GM-01 - Airside Safety Management - Issue 01

GUIDANCE MATERIAL
GM No. 01
Airside Safety Management

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS / DATE OF APPLICABILITY
Issue/Revision Date of issue/revision and date of applicability

Initial May 2014
Issue 01 Date of issue 21 April 2021
Date of applicability 21 April 2021
GM-01 ISSUE 01 Page 2 of 117

HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES
Issue initial Initial publication of the document
Issue 01 Update of references to new AMCs

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. PURPOSE.............................................................................................................................................. 5
2. EFFECTIVE DATE .................................................................................................................................. 5
3. APPLICABILITY ..................................................................................................................................... 5
4. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Glossary .................................................................................................................................................... 7
Definitions ................................................................................................................................................ 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 8
Chapter 1 General Principles of the Management of Health and Safety Airside ................................ 12
Chapter 2 Identifying the Hazards and Managing the Risks ................................................................ 22
Appendix 2A Airside/Apron Safety Committee .................................................................................... 70
Chapter 3 Aprons and Stands ................................................................................................................ 72
Chapter 4 Aircraft Turnround ................................................................................................................ 86
Chapter 5 Airside Vehicle Standards ..................................................................................................... 99
Chapter 6 Training for Safety............................................................................................................... 107
Chapter 7 Safety Performance Management and Measurement ...................................................... 110

1. PURPOSE
Initial Issue of this Guidance Material follows a substantive review by the Apron Safety Sub Group
(ASSG) comprising representatives from all UAE airport operators, the GCAA, airlines and ground
handling organisations, under the auspices of the Aerodrome Operations Technical Committee
(AOTC).
This issue is published to align with the publication of new AMCs that replaced previous CAAPs in
the GCAA website
2. EFFECTIVE DATE
21st April 2021
3. APPLICABILITY
This GM is applicable to all UAE based organisations required to comply with CAR Part IX
requirements.
In this GM, wherever the word “organisation(s)” is used, it shall mean operator(s)/organisation(s).
4. REFERENCES
4.1 Useful References and Further Reading
Documents published by the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) are available from the
GCAA’s website at http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/epublication/Pages/default.aspx
The following documents contain regulations, guidance or information concerned with airside
safety. Many of the documents listed below describe in detail the responsibilities of those
involved in ensuring the safety of personnel and aircraft in airside areas of airports and are
key reference documents. It should be noted that the list is by no means exhaustive but is
intended as an initial reference for further reading.
4.2 Legislation (as amended)
UAE Civil Aviation Law – Federal Act No 20

GCAA Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) Part IX - Aerodromes
GCAA CAR Part X – Safety Management Systems

GCAA CAR Part VI - Dangerous Goods
4.3 Reference Documents
Aeronautical Information Publication (UAE AIP)

Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) AMC-22: Safety Incident Reporting
AMC-30: The Issue and Verification of an Aerodrome Certificate
AMC-32: The Assessment of Runway Surface Friction Characteristics
AMC-36: Runway and Movement Area Inspections
AMC-43: Foreign Objects Debris (FOD)
AMC-46: Ground Operations Authorisation
AMC-50: Safety Management System
AMC-57 - Voluntary Occurrence Reporting Scheme (VORSY)
AMC-59 - Aerodrome Projects
AMC-69 UAE Radiotelephony Standards
Airport Council International (ACI) - Visual Aids Handbook
International Air Transport Association (IATA) Airport Handling Manual (AHM)
IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM)
Airport Council International (ACI) - Apron Signs and Markings Handbook
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident Investigation
ICAO Annex 14 - Aerodrome Design and Operations (Volumes I and II)
ICAO Annex 18 - The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
ICAO Annex 2 Rules of the Air
ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft
ICAO Document 9137 Airport Services Manual
ICAO Document 9157 Aerodrome Design Manual
ICAO Document 9184 Airport Planning Manual
ICAO Document 9859 Safety Management Manual
UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) publication Aircraft Turnround
Department of Transport (DOT), Abu Dhabi, Environment Health Safety Management System
(EHSMS) Decree 42, 2009
4.4 Health and Safety – Further Information and Guidance
Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Environment Health Safety Management System

Document Decree 42 - 2009
Glossary
ACOP Approved Code of Practice

ACI Airport Council International
AGL Aeronautical Ground Lighting
ANO (DG) Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ATC Air Traffic Control
GCAA General Civil Aviation Authority
CAR Civil Aviation Regulation

CCTV Closed Circuit Television
FEGP Fixed Electrical Ground Power
FOD Foreign Object Debris
GPU Ground Power Unit
HS Health and Safety
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ILS Instrument Landing System
JAR-OPS Joint Aviation Requirements - Operations
LVP Low Visibility Procedures
ROSI Reporting of Safety Incidents
NOTAC Notice to Aerodrome Certificate Holders
POB Persons on board
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
RT Radiotelephone/Radiotelephony
SMS Safety Management System
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
VDGS Visual Docking Guidance System

VORSY Voluntary Occurrence Reporting System
Definitions
Although there are many terms used in this document that have a particular meaning, the following
are of particular significance:
Apron A defined area on a land aerodrome provided for the stationing of aircraft for the embarkation
and disembarkation of passengers, the loading and unloading of cargo, and for parking.
Manoeuvring Area That part of an aerodrome provided for the take-off and landing of aircraft and for
the movement of aircraft on the surface, excluding the apron and any part of the aerodrome provided
for the maintenance of aircraft.
Movement Area That part of an aerodrome intended for the surface movement of aircraft, including
the manoeuvring area, aprons and any part of the aerodrome provided for the maintenance of aircraft.
Note: Manoeuvring Area and Movement Area are generic terms intended to describe the ‘airside’ part
of an aerodrome, rather than just those pavements or surfaces on which aircraft movements take
place.
Runway A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome, prepared for the landing and take-off run of
aircraft along its length.
Taxiway A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxying of aircraft and intended to
provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another, including:
a) Aircraft stand taxilane. A portion of an apron designated as a taxi route intended to provide
access to aircraft stands only.
b) Apron taxiway. A portion of a taxiway system located on an apron and intended to provide a
through taxi route across the apron.
c) Rapid exit taxiway. A taxiway connected to a runway at an acute angle and designed to allow
landing aeroplanes to turn off at higher speeds than are achieved on other exit taxiways thereby
minimising runway occupancy times.
Introduction
1 Origin and History

This guidance material - Airside Safety Management was produced in response to a clear need
for guidance about safe operating practices for all those engaged in activities taking place on
the airside areas of aerodromes.
Airlines and the airport industry, along with safety regulators, were concerned about the high
level and extent of damage caused to aircraft, particularly during ground handling activities,
and also about the rate of ramp incidents and the associated safety risks to aircraft,
passengers and airport workers. This concern continues to be shared internationally by
various groups and organisations with an estimated global cost of 4 billion USD (June 2012)
resulting from aircraft damage.
With the support and contributions from industry stakeholders and the UAE Abu Dhabi
Department of Transport Health and Safety Authority, the UAE General Civil Aviation
Authority (GCAA) established an Apron Safety Sub Group (ASSG) to review ground handling
operations and airside safety with the objective of seeking to identify risks and solutions. This
was managed under the auspices of the Aerodrome Operations Technical Committee (AOTC).
This document was drafted in collaboration with aviation stakeholders and contains guidance
which originates from the UK CAP 642 Publication which the ASSG considers to be best
International practice.
2 Purpose
The advice and guidance in this document is best described as ‘accepted or best practice’ and
represents an acceptable way of doing things. It illustrates how risks might be identified and
provides advice about how airside safety can be managed within the context of a systematic
and structured management approach - a Safety Management System (SMS). Service
providers and their contracted organisations (at every level) are ultimately responsible for
deciding on the appropriateness and applicability of any particular safety arrangements with
respect to their own specific circumstances and for monitoring the suitability and success of
the arrangements collaboratively.
This GM sets out the hazards and risks that respective organisations operating in the airside
environment are expected to consider but it should be noted that this guidance is not
intended to be totally comprehensive in the detail provided; nor does adherence to its
content absolve those responsible for securing a safe operating and working environment
from considering hazards and assessing risks for themselves. It indicates the safety
organisational elements which, if provided, may help demonstrate to aerodromes, airlines
and other organisations operating at aerodromes, as well as regulatory bodies, that the effort
to discharge safety accountabilities under the law is effective, well directed and responsible.
This document also seeks to address those operational situations which contain elements of
risk and which might be considered commonplace. It is important to note that the examples
reflect the management organisation that might exist at a typical regional airport and that job
titles and responsibilities described therein will not necessarily be the same at individual
airports.
In many cases the responsibility for performing a particular function is delegated to a

particular individual or third party organisation or service provider. In such circumstances the
delegation or division of responsibility should be clearly documented and accepted by all
parties involved. It should be noted that delegation of a task does not absolve the organisation
of the accountability of ensuring the task is carried out correctly and to the required
standards.
Where information has not been provided to cover a particular situation it is expected that
users will be guided by the general safety management principles set out to identify and
create a safe working and operating environment.
Ensuring the safety of individuals and aircraft in airside areas is a complex undertaking and
the content of this document cannot be taken in isolation. There are many associated systems
and procedure documents that will affect the various organisations that operate in airside
areas at an aerodrome. It is important to recognise that not only will each organisation need
to develop its own systems to complement those it interfaces with but that no two
aerodromes are alike and that no assumptions can be made based on the solutions used at
another location.
3 Applicability
This document is intended as a guide to accepted good practice for those persons and
organisations engaged in working on and around the operational areas of airports,
aerodromes or heliports, or anywhere where aircraft are attended and handled; in other
words it may apply to everybody working airside. Whilst the document is primarily aimed at
aerodrome operators, airlines and ground handling service providers, it is equally applicable
in most cases to activities at uncertified aerodromes. In these cases the term ‘Aerodrome
Operator’ should be considered as the ‘person in charge of safety at the aerodrome’, or for
example, the ‘Accountable Manager’. Any organisation, regardless of size or complexity of
operation, or whether subject to direct oversight by GCAA, should establish a Safety
Management System through the application of the general principles outlined in this
document and from further more comprehensive guidance found on the GCAA website and
other resources such as the Eurocontrol Skybrary website.
4 The Status of this document - Airside Safety Management
This document represents an accepted way of organising and operating safe working practices
which is largely endorsed by industry. The GCAA, as part of the on-going aerodrome
certification process, in conducting its routine inspections and audits of the airside safety
environment, shall consider these guidelines as best practice. The GCAA makes it clear that
the general principles, processes and procedures set out within this document form the basis
of acceptable safety arrangements airside. It is however accepted that there can be other
methods to achieve an acceptable level of safety.
5 Compliance with Statutory Requirements
The requirements for the safe operation of aerodromes, with respect to aircraft safety and
for the safety of individuals at their places of work, are contained within formal legislative
requirements which form part of United Arab Emirates law. It is therefore legally incumbent
on those who provide the workplace, all employers and all employees, to comply with the
safety requirements that are set out in the relevant Statutory Instructions. Nothing in this GM
substitutes the requirements of the law.
Users of this document should be aware of other statutory provisions that may apply to
their activities, for example, the duty to report aircraft accidents and certain occurrences. It
is the responsibility of all those involved with the operation of aerodromes, aircraft and the
provision of services to be familiar with their legal obligations.
6 The UAE Civil Aviation Law
The principal points of interest with respect to this GM relate to the requirements about which
the GCAA will need to be satisfied before it will grant an aerodrome Certificate. These are set
out in Article 27 contained in the Civil Aviation Law supported by GCAA AMC- 30: The Issue
and Verification of an Aerodrome Certificate.
7 CAR Part IX, Chapter 2 Certification of Aerodromes
In relation to aircraft safety, an aerodrome certificate is issued by the GCAA when in

accordance with the provisions of CAR Part IX - Aerodromes and AMC-30 The Issue and
Verification of an Aerodrome Certificate, it is satisfied that the prospective aerodrome
operator is competent in operating the aerodrome in such a way as to ensure the safety of
aircraft. This includes not only the physical layout of the aerodrome, but a variety of other
elements that can affect aircraft safety. The legal requirements and obligations for the
granting of an Aerodrome Certificate are based largely upon the Standards and
Recommended Practices contained within ICAO Annex 14, Volumes 1 and II.
Both the Abu Dhabi Department of Transport EHSMS and the GCAA have published guidance
to help organisations and individuals meet their legal duties, including their duties to manage
the safety of aircraft and people. The GCAA publishes Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs) and
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMCs). Abu Dhabi Department of Transport EHSMS

Aviation Regulatory Office publishes publications as well as free information sheets and
leaflets.
8 Amendment
This document is subject to continuous review and amendment if so required. Questions,

suggestions for improvement or new material should be sent to: [email protected]
Chapter 1 General Principles of the Management of Health and Safety Airside
1 Introduction
1.1 Organisations operating on aerodromes need to manage aircraft safety and are required to
have a duty of care towards occupational health and safety, in order to reduce aircraft
damage and personal injuries on the ramp. However, without adequate safety management,
legal and moral obligations cannot be met, and business and reputational losses may be
incurred. Examples of such losses may include:
a) Compromised aircraft safety and the potential for a catastrophic aircraft accident;
b) Costs of replacing and compensating injured employees or others;
c) Contractual penalties or loss of revenue if flights are delayed or cancelled;
d) Damaged assets (including aircraft and equipment);
e) Loss of reputation;
f) Loss of existing and future contracts.
1.2 Global leading authority studies have shown that the uninsured costs of accidents can be up
to 36 times greater than the costs of insurance premiums. Furthermore, directors, managers
and nominated post holders may be held accountable for failures to control aircraft safety
and/or occupational health and safety.
1.3 The lessons learned from accidents to aircraft and people show that, in many cases, failures
in safety management were a key causal factor. Chapters 1 and 2 of this document seek to
summarise the processes by which aircraft safety and occupational health and safety can be
managed, by identifying the hazards and managing the risks.
1.4 The key elements in an SMS acceptable to the GCAA are:

• Safety policy and objectives;
• Safety risk management;
• Safety assurance;
• Safety promotion.
1.5 GCAA CAR Part X describes five key elements to safety management. All five steps are
fundamental.
• Policy;
• Organising;
• Planning and implementing;
• Measuring performance;
• Auditing and reviewing performance.
1.6 The precautions which protect aircraft from damage on the ramp often also protect people
working on the ramp from harm and vice versa. Consequently, the management of the health
and safety of people (occupational health and safety) and the management of safety of
aircraft share common themes. There are key elements which should form part of any
system for managing safety:
• A system that sets the targets and standards to be achieved, and makes clear to people
what their responsibilities and accountabilities are;
• A way of identifying hazards, assessing risks and introducing control measures;
• A method of monitoring that controls are in place and are effective. This should include
proactive monitoring, such as inspection; reactive monitoring, such as accident
investigation and data trend analysis; and audit and review of standards;
• Documenting the procedures outlined above and relevant key information, including
policies, risk assessments and reports from monitoring activities.
1.7 These basic principles underpin the SMS. However, there are some notable differences in the
terminology used by the GCAA and the Abu Dhabi Department of Transport when discussing

safety management, as well as differences in the benchmarks which are applied and relative
importance of some of the key elements involved. When developing an integrated airside
SMS that deals with both the risks to aircraft and people, it is necessary to recognise these
differences. It does not follow that organisations require separate systems to manage the
safety of aircraft and occupational health and safety.
1.8 Furthermore, all the organisations and individuals involved should always be clear whether
they are considering issues pertaining to aircraft safety, or occupational health and safety, or
both, in order to prevent confusion arising.
2 Key Concepts
2.1 ‘So far as is reasonably practicable’
2.2 Duties under the health and safety law are often qualified by the term ‘so far as is reasonably
practicable’ or ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). These terms are also sometimes
used in relation to aircraft safety.
2.3 The term ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ has been defined by the European courts. To carry
out a duty, ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ means that the degree of risk in a particular
activity or environment can be balanced against the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty
of taking measures to avoid or reduce the risk. If these are so disproportionate to the risk that
it would be unreasonable for the people concerned to have to incur them to prevent it, they
are not obliged to do so.
2.4 Therefore, the greater the risk, the more reasonable it is to go to greater expense, trouble
and invention to reduce it. If the consequences and the extent of a risk are small, insistence
on great expense would not be considered reasonable. It is important to remember that the
judgment is an objective one and the size or financial position of the employer is immaterial.
3 Risk Assessment – as part of a Safety Case
3.1 It is implicit when considering what is reasonably practicable, that hazards have to be
identified and risks assessed.
3.2 The primary function of identifying the hazards and assessing the risks on the airside is to
determine whether enough has been done to prevent an incident or accident that may lead
to fatalities, injuries and ill health and/or damage to aircraft. Risk assessments assist in
determining whether enough has been done to meet the requirements of aviation law
and health and safety legislation and to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level, and are a key
component in any system for managing aircraft safety and occupational health and safety.
Given the complexities associated with aircraft ramp operations, people and ground service
equipment, it is often the case that hazards may not always be directly associated with aircraft
movements.
3.3 Risk assessment can also indicate what improvements need to take priority, and thereby
assist in developing action plans, budgets and business cases. Risk assessments should be
undertaken on a regular basis as circumstances change, with appropriate and suitable
mitigation measures implemented as necessary.
3.4 In brief, when undertaking an assessment the following key items should be considered:
1. Identify the hazards;

2. Decide who/what might be harmed/damaged and how;
3. Evaluate the risks, list any current mitigations and decide on additional precautions;
4. Record findings, allocate actions and implement them.
Note: ICAO Doc. 9859 contains a suggested Risk Assessment Process
3.5 A hazard is anything with the potential to cause harm; a hazard is any condition, potential
condition, event, or circumstance which could induce an accident, lead to injury, illness, or
death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the
environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite to an accident or incident. Risk
analysis is a function of the likelihood (probability) that harm will occur and the severity of
that harm.
3.6 Consideration must be given to the risks to the health and safety of employees from other
organisations, visitors, members of the public and anyone else who may be affected by the
activity or task.
3.7 The general principles for prevention consist of a broad hierarchy of measures:
• Avoiding the risk;
• Evaluating those risks which cannot be avoided;
• Combating risks at source;
• Adapting the work to the individual;
• Adapting to technical progress;
• Replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous;

• Developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organisation
of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors relating to
the working environment;
• Giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures;
• Giving appropriate instructions to staff.
3.8 In reality, a combination of such measures is likely to be required or be in place. Furthermore,

precautions lower in the hierarchy (such as wheelchairs for disabled passengers with reduced
mobility that are specifically designed to be moved up stairs) may be used as a temporary
control measure until other measures, higher in the list, can be implemented (such as the
purchase and use of an ‘ambulift’).
3.9 However, in certain circumstances, the risk will not be acceptable until permanent control
measures are in place. For example, it would not be acceptable to use only a system of work
as a temporary measure to protect staff using a catering vehicle without means to prevent
falls from the platform, as the likelihood and consequences of a fall remain far too high.
3.10 Notwithstanding an aerodrome’s SMS, safety case and risk management processes,
aerodrome operators should engage in dialogue with the GCAA prior to introduction of
significant new measures which might affect aircraft safety in order to ensure that aerodrome
certification conditions shall continue to be met.
3.11 A constituent part of any safety case should be the oversight and interfaces with third party
organisations. A risk assessment for activities that affect people or tasks carried out by
another organisation should consider the impact on the third party. Any mitigation expected
to be delivered or followed by another party should be agreed mutually. For example, during
the aircraft turnround phase, many activities involve interaction with a number of different
organisations. These risks should be assessed collaboratively to ensure ‘buy-in’ of all parties
involved.
4 Health and Safety
4.1 The duty of employers and the self-employed is to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable,
the health and safety of any individual who might be affected by any work activity within their
control. The individuals who may be affected include employees, members of the public,
contractors, visitors and other aerodrome users. Good health and safety management is key
to ensuring that these duties are met.
4.2 Amongst other things, employers and the self-employed need to provide places of work which
are safe, provide and maintain work equipment and systems of work which will not cause

injury, protect their employees and others from hazards to health and provide welfare
facilities for their employees.
4.3 Employers who share a workplace, whether temporarily (such as an aircraft stand) or
permanently, must co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts to ensure a safe workplace.
4.4 Employers are also required to consult their employees on matters connected with their
health and safety at work.
4.5 Organisations, such as landlords, that have some degree of control over workplaces which are
made available to other employers as a place of work, need to ensure that any premises, plant
and equipment or substances that they provide for others to use are safe and without risks
to health. This duty is qualified by the degree of control they have over the premises, plant,
equipment or substances. As the extent of control increases, so does the degree of
responsibility for the management of risks.
4.6 Every worker at an aerodrome has a duty to take reasonable care for their own health and
safety and that of other persons who might be affected by what they do.
5 Aircraft Safety
5.1 Organisations may also have specific responsibilities to ensure aircraft safety. Good
management of aircraft safety is vital if these responsibilities are to be discharged
satisfactorily.
5.2 Key amongst these are:
• The responsibility of the aerodrome certificate holder (who may also be the aerodrome
operator) to provide and maintain an aerodrome which is safe for aircraft to
use;
• The responsibility of the aircraft operator (airline) to operate aircraft in a safe

manner;
• The responsibility of aircraft ground handling organisations and ground service providers
to operate safely during all ramp operations.
5.3 Every individual at an aerodrome has a duty of care to do what they can to ensure that aircraft
are not damaged, and, where this is discovered, that the occurrence is immediately reported
through the appropriate channels, ideally within the organisation’s internal ‘just culture’ or
open non-punitive reporting system.

5.4 The responsibilities for aircraft safety on the ground at aerodromes are essentially placed on
the airline operator and aerodrome operator. However, all aerodrome users, including
aircraft operators, approved maintenance organisations and ground handlers have a part to
play in ensuring the safety of aircraft.
6 Control of Contractors/Third Party Service Providers
6.1 Organisations retain some responsibility for health and safety during activities carried out by
their contractors. These legal responsibilities cannot be delegated.
6.2 There may also be benefits which accrue to those who develop partnerships with their
contractors. Reliance simply on standard contract clauses requiring contractors to comply
with relevant legislation, standards or guidance is unlikely to be enough to secure such
benefits or comply with legal requirements. Therefore all reasonable and practicable steps
should be taken to:
a) Ensure existing and prospective contractors’ arrangements and organisation are

adequate so as to ensure that they can carry out their tasks safely and without damaging
aircraft or equipment, or risks to personnel;
b) Co-ordinate and control the work they carry out; and
c) Monitor their performance.
7 Assessing Contractors (AMC- 59)
7.1 It is recommended that any assessment of contractors should use a number of criteria,
including:
a) At the pre-tender stage, obtaining details of relevant documents, for example the
accountabilities and safety policy and copies of risk assessments for the work included in
the contract;
b) Interviewing short-listed contractors and/or visiting current work to assess standards, for
example, driver training schemes and vehicle maintenance;
c) Investigating past performance, as useful information can include references from

current and former clients, internal audits and inspections against the aerodrome
operator’s safety management system, and/or the results of any audits undertaken by
the aerodrome operator or another third party;
d) Monitoring performance throughout the term of the contract.

8 Co-ordinating and Controlling Performance
8.1 This can be achieved through a combination of:
a) Appointing a supervisor to oversee the activity, especially in relation to aircraft turnround

(described further in Chapter 4). This could be a member of staff, or a nominated agent.
They should have sufficient authority to control the activities involved. For most
construction work it is advisable to appoint a principal contractor, one of whose functions
is to oversee the conduct of the work;
b) Agreeing and writing down a plan for the activity. For construction work, a health and
safety plan may be required by health and safety law. For aircraft turnround, it is best
practice for a plan for the turnround to be developed and agreed between those parties
involved.
c) Where practicable, the undertaking of joint risk assessments for relevant processes.
These assessments could inform the performance standards and the plan. Joint risk
assessments will need to take account of differences between companies’ management,
supervision, equipment and training.
d) Agreeing performance standards, for example, frequency of vehicle maintenance and

standards for training and refresher training. These may be set through reference to
standards imposed on the client and contractor organisations by the aerodrome operator
or AOC holder.
9 Performance Monitoring
9.1 To be effective, performance monitoring should consider several factors, such as:
• Methods of work: standing instructions or method statements for the contractors’ staff
should be clear how confirmation that the plan for the activity is being followed and what
procedures are in place to monitor compliance;
• The foreseeable risks of the activity should be identified and managed. For example,
measures in place to prevent falls from heights or vehicles striking aircraft and how these
risks are identified and how mitigation measures are determined and implemented;
• Aerodrome rules, as well as procedures, should be in place to ensure that these rules are
complied with, should be clear to all working on the aerodrome. For example, the policies

in place to ensure that contractor employees are wearing hi-visibility (hi-viz) clothing and
have the appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE);
• Methods of identifying, reporting and recording deviations from instructions and rules
should be clear, as should those methods that are in place to identify and monitor trends
in these deviations.
9.2 Individuals monitoring performance should be trained to identify unsafe practices and should
have enough resources to carry out the work.
10 Control of Contractors during Turnround
10.1 The use of contractors at aerodromes to provide services for aircraft is increasing. At many
aerodromes, airline, aircraft operators and/or Ground Handling Agencies, (GHA) are the
clients for these services. The contracted staff are usually employed directly by the party who
then contracts the provision of individual services. It is conceivable that there may be a mix
of service providers; some contracted locally, others on the basis of international contracts.
10.2 Whatever the arrangements, the airline/aircraft operator/service provider should consider
the elements discussed in the relevant paragraphs on apron/stand management and
turnround. Further details concerning aircraft turnround can be found in Chapter 4 of this
document.
11 Aerodrome Operator
11.1 The duty of the aerodrome operator (who is usually the aerodrome certificate holder) is to
provide and maintain an aerodrome which is safe for aircraft and people to use.
11.2 Every Aerodrome Certificate Holder is required to maintain an Aerodrome Manual, an integral
part of the aerodrome operator’s system, to manage the safety of aircraft and people on the
ground. The Aerodrome Manual complements the aerodrome operator’s approach to quality
management, including the management of the business, customer-critical processes and
health and safety. CAR Part IX, Chapter 3 requires that the Aerodrome Manual contains all
necessary information and instructions to enable the aerodrome operating staff to perform
their duties and sets out information and instructions that are to be included in the
Aerodrome Manual. The Aerodrome Manual should be disseminated widely so that everyone
who undertakes tasks that can affect aircraft safety is familiar with the relevant parts of the
document.
11.3 The standard of occupational health and safety is not considered as part of the Aerodrome
Certificate, and the Health and Safety Authority’s do not licence aerodrome operators.
Nevertheless, the aerodrome operator should provide an aerodrome which is safe for aircraft
and people to use, as far as reasonably practicable.
11.4 This includes:
• An aerodrome layout which is safe, for example such that pedestrians and vehicles can
move about safely;
• Equipment provided by the aerodrome operator which is safe, for example aerobridges
and fixed electrical ground power for aircraft use;
• Systems of work which ensure safety, such as an aircraft turnround plan or ‘hot work’
permits for contractors.
11.5 The people who need to be protected include the aerodrome operator’s own employees, the
staff of contractors and tenants, visitors, members of the travelling public and their friends
and relatives, and other members of the public, such as spectators.
11.6 Many precautions will protect both aircraft and people, which include:
• Properly planned and adequately maintained infrastructure;
• Adequate standards of specification and maintenance of equipment which interfaces

with the aircraft;
• Adequate standards of specification and maintenance for vehicles, whether

directly serving aircraft or not;
• Adequate driver and operator training;
• Properly planned and executed aircraft turnrounds;
• Good co-operation and co-ordination between all aerodrome users.
11.7 As the central organisation at the aerodrome, the aerodrome operator has a key role in
developing co-operation and co-ordination between all the users of the aerodrome. It may
consider establishing committees or other discussion groups for ensuring aircraft safety,
setting aerodrome-wide health and safety standards or agreements.
11.8 The operators of aerodromes should also take a proactive role in monitoring standards, for
example by introducing aerodrome-wide safety assurance systems or audits of companies
working at their aerodrome. The implementation of a ground operator licensing system may
be a suitable solution at some aerodromes. Those aerodromes which have the power to make
byelaws should consider taking positive action against organisations or persons that
consistently breach their requirements.

12 Aircraft Operators (Airlines)
12.1 In addition to the risks to the safety of aircraft, the operator of the aircraft (usually the airline)
will need to consider the health and safety of persons not in its employ who are affected by
its activities or the activities of its contractors, as well as that of its own employees.
12.2 Airlines may decide to co-operate with each other, the aerodrome operator and service
providers to agree uniform standards for performance and monitoring. This may reduce the
time and effort required for individual airlines to develop such standards and reduce the
probability of human error resulting from a wide variety of standards.
13 Service Providers
13.1 Contractors on the apron are often required to work to tight timescales to complete their
respective tasks in the time allowed for aircraft turnround. However, all those involved should
take adequate account of each other’s safety needs, for example ensuring that their vehicles
or parked equipment is not blocking escape routes of a refuelling vehicle, and that vehicles
are not parked in such a way as to hinder or prevent other vehicles having safe ingress/egress
access to aircraft.
13.2 Where a handling agent has been appointed, service providers should co-ordinate with them
to ensure that safety procedures are understood and implemented by the handling agent.
They should be working to an agreed plan for the turnround and each service provider should
ensure that they have a copy of this plan. In addition, each service provider should have a
supervisor or leading hand who can control the various stages of its contribution to the
turnround. In all instances plans should also be shared with the airport operator.
13.3 Service providers should ensure that any subcontractors they engage undergo an assessment,
control and monitoring processes as appropriate and as may be outlined and in accordance
with company procedures.
Chapter 2 Identifying the Hazards and Managing the Risks
1 Introduction
1.1 At large and complex aerodromes, as well as at small general aviation locations, the
aerodrome apron is a busy and often congested place of work, particularly during peak
periods of air traffic movements. Aircraft and people face many potential hazards,
particularly from the movement and operation of aircraft and ground vehicles. Failure to
eliminate or control such hazards may lead to accidents to aircraft and/or people or cases of
ill health injury or death.

1.2 It is recognised that much of the guidance below may appear to be geared towards large
aerodromes. However, safety management of the apron will apply to any aerodrome,
regardless of size; only the range and magnitude of operations will vary. Managers will need
to consider the degree of applicability of the detailed material presented in this Chapter and,
indeed, the use of any suitable control measures additional to those described. The hierarchy
of controls outlined in Chapter 1 should be referenced when considering the most
appropriate combination of control measures.
2 Potential Hazards on the Apron
2.1 This section discusses some of the potential hazards commonly encountered on the apron. It
is important that all aircraft operations, including turnround’s, should take full account of the
need for safe working practices. Failure to do this may result in short cuts and bad practice
which can lead to accidents, ill health and damage to assets.
2.2 Common hazards/risks at aerodromes (some of which are discussed in the following
paragraphs) may include:
• Vehicles striking aircraft, other vehicle or equipment/object and/or people;

• FOD – Foreign Object Debris
• Erratic and poor apron driving discipline, monitoring and oversight
• Inconsistent working practices and standard operating practices/procedures
• Poor general aerodrome awareness (apron and aircraft stand layout)
• Hazards to passengers and staff on the apron;
• Moving aircraft (including aircraft on pushback or being towed);
• Live aircraft engines (including prop and rotary);
• Falls from height and falling objects;
• Operation and movement of aerobridges;
• Manual handling; (Lifting, pulling, pushing etc)
• Noise; (Aircraft engines and machinery)
• Work equipment (including machinery);
• Hazardous substances and Dangerous Goods (including radioactive substances);
• Inadequate, imperfect or incorrect lighting, glare or confusing lights;
• Adverse weather conditions (Sandstorms, Low Visibility, Thunderstorms etc);
• Slips and trips; (Oil/fuel spillages, defective pavements)
• Electrical hazards; (Fixed Electrical Power FEP and also Static Electricity)
• Faults and defects;
• Refuelling.
2.3 Dealing effectively with these hazards will require good management of aircraft safety and
occupational health and safety, as well as co-operation and co-ordination between the
aerodrome operator, ground handlers, airlines and other aerodrome users, such as
maintenance contractors. Initiatives for reducing the risk to aircraft and health and safety
from these hazards should be an integral part of the planning of individual projects.
3 Vehicles Striking Aircraft, other Vehicle or Equipment and/or People
3.1 Airside vehicles constitute an ever present hazard to both aircraft and people so extreme
vigilance is necessary for all those working airside. It may be possible to eliminate the risks to
people in certain areas of the aerodrome by keeping aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians apart
where possible, for example by the use of passenger boarding bridges (aerobridges), or,
when this is not reasonably practicable, by the provision of separate designated routes, such
as pavements or clearly defined pedestrian routes (green walkways painted on the ground).
Well organised traffic routes, including one-way systems, adequate lighting to roads and
unambiguous road markings can also assist.
3.2 It may not be possible to ensure complete segregation of aircraft, pedestrians and vehicles
in all areas of the aerodrome. However, this does not mean that the whole idea of
segregation can be abandoned. Wherever practicable, procedures to ensure the segregation
of aircraft, people and vehicles should be put in place.
3.3 Where segregation is not reasonably practicable, there are other measures which can be
employed to control the risk. For example, it may be possible to reorganise the layout of an
area, so that the interaction of pedestrians, aircraft and vehicles is minimised, or the
frequency of high risk activities such as reversing are reduced. Any changes to the layout of
an aerodrome which affect aircraft safety should be discussed with the GCAA at an early
stage, as the aerodrome certificate conditions may be affected.
3.4 Paragraphs 4.1 to 4.5 provide further advice on protecting passengers on the apron.
3.5 Some aerodromes may consider service delivery systems built into the stands, thus reducing
the number of vehicles that have to attend an aircraft. However, such systems are normally
expensive and not in use currently within the UAE and in most cases other methods will still
need to be considered. Even if such systems are installed it is important that safe contingency
procedures are available to cater for equipment failure.

