EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 28 2021 Number 2

https://doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.28.2.09

Giancarlo COTELLA *
, Erblin BERISHA *

THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

ON THE WESTERN BALKAN REGION: AN EROSION OF EU
CONDITIONALITY?

Abstract. The EU integration process contributes to influence the ongoing institutional changes
in the Western Balkans. At the same time, the incremental inflow of Chinese capital in the region
that followed the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative is progressively reshaping power relations
there. This article sheds light on the interaction between these two processes, discussing whether
the increasing inflow of resources may gradually erode EU conditionality and hinder the overall
integration process. To do so, the authors draw on an extensive review of academic and policy
documents and on selected expert interviews, upon which they compare the actions of the EU and
China in the region.
Key words: Belt and Road Initiative, the Western Balkan Region, EU enlargement, China, condi-
tionality.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the last 20 years, China’s global political and economic influence has
grown exponentially. The Chinese government undertook its so-called go-
ing-out strategy, which gained further concreteness with the launch of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and is expected to produce “a great

*
Giancarlo COTELLA, Erblin BERISHA, Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Stud-
ies and Planning (DIST), Politecnico di Torino, Viale Mattioli 39, 10125 Torino, Italy; e-mails:
[email protected], [email protected]; ORCIDs: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8445-
412X, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1378-4487

© by the author, licensee Łódź University – Łódź University Press, Łódź, Poland. This article is
an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution license CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Received: 09.03.2021; Accepted: 25.10.2021
166 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

impact on global economy through the integration of a large part of the world”
(Sarker et al., 2018, p. 626). While some of its branches are already complet-
ed, the consequences of the BRI for Europe are still uncertain. The majority
of Western states show a rather lukewarm attitude, while Eastern countries ap-
pear more open to engagement. This is especially true for the countries of the
Western Balkan Region (WBR),1 which see the resources channelled through
the BRI as a potential way out of an unsatisfactory economic situation (World
Bank, 2012).
At the same time, since the 2000s, the WBR countries have been engaged
in a complex process that will eventually lead to their integration into the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), and which influences them through the complex juxtaposi-
tion of conditionality logics (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005; Borzel et
al., 2017; Cotella and Berisha, 2016; Berisha, 2018; Berisha and Cotella, 2021).
While Slovenia and Croatia already achieved full membership, the integration of
the other countries is proceeding at varying paces, as a consequence of a number
of contextual contingencies that have at various moments in time altered the pri-
orities of the actors involved (the global financial crisis, the progressive raise of
euro-sceptic parties throughout Europe, and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pan-
demic and its unpredictable effects).
While the growing role that China plays in the WBR is undeniable, no as-
sessment has been attempted yet of its impact on the integration of the region
into the EU (Hake and Radzyner, 2019). In order to contribute to this direc-
tion, the authors build on the latest literature and policy documents, as well as
on interviews conducted with selected stakeholders, to address and compare
the role and influence of the EU and China in the WBR. Particular attention
is devoted to the conditionality mechanisms that characterise the enlargement
process, and to the impact that the BRI may have on them. After a brief intro-
duction, a theoretical framework to understand EU conditionality in candidate
countries is outlined, building on recent contributions in the field of European
integration studies. The paper then focuses on the role that the EU plays in the
WBR, discussing where the various countries stand along the process of inte-
gration. The fourth section illustrates the BRI’s vision and objectives, together
with its implications for the WBR. The fifth section compares the role of the
EU and China in the WBR through a number of interpretative lenses. Building
on this comparison, some considerations are brought forward, reflecting on
the potential implications that the increasing influence of China may have on
EU conditionality in the region and, ultimately, on the region’s future integra-
tion into the EU.

1
For the purpose of this article, the Western Balkan Region includes Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. While belonging to the area, Croatia is
excluded from the analysis due to its membership status.
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 167

2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY

Europeanisation studies traditionally concerned the impact of European integration on

