement; and
draw imp1ications to education from different theories and sources of,knowledge.

6 . 3 MATERIALISM: ORTHODOX AND

HETERODOX PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS CF
KNOWLEDGE
Two main areas of discussion about epistemology existed in the Classical and Medieval
periods. 'The schools differed over the number of Pramanas, sources or bases of
knowledge in spite of their contributions to a great extent to Indian Epistemology.
Indian Philosophy divides itself into three periods ( I ) the Vedic period, (2) the
Upanishadic period and (3) the post-Vedic period. The post-Vedic period is a systematic
period which saw the development of the so-called orthodox systems. Of the systems
of thought or darsanas, six became more famous than others, viz. Gautama's Nyaya,
Kinada's Vaisksika, Kapila's Siimkhya, Patinjali's Yoga, Jamini's Mrva Mimamsa
and Badarayana's Uttara Mimimsa or the Vedanta. They are the Brahmanical systems,
since they all accept the authority of the Vedas. These schools valued the spiritual
experience as great when compared to intellectual reason. Those who did not recognize
the Vedas were the Jains, Buddhists and Materialists.
The epistemological views of these different schools are discussed under separate
sectio~isin this module.

Ch8rvGka Materialist School's Views of Knowledge

Even in India, where spiritual ideas dominate the culture, there were some who were
skeptical of those ideals and held to a materialist view of the world, they were called
Chrirviika, and their doctrine that this world is all that exists is called Lokayata.
The materialists did not believe in an after life and found sense perception to be the
only source of knowledge, denying the validity of inference or general concepts. They
focused on the senses and the four traditional elements of earth, water, fire and air.
Consciousness for the Charvaka is only a modification of these elements in the body.
The epistemological doctrine of the Chirvska school (materialism) is that perception
(Pratyaksa) is the only means of valid knowledge. The validity of inference is also
rejected. Inference is said to be a mere leap in the dark. According to this School,
we proceed here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this,
though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true. Induction is uncertain,
and deduction is argument in a circle. The crude ChLvska position in this regard has
been vehemently'criticized by all systems of lndian philosophy all of which have
maintained the validity of at least perception and inference.
31
Knowledge in Education Orthodox Views of Knowledge
The Nylyi and Vaishesika schools are primarily analytic and are therefore, more
concerned with logic and epistemology than ethics.
a) The Nylyii School: It was formed about the 4h Century B.C. with the Nyaya
Sutras by Gautama. According to this school, knowledge comes from perception,
inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Objects of learning are self, body, sense
organs, sense objects, intellect, mind and activity.
The Nyiiyl system of Philosophy is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism.
It is allied to the Vaishessika systems, which developed metaphysics and ontology.
The Nyiiyii Philosophy was developed by the orthodox Indian thinkers to invent a
science of knowledge (Prami5nBsiistra) sufficiently effective to fortify their arguments
against unorthodox opponents. Consequently,the Naiylyikas have gone in the history
of Indian thought as highly original epistemologists and logicians. It is seen that the
NySyl system has explored remarkably the domain of cognitive consciousness and
determined the process by which it enters into a connection with the world of physical
objects.
Nyiiyii mentions four sources or Pramhas of knowledge: Perception (Pratyaksa),
inference (Anumha), comparison (Upamiina) and the Vedic word ((Eabda). Nyiiyi
argues that the outside world is known to us through the senses and the mind. It
believes in the external things as reflecting their real nature when knowledge is true,
and their unreal nature when knowledge is false. consequently, for the Naiyiiyikas,
knowledge is the knowledge of things, and it constitutes the expression of reaiity
(arthhubhava). Whatever its type, it is a natural response to the disposition present in
human mind.
b) The Vaishesika philosophy: It is considered to be the oldest of the six orthodox
schools. The Vaishesika sutras by Kannada were written shortly before Gautama's
Nylya Sutras. The word Vishesa meansparticularity, and this philosophy emphasizes
the significance of individuals. It recognizes three objects of experience as having real
objective existence, namely substance, quality and activity, and three products of
intellectual discrimination, which are generality, particularity and combination. Like
the Nyaya School, this School also acknowledges perception, inference, comparison
and verbal testimony as the valid sources of knowledge.
' c) M i m k i i
Let us now consider the nature of knowledge according to Mimiimsii. The word
Mimiimsii literally means 'revered thought' and was originally applied to the
interpretation of the Vedic rituals, which commanded highest reverence. The Mimamsa
philosophy is also very ancient, and the M i m h s a Sutra by Jamini was written about
the 4h century B.C. According to this School, a cognition, which apprehends an object,
cannot be intrinsically invalid. Memory arises froM the impression of a priori cognition
and therefore, cannot be treated as valid knowledge.
Kum2rila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an ob ct which is produced by
causes free from defects and which is nor ,ontradicted by subsequent knowledge. A
valid cognition must fulfill four conditions
1. It must not arise from defective cau3- s (khnadosarihita).
2. It must be free from contradiction. It must be self-consistent and should not be
set. ide by subsequent knowledge (biidhakajnlna - nhita).
3. It n st a~prehendan object which has not already been apprehended. Novelty
is a :ss%:ntialfeature of knowledge (agrhitagrahi). Memory is exclude< from
vali at.vledge.
4. It n st f illy represent the object (yathwha).
32
The Minlflnsa upholds a theory that all knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated Anctent Indian Concept and
Nature of Knowledge
by any other knowledge. Validity of knowledge arises from theessential nature of the
causes uf knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions.
A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be valid. And its invalidity
i h inferred either from some defect in the instrument of knowledge or from a subsequent
contri~dictingknowledge. If a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope
snake is invalidated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity
of knowledge is inrtrred, yet knowledge itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. Its
validity i\ not subjwt to inference. Truth is normal; error is abnormal. Belief is
natural ;dlsbel ief is an exception. The Mimfimsii advocatesthe self-validity of knowledge
both In respect of its origin (Utpatti) and ascertainment (jnapti).
According to Badrayana, (Uttara Mimiimsa and Vedanta)'knowledge comes from the
scriptures (SI-uti)and other authorities (Smriti) though Sruti as revelation is identified
with perception and Smriti as interpretation with inference. Scripture refers to the
Vedas and Smriti to the Bhagavad Gita, Mahabharata and Laws of Manu. Reaspn,
for Badarayana, must confirm to the Vedas, but it is nonethelep~uoordinateto intuitive
knowledge, which can come from devotir- ?nd veditafion. According to SSmkya,
both the validity (Pramfinya) and the invaiidity (Apriimhyii) of knowledge are self-
evident. According to NyfiyCVaishesika,both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge
are due to extraneous conditions. According to MimPmsfi, knowledge is intrinsically
valid, though its invalidity is due to extraneous cqnditions. The Sbrnkhya-yoga School
maintains that both validity and invalidity are alike intrinsic to knowledge and this
predicates opposite characters of it. It bases this view upon the postulate viz. that
whatever manifests itself at any time has all along been latent there.

