People v.s.

Pugay
167 SCRA 439

Facts:

On May 19, 1982, during the town fiesta of Rosario, Cavite, Bayani Miranda,
a 25- year old retardate, was walking around the fair at the town plaza. The
accused, Fernando Pugay, together with Benjamin Samson and other
companions saw Miranda and started making fun of him by tickling him with
a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing, the accused Pugay
took a can of gasoline which he found under the ferris wheel and poured it
into the body of Miranda. Then, co-accused Samson set the body of Miranda
on fire. Eduardo Gabion, a witness to the incident, was sitting at the ferris
wheel at the time Pugay poured the gasoline and even forewarned the latter
to stop their fun-making of Miranda. The body was rushed to the hospital for
treatment, but was declared dead due to the severe degree of burns. The
accused Pugay and Samson were collectively charged of murder, qualified by
treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation, superior strength,
means employed to weaken the defense and causing another wrong
deliberately augmenting the wrong done in the commission of the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not accused Pugay and Samson were both guilty of an intentional
felony.

Ruling:

The respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from

different acts is individual and not collective. Pugay is only guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence for he failed to exercise the necessary
diligence to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from their act of
fun-making with the deceased. Without sufficient evidence of the qualifying
circumstances, Samson is only guilty of homicide because he had no reason
or intent to kill the deceased before the incident. Indeed, he knew that what
Pugay poured was gasoline because of the stingy smell that pervaded. What
he intended was only to burn the clothes of the deceased, but that does not
relieve him of criminal responsibility. Each was guilty only of a culpable
felony.
 People v.s. Intod
215 SCRA 52

Facts:

Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental in
the morning of February 4, 1979, and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. At 10 o’clock in the evening, the accused
Intod together with his companions arrived at Palangpangan’s house and
armed with firearms. Mandaya pointed to the location of Palangpangan’s
bedroom. All the armed men fired at the said room. However, what turned
out was that Palangpangan was in another city and no one was hit by their
shots. Eyewitnesses positively identified the accused and his companions.
The Regional Trial Court charged and convicted Intod of attempted murder.

Issue:

Whether or not Intod was guilty of attempted murder.

Ruling:

The case at bar belongs to the category of impossible crimes, Article 4(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended
by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order
to qualify as an impossible crime. The factual situation rendered the
intended act impossible of accomplishment because of an inherent
impossibility, caused by the absence of Palangpangan in the house.
Therefore, Intod is only guilty of an impossible crime.
 People v.s. Valenzuela
525 SCRA 306

Facts:

On May 19, 1994 around 4:30 P.M., the accused Valenzuela, wearing an ID
labeled “Receiving Dispatching Unit”, was hauling a push cart with cases of
detergent Tide brand coming from the Super Sale Club Supermarket. Jovy
Calderon was waiting outside in the parking space where the accused would
unload the carton of Tide Ultramatic. They were able to unload more of these
and loaded all in a taxi. The two boarded the cab but before they could leave
the premises, the cab they boarded was haulted by Lago, a security guard
and who saw the entire act of the two. He asked for the receipt of purchase
of those cartons, but the two tried to flee on foot. Lago fired a warning shot
to alert his fellow guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended and
were charged of consummated theft. Valenzuela filed a petition to modify
the charge to frustrated theft.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated theft only.

Ruling:

In theft or robbery, the crime is consummated after the accused had

material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same,
although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. When an owner or
juridical possessor does not give his consent to the taking , or if the consent
was given but it was vitiated or where an act by the receiver soon after the
actual transfer of possession, it constitutes unlawful taking. The judgment
that the crime is consummated theft is affirmed.
 People v.s. Azugue
268 SCRA 711

Facts:

It was on October 27, 1990 around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, that the victim
Joebe Arrobang, a conductor of a public utility jeepney, alighted from the
jeep heading towards the direction of Punta Cogon to recover the tire that
got stuck in the mud. Thereupon, the accused Buenafe Azugue came and
held the victim on both forearms while in face to face with the victim. Then,
Morito Salvador stabbed the victim from behind hitting him on his right hip.
Porferio Delmo was the sole witness to the crime because he was only two
arms length from where the victim was stabbed. The assailants were
charged of the crime of murder with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between the two accused.

Ruling:

In conspiracy, what is important is that all performed specific acts, with such
closeness and coordination, indicate a common purpose or design. Although
Azugue’s participation was limited and merely held the victim, it was in
connection with the stabbing by Salvador and that they acted together with
a common purpose and design. Azugue is liable by legislative and judicial
fiat, as if he himself dealt the final blow.
 People v.s. Cahindo
266 SCRA 554

Facts:

The victim Milton Lagilles was urinating in the yard of his house when the
accused Romeo Cahindo came from behind and hacked the former with a
“sarad”. The victim was hacked in his right shoulder and on top of the head,
which caused his death. The incident happened on September 23, 1989 at 7
o’clock in the evening at Baybay District, San Jose, Tacloban City. Cristilyn
Lagilles and Anatolio Bohol, the prosecution witnesses, testified that prior to
the hacking incident, the accused challenged the victim to a fight but the
victim did not mind. During the hacking incident, the victim was heard
uttering “I will not fight you, do not do it, do not do it”. The accused
contended that he acted in self-defense because the victim stabbed him
twice upon refusing to sell him tuba because he was already drunk.

Issue:

Whether or not the plea of self-defense by appreciated

Ruling:

The contention of Cahindo that he was acting in self-defense is unconvincing.

Human experience tells that one who sells alcoholic drinks does not usually
refuse a buyer unless the latter is intoxicated and creates trouble, or that
could constitute unlawful aggression. And, no slightest injury was even
sustained by the accused from the alleged attack by the victim. Self-defense
cannot be appreciated for the circumstance of unlawful aggression is absent.
 People v.s. Ganut
118 SCRA 38

Facts:

The deceased, Salvador Malaqui, together with his brother Nelson and
Antonio Vista went to the house of Pablo Lagutan, the night before a
wedding celebration will take place. It was on October 17, 1970 about 8
o’clock in the evening. The decease went inside the kitchen and sat on the
western side of the table. Also inside the kitchen were the accused Simeon
Ganut, Florentino Lagutan and Marciano Lagutan, who were chopping meat.
The deceased asked Marciano to make some “kilawen”, to which he replied
“You ask the Chief”, referring to Ganut. Thereafter, Ganut hacked the
deceased with his bolo at the back of the left side of his body. A series of
hacking between Ganut and the deceased happened, but the deceased
suffered the fatal blow. Autopsy by Dr. Jovencio Castro declared that the
cause of death was hemothorax and that the body suffered 25 wounds, 8 at
front and 17 at the back. The accused was charged of the crime of murder.
The justifying circumstance of self-defense was contended by the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not self-defense on the part of the accused be appreciated.

Ruling:

The alleged plea of Ganut that the injuries inflicted upon the deceased where
when he was in kneeling position and in furtherance of self-defense is
untenable. Post-mortem reports would contravene the said contention
because the impact to inflict the reported injuries could not be done by one
who is in kneeling position. The foremost requirement of self-defense is
unlawful aggression which is a sudden, unprovoked attack. Since, the
deceased took a seat and a lower position than, it will be clearly hard to
believe that he intended to commit unlawful aggression.
 People v.s. Cano
413 SCRA 92

Facts:

On May 31, 1993 about 7 o’clock in the morning, Orlando Cano arrived at the
Rush ID Booth of his brother Conrado Cano, the petitioner, along the
sidewalk of Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila fronting Philippine Trust Bank and
Uniwide Sales Department Store. Orlando asked an employee where his
brother was. The victim Orlando said angrily that he was a pakialamero
because he photocopied his business permit. Around 9:30 A.M., petition
Conrado arrived at his booth. While he was in front of a mirror combing his
hair, the victim suddenly arrived and held petitioner on the shoulder saying,
“Anong gusto mong mangyari?”, to which the latter did not answer. The
victim tried to stab his brother with a balisong, but the latter was able to run
and lock himself inside a dark room inside his booth. The victim followed and
tried to open the door. The petitioner suddenly emerged carrying a 9-inch
long scissors. The two struck each other for about 2 minutes, then the victim
fell and his wife rushed to his side. Petitioner fled from the scene. He was
charged of homicide. Gloria Cano, wife of the victim, then executed a sworn
statement during the pendency of the appeal that the petitioner had only
acted in self-defense.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner acted in self-defense

Ruling:

For self-defense to prosper, the evidence must clearly prove: unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of means
employed in order to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. First, factual evidence showed that
it was an armed victim who initially attacked the petitioner with a balisong,
constituting unlawful aggression. Second, he was compelled to grab the
scissors as instrument to defend himself. The circumstances condoned the
means employed to protect his life. Lastly, there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the petitioner. All evidence shows that the
requisites are attendant. Therefore, the petitioner acted in lawful self-
defense.
 People v.s. Narvaez
121 SCRA 389

Facts:

At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1986, the deceased Davis
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia together with 3 laborers were fencing the land
of George Fleischer, father of the deceased Davis. This is located in Maitum,
South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house of appellant
Mamerto Narvaez. When he heard that the walls of his house were chisellef,
he arose and told the group “Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house
and if possible we will talk it over what is good”. Deceased Davis however
answered, “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead”. Appellant lost his senses and
he got his gun and shot Fleischer. Seeing Rubia approaching the jeep, where
a gun is placed, he also shot Rubia for he believed that he was going for the
gun to retaliate. Appellant surrendered when police arrested him and also
the shotgun which he used to shoot the deceased. He claims that he did so,
in killing the two, in defense of his person and of his rights, therefore should
be exempt from criminal liability.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant’s liability could be justified by self-defense.

