Science, religion, and the quest for knowledge and truth: an Islamic pers

pective

PENGANTAR STUDY ISLAM

DOSEEN PENGAMPUN

Dr.Ita Rahmania Kusumawati,SS.S SI,MA

Nim :2193054038

ZAINI HARIRI SHOFA

FAKULTAS AGAMA ISLAM

PRODI PENDIDIKAN BAHASA ARAB
UNIVERSITAS HASYIM AS’YARI
2021/2022
 The first one is to a large extent a commentary on John R. Staver’s ‘‘Skepticism, truth as
coherence, and constructivist epistemology: grounds for resolving the discord between science
and religion?’’ The second part is a related overview of Islam’s philosophy of knowledge and, to
a certain degree, science. In responding to Staver’s thesis, I rely strongly on my scientific educa
tion and habit of mind; I also partly found my views on my Islamic background, though I enlarge
my scope to consider western philosophical perspectives as well. I differ with Staver in his defini
tion of the nature, scope, and goals of religion (concisely, ‘‘explaining the world and how it wor
ks’’), and I think this is the crux of the matter in attempting to resolve the perceived ‘‘discord’’ b
etween science and religion. The heart of the problem is in the definition of the domains of acti
on of science and religion, and I address this issue at some length, both generically and using Isl
amic principles, which are found to be very widely applicable. The concept of ‘‘reality,’’ so impo
rtant to Staver’s thesis, is also critically reviewed.
The philosophy of knowledge (and of science) in Islam is briefly reviewed in the aim of showing
the great potential for harmony between the two ‘‘institutions’’ (religion and science), on the b
asis of the following philosophy: science describes nature, whereas religion gives us not only a p
hilosophy of existence but also an interpretative cloak for the discoveries of science and for the
meaning of the cosmos and nature. I conclude by insisting that though science and religion can
be considered as two worldviews that propose to describe ‘‘reality’’ and to explain our existenc
e and that of the world; they may come to compete for humans’ minds and appear to enter int
o a conflicting position, but only if and when we confuse their domains and modes of action
 Table of contents
table contentns............................................................................................................................3

Discussions of the relation between science and religion................................................................6

crucial distinction between knowledge and truth ...........................................................................7

The philosophy of knowledge (and of science) in Islam ...................................................................8

Islamic views of science ..............................................................................................................10

Discussions of the relation between science and religion
Ever since humans started to develop a rational methodology for finding ‘‘truths’’ and ascertaining their
validity, that is since the appearance of (systematic) philosophy, the question of the relation between th
at kind of knowledge and what the revealed scriptures teach became a central one in the humans’ quest
for understanding. How does philosophy, and science today, or more generally human-obtained truth, fi
t with religion (or revealed truth)? Do they seamlessly complement and reinforce each other, or do they
sometimes contradict each other and clash? And what about their methodologies: Are they (very) differ
ent, and is one more trustable than the other?

In his brilliant The Definitive Discourse on the Harmony between Religion and Philosophy, Ibn Rushd, the
great 12th century Muslim Andalusian philosopher known in the west as Averroes, addressed the questi
on of the possible conflict between religion and philosophy (today he and we would be saying ‘‘scienc
e’’). Reviewing the problem from religious and philosophical perspectives, he concluded that not only ca
n revelation not contradict wisdom (philosophy), the two must agree and support each other. He describ
ed them as ‘‘bosom sisters’’ and added that ‘‘injuries [to religion] made by relatives (i.e. people of philos
ophy/science) are the severest injuries’’; he also decried ‘‘the enmity and quarrels which such [injuries] s
tir up between the two, when they (religion and philosophy) are in fact mutually loving friends by nature
and essence.’