Heterodox School's Views of Knowledge

Jai n~smand Buddhism are considered as heterodox schools of philosophy as they did
not recognize the authority of Vedas as the orthodox system of philosophy.
Jainism classifies knowledge into immediate (Aparoksa) and mediate (Paroksa).
Immediate knowledge is further divided into Avadhi, Manahparyiiya and Kevala; and
mediate k~iowledgeinto Mati and Shruta. Knowledge may again be divided into two
kinds - PramBna or knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or knowledge of a thing in
its relcition. Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement
about a thing. All truth is relative to our standpoint. Partial knowledge of one of the
innumerable aspects of a thing is called 'naya'. There are seven 'nayas' of which
first four are called 'Artha-naya', because they relate to objects or meanings and the
last three are called 'shabda-naya' because they relate to words. When taken as
absolute, a 'naya' becomes a fallacy - nayiibhiisa.
Some of the most forceful critics of the epistemologists of the Nyiyii and M i m b s b
schools figured between the 4Ihand 9'" Century A D in the Buddhist sect of Svantra
- Vijnrinavidins. The Buddhist idealists (Vijnhavildine) used various arguments to
show that perception does not yield knowledge of external objects distinct from the

a) First, the experience of a dataum and the datum itself occur simultaneously, but
two supposedly different events occurring simultaneously cannot be distinguished
and should be treated as identical.
b) Second, the external world supposedly consists of a number of different objects,
but they can be known as different only because there are different sorts of
experiences of them. Yet if the experiences are thus distinguishable, there is no
need to hold the superfluous hypothesis of extemal objects.
c) Third, sense organs supposedly mediate between external objects and
consciousness. For example, sensory experienceduring dreams, where it is feasible
33
Knowledge in Education to explain the existence of sensations as due to the inner workings of
consciousness. The absolute evolves itself in a way, which makes individuals
think that there is an external world. Through the debates they carried on with
the realist Naiylyikas and Mimlmsikas, the Svatantra - Vijnlnavldins have
tried to prove that both knowledge by perception and knowledge by inference
reflect only 'moments' of existence, i.e. something eternally moving, something
so fleeting that it is as if buoyed on an infinite expanse of nothingness. According
to this School, no thing or idea can be and yet not-be in consciousness; nothing
can exist and yet be not known. Material things are therefore, constellations oS
sensations, ideas or impressions, emerging as 'moments' of experience like points
along the stream of some amorphous stuff. And just as things are along a flow,
the cons\ciousness that perceives them is in a flow too. The issues like, "If
nothing in the field of ow experience is really permanent or self-identical, how
could we &fine an object," " Where does an object exist?" were addressed in
this School.
Suth questions were of great significance to the Vijnhaviidin. According to them,
when an object is perceived or an impression is thought of, consciousness projects
itself in the form of something positively ."there outside".
The subjectivist theories of the Vijninavidins and of the Svatantra - vyn5navlda,
therefore, that all things are mental constructions, indicate the quest for inward
concentration in Buddhism. The theory states that consciousness constructs the world
and is deceived by the construction that it falls into a realm of fantasy and believes it
to be truly "there" and what is Svachitta or "of one's own mind" is mistaken for being
external to the mind. It is auniversal deception, a mlyi (illusion). And as long asshis
deception keeps the consciousness in bondage, no freedom is possible.
On the whole, it is seen that Buddhism admits perception and inference as the valid
source of knowledge. While Nylya affirms invariable concomitance between two
things in inference (where there is smoke, there is fire), Buddhism pleads for causal
relationship between two things. According to Nyiiya, we can argue from effects to
cause but Buddhism, admitting this, emphasizes that we can also argue from 'things' .

to 'things signified'.
So we see there is much of divergence of opinion among Indian thinkers relating to the
nature of knowledge and the sources of knowledge.

Check Your Progress

Notes: a) Write your answers in the space given below.
b) Compare your answers with the one given at the end of the unit.
1. What is the basic difference between the orthodox and the heterodox
philosophical views ofknowledge?
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2. What are the six orthodox systems of thought?
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 Ancient Indian Concept and
I . What is the difference between Nyaya and Buddhism with regard to inference Nature of Knowl edge
as a sourcq of knowledge?

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The sources of knowledge recognized by heterodox and orthodox schools are discussed
in the following section.

6.4 PRAMANA (SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE-NYAYA)

Pramana is defined as a source or means of valid apprehension (Prams). There are
four different forms of valid apprehension (yathktha anubhava), namely - perception,
inference, analogy and verbal testimony. Vstsylyana defines a Pramsna as a source
or means of valid knowledge. According to the Nyaya School, a causal relation is
discerned and ascertained between Praml and pramlna on the basis of uniform
agreement in presence and absence between the two. The former cannot arise without
the latter and hence it is maintained that the latter is the source or cause of the former.
he general definition of p r a m h a is suggested by the etymological meaning of the
word itself. The word is derived by adding the suffix 'lyut' in the instrumental (karan2)
to the root 'mil' with the prefix 'pra'. The root 'm2' with the prefix 'pra' means to

Vplid knowledge (Prama) is of two kinds - anubhava (presentative and smriti

\representative or remembrance). The latter is the reproduction of a past perception.
It'is produced by the revival of an impression of an object previously known, and
hqnce the instrument of remembrance cannot be accepted as an independent P r a m h a
- If is a form of invalid knowledge.
~ ~ u b h a or
v apresentative knowledge is divided into Yathsrtha or real or Ayathiirtha
or'unreal. Of the two, the former is sound or valid (praml) &, it exactly corresponds to
the ob.ject really or it cognizes an attribute as belonging to an object which it really has.
~ u b ha valid form of knowledge needs a P r a d n a or an instrument. Thus the knower
(pq~rn3titb)and the object known (prameya), too, are causes of valid knowledge (pram@.
These are not considered as pramilna, because these are not instruments or the most
efficacious ones of the causes of valid knowledge. According to the Nylya school,
there 'he four forms of such valid knowledge, namely - Pratyaksa (perception),
Anumrina (inference), Upamlna (knowledge derived through similarity) and Sabda
(verbal testimony).
The Nyiiya school defines pramha as karana the instrument of valid knowledge.
What is an instrument and how it is constituted? As stated already, a karana is distinct
from Kiirana. A karana is a cause, but any and every kdrana is not karana or instrument.
Only the most efficacious (ssdhakatama) of all the causes is called karana or an
instrument A cause, according to the Ny5ya school, is an invariable, immediate and
indispensable antecedent of an effect.
Valid knowledge, according to Nyriya, is a definite and assured cognitionof an object.
Doubt (samsaya), on the other hand, is thecognition ofconflicting notions with regard
the same
It arises when with regard to some perceived object; there is the
some conflicting alternatives, e.g., post and man, It is an incomplete or
Indecisive ~tarrests all activities foi moment.
Knowledgu in Education
6.4.1 Number of Pramha
The different schools of Indian philosophy are not unanimous on the number of means
of knowledge. The C h h & a School recognizes only one source of knowledge, viz.
perception (pratyaksa). The Buddhist school recognizes two sources viz. perception
and inference (anumiina). The Siimkhya School recognizes three sources, viz.
perception, inference and verbal testimony (sabda). The Nybya School recognizes
four, viz. perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy (upambna). The
PrabhSkara School of Mimdmsl recognizes five, viz. the above four and presumption
(arthspani). The Bhatta School of m i m h s a recognizes six, viz. the above five and
non-existence (anupalabdhi). The Pauriinikas recognizes these six sources and in
addition, recognize necessary inclusion (Sambhava) and traditional hearsay (Aitihya)
as the seventh and the eighth pramlnas.
The leading exponents of Indian Philosophy are unanimous on discarding the last two,
sambhava and aitihya. Sambhava, according to majority opinion, which enables one
to be sure of fifty when hundred are guaranteed, is nothing more than an immediate
inference. Aitihya, which consists of traditional hearsays like a spirit dwells in this
banyan tree, is no pramha at all until it is verified and when verified, it comes under
verbal testimony. The Naiyiiyikas firmly hold that there are four kinds of object of
knowledge that are known by four distinct sources. Other sources of knowledge
accepted by the Mimiimsii schools are either included in these four or are redundant.

