Journal of Contemporary China

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Generation Matters: Taiwan’s Perceptions of

Mainland China and Attitudes Towards Cross-Strait
Trade Talks

Frank C.-S. Liu & Yitan Li

To cite this article: Frank C.-S. Liu & Yitan Li (2017) Generation Matters: Taiwan’s Perceptions of
Mainland China and Attitudes Towards Cross-Strait Trade Talks, Journal of Contemporary China,
26:104, 263-279, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1223107

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1223107

Published online: 26 Sep 2016.

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Journal of Contemporary China, 2017
VOL. 26, NO. 104, 263–279
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1223107

Generation Matters: Taiwan’s Perceptions of Mainland China and

Attitudes Towards Cross-Strait Trade Talks
Frank C.-S. Liua and Yitan Lib
a
National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan; bSeattle University, USA

ABSTRACT
It has been widely assumed that perceptions about mutual relationships
positively influence attitudes toward trade talks. The Sunflower Movement
in Taiwan that took place in the spring of 2014 seemed to create an empirical
puzzle, leading observers to believe that Taiwan’s younger generations hold
conservative attitudes about trade talks with Mainland China. This study,
based on an analysis of representative data collected before the movement,
suggests that younger generations in Taiwan are hostile to Mainland China
politically but support trade talks. In summary, the authors find that family
orientation, national/ethnic identification, state/country identification, belief
in Taiwan’s democratic impact, and generation serve as critical factors in the
formation of positive attitudes toward trade talks. These findings contribute
to the literature by providing a deeper insight into the dynamics of the
Sunflower Movement and updating the political orientation profile of
Taiwanese voters.

Introduction
Trade talks, an important political approach to peacefully solving conflict and advancing mutual trust,
have been practiced by Beijing and Taipei in the past two decades. However, in the spring of 2014,
Washington, Beijing and Taipei were surprised, if not shocked, by a large-scale social movement oppos-
ing this policy. The effect of this event reverberated: the nationalist party (KMT) had significant losses
in the ‘nine-in-one’ elections at the end of 2014 and presidential and legislative elections in January
2016; trade talks across the Strait have been halted. The general public attributed this event to younger
voters, particularly students, who hold a different picture about Mainland China and Taiwan’s future.
The analogy of brotherhood has played an important role in the initiation and development of trade
talks across the Strait.1 On 14 March 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao talked about his expectation
for the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan, the most important legal
foundation for later trade talks, and he emphasized the fact that Taiwan and China were ‘brothers’ who
‘cannot sever their blood ties’ and whose ‘problems [over the trade talks] will eventually be solved’.2

CONTACT Frank C.-S. Liu [email protected]

1
Tsai-Lung (Honigmann) Hong, ‘The ECFA: a pending trade agreement?’, in Peter C. Y. Chow, ed., National Identity and Economic
Interest: Taiwan’s Competing Options and Their Implication for Regional Stability (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012),
pp. 39–65.
2
‘Yinwei women shi xiungdi, wenti zong keyi jiejue’ [‘As we are brothers, problems will be solved’], People.com.cn, (14 March
2010), available at: http://2010lianghui.people.com.cn/BIG5/181624/11136184.html (accessed 12 March 2015); Editorial, ‘ECFA
requires more than “belief”’, TaipeiTimes.com, (16 March 2010), available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/
archives/2010/03/16/2003468134 (accessed 15 March 2015).
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
264 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

Not only have the Ma Ying-Jeou administration’s officials been using this analogy in their cross-Strait
policies, Taiwanese elites proposing political independence have also employed this analogy to signal
friendly attitudes toward Chinese officials.3
On 18 March 2014, a group of young scholars and students broke into the Legislative Yuan as a radical
reaction to the Ma administration’s attempt to ratify the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA),
a treaty that was extended from the ECFA and signed in June 2013 as a means to liberalize trade in
the service sector between the two economies. This so-called Sunflower Movement of ‘occupying the
[Taiwanese] Congress’ was the result of a continuous social movement against the ratification of the
CSSTA. This movement, in which 500,000 citizens participated, called for island-wide attention to the
controversial trade talks with Mainland China.4 This movement has led observers to regard Taiwan’s
younger generations as being hostile to Mainland China and relatively conservative regarding future
trade talks between the two sides of the Strait. However, a few questions remain unanswered. Why did
this movement, initiated by young voters, not end with an island-wide movement against Mainland
China? Is the perception of an agonistic relationship with Mainland China the only factor causing the
rejection of trade talks? Can attitudes toward trade talks be secured by more friendly attitudes? What
is the extent to which the general public adopts the analogy of brotherhood that has been shared
commonly by Taiwan’s political elites? Who would reject this analogy and regard Mainland China as an
enemy and why? And most importantly, is this group of voters restricted to the youngest generation?
This study, based on representative telephone survey data collected several weeks before the start
of the Sunflower Movement, reveals how Taiwanese voters view Mainland China and the generational
differences regarding their views on cross-Strait relations. Taking into account voters’ identifications
with nation/ethnicity, party and country, the analysis presents how these variables influence the per-
ceptions of ‘brothers’, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, as well as what different generations of voters anticipate
will happen in Taiwan’s future trade talks with Mainland China. The series of analyses below depict a
paradoxical picture about the younger voters and the dynamics of the Sunflower Movement: compared
to a generation ahead of them, young Taiwanese voters are relatively more likely to view Mainland
China as an enemy, but at the same time, they look forward to more active trade talks with Mainland
China. The article begins with a brief theoretical discussion and a review of all the factors that explain
Taiwanese voters’ perceptions of Mainland China and their attitudes toward trade talks. The analytical
models build upon and extend from these empirical findings.

Theoretical Framework
Traditionally, scholars of cross-Strait relations have mainly used realism and liberalism as the main
theoretical frameworks to analyze the relationship in the Taiwan Strait. Both realism and liberalism
emphasizes the materialist capacity of state actors. Realism views cross-Strait relations through the
lens of balance of power or balance of threat.5 Peace can be achieved through establishing a balanced
equilibrium between China and Taiwan. Realists expect inevitable conflict in the Taiwan Strait as the bal-
ance is gradually titling in China’s favor.6 However, realism has failed to explain the continued economic