Member States (Olsen, 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Radaelli, 2004). How-
ever, a distinctive sub-area of research has recently emerged, focusing on the mech-
anisms through which the EU, by means of its enlargement process, influences the
development of the rules and policies in candidate countries (Grabbe, 2002; Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Balfour and Stratulat, 2011).
The theoretical framework adopted in these studies concerns the conditions un-
der which the EU has an impact, and the mechanisms through which the impact is
delivered (Schimmelfennig, 2011, 2012). These mechanisms are usually identified
as depending on legal, economic, and cognitive conditionality (Cotella and Stead,
2011; Cotella, 2020; Cotella and Dabrowski, 2021), with the first two models be-
ing externally driven in comparison to the latter, which features a mix of social
learning and lesson-drawing episodes (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005).
Previous researches focusing on the Eastern Enlargement have demonstrated the
dominance of incentive-based Europeanisation, and suggest the need to analyse its
impact through the so-called external incentives model, which conceptualises ac-
cession conditionality as a bargaining game. The decisions of the actors involved
in this game depend on self-interest and cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly,
through conditionality mechanisms, the EU imposes target governments with its
rules, through a strategy of reward-based reinforcement. The rewards vary from
financial assistance to political entrustment, with full membership that constitute
the final prize. Here conditionality acts as a function of a strategic calculation of the
target government, which complies with EU rules only if the benefits of the reward
outweigh domestic material and political costs (Zhelyazkova et al., 2018).
In EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, the effectiveness of
conditionality mainly depended on membership incentive by the EU and rath-
er low domestic adoption costs (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006; Schimmelfennig,
2007). Credible political membership enabled EU-enthusiast governments to
pursue reforms, protecting them against the opposition from EU-sceptic actors
(Schimmelfennig, 2005). When it comes to the WBR, more stringent accession cri-
teria, lower credibility of membership, weaker administrative capacity, and higher
domestic costs contributed to a slowing down of the pace. EU conditionality is
showing a differential impact on rules’ adoption in the region. Capacity-building
initiatives and intermediate rewards independent from the accession could explain
the continuous progress of compliance in some Western Balkans countries. At the
same time, the low absorption of EU funds and scarce institutional capacity may
lead to frustration and eventually to an overall disaffection with EU logics.
Overall, in combination with ‘weaker’ conditionality mechanisms, other exter-
nal factors may alter the strategic calculations of the national governments, and
168 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

eventually drive their choices towards immediate and less burdensome benefits
(Adams et al., 2011b). Our argument is that the growing volume of Chinese in-
vestments in the WBR may play a similar role, triggering alternative condition-
ality influences and, in turn, inducing domestic changes that are not necessarily
compatible with those hoped for by the EU.

3. THE ROLE OF THE EU IN THE WESTERN BALKAN REGION

The integration of the WBR into the EU formally started in 1999, with the stip-
ulations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). Since then the
process has continued at varying paces, with Croatia being the only country that
effectively joined the EU while the others are still dealing with the transposition
of the acquis communautaire (Table 1). Montenegro and Serbia initiated negotia-
tions in 2012 and 2014, respectively. North Macedonia has been a candidate since
2005 and in 2009 the European Commission recommended opening negotiations.
Albania started the analytical examination of the acquis in 2018. In March 2020,
the Council finally decided to open accession negotiations, pending the fulfilment
of a set of conditions. In July 2020, the Commission presented a draft negotiating
framework to Member States. One year later, accession negotiations with Albania
– and North Macedonia – have not yet been opened. Finally, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, and Kosovo are still at an early stage, with the former only having applied
for membership in 2016, while the latter has not even apply yet.2
One must note that, when it comes to the influence exerted by the EU, the cur-
rent enlargement strategy significantly enhanced its determinacy by framing its
legal conditionality into a stricter and more coherent system of monitoring. Over-
all, the conditionality increased in terms of the breadth and scope of the reforms
(Dimitrova, 2016). In contrast to previous enlargement rounds, in order to obtain
EU membership, the candidate countries are now required not only to adopt the
regulations and conditions set out in negotiating chapters, but also to have the
most difficult acquis sections effectively implemented before accession.3 An ad-
ditional innovation concerns the change of the suspension clause, with the Com-
mission that now may withhold its recommendation to open/close other chapters
and adapt the associated preparatory work until sufficient progress under the ‘rule
of law’ chapters is achieved. In summary, the conditionality applied to candidate

2
The case of Kosovo is particularly complex due to the fact that a number of EU countries do not
recognise it as an autonomous republic.
3
This is an example of learning by doing, which indicates the intention to settle major rule of law,
political and bilateral problems prior to accession instead of dealing with them afterwards (Müftüler-
Baç and Çiçek, 2015).
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 169

countries through the new approach is formulated in such a way that the EU can
exercise influence and steer reforms on issues that are politically highly sensitive.
While this is expected to positively influence the compliance of Western Balkans
countries, it has also led to a higher variation of determinacy of the EU conditions
across the countries, with a lack of clarity in regards to the nature and scope of
EU acquis, which has negatively affected consistency and impact (Pech, 2016).