Ruling:

Defense of one’s person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance

under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The aggression referred to by
the appellant is the angry utterance by the deceased Fleischer of “Hindi,
sigue, gademit, avante”, in answer to his request addressed to Rubia. The
deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to the appellant’s house.
However, using a shotgun to resist the aggression was a disproportionate
attack. The last requisite of self-defense was also present because there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant who was defending
his property. Since there is lack of one requisite, self-defense is vague but
the appellant can avail a mitigating circumstance.
 People v.s. Genosa
419 SCRA 537

Facts:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, was charged with the crime of Parricide for
the killing of her husband, Ben Genosa, on November 15, 1995 at Brgy.
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte. On the evening of the said date after the deceased
and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight, the Genosas had a quarrel.
Deceased was drunk and started to provoke his wife with his violent acts.
The appellant started to pack his clothes for she wanted him to leave, but
this enraged the deceased more. The deceased had a three-inch long blade
cutter from his wallet. She however smashed the arm of the deceased and
then at the nape with a pipe. She thereafter went inside the bedroom to get
the gun inside the drawer and shot her husband. Appellant contends that she
was inflicted with the “battered woman syndrome” and thus acted in self-
defense.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant was acting in self-defense.

Ruling:

Appellant was allowed and did in fact present clear and convincing evidence
that she was a battered woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered from
the "Battered Woman Syndrome". The requirement of threatening behavioral
pattern of the batterer in previous violent episodes was sufficiently satisfied
in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic's affliction with BWS justified
the killing of the deceased. The danger posed or created in her mind by the
latter's threats using bladed weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the
circumstances, the natural response of the battered woman would be to
defend herself even at the cost of taking the life of the batterer. Marivic was
suffering from the said syndrome and was acting in self-defense when she
killed her husband. The appellant was acquitted.
 People v.s. Ignacio
325 SCRA 375

Facts:

Around 9:00 A.M. on January 11, 1997 at Divisoria, Dimasalang, Masbate,

Jessie Lacson and Edwin Velasco were at the seashore gathering shells. They
decided to get some tender coconuts to drink. Jessie got one and tried to
open it at the dike. Eulogio Ignacio, the caretaker of the fishpond of Cleto
Cortes, then appeared and shouted at Jessie to let go of the coconut. Jessie
obeyed but Eulogio still fired his shotgun at him, hitting him at the left
portion of his breast, and caused his death. He also saw Edwin and aimed at
him but did not fire. Edwin then reported it immediately to their Barangay
Tanod. The accused Eulogio was charged of Murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant acted in defense of his property.

Ruling:

In order self-defense or defense of property be interposed, there should be

the primordial requisite of unlawful aggression. In the case, there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, much more the necessity of
means to prevent or repel it. The accused merely suspected the victim of
stealing the crabs. Moreover, the act was qualified by treachery because the
victim was in no position nor capable to defend himself. The claim of defense
of property by the appellant is untenable.
 People v.s. Dungo
199 SCRA 860

Facts:

On or about May 16, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, appellant

Rosalino Dungo went to the office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
around 2:00 to 3:00 P.M. and willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously stabbed
Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife in her chest several times. He then
immediately departed from the premises and went to Manila where he was
arrested. The victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal. The
husband of the deceased, Atty. Rodolfo Sigua, attested that on or about
February 1987 the appellant inquired on the actuations of his wife for
requiring so many documents. The appellant contends that he was insane at
the time of the commission of the crime. His wife, Andrea Dungo, testified
that two weeks prior to the fateful incident, her husband was always in deep
thought and manifesting insanity through his actions; ; maltreating their
children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment
from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their
children quarreled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth
they were not. The appellant was confined in a mental hospital for three
months and findings were that he suffered a mental illness called psychosis.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant was insane at the time of the commission of
the crime.

Ruling:

The evidences clearly showed that the accused was sane during the
perpetration of the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon
indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked
on a flight in order to evade arrest. One who suffers from insanity at the time
of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a
criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. In order
that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary
that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act. The appellant was sane at the time the act was
done.

People v.s. Alconga

G.R. No. L-162

Facts:

On the night of May 27, 1943, at the house of one Mauricio Jepes in San
Dionisio, Iloilo, several persons were playing prohibited games. The
deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, Maria de
Reposo was one of those playing and Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a
partner. The deceased suffered from the winning spree of the Reposo and
Alconga. Later, he suspected that the two had a scheme that caused his
consequent losses. An exchange of words and an attempt of fist blows
occurred until the maintainer intervened. The deceased left the place with
anger, but prior to this he said to the accused Alconga, “tomorrow I will give
you breakfast”, which signifies an intent to kill him. The following morning,
Alconga was in his post as security guard at barrio Santol. While he was
sitting on a bench, the deceased came along and swung his “pingahan” on
the former, which he was able to evade. The second blow was also evaded
and when the third blow was about to be given, the accused in a crawling
position was able to fire his pistol and hit the deceased in the chest. After
and ensued fist-fight, the deceased ran away but the accused still pursued
him. There he was able to overtake and later gave the mortal blow with a
bolo, slashing the cranium of the deceased. The accused was later taken in
by the authorities and charged for homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and

sufficient provocation on the part of the deceased be tenable on appellant’s
part.

Ruling:
The learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating
circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the
deceased. The first was properly appreciated; the second was not, since it is
very clear that from the moment he fled after the first stage of the fight to
the moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for appellant
to pursue much less further to attack him. The Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court.

People v.s. Rafanan, Jr.

G.R. No. 54135

Facts:

In the evening of March 16, 1976, Estelita Ronaya, the househelper and
victim, was sent by Ines Rafanan, the mother of Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., to
help her son in their store located 6 m. away. Around 11 o’clock, the accused
called Estelita to help her close the door of the store. As the latter was near
him, he pulled her and told her “Come, let us have sexual intercourse”, to
which Estelita replied, “I do not like” and pleaded him to let her go. But the
accused held a bolo 1-1/2 feet pointed at the throat of the victim and
threatened her. The accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
victim. The accused told the victim not to report or else he would kill her.
The victim left the house on the evening of the following day. She went home
and told her mother later that she was raped by the accused. The accused
was arrested. On trial, he claimed that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the act. He was then ordered to be confined in a mental
hospital for observation. The findings presented that the accused- appellant
herein was sick one or two years before the admission to the hospital from
schizophrenia, and also during when he raped Estelita.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant is entitled to the exempting circumstance of

insanity.

Ruling:
In People vs. Puno, the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction as an illness
which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-
power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. The
fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death
should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the
mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral
quality of that assault. The court affirmed the appealed decision, rejecting
the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan. He is not entitled to an exempting
circumstance.

People v.s. Pinto, Jr.

204 SCRA 9

Facts:

The Legazpi City Police issued a search warrant against Francisco Bello for
illegal possession of certain firearms, on December 25, 1970. Three teams
were formed and proceeded to Barrio Homapon around 7 o’clock in the
evening. A jeep passed by. Believing that Bello was inside, they fired at the
vehicle. But on the jeep were Fr. Felix Capellan, Mrs. Zenaida Tiongson, her
six children and driver who came from a lechonada party in Mariawa.
Richard, Mrs. Tiongson’s son, died while her daughter Maria Theresa was
injured by the gunshots. Francisco Bello was at the residence of Inocencia
Malbas in Sitio Ando, Talahib, Daraga, Albay on December 26, 1970. On the
morning of the following day, policemen Buenaflor and Pinto arrived and
apprehended Bello who was at the balcony and gradually fell to the floor with
his hands above his head. Bello died because of shock secondary to massive
hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds. Rosalio Andes, Inocencia’s
nephew, was killed because he fought back. The Circuit Criminal Court of
Legazpi City charged the two policemen of three counts of Murder and
Frustrated Murder for Maria Theresa Tiongson.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused are entitle to the justifying circumstance of while
in the performance of a lawful duty.

