Ford & Aberdein, 2015
Ford & Aberdein, 2015
Tasks for which people must act together to achieve a goal are a feature of daily life. The
present study explored social influences on joint action using a Simon procedure for
which participants (n = 44) were confronted with a series of images of hands and asked
to respond via button press whenever the index finger wore a ring of a certain color
(red or green) regardless of pointing direction (left or right). In an initial joint condition
they performed the task while sitting next to another person (friend or stranger) who
responded to the other color. In a subsequent individual condition they repeated the task
on their own; additionally, they completed self-report tests of empathy. Consistent with
past research, participants reacted more quickly when the finger pointed toward them
Edited by:
Roberta Sellaro, rather than their co-actor (the Simon Effect or SE). The effect remained robust when
Leiden University, Netherlands the co-actor was no longer present and was unaffected by degree of acquaintance;
Reviewed by: however, its magnitude was correlated positively with empathy only among friends. For
Kerstin Dittrich,
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg,
friends, the SE was predicted by cognitive perspective taking when the co-actor was
Germany present and by propensity for fantasizing when the co-actor was absent. We discuss
Barbara C. N. Müller, these findings in relation to social accounts (e.g., task co-representation) and non-social
Radboud University Nijmegen,
Netherlands accounts (e.g., referential coding) of joint action.
*Correspondence: Keywords: joint Simon effect, joint action, task co-representation, referential coding, perspective taking, empathy
Ruth M. Ford,
Department of Psychology, Anglia
Ruskin University, East Road,
Cambridge CB1 1PT, UK Introduction
[email protected]
Social activities often require careful co-ordination of behaviors between people, for example, when
Specialty section: they dance together, play games or competitive sport, work in unison to build things, and engage in
This article was submitted to cultural transmission of artifacts and technology. Given the ubiquity of such activities in daily life,
Cognition, understanding the mechanisms of effective collaboration is essential. In laboratory studies, one of
a section of the journal the most widely used paradigms for investigating joint action has been the joint Simon task devised
Frontiers in Psychology
by Sebanz et al. (2003).
Received: 02 March 2015 In an individual Simon task, participants are asked to respond to the color of stimuli presented
Accepted: 26 June 2015 on a computer monitor (e.g., pressing a left key when a red stimulus appears or pressing a right
Published: 09 July 2015
key when a green stimulus appears) while ignoring the spatial location of the stimulus (left versus
Citation: right of the monitor). The term Simon Effect (SE) refers to the finding that participants react faster
Ford RM and Aberdein B (2015)
when the spatial relationship between stimulus and response is compatible (e.g., pressing a left
Exploring social influences on the joint
Simon task: empathy and friendship.
key in response to a stimulus on the left) than when it is incompatible (e.g., pressing a left key in
Front. Psychol. 6:962. response to a stimulus on the right; review by Lu and Proctor, 1995). Although the SE typically
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00962 vanishes when participants are asked to respond to only one stimulus color in a go/no-go version
of the task, it reappears during the joint Simon task – that is, when is described as “active and intelligent” rather than “passive and
they perform their role while seated next to another person who purely deterministic” (Stenzel et al., 2012) or is endowed with
is responsible for carrying out the alternative response (e.g., with other human characteristics (Müller et al., 2011a).
the person seated on the left responding solely to red stimuli and Several studies have evaluated the joint SE in participants
the person sitting on the right responding solely to green stimuli). who have profound impairments of social cognition, such as
The phenomenon of a spatial compatibility effect under joint- individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), schizophrenia,
action conditions has been termed the joint SE (review by Dolk or brain injury. In a study that tested high-functioning adults
et al., 2014). with ASD, Sebanz et al. (2005b) noted that the effect was
Sebanz et al. (2003, 2005a) speculated that the joint SE arises intact – a finding they interpreted to mean that individuals with
because participants internalize their partner’s contribution to ASD have normal capacity for mapping observed actions onto
the activity, thus generating a shared task representation that mental representations of self-performed actions. In contrast,
interferes with their responses to ‘go’ signals when the irrelevant the joint SE failed to emerge in patients with schizophrenia
stimulus dimension primes the co-actor’s role instead. This (Liepelt et al., 2012) whereas mixed findings were obtained with
suggestion is in line with ideomotor theory, which supposes that brain-damaged adults who performed poorly on theory-of-mind
action and action perception are closely coupled and, hence, that tests (Humphreys and Bedford, 2011). The latter study found
either observing or anticipating another person’s motor responses that participants did not show a joint SE given standard task
activates the same representational structures as if the responses instructions although the effect emerged (to some extent) if they
were self-generated (e.g., Jeannerod, 1999). A related account were requested to pay particular attention to their co-actor. Based
holds that the joint SE reflects actor co-representation rather than on these results, Humphreys and Bedford (2011) concluded that
task co-representation; specifically, difficulties are attributed to the joint SE is linked to social-cognitive abilities. They further
the fact that participants have to decide whose turn is signaled on speculated that the reason Sebanz et al. (2005b) did find a joint
each trial rather than because they mentally depict exactly what SE in their ASD sample was because these high-functioning
their co-actor is supposed to do (Philipp and Prinz, 2010; Wenke participants generally succeeded in passing tests of first- and
et al., 2011). second-order belief attribution.
