7 Security of facilities

Context analysis and What is the context and who are the actors?
actor mapping What impact will your organisation and
BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OR

programmes have on the context and actors?

STARTING PROGRAMME

Risk assessment What are the threats you face? What are your
vulnerabilities to those threats?
What is the probability and impact of risks?

Security strategies Understand your organisational approach: what

Acceptance, protection strategies do you use generally and in this context
and deterrence in particular?

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Security plan NGO security
coordination and other
sources of support
WITHIN FIRST
1-2 WEEKS

Standard Operating Contingency plans

Procedures (How management will
(How staff will mitigate respond to anticipated
the threats identified in situations)
the risk assessment)

Hibernation,
Office/compound/
IMPROVEMENT

relocation and
ONGOING

facility security evacuation

Medical support
Communications Travel safety: and evacuation
and information Airports/vehicles/
security other

EISF guide / Security to go 7:01

 When considering a new office, residence or compound, first review your risk
assessment to understand what the types of threats are, what the threat level is
and what level of protection or deterrence you will likely need. This also applies
if moving into an existing office with a partner organisation. Also consider if
it will be possible to build an acceptance strategy in the location: this is often
more difficult in large urban environments than in rural settings, though it is
always advisable to create mutual understanding with your neighbours.

This is applicable to all organisational properties, offices,

residences, warehouses, clinics, schools, etc.

In an emergency response it is often necessary and/or convenient to share

space. If this is the case, it is important to agree who is responsible for what,
i.e. perimeter security, guard services, local acceptance strategy, etc.
See EISF guide ‘Office opening: a guide for NGOs’

Security of offices, compounds and other facilities

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The ‘neighbourhood’

Property boundary

Your
facility

What you can control

Outside your control

The outer ring: the neighbourhood

This is the area surrounding the office/compound/facility/residence. The risk
assessment should identify who in the area could have an effect on the safety
of staff. You need to understand your neighbourhood and the stakeholders
within it to implement your acceptance strategy. It may be easier in rural
areas than in urban environments, but developing understanding with your
neighbours is essential in all contexts.

EISF guide / Security to go 7:02

 Consider:
Road access, both access to the office and how you will safely travel to
other sites. Is it a dead end? This can be positive for identification of hostile
observation but will limit travel options/escape routes.
Natural hazards like rivers (flooding), hills (mudslides/avalanches), swamps
(malaria/dengue), or forests (fire, wildlife).
Neighbours such as embassies, military/police posts, banks, government
offices, other NGOs, or universities.
Distance to airports, hotels, key locations in an emergency.
Blocking structures/natural features that would interrupt satellite
communications in an emergency.
The landlord and his record and reputation.
Reliable access to clean water.
Access to telephone, the internet and mobile networks.

The middle ring: the property

This is the first area that is under the organisation’s control. The risk assessment
should guide you in how to secure it in terms of a perimeter wall, fence or
hedge, or whether you leave it open, i.e. your protection strategy.

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Always keep in mind that if you feel you need to build a ‘bunker’ to
stay safe, you probably should not be based in that area.

When planning your perimeter you should consider how it may impact your
neighbours and image, and the message it sends. If you decide to have a
low profile and then wrap your compound in barbed wire, making it stand out
from its neighbours, it will be counter-productive. You should also consider
how your presence may affect your neighbours:
Do you require a generator? If you do, can it be positioned away from other
properties and/or is there room for soundproofing?
Is there sufficient parking within the compound and/or in the area without
without inconveniencing others?
Is your presence creating a security risk for your neighbours?
If you are employing guards, where will they be located?
It is possible to build protection measures that do not do not negatively
change the appearance of the compound. For example barbed wire below
the top of the wall, using flower beds or pots to disguise concrete barriers, etc.

EISF guide / Security to go 7:03

 Within your property there are other issues you will need to consider:
Access control (planned): how do staff, visitors, suppliers or community
members access your property? Consider vehicle/personnel gates, identity
checks, safe parking areas, ID cards, waiting areas, and crowd control
(if applicable).
Access control (unplanned): how easy is it for people to get into the site?
Are there shared boundaries with neighbours or open spaces? Are there
overhanging trees and how close are the buildings to the boundary walls?
Fire hazards including storage of fuel and combustibles, electrical power
lines and designated smoking areas.
How is trash collected and dealt with in a safe and environmentally
sound way?
Emergency exits: If your compound has a wall and main gate facing the
street, how will you evacuate unobserved if there is a danger in front of
the facility? Where will you go? Perhaps to a neighbouring compound/
UN facility/other NGO/residences?