Table 1. EU Integration steps for WB countries

Bosnia Mon- North

Alba-
Steps Agreements and Her- tene- Macedo- Serbia Kosovo
nia
zegovina gro nia
Potential
2000 2003 2000 2000 2000 2000
Candidate
Pre- 2006– 2008– 2014–
SAA 2008 2001 2008
adhesion 2009 2015 2016
Agreement Application for
2009 2016 2009 2004 2009 n.a
EU membership
Candidate Status 2014 n.a. 2010 2005 2012 n.a.
Analytical
Screening examination of 2018 n.a. 2011 2018 2013 n.a.
the acquis
Chapters’
Negotiation n.a.a n.a. 2012– n.a.b 2015– n.a.
Discussion Period
Adhesion Adhesion Treaty n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Status Member State n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. n.a.
a
In March 2020 the European Council endorsed the General Affairs Council’s decision to open
accession negotiations with Albania and in July 2020 the draft negotiating framework were
presented to the Member States. However, the negotiation process has yet to start.
b
The North Macedonia negotiation phase is under discussion. However due to some regional
dispute with Bulgaria, the process is now in stand-by.

Source: own work based on Cotella and Berisha, 2019.

In parallel to the varying progress achieved in the implementation of the ac-

quis, in the last three decades it has been possible to witness a progressive eco-
nomic convergence between the EU area and the WBR. Moreover, according to
official data (EEAS, 2017) growing economic ties have been established between
the EU and the WBR, with the share trade volume reaching the value of 49.5 bil-
lion euros in 2017 (EEAS, 2017). Today, EU countries represent the region’s best
trading partners, accounting for 73% of the total trade volume, a leading role
that is also confirmed when considering inward Foreign Direct Investments. This
data confirms that the EU has a strong influence on WBR economy, trade and
170 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

investment system, and this economic interdependency is expected to consolidate

further once full integration is achieved (EEAS, 2017). For this purpose, the EU
has mobilised a set of funding schemes that target different sectors of WBR econ-
omy. These schemes contributed to strategic fields like transport infrastructure,
energy production and efficiency, environmental protection, and greenfields.4 In
particular, since its introduction in 2007, the so-called Instrument of Pre-Acces-
sion (IPA) has delivered over 23 billion euros in the region (see Table 2), support-
ing regional cooperation and connectivity (Pinnavaia and Berisha, 2021).
When it comes to the 2021–27 programming period, according to the politi-
cal agreement between the European Parliament and the Council on the new IPA
III, the multi-annual financial framework will mobilise 14.2 billion euros to sup-
port economic convergence primarily through investments dedicated to inclusive
growth, sustainable connectivity, and green and digital transition (EC, 2020).
Moreover, a recent communication of the Commission (EC, 2020) indicated that
IPA III will team up with the European Green Deal in promoting joint actions
to tackle the challenges of green transition, climate change, biodiversity loss,
excessive use of resources, and pollution. Importantly, apart from the territorial
impacts produced through IPA’s funded actions, one should highlight that these
tools, similarly to the pre-accession tools implemented in Central and Eastern
Europe throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, have contributed to facilitating the
consolidation of EU concepts, priorities, and procedures in the region (Cotella,
2007, 2014; Cotella et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2011).

Table 2. IPA allocations by sector and country (programming periods 2007–13 and 2014–20)

Bosnia North
Alba- Cro- Monte- Ser- Koso-
Sector and Her- Macedo-
nia atia negro bia vo
zegovina nia
Justice [%] 18 18 9 17 12 16 –
PA Reform [%] 13 13 9 23 13 22 –
Transport [%] 16 8 12 13 20 10 –
2007–2013

Energv. and Climate [%] 18 16 15 8 18 19 –

Social Development [%] 10 14 34 8 12 22 –
Agriculture and Rural
22 5 21 18 17 6 –
development [%]
Others [%] 3 26 0 13 8 5 –
Total (M€) 512 554 802 191 508 1.213 679

4
During the 2014–2017 period, the EU invested more than 330 million euros in transport projects,
in turn generating 930 million euros of private investments, as well as overall positive outcomes
in terms of jobs’ creation (EEAS, 2017). For more info see: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
infographics/western-balkans-connectivity/
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 171

Bosnia North
Alba- Cro- Monte- Ser- Koso-
Sector and Her- Macedo-
nia atia negro bia vo
zegovina nia
Democracy and rule of
27 28 – 19 15 22 22
law [%]
Democracy and govern-
16 8 – 11 11 15 14
ance [%]
Rule of law and funda-
10 7 – 7 4 8 8
mental rights [%]
Competitiveness and
23 42 – 30 35 27 28
growth [%]
2014–2020

Environment, climate
3 6 – 6 10 10 12
change, and energy [%]
Transport [%] 2 3 – 5 10 3 0
Competitiveness, inno-
vation, agriculture, rural 14 4 – 12 11 11 10
development [%]
Education, employ-
ment, and social poli- 5 2 – 8 4 4 6
cies [%]
Total (M€) 1279 789,3 – 568,2 1217 3078,8 1204,2

Source: own work based on EU data (European Commission, 2015 and DG NEAR, 2018).

4. THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: OBJECTIVE, GEOPOLITICAL

AMBITIONS, AND INFLUENCE

Since the turn of century, China has been expanding its influence worldwide
(Pu, 2016). With this aim in mind, in 2013 it launched the so-called Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), aiming at promoting economic connectivity between
China and the countries involved in the initiative.5 Importantly, the BRI
should not be regarded as a single megaproject, rather as a continuously grow-
ing initiative with a large portfolio of projects for rail, road, sea, and airport
infrastructure, power and water links, real estate contracts, and, more recently,
digital infrastructure (Sielker and Kaufmann, 2020). In this sense, it is seen
as the most ambitious and economically relevant initiative ever undertaken,

5
The BRI includes 68 countries globally and, in particular, countries located in the Eurasia region.
It corresponds to 65% of the world’s population and over 40% of the GDP produced in the world
(Cai, 2017).
172 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

comparable only with the Marshal Plan launched by the United States after the
Second World War.6
The reasons behind the BRI have been widely debated (Liu, 2015; Grieger,
2016; Djankov, 2016; Tonchev, 2017; Cai, 2017). On the one hand, the initiative
was triggered by domestic market needs, where China in order to counteract the
economic slowdown caused by its internal market reaching its limits is continu-
ously looking for new markets (Pu, 2016; Cai, 2017). Geopolitical conditions also
play a relevant role, with the BRI taking advantage of the swinging stability of the
EU and the US’ retreat from a number of multilateral agreements under president
Trump’s leadership.7 As explicitly argued by Xi Jinping during the Peripheral Di-
plomacy Work Conference in 2013, the objective of China’s economic policy is to
turn the country into a world economy pivot. At the same time, the future conse-
quences of the BRI are subject to debate, as they will depend on the attitude that
the various countries will adopt in response to the structured bilateral cooperation
proposed by China. Despite the launch of the EU-China Strategy 2020, the EU has
not yet managed to unite its member and candidate countries on a common posi-
tion and the latter engage with China through a plethora of bilateral relationships.8
This contributes to reinforce the Chinese influence in Europe beyond individual
projects and geopolitical debates, especially in these Central and South Eastern
European Countries that constitute the BRI’s main entry points (Maçães, 2018;
Sielker and Kaufmann, 2020).
Central and Eastern Europe and WB countries signed their bilateral investment
agreements with China in 2012, hoping it would support their recovery from the
global economic crisis (Furceri and Zdzienicka, 2011). The “16+1 Cooperation”
was then launched in 2013, to facilitate Chinese public and private investments
aiming at the implementation of the BRI vision.9 Benefiting from a strategic po-
sition between Eastern and Western Europe, the WBR has been attracting the ma-
jority of Chinese investments in key sectors such as heavy industry, energy, infra-

6
For ease of comparison, while the Marshall Plan envisioned an investment of 130 billion dollars
(per a 2015 valuation) dedicated to the post-war reconstruction of Europe, the BRI strategy is ex-
pected to mobilise more than 4 trillion dollars (Chen, 2014).
7
China’s annual foreign direct investment in Europe grew from 840 million dollars in 2008, to 42
billion dollars in 2017 (Le Corre, 2018).
8
The situation has recently evolved with the discussion of the EU-China Comprehensive Agree-
ment on Investments, through which the two parties have established the conditions for further peer
cooperation in several sectors that will draw investments of up to 650 billion euros (EU Commis-
sion, 2020b).
9
The countries involved in the 16+1 Initiative are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland (Greece joined in 2017, but the original label of the pro-
gramme remained) (Góralczyk, 2017). President Xi Jinping highlighted the need to create strategic
synergies between the BRI and the 16+1 cooperation to facilitate investments for increasing infra-
structure connectivity within those regions (Liu, 2015).
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 173

structure, and logistics (Fig. 1).10 At the same time, the cooperation also favoured
the proliferation of multinational coordination platforms in different sectors like
tourism, agriculture, infrastructure, logistic, energy, etc., aiming at facilitating co-
operation among institutional and non-institutional actors (Jakóbowski, 2015).