3
Chen-Kai Chu and Xiao-Wui Lan, ‘Kuang-Min Ku: Xiungdi zhi bang bu neng da zhang’ [‘Kuang-Min Ku: no war between brothers’],
ChinaTimes.com, (13 June 2014), available at: http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140613000381-260102 (accessed 15
March 2015).
4
Yu-Zhong Wang, ‘50 wan heichao shang kai dao: Fei-Fan Lin yao Ma chu mien huiying’ [‘Over 5 million Black Tide on the street; Fei-
Fan Lin wanted responses from Ma’], (30 March 2014), available at: http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/978491
(accessed 1 May 2015). This movement ‘ended’ on 6 April 2014, when the student leaders agreed to leave the Legislative Yuan when
Wang Jin-Pyng promised that the Legislative Yuan would give the CSSTA a transparent ratification process under the monitoring
of the political parties.
5
Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959); Stephen M.
Walt, ‘Alliance formation and the balance of world power’, International Security 9(4), (1985), pp. 3–43.
6
Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006).
 Journal of Contemporary China  265

and social integration across the Taiwan Strait. More specifically, as relative power is crucial in a realist
scenario, people should not have seen an increased level of economic integration in the Taiwan Strait.
Liberalism, on the other hand, sees the possibility of peace in the Taiwan Strait through cooper-
ation and institutionalization. For example, functionalists would expect a ‘spillover’ from trade talks
to further political integration.7 According to functionalists, continued economic integration and the
increasing dependence of Taiwan on China in the economic arena would lead to steps of gradual and
further political convergence. However, evidence in the Taiwan Strait suggests the opposite: Taiwan
and the Mainland have significantly deepened their economic ties in the past decades, yet the two
sides are drifting further apart in their political integration.8 Contrary to the liberalist expectation that
closer economic ties would lead to increased desire for closer political integration, people in Taiwan
are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese and they increasingly reject
political integration. Therefore, liberalism has fallen short of providing an explanation about what is
happening in the Taiwan Strait in recent years. If neither realism nor liberalism could appropriately
explain what is happening in the Taiwan Strait, what theoretical framework could best guide the study
of cross-Strait relations? Constructivism emerges to be a more appropriate theoretical perspective that
advances the explanation of the paradoxical dynamics across the Strait, particularly the phenomenon
of economic convergence and political divergence.
Constructivists do not deny the anarchical nature of the system structure and the existence and
importance of materialist capacities, but constructivism focuses more on the importance of agency in
the system.9 In other words, individuals and their social relations are far more important than material
capabilities. Cross-Strait relations are largely determined by the social interactions that happen in this
particular context. Therefore, two relevant points can be drawn from constructivism. First, Taiwan and
Mainland China have developed two different social environments since their separation in the late
1940s. Taiwan has gradually become a multi-party democracy, while Mainland China on the other hand
has remained an authoritarian party-state. The different social environments have helped create and
solidify two different identities. As the identity in Mainland China remains Chinese, people in Taiwan
have increasingly wanted a separate Taiwanese identity that would distinguish themselves from the
people in the Mainland.10 Hence, the new Taiwanese identity and Taiwan’s rising nationalism as the con-
sequences of the unique socialization process have attracted scholarly attention.11 Moreover, economic
integration and Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence on Mainland China have not changed the
respective socialization processes in the Taiwan Strait. This is why economic convergence has not led
to any visible and meaningful political convergence.
The second point in this constructivist context is that how to frame and construct the discourse about
cross-Strait relations is an important topic. To maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing and Taipei
need to shift from a dialog of confrontation or conflict to a dialog of peace. The cross-Strait relationship
is a social construction based on the interactions between the two sides. Constructivism suggests that
the relationship can be re-constructed if the social interactions change in the Taiwan Strait. As this
study presents, different generations of Taiwanese have gone through different socialization processes.
Understanding their perceptions of Mainland China and attitudes towards trade talks across the Strait
has become a foundation of this constructivist turn in studying cross-Strait relations.

7
David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1975).
8
Yi-Wen Yu, Ko-Chia Yu and Tse-Chun Lin, ‘Political economy of cross-Strait relations: is Beijing’s patronage policy on Taiwanese business
sustainable?’, Journal of Contemporary China 25(99), (2016), pp. 372–388; Stan Hok-wui Wong and Nicole Wu, ‘Can Beijing buy
Taiwan? An empirical assessment of Beijing’s agricultural trade concessions to Taiwan’, Journal of Contemporary China 25(99),
(2016), pp. 353–371.
9
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
10
One explanation is that the continued denial by Mainland China of the existence of the Republic of China on Taiwan has forced
people in Taiwan to seek a Taiwanese identity that would distinguish themselves from the Chinese on the Mainland. While most
Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (zhongguoren or Chinese nationals), they do not necessarily deny their ethnic and
cultural Chinese identity. See Yang Zhong ‘Explaining national identity shift in Taiwan’, Journal of Contemporary China 25(99),
(2016), pp. 336–352.
11
Yun-Han Chu, ‘Taiwan’s national identity politics and the prospect of cross-Strait relations’, Asian Survey 44(4), (2004), pp. 484–512.
266 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

Critical Factors of Perceived Cross-Strait Relationships and Trade Talks

Since the 1980s, two important developments have occurred across the Taiwan Strait. The first devel-
opment occurred in Mainland China. Through economic reforms and opening, China has become an
economic powerhouse. According to a recently released International Monetary Fund (IMF) report,
China has overtaken the United States (US) to become the world’s largest economy as measured by the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).12 As the result of rapid and continued
economic growth, Mainland China has become an economic magnet for Taiwan.13 It is clear that Taiwan
is increasingly more dependent on the mainland for economic prosperity.
The second development occurred on the island of Taiwan. Taiwan has transformed from a sin-
gle-party authoritarian political system to a multi-party democracy. During the four-decade process, the
national goals and policies of the Taiwanese government regarding Mainland China and the identity of
the Taiwanese people have changed too. For example, during the dominant years of KMT rule, both the
government in Taiwan and many Taiwanese people, including Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang
Ching-kuo, believed that the ultimate goal of the KMT was to liberalize the Mainland and achieve
national unification.14 Today, however, the liberalization of the Mainland is no longer the national goal
of the Taiwanese government.
Before Taiwan’s recent consolidation of its democracy, the Taiwan issue was largely an issue of ter-
ritorial and/or historical lineage with Mainland China. Increasingly, the Taiwan issue has become an
issue of identity largely due to the fact that people in Taiwan have experienced and created an entirely
different social and political environment compared to the authoritarian environment in Mainland
China. The changes in Taiwan’s social environment have led to changes in the identity of the Taiwanese
on the island.15 In the past, many Taiwanese regarded themselves as Chinese. Today, however, people
in Taiwan increasingly view themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese.
The question of unification has always been an important issue for the two governments across
the Taiwan Strait. With Taiwan becoming ever more economically dependent on Mainland China, one
would expect the two sides to move closer to an eventual unification. Empirical findings show that
those who are pessimistic about Taiwan’s economy are more likely to support unification.16 However, the
converging economic and social interests have paradoxically led to a diverging path towards political
unification.17 The most recent example was the Sunflower Student Movement in the spring of 2014.
Although some argue that the CSSTA would have benefited Taiwan’s economy, many Taiwanese see
the CSSTA as a threat to and an infringement on Taiwan’s sovereignty. One possible explanation is that
democratization in Taiwan and the single-party authoritarian rule in Mainland China have created
two different social experiences for the two respective peoples. Changes in these social experiences
have led to changes in the Taiwanese identity. While people in Mainland China consider Taiwanese as
part of the Chinese nation, people in Taiwan increasingly think of themselves as Taiwanese instead of
Chinese.18 Therefore, identity politics has become increasingly more important in explaining the future
of cross-Strait relations.19