3.6 In all circumstances, a safe system of work should be developed. This provides an opportunity
for partnership in planning involving all those with a direct interest in aircraft safety and
occupational health and safety on the apron. Such a system should include:
• Traffic rules governing such issues as speed limits, especially on approach to aircraft and
in the vicinity of people;
• Correct vehicle maintenance, especially of safety critical components such as brakes and
steering;
• Driver training, airside driving permits, competency checks and refresher training;
• Driving standards;
• Competence/attitude of airside workers;
• Apron management;
• Provision of assistance and/or audible warning devices for reversing vehicles (although
such audible warning devices might not be fully effective in the vicinity of high ambient
noises, or if people are wearing hearing protection, and so may need to be supplemented
by visual systems);
• Procurement of suitable vehicles, e.g. vehicles offering good driver vision;
• Regular monitoring of standards;
• Safe parking of vehicles in such a way as to prevent interference with aircraft
manoeuvring or other aerodrome users;
• Encouragement of good practice;
• The provision and wearing of high visibility clothing;
• Special procedures for operating vehicles during periods of inclement weather (e.g. low
visibility, thunderstorms);
• Adequate supervision of passengers on the ramp.
3.7 Where more than one company or department attends an aircraft, effective co-ordination
and co-operation is essential to prevent vehicles striking aircraft, equipment, vehicles or
people. Airlines, handling agents and third party operators and aerodrome operators all have
important roles in this as part of their systems for assessing, controlling and monitoring their
staff or contractors. The turnround plan is likely to be a key document in ensuring that vehicle
movements are controlled around aircraft. Chapter 4 gives further advice and guidance on
the turnround plan.
3.8 It is likely that a combination of measures will be required to control the risks. The exact
combination may vary with location, activities and perhaps even the time of day. The effects
of changes to the aerodrome, for example due to temporary works or the effect of new
buildings, will need to be considered, preferably at an early stage. It is important that the
risks from vehicles are assessed, as part of an overall system for managing aircraft safety and
occupational health and safety.
3.9 Foreign Object Debris (FOD) is an ever present hazard at aerodromes and must be constantly
managed and procedures implemented to prevent ingestion into engines and other aircraft
components. FOD (prevention and removal) is the responsibility of all apron personnel and
provisions shall be in place by the aerodrome operator to ensure each head of stand has a
FOD disposal bin allocated.
3.10 Erratic and poor apron driving discipline, monitoring and oversight with varying degrees of
driving experience across the apron, this naturally causes a potential hazard to apron safety.
The aerodrome operator shall have an Airfield Driving Permit (ADP) program that is robust
and is continually controlled and monitored.
Inconsistent working practices and standard operating practices/procedures.
Standard operating procedures on the apron (e.g. aircraft pushback procedures) should be as
consistent as possible. Multiple pushback procedures introduce additional elements of risk
which should be avoided. A risk assessment by the aerodrome operator in conjunction with
the airlines and service providers shall be conducted prior to any change in pushback
procedure.
3.11 General aerodrome awareness (apron layout)

Lack of aerodrome familiarity, particularly for personnel involved with aircraft headset
operations and push backs is a significant hazard. Headset operator should be familiar with
pushback instructions provided by ATC to ensure a safe push back manoeuvre at all times.
The aerodrome operator should at the very least have a process in place to ensure that any
personnel performing head set functions have completed an induction course specific to
apron geography.
The airline operator shall ensure that their employees performing the head set operation have
been inducted by the aerodrome operator.
4 Hazards to Passengers on the Apron
4.1 At many aerodromes, passengers have to walk across the apron and sometimes roadways,
between the terminal building and the aircraft. This may expose passengers to hazards such
as vehicles moving across the apron. The risks of injury are increased as passengers are
vulnerable and generally unaware of the dangers around them. Additionally, they will not be
subject to the same PPE requirements (e.g. hi-viz clothing and suitable footwear) as those
who work on the apron. Furthermore, passengers may inadvertently (or even deliberately)
damage aircraft. The aerodrome operator, the airline operator and ground handlers all have

responsibility for ensuring that the movement of passengers is strictly supervised and
controlled.
4.2 Under UAE aviation law the aerodrome operator has a responsibility to provide an
aerodrome that is safe for its users. The aerodrome operator, co-ordinating with
organisations operating at the aerodrome, should conduct a risk assessment. This should
identify the risks to passengers on the apron, and take into account stand layout, equipment
required for the turnround of the aircraft, and other user provision for passenger and ground
services requirements, and airline requirements. Additionally, risk assessments may need to
be conducted for specific stands or pedestrian areas and it may be further necessary for the
company responsible for the movement of passengers to and from aircraft to complete their
own risk assessment prior to implementation.
4.3 In designing the aerodrome layout and facilities, the aerodrome operator can make a
significant contribution to the safety of passengers. For example, when the aerodrome
operator provides aerobridges, passengers are not exposed to any of the hazards on the
apron. Where the provision of aerobridges is not reasonably practicable, the aerodrome
operator should ensure that the layout and marking of airside areas enables the safe
movement of passengers to and from the terminal areas. The guidance in the preceding
section is particularly relevant in this regard.
4.4 The steps that can be taken to ensure passenger health and safety on the apron will vary
from aerodrome to aerodrome and from stand to stand, but will include the following
measures:
a) Passengers should not be permitted to roam free. Staff should be positioned on the
apron to ensure that passengers follow a safe path to the terminal/aircraft. If necessary,
passengers should be led from the aircraft or terminal;
b) Where possible, the aerodrome operator should ensure that permanent traffic routes,
e.g. aerodrome roads or taxiways, do not dissect the pedestrian/passenger routes
between the terminal and the aircraft;
c) Where this is not possible, the aerodrome operator should provide safe routes marked
on the apron surface (including safe crossing points for the apron roads) and clear,
unambiguous signs to indicate the route to be followed. Positive control of vehicular
traffic may be required from the airline or handling agent; co-ordination and cooperation
with the aerodrome operator may be necessary to achieve this;
c) Safe routes can also be indicated by the use of moveable barriers and chains (Passenger
Guidance Systems) to create a temporary safe route across the apron for passengers to
follow. When not in use, it is important that such equipment is properly stowed to ensure
that it does not become a source of ‘Foreign Object Debris
(FOD);

d) Routes to the aircraft should not pass below aircraft wings or beneath fuel vents, or close
to propellers or rotors of aircraft on adjacent stands. Routes should also be clear of
vehicular traffic around the aircraft, electrical cables, fuel hoses and other ramp
equipment; this may require the use of temporary mobile passenger guidance barriers,
also known as ‘Passenger Inward Guidance Systems’ (PIGS) or other suitable airport
passenger guidance system or equipment;
e) Restrictions should be placed on the running of aircraft engines in the vicinity of
passengers and positive measures should be taken to protect them from excessive
engine noise and jet blast;
f) Passengers should be informed of the safe route they should follow into the
terminal/aircraft, in accordance with instructions given by either the handling agents or
cabin crew; this may also include information provided by public announcement before
passengers leave the aircraft/terminal;
g) For remote stands or stands in a different location to the terminal lounge, passengers
should be transported to the aircraft by bus; and
h) Information on embarking and disembarking passengers could form part of the
turnround plan, as per Chapter 4.
4.5 Relying solely on informing passengers of safe routes and marking them out is unlikely to be
adequate for commercial passenger operations. Whenever passengers have to walk across
the apron there should be sufficient ground staff to ensure that passengers do not wander
away from safe routes. If there is insufficient staff, then passengers may need to be
disembarked or boarded in small groups which can be adequately controlled by the available
staff.
4.6 Responsibility for ensuring that passengers are safeguarded between the aircraft and the
terminal building is shared between the airline, aerodrome operator and any ground
handlers involved. It is vital that it is clear who is responsible for providing staff to supervise
and/or escort passengers across the apron, and that sufficient numbers of staff are provided.
Clearly, any contracts will need to take this into account. Failure to supervise passengers
properly may lead to accidents with serious consequences for all involved. Consideration
should be given to unusual circumstances, such as evacuation of terminal buildings or
aircraft, in which passengers and other members of the public may be required to enter
airside areas. Procedures should ensure that responsible persons who are familiar with the
hazards that exist in airside areas are present to supervise passengers and members of the
public as soon as practicable wherever there is emergency egress. Consideration should also
be given to methods by which aircraft movement and other sources of hazard may be
stopped in areas in which passengers and members of the public may congregate with limited
supervision. Furthermore, when passengers have checked in and are proceeding to the
aircraft, it is the responsibility of the airline or handling agent to escort them safely there.

5 Moving Aircraft
5.1 The movement of aircraft on the ground, either under their own power or towed, creates a
number of hazards that are unique to the aviation industry. In particular operating jet or
propeller engines can cause fatal or serious injuries and extensive damage to equipment or
other aircraft, as detailed further in paragraph 6.5.
6 Aircraft Parking Safety Practices - General Considerations - Operation of the Stand
6.1 The following paragraphs describe typical responsibilities and accountabilities for the
operation of aircraft on and off stand. Relationships might vary from aerodrome to
aerodrome due to differing contractual arrangements with stakeholders, or other
owner/operator agreements. Therefore, it is good practice for aerodromes and other
stakeholders to develop and establish the hierarchy of responsibilities and, where
practicable, conducts joint risk assessments with the aerodrome users, then seek to establish
agreed safe working practices within that hierarchy.
6.2 The aerodrome operator is responsible for the rules and procedures that safeguard the
arrival and departure movements of aircraft on stands and for the dissemination of
information to airline/company operators. Information documents/instructions and
requirements should be based upon the subjects described in the following paragraphs.
7 ‘Ownership’ of Stand/Parking Bay
7.1 In general the aerodrome operator has the responsibility to ensure that aircraft stands
remain serviceable, clean and free from obstruction. However, in the busy operation of the
apron, with minute to minute changes of status and vehicle/equipment movements, ground
handling staff also have specific responsibilities (see Chapter 4 Aircraft Turnround).
7.2 Whether an aircraft stand is equipped with a visual docking guidance system (VDGS) or
requires the aircraft to be marshalled, when a stand is allocated for use to an aircraft operator
and the arrival of their aircraft on stand is imminent, it is usually the responsibility of the
handling staff to ensure that the stand and clearways are free from obstructions, FOD, and
vehicles or equipment. These staff should also ensure that, where provided, the aerobridge
is fully retracted and correctly parked with the drive wheels in the parking box/circle provided
before the arrival of the aircraft. These actions must be completed by the handler before the
VDGS is switched on. Switching on the VDGS will normally signify to the aircraft commander
that the stand is clear and is safe to enter. Once the VDGS is switched on, the stand must
remain under supervision until the aircraft arrives on stand in order to ensure that it remains
safe for use by the aircraft. If for any reason the stand becomes ‘unsafe’ or unattended before
the aircraft has arrived on stand the VDGS should be switched off or ‘STOP’ indicated, using
the Emergency Stop System if necessary.

7.3 Ideally, a Stand Supervisor or Turnround Co-ordinator (or equivalent) should be nominated
to control and manage the turnround process and should be clearly identified to all staff
working on the stand. As described in Chapter 4, the supervisor (or Turnround Coordinator)
should be working to an agreed plan for the turnround and should have sufficient authority
to control the activities around the aircraft. The supervisor should be present throughout the
arrival, handling and departure procedures.
8 Vehicle and Equipment Operations
8.1 Further guidance for vehicle operations is contained in Chapter 5 of this publication. Prior to
aircraft arrival ground equipment should be/remain parked in the equipment areas provided.
Service vehicles and baggage trolleys should stay clear of the stand and equipment, such as
ground power units or any other equipment with trailing cables or hoses should be fully
retracted and stowed. The stand must be clear of all obstructions and equipment prior to the
arrival of the aircraft allocated to the stand. Other considerations for the safe docking and
parking of an aircraft are described in the following paragraphs.
8.2 Stand Markings - In areas or stands that can accommodate a number of variations of aircraft
parking arrangements, there are often complex signs or markings, only some of which are
appropriate for specific aircraft. It is important to ensure that all staff who may be involved
in activities in the area are fully trained in the appropriate configuration for all aircraft types
that may use the stand and the appropriate marking and signage. Further guidance and
details on markings, signs and stand design considerations are contained in Chapter 3 of this
document.
9 Self-manoeuvring: Stand Configurations and Safety Considerations
9.1 Self-manoeuvring is a procedure whereby an aircraft enters an apron, parks and

subsequently departs under its own power. The principal methods of stand configuration are
angled nose-in, angled nose-out and parallel-parking; each method involves the adjacent
apron area in being subjected to high levels of engine blast, noise and fumes at some stage
of an aircraft movement. Taxi-through stands can also be used for selfmanoeuvring and the
blast effects are smaller. Some of the busier airports also employ what is known as ‘remote
holding’, which is where loaded aircraft might be towed from its pier stand to a remote area
in order to wait for an ATC delayed slot time, therefore vacating the pier stand for another
aircraft. This might often involve small/medium sized aircraft being positioned nose-out on a
remote stand where self-manoeuvring off the remote stand is not considered a blast
problem.
9.2 Self-manoeuvring operations do not require aircraft tugs and ground crews but the layout of
stands requires approximately double the apron area of conventional nose-in pushback
operations. Due to the relatively high levels of engine power likely to be used for
selfmanoeuvring, and dependent upon location, there is an increased potential safety threat
to buildings, installations, vehicles, equipment and personnel and passengers which must be
controlled and managed.
9.3 Before deciding to adopt self-manoeuvring operations aerodromes should conduct a joint
risk assessment with the aerodrome users. This should include consideration of other
methods of aircraft handling. Self-manoeuvring on open, unmarked aprons should be subject
to special procedures and a marshalling service should be available for all aircraft arrivals.
The aerodrome operator should determine which combination of aircraft stands and
conditions require a marshalling service on departure.
9.4 A risk assessment should ensure that the following arrangements and requirements are met:
a) Stand entry routes, parking positions and departure routes should be marked with
standard paint markings, in accordance with the requirements noted in CAR Part IX or,
in the event of non-mandatory markings, the ACI Apron Markings and Signs Handbook.
b) Buildings and installations adjacent to self-manoeuvring stands should be constructed

to withstand the engine blast or be protected by blast screening;
c) Vehicles and equipment should not be placed in a position where they can be affected
by blast, and where appropriate, equipment parking areas should be protected by blast
screens or located remote from the stands;
d) Where appropriate, and as deemed necessary due to health and safety considerations,
passenger areas and apron staff working areas should be protected by blast screens.
Passengers should not be subjected to blast, excessive noise or fumes;
e) Safety instructions should be issued, specifying the maximum aircraft sizes to be

permitted on individual stands so as to ensure that any prescribed safe clearances (such
as aircraft to stand) are maintained. Pilots should also be required to exercise caution
and use the minimum engine power settings needed to complete a satisfactory
manoeuvre.
10 Out of Service or ‘Dead’ Aircraft Handling
10.1 In addition to the above considerations, the handling staff pushing back a ‘dead’ aircraft for
towing will need to consider the following, accepting that local procedures apply depending
on local circumstances, for example when using ‘tow bar less’ tugs may require specific less
general procedure than stated here:

a) A trained staff member will normally be required to occupy the flight deck to control the
brakes, monitor radio contact between tug/aircraft and ATC and control the aircraft’s
anti-collision and, if appropriate, navigation lights;
b) As soon as a tug crew is assigned a task associated with the movement of an aircraft on
any part of the manoeuvring area it should liaise with ATC for the necessary approvals
and obtain a specific clearance before entering the manoeuvring area. The tug driver is
normally required to advise ATC when the manoeuvre is complete;
c) Whilst an aircraft is under tow, the tug driver is responsible for the safety of the aircraft,
just as the aircraft commander is when it is taxying. It should be remembered that,
irrespective of any instructions issued by ATC, in accordance with Rules of the Air
regulations it is the tug driver who is responsible at all times for ensuring that the aircraft
does not collide with vehicles, aircraft, buildings or other obstructions;
d) When towing an aircraft, it is particularly important to be aware of the extent of the

extremities, such as wingtips, of the aircraft and their proximity to obstructions. In the
event that a tug driver is unsure whether there is sufficient clearance for an aircraft
under tow to be moved safely, he or she should safely bring the aircraft to a stop and
request assistance. If the aircraft stops on the manoeuvring area for this reason, the
driver should advise ATC;
e) For safety reasons it is important that the number of persons on board (POB) the aircraft
is known for local ground movements. Companies involved with ground movements
should ensure that tug drivers ascertain the POB. In the event of an incident or other
unusual circumstances involving the towed aircraft, the tug driver should be able to
advise Airfield Operations or the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service
(RFFS) of the POB;
f) When an aircraft is being towed during the hours of darkness or low visibility, it must
display those lights which would be required when flying, i.e. navigation lights. Logo
lights will usually be of assistance to ATC; however, towbar-less tugs may require specific
procedures regarding the display of navigation lights that must be agreed with both the
aerodrome and Air Traffic Control.
11 Preparation of Stand - Visual Docking Guidance System (VDGS)
11.1 The compliance requirements for VDGS are described in Appendix 9, Paragraph 9.24 of CAR
Part IX.
11.2 Where a VDGS is provided the aerodrome operator should arrange for the stopping guidance
to be calibrated and indicated for all selected user aircraft, in a clear and unambiguous
manner. Azimuth guidance indication should also be regularly checked for accuracy. It is
generally accepted as International Best Practice that the VDGS should only be activated
when the appropriate visual stand checks have been conducted which should include a
walking FOD Inspection. It is often the case with modern or advanced VDGS that the system
self-checks prior to arming, however all systems should be subject to regular serviceability
checks as deemed appropriate, the results of which should be recorded in line with local
maintenance and serviceability procedures. Details of VDGS available at the aerodrome
should be promulgated in the UAE Aeronautical Information Publication with serviceability’s
promulgated via NOTAM.
12 Aircraft Arrival on Stand and Parking Safety Considerations
12.1 In general, some of the hazards generated during the arrival of an aircraft on stand are, jet
blast, carelessly driven vehicles, indiscriminately parked or stowed ground equipment and
misleading markings or signals.
12.2 Control of the Parking/Docking Operation
Ground handling staff are responsible for certain aspects of the control of the parking/docking
operation and should only allow the aircraft on stand once all the necessary stand checks have
been completed, which includes a walking FOD Inspection. Once the aircraft has entered the
stand, and where a marshaller is responsible for guiding the aircraft on to the stand, local
instructions should clearly indicate the point at which responsibility is transferred from the
marshaller to the handling staff. The nominated supervisor should control the progress of the
operation and the actions of the handling team and should include the consideration with
regard to the protection of the marshaller whilst carrying out the task, particularly where they
are required to be positioned on an airside road. However, under all circumstances, it is the
Commander of the aircraft who retains ultimate control and responsibility of taxiing the
aircraft onto stand and bringing the aircraft to a halt. The aircraft remains under the
responsibility of the aircraft commander until the appropriate indication is given to ground
personnel that the aircraft has stopped and the aircraft engines have spooled down.
Wing-walkers - On some particularly compact stands, a wing walker/wingman may be

required to ensure safety oversight of wing tip clearances; particularly on wide bodied
aircraft.
13 Brakes/Chocks
13.1 On arrival, when the aircraft is positioned to the pilot’s satisfaction and finally stopped, the
appropriate aircraft wheel brakes should be engaged by the pilot until the aircraft has been
safely and properly chocked (emergency situations such as dangerously hot or failed brakes
shall be addressed under operator company procedures). Wheel chocks should not be
inserted until the pilot has indicated/signalled that the aircraft has finally stopped, engines
are off and spooled down and any propellers have stopped turning. In addition to aircraft
marshalling hand signals, it is standard practice for the pilot of a jet-engine aircraft to indicate
to ground crews that it is safe to insert chocks by turning off the anti-collision beacons and
shutting down the engines. However, as aircraft engines and the anti-collision beacons are
not coupled for all aircraft types, they should not be considered as the only indication for
ground crews to assume it is safe to approach the aircraft. Personnel should not be permitted
to approach an aircraft unless it has been secured as described above. However, under
certain operational circumstances and/or for emergency (aircraft) operational reasons, the
approaching of aircraft for the purpose of connecting Fixed Electrical Ground Power
(FEGP)/Ground Power Units (GPU) whilst anti-collision lights remain illuminated and when
aircraft engines are running may be acceptable. Under any other circumstances the airline
must produce a safety case that includes a risk assessment that is acceptable to the
aerodrome operator.
13.2 To avoid the possibility of the aircraft climbing or ejecting its chocks, ground markings
showing aircraft stop positions should not be used as a positive indication to insert chocks or
that the aircraft has reached its final position. When not in use chocks should be safely
stowed and not left on the apron surface or the Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP) ‘bucket’
or any on any other type of equipment, for example, a baggage belt unless appropriate
cradles are fitted and the chocks cannot fall off and become a safety hazard to other aircraft
and vehicles. A chock and cone ‘combo’ storage trolley could be provided at the appropriate
head of stand areas.
14 Flap and Control Surface Movement

14.1 Staff should be aware of the dangers of the movement of aircraft flaps and other under wing
devices when an aircraft is on stand. These areas should be avoided by staff, and vehicles and
equipment should not be driven or parked in such a way that damage would be caused by
flap and other control surface movements.
15 Wheels
15.1 When an aircraft is in motion staff should keep well clear of all wheels to avoid becoming
trapped. When an aircraft arrives on stand, tyres and particularly brake assemblies can
remain very hot for some time. Ramp staff should exercise care when required to work in the
vicinity of aircraft wheels. Where there is some free movement of aircraft wheels, care must
be exercised to ensure that clothing and hands or feet do not become trapped.
15.3 Following the placement of chocks, a visual arrival inspection of the aircraft fuselage should
be conducted. The appointed ground handler personnel should conduct an inspection of their
‘work area’ (i.e. cargo door frames, toilet and water service panels) prior to opening.