Fig. 1. BRI-related investments in the WBR in the period 2010–2020 (in M$)
Source: own work based on AEI data (https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/).

The 16+1 cooperation implements the vision of the BRI through the facili-
tation of trade investments and the acquisition of local businesses by Chinese
companies. Altogether, this leads to an inflow of a growing volume of economic
resources, aiming at increasing connectivity between the Chinese and the Europe-
an markets. However, unlike the EU, China does not show interest in the socioec-
onomic and environmental impacts of its investments (Tonchev, 2017), and this
raises a number of challenges (Liu, 2015). The implementation of the BRI in the
WBR occurs through various financial institutions that act either through direct
investments, aimed at the acquisition of local companies, or through open credit
lines, used to develop strategic infrastructures (the Silk Road Fund, the Asian In-
frastructure Investment Bank, and the China CEE Investment Co-operation Fund).
While a number of authors have reported a positive impact of these investments,
they have also warned against the acquisition of national debt shares by Chinese
state funds, which in the long term may negatively impact the involved countries
(Stumvoll and Flessenkemper, 2020; Hurley et al., 2018).
In the 2011–2014 period, Chinese investments financed the construction, of,
e.g., the Mihajlo Pupin Bridge in Belgrade, the Stanari thermal power plant in

10
This was a response to a delay in terms of infrastructure development suffered by the WBR
countries, which have contributed to the spatial and economic isolation of the region. At present,
Western Balkan countries have typically lower levels of motorway density and railway infrastruc-
ture capacity in comparison to Western countries, and the same applies to their energy production
and distribution capacities (EIB, 2018).
174 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bar-Boljare motorway in Montenegro (Jakóbowski,

2015), and the Balkan Silk Road from Piraeus to Budapest (Bastian, 2017). Detailed
data provided by the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation
shows that, during the period of 2010–2020, China invested more than 16 billion
dollars in the WBR, becoming one of the main investors in the region (see Table 3).
The majority of the investments are dedicated to the transport and energy sectors,
followed by technology, logistics, and utilities. It is particularly interesting to note
that the contractors and credit providers are always Chinese companies, largely lim-
iting the spill-over effects of the interventions on domestic economies.11

Table 3. Main projects financed by China in the Western Balkan Region (M $). No data available
for Albaniaa or Kosovob

Country Year Sector Amount (M $) Chinese Entity

Serbia 2010 Transport 260 China Communications Construction
Bosnia and 2010 Energy 710 Dongfang Electric
Herzegovina
Serbia 2010 Energy 340 Sinomach
Serbia 2013 Transport 850 China Communications Construction
Serbia 2013 Transport 330 Shandong Gaosu
Bosnia and 2013 Energy 280 Power Construction Corp
Herzegovina
Macedonia 2013 Transport 370 Power Construction Corp
Montenegro 2014 Transport 1.120 China Communications Construction
Croatia 2014 Logistics 130 China National Building Material
Serbia 2014 Energy 970 Sinomach
Macedonia 2014 Transport 120 Power Construction Corp
Bosnia and 2015 Energy 460 Dongfang Electric
Herzegovina
Serbia 2016 Transport 230 China Communications Construction
Serbia 2016 Energy 230 Sinomach
Serbia 2016 Technology 170 Huawei
Serbia 2016 Transport 220 Power Construction Corp
Serbia 2016 Metals 120 Hebei Steel
Serbia 2017 Energy 720 Sinomach
Serbia 2017 Energy 210 Shanghai Electric

11
In particular, in the case of the 130-kilometre motorway connecting the Montenegrin city of Bar
with Serbia costed over 1 billion euros to complete only 41 kilometres and now, due to the high fi-
nancial exposure, Montenegro is at risk of default due to its high debt contracted with China players.
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 175