12
‘China surpasses US as world’s largest economy based on key measure’, RT News, (8 October 2014), available at:
http://rt.com/business/194264-china-surpass-us-gdp/ (accessed 10 October 2014).
13
David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007).
14
Yu-Shan Wu, ‘The evolution of the KMT’s stance on the one China principle: national identity in flux’, in Gunter Schubert and Jens
Damm, eds, Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2011),
pp. 51–71.
15
Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2004).
16
Chia-Hung Tsai, Ding-Ming Wang and Livianna S. Tossutti, ‘Between independence and unification: an ordered probit analysis of
panel survey data on Taiwan’s constitutional future’, Issues & Studies 44(4), (2008), pp. 71–98.
17
Yitan Li, ‘Constructing peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms’,
Journal of Contemporary China 23(85), (2014), pp.119–142.
18
Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?
19
Dafydd Fell, ‘More or less space for identity in Taiwan’s party politics?’, in Schubert and Damm, eds, Taiwanese Identity in the 21st
Century, pp. 95–112.
 Journal of Contemporary China  267

In this article, the authors focus on four factors drawn from empirical studies on Taiwan’s identity
politics to explain people’s perception of cross-Strait relationships, namely national/ethnic identifi-
cation, state/country identification, party identification and unification/independence preferences.
First, national/ethnic identification has been the driving force of Taiwanese people’s attitudes toward
Mainland China. It is self-strengthened through selective and psychological processes.20 This type of
identification refers to one’s psychological attachment to a group of people living in a political entity and
the feelings toward them. It has been found that those who have dual-national/ethnic identifications
are more likely to be KMT supporters.21
The second factor involves state/country identification, i.e. identification with the Republic of China
(ROC). As the proportion of Taiwanese people who identify themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese
continues to increase, many wonder whether Taiwan would declare de jure independence; and if so,
how Taipei would deal with or avoid any potential military conflicts with Mainland China. Some pre-
fer that Taiwan should establish an independent nation-state, which is independent from either the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the ROC.22 To some others, staying with the ROC, rejecting Taiwan’s
independence from the ROC and protecting the ROC’s state name from being changed to any other
names is an important mission or value of life.
Party identification is the third driving force behind Taiwanese people’s attitudes toward Mainland
China. Party identification in this study refers to voters’ support for either the Pan-Blue Camp, led by the
KMT, or the Pan-Green Camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The ecology of political
parties in Taiwan has evolved from the KMT-dominant system since 1945 to the two-political camp
system today. Studies of the history of recent Taiwanese politics have shown that the rise of the DPP is
based on the opposition to the KMT as the primary reason and the opposition to the ROC constitutional
tradition as the secondary reason. The use of Taiwanese nationalism in electoral campaigns is typically
highlighted as the DPP’s main strategy for winning elections.23
The fourth important factor of Taiwanese’s political attitudes toward Mainland China involves uni-
fication/independence preferences. For example, when the proportion of Taiwanese national identi-
fication increased to 60% and the proportion of voters who favor independence increased to 23.8%
in June 2014, both figures had reached their historically highest points, implying a direct and causal
relationship between the two parameters.24

Democratic Impact and Generation Politics in Taiwan

Beyond the three variables that have been identified by the literature as the primary explanatory varia-
bles of Taiwanese attitudes toward Mainland China, two other factors are analyzed: Taiwan’s democratic

20
P. G. Klandermans, ‘Identity politics and politicized identities: identity processes and the dynamics of protest’, Political Psychology
35(1), (2014), pp. 1–22.
21
Frank C.-S. Liu, ‘When Taiwan identifiers embrace ROC: the complexity of state identification in Taiwan’, Issues & Studies 48(2),
(2012), pp. 1–34.
22
Some in Taiwan, particularly activists of Taiwan independence, argue that a formal declaration of independence would
not only mean independence from the PRC, but also independence from the ROC, as long as the ROC is symbolically con-
nected to Mainland China [Chao-Tang Huang, ‘Yao duli shi shuo taidu yao chong Zhong Hua Ming Guo tizhi nei duli’
[‘Independence means becoming independent from the ROC system’], Youtube.com, (19 November 2012), available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI4A0pKW530 (accessed 4 April 2014); Chang-Chin Tsao, ‘Taidu: Taiwan chong Zhong Hua
Ming Guo duli chuqu’ [‘Taiwan independence: independent from ROC’], LibertyTimes.com, (12 February 2007), available at:
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/opinion/paper/116007 (accessed 4 January 2014)]. While no one has seen any public survey on
this sensitive issue of ‘independence from ROC’, this perspective has been circulated in Taiwan for decades and become a salient
subject recently.
23
Shale Horowitz and Alexander C. Tan. ‘Rising China versus estranged Taiwan’, in Shale Asher Horowitz, Uk Heo and Alexander C.
Tan, eds, Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 115–130.
24
Wei-Zhen Zen, ‘Jheng da tiao jha tai wan ren ren tong tai dou xhi chi lu jyun pan sin gao’ [‘NCCU survey: the proportions of
identifying as Taiwanese and supporting for Taiwan independence achieved high records’], (11 July 2014), available at:
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1052425 (accessed 11 July 2014).
268 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

impact and the generational factor. Neither guided by liberalism nor stimulated by anti-communist
nationalism,25 Taiwan’s democracy is a result of party competition and mobilization, social movement
and political socialization and has become a collective memory that residents employ to distinguish
between ‘we’ (the Taiwanese) and ‘they’ (the Chinese).26 In this study, respondents’ belief in Taiwan’s
democratic impact on the democratization in Mainland China was measured by the level of agreement
with the following statement: ‘Do you believe that our democracy and freedom can change Mainland
China?’. Those who agree with this statement are likely to be those who hold a friendlier view regarding
Mainland China, because a democratic regime is more likely to show respect to Taiwan’s political needs
and systems; therefore, they will perceive that Taiwan has a positive relationship with Mainland China.
On the contrary, those who disagree with this statement are less confident that Mainland China could
change or would conduct political reforms; hence, these individuals are likely to describe Taiwan’s
relationship with Mainland China using a negative or hostile language. Moreover, democratization in
Taiwan has changed the social basis on which the Taiwanese identity is formed.27 Today’s Taiwanese
increasingly think they are different from the Mainland Chinese, because the identity of the former is
constructed in part from a democratic social environment, whereas the identity of the latter is con-
structed from an authoritarian social experience.28
Age has been used as another important control variable in Taiwan’s empirical identity studies, but
the concept of ‘generation’ has not been employed until recently. Scholars have suggested that gener-
ation is a critical factor of identity shifts. For example, Wakabayashi identifies several previous identity
shifts among different generations of Taiwanese. The first occurred when Taiwan was annexed by Japan
after the first Sino–Japanese War in 1895. The Japanese occupation helped to create a pan-Taiwanese
identity, an identity limited to Han and centered on the resistance to the Japanese occupation. The
second change occurred when Taiwan was ‘gloriously returned’ to the ROC in 1945. Many Taiwanese
thought they were Chinese again. The third identity shift was likely marked by the 2.28 Incident, after
which many people in Taiwan (‘we, the Taiwanese’) saw themselves as being different from the Mainland
Chinese (‘they, the Chinese’).29 Perhaps the most recent identity shift occurred together with Taiwan’s
democratization process. Today, most Taiwanese see themselves as being different from the Mainland
Chinese. Thus, different generations of people may very likely have different identities based on the
social experiences they live through. Therefore, as generations change, the political meanings of their
identities change too.
Previous studies have identified four generations, each of which has particular political experiences.30
Voters of the first generation were born in 1931 or earlier and entered their formative years before 1949.
This generation witnessed the social conflicts between the ethnic groups. The voters of the second
generation were born between 1932 and 1953 and entered their formative years between 1949 and
1971. The second generation witnessed the diplomatic difficulties the ROC experienced. The voters of
the third generation were born between 1954 and 1968 and entered their formative years between
1972 and 1986. The third generation witnessed Taiwan’s economic boom. The voters of the fourth
generation were born between 1969 and 1978 and witnessed the era of student social movements
for Congressional reform and the establishment of the DPP in their formative years between 1986