15.4 The engineer should conduct a full fuselage damage inspection. Any damage noted must be
communicated to the engineer and airline representatives.
16 Marshalling of Aircraft
16.1 The marshalling service is normally, but not necessarily exclusively, provided by the
aerodrome operator. The principal considerations are as follows:
a) The aerodrome operator, as part of its SMS, should provide for the training, testing and
authorisation of aircraft marshallers. This provision may be also met by the approval of
trainers from handling agents, or third party organisations providing the training. To
ensure compliance with regulation and standards, it is recommended that this is audited
by the aerodrome operator and findings communicated and followed up as required in
any corrective action plans. Only the standard (ICAO) marshalling signals, as laid down in
the ‘Rules of the Air Regulations 2009’ should be employed. Only trained, experienced
marshallers in regular practice should be permitted to marshal aircraft unsupervised;
b) Except where full self-manoeuvring is permitted, a marshalling service should be

provided automatically on stands not equipped with VDGS or where the VDGS or other
stand facilities have known unserviceabilities. A marshalling service should also be
available on request;
c) In certain circumstances, such as a non-standard taxiway routing or on request from a

visiting pilot, unfamiliar with the aerodrome, and/or in poor visibility, a ‘Follow me’
vehicle should lead the pilot to a marshaller or the designated parking place directly.
17 Fixed Electrical Ground Power (FEGP)/Auxiliary Power Units (APU)/Ground Power Units
(GPU)
17.1 In accordance with local airport environmental policies and rules, concerning noise and
emissions predominately, the running of all types of engines on the apron should be kept to
the minimum necessary to maintain operational needs. Where FEGP units are provided on
stands they should be used in preference to other forms of auxiliary power. The running of
aircraft Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) and engine driven Ground Power Units (GPUs) should
be strictly controlled to the minimum operational requirement. Airlines should be
encouraged to use GPUs with the quietest engines available. At large aerodromes
consideration can be given to the provision, on stand, of pre-conditioned air units to reduce
the running of APUs for cabin conditioning.
17.2 When entering a stand, it is desirable that flight crews use the minimum power needed to
carry out a normal arrival manoeuvre. Where possible the aircraft should be kept moving to
avoid the need to apply ‘break away’ power to continue the approach to the stand. This may
be particularly important in locations where there are stands on the opposite side of the
taxiway or taxilane.
17.3 Thrust levers should not be exercised for any purposes when the arriving aircraft is on stand,
unless specifically approved by the aerodrome operator.
17.4 Fundamental to the safe management of an aircraft movement is the timely attendance of
the dispatcher/aerobridge operator to initiate those actions necessary to promote a safe
arrival sequence. A full functional check of the aerobridge should be completed in good time
before the aircraft arrives. To maintain aircraft and personnel safety and to ensure that the
prescribed safe clearances between aircraft and bridge are maintained, the following
precautions should be taken into consideration by the team leader:
a) Before the aircraft enters the stand, ensure by personal visual inspection that there are
no potential hazards (such as FOD or vehicles illegally parked or equipment poorly
positioned) to a safe parking operation; (regulation for the control of FOD can be found
in CAR Part IX, Chapter 4, Paragraph 4.15.7 and further guidance provided in AMC- 43 –
Foreign Object Debris.
b) A visual inspection of the serviceability of the aerobridge tyres should also take place to
verify that there is sufficient pressure in the tyres (where applicable, some are fitted with
solid rubber tyres) before manoeuvring of the bridge can take place.
c) Before the aircraft enters the stand, the drive wheels of an apron-drive aerobridge must
be positioned in the marked parking box/circle provided or, in the case of a rail-drive
aerobridge, must be fully retracted;
d) Before the aircraft enters the stand, confirm that the stand is set up for the approaching
aircraft type;
e) A careful check should be made to ensure that no vehicles or equipment are obstructing
the horizontal or vertical movement of the bridge while ensuring that the aerobridge
remains in the appropriate position;
f) The aerobridge cab should be adjusted vertically and in azimuth to suit the incoming
aircraft type;
g) Only when the aircraft has stopped, the wheel chocks are in place, the engines have run
down and the aircraft anti-collision beacon has been extinguished, can the aerobridge be
driven from its parking position and docked to the aircraft, or steps be positioned beside
the aircraft;

h) The aircraft passenger door should remain closed until the aerobridge has been docked,
the canopy has been lowered on to the fuselage and the autoleveller device has been
set;
18 Stop Short System
18.1 On stands equipped with VDGS, an indicator system should be provided to advise the pilot to
Stop Short; this may be because the aerobridge is unserviceable and passenger steps must
be used, or due an obstruction or due to works at the head-of-stand for example. The Stop
Short indication may be an electronic sign associated with the VDGS display, or conspicuous
painted signs may be used, normally fixed to the aerobridge. In Stop Short conditions a
marshalling service should be provided.
19 Location of Controls
19.1 The determination of the best positions for VDGS, Stop Short and Emergency Stop switches
may vary from aerodrome to aerodrome, or even from stand to stand. However, it should be
an objective of the safety system to standardise the location of switches on all stands at a
particular aerodrome. The following locations offer the best control positions:
a) Emergency Stop switches: One gated switch located in the aerobridge cab and clearly
marked. A second gated switch, working in parallel with the first, located in a prominent
and easily reached position at the head-of-stand and conspicuously marked. A person
should be positioned adjacent to each switch until the aircraft has successfully parked.
b) Stop Short and VDGS Switches: These switches should ideally be grouped together with
the emergency stop buttons, fuel cut-off switches and emergency telephones. One set
of VDGS switches should be located in the aerobridge cab and clearly marked. A second
set of VDGS switches working in parallel with the first should be located at a prominent
easily reached position at stand level and conspicuously marked. Which of these
positions is the primary VDGS switching position will depend on which position gives the
operator the best view of the stand area.
NOTE: It is important the VDGS controls are located in a position such that the operator has an
unimpeded view of the specific apron parking position whilst the controls are being used.
20 Departure and Post Turnround Responsibilities - Aircraft Departure
20.1 Aircraft departure is a critical phase of flight. Notwithstanding the pressures that often call
for expeditious movement to meet schedules, clearances and ‘slot’ allocations, the safe
management of departure procedures is paramount. For the purposes of this section the
departure phase is considered to be from the time the aircraft starts an engine, or pushback
movement starts (if earlier), to the point where taxi clearance is issued by ATC. Guidance
covering the various methods of aircraft departure is given in the following paragraphs.
20.2 To avoid damage and to maintain a safe clearance from the aerobridge the following
precautions should be observed before aircraft pushback is initiated:
a) The aircraft passenger doors must be closed;
b) The aerobridge canopy and autoleveller must be retracted;
c) The aerobridge safety barrier should be erected or the doors should be closed;
d) An apron drive bridge or steps should be withdrawn and the drive wheels placed in the
parking position provided;
e) A rail drive bridge should be fully retracted; and
f) A check should be made that there are no vehicles, FOD, equipment or personnel
obstructing the movement of the aerobridge before it is moved. A check should also be
made to confirm that the ground equipment is configured to meet any specific settings
for the aircraft type.
21 Pushback Procedures
21.1 Aircraft pushback operations have the potential for accidents involving personal
injury/fatalities for ground crews and damage to aircraft, vehicles and equipment. During the
pushback sequence the stand centreline should be followed by the pushback driver until the
main landing gear has reached the back of stand safety line and should also be monitored by
the head set operator. Any deviations from the centreline prior to the safety line then the
push should be stopped.
21.2 As part of an SMS, it is recommended that all stakeholders (aerodrome operators, airlines
and ground handlers) conduct and coordinate risk assessments to establish and promulgate
general rules and requirements for the safe conduct of pushback operations. The
development of detailed procedures, within the guidelines issued, may remain the
responsibility of airline operators/handling agents. Aerodrome operators should maintain
safety management arrangements to audit compliance with pushback requirements
including the use of Tug Release Points (TRP) where required. When considering rules for
pushbacks the following should be taken into account:

a) Detailed written operating procedures should be produced by airline operators/handling
agents for use by their staff. These procedures should ensure the safety of the aircraft
and the personnel involved; ideally this information should be contained within the
aircraft turnround plan or similar associated documentation which should include
instruction in regard to simultaneous pushbacks on adjacent stands;
b) A visual fuselage external check of the aircraft to ensure that there are no missing panels
or damage has occurred and all doors/holds are closed;
c) Unless required to ensure the safety of the aircraft, personnel involved in the pushback
should stay within the aircraft tug. Personnel working outside the aircraft tug, such as
the headset operator, are particularly vulnerable to injury and employers must have risk
assessments and safe working practices in place to address the hazards. Where risk
assessment has shown it to be advisable, ‘tail look-out’ and/or ‘wing-walkers’ should be
used to safeguard the rearward movement of the aircraft and prevent collisions with
other aircraft, vehicles or personnel. Procedures for these personnel should be written
down and should ensure the safety of the aircraft and the people involved. Personnel
should be trained to ensure they are familiar with the procedures;
d) During the pushback process, head set operators should not ‘ride’ the pushback tug and
should walk alongside the aircraft. The side at which they walk (port or starboard) should
be dictated by the most prominent hazard at either side of the aircraft.
e) Tug drivers should not commence the push if the head set operator is riding the tug.
f) All tug drivers should be trained and competent to drive aircraft tugs in all weather
conditions;
g) Pushback supervisors should be nominated, trained and certificated as competent,

as in c) above;
h) The supervisor should, ideally, be in verbal contact with the flight deck crew throughout
the pushback. Where there is a possibility that verbal communication will not be
available for any reason, the supervisor and other members of the ground crew should
be trained to use internationally agreed hand signals;
21.3 In the case of a departing aircraft being pushed back from its stand, the pilot of the aircraft
will usually obtain approval to push back from ATC and pass this information to the headset
operator who will then communicate this to the tug driver. It is imperative that the Tug Driver
is provided with all the ATC clearance information in regard to ‘standard’ or ‘non-standard’
pushbacks.

22 Power-back procedures (Reversing under Power)
22.1 Powering back an aircraft is inherently less directionally accurate than pushback or powering
forward; there may also be an increase in noise and blast effect. Accordingly, the use of this
technique should be limited to those aircraft types authorised in the aircraft’s flight manual
to reverse under power and for which procedures can be agreed which do not adversely
affect apron safety in respect of engine noise, vibration and blast effects.
22.2 Before approving power-backs the aerodrome operator should conduct a risk assessment
taking into consideration aircraft characteristics, apron layout/stand density, the stand
clearances available and any gradients involved on stands or taxiways.
22.3 The following items should also be considered:
a) The procedures are authorised in the aircraft manufacturer’s manual;
b) The procedures to be used are incorporated in the airline’s operations manual;
c) Pilots are trained and experienced in power-back operations;
d) The aircraft is directed by a trained handling agent/marshaller using standard power-

back marshalling signals;
e) Wing walkers are employed to safeguard the rearward movement of the aircraft,
particularly wing tip clearances, to prevent collisions with other aircraft or vehicles or
personnel. Procedures, training and personal protective equipment should be employed
which ensure the safety of these personnel during power-back operations;
f) A trial of a live power-back is carried out using the engine settings, aircraft weight and
procedure intended for operational use in which the safety of the operation is
demonstrated.
22.4 The aerodrome operator should assess the effects of noise, vibration, blast and fumes,
observed during the trial, in order to decide the suitability of the procedure demonstrated.
It is not possible to state the finite limits of noise, blast and fumes to suit all locations and all
aircraft types; aerodrome operators should decide the local limitations to be met.
22.5 Power-back operations should not be permitted when passengers are being boarded or
disembarked on adjacent stands unless it is necessary for operational reasons. In such
circumstances, the aerodrome operator should specifically risk assess the associated hazards
and put in place control measures to reduce the risks to as low a level as reasonably
practicable.
23 Engine Management on Aircraft Arrival/Departure
23.1 When entering a stand, it is desirable that flight crews use the minimum power needed to
carry out a normal arrival manoeuvre. Where possible the aircraft should be kept moving to
avoid the need to apply ‘break away’ power to continue the approach to the stand. This may
be particularly important in locations where there are stands on the opposite side of the
taxiway or taxilane. A trained member of airline or handling staff should ensure that the area
behind the aircraft and the zone immediately in front of the engine intakes are clear of
personnel, vehicles FOD and equipment before engine start.
23.2 The aircraft anti-collision beacon(s) must be switched on before an engine is started.
23.3 The number of engines started before pushback commences should be the minimum to meet
technical and passenger service needs.
23.4 During start up and pushback, engine power settings should not normally exceed ground idle.
23.5 Aircraft leaving the inner stands of a cul-de-sac should be towed forward to a safe distance
from the blast screen (noting that not all airports provide blast screens at the end of a culde-
sac where a rear-of-stand road is provided for example) before the tug and towbar are
disconnected. This position may be marked on the taxiway centreline for additional guidance
to the tug-crew.
24 Multiple Pushback Procedures
24.1 Multiple aircraft pushbacks from a run of stands, or in a cul-de-sac, are an accepted method
of achieving a faster pushback and departure rate, but they must be conducted with due
regard to the additional health and safety requirements that arise for ground crews and for
overall aircraft safety.
24.2 Approval for start of ‘pushback’ normally rests with ATC and if there are apron areas of an
aerodrome where the ground movement controller does not have a full view of the aircraft,
then any procedures must take this into account.
24.3 The principal safety threats in multiple pushback operations where aircraft end up positioned
nose to tail are:
a) Aircraft positioned too close to each other when the pushback phase is completed;

b) Excessive levels of engine blast and fumes for pushback crews positioned behind aircraft
with engines running.
24.5 In order to avoid excessive blast and fumes, the safe separation distance behind an aircraft
must be determined by conducting collaborative a risk assessment involving all interested
parties, including the air navigation service provider, which should make reference to aircraft
engine manufacturer’s specific guidance. The distance may vary according to aircraft type and
engine fit. Experience gained from other aerodromes may be useful in deciding what practical
separation distances can safely be used. It is impractical for pushback crews or operational
staff to measure exact distance each time, so a practical rule of thumb should be established
to permit multiple pushback operations to be managed and sequenced safely. Aircraft
maintenance manuals will also include guidance on this topic.
24.6 The acceptance of a clearance from ATC to push back into an area in which other aircraft are
being manoeuvred will normally assume that the prescribed safety distance criteria will be
achieved. The decision to accept a clearance for a ‘multiple pushback’ remains with an aircraft
commander as does the responsibility to ensure that the pushback crew are fully aware of
any limitation or conditions to be adhered to. Clearly there is a need for prior planning, co-
ordination and information exchange between the aerodrome operator, the aircraft
operators and ATC before such manoeuvres are adopted as standard practice at any
aerodrome.
25 Engine Hazards
25.1 The associated safety hazards caused by exhaust blast, vibration, fumes, turning propellers
and rotors and the intake suction of jet engines are well recognised. As part of the safety
management system, aerodrome operators should ensure that rules and procedures for safe
engine running on the aerodrome are promulgated and understood by flight crews and
handling staff. All personnel (including contracted employees) should have successfully
completed an apron safety awareness course (Induction) prior to release to working airside,
acceptable to the aerodrome operator.
26 Blast, Vibration, Noise and Fumes
26.1 Even at idle power the blast effects, ingestion, vibration and fumes from all sizes of aircraft
engines can be significant. As engine size and power settings are increased, the potential for
personal injury and damage increases. The amount of fumes produced is directly related to
the engine running time and the power settings used. Engine running on the apron and
adjacent taxiway areas should be limited to the minimum necessary to meet aircraft
operating needs. In formulating safety rules the issues detailed in the following paragraphs
should be considered.