Sebanz et al. (2003) discovered that there is no need for on- The evidence reviewed so far implicates an important
line feedback about the co-actor’s responses to produce the joint contribution of social factors to the joint SE, consistent with
SE. Because the effect was robust when the co-actor performed notions about task and agent co-representation. Nevertheless,
the complementary role but their hand was hidden from view, there are grounds for querying whether it is truly a social
results were taken to mean that the joint SE is triggered when phenomenon. Guagnano et al. (2010) suggested that the joint
participants first encode their co-actor’s contribution to the task. SE merely reflects participants’ spatial coding of the activity,
It has further been shown that the joint SE appears even when coding that is heightened when the experimental conditions
participants sit outside each other’s peripersonal space (Welsh emphasize collaboration rather than individual performance.
et al., 2013). However, there is conflicting evidence regarding On their account, participants do not consider their co-actor’s
whether participants need to be able to see each other at all. agency or intentionality when performing the joint Simon task;
The joint SE has been observed when participants perform the rather, the joint SE emerges because the co-actor provides a
task from different rooms (Tsai et al., 2008), and when they are frame of reference that transforms the participant’s perception
prevented from seeing and hearing each other during the activity of their role from simple button press to either left or right
(Vlainic et al., 2010). In contrast, two studies found no joint SE button press (see also, Dittrich et al., 2012, 2013). Consistent with
when co-actors were physically separated (Welsh et al., 2007; this interpretation, Guagnano et al. (2010) showed that joint SE
Sellaro et al., 2013). depends on the physical proximity of the co-actors, with greater
Notably, the size of the joint SE has been shown to vary separation associated with a smaller effect.
according to the interpersonal relationship of the co-actors. For Alternatively, a referential coding argument draws on the
example, it is accentuated when participants are paired with a theory of event coding (TEC: Hommel et al., 2001) in proposing
partner who is friendly and supportive rather than unfriendly that the joint SE reflects conflict between concurrently active
and intimidating (Hommel et al., 2009), or who is perceived event representations (which comprise information regarding
as an in-group member rather than out-group member (Müller the perceptual characteristics of the actions and their sensory
et al., 2011b; McClung et al., 2013). It is similarly increased when consequences). This concurrent activation is thought to pose
participants are engaged in an activity that encourages thoughts a discrimination problem that participants attempt to solve
of inter-personal connectedness (Colzato et al., 2012a), promotes by focusing on features that best differentiate the competing
a positive- rather than negative mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010), representations – which in a typical joint Simon task is usually
or encourages interdependence rather than autonomy (Ruys and the left/right location of the responses (Dolk et al., 2011, 2014).
Aarts, 2010). It has even been reported that Buddhists showed Unlike the spatial response coding explanation, a referential
a greater joint SE than atheists, a phenomenon attributed to coding view succeeds in accounting for evidence that the social
heightened awareness of, and caring for, other people in the similarity of the two co-actors influences the magnitude of the
former group (Colzato et al., 2012b). Although the joint SE fails joint SE; specifically, it is assumed that greater perceptual and
to emerge when participants perform the task together with a conceptual overlap between event representations increases the
mechanical agent (Tsai et al., 2008), it can be restored if the agent likelihood that participants will try to distinguish between them
by linking them with their respective spatial locations. In line are familiar to them or who share similar social characteristics
with notions about referential coding, Dolk et al. (2013) obtained (Preston and de Waal, 2002; Decety and Lamm, 2006). For
reliable SEs in an auditory version of the joint Simon procedure example, it has been reported that brain activations in response
which emphasized the horizontal dimension using a variety of to self-focused threat mimic those elicited by threat to a friend
non-animate objects, including a Japanese waving cat, a clock, but not by threat to a stranger (Beckes et al., 2013) and that the
and a ticking metronome. The effect disappeared using an object physiological arousal experienced by fire-walkers is tightly bound
that was less attention-grabbing (a silent metronome), ruling out with that of the spectators only when such spectators are friends
the possibility that the placement of the objects by a human or relatives (Konvalinka et al., 2011). Such evidence indicates
experimenter leant them social significance. that the perception/action coupling mechanisms underpinning
empathy are modulated by brain centers involved in processing
The Present Study of social information and, consequently, that the experience
In the present study we took a novel approach to evaluating of empathy is heightened when the neural representations of
social influences on the jointly performed Simon task by assessing self- versus other show greater overlap (Beckes et al., 2013). It
participants for trait empathy. Despite evidence that the joint SE therefore follows that if empathy influences the joint SE then the
depends on participants’ mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010) and trend should be augmented when the co-actors are friends.