25
Chih-Yu Shih, ‘Constituting Taiwanese statehood: the world timing of un-Chinese consciousness’, Journal of Contemporary China
16(53), (2007), pp. 699–716.
26
J. Bruce Jacobs, ‘Whither Taiwanization? The colonization, democratization and Taiwanization of Taiwan’, Japanese Journal of Political
Science 14(4), (2013), pp. 567–586.
27
Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?
28
Yitan Li, ‘Constructing peace in the Taiwan Strait’.
29
Masahiro Wakabayashi, ‘Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others”’, in Edward Friedman, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s
Dilemmas and International Peace (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 3–21; Stefan Fleischauer, ‘Perspectives on 228: The “28 February
1947 Uprising” in contemporary Taiwan’, in Schubert and Damm, eds, Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century, pp. 35–50.
30
G. Andy Chang and Te-Yu Wang, ‘Taiwanese or Chinese? Independence or unification? An analysis of generational differences in
Taiwan’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 40(1–2), (2005), pp. 29–49; Shelley Rigger, ‘Taiwan’s rising rationalism: generations,
politics, and “Taiwanese nationalism”’, Policy Studies 26, (2006), pp. ix–74.
 Journal of Contemporary China  269

and 1996. Studies based on this categorization of the generations suggest that the second, third and
fourth generations are more likely to identify themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese than the first
generation is.31
This categorization of generation, however, has not been updated since it was introduced to Taiwan
studies. Following the logic of this categorization, this study added the fifth and sixth generations. The
voters of the fifth generation were born between 1979 and 1988 and entered their formative years
between 1997 and 2006. The fifth generation experienced the tension of the ‘missile crisis’ in 1996, when
Mainland China fired missiles toward Taiwan’s offshore areas before the island’s first direct presidential
election in 1996, and witnessed the transfer of power from the KMT to the DPP in 2000. The voters of
the sixth generation were born after 1989 and entered their formative years after 2007. The sixth gen-
eration witnessed the transfer of power from the DPP to the KMT in 2008 and the debates and signing
of ECFA between 2010 and 2013.
Previous studies have not systematically applied this categorization to examine if there are gaps
between the generations regarding their perceptions about Taiwan’s relationship with Mainland China,
however historical observation has provided some clues. Pei-de Lien summarizes previous studies on
the relationship between Taiwan’s democratization and the reform of textbooks and finds that the early
1990s was when the fourth generation experienced the democratization and localization of civic edu-
cation. For example, traditional civics and morality courses were gradually replaced by Taiwan Studies
and civil societies between 1993 and 2006. She also points out that the fourth generation and younger
have been educated less and less about their connection with Mainland China.32
Although Taiwanese nationalism may seem to be the popular ethos in post-reform Taiwan, some argue that the
content of its character is much less about ethnic nationalism or the pursuit of independence than about civic
nationalism or the pursuit of preserving the democratic and sovereign status quo … Teaching national [state]
identity as key to forging a collective and positive identity with the state in democratized Taiwan may be more
complicated than before because of the perceived China threat, the ambiguous status of Taiwan’s statehood, and
the encouragement of critical thinking in student learning.33
Therefore, the fifth and the sixth generations’ attitudes toward Mainland China can be seen as the
evidence reflecting a consequence of this decades-long educational reform. They are expected to be
more politically aware of, if not hostile to, the image of Mainland China being the one setting the rules
and timetable for political reunification.
Shelley Rigger further suggests that Taiwan’s younger voters are less concerned than the elder voters
about trade talks with Mainland China, even though state identity is often seen as the main cleavage
between political parties. She thinks that the younger voters are concerned about cross-Strait talks
because they see Mainland China as a threat politically.34
Given these clues, the updated categorization of Taiwanese voters’ generation should reflect the
unique political life of each generation. The authors then advance this observation and systematically
and quantitatively examine the following hypotheses: (1) voters of the first two generations may tend
to be friendly to Mainland China while the younger generations feel politically less connected with the
Mainland Chinese; and (2) the younger generations (particularly the fifth generation who started to
work after graduation from school) see economic opportunities from interactions with Mainland China.

Method and Data

The survey data used for the present study (N=1,072) were collected from 10 to 24 January 2014 by
a university-based survey institute. The survey was conducted using the landline only random-digit

31
Ibid.
32
Lien Pei-Te, ‘Democratization and citizenship: education changing identity politics and shifting paradigms of teaching and learning
in Taiwan’, Taiwan Journal of Democracy 10(2), (2014), pp. 25–48.
33
Ibid., p. 36.
34
Shelley Rigger, ‘Strawberry jam: national identity, cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s youth’, in Cal Clark, ed., The Changing Dynamics
of the Relations among China, Taiwan, and the United States (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp.
117–135.
270 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

dialing (RDD) system, or a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system to maximize the
sample’s national representativeness. The random phone numbers were drawn from a national phone-
book published in 2012 and the sampling error lies in the range of plus and minus 3%. The response
rate was 23.9%, which was calculated on the basis of the formula 2 of the American Association of
Public Opinion Research (AAPOR).
The sample collected before the Sunflower Movement occurred has its advantage for this study.
Just like an electoral forecast relying on data collected before elections, analysis based on this dataset
depicts a very general, down to earth picture about voters’ feelings toward the imagined Mainland
China before the movement. To understand the movement, data collected before it are preferable to
data collected after the movement because the former avoids emotionally biased responses aroused
during the movement. Although no one could predict the occurrence of the movement and design
a questionnaire for it, the questionnaire has captured ingredients that are relevant to the movement,
particularly attitudes toward Taiwan’s economic future, national/ethnic identification, party identifica-
tion and state/country identification. Therefore, the analysis based on this dataset captures the picture
of Taiwanese voters’ identity politics a few months before and after the movement.35
Binomial logistic regressions were consistently applied to a series of analyses that share the same
theoretical framework, in which national/ethnic, party and state/country identification, as well as gen-
der, education and generation serve as control variables. The details regarding the question wording
and frequency tables are provided in the Appendix.