Returning to Staver’s paper, let us try to examine (a) whether there is a ‘‘discord,’’ necessarily or under s
ome conditions, and (b) how to address that problem. In my view, the main reason why Staver declares t
he existence of a discord between religion and science and devotes his paper to the task of resolving it u
sing his proposed epistemology (skepticism, truth as coherence, and construct epistemology) is the very
definition he gives of the domains of action of the two ‘‘social institutions’’ (as he calls religion and scien
ce). For him, not only are ‘‘truth, knowledge, and their relation … central’’ to these ‘‘institutions,’’ but m
ore importantly, their ‘‘goals are explaining the world and how it works.’’ And if, as it soon becomes clea
r, by ‘‘world’’ Staver refers to the natural world and by ‘‘knowledge’’ he means ‘‘the facts of reality,’’ the
n the conclusion is immediate: ‘‘conflict is inevitable….’’ Staver is aware that the above definition of the
domain of application of the two institutions is not the only possible one. Indeed, he cites Levinson (199
6), who considers religion to be ‘‘about the relationship between humans and the supernatural world’’
(p. vii), a definition which then presents two different foci: nature for science, and the supernatural worl
d for religion. But Staver seems to favor the earlier definition of the domains of action, which makes the
goals of the two institutions (explaining the world and how it works) ‘‘identical.’’

It is far from acceptable to declare that the goal of religion is to explain the world and how it works. A m
ore reasonable and widely applicable description—and one which corresponds very well with the Islamic
viewpoint—is that religion is a revealed way of life and being (including belief, understanding, etc.), whic
h can be complemented by a human quest for truth, and science is a human exploration of the world, a
ttempting to understand how it works and how it fits with man’s worldview. This latter point is where th
e connection occurs with religion. I should not oversimplify the issue to the point of diffusing any potenti
al problem that might need to be resolved, so I will acknowledge that there may still be two sources of c
onflict even with this fundamental distinction of the goals and realms of the two institutions: (a) scriptur
es do sometimes present descriptions and even on occasion appear to present explanations of natural o
r human phenomena, topics which we now recognize to be within the realm of science, with the latter o
ften providing different explanations than the scriptures; (b) modern science has adopted ‘‘methodologi
cal naturalism’’ as a basis of its pursuit of knowledge, removing any divine or supernatural element from
its considerations, in essence establishing an unbridgeable chasm between the two domains, something
which many religious people find unacceptable

Still, one cannot simply declare that ‘‘science denies the existence of God in favor of naturalism.’’ More c
orrectly one should say that modern science removes God from being an explanatory element in its fram
ework. This then leaves open the existence and humans’ belief in, and even interaction with, the deity, if
the latter is outside of the natural domain. In short, one cannot consider religion as attempting to explai
n the world and how it works, for then the conflict is indeed inevitable. Furthermore, the nature of the r
eal—or at least potential—conflict between science and religion is then misunderstood, and the propos
ed resolution is off the mark.

Another fundamental issue raised in Staver’s paper is the concept of ‘‘truth.’’ The author presents two d
efinitions/types of truths: (a) ‘‘truth as correspondence,’’ whereby knowledge obtained by science (or, in
his opinion, religion—see above—) corresponds to the facts of reality (nature, or the world), which know
ledge is in principle possible and thus sought; (b) ‘‘truth as coherence,’’ where elements of knowledge ar
e not linked to reality but are rather ascertained on the basis of their coherence within a body, for in this
case our capacity to know reality is denied. The problem occurs when the concept of ‘‘truth’’ thus define
d as relating to the world, something we can reach or construct in a coherent way, is conflated with the
concept of ‘‘truth’’ in religion. Indeed, Staver writes that ‘‘truth is revealed through God’s word’’ and ‘‘in
contrast to revealed truth, scientists seek truth through observations, experimentation, and analysis of p
hysical evidence.’’ And last but not least, the concept of ‘‘reality,’’ whether it exists, and whether it can b
e known, plays a central role in Staver’s thesis. In a nutshell, Staver considers ‘‘reality’’ (a world existing
and behaving according to its own rules, independently of us) to exist but not to be knowable. He conce
des its existence in order to escape sophism, but he considers the human knowledge of that reality to be
unattainable, on the basis of ‘‘the problem of the criterion’’ (see below). For him the western world’s ins
istence on the existence and knowability of reality is the root cause for the discord between science and
religion (keeping in mind that in his definition, both are trying to explain the world). This is a fundament
al issue, one that requires discussion, or at least comment.