relationship with the co-actor (Hommel et al., 2009; Müller et al., After completing the joint version of the Simon task, all
2011b; McClung et al., 2013) no previous research has explored participants were asked to perform the same task individually;
sources of individual differences in the size of the effect. Based on that is, seated in the same chair as before and making the same
the aforementioned evidence, we expected that the magnitude of response they had been responsible for in the earlier joint version.
the joint SE would be greater among participants who are more Although previous studies have observed no spatial compatibility
empathic. effect in the individual (one-handed, go/no-go) Simon task, we
We evaluated empathy comprehensively by measuring both wanted to see whether this would still hold true if the individual
cognitive and affective components. Whereas cognitive empathy condition followed the joint condition and conformed to its
involves the ability to ponder other people’s intentions and procedure in all respects apart from the absence of the co-
beliefs (i.e., theory-of-mind), affective empathy reflects our actor. Both social and non-social accounts of the joint SE suggest
immediate emotional responsiveness to others’ feelings. These that the effect is likely to endure under these conditions. On a
two types of empathy appear to rely on different brain systems; social account, such a scenario could give rise to thoughts of
neuroimaging evidence suggests that cognitive empathy engages the co-actor performing their complementary role that reinforce
the temporo-parietal junction, medial parietal cortex, and medial participants’ task sharing or agent co-representation. On a non-
prefrontal cortex, with affective empathy instead relying on the social account, by contrast, the participants could carry forward
anterior midcingulate cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, with them the spatial response mappings that they acquired
and bilateral anterior insula (Frith and Frith, 2003; Bernhardt during the earlier joint procedure – a possibility in line with
and Singer, 2012) and possibly involving a mirror neuron system evidence that the SE emerges in the individual go/no-go Simon
that elicits spontaneous mimicry of others’ observed emotional task when participants have recently performed the standard
states (Iacoboni, 2009). In relation to the Simon task, previous two-handed version (Ansorge and Wühr, 2009). In such an
research suggests that cognitive empathy is likely to have a greater eventuality it will be of interest to compare the relations between
influence on the joint SE. An impact of cognitive empathy is empathy and the SE in the joint and individual conditions. For
implicated by the finding that the effect is lacking among brain- example, if empathy predicts the magnitude of the effect only
injured patients who fail theory-of-mind tests (Humphreys and when participants perform the task in the company of their co-
Bedford, 2011). Moreover, the theory-of-mind network handles actor then this could suggest that the joint task elicits genuine
the reading of others’ intentions and appears to play an important social processes that are lacking in the individual task.
role in maintaining the distinction between self and other (review
by Decety and Sommerville, 2003).
Importantly, we also explored whether any possible influence Materials and Methods
of empathy on the joint SE was affected by the degree of
prior acquaintance between the co-actors; specifically, we were Participants
interested in the possibility that effects of empathy might be Participants were 44 undergraduate students at Griffith
accentuated for actors who were well acquainted. Given evidence University, ranging in age from 17- to 44 years (M = 22.50,
that the perception of self-other overlap is increased when people SD = 5.49), who received course credit or a small payment
know each other well (e.g., Myers and Hodges, 2012), we asked depending on how they were recruited. All participants had
participants to perform the joint Simon task with either a friend normal or corrected-to-normal near vision, were not red–green
(who signed up for the experiment at the same time) or a color blind, and had no impairments of manual co-ordination.
stranger (who signed up individually). The need to take account They either signed up as part of a friendship pair (n = 22; 15
of relational context when researching human social behavior females; mean age = 21.5) or were assigned to the stranger
has been gaining recognition, especially in regards to kinship condition (n = 22; 17 females; mean age = 23.5), with 11
and friendship (reviews by Beckes and Coan, 2013; Clark-Polner pairs (10 same-gender and one mixed-gender) in each case.