27 General
27.1 Vehicles and personnel should not pass behind running engines. Staff should not approach
aircraft whilst engines are running and/or whilst anti-collision beacons are illuminated unless
it is part of their job function and is necessary for the task at hand, in which case a risk
assessment of the procedure, leading to control measures and mitigations which protects
aircraft safety and health and safety of ground personnel have been jointly agreed with all
relevant stakeholders.
27.2 Drivers and pedestrians should be vigilant at all times on the apron. A common indication to
ground staff that aircraft engines are running, or are about to be started, is the illumination
of the aircraft’s anti-collision beacon(s).
27.3 Where possible, blast screens should be provided to protect buildings, installations and
vehicle and staff areas that are vulnerable to blast. These screens should be designed to
withstand blast from the aircraft types expect to use those stand areas.
27.4 An assessment and consideration should be given to the location and building design
(including protection to minimise the effects of blast, vibration, noise and fumes for the
occupants) where contractors are required to use temporary buildings (i.e. portacabins etc)
on the apron or other airside locations,
28 Engine Test Running
28.1 Engine ground runs and check starts should be controlled and only carried out with prior
approval from air traffic control and the aerodrome operator who should specify the
conditions to be applied, for example:
a) Where possible, engine ground runs should be carried out on agreed, selected and
prepared remote areas, preferably equipped with engine baffles/detuners;
b) Engine ground runs at above idle power should not be permitted in cul-de-sacs or, for
example, in areas where the jet efflux would impinge on stands, equipment areas or
works areas;
c) Engine ground runs on stands in regular use in apron areas should be limited to check
starts and idle power only;
d) Where engine running is permitted on the apron, a remote area should be chosen where
the jet-blast will not affect other apron areas and busy taxiways;

e) Where necessary, engine ground runs should be safeguarded by Airfield Operations staff
who should arrange for any rear-of-stand roads and, if needed, sections of taxiway to be
closed;
f) The area behind and adjacent to the cone of the blast should be clear of equipment and
aerodrome signage and the ground must be firm and without loose tarmac, stones or
other material;
g) The engineer in charge of the ground run must ensure that the aircraft wheels are safely
chocked and that the aircraft cannot move forward under any circumstances;
h) Ground running must not take place when passengers are being embarked/ disembarked
on any adjacent or opposite stands, except when such passengers are using an
aerobridge;
i) A trained member of airline or handling staff is to be positioned on the stand and should
be in verbal contact with the flight deck and ATC. He/she will communicate by R/T or
interphone with the flight deck to ensure that the engine(s) are shut down if persons or
vehicles move into the danger area in front of, behind or in the vicinity of a live engine.
For this purpose and if the R/T or interphone link is unserviceable, hand signals by day
and light signals by night may be used.
29 Propellers
29.1 Aerodrome operators should issue instructions to safeguard apron operations around
propeller driven aircraft. Apron staff must be alert to the dangers of running propellers and
should be educated by suitable awareness campaigns. At some aerodromes there are
relatively few propeller driven aircraft and ramp staff are likely to be less familiar with
precautions that need to be observed, particularly for staff of airlines which themselves offer
no propeller driven services. In these circumstances it is the airlines responsibility to
communicate such risks to the relevant handling organisation and other stakeholders to
ensure that the safeguarding of ‘propeller areas’ is included in operating safety procedures.
29.2 Aerodrome operators should provide suitable apron layouts and facilities that provide
compliant clearances for the operation of propeller aircraft types, with particular emphasis
on ground clearance for propeller tips and the proximity of ramp equipment when the
aircraft is at, or approaching, its parking position. Stands at which this cannot be achieved
should not be used for propeller aircraft.
29.3 Passengers must not be permitted to walk on aircraft parking stands when propellers of an
aircraft on that stand are turning. Where it is operationally essential to have the propellers
turning, passengers must be effectively controlled by the relevant handling company’s safety
procedures.
30 Rotors
30.1 Helicopter operations, particularly those of large helicopters, should be segregated from
fixed-wing apron operations where possible. In addition to the provision of standard
clearances for rotors in the apron layout, due regard should be given to the other
characteristics of rotary operations, including:
a) The heavy down draught produced by helicopter movements;
b) The vulnerability of helicopters and aircraft to jet blast, strong winds and rotor
downwash from other helicopters;
c) The risk of reduced ground clearance caused by the drooping of the rotor (blade sailing)
as it runs down following engine shut down or drive disconnection;
d) The ease of approach to the chosen helicopter stands in hover and hover-taxi mode and
the least interference from/for taxying fixed wing aircraft;
e) The risks associated with tail rotors.
30.2 Dependent on aircraft type characteristics, procedures should include arrangements

whereby:
a) Helicopter arrivals are marshalled, unless the helicopter apron is remote and configured
for self-manoeuvring. Marshalling assistance/safeguarding may also be required for
departure;
b) Ideally passengers should not be allowed to walk on the apron when rotors are turning.
Where it is operationally essential to keep rotors running passengers must be effectively
controlled;
c) Staff, vehicles and ground equipment should remain well clear of the rotor disk until it
has come to rest. If as above, running the rotors is essential, handling staff must be
trained accordingly;
d) Suitable signs should be provided to warn drivers and apron staff that they are
approaching an area where helicopter operations are handled. All airside drivers and
handling staff should be briefed to maintain a good look-out and also should be trained
to look upwards as well as horizontally to detect and give way to helicopter movements.
31 Fumes and Noise

31.1 In approving engine running or self-manoeuvring on the apron, the following should be taken
into account:
a) The concentration of fumes present in an aerodrome area is in direct relation to the

length of time engines are run, the type of engine and power settings used and the
strength and direction of the surface wind;
b) Where workplaces, such as cargo-sheds and engineering facilities, have to open directly
on to stand areas, a specific risk assessment is required to determine how best to operate
all facilities safely and without risks to health, in respect of noise and fumes.
32 Suction - Ingestion
32.1 Personnel entering the danger zones in front of a running jet engine expose themselves to
the risk of being sucked in, almost invariably resulting in serious or fatal injury. The intake
suction of jet engines is a hazard, even at idle power, and the flow characteristics of air into
an engine are such that items can be picked up from in front of, from below, and from the
sides of the intake. Even small items ingested can damage the engine, but the larger engines
are quite capable of ingesting large objects from several metres away with catastrophic
effect.
32.2 The extent of the danger zone depends on the size of the engine, the mounting height and
the power setting. Managers of aircraft handling staff should calculate and promulgate to
their staff the safe distances for operating around the types of aircraft they operate.
33 Foreign Object Damage
33.1 Foreign object damage’ or ‘foreign object debris’, both abbreviated to FOD, are a potential
source of catastrophic damage to aircraft, particularly engines. FOD can also be a tripping or
slipping hazard resulting in injury to personnel and passengers. Foreign objects may be
ingested into aircraft engines causing damage leading to engine failure, which is critical if it
occurs during the take-off phase of flight. At best, such damage leads directly to premature
engine removal and replacement. In addition, damage caused by foreign objects can occur to
tyres and undercarriages, control systems and other parts of the airframe. All such damage
could lead to in-flight failures and inevitably requires expensive repairs to be made. All foreign
objects are a threat to aircraft safety.
33.2 Dealing with the temporary sources of risk, such as FOD, requires the whole aerodrome
community to play a part. Loose items should be removed by whoever notices them; some
of them will only be suitable for the FOD bin. Larger items, such as cables, should be reported
to the owner of the piece of equipment concerned, who should in turn have the items
removed or tidied away promptly. If the owner of a larger piece of equipment cannot be
established, the FOD should be reported to the aerodrome operator.
33.3 Foreign Object Debris (FOD) is a general term which applies to all loose objects which are a
danger to the safety and integrity of an aircraft and which, therefore, must not be left in any
area so as to constitute a hazard. The list of FOD items most frequently found on the apron
is long and principally includes:
• plastic and paper bags/sheets;

• rags;
• empty oil and hydraulic fluid cans;
• empty soft drink cans;
• nuts and bolts, tools and equipment;
• luggage wheels and baggage tags;
• metal cutlery;
• burst ballast bags;
• broken wooden items and miscellaneous rubbish.
33.4 The presence of FOD is due mainly to the carelessness of staff and their lack of understanding
of the consequences. Every individual has a responsibility to ensure that the risk of damage
to aircraft from FOD is minimised. Any item of FOD found by any staff member in the course
of their work should be removed and placed in the bin provided. An item of FOD seen in an
area that a staff member is not authorised to enter or which they are unable to remove for
any reason should be brought to the attention of their supervisor and the duty manager
airside operations. All operators should introduce staff procedures that reflect these
responsibilities.
33.5 Aerodrome operators should include instructions, services, facilities and initiatives to combat
the risks arising from FOD, establish a programme to educate all apron users on the hazards
and requirements associated with FOD, and stress the responsibilities of all personnel
employed on the apron to minimise risks from FOD.
33.6 Aerodrome operators should ensure that there are programmes of regular apron sweeping,
cleaning and inspection, including appropriate and timely response to fuel and other liquid
and chemical spillages in accordance with agreed procedures. They should also provide
facilities for the disposal of solid and liquid aircraft waste and FOD protection, with particular
attention to such prime FOD generators as contractors’ areas, bin, compactors and baggage
facilities all of which should be regularly checked. FOD bins should be located in the vicinity
of the head of each stand.

33.7 All vehicles and equipment used on the aprons should be maintained in a clean and
serviceable condition, not only for reasons of safe vehicle operation but also to minimise the
leakage of fluids and depositing of FOD from these vehicles (See Chapter 5 for additional
guidance on the management of airside vehicles.).
33.8 Generally, airport operators should have in place agreed policies and arrangements for the
removal of hazards from the apron such as abandoned vehicles and equipment.
33.9 Regulation for the control of FOD can be found in CAR Part IX, Chapter 4,
Paragraph 4.15.7 and further guidance provided in AMC-43 – Foreign Object Debris.
34 Falls and Falling Objects - General
34.1 Access to external elevated levels on and around aircraft will be required when aircraft are
on the stand. Such work includes catering, cargo and baggage handling at the aircraft holds,
some cleaning activities and maintenance.
34.2 It is not sufficient merely to indicate the presence of an edge from which a person may fall.
There must be suitable and effective measures to prevent any person falling a distance likely
to cause personal injury. Measures must also be taken to prevent aircraft or people being
struck by falling objects. Preference should be given to providing a safe place of work (e.g.
elevated platforms with edge guards) rather than relying on personal protective equipment,
information, instruction, training or supervision to prevent these events. Nevertheless, even
where all other reasonably practicable measures have been taken to prevent falls, personal
protective equipment (PPE), for example a safety harness and lanyard, may still be necessary
if a significant risk of falls remains.
34.3 The necessity and provision of head protection should be determined by the employer’s risk
assessment of staff carrying out tasks on the ramp. Head protection may be necessary for
other activities on the apron, such as construction work or maintenance of plant.
34.4 By its very nature all access equipment has to be used in close proximity to the aircraft.
Drivers may need to seek assistance, especially from a person appointed to guide the vehicle,
to ensure the correct positioning of the access equipment so that there are no gaps large
enough for a person to fall through, as well as preventing the access platform or its chassis
striking the aircraft. Drivers should also make allowance for the change in height of an aircraft
during loading/unloading as this might cause the aircraft to touch the access equipment
resulting in damage to the aircraft.
34.5 Suitable access equipment should always be used to gain access to heights. Work from
surfaces such as vehicle cabs, roofs of buildings and equipment is not acceptable unless these
places have been designed or adapted to make them safe for such work. Mobile elevating
work platforms (MEWPs) provide flexible and safe means of access to heights. They should
be used in accordance with a safe system of work and procedures which minimise the risk of
injury and damage to the aircraft. Passenger steps should be equipped with non-slip devices
to mitigate the potential for falls, particularly in humid conditions.
34.6 Some places may be temporarily adapted to make work at heights safe. For example, some
aircraft have attachment points on their wings for running lines and harnesses. The health
and safety of the engineers preparing such places of work for use should be considered, as
well as the prevention of damage to the aircraft.
34.7 Work at heights above should only be undertaken from equipment fitted with guardrails to
all sides in order to meet best practise guidance or requirements.
34.8 Where guardrails or barriers cannot be fitted, other means, such as the use of PPE, should be
considered. It should be noted that where the potential height of a fall is less than four
metres, the use of lanyard and harness systems as fall arrest devices may not prevent injury
as the worker may hit the ground before the device becomes effective. Advice should be
obtained from the equipment supplier.
34.9 Where the potential height of a fall is less than two metres, each situation should be assessed
for the likelihood of injury and aircraft damage, and appropriate preventive measures taken.
For example, the likelihood of injury is increased if there are obstructions, such as low profile
equipment with sharp edges, onto which people may fall, or the work is taking place
alongside a traffic route. The availability of safety guard rails on Main and Lower Deck Loading
equipment and passenger steps should be mandatory. Conveyor belts should be equipped
with safety guard rails and should be utilised, especially when used on wide body aircraft.
34.10 As with all equipment, means of access and means for preventing falls (including those
integral to the aircraft) should be maintained in efficient working order and in good repair if
continued protection against injury and aircraft damage is to be ensured. A regime of
inspection may also be required to ensure that any deterioration in the equipment which
may affect health and safety or aircraft safety is detected and rectified in good time. This
inspection should be carried out by people with sufficient knowledge, experience and
training to identify and prioritise defects. The results of inspections should be recorded and
kept until at least the next inspection and longer if the inspection results are used for
monitoring serviceability trends.
35 Access to Aircraft Doorways
35.1 Safe access to aircraft entry/service doorways is particularly important as the height of fall
from the doorway of an aircraft may result in a fatal injury. Aircraft doors and doorways are
also particularly vulnerable to damage. Such damage may go undetected for some time. For
example, damage to escape slides may not be immediately apparent and may not be
discovered until the next periodic inspection of the slide assembly or until it is used in an
emergency. Equally, for example, damage to door sills can cause aircraft depressurisation;
therefore all damage, even seemingly insignificant, should be reported via the local
incident/accident reporting procedures (See Chapter 7 Safety Performance Management and
Measurement for more details about reporting).
35.2 Airline operators should ensure that doors are not to be opened unless ground equipment is
in place. This must be communicated to ground handlers and other service providers. A door
safety lanyard is not sufficient mitigation as it does not act as a weight bearing safety device.
During maintenance/hangar input the use of a door safety net should be considered.
35.3 Proper planning, safe systems of work and instruction and training are required to ensure
that aircraft doors are opened in such a way that no one is exposed to the risk of a fall, and
the risk of damage to the aircraft is minimised.
35.4 Airlines should ensure that they do not require aircraft doors to be opened in a manner which
exposes people to unnecessary risk. The types of vehicles commonly used to service aircraft
rarely have means to prevent falls from the edge that is adjacent to the aircraft when in use.
In some circumstances the access equipment can be brought close to the aircraft before a
person has to approach the leading edge. Examples are when the aircraft doors open inwards
upwards, are powered open and closed, or otherwise avoid the need for people to approach
the edge of the access equipment or the aircraft doorway.
35.5 Where the aircraft has outwards opening doors, which may foul the access equipment during
opening and closing, employers should establish whether the safest option, for both the
worker and the aircraft, is to open the door from inside. This may require cooperation and
co-ordination with the airline operating the aircraft.
35.6 If opening the door from the inside is not the safest option, employers should ensure that
people work at the unprotected edge of the access equipment for the shortest time that is
practicable. The floor on which the employee is standing should not have any defects that
are likely to cause them to slip, trip or fall. Secure handholds should also be provided.
35.7 Where an extra wide platform can be positioned against the aircraft, the increased width can
provide additional protection against falling and reduce the risk of damage to the aircraft
door. There should be a safe system of work in place for opening the door, and employees
should be given information, instruction and training on the task.
35.8 Whatever platform is used, the moveable side guardrails should be adjusted to be close
enough to the aircraft to protect the workers without causing damage to the aircraft; it must
be kept in mind that a gap of more than 300 mm will not ensure the safety of the workers
and that the aircraft may move during loading and unloading. Guardrails should be moved
into position as soon as is practicable and certainly before the doorway is used. The last task

before the access equipment is withdrawn from the aircraft should be to retract the
guardrails. It is equally important that any controls that move the platform should be located
so that the operator has a clear view of the platform in order to prevent the platform striking
the aircraft. For vertical height fluctuations, particularly as an aircraft is being
loaded/unloaded and refuelled during a turn around, it is recommended that some guidance
is given to ground handlers as to the maximum safe height clearance. A useful guide is 29mm.
A clearly defined horizontal guidance marker line is also recommended (dependant on the
ground movement characteristics of the aircraft type).
35.9 Sometimes aircraft doors are left open for reasons other than access, for example to keep
the aircraft cooler in hot weather whilst cleaners etc. work inside. When doors are left open,
suitable means to prevent a fall should be in place. These include placing aircraft steps at the
doorway; although particular aircraft operator’s or aerodrome operator’s security
requirements need to be kept in mind.
35.10 The straps and their attachments which are often fitted to aircraft doorways are not sufficient
as a means to prevent a fall, as they are not designed to withstand the forces generated by a
person falling or leaning against them.
35.11 If other means of preventing a fall cannot be provided, then the aircraft doors should be kept
shut. If necessary, the aircraft’s air conditioning should be used to keep working
temperatures comfortable. Where possible, this should be provided by a safely positioned
mobile air conditioning unit, rather than the aircraft’s auxiliary power unit (APU), as the APU
generates considerable noise for those working outside the aircraft. Any aerodrome policies
on the use of GPU/APUs should be followed.
35.12 Access to parts of the aircraft other than the doorway may be gained by a suitable MEWP,
although other measures may be used if they are suitable and effective. The edge protection
around the working platforms should be maintained so as to prevent persons falling.
35.13 Lightweight fall restraint devices incorporating a lanyard and harness have been found to be
effective for over-wing access. Any equipment which interfaces with the aircraft surfaces
should be approved by the aircraft manufacturer. Some aircraft manufacturers provide
attachment points for harnesses on wings of their aircraft and, in such cases, the
manufacturer’s guidance on their use must be followed.
35.14 A significant number of accidents occur as the result of falls through uncovered access points
in the internal floors of aircraft when covers have been temporarily lifted. Accordingly, covers
should be replaced when the access way is not in use and uncovered access points should be
provided with a temporary barrier.
36 Aerobridge Operations