The inner ring: the building(s)

Security for the organisation’s buildings, whether they are offices, compounds/

Module 7
warehouses or residences, is key as these hold your most valued items including
people, equipment, assets, cash, records, and aid materials and supplies. The
design of the building should also be appropriate for the natural hazards, e.g.
earthquake resistant, insulated against heat and/or cold for heat and/or cold.
For staff to be effective in their work, it is important for them to feel safe in their
office and accommodation. Consider:
Security of doors/windows that prevent unauthorised access but do not
trap staff in event of fire/evacuation.
Security of roof areas (often a preferred entry point for robberies after hours).
A reception area that controls access to other vulnerable areas.
Access control procedures so that visitors admitted to the building cannot
roam around unsupervised.
Scheduled electrical inspections to reduce fire risk in addition to strict
policies on not overloading electrical outlets.
Safe storage of documents including fireproof safes secured to the wall
or floor.
Emergency evacuation routes and procedures clearly posted and
rehearsed.

EISF guide / Security to go 7:04

 If necessary, a safe room that will fit all staff expected to be in the building
and equipped with emergency supplies (first aid kit, torch, blankets, food,
communications device(s) that are charged/powered, fire extinguisher).
Check that the emergency communication equipment works in the safe
room. Satellite phones normally require line of sight, so external aerials
may be needed.
Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) units to protect computers and other
electrical devices when power supply is not reliable or subject to spikes
and power cuts.
Alarms for fire or intrusion, and actions to take on hearing them,
including rehearsals.

Security of staff residences

Staff residences can be approached in a similar fashion to other properties,
but with some additional precautions to ensure safety. While the whole
residence needs to have adequate security, valuables (TVs, computers,
appliances etc.) are usually held in the ‘public’ areas of the house where
guests or friends may be entertained, and these items are likely to be the
principal lure for thieves. Private areas of the residence will include sleeping
areas. These need to be secured to a higher standard than the ‘public’ areas.

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‘Public’ area Private (safe) area

Bedroom
Lounge

Kitchen Bedroom Safe room?

EISF guide / Security to go 7:05

 Consider:
A solid, lockable door between the public and private areas of the residence.
Improved window and roof security in private areas, lockable from inside
but not an obstacle in event of a fire for evacuation.
A safe room with first aid kits, blankets, torch, fire extinguisher and a
communications device that is charged and tested regularly.
Window screens to keep out mosquitos (for prevention of diseases).
Firm control of keys and any duplicates.
Exterior lights, especially around entrances.
It is also important to consider local culture. In a conservative environment
you may need to consider separation between male and female quarters, as
well as separation between national staff such as guards and drivers, and
international staff – so that international staff can relax without giving offence or
the wrong impression by drinking and dancing, women wearing shorts, etc.

Watchmen and security guards

Many organisations look to locally engaged watchmen and/or security
guards as a first step to developing their security systems around facilities.

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Organisations often use the term ‘watchmen’ rather than ‘guard’ to support
the understanding that staff are not expected to risk their own safety to protect
the compound and assets.
Guards are often the first point of contact between the host community and
an NGO. How they behave, their manners as well as professionalism will
often reflect back on their employer. Therefore, for all guards or watchmen
ensure the following:
They are aware of your organisation’s mandate and Code of Conduct.
They are given clear instructions on their duties and how they will be
supervised.
Guards have a list of ‘actions on’ to deal with visitors, suspicious activity,
robbery, fire, injuries or other incident likely to occur, as identified in your
risk assessment.
Ensure staff members treat guards with respect as well as understanding
of the guards’ duties, and ensure compliance.
Guards should be given an emergency contact list and means to
communicate if an incident should occur.
See EISF briefing paper ‘Engaging private security providers: a guideline for
non-governmental organisations’.

EISF guide / Security to go 7:06

 Virtually all NGO guards are unarmed. However, in high-risk environments
it may be common for organisations to have an armed response in case of
emergency, either activated by panic buttons or existing guards. If this is the
case the organisation should get information about who provides the armed
service (private company, police, military), what its purpose is (protecting the
organisation’s staff and assets or apprehending the attackers), their level of
training, and the organisation’s liability if someone (staff, guard, bystander) is
shot during an armed response.
There are three main categories of security guards: commercial guards,
contracted guards and community volunteers. Each has advantages
and disadvantages.
Commercial guard services
They are provided by a contracted guard services company. The guard
company may rotate staff making it difficult to create a level of trust. It is
important, particularly in residence buildings, that staff members know the
guard who should be opening the gate. Otherwise the guard can create
feelings of insecurity rather than alleviating them.