and Clark, 2014). People empathize more readily with those who The ‘friend’ and ‘stranger’ groups did not differ significantly in
(2) a blank (white) screen displayed for 100ms, (3) the target TABLE 1 | Group mean and SD of response latencies (in milliseconds)
shown separately for compatible and incompatible trials in the joint
stimulus displayed for 500 ms, and (4) a further blank screen
condition (top panel) and the subsequent individual condition (bottom
displayed for 500 ms. Recording of the RTs was initiated from the panel).
instant that the stimulus appeared, giving participants 1000 ms
to respond before the next trial commenced. Compatible trials Compatible Incompatible SE Difference Scores
were those in which the finger was aimed at the player receiving
M SD M SD M SD Range
a ‘go’ signal based on ring color (i.e., a finger pointing left when
wearing a green ring, a finger pointing right when wearing a red Joint Condition
ring) and incompatible trials were those in which the finger was Friends 429.68 14.42 438.59 22.64 8.91 19.66 −33 to 48
aimed at the player receiving a ‘no go’ signal based on ring color Strangers 435.05 20.53 438.05 23.53 3.00 13.32 −23 to 22
(i.e., a finger pointing right when wearing a green ring, a finger Overall 432.36 17.74 438.32 22.82 5.95 16.86 −33 to 48
pointing left when wearing a red ring). Individual Condition
Friends 429.82 25.93 435.23 24.83 5.41 14.09 −24 to 26
Empathy Measures Strangers 435.59 24.34 440.41 20.75 4.82 13.08 −12 to 48
Participants completed two empathy questionnaires in an Overall 432.70 25.03 437.82 22.76 5.11 13.44 −24 to 48
adjacent room while their co-actor carried out the individual
version of the Simon task.
RTs in milliseconds, presented separately for compatible
Empathy quotient
and incompatible trials in the joint condition (top panel)
The empathy quotient (EQ) is a self-report measure designed to
and the subsequent individual condition (bottom panel).
assess empathy is normal adult populations (Baron-Cohen and
The far-right columns show descriptive statistics for the
Wheelwright, 2004). It comprises 60 rating-scale questions (40
SE, calculated by subtracting RTs on compatible trials from
target questions intermixed with 20 distracter questions) that
RTs on incompatible trials. Data were subjected to a 2
yield an overall score encompassing cognitive perspective taking,
(Group: friends vs. strangers) × 2 (Trial Type: compatible
affective empathy, and social skills.
vs. incompatible) × 2 (Player Condition: joint vs. individual)
Interpersonal reactivity index ANOVA with repeated measures on the second and third
The IRI is a self-report measure of cognitive and affective factors. There was a significant main effect for trial type,
empathy using 28 rating-scale questions that yield four F(1,42) = 11.14, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.21, reflecting faster response
separate scores; empathetic concern (i.e., the ability to feel latencies on compatible trials (compatible M = 432.53,
concern for others), perspective taking (i.e., the ability to incompatible M = 438.07). In contrast, there were no
understand another person’s point of view), fantasy (i.e., one’s significant effects of either group (friends M = 433.33, strangers
propensity for becoming involved in fiction and fictional M = 437.27), F(1,42) = 0.52, p = 0.474, η2p = 0.01, or
characters) and personal distress (i.e., feelings that accompany player condition (joint M = 435.34, individual M = 435.26),
altruistic behaviors; Davis, 1980). Perspective taking and fantasy F(1,42) = 0.00, p = 0.980, η2p = 0.00. Likewise, there
represent cognitive aspects of empathy whereas empathic were no reliable interactions, all p-values >0.05 (lowest
concern and personal distress represent affective aspects of p = 0.33).
empathy.
False Alarms on ‘No Go’ Trials
Participants rarely responded inappropriately on ‘no go’ trials.