Country Year Sector Amount (M $) Chinese Entity

Bosnia and 2017 Transport 640 Shandong Gaosu
Herzegovina
Serbia 2017 Transport 520 China Communications Construction
Serbia 2017 Utilities 310 Sinomach
Serbia 2017 Transport 350 China Railway Engineering
Montenegro 2017 Energy 100 State Power Investment
Serbia 2017 Energy 230 Power Construction Corp
Bosnia and 2018 Energy 310 China Poly, Sinomach
Herzegovina
Serbia 2018 Energy 140 Shanghai Electric
Croatia 2018 Energy 220 Norinco
Croatia 2018 Transport 340 China Communications Construction
China Railway Engineering, China
Serbia 2018 Transport 1.090
Communications Construction
Serbia 2018 Metals 650 Zijin Mining
Serbia 2018 Transport 990 Shandong Linglong Tire
Serbia 2018 Other 260 China Communications Construction
Macedonia 2019 Real estate 160 Sinomach
State Construction Engineering,
Bosnia and
2019 Transport 100 Power Construction Corp, China
Herzegovina
Communications Construction
Serbia 2019 Metals 120 Hebei Steel
Serbia 2019 Metals 380 Zijin Mining
Serbia 2020 Metals 800 Zijin Mining
Bosnia and 2020 Metals 110 Sinomach, China Nonferrous
Herzegovina
Bosnia and 2020 Energy 220 China Energy Engineering
Herzegovina
Bosnia and 2020 Energy 120 China Energy Engineering
Herzegovina
Serbia 2020 Transport 180 Shandong Gaosu
TOTAL 16.180
a
In the case of Albania there is no exact data. However, Chinese companies have acquired various
local enterprises, e.g., the International Airport of Tirana (acquired by China Everbright Limited in
2016), and the Bankers Petroleum (by Chinese Geo-Jade in 2017). More information available at:
http://al.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1484485.htm
b
To date, there has been no information about Chinese investments in Kosovo, and China has not
officially recognised Kosovo as an independent state.

Source: own work based on the database of the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage
Foundation, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
176 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

5. COMPARING THE ACTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE EU AND CHINA

IN THE WESTERN BALKAN REGION

Despite the fact that during the recent Western Balkans Summit that was held
in Sofia Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, con-
firmed that the accession of the Western Balkans country remains a priority
for the EU, how this process is affected by the increasing influence of China
in the region remains unclear. In order to shed some light on the matter, this
section attempts to offer a preliminary comparison of the attitudes adopted by
the EU and China towards the WBR, according to three main steps (Fig. 2): (1)
identification of the analytical lenses and comparative factors; (2) assessment
and (3) implications.
Step 1 consists of the identification of the analytical lenses through which to
explore the main similarities and differences that characterise the approaches of
the EU and China towards the region. To offer more detail, five categories have
been identified, each characterised by a number of comparative factors:
– Vision – it offers an overview of the strategic orientations of China and
the EU when it comes to highlighting the role that the WBR plays within their
regional and global strategies. It concerns geopolitical, economic, and strategic
factors;
– Approach – it explores the main differences and similarities between Chi-
na and the EU in relation to the nature of the agreements adopted (bilateral or
multilateral), and the mechanisms of influence that they entail (economic and/or
political conditionality);
– Priorities – it offers the opportunity to understand the different long and
short-term orientations of the two players in relation to political, economic, social,
and environmental issues;
– Sectors – it concerns the different strategies that China and the EU adopted
in relation to sectoral investments and, in particular, to initiatives related to infra-
structure, energy, and industry;
– Implementation – it focuses on the multiple aspects that characterise pro-
ject implementation phase, analysing the nature of management, the adopted
financial mechanism, and the environmental and social standards that charac-
terise the process.

For each category, the roles of the EU and China were analysed and assessed as
either convergent (with both players adopting similar strategies), divergent (with
players adopting different, often opposite approaches) or unrelated (when there
is no explicit relation between the action of the EU and China) (Step 2). Finally,
the implications of the results of the analysis were presented, in terms of potential
opportunities and risks for the WBR (Step 3).
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 177

Fig. 2. Methodological approach

Source: own work.

When considering the collected evidence, it becomes obvious that the atti-
tudes of the EU and China towards the region largely differ (see Fig. 3). More
specifically, in relation to their strategic visions for the region, a substantial
divergence emerges. China’s ‘going out’ strategy is characterised by a central-
ly-driven approach whereby China establishes the main objectives and defines
the rules of the game while the other countries are rarely included in the process.
Conversely, the EU approach is founded on the vision to complete the economic
and political integration of the continent. The WBR can be negatively influenced
politically and economically as a consequence of the increasing tension between
these two approaches, with China often acting according to divide et impera
logic that may transform the region into a space of future geopolitical disputes
(Bechev, 2020). In this perspective, the risk of turning the WBR into a transit
corridor for goods and resources that remains poorly integrated into the EU is
relatively high (Fruscione, 2021).
The second category focuses on the nature of the approach to the region adopt-
ed by each player. In this respect, the EU and China follow different paths in
relation to the types of agreements they employ (multilateral versus bilateral),
the mechanisms of resource distribution (co-financing and grants versus loans),
and the direction of their political conditionality (political stability versus divide
et impera) (Cotella and Berisha, 2019). The name 16+1 given to the cooperation
platform is a symptom of how China conceives its prominent role in diplomatic
relations. As recognised by Zweers et al. (2020), indeed, the ‘+1’ model self-es-
tablishes China as the only extra-regional participant in the cooperative scheme.
Moreover, Chinese pragmatism in international relations usually favours bilateral
over multilateral agreements, aiming at accelerating the implementation of the
178 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