i) Pratyaksa (Perception)
The word 'aksa' in Pratyaksa means the sense-organ and the word 'prati' means
each of all the sense organs and as such the word means the function of each of the
sense-organs in respect of its appropriate object. In view of its etymological meaning;
the old school of the Nyiiya defines perception in terms of sense object contact.
Perception is a valid form of knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a
sense organ. This means that perception is conditioned in its origin by the operation of
the senses. In other words, the knowledge arises by contact of sense organs (indriya)
with an object. Such contact is not the sole condition of perception, but it is its distinctive
feature or extraordinary cause (karana) of perception. The actual process involved in
perception is described thus : Theself comes into contact with mind (manas); the
manas with the senses and the senses with the object. The function of a sense organ
in respect to its own object is described in two ways.
According to Vitsybyana, the senses may function to bring about a contact of itself
with the object. Here the function is of the nature of contact, which brings about the
cognition of the object. Secondly, the function may be of the nature of knowledge.
Here the function consists in sense-cognition, which results in a judgement of the
cognized object as desirable or undesirable or neither. But the function of the sense,
either of the nature of contact or knowledge, is conditioned by sense-object contact.
Hence the latter is called the instrumental cause of perception, as it immediately gives
rise to the perceptual knowledge of that particular object. Taking sense-object contact
to be an instrument of perception, Gautama defines it as follows: "It is a valid cognition
which arises through sense-organ coming into relation with object and which is non-
verbal, unerring and of the nature of indubious knowledge".
The modem school of Nyiiyagives a new definition of perception. Visvaniitha defines
it as: Direct or immediate cognition that is not derived through the instrumentality of
any other cognition. Perception, according to modem school, is characterized by
immediacy (siiksatkiiritvam)which is common to all perceptions. It applies to all cases
of perception, human or divine. All human perceptions are characterized by immediacy
alike. Even God's omniscience has the highest degree of immediacy conceivable.
Therefore, according to the modem school, it is direct or immediate knowledge, not
derived through hemedium of some other knowledge. It excludes inference. which
is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of universal relation. It Ancient Indian Concept and
Nature of Knowledge
excludes analogy, which is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of
similarity. verbal testimony that is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge
of words. It also excludes memory, which is produced through the instrumentality of
previous apprehension.
ii) Anumana (Inference- Nyilyil)
Etymologically the word 'Anumana' indicates after knowledge (anu - after, mbna -
knowledge) and it follows perception. Gautama defines it as a specific form of
knowledge preceded by perception. The perception of the invariable relation between
the proban ( linga) and the probandum (lingi) is a previous perception of such a relation
somewhere else. Again, there is a perception of the proban as invariably related to
probandum as it exists in the locus. Inference is defined as the knowledge of an
ob-ject(lingi) due to a previous knowledge of some sign or mark (linga). The process
of inference is explained as follows : A man first perceives smokexlinga) as invarably
related to fire in a place like the kitchen. This is the first perception of the proban.
Such a perception results in the reminiscent impression that smoke is pervaded by
fire. Later on, the man perceives similar smoke in some other place like a hill. The
second perception of the mark revives the reminiscent impression leading to the
recollection that smoke is "preceded?'by fire. The recollection in turn, is followed by
a further perception of smoke not simply as smoke but as the smoke, which is invariably
related to fire and exists in the hill. This is the last and the third perception of the
mark. This is followed immediately by the inferential knowledge of fire. The third
perception of the mark is the immediate cause (karana) of inference and is therefore,
called the instrument (anumbna - pramha).
Constituents of Inference: From the definition of inference, it follows that there
must not be less than three terms in any inference. There are Paksa (hill), SPdhya
(lingf) and the Linga (hetu) which correspond respectively to the minor, the major and
the middle terms in western syllogism.
The Paksa (locus) - It is the subject under consideration or the substratum possessing
the SIdhya (probandum) and the linga (proban). For instance, the hill is the paksa in
which smoke is perceived and fire is inferred.
The Sildhya (probandurn) - It is the object of inference or that which we want to
prove by means of inference. It is also called 'Gamya' because it is known with the
help of 'Gamaka' (mark) or Lingin (possessor of linga). The Linga (mark) - It is the
reason of inference. It is also called 'Gamaka' because it is the indicator or hetu
because it serves as mark or Ssdhani because it the means of proving something
(Characteristics of valid reason).
iii) Sabda (VerLl Testimony - Nyiiyf)
Sabda literally 1 ns verbal knowledge because by it, the meaning is verbally
communicated. It sists in the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences.
Words or sentenc onstitute verbal statements. However, all verbal statements are
not valid. Hence autama defines Sabda Pramba as the statement of a reliable
person. In other words, verbal testimony is the communication from a trustworthy
person. Who is the trustworthy person (Apta) and why is assertion (upadesa) is a
testimony (prambna)? 'Apti9 is the one who possesses it. An Apta or a trustworthy
person is the *%kerwho has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by
the desire of . micating the object as directly known by him. Hence a verbal
statement is va hen it comes from a trustworthy person who knows the truth and
!L