Staver pushes this question further and wonders whether we humans could really come to know the rea
l way in which God constructed the world; he inverts the question and asks: ‘‘On what grounds can we a
rgue that God must obey human ways of knowing? On what grounds can we argue that we know anythi
ng independent of and separate from experience?’’ Both are very difficult questions to address, but the
second one is easier than the first, and I would simply respond with three factors which help ascertain th
e ‘‘reality’’ of the observed world, that is the independence from our mind of the phenomena being obs
erved, described, and understood: (a) the independence of the observations made by different people o
f a given phenomenon; (b) the repeatability, without prior information or influence, of observations and
experiences; (c) the simultaneous discovery of phenomena and laws by individuals with no mutual com
munication whatsoever. I should also point out that humans have gradually come to realize that there is
more to this world than meets the (human) eye, for example the existence of invisible radiation and par
ticles (e.g. neutrinos) which hardly interact with us or with our everyday world and which we would nev
er have invented by our imagination, had it not been for measuring devices, which cannot be viewed as r
epresenting our ‘‘perception.’
crucial distinction between knowledge and truth
independent reality and are we able to know it? I would argue that indeed there must be an ind
ependent reality out there, which has existed separately from our perception well before we humans ca
me into existence. This viewpoint I base not on ‘‘common sense’’ (which concept I view with skepticism
and do not rely on), but rather on the three arguments I mentioned briefly above as well as on my belief
that if there is a Creator, He must be a rational one, He must have built the world on orderly patterns, ru
les, and behavior, and He must have made it possible for us to make sense of the world and even to reco
gnize His wisdom behind it all. As to whether we can come to know this reality, whose existence Staver a
lso accepts (though for different reasons), I will say that our understanding of nature/reality can only be
achieved in an asymptotic way. Our quest tends toward the truth, but we may never reach it completely,
and so at any time we will have only achieved a certain degree of certainty of our ‘‘correct’’ understandi
ng of various aspects of reality (say light or electricity or evolution or other parts of nature). But our com
prehension continuously improves with time This is why I make a crucial distinction between knowledge
and truth, particularly in regard of the natural world. As to ‘‘religious truth,’’ if it relates to spiritual and
out-of-this-world issues, it must be accepted on faith and cannot be confronted to any other source of k
nowledge/truth. But if it relates to this (natural) world, then it must yield to scientific checks and in man
y situations be subjected to hermeneutical and allegorical interpretation.

It may be important to address the issue of ‘‘common sense’’ and the theory of quantum mecha
nics, since Staver uses both as arguments against the idea of a knowable reality. He approvingly quotes
Purves and Lotto (2003): ‘‘is it not just common sense that one object cannot be in two distant places at
once? …. And does it not go without saying that there is a real world ‘out there,’ whether or not we look
at it? Quantum mechanics challenges each of these intuitions by having (conscious) observation actually
create the physical reality observed’’ . Staver adds, ‘‘Moreover, these challenges are well documented b
y experimental results, which show that one object can be in two distant places at once, that events her
e can be affected by simultaneous events at great distances, and that conscious observation creates real
ity.’’