BRI. On the contrary, EU institutions favour complex multilateral arenas to create

a broad consensus (Cotella and Berisha, 2019) and full socio-political awareness
(Zweers et al., 2020). In this respect, Western Balkan countries risk being left
within a number of bilateral negotiations that, while producing immediate direct
economic benefits, may at the same time overshadow the importance of regional
integration into the EU economic market (Mardell, 2020).
The third analytical category explores the short and long-term priorities of
the EU and China in the region. In this respect, the EU and China display very
different political, economic, social, and environmental attitudes. While the EU
views sustainability in a holistic manner through the conditions and regulations
specified in its Treaties, Chinese initiatives apparently pay less attention to the
environmental impact and the overexploitation of natural resources they gen-
erate, nor do they seem concerned with their socioeconomic impact on local
communities (Tonchev, 2017). According to Zweers et al. (2020), although not
directly responsible for the side effects of their implementation (i.e. low envi-
ronment standards or high corruption), the investments made by China may
perpetuate local networks of patronage and corruption (Doehler, 2019). Despite
that, both players converge on the importance of the economic growth of the
region and its capacity to convey goods and resources towards wealthier EU
regions (Cotella and Berisha, 2019).
In relation to the sectors targeted by the investments, the EU has explicitly
argued in favour of a joint action towards a better connection between Europe
and Asia. Both players are concerned with the region’s infrastructural devel-
opment, and the Orient-East Med corridor planned by the EU coincides with
the respective segment of the BRI. In this sense, the “Memorandum of under-
standing on establishing a Connectivity Platform between the EU and China”
(2015) marks an opportunity to strengthen the synergies between the BRI and
the Trans-European Networks. According to Zweers et al. (2020, p. 8), howev-
er, “China’s main interest in the Western Balkans relates not primarily to the
region’s countries as such, but to their proximity to the EU, which is a major
export market for China.” In this light, the acquisition of the Piraeus harbour,
the Piraeus Europe–Asia Railway Logistics (PEARL) railway company, and
a share of the Budapest train terminal constitute important indicators. A number
of divergences emerge also in relation to the energy and industrial fields, with
the EU promoting an eco-friendly and sustainable use of resources by financing
renewable energy provisions and inviting local government to adopt circular
economy logics, while China continuing to finance coal power plants such as
the Kakanj plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cotella and Berisha, 2019) or the
Kostolac B3 coal power plant in Serbia (Zweers et al., 2020). At the same time,
while the EU introduced funding programmes dedicated to stimulate research
and innovation in the WBR, China rather acquires local innovative industries,
thus hampering local development dynamics.
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region...

Fig. 3. Evidences of the EU and China’s attitudes towards the Western Balkans
179

Source: own work.

180 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

When it comes to the mechanisms of implementation, evident divergences

emerge in relation to the nature of management, the quality of financial mech-
anisms, and the environmental and social standards that are adopted. As many
researchers have reported (see Bechev, 2020; Zweers et al., 2020), the majority
of Chinese projects activated in the WBR have been awarded to Chinese compa-
nies through rather opaque selection procedures, and concern Chinese contractors,
suppliers, workers, and materials (EIB, 2018).12 This drastically reduce the spill-
over effect that this kind of interventions could activate. In contrast, the EU has
established a procurement package that defines how tenders should be conducted,
guaranteeing the principles of transparency and open access.
To conclude, the different attitudes of China and the EU towards the WBR car-
ry both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, the region can benefit from two
different sources of funds, which altogether increase the share of investments in
the region, possibly contributing to enhancing regional competitiveness. One the
other, however, this dual scenario may result in a progressive slow-down of the
EU integration process, with the increase of economic inference of Chinese com-
panies that may lead to a further overexploitation of natural resources, as well as
to a progressive desertification of innovative entrepreneurship and, ultimately, to
incremental indebting of Western Balkan countries with China and a consequen-
tial increased influence of the latter on the countries’ domestic politics.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