Ruling:

In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article

11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has
to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the
performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty. Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved,
originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant on
Bello. In the process, however, appellants abused their authority resulting in
unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. The court did not grant
the justifying circumstance of while in performance of a lawful duty.

People v.s. Fronda

222 SCRA 71

Facts:

At 6 o’clock in the morning of June 11, 1986, the deceased brothers Eduardo
and Esminio Balaan were taken by seven armed NPA’s accompanied by Rudy
Fronda and Roderick Padua. They tied the wrists of the victims and were
taken to the mountain at Sitio Tulong, Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan.
Fronda and Padua were ordered to get a spade and crowbar. They were
ordered to dig a hole in the mountain, one (1) kilometer away from his
house. The bodies of the victims were examined only on March 21, 1989.
Rudy Fronda was charged and convicted by the trial court guilty as a
principal by indispensable cooperation. Thereafter, appellant interposes the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear, claiming that his act of
pointing to the NPA’s the whereabouts of the Balaan brothers and other
contributions to the said crime were performed under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear and to save his life.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant acted under an uncontrollable fear.

Ruling:
Appellant cannot claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear.
Fear in order to be valid should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one's life or limb In the case at bar, records indicate that appellant
was seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed men a
hunting knife. Also, as aforesaid, appellant was not able to explain his failure
to report the incident to explain his failure to report the incident to the
authorities for more than three (3) years. These circumstances, among
others, establish the fact that appellant consciously concurred with the acts
of the assailants. In order that the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may
apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. Appellant had the
opportunity to escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go home
after bringing the victims the mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the
armed men when required to bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig
the grave.

People v.s. Morales, et. al.

427 SCRA 765

Facts:

On November 9, 1994, around 6:30 A.M., Jefferson Tan, Joanna Tan, Jessie
Anthony Tan, Malou Ocampo and Cesar Quiroz, while on board an L-300 van
with plate no. CKW-785 at San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga were kidnapped
for ransom by Narciso Saldaña, Elmer Esguerra, Fernando Morales, and
Arturo Malit. They were taken and detained at Bataan until their father
Feliciano Tan delivered the ransom amount of P92,000. The aforementioned
accused were charged and sentenced to the penalty of death. Morales and
Malit interposes the defense of uncontrollable fear. They argue that the
threat against them by Romeo Bautista constituted a clear and imminent
danger to their lives and instilled fear in them which made them incapable of
acting with deliberate or criminal intent.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused can avail the exempting circumstance of

uncontrollable fear
 Ruling:

A person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of

an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. And, for
such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. We have held that in order that the
circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or
self-defense in equal combat. Appellants had a real chance to escape when
they went to Feliciano's van. Under the circumstances, even if true, the fear
that appellants allegedly suffered would not suffice to exempt them from
incurring criminal liability.

People v.s. Gatong-o, et. al.

168 SCRA 716

Facts:

About 9 o’clock in the morning of May 30, 1984, Pat. Celestino Dela Cruz of
the Narcotics Unit of the Angeles City Police received word from an unknown
civilian informer that three Igorots were arriving in Angeles City later in the
evening to sell twelve kilograms of marijuana. At 11 o’clock, the informer
went to the police station of Angeles City to talk to the policemen. The
information was relayed to Capt. Paras, who schemed the entrapment
operation of the Igorots. At midnight, the informer told the policemen that he
was now in touch with the marijuana-sellers and asked them to proceed to
Deang’s Marketing & Commercial establishment. The policemen arrived at
the said establishment around 12:30 in the morning. Sgt. Raquidan alighted
from their car to act as a marijuana buyer. The informer brought with him
the three suspects. Raquidan agreed to purchase marijuana from them. The
suspects handed him over a plastic bag of 1 kilogram of marijuana. Raquidan
gave the signal, thus the other police apprehend them for being caught in
the act in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Appellants’ defense was that
in the evening of May 30, they were on their way to work in a certain Jun-Jun
Bakery and that they were hastily accused and apprehended after they took
dinner in a restaurant for selling marijuana by the police.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of the police to identify the informer will be given
credence on the part of the defense.

Ruling:

The version of the appellants is far from credible. They have not shown any
cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge them for peddling
marijuana. The examination of the contents of the plastic bag that was taken
from them proved to contain marijuana. They were caught in the act of
selling marijuana to Raquidan. The case of the prosecution is positive and
clear. The conviction of the appellants is in order.

People v.s. Marcos

185 SCRA 154

Facts:

Major Florencio Junio, Commanding Officer of the First Narcotic Regional Unit,
Baguio City, acting upon an information given by a confidential informer that
accused-appellant Dante Marcos was selling marijuana at the Holy Ghost Hill
Proper, Baguio City, organized on December 4, 1985. An entrapment
operation was then planned. A2C Serafin Artizona, as a poseur-buyer, then
went to the Holy Ghost Hill Proper. They were asked to proceed to the 2 nd
floor where the accused Dante Marcos was. He then ordered ten kilos of
marijuana priced at 700 pesos per kilo. The accused left to get the stuff and
came back with a blue sack containing the ordered marijuana. Then, Artizona
gave the prearranged signal by spitting through the window. The accused
was arrested while his companion was able to evade arrest. Accused was
charged in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused-appellant therein
claimed that the supply belonged to Roland Bayogan. Also, he contends that
there was instigation or even frame-up and not a real entrapment.
 Issue:

Whether or not there is instigation or entrapment of the accused.

Ruling:

The testimony of Artizona, the poseur buyer, was clear and convincing and
demonstrated that the accused needed no instigation or prodding to commit
a crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is the fact that
the accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana
for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the price asked for the
prohibited material. Thus, the acts of the arresting officers here constituted
entrapment, a process not prohibited by the Revised Penal Code. In
entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit the offense
charged originates from the mind of the accused and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the commission of the offense, the accused cannot
justify his conduct. The mere fact that the authorities deceived the
appellants into believing that the former were buyers of heroin does not
exculpate the latter from liability for selling the prohibited drugs.

People v.s. Doria, et. al.

301 SCRA 668

Facts:

In November 1995, the North Metropolitan District, PNP Narcotics Command

received information from two civilian informants that a certain “Jun” was
engaged in the illegal pushing of drugs in the city of Mandaluyong. Narcom
organized a buy-bust operation and conducted it on December 5, 1995. It
was on the same date, around 7:20 A.M, PO3 Manlangit, the designated
poseur-buyer for the buy-bust operation, met with “Jun” or originally named
Florencio Doria at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street. PO3
Manlangit produced the marked bills and handed it over to “Jun” for the
purchase of 1 kilo of marijuana. An hour later, Jun appeared and took out a
white plastic bag containing the ordered marijuana. The arrest took place
forthwith but they found out that the marked bills were not with the accused.
Jun told them that the bills were with his associate “Neneth”, so he led them
to the latter’s house. As they arrived at the said house and identified the said
associate, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table and
saw that there was something wrapped in plastic similar to the one Jun
handed over to them. His suspicion arouse so he took hold of the box and
peeked inside it, for what turned out to be that it contained ten bricks of
marijuana. On trial, the two accused denied the allegations. But, the trial
court convicted Jun, Florencio Doria, and Neneth, Violeta Daddao, for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, penalized by death and a fine of
P500,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the entrapment of Doria and warrantless arrest of Daddao

are valid.

Ruling:

The court ruled that the entrapment of Doria was valid because the decisive
fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-
appellant in exchanged of the marked money, regardless of the non-
identification of informants and non-issuance of warrant. However, the
warrantless arrest of Daddao was invalid because she was not caught in the
act or attempting to commit an offense. In fact, she was going about her
daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. Moreover, appellant Doria
did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but
as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her
co-accused in pushing drugs.

People v.s. Cabarrubias

223 SCRA 362

Facts:

On or about July 13, 1986 at Brgy. Patoc, Bucay, Abra, Talledo Espiritu was
waiting for his son 17-year old Pedro to arrive home from the fields.
Suddenly, Pedro appeared gaping his wounded neck and embracing his
father, saying to him that he was stabbed by Antiporda. The latter then died
moments later. Thereafter, screams of a child were heard by Domingo
Espiritu, a next-door neighbor, so he ran outside to see where it was coming
from. He saw his 8-year old granddaughter Jonalyn Espiritu squatting on the
ground about three meters away from Talledo’s house. She told her
grandfather that she was stabbed by Cabarrubias because she saw
Antiporda stab Pedro and that the culprits chased her upon noticing her
presence. Jonalyn died the next day for multiple stab wounds. Trial court
charged and convicted them of murder. Cabarrubias asserts that he should
have been convicted of homicide, not murder, and that the mitigating
circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed and the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, should
have been appreciated in his favor.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant’s liability can be mitigated for lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and for passion or
obfuscation.