Let me discuss this viewpoint. First, it all depends on what one means by ‘‘object’’; a wave is by definitio
n a distributed ‘‘entity,’’ and it is at many points at the same time; likewise, ‘‘quantum objects,’’ which a
re not simply ‘‘objects,’’ that is, particles in the ‘‘common sense’’ way, have their own rules of existence.
Common sense cannot be trusted and applied to areas where it is not meant to apply. Secondly, we can
accept that there is indeed a ‘‘real world ‘out there’, whether or not we look at it,’’ and quantum mecha
nics will not contradict this. It will simply say that the ‘‘observed reality’’ will be a projection of the ‘‘reali
ty’’ that was there before we made the observation, and there is no contradiction or paradox to worry a
bout. As to the presumed ‘‘experimental result’’ that ‘‘one object can be in two distant places at once,’’ t
hat is a misrepresentation of the facts. What has been found is the continued (simultaneous) relation be
tween two quantum objects at great distances (several kilometers), such that any measurement on one
affects the other simultaneously, and that is highly significant, but it is not the same thing as one object
being at two distant places at once. Furthermore, Staver declares quantum mechanics to be ‘‘a controve
rsial theory because it ultimately connects the well-defined discipline of physics with the ill-defined conc
ept of consciousness’’ and that it remains ‘‘an incomplete theory … with variables still hidden and awaiti
ng construction that will render [it] more consistent with common sense.’ (Nidhal Guessou
m,2009,page62)
 These statements represent only a fringe minority opinion among the community of physicists, a
nd the overwhelming majority of scientists will reject them. Hence, attempting to rely on such a portray
al or quantum mechanics in constructing a vision of physical reality that requires ‘‘an alternative concept
of truth’’ is ill founded. Staver’s rejection of the ‘‘realist’’ worldview and his conversion to the ‘‘skeptical,
constructivist’’ approach is based largely on his conviction that the ‘‘problem of the criterion’’ cannot be
solved within the dominant realist paradigm. Relying on Chisholm (2002), he defines this problem as the
impossibility to build a procedure to distinguish between true and false appearances for ascertaining the
validity and accuracy of the procedure would require us already to be able to distinguish between true a
nd false procedures. Hence, Staver concludes, one cannot seek any knowledge of reality with any certain
ty, and so the constructivists recommend silence (or agnosticism) on this crucial issue. This ‘‘problem of
the criterion’’ is thus regarded as ‘‘a single experiential character, and therefore a limit, on our knowing.’

Philosophers of science (of the dominant paradigm) would argue, however, that the criterion of
prediction, added of course to the criteria of falsifiability, repeatability, universality, and independence
(‘‘objectivity’’ of any model/theory), is sufficient to distinguish between ‘‘procedures’’ for knowing whet
her what is being described is ‘‘real’’ (independent of the subject) or ‘‘illusionary.’’ Moreover, scientists
have long known that one can only hope to describe what is accessible to us and not any deeper level of
reality, hence the concept of ‘‘veiled reality’’ invoked in quantum mechanics (by d’Espagnat, in particula
r) to distinguish what we can measure from what exists in the quantum world. But scientists remain con
vinced that the outer level of reality that is accessible to us is not an illusionary construction, since it can
be predicted, measured in many independent ways, and repeated. The ‘‘problem of the criterion’’ is far f
rom being a crippling problem for the realist philosophy of science or epistemology

The philosophy of knowledge (and of science) in Islam

Readers of the Islamic texts (Qur’an, Hadiths, i.e. statements by Prophet Muhammad, and exegetical an
d other literature) quickly come to realize that Islam puts strong value and emphasis on the quest for kn
owledge. For instance, one reads in the Qur’an: ‘‘Are those who know equal with those who know not?’’
(39:9), and in another verse: ‘‘Truly fear Allah those among His Servants who have knowledge’’ (35:28).
And famous hadiths include: ‘‘The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr’’; ‘‘Seek
knowledge even in China’’; and ‘‘An hour’s contemplation (or study) of nature is better than a year’s wor
ship (of God).’’ The above injunctions and references are about ‘‘knowledge,’’ or ‘ilm, to use the importa
nt Arabic/Qur’anic term. Golshani (2002) tells us that ‘‘In the Holy Qur’an, the word ‘ilm (knowledge) an
d its derivatives are used more than 780 times.’’ The problem is that the word ‘ilm has been understood
in so many different ways and assigned so many different meanings, including ‘‘knowledge,’’ ‘‘science,’’
‘‘religious knowledge,’’ and ‘‘knowledge of God,’’ that one finds himself having to struggle to delimit its
meaning and usage before going further. (Nidhal Guessoum,2009,page63)