Findings and Analysis

The results presented below are composed of three parts: the first part describes how the respond-
ents view Taiwan’s relationship with Mainland China. The second part explains the formation of such
perceptions. The third part explores the extent to which these perceptions influence voters’ attitudes
toward trade talks with Mainland China. As the previous sections depict how variables are chosen for
this study, the section below specifies the measurement of the variables, the logic behind expected
causal relationships, and the results of hypotheses testing.

Part 1: Descriptive Analysis of The Imagined Relationship with Mainland China

Respondents were asked, ‘How do you see our relationship with Mainland China, is it more like father
and son, brothers, couples, friends or enemies?’. The top three categories that respondents selected
were friends (42.35%), brothers (25.84%) and enemies (13.71%). This distribution suggests that a few
weeks before the Sunflower Movement in March 2014, the majority of the voters were not hostile to
Mainland China.
Figure 1 shows how voters holding different national/ethnic identities view cross-Strait relations.
The distribution suggests that Taiwanese identity is more associated with ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ than
‘brothers’, while Chinese identity is, unsurprisingly, more strongly associated with ‘brothers’ and ‘friends’
than ‘enemies’. Those with dual identities, i.e. ‘I am both Taiwanese and Chinese’, have a similar pattern
with those of the Chinese identifiers, except with respect to the strength of the family connection.
Figure 2 further shows the distribution of imagined relationships by unification preference, measured
by the question ‘Do you hope that Taiwan and Mainland China become one country?’. While more than
half of the respondents who chose ‘brothers’ are associated with unification, it is not clear whether the
unification preference is associated with the images of ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’. The category of ‘friends’
is composed of both supporters and opponents of unification. This composition implies that ‘friends’
serves as a neutral term for those who hold strong political beliefs when they describe Mainland China.

35
All of the variables are selected based on their relevance to the perception about Mainland China. Therefore, the set of variables
that are statistically significant based on this dataset, as to be shown in the next section, should at least remain so in other
post-movement analysis.
 Journal of Contemporary China  271

Figure 1. Distribution of imagined relationships with Mainland China by national identity. Source: authors.
Notes: N=931; Chi-square statistics=62.60; degree of freedom=10; significance p-value < 0.001.

Figure 2. Distribution of perceived relationships with Mainland China by unification preferences. Source: authors.
Notes: N=932; Chi-square statistics=61.13; degree of freedom=10; significance p-value < 0.001.

Part 2: Explanatory Analysis of The Imagined Relationships with Mainland China

As scholars of party identification have confirmed, preferences and perceptions about a political entity,
such as a candidate or a political party, are driven by one’s belief system that is rooted in one’s stereotype
272 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

Table 1. Factors of the perceived relationships with Mainland China.

Brothers Friends Enemies

Reg. Coef. Std. Error Reg. Coef. Std. Error Reg. Coef. Std. Error
(Intercept) -1.983*** 0.556 0.888 0.481 -1.749** 0.674
National/Ethnic Identification (base=Both)
Taiwanese -0.252 0.217 0.001 0.189 0.796* 0.294
Chinese 0.063 0.349 0.015 0.331 0.167 0.669
Party Identification (base=Non-Partisan)
Support for the Pan-Blue Camp 0.484* 0.234 -0.375 0.215 0.039 0.349
Support for the Pan-Green Camp -0.253 0.251 -0.022 0.200 0.340 0.240
State/Country Identification
Prefer using the country name Taiwan -0.498* 0.227 0.323 0.195 0.386 0.274
Willing to change ROC to Taiwan -0.037 0.081 -0.133 0.069 0.108 0.091
Unification/Independence Preference
Hope Taiwan and PRC become one country 0.185* 0.085 -0.056 0.078 -0.404** 0.141
Our democracy can change Mainland China 0.179* 0.070 -0.041 -0.118 0.087 0.083
Taiwan can keep economic status quo -0.036 0.077 0.174** 0.065 -0.248** 0.094
Male 1.077*** 0.189 -0.661*** -0.085 0.216 0.210
Education 0.031 0.038 -0.046 -0.009 0.047 0.045
Generations (base= 3rd, born 1954~1968)
1st & 2nd (born before 1953) 0.605** 0.250 -0.744** 0.236 0.217 0.338
4th (born 1969~1978) -0.459 0.266 -0.276 0.220 1.072*** 0.304
5th (born 1979~1988) -0.574** 0.308 0.034 0.248 0.750** 0.344
6th (born 1989~1993) -0.769 0.371 -0.485 0.295 1.275** 0.371
Observations 734 734 734
AIC 782.930 992.305 617.507
Notes: Significance level.
*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
***p<0.001.

and ideology and strengthened by selective reception of political information.36 Following this theoret-
ical path, Taiwanese voters’ perception about Mainland China could be explained by their belief system
composed of national/ethnic identification, party identification and state identification. A model of the
imaged relationships with Mainland China is constructed, which takes into account gender, education
and the belief that Taiwan’s democracy can change Mainland China and that Taiwan’s economic power
can help keep the status quo. Specifically, these two control variables are measured by the two survey
questions: ‘How much do you hope that Mainland China becomes a democracy?’ and ‘Do you think
that our economic power can keep the cross-Strait status quo?’, respectively.
As Table 1 presents, these variables vary in their explanatory power for the types of imagined rela-
tionships. First, in terms of national/ethnic identification, respondents insisting on Taiwanese nationality
(neither Chinese nor both) are likely to be hostile to Mainland China, but there is no evidence that
Chinese identifiers share the same image about Mainland China.
Second, regarding party identification, there is no statistical evidence showing that all of the Pan-
Green supporters (compared to the non-partisan respondents) regard Mainland China as enemies;
however, it is evident that Pan-Blue camp supporters are more likely to regard Mainland China as
brothers.
Third, given the strong evidence showing that the unification/independence preference plays a critical
part in the formation of one’s perception about Mainland China, those who prefer using Taiwan as the state’s
name when applying for membership of an international organization are less likely to see Mainland China

Philip Converse, ‘The nature of belief systems in mass publics’, in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press
36

of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–261; Richard Johnston, ‘Party identification: unmoved mover or sum of preferences?’, Annual Review of
Political Science 9, (2006), pp. 329–351; Kevin Arceneaux, Martin Johnson and Chad Murphy, ‘Polarized political communication,
oppositional media hostility, and selective exposure’, The Journal of Politics 74(1), (2012), pp. 174–186.
 Journal of Contemporary China  273