Results There was no evidence that the frequency of such errors was
affected by spatial compatibility (compatible trials M = 0.86,
Data were screened for normality and univariate outliers both incompatible trials M = 0.91), t(43) = 0.36, p = 0.722, η2p = 0.00,
across- and within groups (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). All or player condition (joint M = 0.88, individual M = 0.90),
empathy measures and Simon task variables used in the following t(43) = 0.17, p = 0.870, η2p = 0.00. However, there were reliably
analyses had distributions that were acceptably normal. Adopting fewer false alarms among friends (friends M = 0.65, strangers
a criterion of absolute z > 2.5, a single outlier was identified in the M = 1.13), t(42) = 2.50, p = 0.016, η2p = 0.13.
friends group; namely, an unusually low score on IRI Perspective
Taking (z = −2.61). In the strangers group, there was one high Descriptive Statistics for the EQ and IRI
outlier in terms of size of the joint SE (z = 3.19). Analyses were Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of scores on the EQ and the
conducted both with and without these cases; because the pattern four scales of the IRI. There were no significant group differences
of findings was unaffected the analyses reported below included on any of the measures, all p-values >0.05 (lowest p = 0.18).
all participants’ data. Results for the whole sample closely approximate normative data
reported in previous research (IRI: Davis, 1980; EQ: Lawrence
Joint and Individual Simon Tasks et al., 2004). Outcomes for the EQ were positively correlated
Reaction Times on ‘Go’ Trials with those for IRI Perspective Taking although the effect was
All participants responded accurately on all ‘go’ trials. reliable only for strangers; friends r(22) = 0.40, p = 0.067;
Table 1 shows group means and standard deviations of strangers r(22) = 0.51, p = 0.016. Similarly, the EQ was positively
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of scores on the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and the four scales of the IRI.
Full-Scale EQ 44.50 7.64 30–56 47.23 9.46 27–62 45.86 8.61 27–62
IRI: Perspective Taking 16.18 4.79 4–25 17.18 5.00 5–24 16.68 4.87 4–25
IRI: Fantasy Scale 18.05 5.32 5–24 16.59 5.76 5–27 17.32 5.53 5–27
IRI: Empathic Concern 20.23 3.99 9–28 20.23 4.59 10–28 20.23 4.25 9–28
IRI: Personal Distress 10.36 4.86 1–19 12.91 4.51 4–20 11.64 4.81 1–20
Maximum possible scores are as follows: EQ = 80; Each IRI scale = 28.
correlated with IRI Empathic Concern; friends r(22) = 0.44, p = 0.007, and scores on the EQ, p = 0.015. For the stranger pairs,
p = 0.040; strangers r(22) = 0.72, p < 0.001. In contrast, the by contrast, it failed to show a reliable correlation with any of the
EQ was not significantly correlated with IRI Fantasy; friends empathy measures.
r(22) = 0.06, p = 0.782; strangers r(22) = 0.21, p = 0.353, When considering the SE for the individual condition,
or IRI Personal Distress; friends r(22) = 0.27, p = 0.234; results for the whole sample were not correlated with empathy.
strangers r(22) = −0.19, p = 0.402. Likewise, Lawrence et al. Nevertheless, for friends the effect was augmented among
(2004) found reliable correlations between the EQ and the participants who scored higher on IRI Fantasy, p = 0.014. For
IRI for the perspective taking scale and the empathic concern strangers, the only significant result was a negative correlation
scale but not for the fantasy scale and the personal distress between the SE and IRI Personal Distress (i.e., participants who
scale. reported higher levels of personal distress were less likely to show
a speed advantage on compatible trials relative to incompatible
Exploring the SE as a Function of Empathy trials when performing the task on their own).
Table 3 shows Pearson correlations between (1) scores on the EQ To compare the impact of empathy on the SE between the
and the four scales of the IRI, and (2) the magnitude of the SE two groups, ANCOVAs were conducted that entered SE as
in the joint- and individual conditions (calculated in each case the dependent variable, group (i.e., friends or strangers) as the
by subtracting mean RT on compatible trials from mean RT on independent variable, and empathy measure as the covariate.
incompatible trials). The correlations are presented for the whole These analyses were conducted for all empathy measures and
sample, as well as for friends and strangers separately (n = 22 for both the joint and individual SEs, and produced significant
each) to evaluate our prediction that any influence of empathy outcomes in the following four cases. First, the ANCOVA
would be accentuated for friends. exploring group differences in the effects of EQ scores on the joint
When considering the SE for the joint condition, results for SE showed a marginal effect of group, F(1,40) = 4.03, p = 0.052,
the whole sample showed that the effect was significantly and η2p = 0.09, a significant effect of the EQ, F(1,40) = 5.30,
positively correlated with perspective taking as gaged by the IRI, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.12, and a significant interaction, F(1,40) = 5.39,
p = 0.016. As predicted, however, the impact of empathy was p = 0.025, η2p = 0.12. Second, the ANCOVA exploring group
enhanced among friends. For the friend pairs, the SE for the differences in the effects of IRI Perspective Taking on the joint
joint condition was correlated with both IRI Perspective Taking, SE showed a non-significant effect of group, F(1,40) = 2.04,
p = 0.161, η2p = 0.05, a significant effect of IRI Perspective Taking,
F(1,40) = 8.17, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.17, and a marginal interaction,
TABLE 3 | Bivariate correlations between (1) the magnitude of the SE, and F(1,40) = 3.76, p = 0.059, η2p = 0.09. Third, the ANCOVA
(2) scores on the EQ and four scales of the IRI.