Golshani (2002) rhetorically asks what kind of knowledge these prime Islamic sources are referring to; h
e answers: ‘‘We believe that the spectrum of knowledge recommended by Islam is very wide. It includes
both specifically religious teachings and those branches of knowledge that are beneficial to the welfare
of individuals and human societies.’’ This Iranian thinker insists on the fact that, contrary to what many r
eligious scholars have proclaimed, ‘ilm as described in the Qur’an is much wider than—and is not limited
to— the religious fields that may be more obligatory upon Muslims to know about. In fact the author si
mply rejects the traditional classification of knowledge into religious and nonreligious; he notes that in t
he Qur’an (e.g. 39:9, 96:5, 16:70) ‘ilm is presented in its most general sense; he further refers to the abo
ve Prophetic statement to ‘‘seek knowledge even in China’’ and remarks that ‘‘the Prophet couldn’t hav
e been asking Muslims to seek religious knowledge in China.’’ Finally, he adopts the 20th-century Iranian
scholar Murtaza Mutahhari’s (1922) principle: ‘‘Islam’s comprehensiveness and finality as a religion dem
ands that every field of knowledge that is beneficial for an Islamic society be regarded as a part and parc
el of the ‘religious sciences’’’ (p. 137). Golshani (2002) concludes: ‘‘The Qur’an used the term ‘ilm for bot
h the natural sciences and the human/social sciences; it strongly encouraged the study of natural pheno
mena, but this was not intended for its own sake, but rather as part of a general objective of finding Go
d’s fingerprints in the cosmos, filling the earth, and benefiting from its bounties.’’

Ziauddin Sardar fully supports this globalistic philosophy of knowledge in Islam. He writes: ‘‘Polymaths, li
ke al-Biruni, al-Jahiz [and 10 others he mentions by name], and thousands of other scholars are not an e
xception but the general rule in Muslim civilization. The Islamic civilization of the classical period was re
markable for the number of polymaths it produced. This is seen as a testimony to the homogeneity of Isl
amic philosophy of science and its emphasis on synthesis, interdisciplinary investigations and multiplicity
of methods’’ (p. 112). The first principle that the Qur’an presents in its philosophy of knowledge is that
man has been endowed with the capacity to learn and to comprehend. Indeed, this is what makes him G
od’s vice-regent (or viceroy, or deputy) on Earth. The first act of God toward humans shortly after their c
reation was to teach Adam ‘‘all the names’’ (concepts) and to ask him to restate them, which he did succ
essfully, thereby proving to the angels that humans had a distinct capacity that made them superior to al
l other creatures and thus worthy of carrying God’s mission on Earth. Indeed, the concept of reasoning a
ppears in the Qur’an 49 times, always in the active form, not as an abstract idea or passive human ability.

Muzaffar Iqbal stresses further that ‘‘God’s ways and laws are unchanging’’ (p. 6), citing the Qur’anic ver
se ‘‘That was the way of Allah in the case of those who passed away of old, and you will not find for the
way of Allah any changes’’ (33:62), and adding: ‘‘thus the entire world of nature operates through immu
table laws that can be discovered through the investigation of nature.’’ Along the same lines, Muhamma
d Iqbal (19th-20th century Muslim poet-philosopher) considered the Qur’an’s methodology and epistem
ology to be empirical and rational. Massimo Campanini (2005) notes the fact that ‘Abd al-Jabbar (an imp
ortant Mutazilite School, i.e. rationalistic, theologian, d. ca. 1024) held that God operates according to ra
tional laws. Finally, I note here that the Qur’an draws attention to the danger of conjecturing without evi
dence (‘‘And follow not that of which you have not the (certain) knowledge of…’’ 17:36) and in several di
fferent verses asks Muslims to require proofs (‘‘Say: Bring your proof if you are truthful’’ 2:111), both in
matters of theological belief and in natural science. In many instances, the Qur’an/Allah argues with the
unbelievers and cites examples/arguments to try to convince them; for instance: ‘‘Or, Who originates th
e creation, then reproduces it, and Who gives you sustenance from the heaven and the earth? Is there a
god beside Allah? Say: Bring your proof if you are truthful’’ (Nidhal Guessoum,2009,page65)