36.1 There have been several incidents involving aerobridges which have occurred globally which
had potential for major aircraft damage and/or serious injury to personnel. These have
included:
• Collapse and other extensive structural failure, in particular the service steps which are
often overloaded with cleaning staff waiting to access the aircraft;
• Un-commanded or unexpected movements;
• Obstructions, such as vehicles and equipment, being struck by the aerobridge, due in part
to the failure of detection devices;
• Rotten floors and leaking roofs creating slip and trip hazards.
36.2 These incidents have commonly been caused either by incorrect installation or inadequate
maintenance of the equipment, or poor procedures leading to operator error.
36.3 The efficient and safe in-service operation of these walkways depends on their correct
installation. Therefore, they should be inspected after installation and before being put into
service for the first time.
36.4 Detailed advice cannot be given on the content of such an inspection, but it is unlikely to be
adequate unless it is based on the findings of a risk assessment. Such an assessment will need
to cover the appropriate issues outlined in paragraph 9.12.
36.5 The process of installation may be subject to any requirements of the Construction (Design
and Management) Regulations.
36.6 The following auxiliary equipment should be fitted to apron drive aerobridges:
a) Audible and visual warnings that operate automatically when the bridge is in
motion;
b) In order to overcome downward and rearward blind spots for the operator, CCTV or sight
mirrors should be fitted to cover blind areas in which the aerobridge is able to
manoeuvre;
c) Pressure sensitive safety hoops which, when they touch an object, cut out the motive
force thus stopping movement of the bridge;

d) Means to prevent falls from the leading edge of the aerobridge, such as doors or
guardrails, for use when the aerobridge is not in place against an aircraft.
36.7 Apron-drive aerobridges are vulnerable to obstructions. Significant damage has occurred
when items of equipment have been parked in the operating area of aerobridges. For stands
equipped with an apron-drive aerobridge, ground marking in the form of a hatched area
should be provided to delineate the area within which the parking of vehicles and equipment
must be prohibited. The aerodrome operator should enforce this parking restriction and
aerobridge operators should bring improperly parked vehicles to the aerodrome operator’s
attention.
36.8 For stands equipped with an apron-drive aerobridge, a ground marking in the form of a
parking box should be provided to show the position of the aerobridge wheels when it is fully
retracted so that the prescribed safe clearance can be maintained between any aircraft and
the bridge structure. The parking box should be clearly defined at all times, particularly during
night operations. Any unserviceable markings should be reported to the airport operator
immediately.
36.9 To assist marshallers and tow-on crews, painted stop marks should be provided across the
stand centreline and designed for each aircraft type permitted to use the stand. These stop
marks should be harmonised with the VDGS stopping positions for the particular aircraft.
36.10 The extendable portion of rail-drive aerobridges should be highlighted by conspicuous

marking (such as retroflective chevrons) to indicate to pilots, drivers and apron staff that the
bridge is extended.
36.11 Aerodrome operators should establish a schedule of preventative maintenance and cleaning,
including inspection by competent people.
36.12 Such inspection and maintenance regimes are unlikely to be adequate unless they consider
the following points:
• The structural integrity of the aerobridge, including components vulnerable to

catastrophic failure and the potential for water ingress to cause corrosion to the walkway
or its control and drive systems;
• The electrical safety of the aerobridge and the potential for electrical failure to cause un-
commanded or unexpected movement;
• The mechanical integrity of the drive and control systems of the aerobridge, including
the condition of the hydraulic fluid and the components on which it impinges;
• The conditions of wheels and tyres;

• The devices for detecting obstructions (if any), such as closed circuit television (CCTV) or
sensor rings:
• The cleanliness of aerobridge cab windows to provide unobstructed vision to the ramp
and a FOD-free cab.
36.13 Aerodrome operators should establish and promulgate a formal reporting system for
aerobridge faults. The procedure should include immediate response activities by
engineering and airfield operations staff, where necessary withdrawing the aerobridge from
service until remedial action is taken, to maintain safe aircraft and passenger handling.
36.14 Aerodrome operators should ensure that they develop and promulgate Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for aerobridges. These should include emergency back-off and wind-off
procedures. Instructions for emergency back-off action should be displayed in the aerobridge
cab and in the case of manual wind-off, at the point of operation.
36.15 Procedures that are specific to the stand or aerobridge should normally be displayed at the
aerobridge control position. This is particularly important if the procedures relate to different
configurations for particular aircraft types.
36.16 In the event of an emergency whilst the aircraft is on stand, the aerobridge should remain
attached or be re-attached to the aircraft until all passengers and crew have evacuated the
aircraft.
36.17 A system should be established for the training, testing and licensing of aerobridge operators.
An Aerobridge Operator’s Licence (or permit), endorsed for the appropriate type of
aerobridge, should be issued by the aerodrome operator or delegated trainer provider when
a satisfactory level of competence has been demonstrated. The demonstration of
competence should include a practical test. Procedures should be established to ensure that
aerobridge operators attempt to operate only those types of aerobridge on which they have
been assessed as being competent. Aerobridges with different operating characteristics or
control/warning systems are be considered to be different types of aerobridge.
36.18 Licences should only be issued to those staff who regularly operate aerobridges as part of
their job function, as it is these staff who remain fully familiar, in good operational practice
and up to date with operational changes and aerobridge modification states. Licence holders
should be subject to regular revalidation to confirm that they remain competent to operate
the equipment. The aerodrome operator should also establish an audit system to ensure
aerobridge operator competency and adherence to standards. Records of aerobridge
incidents and major faults should also be examined. If responsibility for training and/or
testing of aerobridge operators has been delegated to a handling agent or a third party, the
airport operator should conduct regular audits of the performance and actions of these
organisations in order to ensure that adequate levels of safety are achieved. Following an
accident or incident, aerobridge operators should be subject to revalidation on request of
the aerodrome operator and it should be possible to suspend an operator’s licence pending
re-training.
36.19 If a new type of aerobridge is introduced, all aerobridge licence holders who will be required
to operate (or trainers who will be required to give instruction on) the equipment, should
undertake training and testing to demonstrate their competency and familiarity with the new
equipment before being permitted to use it operationally.
36.20 Aerobridges should not be left unattended when passengers are being embarked or
disembarked. Should the bridge go out of limits while loading or unloading is taking place,
the bridge is to be removed and repositioned.
36.21 When bridges are not being used for passenger loading or unloading they should be retracted
into their parking box and closed down. Airlines and handlers are advised that whenever a
bridge is docked to an aircraft a qualified aerobridge operator should be in attendance, unless
an approved and serviceable safety shoe device is employed.
36.22 Aircraft operators are reminded that they are responsible for the security of their aircraft and
docked aerobridges make aircraft vulnerable. To prevent unauthorised access via
aerobridges, airlines should either deploy personnel to control access to their aircraft or
remove the aerobridge from it.
36.23 The aircraft passenger door is to remain closed until the aerobridge has been correctly
docked and must be closed before the bridges is retracted. Additionally, aerobridges must
not be moved when passengers are on the aerobridge.
37 Manual Handling
37.1 Manual handling is the term that applies to activities such as lifting, lowering, pushing, pulling
or supporting a load by hand or bodily force. Commonplace manual handling activities in the
industry include, for example, ground crew operations such as the loading or unloading of an
aircraft and lifting tow bars onto and from aircraft or towing vehicles. The provision of
assistance for incapacitated or disabled passengers will require particular thought.
37.2 Some Handling Agents have developed Handling Operations Manuals which set out the
requirements.
37.3 The best means of avoiding risk is to eliminate the hazard altogether, for example, by
mechanised handling techniques. These include the use of ambulifts to assist the movement
of incapacitated or disabled passengers onto the aircraft and handling aids for baggage.
Where it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate the hazard, and ground staff are required
to undertake manual handling, best practice requires that:
• A suitable and sufficient risk assessment is made of each task which is considered to
present a risk of injury. This should address the task, the load, the working environment
and the capabilities of the individuals concerned;
• Action is taken on the results of the assessment, appropriate steps are taken to reduce
the risk of injuries from manual handling;
• Information is provided on the weight and centre of gravity of the loads that are to be
lifted where it is reasonably practicable to do so.
37.4 Baggage handling potentially, gives rise to more manual handling problems than any other
activity at aerodromes. The following may help reduce injury from baggage handling. All
these suggestions will require co-operation and co-ordination between the aerodrome
operator, airlines and ground handling companies:
• Proper planning of new and refurbished facilities can provide significant reductions in the
risk of injury, as well as increasing efficiency;
• Examine the entire handling operation (where possible, from the first moment a bag is
handled by a worker to the last) and consider whether a change of process or equipment
could eliminate any stages of manual handling;
• Handling systems should be integrated with each other where possible. Different pieces
of equipment should be compatible with each other and positioned to prevent
unnecessary handling between, for example, security scanners, conveyors, dollies and
aircraft loading equipment;
• Use conveyors (or similar) that are of a suitable height to minimise the risk of injury from
lifting or lowing items to or from such equipment. 650 mm above the floor is commonly
found to be an acceptable height, but this might vary depending on local circumstances
and should not be applied rigidly;
• Consider the environment in which manual handling is undertaken. Floors should be dry
and adequately maintained. There should be sufficient space to allow people to
turn whilst handling, if such turning is unavoidable. There should be no gaps between
equipment that result in people having to throw baggage. Lighting should be sufficient
to allow tasks to be carried out safely. Ambient temperature should be kept at a
reasonable level (e.g. in baggage halls), or warm/cool clothing provided where this is not
possible (e.g. on the apron);

• Ensure that automated systems are properly maintained to minimise consequential poor
manual handling techniques;
• Ensure that training is relevant to the tasks that people are undertaking. It may be
necessary to target training to specific activities such as moving bags in the confines of
the aircraft baggage hold;
• Provide general indication of the weight of each bag. This could be achieved by the
attachment of a ‘heavy bag’ label at check in with instruction and training given to
employees on how to deal with such baggage.
37.5 The primary objective must be to reduce the requirements for manual handling. It is good
practice to review each stage of the baggage handling process with the aim of eliminating
any unnecessary stages. For example, it might be possible to eliminate some stages by using
a baggage transfer vehicle that can adjust to the correct height of the aircraft hold door. This
eliminates manual handling from the transfer vehicle to a belt loader.
38 Noise
38.1 There are many sources of noise on an aerodrome. Excessive noise exposure can result in
both short-term and permanent hearing loss. It can also compromise effective
communication during safety-critical tasks.
38.2 The primary source of noise on aerodrome aprons are aircraft engines, APUs and support
equipment such as mobile ground power units. Many of these sources are highly mobile and
exhibit variability in their noise emissions. Therefore, the level of ambient/background noise
and, potentially, levels of personal noise exposure, can fluctuate very significantly and can
greatly exceed the action levels.
38.3 Employers should try to reduce the noise exposure of both their employees, and others at
work on the apron exposed to the noise created by their activities, without relying on hearing
protection. Some suggestions are:
a) Where fixed electrical ground power units (with power generation sited away from
employees on the apron) and fixed air conditioning units are provided on the stands,
aircraft operators should make full use of these facilities to minimise the need for APUs
or mobile units which generate high levels of noise;
b) Where existing noisy ground support plant is used it should be engineered to minimise
noise output. In some instances this may require retrospective remedial action, e.g.
partial enclosure, to reduce noise emission;

c) Before the procurement of new plant, noise emission data provided by the supplier,
should be taken into account in deciding whether to purchase, and whether further
protective measures may be needed. The aerodrome operator may set minimum
standards for new equipment;
e) The amount of time that workers spend in the vicinity of noisy plant and equipment should,
if possible, be minimised by planning and organising work accordingly;
e) Work associated with cargo holds or other service points near the APU could be
undertaken when it is not running;
f) For vehicle operators an acoustic cab could be fitted, provided that the vehicle can be
operated with the doors and windows kept closed. If this is not reasonably practicable, it
may be feasible for drivers to use hearing protection.
38.4 The areas in which hearing protection is required should be marked and warning notices
displayed, so far as is reasonably practicable. This may be difficult on the apron itself, but
relatively easy within or on equipment, e.g. in cabs of vehicles where the second action level
may be exceeded for part or all of the time. Signs should also be placed at all apron access
points.
38.5 On the apron one employer’s activities may cause the employees of other employers to be
exposed to noise. For example, high levels of noise from an APU will affect baggage handlers
and others working in the vicinity of the aircraft. The various employers involved will usually
need to agree who is to co-ordinate their action on noise. Normally, this will be the employer
in overall control of the work. This employer should make sure that the noise exposure that
his work activity generates is assessed and reduced, and that the information on noise is
made available to all affected employees; the actual employer of each worker provides any
training and personal protective equipment needed. In most cases exchange of information
and collaboration between employers will be needed to ensure that duties are fulfilled
without unnecessary duplication.
38.6 Where communication between personnel is essential or audible alarms are used to assure
safety, a thorough risk, health and safety assessment of the environment must be carried out
to ensure that any risks that result from the use of hearing protection are properly managed.
39 Work Equipment (including machinery) - General
39.1 Work equipment includes every item on the apron, including vehicles, specialist equipment
such as cargo loaders, fixed equipment such as aerobridges and FEGP Units and hand tools.
39.2 The hazards to health and safety and aircraft safety from work equipment can arise when it
is moved, installed, used, maintained or dismantled. They include hazards from:
• Machinery;
• Hot or cold surfaces;
• Instability (collapsing or overturning);
• Objects or people falling or being ejected from the equipment;
• Disintegration, deterioration or malfunctions in the equipment or its controls;
• Improper use of the equipment (for example using it for a purpose for which it is not
suitable);
• Fire or overheating.
39.3 Dependent on the process involved, the hazards may always be present with the equipment,
(such as its weight which may affect how easily it can be moved or lifted), or transitory (such
as the risk of striking the aircraft when equipment is raised or lowered).
39.4 In order to protect aircraft and people, all companies at aerodromes should ensure that:
a) Equipment is suitable (i.e. with regard to its initial integrity, the place where it will be
used and the purpose for which it will be used);
b) Equipment is maintained in a safe condition;
c) Equipment is inspected in certain circumstances to ensure that it is, and continues to be,
safe for use. Any inspection should be carried out by a competent person and a record
kept until the next inspection and longer if the inspection results are used for monitoring
serviceability trends.
39.5 Companies should also ensure that the risks created by the use of the equipment are:
Eliminated, where possible or controlled by:

• taking appropriate ‘hardware’ measures, e.g. providing suitable guards, protection
devices (such as buffers to surfaces which interface with the aircraft), markings and
warning devices (such as Emergency Stop buttons); and
• taking appropriate ‘software’ measures, such as following safe systems of work (e.g.
ensuring maintenance is only performed when equipment is shut down) and
providing adequate information, instruction and training.

39.6 The measures should be selected on the basis of an assessment of the risks. As part of this
assessment, the hierarchy of controls outlined in Chapter 1 should be considered. In many
cases, a combination of measures may be necessary.
39.7 Whatever the combination of measures, stakeholders need to ensure that people using work
equipment have received adequate training, instruction and information for the particular
equipment.
39.8 Mobile work equipment poses additional hazards to aircraft and people. Such equipment or
vehicles may strike aircraft, people, or other work equipment. Furthermore, unless it is
operated correctly and loose articles are suitably secured, objects may fall and strike aircraft
or people nearby and may also create a FOD hazard.
39.9 Consequently, stakeholders and their staff should ensure that where mobile work equipment
is used for carrying people or objects, it is suitable for this purpose (i.e. there is proper seating
and stowage areas). In some cases, measures may need to be taken to reduce the risks to the
operator, any other people being carried, anyone else who might be affected (such as
passers-by) and aircraft. This may include measures to prevent the work equipment rolling
over, or people or objects being thrown from the equipment (i.e. seatbelts or other
restraints). The measures should be based on the findings of a risk assessment. In all cases it
is important that loads carried in vehicles are appropriately secured, with vehicle side and
rear flaps fastened. An equipment ‘health check’ should be carried out by the operator prior
to use.
39.10 Aircraft may be struck and damaged by lifting equipment as it moves up or down. Lifting
equipment also poses risks to people. People may fall from elevated working positions, or
may be struck by loads falling or released from the equipment. Lifting equipment may
overturn or collapse, resulting in injury and damage.
39.11 All lifting equipment and lifting operations (except those done solely by manual effort
without assistance from equipment) are subject to a ‘Lifting Operations and Lifting
Equipment’ serviceability check and issued with an appropriate certificate from the
manufacturer.
39.12 In order to ensure that the risks to aircraft, people and are controlled, lifting equipment
should be:
• strong and stable enough for the particular use and marked to indicate safe working
loads;
• positioned and installed to minimise any risks;
• used safely, i.e. the work is planned and organised, and is performed by competent
people; and
• subject to on-going thorough examination and, where appropriate, inspection by
competent people. The aerodrome operator should lay down maximum periods
between examinations, depending on the nature and use of the equipment.
39.13 It may sometimes be difficult to determine what is, and what is not, lifting equipment. At
aerodromes, the following should always be considered to be lifting equipment:
• Catering vehicles, ambulifts and other hi-loaders;
• De-icers with a boom assembly;
• Cargo loaders;
• Mobile elevating work platforms (MEWPs, ‘cherry pickers’);
• Lifting platforms on toilet and potable water servicing vehicles and refuelling vehicles
including Forklift trucks.
39.14 The following are not regarded as lifting equipment or lifting operations:
• Aerobridges (any lifting which occurs during manoeuvring is entirely incidental to their
main function);
• Escalators.
39.15 Before purchasing a machine, users need to consider:
a) Where and how it will be used;
b) What it will be used for (is it fit for purpose);
c) Who will use it (skilled employees, trainees);
d) What risks to aircraft safety and staff health and safety may result;
e) Comparison of how well these risks are controlled by different manufacturers’

equipment;
f) Human factors – does the equipment determine the process or working practice, or vice
versa.