Advantages Disadvantages

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The provider can supply additional The organisation has little or
services such as a rapid response no control over the guard’s
team (be clear on what this involves), instructions and duty standards.
alarms, radio networks, vehicle
patrols, and night supervisors.
Recruiting, training, payroll, HR, Security companies are mostly
admin and scheduling are done by concerned with ‘the bottom line’.
a commercial provider.

Guards are poorly paid

and unmotivated.

EISF guide / Security to go 7:07

 Contracted guards
They are employed directly by the organisation.

Advantages Disadvantages
Guards can be better paid since the The organisation must take
money of the aid agency does not responsibility for training, uniforms,
go to the commercial profit system. equipment, administration
and supervision.
As members of staff, they have No additional support available.
increased loyalty and knowledge
of the organisation’s standards,
policies and code of conduct.

Community volunteers
Normally, they are guards provided by the host community in programme
areas. They are often the only option in remote areas. There is normally a cost
for salaries, training, minimal equipment.

Advantages Disadvantages

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Utilises ‘acceptance strategy’ No set standards for duties.
approach by incorporating the
community into security.
Lack of accountability.

Open to abuse.

EISF guide / Security to go 7:08

 Contents
Introduction
Response
Modules Module 10
Hibernation, relocation
Planning and preparedness and evacuation
Module 1 Module 11
Security risk management Medical support and
planning process evacuation
Module 2
Actor mapping and context Support services
analysis
Module 12
Module 3
People management
Risk assessment tool
Module 4
Security strategies: Glossary
acceptance, protection
and deterrence Other EISF publications
Module 5
NGO security coordination
and other sources of support
Module 6
Security plan
Module 7
Security of facilities
Module 8
Communications and
information security
Module 9
Travel safety: airports,
vehicles and other means
of transport

EISF guide / Security to go iii

European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)
EISF is an independent network of Security Focal Points who currently represent 85 Europe-based
humanitarian NGOs operating internationally. EISF is committed to improving the security of
relief operations and staff. It aims to increase safe access by humanitarian agencies to people
affected by emergencies. Key to its work is the development of research and tools which
promote awareness, preparedness and good practice.
EISF was created to establish a more prominent role for security risk management in
international humanitarian operations. It facilitates exchange between member organisations
and other bodies such as the UN, institutional donors, academic and research institutions,
the private sector, and a broad range of international NGOs. EISF’s vision is to become a
global reference point for applied practice and collective knowledge, and key to its work is the
development of practical research for security risk management in the humanitarian sector.
EISF is an independent entity currently funded by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Department for
International Development (DFID) and member contributions.
www.eisf.eu

Acknowledgements
The first edition of this guide, published in 2015, was developed jointly by James Davis (Act
Alliance) and Lisa Reilly, Executive Coordinator of the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF).
The project manager of the first edition was Raquel Vazquez Llorente, Researcher at EISF.
Module 12 – People management was developed by Christine Williamson. The project
manager was Adelicia Fairbanks, Research Advisor at EISF.
The European Interagency Security Forum and the authors would like to thank the following
individuals for sharing their expertise with us: Marko Szilveszter Macskovich (UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Michelle Betz (Betz Media Consulting), Veronica Kenny-
Macpherson (Cosantóir Group), Jean Michel Emeryk, Peter Wood, Shaun Bickley, William Carter,
Rebekka Meissner and Christine Newton.

Suggested citation
Davis, J. et al. (2017) Security to go: a risk management toolkit for humanitarian aid agencies.
2nd edition. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF).

Disclaimer
EISF is a member-led grouping and has no separate legal status under the laws of England and Wales or any other jurisdiction, and
references to ‘EISF’ in this disclaimer shall mean the member agencies, observers and secretariat of EISF.
While EISF endeavours to ensure that the information in this document is correct, EISF does not warrant its accuracy and completeness.
The information in this document is provided ‘as is’, without any conditions, warranties or other terms of any kind, and reliance upon any
material or other information contained in this document shall be entirely at your own risk. Accordingly, to the maximum extent permitted by
applicable law, EISF excludes all representations, warranties, conditions and other terms which, but for this legal notice, might have effect in
relation to the information in this document. EISF shall not be liable for any kind of loss or damage whatsoever to you or a third party arising
from reliance on the information contained in this document.
© 2017 European Interagency Security Forum

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