the Qur’an, he notes, uses a different vocabulary each time it calls upon humans to observe or notice a
particular sign in nature, depending on whether the phenomenon is obvious or subtle. Indeed, dependin
g on the situation, the reader is asked to watch, listen, think, reflect, or exhibit wisdom, these being grad
ually higher and higher functions of the mind. He writes, ‘‘Oftentimes the expression ‘haven’t you seen
… ’ comes back in the Qur’an, each time addressing people on items that offer themselves to our observ
ation’’
Islamic views of science
Let us first examine briefly and try to agree on a definition of ‘‘science.’’ Here is how one scholar starts o
ut his short ‘‘philosophy of science’’ treatise: ‘‘Surely science is just the attempt to understand, explain,
and predict the world we live in?’’ (Okasha 2002, p. 1). This is a good start, as this contains several impor
tant aspects of science: (a) the attempt to make the explanation objective; (b) the fact that science is co
nstructed by humans, thus signaling the possibility of error or bias; and (c) the attempt to describe the w
orld, as widely as possible. But this first-draft definition may be substantially lacking, at least in some res
pects: (a) it does not declare whether science is limited to the natural world or is to be extended to all o
bservable phenomena, including psychological, social, religious, historical, etc.; (b) it says nothing about
the nature of the enterprise of constructing objective explanations.

Ziauddin Sardar (2006a) provides us with a more precise definition of science; he writes: ‘‘[science is] an
organized, systematic and disciplined mode of inquiry based on experimentation and empiricism that pr
oduces repeatable and applicable results universally, across all cultures’’ (p. 181). Indeed, this has the vir
tue of emphasizing the goals of objectivity (repeatability, universality) and testability (experimentation,
empiricism). It also implicitly restricts the fields to the natural sciences. So the essential and perhaps defi
ning characteristic of science may very well consist in the method and process it has developed, almost c
anonized, and required everyone who practices science to adopt. That is what we call ‘‘the scientific met
hod’’ and what we uphold as the glorious aspect of science, in fact much more than the marvelous array
of results that scientists have achieved until now.

There are still some important aspects missing from the above description: (a) it downplays the personal
/subjective elements; (b) it does not emphasize strongly enough the scientific community’s role in the pr
ocess, in particular the gathering of facts, the checking of results and predictions (experimental and theo
retical), as well as the internal (logical, mathematical, etc.) consistency of any proposed theory/model, e
tc. This second (peer-review) aspect is in fact what has given science its robustness and allowed it to filte
r the erroneous claims from the true results, and it is this part that is often greatly underappreciated by t
he public at large, including the highly educated but non-scientific groups.

The other aspect (the subjective human element in the scientific enterprise), however, is its Achilles heel,
and few people, including many in the scientific community, are fully aware of it. On the other hand, it i
s also often greatly exaggerated by the detractors of science, including the traditionalists, the cultural rel
ativists, and other post-modernists. Traditionalists like William Chittick (2007) dismiss the claim that mo
dern science carries any true objectivity; he considers it simply as ‘‘a vast structure of beliefs and presup
positions’’ (p. 24). For him, ‘‘what people call ‘science’ is strikingly similar to what a [previous] times was
called ‘sorcery’. Certainly, the goal is exactly the same’’ (p. 34). Finally, he rejects any usefulness of scien
ce: ‘‘people have no idea that all this information is irrelevant to the goal of human life…. The more ‘fact
s’ they know, the less they grasp the significance of the facts and the nature of their own selves and the
world around them’’ (p. 34). Needless to say, this is an overly harsh description and assessment of scienc
e, one that is, in my view, based on an erroneous understanding of the scientific enterprise, its foundatio
ns, its methods (which are far from rigid and simple), and its claimed results, which are often open to int
erpretation and reevaluation. The bulk of this paper is devoted to precisely clearing up the correcting su
ch misunderstandings.
 Now, does Islam, particularly its prime reference, the Qur’an, present us with any clear principles that ca
n be viewed as a ‘‘philosophy of science’’? The following principles can be extracted from the Qur’an: (a)
the importance of the systematic study of nature and of the cosmos (e.g. ‘‘Behold! in the creation of the
heavens and the earth, and the alternation of night and day, there are indeed signs for men of understa
nding, Men who celebrate the praises of Allah, standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, and conte
mplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens and the earth, (With the thought): Our Lord! not for na
ught Hast Thou created (all) this! Glory to Thee!’’ 3:190–191; ‘‘Say Travel through the earth and see how
creation (was) started (by Allah)’’ 29:20); (b) The exploration of nature, from mere observation to full scr
utiny, should clearly point out the order and purpose of the cosmos; and (c) the study of nature should p
oint to a certain unity and thus lead to a (greater) faith in the Creator (Nidhal Guessoum,2009,page67)