40 Hazardous Substances and Transport of Dangerous Goods Substances Hazardous to
Health
40.1 Some substances are defined as hazardous to health. Some of these substances may also
damage aircraft, for example, by corroding control surfaces and fuselage. These substances
can be toxic, corrosive, irritant or otherwise harmful to health (e.g. biological agents). Further
reference to the carriage of dangerous goods may be found on the GCAA website.
40.2 Substances can be:
a) Used in a work activity (such as hydraulic oil or cleaning products); or
b) Those that arise or are encountered during a work activity (such as engine exhaust fumes,
microbes in aircraft toilet waste, leaks from damaged packages of dangerous goods).
40.3 Cargo that is hazardous to health may also be subject to the requirements for the carriage of
dangerous goods.
40.4 Companies should assess the risks arising from the work with hazardous substances. This
assessment should consider the risk created by the use, handling, or release of the substance.
First and foremost, the assessment should show whether exposure to the hazardous
substance can be eliminated - for example, could a less hazardous substance be used instead?
40.5 If exposure cannot be prevented then it should be adequately controlled. This could be
achieved, for example, by ensuring chemicals cannot splash onto aircraft or people, or that
fumes cannot accumulate near to aircraft or people. Personal protective equipment (PPE)
should not be relied upon alone to protect people from harmful substances. However,
personal protective equipment may be a useful back-up for employees undertaking such
tasks as emptying and cleaning toilets, who might use protective gloves, and overalls.
Eye/face protection might also be useful in some circumstances.
40.6 Certain substances used on aircraft, where appropriate, should be approved by the aircraft
manufacturer. Any control measures selected must be effective and in some instances it may
be necessary to monitor the exposure of people to hazardous substances to ensure that they
are not exposed to harmful levels.
40.7 Exposure to substances which emit radiation can cause damage to health. Radiation may
cause immediate harm, e.g. radiation burns, or may cause changes in cell DNA, which can
eventually lead to cancers.
40.8 Companies need to assess the risks from exposure to radiation and to ensure that exposure
is restricted. They should also have in place contingency plans. Staff working with radioactive

substances, including those handling radioactive cargo should be competent in order to
ensure their safety, the safety of those working with them and the safety of the aircraft.
40.9 Companies may have to appoint Radiation Protection Advisors to give competent advice on
the measures needed to protect staff health and safety. Some radioactive substances may
also be toxic or corrosive etc. Radioactive substances which form part of a cargo consignment
may also be subject to the requirements relating to the transport of dangerous goods.
40.10 As with substances hazardous to health, flammable substances may be used as part of a
process (such as aircraft repairs), handled as cargo, or encountered accidentally, for example
as the result of a fuel spillage. They may be solid, liquid or gaseous. Fire and explosion are
the main hazards associated with these substances. Such events may cause considerable
damage to aircraft and injury to people. However, these substances may also be hazardous
to health or may damage aircraft in other ways, for example because they are corrosive.
40.11 The risks from work involving flammable substances, including storage and transport, should
be assessed. Where possible, the flammable substance should be eliminated, or substituted
for a substance which is non-flammable. There may be a balance to be struck between the
risks involved, for example, if the proposed substitute carries a greater hazard to health than
the flammable substance. Where the substance cannot be eliminated, or substituted, then
appropriate precautions need to be in place. Control of the risks of flammable substances
can be considered in terms of removing at least one side of the ‘Fire Triangle’.
40.12 This may include a combination of:
• Safe storage, away from sources of ignition, incompatible substances (such as oxidisers)
and mechanical damage;
• Adequate ventilation to remove flammable vapours or gases;
• Dispensing and decanting in a way which reduces spills and releases;
• Use of equipment specifically designed for use with flammable substances;
• Good housekeeping to remove flammable residues;
• Adequate procedures and equipment for dealing with emergencies and spillages,
including training, information and instruction for staff.
40.13 The flammable substance which is likely to be found in the greatest quantity at aerodromes
is aircraft fuel. Guidance on working with fuel safely is not reproduced in this publication.
Please refer to the Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry Part 7. Most aerodromes
will also operate ‘Hot work permits’ intended to reduce the risk of fire, including fuel fires.
40.14 Currently, there is no specific legislation on the use of flammable substances on the apron.
40.15 Flammable cargo is also subject to the requirements relating to the transport of dangerous
goods.
40.16 Transport of dangerous goods by air is also subject to the requirements of the ICAO
Technical Instructions, which are reflected in the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations. Further
advice on these standards can be obtained from the GCAA Dangerous Goods Office.
Note: Compliance with these standards does not necessarily mean that the requirements of UAE law
covering transport of Dangerous Goods by other modes of transport have been met. However,
requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods by road include an exemption permitting the carriage
of dangerous goods that are intended for air transport, to or from an aerodrome when not fully meeting
the road requirements, providing that the ICAO Technical Instructions have been complied with.
41 Task Lighting, Glare and Confusing Lights
41.1 During darkness and periods of low visibility, apron areas must be provided with lighting of
sufficient coverage and level of luminance to enable pilots and ramp staff to operate safely
and effectively.
41.2 The levels of luminance on aircraft stands should comply with the standards described in CAR
Part IX, Appendix 9, Paragraph 9.23 Apron Floodlighting.
41.3 It is equally important that every workplace has suitable and sufficient lighting to ensure
people can work safely. In general, lighting should achieve a reasonably uniform luminance
on all relevant work areas and should avoid sudden changes in luminance (for example,
where apron roads run underneath buildings). There may be a need for local lighting (for
example, task or vehicle) at specific areas where people are at work).
41.4 Aerodrome operators should introduce arrangements to control and co-ordinate the
provision and installation of any general airside (apron) and aeronautical lighting systems.
41.5 Area lighting is normally mounted on pylons or gantries and should be subject to the
following:
a) The intensity, beamspread, setting angles and mounting height of the luminaires should
achieve the specified apron luminance without causing dazzle to pilots and other
persons;
b) The layout of lighting pylons should be such that overlapping cover is provided which
does not give rise to areas of deep shadow;

c) Floodlighting, including mobile equipment, in contractors’ work areas should be strictly
controlled and subject to regular checks to ensure that glare/dazzle are eliminated.
42 Adverse Weather Conditions (including Winter Operations)
42.1 Adverse weather conditions affect the safety of aircraft operations on aprons, principally
strong surface winds and low visibility conditions. As part of the safety management system,
aerodrome operators should issue instructions about the precautions to be taken in
anticipation of these conditions and with emphasis on the safety requirements for apron
operations.
42.2 Strong wind conditions can give rise to hazards from wind-blown items and in very strong
winds there is a possibility of structural damage to aircraft. The principal threats are of engine
ingestion or airframe damage to aircraft on stands, taxiways and runways; the severity of the
threat of obstruction of a runway to an aircraft taking off or landing cannot be stated too
strongly. There is also a danger of personal injury for apron staff and damage to vehicles and
equipment. Some aerobridges also have operating design limits during periods of strong
winds which should be understood and adhered to.
42.3 When meteorological warnings of strong winds are received, they should be promptly
relayed to all relevant organisations including airlines, ground handling organisations and
operators.
42.4 When strong wind conditions are experienced, one of the first problems encountered is FOD
being carried across the airfield, causing engine ingestion threats to aircraft on stands,
taxiways and runways. Plastic bags and sheeting are particular problems.
42.5 As wind speeds increase, baggage containers, unsecured equipment, and large debris (mostly
from the aprons), can be blown across the movement area causing a damage hazard to
aircraft in all areas. There is also a risk of personal injury and damage to vehicles and
equipment by ‘flying’ debris. Action must be taken to ensure that covers are securely
fastened on all waste containers and to ensure that parking brakes are applied to all vehicles
and equipment. All non-essential equipment should be removed to a protected area or
stillage, secured to a fixed object or removed from the ramp area. Additionally, aircraft may
require enhanced chocking in line with airline requirements.
42.6 It is not always feasible or necessary to position a large aircraft into wind at aerodromes.
Where there is a requirement for aircraft to be positioned into wind and/ or picketed, this
should be the responsibility of the airline manager, agent or owner concerned. Aerodrome
operators may assist by the allocation of suitable stands and other airfield areas for this
purpose. As wind speeds rise, there is a requirement for airline managers, agents or owners
concerned to ensure that wind milling propellers and rotors are feathered and/or secured.
42.7 Aerodrome operators will have in place comprehensive arrangements and rules to safeguard
low visibility operations on the manoeuvring area and these issues are not discussed in detail
here. Further information about the implementation of low visibility operation and
procedures can be found in CAR Part IX, Chapter 4, Paragraph 4.21 and in AMC-44 - Low
Visibility Procedures and in the relevant Aerodrome Manual.
42.8 In most airfield layouts, aprons border directly on to the taxiway system. Therefore, when
LVPs are in force, there is an impact upon apron operations and there is a requirement for
ramp staff to be aware of the implications for taxiway operations and to comply with any
requirements and limitations that are notified.
42.9 When visibility is reduced, it must be ensured that staff are aware of the additional safety
requirements to maintain safe operations. All users should make themselves aware of the
additional restrictions that are required in low visibilities. These may include escorts for
vehicles normally allowed to operate on the manoeuvring area, warning signs should be
placed at airside access points and safeguarding barriers on airside roads as required.
42.10 During periods of low visibility, vehicles should be operated with dipped headlights, and
where fitted, fog lights should be illuminated. Drivers should proceed with extreme caution,
and vehicle obstruction lights should be switched on. Staff should be alert to the sudden
appearance of an aircraft entering a stand and be prepared to give way accordingly.
42.11 Managers of aerodromes that continue to operate during severe winter conditions are
recommended to issue an ‘Adverse Weather Warning’ to all airside users and to agree and
publish an Adverse Weather Plan to include operations during thunderstorms and
sandstorms.
42.12 During adverse weather conditions additional precautions and arrangements are required,
by all those involved with airside operations. Safety instructions should be issued to highlight
the hazards of adverse weather operations and detail the measures to be taken to mitigate
the effects on the apron. The aerodrome plan should involve all relevant business partners
where required, and it is good practice to arrange briefings for the managers and staff of user
airlines/companies on working and operating in adverse weather conditions.
42.13 The aerodrome operator should establish that they, airlines and handling agents have
arrangements in place for the following:
a) The clearance of sand in critical areas peripheral to stands such as loading bridge
movement areas, bridge steps and drive wheels, passenger routes (including external
steps and ramps), FEGP units and other fixed service equipment;

c) When meteorological warnings are received and when thunderstorm conditions are
expected or observed, warnings should be transmitted to all apron operators and staff
by the best local means;
C) Additional apron inspections to detect sand build up on perimeter roads and around
aerodrome signage etc.
42.14 Simple precautions that can reduce risks should be taken as follows:
a) Allow additional time for all ramp activities;
b) Take extra care when driving, especially when approaching an aircraft, or on the
approaches to a road junction. When driving, bear in mind that vehicles require a greater
distance in which to stop safely;
c) Do not leave a vehicle unattended with the engine running simply to keep the cab
cool/warm or to charge the battery;
d) Ensure attention is given to vehicle inspection prior to use. Check the operation of lights,
battery condition, brakes and tyres;
e) Surfaces, particularly painted areas, initially become more slippery during very wet
conditions. Staff and passengers should be warned to exercise extra care in these
circumstances;
f) High visibility clothing should be worn in accordance with current instructions;
g) Make allowance for other staff whose movements may be restricted by difficult working
conditions;
h) Avoid the unnecessary formation of sand on apron and road surfaces;
43 Slips and Trips
43.1 Slips and trips account for almost a quarter of accidents to people at aerodromes. Whilst
some of these accidents are difficult to prevent, many could be avoided by simple measures
which can and should be taken.
43.2 Slips and trips may be caused by a variety of obstructions, loose items and defects in
walkways, stairs and other areas. Loose items include FOD, which is of course a source of risk
to aircraft as well. Improperly stowed cables (for example, from fixed or mobile electrical
ground power units) can also cause people to trip over. Slips can be caused by spillages, for
example from hydraulic leaks. Marshallers are specifically at risk of trips and falls due to the
focus being concentrated on the aircraft so procedures should not encourage them to walk
backwards during the docking of aircraft.
43.3 The initial design and construction of work areas can contribute as much to the risk of slips
and trips as to its reduction. Sudden changes in level, poor drainage, and insufficient surface
roughness of the floor can all increase the risk of slips or trips. The aerodrome operator
should ensure that the risks from slips and trips are considered at the design of new or
refurbished facilities, and are eliminated or controlled by good design, as much as possible.
43.4 Poor maintenance of surfaces can also contribute to the risk of slips and trips. Damage such
as potholes and excessive wear increase the risk that slips will occur, as well as also being a
potential source of FOD. Aerodrome maintenance programmes should be developed by the
aerodrome operator to discover areas in need of attention before they become a source of
danger. Airlines and ground handlers should assist, for example by reporting parts of the
apron which have been damaged, or are becoming excessively worn.
44 Electrical Hazards
44.1 There are a variety of sources of electrical hazards on the apron, including lighting, fixed or
mobile electrical ground powers units, power supplies to other apron equipment (such as
aerobridges) and the aircraft itself.
44.2 Again, design and installation can significantly reduce risk. Proper means of isolation should
always be provided to electrical systems. These should be lockable. Where possible, isolators
should be designed so that people cannot gain access to parts which carry dangerous
electrical currents unless the power is switched off. The aerodrome operator should ensure
that redundancy is designed into systems where isolation would cause severe inconvenience
(for example, as with the AGL system), so that one circuit can be isolated and worked on
safely, whilst the second circuit keeps vital services operating.
44.3 Electrical equipment should always be used safely. Plugs should be used with the sockets for
which they were designed. Circuits should not be overloaded, and should be suitable for the
environment in which they are used. Cables should not be left in positions where they could
be damaged.
44.4 Of particular note is the use of ground power units (GPUs). Many GPUs have an electrical
interlock which detects when the aircraft is connected. This interlock can be bypassed.
However, this facility is intended for maintenance purposes only. Interlocks should not be
bypassed, even temporarily, whilst the GPU is in normal use. If the GPU will not operate
unless the interlock is bypassed, then the GPU is faulty, and it should be withdrawn from
service for repair.
44.5 All electrical systems should be properly maintained. This will require a programme of
inspection and test to identify defects before they become a source of danger. It also requires
everyone to report promptly to their employer, and/or the operator or owner of the
equipment, any defects they discover during the course of their work. All maintenance of
electrical systems should be carried out by competent people to an adequate standard.
44.6 Where contractors are to be used to undertake electrical work, they should be subject to the
assessment, control and monitoring arrangements outlined in Chapter 1.
45 Faults and Defects
45.1 Aerodrome operators should promulgate and maintain comprehensive fault reporting
procedures for all apron equipment and installations provided by the aerodrome. Clear
instructions should be issued and repeated by notice at main installation sites.
45.2 For staff of airlines or operators, simple ‘one shot’ fault reporting is best. Faults on vital
operational equipment, or facilities, that could affect aircraft safety, such as aerobridges and
VDGS, should be reported to a single agency. By this means the appropriate and immediate
safety decisions can be taken and at the same time a prompt engineering response can be
initiated.
45.3 Details of all reported faults and their rectification should be recorded for management audit
purposes.
45.4 For faults where a hazard to aircraft existed or was thought possible, consideration should
be given to filing a ROSI. Further details can be found in Reporting of Safety Incident (ROSI)
on the GCAA website www.gcaa.ae.
45.5 Some faults may also be serious enough to require reporting to the Safety Department, even
if they also qualify as a ROSI. These include the collapse or overturning of any lifting
equipment, certain electrical short circuits or fires, and collapse of certain scaffolding.
45.6 Reports submitted under company reporting procedures should be made via the aerodrome
operators SMS.
45.7 All employers should ensure that there are systems in place to enable staff to report defects
and faults in company equipment. Action should be taken on these reports, within in a
timescale which reflects the seriousness of the defect or fault and the risk to aircraft and/or
people.
46 Movement Area Inspections
46.1 The requirement for inspections and maintenance of airfield facilities is implicit in the
aerodrome certification process and the associated legislation. The Aerodrome Manual must
contain the requirements and accountabilities for the inspection and auditing of all the safety
systems airside on a systematic basis. The results should be recorded/ reported and fed back
into the safety management system. Further guidance is provided in AMC-36 – Runway and
Movement Area Inspections.
46.2 Aerodrome operators should maintain inspection schedules for all apron equipment and
facilities it provides. The results of these inspections should be recorded.
Serviceability/availability records should be maintained on the principal systems for audit
and management purposes.
Appendix 2A Airside/Apron Safety Committee
1 Airports and aerodromes need effective forums in order to communicate with all airside
operators; the aim of the Airside/Apron Safety Committee (ASC) is to promote and maintain
airside safety standards and it is the foremost forum for the discussion and resolution of apron
and ramp safety issues. The ASC provides the partnership between the airport operator’s
safety managers and other airside users to communicate and resolve matters concerning
airside safety and operations.
2 It is recommended that aerodrome certificate holders or airport operators establish an ASC

or an equivalent. The committee should be headed by the aerodrome manager, or senior
airport operations manager, safety manager, or equivalent. At large airports, membership
should consist of many different organisations including flight operators, ground services
companies, and aircraft handling organisations, ATC and representatives from the emergency
services. In order to maintain membership at a manageable level, joint operator groups, such
as a ramp, baggage, or aircraft fuelling, may consider nominating selected members to
represent group interests.
3 At smaller airports or aerodromes, the ASC may be less complex and comprise membership
from multi-disciplined stakeholders, commensurate with the particular type of hazard
presented in the airside environment and the safety issues represented.
4 Meetings should be scheduled on a regular basis, with notes and actions from meetings
communicated and promulgated to the wider airside community in a timely manner following
meetings, with agreed actions recorded and tracked for closure.
5 The Airside/Apron Safety Committee should:
a) Ensure that all airside personnel are aware of the potential safety hazards connected
with their duties (safety awareness);
b) Ensure that lessons arising from safety occurrence investigations and other safety
activities are disseminated to accountable safety managers within all organisations
operating airside;
c) Ensure that all stakeholders are actively encouraged to engage and propose solutions to
identified hazards and changes in order to improve safety where they appear needed, or
in response to safety incidents.
6 The Committee’s Terms of Reference should include:
a) Acting as the focus for shared ownership of and responsibilities for airside safety
issues;
b) Developing policies for safe airside operations;
c) Considering actions to resolve airside safety problems;
d) Promoting airside safety discipline;
e) Reviewing apron and Health and Safety incidents, in order to share analysis and lessons
learned. The committee may consider other aspects of operational safety such as the
following list (not exhaustive or prioritised):
i) Apron congestion issues and advise on best solutions;
ii) Airside cleanliness issues;
iii) Review reports and statistics on accidents, incidents and emergencies, airside
discipline issues and discuss trends and solutions;
iv) Identification and reduction of shared risks;
v) Apron equipment issues; vi) Airside traffic issues;
vii) Standard operating procedures for airside
activities; viii) New and updated airside safety
instructions; ix) Personal protective
clothing/equipment issues;
x) Environmental safety matters such as noise, blast and fumes;
xi) Methods to develop and promote apron safety awareness initiatives, such as
poster campaigns and safety presentations/exhibitions;
xii) Sand clearance issues;
xiii) Receive reports on significant outages and breakdowns concerning airside fixed
facilities;
xiv) Receive engineers’ briefings and reports on ongoing or imminent airside works and
projects and provide safety advice;
xv) Proposed changes/developments to the airside environment, aircraft ground