exploring group differences in the effects of IRI Fantasy on the
EQ IRI:PT IRI:FS IRI:EC IRI:PD individual SE showed a significant effect of group, F(1,40) = 9.14,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.19, a non-significant effect of IRI Fantasy,
Whole group (n = 44)
F(1,40) = 0.53, p = 0.465, η2p = 0.01, and a significant interaction,
Joint condition 0.23 0.36∗ 0.01 0.06 0.11
Individual condition 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.16 −0.13
F(1,40) = 10.22, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.20. Fourth, the ANCOVA
Friends (n = 22)
exploring group differences in the effects of IRI Personal Distress
Joint condition 0.51∗ 0.56∗ ∗ 0.16 0.24 0.24
on the individual SE showed a significant effect of group,
Individual condition 0.00 0.06 0.52∗ 0.14 0.20
F(1,40) = 4.91, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.11, a non-significant effect of
Strangers (n = 22) IRI Personal Distress, F(1,40) = 1.02, p = 0.318, η2p = 0.03, and
Joint condition 0.00 0.17 −0.25 −0.17 0.04 a significant interaction, F(1,40) = 5.56, p = 0.023, η2p = 0.12.
Individual condition 0.30 0.18 −0.38 0.17 −0.50∗ Figure 2 depicts the group × empathy interactions for (1) EQ
EQ, empathy quotient; IRI:PT, perspective taking; IRI:FS, fantasy scale; IRI:EC, and the joint SE, (2) IRI Perspective Taking and the joint SE, (3)
empathic concern; IRI:PD, personal distress. IRI Fantasy and the individual SE, and (4) IRI Personal Distress
∗ p < 0.05 two-tail, ∗∗ p < 0.01 two-tail; significant correlations are shown in bold.
and the individual SE.
FIGURE 2 | Scatterplots showing the group × empathy interactions for (A) EQ and the joint condition Simon effect (SE), (B) perspective taking and
the joint condition SE, (C) fantasizing and the individual condition SE, and (D) personal distress and the individual condition SE.
It was further shown that the impact of empathy on the SE (as suggested by notions of agent co-representation; Philipp
differed between friends and strangers even in the subsequent and Prinz, 2010; Wenke et al., 2011). Consistent with the
individual condition. When friends performed the task on their latter interpretation, Wenke et al. (2011) obtained preliminary
own, a larger SE was associated with higher scores on the evidence linking general empathy with impairments of self/other
fantasizing scale of the IRI – this effect was lacking in the differentiation. In their study, participants (who faced one
strangers group as reflected in a significant interaction between another) were each responsible for binary go/no-go responses to
group and fantasizing. In contrast, strangers showed a negative a central colored circle (the target) flanked by two other circles.
correlation between the individual SE and IRI Personal Distress For example, one participant responded to a blue target with a
that failed to emerge among friends. left key press and to a red target with a right key press, whereas
Previous research has produced evidence of top–down the other participant responded to a yellow target with a left
modulation of empathy from brain centers that process key press and to a green target with a right key press. Although
information about social relationships (e.g., Preston and de irrelevant to the participant’s response, the flanker circles could be
Waal, 2002; Beckes et al., 2013; Decety, 2015). There is either ‘own color’ or ‘other color’ and signal either the same key
also a growing literature documenting effects of relational press (compatible trial) or the opposing key press (incompatible
context on social behavior and neural responses (reviews by trial). Whereas results failed to support the hypothesis that
Beckes and Coan, 2013; Clark-Polner and Clark, 2014). In an participants would be influenced by knowledge of their co-actor’s
electrophysiological study, Leng and Zhou (2010) measured specific stimulus/response mappings, the finding that RTs on ‘go’
event-related brain potentials while participants observed reward trials were faster when targets appeared next to ‘own’ flankers
feedback to either a friend or a stranger in a gambling task. rather than ‘other’ flankers was taken to mean that the flankers
They found that a late component, the P300, was modulated influenced the ease of agent identification. Because the own-
by the acquaintance variable – suggesting that outcome flanker advantage was accentuated for participants who scored
evaluation engages a controlled process of cognitive appraisal highly on self-reported empathy, Wenke et al. (2011) further
that is sensitive to interpersonal relationships. Using functional posited that agent identification was impaired by empathic
magnetic resonance imaging (fRMI) during a social interaction processes.