speaks the truth out anything for the guidance of others. In other words, the validity
of-verbal staten ~ t is
s based on the reliability of a person making a statement. But
the possibility o rbal testimony depends on understanding the meaning of a statement.
Unless the me11 2 of a valid statement is properly understood, there cannot be a true 37
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Kn~twledgein Education
comprehension of the object meant. Therefore, Sabda as a prambna consists in
understanding the meaning of the sentences or the assertion made by the reliable
person. Analysing the process ofiverbal testimony we get the following steps:
First, there is the perception of the words of a sentence uttered by the trusfworthy
person. Second, there is the understanding of the meaning of words. This is called
the Karana or the special cause of the verbal knowledge. The knowledge of words
(padajnbna) leads to the knowledge of objects through the function (vyapaa) of recalling
the meaning of words.
There are two ways in which all verbal knowledge has been classified according to
the Nybya school. According to Gautama and Vbtsybyana, verbal knowledge is of
two kinds, viz. 'Drsththa' or one relating to perceptible objects and 'Adrstbrtha'or
that relating to imperceptible objects. The former is limited to the sensible object
attainable in this world while the latter relates to super-sensible object, which is attainable
to the other world. This is the division of words of the ordinary persons and the seers.
According to later logicians, there are two kinds of verbal testimony viz. Vaidika or the
scriptural and Laukika or the secular. The former relates to the words of God. The
Vedas are created by God ~ n dtherefore, valid perfectly. The latter relates to the
words of trustworthy persops and may, therefore, be true or false. In other words,
scriptural testimony is the statement of the Vedas while secular testimony is the
statement of human beings.

Upamana (Comparison)
UpamBna or Comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name.and thing
so named on the basis of given description of their similarity to some familiar object.
For example, when we tell a city man that a wild cow is an animal like a cow and later
on, in a forest, when he sees a wild cow he recognizes it as the wild cow. Then his
knowledge of the wild cow is the outcome of conjunction with the knowledge of the
cow. Hence the upambna is just the knowledge of the relation between a name (here
it is the wild cow and the object denoted by that name (the actual wild cow seen in the
forest).
iv) Arthapatti (Presumption - M i m h s a )
It is an independent source of knowledge according to K u M l a Bhatta and Prabhbkara.
Both admit it as a distinct pramdna which cannot be brought under anumlna or sabda.
It consists in the assumption of some unperceived fact in order to explain apparently
inconsistent facts. The stock example of presumption is set forth thus: Devadatta is
alive and he is not present in his house, we presume that he is elsewhere. The essential
element in presumption is that a certain fact like Devadatta's 'being alive' and 'not
being present in his house' is unaccountable without presuming another fact like being
outside his house. In presumption, we proceed from the knowledge of something to
*
be explained to the knowledge of that which explains it. The means of presumption
(karana) is the knowledge of the inner contradiction (anupatti) and its result is the
reconciliation of the contradiction (upapatti). If Devadatta is fat and he does not eat
during day, we presume that he must be eating during night, otherwise the inconsistency
between 'being fat' and 'not eating during day' cannot be resolved.
V) Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension - Mimlmsa)
According to Kumdrila Bhatta and others, non-apprehension is the sixth independent
source of knowledge. It consists in the presentative knowledge of negative facts. In
other words, negative facts are cognized by a special instrument (karana) called non-
apprehension. Only positive facts are apprehended through positive sources like
perception, inference, etc! but negative fact* are apprehended through non-
apprehension i.e., the abse~ceof the jar on the ground is apprehended through
anupalabdhi.
38
Kumririla argues that the concept of the emptiness of the container inevitably Ancient Indian Concept and
Nature of Knowledge
presupposes non-existence. He also refutes the Ny2ya view that non-apprehension is
the same as perception or inference. Negation is never perceived, for there is no
sense-object contact in it. Our senses function only in the cognition of the ground, but
we do not perceive the non-existence of the jar. It is also not reasonable to hold that
the absence of the jar is a qualification and the ground is the qualified object. It is not
possible to perceive the qualified object without perceiving the qualification. Negation
cannot be inferred also for the invariable relation is not known there. Hence Kumiirila
concludes that non-existence is a distinct category which is cognized by non-
apprehension only.

Check Your Progress

Notes: a) Write your answers in the space given below.
b) Compare your answers with the one given at the end of the unit.
4. What are the sources of knowledge according.to Indian philosophy?
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5. Difference between Vaidika and Laukika verbal testimony.
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6. What does Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension)emphasize?
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6.5 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: ISSUES RAISED - - - - - ----

Indian philosophy had its start in an inquiry about the nature of man himself, and the
nature of universe is known only as part of the understanding of man's own nature.
The question of knowledge cannot be dissociated from the way of knowing. What is
wanted is not mere knowing, but correct knowing, and there arises the need for a test
of the knowledge whether it is correct or false. As we have seen in the preceding
sections, there have been various schools of thought in India that have held different
views about the ways of knowing and the tests for the correctness of the knowledge.
In this section, some of the issues raised regarding the theories of knowledge by
different schools are discussed.
As .we have seen in the preceding sections, Chbrvfika's theory of knowledge is a
thorough-going positivism, wherein the reality of whatever we perceive is accepted
and those that cannot be perceived is rejected,perception as the only source of valid
knowledge is accepted and the validity of inference is rejected.
Knc~rvletlgein Education According to Chkiikas, the major premise of an inference cannot be proved and so
its validity cannot be accepted. Some of the questions raised regarding the classical
example of inference are as follows:
a) How can we formulate the major premise unless we have seen all the instances
of smoke? If we have not examined all the instances, how can we be logically
justifiable in using the word "wherever"?
b) If we have seen all the cases in which smoke and fire are present together, we
must have seen the present case, viz. the mountain also. Then what is the use of
making an infwence of fire from smoke when we have already perceived the
fire in the mountain?
C) Inference is made possible by universal relation (vylpti) obtaining between two
facts or events.
d) The principle of causation is rejected, because it is not supported by sense
perception.
(i) The Chlrvfikl challenges the universal and invariable relation, as it is a
mere guess work and lacks certitude. The universal relation hvolves infinite
regress. Neither verbal testimony nor compassion are capable of establishing
universal relation.
(ii) The uniformities of experiences is also rejected. (For example, Is not fire
hot always? Is not ice cold always?) Uniformities in nature prove the
universal relationship between two things. They say that it is due to inherent
nature or Svabhlva of things that they possess certain characteristics.
(iii) According to C h k i i k k , verbal testimony consists of spoken words dhich
are heard through our ears. Since words suggest or mean things, but actually
do not give us direct apprehension of the objects, they are not frek from
error.
Like the C h b m s , the Buddhists also took up a position that the only way of correct
knowing is through perception. They accepted natural deductions from direct
perception also as a way of correct knowing like Charviikls. But they differentiated
between direct perception and inference as two distinct modes of knowing. The
difference is, when some invariable concomitance is established between two events
by direct perception, and then through such concomitance, we can infer the presence
of one of them when the other is present. But Buddhism restricted the possibilities of
such concomitance to the relation of cause and effect and the relation of the general
and the particular. Thus if there is fire, we can infer that there is heat and when there
is heat, we can infer that there is fire. There can be no establishment of such a
concomitance between two events, one of which is absolutely outside the sphere of
direct perception and as such they do not recognize things that can only be inferred,
they do recognize any other mode of knowing also. For this reason, like the Chbiiki.s,
they reject things like an enduring soul and the efficacy of rituals that bring about
happiness in another world.
The C h h 4 k l s and Buddhists were confined in their thought to the category of pormal
perception and inference. Things falling absolutely outside the sphere of such normal
experience had no bearing on the thoughts of Buddhists and Chirviikls. It is here that
there is a real differencebetween the Vedic and the Buddhist thoughts. Direct perception
of the normal type found a place in both and reason of a particular group also found a
place in both. But in the Vedic thought there was reason of another group and also
direct experience of a super-normal nature.
The Nyiya and the Mimamsa schools differed in their thoughts about inference.
Considering Inference (anumina) as the source of knowledge, the classical example
cited in the preceding section is taken here for a discussion.