as brothers.37 This outcome reflects a commonly shared perception in Taiwan that Mainland China is not a
helpful partner like a brother for solving the difficult problem of Taiwan’s international status, but such frus-
tration does not transform into hostility toward Mainland China. A person’s hope for unification leads him
or her to view Mainland China as a brother instead of an enemy, whereas hope for Taiwan independence
drives him or her to view Mainland China as an enemy instead of a brother.
Fourth, the two control variables about confidence in Taiwan’s democracy and ability to maintain
the economic status quo provide further explanations. Those who believe that Taiwan’s democracy and
freedom can change Mainland China are likely to imagine Mainland China as a brother instead of an
enemy; those who do not believe so are likely to see tension across the Taiwan Strait. Those who are
confident in Taiwan’s economic status quo are likely to view Mainland China as a friend, while those
who are not as confident are likely to view Mainland China as an enemy.
Fifth, there is a clear gap between the older and younger generations, compared to the third gen-
eration, those born between 1954 and 1968 and who are now in the leadership positions in business,
government and education.38 The generations that are born before 1953 are likely to perceive the cross-
Strait relationship as one between brothers rather than between friends. Interestingly, the generations
that were born after 1968 are likely to regard Mainland China as an enemy. Particularly, the youngest
generation of voters (those born after 1989) not only regards Mainland China as an enemy but also
refuses to regard Mainland China as a brother.
Sixth, the authors did not find any explicit evidence that explains why respondents chose ‘friends’
as the analogy of the cross-Strait relationship. However, two factors, gender and level of education,
could help explain why respondents did not choose ‘friends’ when controlling for respondents’ age.
Male respondents are likely to reject using the term ‘friends’ but accept the term ‘brothers’, whereas
female respondents behave oppositely. While the gender disparity requires formal explanation in future
studies, it is suspected that female respondents feel that ‘friend’ is a safer choice to describe cross-Strait
relations. Those with a higher education level may attempt to digest information regarding cross-Strait
relations and interactions more carefully. Therefore, better-educated voters may be more likely to form
more complex attitudes toward Mainland China. These voters may either have options in their minds,
such as ‘both friends and enemies’, other than the options they were provided with during the survey,
or they may have chosen ‘friends’ as an alternative to their complex answers.39
In sum, Taiwanese voters vary in their perceptions about Taiwan’s relationships with Mainland China.
Those who are born before 1953, male, supporting the Pan-Blue Camp, preferring unification, and/or
confident that Taiwan’s democracy can change Mainland China are likely to use ‘brotherhood’ as an anal-
ogy in their description about Taiwan’s relationship with Mainland China. Those who were born in 1969
and after have strong Taiwanese national/ethnic identity, reject unification and/or doubt that Mainland
China will be politically influenced by Taiwan, are likely to hold hostile attitudes in their description about
their mainland counterpart. As shown in Figure 1, the category ‘friends’ includes a variety of national
identity, which implies that a good number of respondents hold complex views about Mainland China.

Part 3: The Imagined Relationships with Mainland China and Future Trade Talks
Next, the understanding about the formation of imagined relationships with Mainland China is dis-
cussed to examine the extent to which such perception influences one’s attitudes toward cross-Strait

37
The question wording is ‘When we are applying for a membership of an international organization, do you prefer using the name
of ROC or Taiwan?’.
38
Taking this group (between 47 and 61) as the reference group helps check the hypothesis regarding whether the Sunflower
Movement involves generation conflict (and this article presents a clear picture of it). Additionally, because in the present study
the authors wanted to present how people perceive Taiwan’s relationship with Mainland China, it made more sense to compare
the most senior generations with the younger generations.
39
In additional analysis that is not reported here, the authors found that ‘father–son’ and ‘couple’ relationships are also likely options
for the fifth and sixth generations (compared to the third generation), where father refers to Mainland China. During interviews with
a few young voters, the interviewees stated that Mainland China could be analogized as a rigid father who has been prohibiting
his ‘son’ from leaving the family.
274 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

trade talks, measured by the question: ‘Our government has been conducting trade talks with Mainland
China, do you prefer a more aggressive process or a more cautious one?’.
To study the factors underlying attitudes toward trade talks, the model used in Table 1 is modified in
two respects. First, the perceived relationships were added as dummy variables, including ‘father and
son’, ‘brothers’, ‘friends’, ‘enemies’ and ‘others’. The relationship ‘Couples’ was taken as the base of com-
parison because, among the six options, it represents the closest relationship between two individuals.
Second, two control variables are included in the model: the evaluation of Taiwan’s economic status
and the perspective on the democratization of Mainland China. People with confidence in Taiwan’s
economic power in terms of keeping the cross-Strait economic status quo are more willing to continue
trade talks with Mainland China. Those who think Taiwan’s economy is vulnerable to the influence or
pressure from Mainland China will be conservative about further trade talks. Those who share the belief
that economic development leads to democratization are more likely than those who care less about
the PRC’s democratization to show support for cross-Strait trade talks.
Some results were quite consistent with conventional wisdom. As shown in Table 2, those who prefer
unification and/or those who believe that Taiwan’s democracy can change Mainland China are likely to
welcome trade talks, whereas Taiwanese identifiers, compared to those who hold dual-national/ethic
identity and/or those who see Mainland China as an enemy, are likely to oppose further trade talks.
Other results were unexpected. First, none of the other types of perceived relationships, compared to
‘couples’, has a statistically significant influence on the dependent variable. Second, those who identify
themselves as Chinese, compared to dual identifiers, are less likely to support further trade talks. In other
words, support for trade talks across the Strait cannot be attributed to imagined brotherhood, friend-
ship or partisanship. Those who identify themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese are more likely to

Table 2. Perceived relationships with Mainland China and attitudes toward trade talks (1).

Reg. Coef. Std. Error

(Intercept) 0.807 1.272
Imagined Relationships (base=Couples)
Father-Son -1.641 1.183
Brothers -2.119 1.127
Friends -2.034 1.121
Enemy -2.408* 1.138
Others -2.035 1.238
National/Ethnic Identification (base=Both)
Taiwanese -0.461* 0.204
Chinese -0.868* 0.363
Party Identification (base=Non-Partisan)
Support for the Pan-Blue Camp 0.155 0.230
Support for the Pan-Green Camp -0.147 0.230
Unification/Independence Preference
Prefer using Taiwan to ROC -0.349 0.196
Prefer unification 0.495*** 0.087
Hoping Mainland China become democratic 0.154 0.096
Our democracy can change Mainland China 0.138* 0.068
Taiwan can keep economic status quo -0.128 0.074
Male -0.606** 0.182
Education -0.033 0.038
Generations (base= 3rd, born 1954~1968)
1st & 2nd (born before 1953) 0.012 0.270
4th (born 1969~1978) 0.537* 0.251
5th (born 1979~1988) 1.125*** 0.278
6th (born 1989~1993) 0.617 0.341
Observations 674
Notes: Significance level.
*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
***p<0.001.
 Journal of Contemporary China  275

support such trade talks. This suggests that the cross-Strait relationship is a complex issue involving a
multitude of factors. Any one explanation is insufficient to explain the relationship.
Additionally, at the time of the survey respondents between the ages of 26 and 45 (the fourth and
fifth generations in this study) are more positive than those between 45 and 60 (the third generation)
regarding the cross-Strait trade talks. This result perhaps reflects their perception about the economic
rise of Mainland China and the fact that Taiwan’s economy and their career opportunities are related
to Mainland China’s economic development.
Because only a few respondents chose ‘father–son’ (3.73%) and ‘couples’ (1.03%), ‘father–son’, ‘cou-
ples’ and ‘brothers’ are grouped into a new variable: ‘family’. ‘Family’ is then compared with the two
additional models using ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ as explanatory variables, respectively. As Table 3 shows,
respondents who see Mainland China as family are likely to support trade talks; however, there is no
evidence suggesting that opposing trade talks should be attributed to respondents’ hostile perception
about Mainland China. All other patterns shown in Table 3 are consistent with those in Table 2. The third
model in Table 3 also shows that those between 21 and 25 (the sixth generation) hold more progressive
attitudes toward cross-Strait trade talks than the third generation.
In sum, findings suggest five main points. First, unification/independence preferences and belief in
Taiwan’s democratic impact could explain why Taiwanese voters see Mainland China as a brother or an
enemy. Second, Pan-Blue supporters tend to see Mainland China as a brother, but this does not imply
that they are zealous about cross-Strait trade talks. Third, Taiwanese identifiers tend to see Mainland
China as an enemy, but this does not mean that all Pan-Green supporters have this tendency. Fourth,
diversity (if not a gap) exists between the older and younger generations regarding their perceptions
about Mainland China. Compared to those who are 46–60 years old, Taiwanese voters who are older

Table 3. Perceived relationships with Mainland China and attitudes toward trade talks (2).