Ruling:

Contrary to appellant’s contention, the evidence shows that he intended to

kill Jonalyn. He used a bolo to inflict five incisions and penetrating wounds on
the head and torso of Jonalyn, a mere eigth-year old child. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were
reasonably sufficient to produce the result that they actually produced.
Furthermore, appellant contends that Jonalyn’s screams produced passion or
obfuscation that deprived him of time to reflect. The circumstance of passion
and obfuscation is not mitigating when the accused acted in a spirit of
lawlessness. Besides, the screams of an eight-year old child are not
provocative enough to generate a sudden impulse of natural and
uncontrolled fury.

People v.s. Pajares

216 SCRA 237

Facts:

Renato Perez and the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store
at Gomez st., Paco, Manila on October 11, 1985, 11:30 P.M. While they were
walking, appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan
with a baseball bat at the back of his head. When Perez tried to help Viojan,
he too was attacked by Pajares hitting him at the back below his left
shoulder. He then grappled with the appellant for possession of the bat, but
the latter’s companions intervened and mauled the former until he lost his
consciousness. Perez was then brought to the Philippine General Hospital for
treatment of the injuries he sustained. Pajares was charged for murder,
qualified by treacher, of Viojan, and slight physical injuries of Perez. The
court sentenced him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant avers that
hours before the clubbing incident, the deceased mauled his younger brother
Roberto Pajares; which according to him was a vindication of a grave offense
committed against his family.

Issue:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense

be valid.

Ruling:

While it may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by
the companions of the deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985, it
must be emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten hours between said
incidents. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant
to recover his serenity. Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.

People v.s. Reyes

84 SCRA 156

Facts:

At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1968, deceased Judge
Ruperto Advincula of the Municipal Court of Dumarao, Capiz boarded a north-
bound train for Capiz at the railway station at La Paz, Iloilo City. Two men
also boarded the same train and one of them occupied the second seat
across the aisle, to the left of Judge Advincula, while the other sat behind his
companion about two seats apart. As the train was pulling out of the flag
station of Barrio Camoncil, Pototan, Iloilo, the man seated across the judge
arose then pulled out his gun and shot the judge point-blank. He and his
companion then jumped off the train and then ran away. Medico legal
necropsy report showed that Judge Advincula sustained a gunshot wound on
the forehead, between his eyes. Investigations revealed that the culprits
were Rodolfo Reyes, Ricardo Mamon and two John Does. Reyes was arrested
at Las Piñas, Rizal and pointed to Ricardo Mamon as the gunman. Mamon
remained at large at that time. It was on the morning of November 30, 1968
that the police learned Mamon was in the Provincial Jail of Iloilo, having
allegedly surrendered. He contends that he voluntarily surrendered to the
Provincial Governor through the Provincial Warden, thus invoking a
mitigating circumstance.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant Mamon is entitled to a mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his agents.

Ruling:

The court ruled that in order the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender to be appreciated, the same must be spontaneous in such a
manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally
to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he
wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his
search and capture. the surrender was made upon certain conditions with
the Governor. Therefore, the said mitigating circumstance could not be
appreciated.

People v.s. Crisostomo

160 SCRA 47

Facts:

On Christmas day of 1967, between 6:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M., at Sto. Rosario,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, while Eugenio Crisostomo was passing near the house of
Romeo Geronimo, he met the latter and invited him to a drinking spree.
Romeo declined. Suddenly, Eugenio rushed towards Romeo, who was
standing near a store facing the street with his back towards the former, and
shot him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one meter. The bullet
entered about two (2) inches below the axilla (armpit) and came out on the
right side of the chest about one (1) inch to the sternum. Romeo fell to the
ground mortally wounded while Eugenio ran away. Trial court convicted
Eugenio for murder qualified by treachery. Appellant herein then contends
that he should be entitled to the mitigating circumstances of drunkenness,
voluntary surrender, and voluntary plea of guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not the aforementioned mitigating circumstances can be

appreciated.

Ruling:

Intoxication as a mitigating circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised

Penal Code cannot be appreciated. Appellant admitted that he was only
dizzy, in fact he was on the way to another drinking spree which means he
was not drunk enough. He remembers clearly the details of the shooting and
realized the gravity of the offense at that moment. All these acts are not of
one whose mental capacity is impaired. The requisites of voluntary surrender
are: (a) that the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) that the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent;
and (c) that the surrender was voluntary. The Court agreed that appellant is
entitled to this mitigating circumstance because although he hid from
authorities, he voluntarily surrendered after ten days. The mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt cannot be appreciated because the
appellant ordered to enter a plea of guilty only after some evidence of the
prosecution had been presented; forfeiting the last requisite of the said
circumstance.

People v.s. Comendador

100 SCRA 155

Facts:
On October 25, 1973 in the afternoon, appellant accompanied the deceased
Jungle Zaragosa, the son of the owner of the hacienda where he was
working, at Toledo City. They were seen by Dolores Reponte, a farmer
residing at Cantabako, Toledo City proceeding towards the bushes after the
appellant remarked that he is familiar with the place. At around 5:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, she was informed by Patrolman Panda-an that there was a
dead man at a distance from her farm. When she went to the scene, she
recognized it was the companion of the appellant. On October 27, 1973, the
appellant went to the office of Gabriel Trocio, Jr. to sign a prepared extra-
judicial confession that he robbed and killed the deceased. On trial, the
prosecution rested its case after presenting the said confession. The court
convicted appellant for the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced
him to death. Appellant seeks for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt.

Issue:

Whether or not the contended mitigating circumstance be tenable.

Ruling:

Court ruled to modify the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua because
of the mitigating circumstances present. It is elementary that a plea of
guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession of
guilt if an admission of all the material facts is alleged in the information,
including the aggravating circumstances alleged. To be considered, it must
be spontaneously in open court prior to presentation of evidence. It must
also be made unconditionally. In the case at bar, while it is true that
accused-appellant requested for a lesser penalty, such does not make his
plea of guilty conditional. It remains to be an admission of the facts alleged
in the information charging robbery with homicide. That the accused-
appellant intended his plea of guilty to be unconditional is further bolstered
by the fact that he did not adduce any evidence in his favor and merely
submitted the case for decision. Although he had an opportunity to do so
after the prosecution rested its case, he did not avail of the same. He
remained resolute in his decision to own the crime.

People v.s. Monaga

118 SCRA 466
 Facts:

Benhur Banaban and his son, tenants of the land of Juanita Barrido, lost a
female carabao and suspected Herminio Balderas, a co-tenant, to have
stolen it. On January 25. 1972 the carabao was found dead, tied to a tree in
the mountain of the barrio of Pedaga. Ajuy. Herminio promised before the
mayor that he would pay Benhur Banaban P400 for the carabao on February
1, 1972. He tried to borrow from Jesus Barrido, but the latter refused.
Herminio was not able to pay the promised amount so the mayor ordered his
patrolmen to call for Herminio. Herminio was found drinking beer in the store
of Norman Alejan in Punta Equi, Culasi, Ajuy. He refused to go with the
patrolmen for they did not have any warrant. At about 8:45 in the evening of
February 8, 1972, while Herminio Balderas was walking along the road with
his child on his right shoulder, followed by his wife Marina Balderas, he was
ambushed, shot and wounded with a “pughakang” by Jesus Barrido, Benhur
Banaban, Danilo Banaban, Jimmy Monaga, and two other unidentified men,
near the bodega of Mr. Blancaflor in Piliwan, Ajuy, Iloilo. On February 13,
1972, at 11:15 P.M. Herminio Balderas died in the Iloilo Mission Hospital. The
accused were convicted for the crime of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant Banaban is entitled to any mitigating circumstance.

Ruling:

It results that the trial court did not err in finding the appellant Benhur
Banaban guilty of the crime of Murder. The appellant, however, is entitled to
the mitigating circumstance analogous to, if not the same as, vindication of a
grave offense committed by the deceased when the latter took away the
carabao of the appellant and held it for ransom, and thereafter, failed to fulfil
his promise to pay its value after the carabao had died.

People v.s. Baroy

 382 SCRA 56

Facts:

Emeliza Bueno, a guest relations officer of Ringo Japanese Karaoke Bar, was
on her way home to Camella, Parañaque around 2:30 in the morning, on
March 2, 1988. While on board the tricycle, two armed men, identified as
Alfredo Baroy and Felicisimo Nacional, blocked their path. They asked money
from the driver and pulled out Emeliza. Then, they took her to a vacant lot
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her. The two culprits took
turns. Afterwards, Nacional left Baroy who again raped Emeliza for the
second time. Meanwhile, the tricycle driver Alfredo Vinuya reported to the
security guards of Better Living Subd. He convinced them to accompany him
to the place of the incident. When they searched the place, they noticed
someone coming out of the bushes, who were Baroy and Emeliza. Baroy was
taken to the Barangay Hall and thereafter to the police station, wherein he
pointed where Nacional could be arrested. The accused were charged and
convicted for the crime of rape, aggravated by nighttime and confederation.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and

confederation are valid.