40 "There is fire on the hill because there is smoke on it".

Smoke is 'hetu' or 'Iinga'; the assertion that has been made (the hill in this example) Ancient Indian Concept and
Nature o f Knowledge
is called paksa and the term fire is called 'Sadhya'. The Nyiiya school holds that
inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the linga or hetu
with sadhya and not because of specific conditions (essential identity, cause and effect).
For example, if it is held that the inference that 'it is a tree' because it is a pine is due
to the essential identity (tiid2tmya) of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it
is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity
ibought to be the same bothways. The argument from tadut path (association as cause
and effect) is also due to invariable association as cause and effect for it explains the
case of inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference,
where the association as cause and effect is not available (eg. from sunset the use of
stars is inferred). Wow the question arises that since the validity of an inference will
depend namely on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetu) with the signate
(~lidyi~).how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining
the concomitance had been correct and the observation of concomitance had been
valid.
The MimBmsa school held that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which
there was smoke but no fire, and if in all cases smoke was perceived when there
was fire. one can enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyiiya holds
that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is
necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke.
Among-theintellectual processes employed for the establishment of truth, the formal
infersnce that has been described in the proceeding paragraphs deserves the prominent
posittion. Every theory has to be tested by the rules framed within the scope of this
process. But this process does not exhaust the field for the play of the intellect in its
quest for t~uth.There are other modes of knowing things deduced from a knowledge
already derived. The essential nature of a forhal inference is that there must be
universal relation through whose medium such deductions are made. But there are
other processes where some schools do not accept the medium of such a universal
and they are brought under other forms of general inference bearing other names.
What is wanted is that any theory must be based on observed facts, mbst not go
against facts and must conform to some patterns of reasoning.
The most important process that comes within the pattern is what is called
' (Artl7apaths). The Nyiiya - Vaisesika school tries to bring this process
'p'u~s~inlption
also under the pattern of a formal inference with a universal included in it. But in the
Mimlirnsika school, this is recognized as a distinct and independent process. It brings
a large number of cases within our day-to-day experience within this pattern of the
process of valid knowledge. One of the examples as cited under source of
knowledge is
I. A particular person does not eat by day and is found to continue fat; therefore,
he eats at night.
2. A particular person known to be alive, is not in this house; therefore, he is outside.
Here is a process of knowing that is peculiar in nature. It is not a syllogistic inference
with its 'universal'. There is no verbal statement either. Still there is knowledge. This
is what is technically called presumption (Arthapathi) in Indian logic. We do not
always think in terms of syllogistic logic. We think in general terms, but general ideas
must rest on some particular and when the particular is sublated, the general preposition
cannot stand, for want of a particular to rest on. Therefore, another particular is
presumed, to afford the general idea some resting place.
A statement like "there is no jar here," means either that there is something other than
a jar here or that the jar is elsewhere. Without one or the other of these two alternatives,
a purely negative idea is impossible. Here the process of presumption starts. When
one finds that the man whom he was looking for is not at home, there is other possibility
Knowledge in Education that he may be dead. As a matter of fact, Prabhlkara, the founder of one of the two
schools of Mimlmsa, accepts such a stage in the process of 'presumption'. He says
that the proposition of the man being outside is resorted to avoid the doubt regarding
the other alternative of his being dead. But Kumlrila, the founder of Mimiimsa, does
not accept this stage. According to MimPmsa, propositibn is resorted to avoid the
impossible stage of the mind having a negation as its object. They ask whether, when
a valuable property is lost, the owner may resort to such a proposition and entertain
I
the consolation that the property may be elsewhere.
Analogy (upamcina) is another process, which is recognized by all. But there is a
difference of opinion whether it should be recognized as a distinct process or whether
it may be brought under formal inference. There is also a difference of opinion regarding
the final result of this process. Considering the example of a man hearing the name of
a wild cow (refer to source of knowledge), the process is not mere perception. If he
had seen the a wild bull, without knowing that wild bull is just like a bull, he would not
have known that animal is the wild bull. When he simply heard that the wild bull
resembles an ordinary bull, then also he did not know what a wild bull is. This is the
position taken up in the Nylya-Vaisesika system. There is a slight difference in the
point of view of Mimiimsa. When a man hears the statement that a wild bull is like a
bull, he understands that the similarity of a bull exists in a wild bull. When he sees the
wild bull later, he understands the similarity of a wild bull as existing in the bull, which
he had seen in the village. At the time of seeing the wild bull, he was not seeing the
same bull, which is in the village. So the knowledge of the existence of the similarity of
the wild bull in the bull cannot be perception, since the bull is not in sight.
The Naiyiylkas are thorough realists and they do not regard the observation of similkity
as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by
the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception
of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is called upamina.
Regarding the Sabdapnunrina or testimony, it is considered that all knowledge derived
from Vedas is valid, for the Vedas gave us right knowledge not of itself but they came
out as the utterances of the infallible Isyara. The Vaisesikas did not admit Sabda as a
separate Prambna, but they sought to establish the validity of testimony (Sabda) on
the strength of inference on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person.
What is called 'Authority' is not a special feature of any particular system of thought,
either in religion or in philosophy in India. Organized social life demands the recognition
of the three modes of knowing, the modes of direct experience, reasoning and authority.
All logical thinking also demands the three-fold approach to the problem included
within philosophy. when it is generally stated that the,Charv&ls recognized only
direct experienc,e,Buddhism included reason within the schemes of modes of knowing,
the Vedic schools accept 'Authority' within the scheme of knowing. Direct experience
and reasoning fall within one's own authority, while what is called 'Authority' is the
authority of another person's experience. This experience of another is communicated
through the medium of language. In the Mimiimsa system it is definitely said that the
subject matter of the system, namely, Dharma, is what can be known only from
scriptural injunction. In the Vedanta also, it is said that the understanding of Brahman,
the subject matter of the system has scripture as its source. What is meant by
'Authority' on which the two systems depend for a treatment of the subject matter?
The authority may be a set of texts known as the Vedas, or the authority may be a
distinct mode of knowing certain realities in the world. The Mimfimsa and the Vedhta
lose their claim as philosophy if it is the second alternative,they become super-rationalistic
philosophy. In both there is a 'desire to know' what is identical with philosophy.
Regarding the Pramfina, 'Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) the Naiyiyikas like
Kumirila admit that abh2va is adistinct category, but do not believe in non-apprehension
as an independent source. According to them, negative facts are known either by
 perception or by inferences as the correlate of negation is a subject of perception or Ancient Indlad Concept and
Nature of Knowledge
inference. In negative judgements such as "there is no jar on the ground", the ground
as well as the negation of the presence of the jar are cognized. According to Vaisesika,
negation is real, but is not re-cognized by a distinct source. It is cognized by inference.
According to them, abhdva gives us the knowledge of such objects, which should
have been perceived, if they existed. Abhdva is the non-perception of the object under
special circumstance called 'yogayanupalabdhi'. In short, the knowledge of abhdva
arises from the non-perception of the apprehensible. Prabhikara does not admit abhiiva
as an Independent category. He contents that the basis of negative proposition is the
mere container, and 'there is no jar on the ground' refers to the empty floor. It is only
a description of the form of cognition underlying negative statements and that abhdva
is the cognition of the container. Kumarila refutes the above by saying negation cannot
be inferred, for the invariable relation is not known here. Philosophically this process
has little importance. It plays a very subordinate part in our day-to-day experiences
too. It is dealt, within philosophy, only as a fact in the process of knowing and not on
.account of its importance. The case is quite different with 'presumption' which has as
much importance in philosophy as inference itself, if not a greater importance. He
concludes saying that non-existence is a distinct category, which is cognized by non-
apprehension only.
The above issues raised regarding the source and theory of knowledge in different
ph~losophicalsystems show us how knowledge has been given importance in our
Indian Philosophy. The Nyiya and the Vaisesika realism, and the heterodox schools
of subjective idealism have been engaged constantly in the examination of knowledge.