simulation task, Güroğlu et al. (2008) reported that when On the other hand, it could be argued that the joint SE
participants interacted with friends rather than strangers they was driven by referential coding in both groups but that event
showed stronger activations in brain regions integral to empathy representations differed between friends and strangers. From
and reward-related processes. These findings highlight the effect the perspective of the referential encoding account, action
of social bonds on the affective experience associated with control during joint tasks poses a discrimination problem;
everyday human interactions. More generally, they resonate with specifically, participants are thought to represent events they
extensive developmental research documenting the important produce themselves in the same manner as events that are not
role of emotional attachments in stimulating joint attention and under their control regardless of whether the external events
shared intentionality (Tomasello et al., 2005). are of human origin. It is assumed that event representations
One possible conclusion to be drawn from our study is that comprise information about the characteristics and consequences
the underlying mechanisms of the joint SE differed between of actions, and that action selection involves activating codes
friends and strangers, with the former group showing a greater of to-be-generated action effects (Hommel et al., 2001). The
influence of processes that were genuinely social. Assuming this problem of selecting the relevant representation from all
to be true, it follows that conclusions about joint action might currently active representations is made more difficult when the
differ profoundly depending on how well the co-actors know one sources are perceptually or conceptually similar, thus heightening
another. It has been suggested that the basic human drive to form participants’ attention to whichever spatial features of the task
friendships might have originated in the evolutionary advantage help to differentiate between self- and other-generated events
afforded to cooperative- over individual activities (Baumeister (Dolk et al., 2011, 2014). Applied to the present findings, notions
and Leary, 1995). From this perspective, social relationships and about referential coding raise the possibility that friends assigned
joint action could be linked in a mutually reinforcing manner, greater prominence than strangers to features within their event
in keeping with evidence that encouraging participants to engage representations that were socially relevant; consequently, friends
in synchronized movement promotes emotional closeness and who were more empathic may have perceived greater similarity
improves their ability to pursue joint action goals (Valdesolo et al., between self- and other-generated events than did friends who
2010). were less empathic. In the case of strangers, by contrast, overlap
On a social account, members of the friends group who had between competing event representations may have reflected
better perspective-taking skills might have been more inclined different kinds of attributes (perhaps more perceptual than
to note their co-actor’s role in the task – thus increasing their conceptual) that were not indexed by any of our individual
susceptibility to interference when the pointing direction of index differences measures.
finger signified the co-actor’s response (consistent with notions As expected, there were no indications that the joint SE for
of task co-representation; Sebanz et al., 2005a). Alternatively, friends was influenced by affective empathy. Given the non-
their proclivity for putting themselves in others’ shoes could significant correlation between the joint SE and the empathic
have fostered a sense of collaboration with the co-actor that concern scale of the IRI, the reason why the effect showed a
posed challenges of agent identification on incompatible trials positive association with the EQ appears to be the presence
of numerous items within the EQ designed to gage cognitive such that they considered their co-actor’s agency and intentions
perspective taking. Theoretical accounts of empathy hold that when he or she was physically present but treated them as
it reflects feelings of concordance between self and other. a spatial referent (in their imagination) when they were not.
According to Gallese (2001, p. 43), for example, empathy “is Alternatively, whether the co-actor was present might have
relevant when accounting for all aspects of behavior enabling influenced the type of social attributes that friends emphasized
us to establish a meaningful link between others and ourselves” in their event representations (with a shift from psychological
and he further speculated that it is grounded in a human mirror features in the joint condition to physical features in the
neuron system that automatically simulates others’ emotional individual condition).
experience. While mindful of the need for caution in interpreting A reliable interaction between group and personal distress in
a null finding, our results could thus be taken to mean that relation to the individual SE reflected the fact that its magnitude
the similarity effects driving the joint SE rely much more was diminished for strangers with higher levels of personal
on the controlled and self-referential aspects of empathy (i.e., distress. We are reluctant to place much weight on this finding
perspective taking and theory-of-mind) than the affective ones. given the failure of any of the empathy measures to predict
A related suggestion would be that cognitive empathy contributes the SE for strangers in the joint condition but we speculate
not just to the perception of similarity between acquainted co- that greater personal distress was linked with more self-focused
actors but to the selection of event features that discriminate attention. An association been distress and self-focused attention
between them. Such a proposal is in line with evidence that has been reported widely in the clinical psychology literature (e.g.,
the brain regions underpinning cognitive empathy also play Wells and Matthews, 2015) and may have been accentuated for
a role in self-awareness (Decety and Sommerville, 2003). For strangers relative to friends if they felt less relaxed during the test
example, neuroimaging studies have found that the theory- session.