Family Friends Enemies

B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
(Intercept) -1.244* 0.631 -1.241 0.642 -1.178 0.631
Family 0.747* 0.377
Friends 0.085 0.178
Enemy -0.405 0.254
National/Ethnic Identification (base=Both)
Taiwanese -0.498* 0.201 -0.508* 0.200 -0.469* 0.202
Chinese -0.896* 0.362 -0.907* 0.363 -0.896* 0.362
Party Identification (base=Non-Partisan)
Support for the Pan-Blue Camp 0.138 0.228 0.130 0.229 0.137 0.229
Support for the Pan-Green Camp -0.196 0.229 -0.191 0.228 -0.163 0.229
Unification/Independence Preference
Prefer using Taiwan to ROC -0.344 0.194 -0.352 0.194 -0.325 0.194
Prefer unification 0.502*** 0.087 0.510*** 0.086 0.500*** 0.086
Hoping Mainland China become democratic 0.151 0.095 0.144 0.095 0.151 0.095
Our democracy can change Mainland China 0.133* 0.067 0.130 0.067 0.126 0.067
Taiwan can keep economic status quo -0.113 0.073 -0.116 0.073 -0.124 0.073
Male -0.618** 0.178 -0.610** 0.180 -0.624*** 0.178
Education -0.036 0.038 -0.036 0.038 -0.035 0.038
Generations (base= 3rd, born 1954~1968)
1st & 2nd (born before 1953) 0.001 0.266 0.025 0.268 0.027 0.266
4th (born 1969~1978) 0.494* 0.246 0.533* 0.245 0.581* 0.248
5th (born 1979~1988) 1.075*** 0.274 1.107*** 0.273 1.146*** 0.275
6th (born 1989~1993) 0.557 0.336 0.644 0.334 0.696* 0.336
Observations 674 674 674
AIC 829.877 833.690 831.317
Notes: Significance level.
*p<0.05.
**p<0.01.
***p<0.001.
276 F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

than 61 tend to use the brotherhood analogy in their description of the cross-Strait relation; conversely,
those born after 1968 tend to use hostile expressions (such as ‘enemy’) to describe Mainland China
but welcome more economic connection with Mainland China. This paradox reflects the reality of the
younger generations of Taiwanese. Although younger Taiwanese wish to maintain their separate and
unique identity, their future may be highly dependent on Mainland China. Fifth, as the majority of
Taiwanese identifiers (58.86%) tend to be conservative about trade talks with Mainland China, one-third
of the respondents (30.88%) who identify themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese are likely to be
the driving and supportive force for trade talks with Mainland China.

Discussion and Conclusion

The attitudes of the Taiwanese government and voters toward trade talks with Mainland China have
been identified as a salient issue in the interaction among Washington, Beijing and Taipei. The Sunflower
Movement in 2014 showed the world that Taiwanese voters, particularly the younger generation,
seemed antagonistic to Mainland China and conservative about further trade talks.
This study provides empirical evidence supporting a different picture: a generation gap exists regard-
ing the perceptions about the Taiwan–Mainland China relationship. More specifically, those who are
born after 1968 see Mainland China as both a political threat and an economic opportunity.
First, this study confirms conventional wisdom that those who identify themselves as Taiwanese
(but neither Chinese nor both) and those who reject unification are likely to firmly oppose active trade
talks. It further contributes to the literature by identifying five variables that explain Taiwanese voters’
attitudes toward trade talks with Mainland China, namely family orientation (those seeing Mainland
China as family), national/ethnic identification (dual-national identifiers), state/country identification
(those favoring unification), belief in Taiwan’s democratic impact (those believing that Taiwan’s democ-
racy will change Mainland China) and generation (those who were born in 1968 and earlier). Note that
even though some respondents reported that they saw Mainland China as an enemy (13.71% of the
sample), no evidence shows that such a perception would lead them to oppose active trade talks. This
result suggests that, to Taiwanese voters, the perception of Mainland China as a political threat coexists
with the perception of Mainland China as an economic opportunity.
Second, as data employed by this study are representative of voters in general but not the
Sunflower Movement participants in particular, the findings help draw an understanding about
how the generations of voters perceive the movement. Students regarded Mainland China as
both a political enemy and an economic opportunity and they are not likely to be the initiators of
the movement. In effect, the movement was initiated by non-students who resisted unification or
held hostile attitudes toward Mainland China. Because the issue is salient and connected directly
to Mainland China, the movement was echoed by those who share the same Taiwanese national/
ethnic identity, particularly those born in 1969 and after. To the elder generation (those born in
1968 and before) who regard Mainland China as a brother (first and second generations) and who
are less likely to regard Mainland China as an enemy (third generation), they may not have felt as
involved as the voters who were born in 1969 and after.
Beyond explaining the dynamics of the Sunflower Movement, the findings suggest three more
points for future studies. First, the meanings of ‘brother’ and ‘friend’ need more elaboration and explo-
ration in the study of the cross-Strait relationship. In Taiwan, ‘brother’ was used only by the oldest two
generations. This reflects their understanding about the civil war since 1945 when the ROC (KMT)
and PRC (CCP) fought against one another like brothers competing for legitimacy. The rejection of
the brotherhood analogy by the youngest generation implies that this ‘civil war’ way of thinking has
ended with this generation. More interestingly, while the elder generation regards the ROC as the
older brother because the ROC was born earlier than the PRC, the younger generations of voters who
take this analogy are likely to regard the PRC as the older brother because of its political and economic
power, which is consistent with the perceptions of Mainland Chinese regarding the current cross-Strait
relationship. Moreover, ‘friends’ has become a term that accommodates both positive and negative
 Journal of Contemporary China  277