6.6 CONCEPT AND NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE -

GYANA YOGA
In this section, the concept and some of the major features of the nature of knowledge
accord~ngto Gyana Yoga is discussed.

6.6.1 Gyana Yoga

This system of philosophy was founded by Patanjali, which shows the practical path
leading to Viveka-.jnana of the Simkhya. The Yoga SOtra of Patanjali is the oldest
textbook bf the yoga school. It has four parts, of which the first explains the nature
and aim of Salnidhi, or meditative absorption; the second explains the means of attaining
this end. the third gives an account of the supernormal powers that can be attained
through the yoga practices, and the fourth sets forth the nature of liberation. Patanjali
systematized the conception of the yoga and set them forth on the background of the
. metaphysics of the Simkhya. In the early works, the yoga principles appear along
with the Siimkhya ideas. Yoga is intimately allied to Simkya. The Gita calls them
one. Yoga means spiritual action and Sdmkya means knowledge; Sdrnkya is theory;
yoga is practice.

Theory of Knowledge (Chitta)

This school lays emphasis on the practice of yoga as a means to the attainment of
Vivekijnrina (the doorway to liberation). Patanjali describes yoga as,
"Yogaschittavrttinirodhah". It means the stoppage of the modifications of chitta. Chitta
includes buddhi, ahamkh-a and manas. Chitta itself is unconscious but it has the
power to reflect the Purusa and therefore, appears as if it is conscious. This reflection
of Purusa in Chitta is the empirical self. Purusa is essentially pure consciousness.
When it wrongly identifies itself with its reflection in the Chitta it appears to be
undergoing change and modifications. The cessations of this modification lead to the
realization of the true nature of Purusa. The yoga system holds that the cessation of
43
Knc~wleduei n Education modifications of Chitta can be attained through meditation or concentration, which is
a1so called yoga.
When through yoga and Viveka-Jnina the Purusa in us realizes that it is completely
separate from and is only a witness of the Prakriti, then Purusa steps into identify
itself with its reflection in the Chitta. Thus, the light of consciousness of Purusa'is
withdrawn from the Chitta when all modifications of the Chitta are stopped through
concentration or meditation. Thus yoga can also be said to be the return of Purusa to
its original perfection.
According to this system, the modifications of the Chitta are of five kinds.

Kinds of Chitta Modi6cation

Chitta

I I I
Right Cognition Wrong Cognition Verbal Cognition or
( v $ a r ~ aa)~ Imagination (Wkalpa)
I

Pratyaksa Anumlna Sabda Abskce of

Memory Cognition or
(Smriti) Sleep (Nidri?)

Pramha is called right knowledge as in it (a) Chitta through the sense, comes into
direct contact with the external object and assumes its form, or comes into contact
with internal mental emotions, here it is called Pratyaksa, (b) or the Chitta cognizes
the generic naturevof things through inference (anumha) or (c) Chitta accepts the
verbal testimony of a trustworthy man, (Sabda).
Viparyaya is wrong cognition or wrong knowledge e.g. the knowledge like that of a
piece of silver is a non-metal.
Vikalpa is imagination like that of a hare's horn which does not exist.
Nidra is absence of cognition, but even in it there is mental modification,because after
sleep we say, 'I had a sound sleep' and this knowledge can come only through some
mental modification, as this is the source of all knowledge.
Smrti or memory isthe mental modification through which we recollect the past
experiences.

Chittabhumi
Yoga propagates five levels of mental functions or Chittabhumi. The difference in the
mental levels or Chittabhumi are due to the predominance of the different gunas in the
different Chittabhumis.
1. The first is the Ksipta Chittabhumi. Here there is excess of Rajas guna. In this
state, Chitta is in a dissipated condition and 'moves from object to object like a
shuttlecock.
2. Mudha is a mental condition due to the preponderance of Tamas. Here the mind
is in a condition of sleep, ignorance, indifference and lethargy.
3. Viksipta is the mental state where Sattva guna predominates but at times Rajas
guna also asserts itself. This is acondition of relatively pacified mind yet at times
due to Rajas it gets distracted.
4. ' Ekigra is the state of preponderance of Sattva in the mind. This is the state the
mind becomes concentrated on the object of concentration or meditation.
5. Nin~ddhais also a state of the preponderance of Sattva in the mind. This is the Ancient Indian Concept and
Nature of Knowledge
highest Chittabhumi. Here the mental modifications are completely arrested, yet
their latent impressions or V h a n i s remain. In this state, due to complete cessation
of modifications of the mind there is complete absence of all knowledge including
that of the object of meditation.