Ruling:

The trial court imposed the capital punishment of death in consideration of

the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and confederation. The Court
noted that confederation is not among the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Only that, confederation
is only a manner of incurring criminal liability. The trial court erred in
appreciating it for the purpose of imposing the penalty of death. Nighttime is
considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is deliberately sought
to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. The
records reveal that they did not utilize the circumstance of nighttime to
conceal their identities, as there was sufficient illumination at the scene of
the crime that enabled both the tricycle driver and the victim to recognize
them easily. Clearly then, they did not specifically or purposely seek the
cover of darkness, which was merely incidental, therefore not valid in the
imposition of the penalty.
 People v.s. Ordiales
42 SCRA 238

Facts:

On November 4, 1968, at 5:30 in the afternoon, Vicente Bayona with two

companions, Daniel Brown, Jr. and Rolando Cruz, were at the air-conditioned
of Nad’s restaurant, Libertad st., Pasay City. While they were starting to drink
pepsi-cola, accused-appellant Florencio Ordiales, Confidential Agent of the
City Mayor of Pasay City, entered asking Vicente, “Sino ba ang minumura
mo?”, then immediately firing at the latter a U.S. carbine caliber .30 in rapid
succession. After which, he left the restaurant and boarded a yellow cab
parked outside. Daniel Brown, Jr. ran away after the first shot and Rolando
Cruz was literally frozen with fear in his seat. Bayona died of multiple
gunshot wounds at 6:10 that same afternoon. The culprit shot him at a
distance of two and a half yards. The court charged and convicted appellant
of murder, qualified by alevosia and the aggravating circumstances of abuse
of his public position and evident premeditation.

Issue:

Whether or not the said aggravating circumstances are valid.

Ruling:

The sudden and unexpected shooting of the victim with a carbine constituted
treachery. Authorities are clear that even when an attack or aggression is
made face to face, treachery or alevosia is nevertheless present when the
attack is sudden and unexpected to the point of incapacitating the victim to
repel or escape it. For abuse of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1,
Revised Penal Code, to be appreciated, it is not only necessary that the
person committing the crime be a public official; he must also use the
influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as a means by
which he realized his purpose. Accused-appellant could have shot by Bayona
without having finding occupied the said position. The aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position could not be properly appreciated
against him. As there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation,
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation has not likewise been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 People v.s. Alegarbes, Jr.
154 SCRA 125

Facts:

At about 8:30 P.M. of April 23, 1978 in the Poblacion of Bacolod, Lanao Del
Norte, the victim Arlington Rara was mauled by the group led by a certain
Gorio Balani. Rara was still lying in the middle of the road when two soldiers
held him up and took him to their checkpoint to rest. Before they could reach
the checkpoint, the accused Esperidion Alegarbes, Jr., a soldier connected
with the 40th Infantry Battalion and designated as Assistant Chief of the
Military Police, arrived and started investigating Rara himself. When Rara
could not identify the ones who mauled him, Alegarbes immediately hit him
with the back of his left hand and raised him. Alegarbes fired his revolver at
Rara’s side but not hitting him while asking him again who mauled him.
When Rara still could not answer, Alegarbes took off the victim’s belt and
whipped him until its buckle fell off. When Rara asked for forgiveness
kneeling in front of Alegarbes, but the latter pulled again his hair, raising
him, and then simultaneously drew his revolver and fired at the victim’s neck
point-blank. The accused-appellant was convicted for murder, qualified by
treachery and the aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and
cruelty.

Issue:

Whether or not the said aggravating circumstances attended the crime.

Ruling:

Treachery was present in the killing, because the victim was not in a position
to defend himself when he was unexpectedly shot by the accused. Unarmed,
he was a helpless victim of the senseless assault by the accused. Appellant
undoubtedly took advantage of his public position as a soldier, when he
maltreated and killed a civilian victim of mauling, whom he was supposed to
protect in the performance of his duties. The trial court likewise did not err in
considering both aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and
cruelty.
 People v.s. Magdueño
144 SCRA 210

Facts:

On October 15, 1980 few minutes past 8:00 o’clock in the morning, as soon
as Fiscal Fernando M. Dilig placed himself at the driver’s seat of his jeep
parked near his house at the corner of Roxas and D. Mendoza Streets, Puerto
Princesa City, a gunman coming from his left side aimed and poured
gunshots at the body of the fiscal inflicting two fatal wounds. Three
witnesses namely Elena Adion Lim, Ernesto Mari, and Cynthia Canto
identified the gunman as Hermogenes Magdueño. The accused was charged
for murder qualified by treachery and aggravating circumstance of insult to
public authority. Magdueño also executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he admitted that he killed Fiscal Dilig for a price or reward and
implicated Leonardo Senas and Mauricio de Leon to the commission of the
crime. However, both Senas and de Leon were later dropped from the
amended information for lack of a prima facie case against them. All the
other accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the mentioned aggravating circumstances are valid.

Ruling:

Treachery in the commission of the crime is clearly established by the

record. The appellant fired two successive shots at the defenseless Fiscal
Dilig while the latter was still seated in his jeep. The manner of the execution
was such that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted means and
ways of committing the crime and insured its execution without risk to
himself arising from any defense Fiscal Dilig might make. However, the
aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public
authority does not seem to be borne by the records. For this aggravating
circumstance to be considered it must not only be shown that the crime was
not committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime
was not committed against the public authority himself. In the instant case
Fiscal Dilig, the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence,
the lower court, erred in including commission of the crime with insult to
public authority as an aggravating circumstance.

People v.s. Ga
186 SCRA 790

Facts:

At about 8:00 A.M. of July 29, 1977, the accused Ernesto Ga, Alfredo
Endencio and Reynaldo Ruga, planned to rob the residence of the Gonzaga
family at Forbes Park. Then around 7:30 in the evening, the three accused
proceeded to the servant’s house of the said residence for a drinking spree
up to midnight together with Bonifacio Marteja, Andres Laxion and Francisco
Melorin. Upon the signal, Ga declared a hold-up and subsequently hog-tied
the three victims. They got the key to the main residence from Marteja who
was stin hog-tied and then entered. They first entered the bedroom of Ester
Gonzaga, but did not harm her because she was a cripple. Then, they
entered the master’s bedroom where they were caught by Donya Juliana
who was awake. Endencio then immediately approached and stabbed her
with a kitchen knife. Don Julio was awakened by the screams but he was
stabbed by Ga when Rogelia Gonzaga rushed towards them screaming.
Endencio stabbed also Don Juho who was then going out of the bedroom.
Then, Ga and Endencio met Rogelia by the door and stabbed her on the face
and several parts of her body. Though wounded, Rogelia managed to call the
security guards of Forbes Park but the accused already fled. The court
charged and convicted all of the accused of the crime Robbery with Triple
homicide aggravated by abuse of superior strength, insult or disregard of
respect due to victims on account of their age, nighttime, and band.

Issue:

Whether or not the mentioned aggravating circumstances attended the

crime.

Ruling:

The aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime by a band should

not have been appreciated against them. A band consists of at least four
malefactors who are all armed. In this case there were only three
perpetrators and two weapons, a kitchen knife and a dagger. No evidence
was presented and nothing appears in the judgment to indicate that, in the
commission of the crime, the appellants deliberately intended to offend or
insult the sex or age of the victims. Appellant also assails the appreciation of
nighttime as an aggravating circumstance on the ground that, while
nighttime may be the factual setting of the crime, it does not appear to have
been especially or deliberately sought by the accused in order to facilitate its
commission.

People v.s. Padilla

G.R. No. 126124

Facts:

Around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon on April 27, 1995, Maria Aurora, a 13-
year old retardate, was in a citrus farm owned by a neighbour Jose Sagun
when the accused-appellant accosted her. The accused Zaldy Padilla, 26
years old and employed by Sagun as a farmhand, forced Maria with a scythe
and a knife to lie down on the grass and said, “Kantot tayo”. Appellant
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim. Maria resisted but
she cannot win over the physical strength of appellant. Maria told her father
Engracio about what happened. He filed a complaint against the appellant.
The court convicted the appellant of the crime of rape with attendant
circumstances of disregard of respect due to the offended part on account of
her age, and abuse of superior strength.