There is a growing literature focusing on the implication of China’s action on

the EU territory, in particular in relation to the future of EU integration (Bechev,
2020; Zweers et al., 2020). To contribute to this debate, the article has addressed
the question of whether China could support the integration of the WBR into the
EU or, conversely, become an agent of ‘de-Europeanisation’.
Despite the important progress made, the majority of WB countries are still
struggling with the transposition of the acquis communautaire and the fulfilment
of EU requirements (Berisha, 2018; Berisha et al., 2021 a, b, c). This process
will take years since there is no chance of joining the EU before 2030 (European
Commission, 2018), also as a consequence of the stricter requirements. At the

12
For example, the lack of transparency in the selection process led to a momentary stop of works
for the completion of the Belgrade-Budapest railway. Another good example is the implementation
of the Montenegrin motorway in relation to which it is unclear how the Chinese Eximbank funded
the project, which accounts for 80% of the country’s GDP, or how the China Road and Bridges
Corporation won the contract without an open tender and why it is exempt from VAT and customs
duties (Bechev, 2020).
 The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the Western Balkan Region... 181

same time, the role of China in the region has increased, as the EU Enlargement
Commissioner Johannes Hahn that recently admitted in an interview how “the EU
has overestimated Russia and underestimated China”. In this light, Stumvoll and
Flessenkemper (2020) have highlighted that China’s growing momentum derives
from the country’s ability to meet real investment needs in the region, a dynamic
that the EU has been slow to acknowledge (Cotella and Berisha, 2019). At the
same time, China’s influence has also grown as a consequence of the slowing
down of the EU accession process in the aftermath of the global economic crisis
and, more recently, of the refugee crisis, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
The credibility of EU membership is much lower than when compared with pre-
vious enlargement rounds.13
WBR countries that do not seem yet to possess the economic and administra-
tive capacity to implement the EU accession requirements to a full extent, bearing
at the same time higher adaption costs in comparison to the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. In particular, while the number of domestic veto players ap-
pears relatively low, EU political conditionality in most cases directly affects sen-
sitive issues of national and ethnic identity and statehood (Freyburg and Richter,
2010; Subotic, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2008; Noutcheva, 2009; Elbasani, 2013,
Gordon et al., 2013).14 Similarly, even EU-supportive governments may not be
willing to reform institutions that operate currently in a way that is favourable to
their political and electoral interests.15 In this light, the lower domestic costs relat-
ed to Chinese investments certainly offer an appealing perspective.
Overall, the BRI seems to have found a hole in the EU integration system,
which it could easily fill. The growing volume of Chinese investments in the area
demonstrates this and, while lowering the attractiveness of the EU intermediate
rewards for the candidate countries, they at the same time may trigger alternative
conditionality influences, in turn inducing domestic changes that are not necessar-
ily compatible with those promoted by the EU. However, despite these potential
pitfalls, the fact that Chinese investments do not come as an alternative to EU
integration, allows WBR countries to pursue both ways at the same time – and
they should do so.
While being fascinated by Chinese investments and their more pragmatic mech-
anisms, domestic authorities should continue to progressively metabolise EU rules
and regulations in terms of transparency, quality standards, and public procurement.

13
According to recent surveys, the enthusiasm of the EU population in relation to the EU enlarge-
ment has been decreasing in the last 10 years, leading to a more unfavourable constellation of inter-
governmental preferences regarding WBR accession (Zhelyazkova et al., 2018).
14
Despite the absence of Eurosceptic parties, nationalist and non-Western identities are much stron-
ger in some of the current candidates and make compliance with EU conditions less acceptable
(Freyburg and Richter, 2010).
15
Extensive electoral reforms were only superficially implemented by national governments, and
clientelist structures still put pressure on voters (Giandomenico, 2013).
182 Giancarlo Cotella, Erblin Berisha

The EU will remain the biggest investor in the region and this path seems to ensure
the highest long-term domestic benefits. More specifically, the conditions attached
to EU rewards will strengthen the WBR internal coherence, and further consolidate
its links with Europe. An additional momentum to this process may come from the
EU’s increasing commitment towards the region, as recently argued in a number of
official communications16 and demonstrated by the introduction of the WBIF – IPF7
(Western Balkan Investment Framework – Infrastructure Project Facility). Overall,
the EU should aim at accelerating the integration of the region, and the recent allo-
cation of 9 billion euros dedicated to this goal is a step in the right direction (Europe-
an Commission, 2020a). However, it should be acknowledged that, in the presence
of further delays, the influence of China in the region is likely going to increase,
potentially triggering episodes of de-Europeanisation in the long run.

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