6.6.2 The Jain Theory of Judgement

The theory of knowledge held by the Jainism is that of common sense realism and
pluralism. The theory of Reality is many faced (anetintavida).
According to this theory, the different kinds of immediate and mediate knowledge that
we possess about objects reveal that every object has many characters. Such partial
knowledge about any one of the innumerable aspects of an object is called 'Judgement'
by Jain. Every judgement that we pass is, therefore, true only in reference to the
standpoint occupied and the aspect of the object considered. The standpoint about
,any object may differ on account of its Svarupa (own form), Svadravya(own matter)
Svaksetra, (own place) and Svaklla(own time) and this happens in simple affirmative
judgements. Similarly, in simple negativejudgements difference may take place because
a thing is not in its pararupa (other form), paradravya (other matter), paraksetra (other
place), and parakdla (other time). According to Jainism, the knowledge is classified

1. Immediate Knowledge
i) Avadhi: Direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space and time.
It is called Avadhi because it functions within the limits of space and time.
ii) ManahparyPyP is the direct knowledge of the thoughts of others (telepathy)
which is limited to space and time conditions. Both Avadhi and
Manhaparyiiyi are called extra-sensory form of knowledge, as the soul is
unaided by the senses or mind in obtaining direct knowledge.,
iii) Kevala-jnana is absolute, extraordinary and infinite knowledge. It is not
limited by space, time or object and can be acquired only by liberated souls.

2. Mediate Knowledge
i) Matti includes perceptual and inferential knowledge, Pure perception in
the sense of mere sensation cannot be knowledge. Sensation to become
knowledge must be given meaning and arranged into order by thought.
ii) Sruta means knowledge derived from authority. The instruments of mati
and Sruta knowledge are perception, inference i n d authority:
Know ledge. according to Jainism, may be again divided into two kinds viz. Prarnana
or knowledge of a thing as it is which is real and complete knowledge. Naya is the
knowledge of a thing in its relation. It is relational and partial knowledge. There are
seven Nayas which are divided into Artha Naya (related to meanings or objects) and
Sabda-Naya (related to words). The Jainas elaborate the doctrine of Naya in order to
show that several judgements or propositions may be true about the same object from
45
Knowledge in Education different points of view. Even contradictory judgements can be true of the same
thing, provided it is admitted that there can be different viewpoints. In short, a partial
view of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called a Naya or a standpoint. It influences
our judgement and so a judgement based on the pnttial view is also called Naya.
Therefore, the Jainas say that every judgement (naya) should be qualified by some
word like 'somehow' (Sylt, i.e. in some respect), so that the limitation of the judgement
and the possibility of other alternative judgements from other points of view may
always be kept in mind.
The Jaina logic distinguishesseven fonns of judgement. Each judgement, being relative,
is preceded by the word 'syk'- probable, perhaps, may be etc. The Jaina theory of
judgement is called 'SYADVADA' or Sapta - bhangi - Naya. Sapta - bhangi - naya
means the 'theory of seven-fold judgement'.
1. Syldasti: Relatively, a thing is real.
2. S y l d h t i : Relatively, a thing is unreal.
\
3. Syiidastica nhtica: Relatively, a thing is both real and unreal.
4. Syiidavaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is indescribable.
5. Sydkti ca Avaktavyarn ca: Relatively, a thing is real and is indescribable.
6. Syidnlsti ca avaktavyam ca: Relatively, a thing is unreal and is indescribable.
7. Syldasti ca nlsti ca avaktavyam ca: ~elativejy,a thing is real, unreal and
indescribable.
There is no universd and absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid
only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the SyMvMa doctrine is that
for any judgement according to any and every naya, there are as many alternatives as
are indicated by syMviida. The validity of such a judgement, is therefore, only
conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgement according to any
naya, the naya is rightly used. If however,the judgements are made absolutely according
to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the SyMvMa
doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such
judgements are false and should, therefore, be called false nayas (naylbMsa).

6.6.3 Buddhist l'hdory of Causation

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Effective Causation
(Arthakriyiikhitva).
The theory of &pendant origination ( h t i t y a SamutpMa) of things is the spontaneous
and universal law of causati6n, which is known in Buddhism as dharma or dhamma.
This view holds that on getting the cause, the effect arises and the existence of everything
is conditional. This view according to Buddha is the middle view because it avoids the
extreme views namely that there is some eternal reality underlying all things and that
all is annihilitatedultimately. The theory of universal change holds that all are in a flux.
The doctrine was developed later on and came to be known as the doctrine of
momentariness of things.
The law of karma holds the view "as you sow, so you reap". The doctrine of
momentariness of things not only results in no-self doctrine (AnattAvlda), but it also
gives rise to no permanent ultimate reality, spiritual or material. Buddhism holds that
the real is that which has capacity to produce some effect. The idea of causal efficiency
is, therefore, the criterion af existence. The criterion of existence or being is the
performance of certain specific actions; or rather existence means that a certain
effect has been produced in some way (casual efficiency). That which has produced
such an effect is then called existent or sat. Any change in the effect thus produced
means a corresponding change of existence.
 I

Buddhism holds that the Lffects ~roducedin us by objects at different moments of Ancient Indian Concept and
Nature of Knowledge
time may be similar but cannot be identical because each moment is associated with a
new effect and each new effect thus produced means coming into being of a
correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no
reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time.
Any differencein the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination
with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new
one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power
it has upon our minds. If it had no such power then we could not have said that it
existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression
a thing produced; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us.
According to the theory of causation, we perceive the power of producing effects and ,
define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there
would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many
new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment
that exerts a new power

6.7 COMMON FEATURES OF THE ANCIENT

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS
RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
EDUCATION
Though there is a variance between the six orthodox schools regarding the sources of
knowledge, it is a well-accepted fact that all schools have acknowledged Pratyaksa, -
Anumina and Sabda as valid sources of knowledge. The knowledge through sense
experience is considered to be the basic source even in other prambas for further
evidences and validation. p he Nyiya School has added upamba to the list, while
Min~imsahas added Arthipathi and Anupaliibdhi to the list. The latter two sources
have been considered as less valid when compared to other pramhas.
Considering each of the Pramina with its merits, let us examine for their reldvance
and imp1ications for Education.