Issue:

Whether or not the mentioned aggravating circumstances are valid.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the inferior court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstances of disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of his
or her age and abuse of superior strength. Although disregard of the respect
due to the victim by reason of his or her age can be taken into account
where the victim is of old age as well as of tender age, the same can be
considered only in cases of crimes against persons and honor. At the time of
the rape on April 27, 1995, rape was classified as a crime against chastity.
R.A. No. 8353 classifying it as a crime against persons took effect only on
October 22, 1997 so as to justify the consideration of disregard of the
respect due to the victim by reason of his or her age. Nor can the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength be appreciated as
the trial court did, since the consideration of the same requires evidence of
the relative physical conditions of the assailant and the victim, which the
prosecution failed to present.

People v.s. Penillos

205 SCRA 546

Facts:

On the evening of July 31, 1981 at Sitio Naontogan, Bariis, Legazpi City, in
the house of Aproniano Lladones and spouse Epifania Lopez, four men
intruded with intent to rob the said residence. The spouses were awakened
by the entry of the four men, but they were overpowered. Aproniano was
carried outside his dwelling and hogtied, then later died because of multiple
stab wounds. Epifania was also hacked with a bolo upon finding out where
her husband was taken. She was able to sustain and survive the injury until
she was able to report the incident to their neighbor and later to the
barangay captain. Only Abelardo Penillos was positively identified and
apprehended. The accused was charged for robbery with homicide and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

Ruling:

The Court considered the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Dwelling is

aggravating in robbery with homicide because this type of robbery could be
committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the
home. 38 It is indisputably clear from the pleadings and the decision of the
trial court that although the homicide was committed outside the house of
the deceased, the principal offense of robbery was perpetrated inside; the
killing thus occurred as a result of the initial evil design to steal.
 People v.s. Dela Cruz
189 SCRA 391

Facts:

About 8 o’clock on September 6, 1980, Brigida Venancio, a 7-year old girl,

while walking through a heavy rain without an umbrella and bound for her
grandparents’, she passed by the Chapel in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
The accused Carlos Dela Cruz, a blood relative of Brigida, grabbed her by the
arm and pulled her inside the chapel. There, he pinned her down inside
where it was dark because no light was on. The accused was introjected his
organ unto Brigida’s. He succeeded in placing his organ on top of Brigida’s
private part with panty and pants on. Shortly thereafter, two parishioners,
Luzviminda Mendoza and Marilou Carpio, entered the Chapel for a scheduled
prayer rally and switched on the lights. The accused and Brigida stood up
simultaneously upon the illumination. Mrs. Mendoza advised Brigida to go
home, where she then told her parents about the incident. The accused was
apprehended and charged for the crime of rape. On trial, the accused
contends that rape was not consummated because no penetration occurred.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of commission of offense in a

place dedicated to religious worship is valid.

Ruling:

First, the contention of the accused that no rape occurred is untenable.

Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen suffices to warrant conviction for
rape. Therefore, there is no question that rape was consummated. The
aggravating circumstance of commission of offense in a place dedicated to
religious worship was considered by the Court as a generic aggravating
circumstance.

People v.s. Detuya

154 SCRA 410

Facts:

About 2 o’clock in the morning of March 4, 1970, the residence of Bernardo

Jumalon in Barrio Ditulan, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur was intruded by
five persons and perpetrated robbery. Bernardo was hogtied while the five
persons proceeded inside and went to the room of Bernardo’s common-law
wife Indin Subana. There they succeeded in raping Indin, only fourteen years
old, and also Graciana Jumalon, fifteen year-old daughter of Bernardo. The
accused ransacked the house, getting P500.00 from the trunk, a wristwatch
worth P30.00, two rings worth P45 and three hens valued P3.00 each.
Thereafter, Bernardo wasted no time in reporting the incident to the barrio
captain, who inspected the scene of the crime, and ordered the arrest of
Bernido Detuya and Feliciano Navales, both who were positively identified by
Bernardo. The accused were charged of robbery with rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of band, dwelling, nighttime

and ignominy attended the commission of the crime.

Ruling:

Band has been correctly appreciated by the trial court only as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Nighttime is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in that it facilitated the commission of the crime. As previously
shown, the appellant and his companions blackened their faces so that they
could easily blend with the darkness thereby making them even more
indistinguishable. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy is present in
this case inasmuch as firstly, Indin Subana was raped in the presence of her
husband, Bernardo Jumalon, and secondly, Graciana Jumalon was
successively raped by five men, which made it more humiliating. Present,
likewise, is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, considering that the
crimes were committed in the home of the victims who have not given
provocation to the appellant and his companions.

People v.s. Balatucan

206 SCRA 31

Facts:

On the evening of March 18, 1988, Jaime Balatucan went to a dance held at
the BLISS Housing Project in Umabay Exterior, Mobo, Masbate on the
occasion of a barangay fiesta. When Jaime arrived at the scene of the dance,
he was suddenly boxed by Rudy Tugbo, who was a company of appellant
Ramil Balatucan and two others. After the striking Jaime, Rudy ran away and
Jaime lost him. When Jaime, together with his brother Alex Balatucan, Jonnel
Labao and Joey Labao, left the dance hall around 10 o’clock in the evening,
appellant rushed towards Jonnel and stabbed him with a knife. Alex was also
stabbed when he tried to help Jonnel. Jaime tried to grab Ramil but he tore
loose his shirt and also fatally injured Alex Balatucan. Appellant was charged
for murder with the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery. Appellant argues that the mode of attack was not previously
considered but only a result of a sudden decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and

treachery are tenable.

Ruling:

There is treachery when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the
execution of the felony which insures its commission without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might take. The evidence
of the prosecution showed that appellant had deliberately posted himself on
the shoulder or gutter of the highway not far from the dance hall and waited
for about an hour until his victim passed by. The Court appreciated evident
premeditation because the requisites were present. Appellant had several
hours to reflect on the crime that, per his own announcement, he was about
to commit and to desist from it if he had wanted so to desist. The slaying of
Jonnel and the serious stab wound inflicted on Alex demonstrated clearly
that appellant had clung to his determination to kill. The two aggravating
circumstances were clearly present in the case at bar.

People v.s. Gregorio

255 SCRA 380

Facts:

About 1:00 A.M. of May 8, 1986, at the house of appellant Adronico Gregorio
at Sitio Bug-as, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Murcia, Negros Occidental, while appellant
Ricardo Gregorio together with “Tunggak” was playing pusoy, he shouted at
the latter reprimanding him for peeping at the cards of others. Tunggak
stood up and ordered the game to stop. Overhearing the incident, Adronico
called Tunggak, his son, downstairs and there scolded and boxed him. The
deceased Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico to stop hurting
his son. Suddenly, Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind with his
samurai. Romeo Catorse, the victim’s son, ran out of the house. That same
morning, Marcelo Lo was also stabbed and hacked by the accused for
helping his uncle Jovita Nicavera, who was also hacked by the accused but
managed to escape. Romeo Catorse together with his sister and younger
brother returned to the house of Adronico where they found their father
dead. The appellants were charged and convicted for murder of Carlos
Catorse and Marcelo Lo.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present in the

crime.

Ruling:

We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
may be appreciated against the appellants. Treachery exists when an
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In this case, the mode of attack
adopted by the appellant and his brother qualifies the killing to murder as
the same rendered the victims who were unarmed at that time defenseless
and helpless, without any opportunity to defend themselves from their
assailants' unreasonable and unexpected assault.

People v.s. Escote, Jr.

400 SCRA 603

Facts:

On September 28, 1996, past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver
of Five Star Passenger Bus, drove from its terminal at Pasay City to its
destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the
regular conductor of the bus. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers
boarded including the accused Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr.
Another passenger was SPO1 Jose Manio, Jr. When the bus was traveling
along the highway at Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly declared a
hold-up as they fired their guns upward to frighten the passengers. They
divested the money and valuables of all passengers including the fare
collected by the bus. When they saw SPO1 Manio, they also took his
identification card and service gun. They treacherously fired the gun and
killed him despite the policeman’s pleadings. The accused ordered Rodolfo to
stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga, where they will alight
from. When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo reported
the incident to the authorities. Then they proceeded to Plaridel, Bulacan
where they reported the robbery. Barely a month after, Victor was caught,
while riding a white colored taxi cab, at a checkpoint by SP03 Meneses where
he also presented the I.D. of SP01 Manio. A warrant of arrest was also served
to Escote who was in Laoang, Northern Samar. The accused were charged for
robbery with homicide.

Issue:
 Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery is valid in the
case at bar.

Ruling:

Treachery only applies to crimes against persons. Robbery with homicide, as

in this case, is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, the court
ruled that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery. However in the
case, treachery was not alleged in the information, thus it cannot aggravate
the penalty as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedures.