of-mind network becomes activated when people inhibit their
automatic imitation of observed actions (e.g., Spengler et al.,
2009) and strive to differentiate between their own actions and Conclusion
emotions and those of other people (e.g., Schulte-Rüther et al.,
2007). A role of self/other differentiation in the joint SE was In summary, we have reported a novel demonstration that
demonstrated by Dolk et al. (2011). Their study used an auditory the magnitude of the SE in the joint Simon task is predicted
version of the joint Simon task and aimed to manipulate the by cognitive perspective taking but only when the co-actors
extent to which participants integrated the actions of their co- are friends. Given our relatively small sample size, the present
actor’s hand into their own body representation using either findings must be regarded as preliminary. Nevertheless, we
synchronous or asynchronous stroking. Results showed that the believe they highlight the importance of heeding the relationship
joint SE was greater following asynchronous stroking, in line with between participants in studies of human interaction. If social
the idea that it reflects segregation of self- versus other-related similarity activates empathic processes then research using co-
information. actors who are unfamiliar with one another might fail to capture
Notably, there was no significant influence of perspective the whole story regarding the nature of joint action. As we have
taking on the SE when friends performed the task on their discussed, our findings are amenable to interpretation in terms
own despite the fact that the effect was not reliably smaller of both social (e.g., task co-representation) and non-social (e.g.,
than in the earlier joint condition. The phenomenon of a SE referential coding) accounts. Even the latter explanation, though,
in the absence of a co-actor mimics findings from previous still recognizes the important contribution of social factors to
research whereby the effect was observed even when the co-actors the joint SE by virtue of their role in shaping and discriminating
were unable to see or hear each other (e.g., Tsai et al., 2008; between action event representations.
Vlainic et al., 2010). It could be argued that the individual SE Future research could extend the present work in a number of
reflected a carrying forward of spatial response codes acquired ways. For example, the effects of friendship on the joint Simon
during the earlier joint paradigm, in line with evidence of task could be explored in more detail by gaging performance as a
similar transfer effects when participants proceed to a go/no- function of how long friends have known each other. Rather than
go version of the Simon task after previously having performed simply comparing friends and strangers, this approach would
the standard two-handed version (Ansorge and Wühr, 2009; and reveal whether longer durations of friendship result in larger
see Sellaro et al., 2013, for a response-discrimination account effects of perspective-taking skills on the joint SE. Likewise,
of the Tsai et al., 2008 findings). However, the finding that varying the length of time before participants engage in the
the individual SE for friends was correlated positively with individual version of the task (i.e., following the joint task) would
fantasizing raises the possibility that participants continued to help to evaluate the suggestion that the SE for the individual
conceptualize the task as a joint activity1 . This being the case, it condition reflects spatial response coding as (presumably) such
could be surmised that different processes underpinned friends’ an effect should tend to dissipate over time.
performance in the joint- versus individual tasks; specifically, It would also be informative to compare the impact of
perspective taking on the joint SE across different variants of
1 the Simon task. Philipp and Prinz (2010) devised a paradigm
We acknowledge the need for further research to confirm that fantasizing fails to
predict the individual SE among friends when the individual condition precedes the with diminished spatial characteristics; here, participants were
joint condition. asked to respond to targets superimposed over task-irrelevant
faces that corresponded to either their own face or the co-actor’s we anticipate that this effect will be positively correlated with
face. Testing pairs of friends, they demonstrated that participants perspective taking in the case of friends but not strangers. In
reacted more slowly when the ‘go’ target appeared on the co- contrast, we foresee no influence of perspective taking on the size
actor’s face, although such impairment disappeared when the of the joint SE in paradigms where the co-actor is an inanimate
task was performed individually. Based on the present findings, object.
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Hum. Brain Mapp. 30, 3704–3718. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20800 Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
Stenzel, A., Chinellato, E., Bou, M. A., del Pobil, A. P., Lappe, M., and Liepelt, R. conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
(2012). When humanoid robots become human-like interaction partners: be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
corepresentation of robotic actions. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 38,
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