NYNAS CODE OF SAFE CONDUCT

PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS

We respect hazards We walk the line

• We improve our understanding of process safety • We use up-to-date documentation (e.g., Piping
hazards at our location and our roles in and Instrumentation Diagrams) that accurately reflect
controlling them. installed systems and equipment.
• We are vigilant about the potential impacts of • We physically confirm the system is ready for the
uncontrolled process safety hazards. intended activity (e.g., valve positions, line up of relief
• We discuss process safety hazards before starting devices, etc.).
a task. • We alert supervision to identified documentation and
• We bring forward process safety hazards to be readiness issues before operation.
included in activity risk assessments.

We control ignition sources

We apply procedures • We identify, eliminate, or control the full range of
• We use operating and maintenance procedures, even potential ignition sources during task risk assessments
if we are familiar with the task. and during job preparation and execution.
• We discuss the key steps within a critical procedure • We minimise and challenge ignition sources even in
1
before starting it. “non-hazardous” areas.
• We pause before key steps and check readiness to • We eliminate ignition sources during breaking
2 containment and start-up and shutdown operations.
progress.
• We stop, inform supervision and avoid workarounds
if procedures are missing, unclear, unsafe, or cannot
be followed. We recognise change
• We take time to become familiar with, and practice, • We look for and speak up about change.
emergency procedures. MOC • We discuss changes and involve others to identify the
need for management of change (MOC).
• We review the MOC process for guidance on what
triggers an MOC.
We sustain barriers • We discuss and seek advice on change that occurs
• We discuss the purpose of hardware and human gradually over time.
barriers at our location.
• We evaluate how our tasks could impact process
safety barriers.
• We speak up when barriers don’t feel adequate. We stop if the unexpected occurs
• We perform our roles in maintaining barrier health • We discuss the work plan and what signals would tell
and alert supervision to our concerns. us it is proceeding as expected.
• We use an approval process for operations with • We pause and ask questions when signals and
degraded barriers. conditions are not as expected.
• We stop and alert supervision if the activity is not
proceeding as expected.

We stay within operating limits

• We discuss and use the approved operating limits for
our location. We watch for weak signals
• We escalate where we cannot work within operating • We proactively look for indicators or signals that
limits. suggest future problems.
• We alert supervision if an alarm response action is • We speak up about potential issues even if we are
unclear or the time to respond is inadequate. not sure they are important.
• We obtain formal approval before changing operating • We persistently explore the causes of changing
limits. indicators or unusual situations.
• We confirm that potential for overpressure from
temporary pressure sources has been addressed.

We maintain safe isolation

• We use isolation plans for the specific task, based on
uptodate information.
• We raise isolation concerns before the task starts and
challenge when isolation plans cannot be executed.
• We check for residual pressure or process material
before breaking containment.
• We monitor the integrity of isolations regularly and
stop to reassess when change could affect an isolation
integrity.
• We confirm leak-tightness before, during, and after
reinstating equipment.

The process safety fundamentals have been developed by the IOGP, (International Association of Oil & Gas Producers).