Ghaleb Hasan further extracts some important philosophical principles of science from the Qur’an; he s
ummarizes them in three points: (a) unity; (b) generalization; and (c) prediction. He cites various verses i
n support of his view; for instance: ‘‘For you shall not find any alteration in the ways (laws?) of Allah; and
you shall not find any change in His ways’’ (35:43). He adds that ‘‘science’’ in the Qur’anic philosophy is
meant as the act of interpreting the observed signs (ayat) of God, just as—one may add—exegesis is the
‘‘science’’ of interpreting God’s written verses (also ayat). Regarding prediction, he notes that the Qur’a
n points out the regularity in the phenomena of nature and (the Qur’an) further explains that the compu
tability and predictability of such phenomena is for humans’ benefit: ‘‘It is He Who made the sun a shini
ng brightness and the moon a light, and ordained for it phases that you might know the computation of
years and the reckoning (of time)’’ (10:5). Mujahed finds the concept of cosmic laws in the verses 36:38
–39 (‘‘And the sun runs on to a term/resting-place determined for it; that is the decree of the Exalted in
Might, the All-Knowing. And the Moon, We have ordained for it mansions/ stages till it becomes again as
an old dry palm branch.’’), where the terms ‘‘determined,’’ ‘‘decree,’’ and ‘‘ordained’’ are understood to
imply a ‘‘natural law.’’ Mujahed draws the same conclusion from the verse: ‘‘Verily We established Zulqa
rnain’s power on earth, and We gave him the ways and the means to all ends’’ (18:84), highlighting the
words ‘‘ways and means.’’ Golshani (2003a, p. 278) emphasizes the theistic objectives of the study of na
ture in Islam: ‘‘The Qur’an does not approve of such cognitions which aim at nothing except satisfying on
e’s own curiosity. On the way of understanding nature, one should busy oneself with the means and forg
et the ultimate end.’’ Other thinkers of different philosophical propensities, adopt a very different view,
however. Campanini reminds us that the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) ‘‘denies, on principl
e, any interaction between faith and technical knowledge; the Qur’an is all about the route to salvation,
while science deals with other issues’’ (p. 55). That is why Campanini calls Qutb’s position ‘‘galilean, for
[Qutb] is adamant in distinguishing the religious dimension from the scientific.’’

My own position regarding the possible relation between science and religion is that one can and should fi
nd a terrain of dialog and cooperation between the two. But some conditions must be upheld: while the f
undamental mechanisms of science (falsifiability, in particular) should not be corrupted or negotiated, a fr
uitful exchange and mutual enrichment is possible at the ‘‘metaphysical’’ level, as different general philos
ophical frameworks can be adopted for science, ranging from the materialistic to the theistic.that a non-d
estructive theistic envelope can be added both without loss of rigor and with gains in meaning, ethic, and
general outlook (worldview). To paraphrase Dyson, science and religion can avoid conflict and be positive
engines in humanity’s growth if Science can accept to give up its imperialistic. dreams and if Religion can a
ccept .
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