People v.s. Alba

G.R. No. 130523

Facts:

On January 31, 1993, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, at Sitio Pananlaya-an,

Brgy. Datagon, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, while the victim Ricky Aguilar and
Esterlito Aniñon were having a drinking spree at Paterno Flordeliza’s store,
appellant Gario Alba suddenly appeared behind Aguilar and stabbed him at
the back with a knife. Appellant immediately fled the scene. The accused
was charged and convicted for the crime of murder with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident

premeditation were present in the crime.

Ruling:

The findings of Dr. Bascos on the injuries inflicted on the victim strengthened
the testimony that the appellant attack the victim treacherously at the back.
There was stealth in the execution of the attack by Alba, thus there is
treachery involved. That treachery qualified the killing in this case is
indubitable as the attack was done from behind and in such manner as to
completely surprise the victim and makes him a defenseless target.
However, treachery was not alleged specifically as a qualifying circumstance
so it would be only considered a generic aggravating circumstance. Evident
premeditation was also not clearly established by the evidences.

People v.s. Saylan

130 SCRA 159

Facts:

On January 23, 1971 in the afternoon, Eutropia Agno, a married woman and
a classroom teacher of Malinao Elementary School, went to a public market
in Gingoog City to buy food for her family and thereafter proceeded to fetch
her 5-year old daughter Nilsonita. On their way home, Eutropia and Nilsonita
boarded a passenger jeep together with the appellant and other passengers.
It was almost 6:30 in the evening when the jeepney arrived at Malinas citrus
farm, all passengers alighted because the jeep could not go further. While
walking towards their house, appellant also walked side-by-side with Eutropia
and then suddenly pulled out a dagger about 8 inches long and pointing it at
the latter. He then dragged Eutropia, together with the children Nilsonita and
Rudy Gonzales, at some distance. He ordered then the children to stop upon
reaching a junction of the trail for men and carabaos. He dragged Eutropia
by her hand towards a creek 5 meters away. Appellant then ordered Eutropia
to remove her panty and simultaneously threatened her if she refuses.
Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Eutropia for five times.
The appellant did the “missionary” and “dog-style” positions. Afterwards,
they were taken to the house of Ben, a friend of Eutropia. There Eutropia
asked Ben to call her husband. The next day, she told her husband about the
incident and reported to the authorities. The accused was charged for the
crime of rape attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
abuse of superior strength, despoblado, ignominy and reiteracion.

Issue:

Whether or not the said aggravating circumstances are attendant in crime.

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the trial court in disregarding superiority, reiteracion and
nocturnity. Despoblado or uninhabited place was present because he did the
crime in a place far from detection. The trial court held that there was
ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, male
superior, female inferior, but also “The same position as dogs do”, entry from
behind.

People v.s. Carmina

143 SCRA 429

Facts:

On November 15, 1986, in the Municipality of Tarragona, Davao Oriental,

around 2:30 in the afternoon, Victoriano Agotano and Jose Billy Agotano were
intercepted by Valero Carmina, his wife Ernita, their son Israel and Aileen
Masanguid. Valero had a carbine, Israel a garand rifle and hunting knife and
Ernita had a bolo at her waist. They accused Billy for being a “pulahan”
because of the red shirt wrapped around his head. The two of them were
taken to the house of Dionisio Megriño, and they stayed there for thirty
minutes. Then they were ordered to march to their brother Alfredo’s house
while singing Lupang Hinirang. Twenty minutes later, they were taken to a
cousin of the Agotano’s from whom the Carminas demanded tuba, rice and
chickens. The drinking lasted for two hours. Then the Carminas decided to
leave taking with them Victoriano and Billy carrying a kettle, the rice and
chickens. They arrived at the house of Ramon Katiad around 6:30 P.M., but
the Katiads arrived 7:00 P.M. They ate supper altogether. Then about 10
o’clock, Israel took Billy to the yard and shot him at the nape. Then, he
invited everyone to witness the following acts on the body of Billy: he cut off
the limbs and the head, cut the stomach and pulled out the intestines, and
then he pulled out the liver and lungs. He turned to Victoriano to hurt him
next, but Victoriano made a good escape. Victoriano then reported to the
authorities. Valero Carmino, herein appellant, and his son Israel were
charged for murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery, superior

strength, evident premeditation and ignominy attended the crime.

Ruling:

The crime was qualified with treachery because, although the victim was
forewarned of his impending death, he was shot in the back while he was
entirely defenseless and the killers were under no risk whatsoever from any
retaliation the victim might make. Evident premeditation was not attendant
because there was no sufficient time for determining the mode of attack.
Superior strength is absorbed in treachery. And, ignominy was not
considered because the victim was already dead and no moral suffering
could anymore be suffered.

People v.s. Soriano

134 SCRA 542

Facts:

In the evening of March 20, 1976, Sergio de Guzman was aboard the
Catherine mini-bus driven by appellant Fernando Valdez. Appellant Frankie
Soriano and one John Doe, were conductors of the said mini-bus. Sergio
boarded the bus with two companions namely, Danilo Corpuz and Armando
de Guzman. There were also other passengers. As the bus travelled to
Dagupan City, it stopped at Malabago, Pangasinan. The appellant-driver
alighted from the bus to go to a house across the street. He was gone for 20
minutes, and returned with a scythe and gave it to the appellant. Upon
reaching Saipan, Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Danilo Corpuz, Armando de
Guzman and Sergio de Guzman stopped the bus. Corpuz and Armando were
able to alight from the bus, but Sergio was prevented. Appellant Soriano and
his co-conductor boxed Sergio. Then, appellant began hacking him with his
scythe until he was kicked out of the bus. Thereafter, appellant Valdez
maneuvered the bus in a zigzag manner, running over Sergio who died
instantaneously thereof. The appellants were charged for murder attended
by aggravating circumstances of treachery, use of motor vehicle and with
superior strength.

Issue:

Whether or not the said aggravating circumstances were correctly

considered.

Ruling:

Treachery was not satisfactorily established because the evidence failed to

show that the victim was unaware of the attack of the appellant. Abuse of
superior strength was correctly considered because the mode of attack was
knowingly intended by the assailants to insure the accomplishment of their
criminal purpose without risk to themselves arising from any defense that
the victim might offer, but only as a generic aggravating circumstance
because it was not alleged in the information. The aggravating circumstance
of use of a motor vehicle served as the qualifying circumstance.

People v.s. Martinez

127 SCRA 260

Facts:

On December 21, 1969, at about 9:00 in the evening, Asuncion Mendez of

Tondo, Manila was fetching water from a nearby faucet from their house with
Aling Nelly. That night, Asuncion saw the accused Narciso Martinez with
some companions talking to the deceased Roberto Dorado. The accused put
his arms around the shoulder of the deceased and twisted the arms of the
latter to the back. The companions then got a handkerchief and covered the
mouth of the deceased. A man coming from across a railroad track drew a
knife and stabbed the deceased at the chest, who thereafter died. The
accused and the companions left immediately. It was only on January 27,
1970 that Asuncion gave a written statement identifying the accused. Thus,
they were apprehended and charged for the crime of murder. Appellant
denies having killed the deceased because it was another man who stabbed
the latter.
 Issue:

Whether or not appellant is liable as a principal of the crime.

Ruling:

The Court finds conspiracy. The rule is that there is conspiracy where the
acts committed by the accused taken collectively, result from concerted and
associated action. The acts should apparently show that it originated from a
common purpose or object. There can be no question that appellant's act in
twisting the victim's arm from behind when the latter was stabbed by
appellant's companion, was a positive act towards the realization of a
common criminal intent. The appellant and his companion showed unity of
criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing. This
makes the appellant a conspirator and a principal by indispensable
cooperation

People v.s. Cruz

191 SCRA 377

Facts:

Around 4 o’clock in the afternoon of November 25, 1983, Jesus Baang, while
walking along M. Sioson Street, was followed by Rading Sason. Suddenly,
Sason shot Baang from behind. After the first gunshot, Baang turned around
and faced his assailant, who fired for the second time. Baang tried to escape
but he fell, thereafter Sason fired the coup de grace, hitting Baang on the
head. Sason then immediately left. Ismael Rivera, an eyewitness, sought to
establish conspiracy between Sason and Rolando Cruz. He testified that two
hours before the shooting incident, he was drinking with Sason, Cruz, Danilo
Soriano, and Renato Ramirez at the house of Aling Jusing. He said he saw
Cruz, thereafter, come out of his house and talked with Sason where the
former told the latter, “andiyan na”, referring to the deceased Baang. The
trial court relied on this testimony to establish Cruz as a principal by
inducement.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant Cruz is a principal by inducement in the case at

bar.