6.8 PRAMANAS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR

EDUCATION
As you must have learnt, education aims at all round development of the child, which
includes the development of sensory powers too. Since perception is the chief means
of all knowledge, it is imperative on the part of education to aim at physical as well as
intel lectual development of child's personality.
The Nyiiya, being mainly a logical and analytical approach to the world holds that
education should aim at sensory and intellectual training. Besides this, the school also
aims at developing a good and a balanced life. Both cognitive as well as conative
faculties are needed to be developed according to Nyiya's concept of Education. A
keen sense of observation and enjoyment therein is the main characteristic of an
inquiring student. Since Nyiiya's analysis of perception is a foundational concept in
the entire Indian system, the emphasis on the refinement of perception also leads to
aesthetic values. The development of aesthetic values depends on all aspects of arts,
which ob-jectifies our emotions. The Nyiya's concern for meaning through their
epistemological doctrine proves that they loved symmetry, proportion, balance and
harmony, and this trait can lead to aesthetic values on which depends the growth and
development of a great edifice of culture and civilization of humans. \

47
 I
Knowledge i n ~ d u c a h o n The analytical method used in Nybya can have relevance to our methods of teaching.
In subjects like Mathematics, analysis and synthesis are used which are the dimensions
of inference. Problem-centred method can be used in teaching. Analogy (upamha)
is used in all comparative knowledge. Verbal testimony (Sabda) can include seminar,
group discussion and lecture method. On the whole, deductive-inductive method,
project method, symposium, dialogue and argumentation can be used as effective
methods of teaching.
From Vaisesika school, we can draw implications for science. Scientific attitudes can
be developed with the proper education embodying all knowledge with reference to
the physical laws especially. This school advocates that each field of knowledge
concerned with the discovery of hidden laws of nature and man should constitute the
curriculum. As Nybya, Vaisesika also believes in perception as the major source of
knowledge. So all deductive methods including dialogue and lecture method should be
acceptable. The aim of education according to Samkhya school is to evolve sattvic
status of body, sense organs, manas and self-sense, because on these the outgrowth
of sattvic intelligence depends. Different skills need to be developed which are based
on the proper evolution of sense organs and the organs of actions, which are made of
Tammitras (the quiescence of;gross material elements). According to this school, the
development of knowledge through sense organs, manas and self sense is aimed at.
So the cumculum should be concerned with the knowledge of surrounding elements
with which the body is sustailed. Since the student in his initial stage must learn the
meaning of taste, smell, touch, sound, form, etc. the topics pertaining to soil, water,
light, air, etc. must be included in the school cumculum. Since evolution is the main
theme of the sarnkhya system and prakrti in presence of purusa (consciousness) gives
rise to divine forms of creation, a child who is an integrated whole of purusa and
prakrti has also to evolve physically, mentally, emotionally, intellectually and spirituality.

Check Your Progress

Notes: a) Write your answers in the space given below.
b) Compare your answers with the one given at the end of the unit.
7. Differentiatebetween immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge acoording
to the Jaina theory of judegment.
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8. What is the theory of causation according to Buddhism?
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9. How do sources of knowledge according to Indian philosophy influence
educational practice? Give two examples.
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 Anclent Indlan Concept and
6.9
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LET US SUM UP Nature of Knowledge

Epistemology is that branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, structure,

methods and validity of knowledge. The chief aim of Epistemology are: How far can
we know reality? How does knowledge originate and develop? Which is the valid
source of knowledge? and so on. The different schools of philosophy starting from
Vedic times have debated upon several issues of knowledge, their sources and validity.
The orthodox schools (six systems of philosophy) and the heterodox schools have
contributed to the theories of knowledge.
The Chiirvaka School which is materialistic recognizes only perception as the valid
source of knowledge. The Jaina philosophy believes that consciousness or J n h a is
the inseparable essence of every soul. The knowledge is categorized in!o immediate
and mediate which are perceptual and inferential in nature. The Jain theory of judgment,
which is also called Syiidviida, distinguishes seven forms of judgement. The Buddhist
School of Philosophy admits perception and inference as the valid source of knowledge.
t It also emphasizes upon the causal relationship between two things. It did not believe
in Vedic authority for valid knowledge. The theory of dependent origination explained
the origin, experience and decay of things through the theory of natural causation.

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The orthodox schools (Nyiiya, Vaisesika, Sarnkhya, Yoga, M i m h s a and Vedhta)
differ in their interpretations about knowledge and their sources. The Nyiiya school
recognized Pramhas like Pratyaksa, Anumiina, Sabda and Upamha, while Vaisesika
also recognized the same pramanas. The Simkhya and Yoga philosophy also believed
in perception, inference and scriptural testimony. The Mimiimsa school of philosophy
adds two more pramana to the above, viz. arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi
(non-perception).
The sources of knowledge according to the Vedic schools and heterodox schools have
certain relevance and implications for to education - content and methods of teaching
which have been discussed in this unit.

6.10 UNIT-END ACTIVITIES

1. Provide some daily life instances where 'upamiina' is used as a source of
knowledge.
2. Observe the instructional transaction taking place in different subject areas at
the primary, secondary and higher education levels. Find out at least five instances
at each level where the following sources of knowledge are used.
a) Anumana k

.
b) Sabda
C) Upamana
d) Arthapatti
e) Anupalabdhi
i

6.11 POINTS FOR DISCUSSION

1 . What met hods of teaching can be adopted in school education to develop effective
I sensoly perception?
2. How can we develop the skill of inference in students?
3. Explore the ways in which we can train the students in scientific and analytical
I methods.
4. Identify the Verbal testimony as the source of knowledge and discuss the ways
in which knowledge has been communicated. 49
t
Knowledge in Education 5. Criticisms of Buddhist school of Philosophy about Vedic schools' viewpoints on
knowledge.
6. Is 'Upamilna' relevant to our classroom teaching? In which contexts it is useful?

6.12 SUGGESTED READINGS

_Awasthi, J.P. and Sharma, M. (1988): Classical Indicln Philosophies and Their
Practice in Education, Agra: Modem Printens.
Kunhan Raja (1974): Some Fundamental Problem in Indian Philosophy, Motilal
Banarsi Dass, Delhi: Indological Publishers.
Sharma, C. (1976): A Critical Survey of lndian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsi

Sinar, A.R. (1984): The Structure of lndian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hiriyanna, M. (1969): The Essentials of lndian Philosophy, London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd.
Das Gupta S. (1975): A History of lndian Philosophy, Vol.1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsi
Dass.

6.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. The Orthodox Schools of thought accept the authority of the Vedas while viewing
the nature of knowledge but the Heterodox Schools of thoughts do not recognize
the authority of the Vedas.
2. Nayaya, Vaisesika, Sarnkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa or
the Vedanta.
3. The difference between Nayaya and the Buddhism with regard to inference as
a source of knowledge is that the former affirms concomitance between two
things in inference (When there is rain, there is cloud), while Buddhism argues
for causal relationship between two things (There is rain because there is cloud).
4. The sources of knowledge according to Indian philosophy are perception,
inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption and non-existence.
5. Vaidika or the scriptural verbal testimony is the statement of the Vedas and
Laukika or the secular verbal testing is the statement of human beings.
6. ,Anupalabhi (Non-apprehension) emphasizes knowledge of negative facts.
\*
Negative facts are not perceived, for there are no sense-objects contained in
4 them.
7. Immediate knowledge refers to direct knowledge of things while mediate
knowledge includes perceptual and inferential knowledge. It also includes
knowledge from authority.
8. The theory of causation according to the Buddhism stress that we perceive the
power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to
a unit of existence. Hence, any change in the effect thus produced means a
corresponding change of existence.
9. The analytical method used in Ny&y&is applicable to subjects like Mathematics.
Verbal testimony (Sabda) and is used in seminar, group discussion and lecture
method.

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