meanings and, therefore, this variable falls short of explaining the attitudes toward trade talks and
possibly toward all other issues regarding Mainland China. This suggests that future research is needed
to elaborate the meanings of ‘brothers’ and ‘friends’ in the contexts of both Taiwan and Mainland China.
Third, this study shows that Taiwanese people’s belief in Taiwan’s democratic impact plays an impor-
tant role in explaining their attitudes toward Mainland China. While the majority of Taiwanese voters
hope that Mainland China will democratize, this hope does not necessarily make them want more
trade talks with Mainland China. Those who believe that Taiwan’s democracy can change Mainland
China are likely to support trade talks. This belief implies that Taiwanese people are likely to prioritize
democracy over future trade talks. The Ma administration and the Legislative Yuan were forced to
agree to adopt more democratic procedures before ratifying the CSSTA in order to put an end to the
Sunflower Movement. Moreover, Taiwanese people who are less confident in Taiwan’s democracy or
who become indifferent in influencing Mainland China with Taiwan’s experiences of democratization
are likely to become conservative in future trade talks with Mainland China.
Furthermore, the negative coefficients of Taiwanese and Chinese identifiers in the models of trade
talks deserve greater attention. Those who have dual-national/ethnic identifications are more optimistic
about future trade talks. Chinese identifiers (7% in the sample) are less enthusiastic about trade talks
than dual identifiers are. They are likely to be anti-Communist ROC diehards. Future research is needed
to explore this diminishing group of voters in Taiwan as well as those who hide themselves behind the
label of dual identities.
Last but not least, the historic meeting of the PRC President Xi Jinping and ROC President Ma Ying-
Jeou on 6 November 2015 in Singapore suggests an important aspect of observing how Taiwanese
voters view prospective trade talks and perceived relationships across the Strait. Mr Xi and Mr Ma
avoided discussing sensitive political issues but emphasized ‘family’ and the ‘92 consensus’ established
as the base of past trade talks. Future studies are invited to inspect how political and symbolic actions
taken by Beijing and Taipei based on the ‘brotherhood’ and/or ‘friendship’ analogy and observe how
generations of Taiwanese voters think about and respond to these actions that would inevitably affect
their economic (and ultimately political) future with Mainland China.

Acknowledgements
This study is supported by Taiwan’s Ministry of Science and Technology (104-2410-H-110-014-MY2). The earlier draft of this
article was presented at the 2014 annual conference of the Taiwanese Political Science Association. The authors would like
to thank the conference audience and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for useful comments.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Frank Cheng-Shan Liu is Professor of Political Science at National Sun Yat-Sen University. Dr Liu’s teaching and research
interests include comparative politics, Taiwan politics, public opinion and political behavior, political psychology, polit-
ical communication, and research methods and methodology. His works has appeared in Journal of East Asian Studies,
Asian Survey, Advances in Complex Systems, International Political Science Review and International Journal of Public Opinion
Research. He is the founder and director of smilepoll.tw, a Chinese-based web survey platform that facilitates research
about Taiwanese voters’ social and political attitudes.
Yitan Li is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Asian Studies at Seattle University. His research
focuses on international relations, foreign policy analysis, international conflict and security, international political
economy, comparative politics, and Chinese and East Asian politics. He has published recently in Applied Economics,
Asian Affairs, Asian Perspective, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences,
Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies Perspectives, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of East Asian Studies,
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics and Political Research Quarterly. He is currently serving as the assistant editor of the
Journal of Chinese Political Science.
Appendix.
278

Table A1. Variable description of the telephone survey dataset.

Constructs / Variables Measurement / Question wording Options Freq. %

Perspectives on the cross-Strait (r18) How do you see our relationship with Mainland China, is it more like father and son, brothers, Father–son 40 3.73
relationship / Perceived couples, friends or enemies? Brothers 277 25.84
relationship between Couples 11 1.03
mainland China and Taiwan Friends 454 42.35
Enemies 147 13.71
F. C.-S. Liu and Y. Li

Others 30 2.80
Enemies and friends 13 1.21
Country to country 16 1.49
Missing 84 7.84
Attitudes toward cross-Strait (r13) Our government has been conducting trade talks with Mainland China, do you prefer a more Moving forward bravely 393 36.66
trade talks aggressive process or a more cautious one? Watching steps and slowing down 576 53.73
Missing 103 9.61
National/Ethnic identification (r12) Some people say they are Taiwanese, some say Chinese and some say both. What about you? Taiwanese 631 58.86
Chinese 76 7.09
Both 331 30.88
Others but non-PRC 16 1.49
Missing 18 1.68
Party identification (v1) Which political party’s position is closer to yours? Independent 367 34.24
KMT 138 12.87
DPP 163 15.21
PFP 5 0.47
NP 2 0.19
TSU 11 1.03
Pan-Blue 51 4.76
Pan-Green 44 4.10
Others 4 0.37
No party affiliation 210 19.59
Support none 67 6.25
Missing 10 0.93
Preferred country name in (v9) When we are applying for a membership of an international organization, do you prefer using ROC 464 43.28
international affairs the name of ROC or Taiwan? Taiwan 511 47.67
Missing 97 9.05
Willingness to change country’s (r10) Do you hope that one day ROC changes its name to Taiwan or Republic of Taiwan? Hope not very much 202 18.84
name Hope not 286 26.68
Neutral 187 17.44
Hope so 166 15.49
Hope so very much 175 16.32
Missing 56 5.22
Prospective on future unifica- (r11) Do you hope that Taiwan and Mainland China become one country? Hope not very much 477 44.50
tion with Mainland China Hope not 329 30.69
Neutral 123 11.47
 Hope so 70 6.53
Hope so very much 39 3.64
Missing 34 3.17
Prospective on the democratiza- (r14) How much do you hope that Mainland China becomes a democracy? Hope not very much 27 2.52
tion of Mainland China Hope not 54 5.04
Neutral 23 2.15
Hope so 344 32.09
Hope so very much 521 48.60
Missing 103 9.61
Belief in Taiwan’s democratic (r15) Do you believe that our democracy and freedom can change Mainland China? Not at all 337 31.44
impact Do not believe 316 29.48
Neutral 39 3.64
Believe so 263 24.53
Strongly believe so 64 5.97
Missing 53 4.94
Evaluation of Taiwan’s economic (r16) Do you think that our economic power can keep the cross-Strait status quo? Cannot at all 289 26.96
power Cannot 365 33.96
About right 71 6.62
Can 218 20.34
Absolutely can 45 4.20
Missing 85 7.93
Sex Male 503 46.92
Female 569 53.08
Missing 0 0.00
Education level Illiteracy 12 1.12
Literate but no school 5 0.47
Elementary school (incomplete) 16 1.49
Elementary school 70 6.53
Junior high (incomplete) 13 1.21
Junior high 81 7.56
Senior high (incomplete) 19 1.77
Senior high 291 27.15
College (incomplete) 16 1.49
College 155 14.46
University (incomplete) 32 2.99
University 282 26.31
Graduate school 74 6.90
Missing 6 0.56
Generations First generation (born by 1931) 4 0.37
Second generation (born 1932~1953) 230 21.46
Journal of Contemporary China 

Third generation (born 1954~1968) 419 39.09

Fourth generation (born 1969~1978) 186 17.35
Fifth generation (born 1979~1988) 132 12.31
Sixth generation (born 1989~1993) 83 7.74
279

Missing 18 1.68
Notes: Data collected via CATI from 10 to 24 January 2014. N=1,072.