Ruling:

The Court did not abide by the trial court’s conclusion that the utterance
“andiyan na” were intended by the appellant to signal the gunweilder into
killing Baang because the phrase has equivocal meanings, and because the
slightest doubt must be resolved in favor of innocence. Inducement exists if
the command or advice is of such a nature that, without its concurrence, the
crime would not have materialized. The Court finds it hard to consider that
without Cruz’s utterance, the shooting by Sason would not have occurred. In
the case at bar, there is absence of conclusive proof indicating a prior plan or
agreement between appellant Cruz and Sason to kill the victim. The criminal
complicity of appellant Cruz, either as a principal by inducement in the killing
of Baang has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant
was acquitted.

People v.s. Gensola

29 SCRA 483

Facts:

Rufino Gensola was the driver of Gelveson No. 17, while Felicisimo and
Fidelina Tan were the conductors. They suspected Miguel Gayanilo for
puncturing the tires of the truck while it was parked in Gerona st., Guimbal,
Iloilo on November 18, 1958. The next day, around 6:30 P.M., Miguel
Gayanilo was crossing the street from the public market in the direction of
his carinderia with Rufino Gensola, who had a stone in his right hand as big
as a man’s fist. After crossing the street, Fidelina Tan shouted, “Rufino, strike
him”. Thereafter, Rufino did strike him with the stone on the left face.
Felicisimo followed striking the back of Rufino’s head with a piece of iron.
And, Fidelina also struck the victim on the left forehead with the piece of
iron. The victim died of traumatic shock. On trial, Rufino assumed sole
responsibility of the crime. But, the trial court found the three defendants
guilty as principals of the crime of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between the three defendants,

qualifying them to be principals of the crime.

Ruling:

The Court did not agree that the defendants are guilty as principals on the
ground of conspiracy. Fidelina’s muttering of “He does not appear because I
will kill him” and shouting of “Rufino, strike him”, and the blows given by
Felicisimo and Fidelina after Rufino’s strike did not show previous concert of
criminal design. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three
appellants is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.

People v.s. Madali

188 SCRA 69

Facts:

The son of Ricarte Madali, Ramon, had an altercation with the group of Felix
Gasang and Agustin Reloj on October 26, 1979. The following day, Felix and
Agustin was detained at the municipal jail. Ricarte Madali, a police officer,
angrily scolded Felix for being “very brave” and that he would sow bullets in
the body of Felix. On October 31, 1979, around 9:00 P.M., when Agustin Reloj
was fifteen meters from the house of Ricarte Madali, the latter accosted and
held him by his arm. He dragged Agustin towards the gate of their house,
where he was clubbed by Annie Madali. Agustin was able to escape but he
was hit by the shot of Ricarte at the back. Felix came and pleaded to Ricarte,
but the latter fired at the former twice. When Cipriano Gasang arrived, Annie
beamed her flashlight at him and said, “Here comes another, fire upon him”.
Merlinda Gasang who was with her father Cipriano was also shot but was
able to survive the injury. The Madali spouses were charged separately of
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.

Issue:

Whether or not Annie Madali’s participation in the crime is that of an

accomplice.

Ruling:

The Court is not convinced that there was proof beyond reasonable doubt as
to the existence of conspiracy between the Madali spouses. To prove
conspiracy, it must be shown by the acts and circumstances from which may
logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused.
Annie’s participation was only limited to beaming the flashlight and warning
her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. Annie only
assisted her husband in taking a good aim. Such assistance merely
facilitated the commission of the felony, which is the act of an accomplice.
The Court ruled that Annie’s liability is only that of an accomplice.

People v.s. Doctolero

193 SCRA 632

Facts:

On November 8, 1970, 6 o’clock in the evening, the three accused Ludovico,

Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero threw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun,
asking for the man to come out. Impatiently, they went inside the house.
Ludovico brutally killed the women inside, Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio, and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside their room
of the said house. When the accused were coming down from the house,
going towards the road, they met Marcelo Doctolero and also boloed him
several times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck
Marcelo with a bolo in the head. Then all of them left. The accused were
charged of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries. Ludovico was
the principal of the crime, and his co-accused Conrado and Virgilio were
found guilty as accomplices.

Issue:

Whether or not Conrado and Virgilio are liable as accomplices of the crime.

Ruling:

The appellants Conrado and Virgilio, though only stood outside the room
where their brother was hacking the victims, knew what was going inside the
room and did not bother precaution or stop their brother. Therefore, it is
reasonable to believe that the two appellants merely stood by ready to lend
assistance to their brother. The Court held that where one goes with the
principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to
kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and
moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. Though appellants interposed
that they did not know what crime their brother did, they are still
accomplices even if they did not know of the actual crime intended by the
principal, provided that they were aware that it was an illicit act.

People v.s. Continente

399 SCRA 1

Facts:

Around 7 o’clock in the morning of April 21, 1989, the car of U.S. Col. James
N. Rowe was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City. While they were on their way to JUSMAG Compound,
gunmen who were onboard an old model Toyota Corolla suddenly fired at the
car of Rowe, thereby killing him and wounding his driver Joaquin Vinuya. The
car used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car. Donato
Continente’s involvement in the ambush was established by further
investigation of CIS agents. Juanito Itaas, a known member of the Sparrow
Unit of the BPA based in Davao City, was also arrested for investigation. Trial
court after series of litigations found Continente and Itaas guilty of the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant Continente served only as an accomplice.

Ruling:

Trial court erroneously found that the appellants allegedly conspired in the
commission of the crimes. Donato Continente was only assigned by their
group to conduct surveillance on the area of JUSMAG, and reported it to a
certain Freddie Abella. Conspirators are those who are authors of a crime
and decides that it should be committed. Appellant was merely assigned to
gather data, thereby facilitating only the commission of the crime. Donato
Continent is liable for the crimes charged only as an accomplice.

People v.s. Taer

186 SCRA 598

Facts:

At 2 o’clock dawn of December 6, 1981, accused Emilio Namocatcat and

Mario Cago arrived at Jorge Taer’s House with two male carabaos, which
Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The carabaos were left at Taer’s place. In
the morning of the same day, Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang,
Valencia, Bohol discovered that their respective carabaos were missing. The
two were informed on December 15, 1981 that their lost carabaos were
found at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez. When they went to the said place, the
carabaos were tied to a bamboo thicket near the house of Taer. Taer was
found by trial court and Court of Appeals to have conspired with Namocatcat
of the crime cattle rustling.

Issue:

Whether or not Taer’s liability is that of an accessory only.

Ruling:

Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and

conclusive evidence. Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of
the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy. Taer did not participate in the taking
of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of
taking by profiting himself by its effects. By employing the two carabaos in
his farm, Taer was profiting by the objects of the theft. Taer is thus only an
accessory after the fact.

People v.s. Lucas

240 SCRA 66

Facts:

In the decision in this case, the nature of reclusion perpetua in the light of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 1 which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal
Code by specifically fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years was questioned. It opined that since
no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code was
made, the said laws has not made explicit an intention to convert reclusion
perpetua into a divisible penalty. Applying Article 65 of the Revised Penal
Code, the time included in reclusion perpetua can be divided into three equal
portions with each composing a period. Taking into account the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-91-
18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua. The appellee files a motion
for clarification to correct 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years, as
stated in the decision, to 33 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years.

Issue:

Whether or not the amendment of Article 27 by Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659

has made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty.

Ruling:

After re-examination of legislative history of R.A. 7659, the Court concludes

that although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there
was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty. Although
Senator Tolentino described reclusion perpetua as a “flexible or divisible”
penalty, yet in the portion of his sponsorship speech explicitly stated that the
said penalty is one of the two indivisible penalties in the Revised Penal Code.

People v.s. Baguio

196 SCRA 459

Facts:

Lidovina and her husband, the deceased, Alfredo Paulino were conversing
with a certain Benny in front of their house around 10 o’clock in the evening
of March 31, 1981. A group of nine or ten people passed by, among whom
was the accused Rodolfo Baguio. It was said that the deceased had
unpleasant dealings with the accused for charging the latter for theft in the
neighborhood. While Lidovina was inside to get money to buy some
cigarettes, she heard her husband cry “Aray ko po!”. She rushed to see what
was happening to her husband, so she saw that Baguio and his companions
were stabbing him with pointed weapons. Assailants then fled. Alfredo was
brought to the hospital, and thereafter died in the surgery room. The
accused and his companions, who were still at large, were charged of
murder. The trial court convicted the accused Baguio for the charge, and
sentenced to the penalty of “reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment”.

Issue:

Whether or not reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are distinct.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the trial court erred in sentencing Baguio to “reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment”. They are distinct from each other. The Code
does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. The felony
committed by Baguio being one punished under the Revised Penal Code, the
proper penalty that should be imposed on him, therefore, is that prescribed
by the same Code, reclusion perpetua, not "life imprisonment."