handling operations and/or standard operating procedures;
xvi) Results of aircraft turnround audits.
NOTE: The existence of an Airside Safety Committee must not substitute for safety
management arrangements made by individual organisations represented on the
flight safety, ground safety or local runway safety committees.
Chapter 3 Aprons and Stands
1 Introduction
1.1 The guidance in this Chapter is intended to ensure compliance with CAR Part IX (minimum
standards) but also takes account of good practice at major International airports, and applies
equally to terminal-contact and remote stands. Stand and aerodrome design needs to be
dynamic to allow for changes to aircraft type, dimensions, aircraft mix and other operating
characteristics.
1.2 Aprons are provided to accommodate aircraft for the purpose of loading or unloading
passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance. They usually comprise individual
stands, apron areas divided into separate stands, Multi-Aircraft Ramp Systems (MARS) or a
Multi-Choice Apron (MCA). The location and purpose of the stand may impact on its design;
whether the stand is being used for passenger traffic, freight or remote parking or whether
the stand is used in a ‘taxi or nose-in, push back’, ‘self-manoeuvring’ or ‘drive-through’
configuration.
1.3 ‘Best Practice’ has highlighted some of the hazards that may occur on apron areas, and
therefore it is important to provide stands and aprons that are designed to reduce the hazards
where possible and to facilitate aircraft turnrounds and other activities as safely as possible.
1.4 Congested operating conditions may impact on a safe apron environment and the degree of
ramp congestion is often, though not exclusively, related to the total numbers of vehicles and
equipment permitted/required to park and operate on the apron. Operators should take into
account the delivery targets and service/safety level agreements between airlines and ground
handling organisations. The business models of many airlines reply on short aircraft turnround
times; on some occasions without using the aerobridges that are provided. This, together with
the general increase in the volume of baggage/cargo and servicing products, may put pressure
on the aircraft stand area available to support increased activity. The aerodrome operator can
contribute to the safety and efficiency of aircraft turnrounds by providing aprons and stands
which take into account the actual practices at the airport and by enforcing agreed operating
principles.
1.5 The introduction of future and next generation aircraft design features, such as winglets or
blended wings on aircraft, may result in aerodromes having to modify some stands to
accommodate increased wingspan generated by the new wing designs. This may lead to
reduced clearances between stands, which results in a more demanding environment for the
ground handlers to complete the safe turnround of the aircraft. To address these challenges,
and to allow for future increases in aircraft size, aerodromes may wish to consider, as
appropriate, generic stands, linked to aircraft code rather than specific aircraft type, in the
development of future aprons.
1.6 Consideration may also be given to addressing the shift towards containerisation of the
smaller aircraft (e.g. A320 type) and the effect this operation places on the available space
within the stand area. One solution may be the employment of offset centrelines, which
provide an increased area on the starboard side of the aircraft. This allows for a greater
manoeuvring area for the increased amount of large equipment employed during an aircraft
turnround. The location of other services such as fuel hydrant pits, FEGP, aerobridge, PCA etc,
will need to be considered.
2 Physical Characteristics
2.1 A stand is a ‘box’ of designated apron space intended to be used for the parking and turnround
servicing of an aircraft, and individual or groups of stands should have a design maximum size
of aircraft to be served. The boundaries of a stand are:
• Front: boundary with the head-of-stand road, equipment area or building line;
• Rear: boundary with the rear-of-stand road or taxilane /taxiway strip;
• Sides: measured laterally from the wingtip of the largest span aircraft.
2.2 Stand design should provide minimum clearances around the extremities of the largest
aircraft type expected to use the stand, as set out in CAR Part IX.
3 Multi-Aircraft Aprons
3.1 Flexibility for changing aircraft size can be accommodated by adopting Multi-Aircraft Ramp
System (MARS) stands or a Multi-Choice Apron (MCA) concept.

3.2 Multi-Aircraft Ramp System (MARS) stands allow either two smaller aircraft or one larger
aircraft to be parked on the same stand, for example, two B737-400s or one B747-400.
Clearances will be as described above, except that it is recommended that the clearance
between the wingtips of the two smaller aircraft as one passes the other be as required in
CAR Part IX. Guidance for vehicles to pass safely between the wingtips of the two smaller
aircraft on MARS stands may be indicated by ground paint markings known as wingtip
guidance lines or ‘MARS Bars’.
3.3 A Multi-Choice Apron (MCA) is a defined area of pavement accepting more complex
combinations of aircraft than MARS (for example: three smaller aircraft or two larger ones).
Clearances around the edges of the MCA will be as described above. Good practices for MCA
design are as follows:
a) A set of adjacency rules will be required for stand allocation;
b) No two centrelines should be closer than 10 m;
c) A distinct sequence will be required for stand numbering (i.e. no L, C and R suffixes);
d) Stand numbers will be marked beside the lead in arrows at the taxiway centreline and
repeated at the double white line marking the tail of stand;
e) Both elements of VDGS (azimuth and stopping) should be provided and co-located
directly ahead of the cockpit;
f) Inter-stand clearways or airside roads will be provided, as required, at the extremities

of the area defined as MCA;
3.4 Normally wingtip guidance lines (MARS Bars) are not provided within the MCA as these have
proven difficult to provide in an unambiguous way. The major advantage of aprons using MCA
layouts is the flexibility provided to meet different aircraft mix requirements at different
times. However, there are also a number of possible disadvantages, as follows:
a) Lack of markings other than centrelines requiring additional operating procedures, such
as the use of cones around wingtips, affecting airline and handling agents training and
costs;
b) Problems in providing service connections to serve all parking combinations,

particularly aerobridges and FEGP. Underground service pits may have to be
considered;
c) Multiplicity of the humps associated with fuel hydrants which cause problems for
positioning of equipment when serving the aircraft;
d) Reduction in area available for head-of-stand equipment parking due to the increased
number of tug lanes and other factors, leading to increased requirements elsewhere.
e) The human factors element: MCA layouts provide potential for both ground staff and
pilots to become confused about the correct positioning of aircraft and equipment due
to multiple ground markings.
4 Self-manoeuvring Stands
4.1 Safety clearances around self-manoeuvring stands will need to be increased from those used
for nose-in/pushback stands to take account of jet blast/prop wash. There may also be
requirements for jet blast protection, which may include blast diffuser screens and/or an area
clear of equipment, roadways, buildings and activity.
5 Access Roads
5.1 Stands should, wherever possible, have a head-of-stand road, used not only to access the
stand but also to provide a route for traffic to move around the terminal area. Where this is
not possible, a rear-of-stand road may be provided but this should lie entirely outside both
the taxilane strip and beyond the rear-of-stand.
5.2 Normally, a head-of-stand road is preferable to a rear-of-stand road because, on the latter,
traffic would be held up as an aircraft enters or is pushed back from the stand, and at least
one additional member of staff is normally required in the pushback ground handling team to
check that traffic has stopped. The main exception may be at smaller airports where the
passenger handling is carried out without aerobridges, at ground level resulting in a tail of
stand road being preferred, as this reduces the risks associated with vehicles and pedestrians.
5.3 A reserved area should be located at the head of each stand for the pushback tug. Width
should be a minimum of 6 m for small and medium stands and minimum of 7.5 m for large
stands and above, equally disposed about the stand centreline. Access from the head-ofstand
airside road should not be restricted by building columns, particularly where the head-of-
stand road is one way providing less space to make the turn into the reserved tug area. On
stands without a head-of-stand road, a greater length will normally be required.
6 Equipment Parking/Storage
6.1 Aerodrome operators should take a proactive approach in ensuring this is included in
development plans for future projects.
6.2 It is generally accepted that equipment areas are divided into a number of locations, those on
the stand/apron, support areas and dedicated areas for specific operations (e.g. ULD storage,
and large vehicle operations). However, growing pressures to achieve shorter turnround
times have forced ground handling companies and aerodrome operators to develop
initiatives which support the objectives of the airlines, but at the same time, using the
opportunity to increase the safety aspects of the turnround operation. Enhanced methods of
managing the ‘on stand’ equipment areas may be suitable, for example the establishment of
dedicated areas on the stand for the storage and parking of equipment, seen as essential to
the efficient turnround of aircraft provided clearances are maintained.
6.3 The aerodrome operator, in co-operation with the ground handling companies, should
identify the equipment that is required close to the apron to support the shorter turnround
times. It is important that the design of the stand is fine-tuned to identify the greatest possible
area that could be allocated to equipment storage, taking into account the capacity of the
stand and its layout (e.g. MARS, MCA). Allocation of the equipment area to specific equipment
types should be jointly agreed and supported by the marking of the area to ensure it is
effectively managed.
6.4 Demands on space caused by aerodrome development may cause pressure to reduce the
levels of equipment areas. Aerodrome operators should be aware of their responsibility to
ensure parking/storage space is allocated for aircraft and the equipment required to service
it.
6.5 At some airports it may be the responsibility of the Turnround Coordinator, or other such
person with responsibility for the aircraft turnround, to ensure all equipment used in the
turnround process is returned to its allocated space when the process is completed.
6.6 Aerodrome operators, airlines and ground handlers may wish to consider the use of
equipment pre-positioning areas. Temporary waiting areas are identified and marked on the
stand, which allow vehicles and equipment, intended to be utilised in the turnround, to await
the arrival of the aircraft. To ensure the areas are not used as permanent parking areas, it is
advised that the areas are identified in a different colour to that used for the existing
equipment parking areas.
6.7 Allowance should be made for parking areas for ground service equipment and vehicles, for
areas on and close to stands for vehicle positioning prior to an aircraft’s arrival, and for longer
term fleet parking areas, preferably close to crew room accommodation. Where crew rooms
are close to stands, it may be necessary to split the nearby equipment areas between the two
requirements. The factors affecting the area required include routes served (i.e. long-haul or
short-haul), aircraft type (i.e. narrow-body or wide-body), whether it is a local based airline,
and the number of handling agents.
6.8 Ideally as a suggestion, an area equivalent to a figure between 12.5% of the stand area for
short-haul, narrow-body aircraft, and 22.5% of the stand area for long-haul, wide-body
aircraft has been assessed as necessary for equipment parking. The higher figure is because
long-haul passengers have greater baggage allowance and wide-body aircraft use baggage
containers whose storage is space consuming. However, where a higher proportion of aircraft
use containerised baggage, additional parking and Unit Load Device (ULD) container storage
facilities may be required. Only part of this requirement (no more than 7.5%, often less) is
met by the head-of-stand areas either side of the pushback tug reserved area. These figures
are strictly net and will, for purposes of calculation, exclude all fixed installations, items not
relevant to the operation of the individual stand and those portions of the area available
which are not considered to be accessible or of reasonable size or shape. Stand area is the
length multiplied by the width. Special considerations apply on aprons used by cargo aircraft.
6.9 The parking areas needed for longer term parking are additional to the above, as are any areas
required for cargo consolidation, Unit Load Device (ULD) container storage facilities, and
areas required for the repair and maintenance of ground service vehicles and equipment and
where practicable located off or away from the ramp. In general, parking areas should be
sized to meet the needs of all the stands in a particular apron area. They should be sited so
that they are accessible from both stands and crew accommodation whilst ensuring that
travelling distances are minimised.
6.10 Where apron space is short, consideration should be given to the provision of multideck
‘stillage’ for the storage of baggage containers.
6.11 Provision may also be required in parking areas for the recharging of electrical vehicles and
equipment.
7 Passenger/Staff access
7.1 Safety principles places importance on the segregation of pedestrians, whether staff or
passengers, and vehicles. Therefore pedestrian routes on aprons and associated with airside
roads are required to be clearly marked. A clear unobstructed walkway of at least 1m width
should be provided, between the point(s) where pedestrians leave the terminal building to
the side of the aircraft nose on the aircraft commander’s side. This should be painted green
with a non-slip surface and showing a white ‘pedestrian’ figure motif every 20m, or as
necessary. Where these cross a roadway, a ‘zebra’ crossing should be painted and traffic
control lights or other control measures should be considered.
8 Surface Markings
8.1 Guidance on ground markings is provided in the ‘ACI Apron Markings and Signs handbook’.

a) A lead-in arrow, aligned with the stand centreline, should be painted on the taxiway
surface to delineate the stand centreline intersection with the access taxiway or taxilane-
lane. The stand number should be painted alongside this arrow;
b) Aircraft nosewheel stop marks, painted perpendicular to and across the stand centreline,
should be provided towards the head of the line such that the aircraft parking position
provides sufficient access for any aerobridge and such that all service vehicles can access
the appropriate part of the aircraft. Aircraft types are to be stencilled alongside the
relevant stop bar, abbreviated i.e. ‘A332’/‘B744’;
c) Aerobridge manoeuvring areas should be cross-hatched or ‘starburst’ in white, with a

white circle or rectangle denoting the normal retracted position;
d) Active and redundant fuel hydrant positions should be outlined and differentiated colour
wise;
e) Inter-stand clearways should be outlined in white zig-zags;
f) Fire hydrants should be cross-hatched in red.
g) Should a stand have undergone a reconfiguration process over time, the previous
markings should not be visible with the naked eye. This has the potential to confuse
pushback and flight crews, especially during night or adverse weather operations
whereby a clearly defined centreline and associated markings are crucial.
9 Services and Equipment
9.1 The safety aspects of stand operation are of paramount importance and should not be
compromised. Of particular concern is the large number of vehicle movements on the stand
which presents a safety hazard to aircraft and people (airport personnel and passengers).
Collisions between vehicles and aircraft can cause considerable expense and disruption due
to delays to passengers as well as the cost of repairs, and, with the presence of aviation fuel,
are potentially very dangerous. The overall design objective therefore, must be to reduce the
number of vehicle movements, particularly the large and less manoeuvrable vehicles such as
aviation fuel tankers and apron passenger vehicles, by the use of fixed services wherever
practical.
9.2 In addition to providing space for vehicles to service an aircraft and for equipment parking,
stand and apron design must allow for the range of other facilities that may be required:
9.3 Aircraft Cleaning and Disposal of Aircraft Refuse - Airline ground handling staff or their agents
will clean the interior of the aircraft during the turnround and remove the waste generated,
together with the waste generated from in-flight catering, etc. Additionally, some airports
may allow aircraft to be washed on stand. Where this is allowed, the design of the pavement
drainage system will need to accommodate this.
9.4 When the weather conditions, particularly thunderstorms, reach certain limits, the airlines or
their handling agents should have specific procedures in place to reduce the risk of a lightning
strike to staff working on the aircraft particularly the headset man.
9.5 Aircraft Electrical Supplies - Most aircraft types are equipped with an Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) which provides power to run the aircraft systems when the aircraft’s engines are shut
down and to start those engines. However, they can be noisy, polluting and not particularly
economical to run for long periods. Therefore, the provision of ground power is normally
required. This can take the form of a mobile Ground Power Unit (GPU), or a Fixed Electrical
Ground Power (FEGP) system with an outlet associated with each stand centreline. GPUs
suffer from the same problems as the APU, as they can also be noisy, polluting and not
particularly economical to run. In addition, local planning constraints or airport procedures
may limit or ban the running of APUs and GPUs at certain times because of their noise and
emissions. Therefore, the provision of FEGP should be considered in the design of all stands.
FEGP may be supplied from a cubicle located in the head-of-stand equipment area via a cable
mounted on a pantograph (or ‘crocodile’), from below an aerobridge or from a pit in the
stand. The addition of an AC/DC converter may be required on stands used by the smaller
turbo-prop aircraft. Experiments in the past to route FEGP along the aerobridge have not been
entirely successful, with problems created when the aerobridge is unserviceable, and aircraft
damaged when the aerobridge has been backed off before the power cable was disconnected.
Typical power requirements are:
a) Code A-C stands: 115v 400Hz 90kVA ;
b) Code D-F stands: 115v 400Hz 180kVA (double-unit).
9.6 Aircraft Maintenance - Routine minor maintenance is carried out during the aircraft
turnround on stands. However, on occasion, minor repair work may be carried out involving
the use of engineering platforms, etc. For major repair work, the aircraft would normally be
towed to the maintenance area or a remote stand.
9.7 Aircraft Refuelling - Aircraft may be refuelled from large fuel tankers or from an underground
pipeline via a hydrant service vehicle which regulates the flow rate, filters the fuel and records
the amount delivered. At airports without hydrant fuelling facilities, longrange wide-bodied
aircraft may need several of the largest tankers to refuel, and as the elimination of large
vehicles is encouraged, the provision of fuel hydrants should be considered in the design of
all stands at airports with the necessary infrastructure. Each stand with fuel hydrants should
have an emergency fuel cut-off button provided at the head-of-stand in an easily accessible
position, prominently signed and close to the telecommunications link and apron-level
emergency aircraft stop facility.
Example diagram:
9.8 Aircrew Handling - At some airports aircrew are taken to and from the aircraft by coach;
sometimes separate coaches for flight deck crew and cabin crew.
9.9 Apron Floodlighting - Stands used at night shall be lit so that the turnround activities can take
place safely. For further information see CAR Part IX, Appendix 9 paragraph 9.23.4
9.10 Assembly Points - To cater for evacuation from the passenger terminal and/or pier, assembly
points need to be provided in accordance with the H & S requirements.
9.11 Baggage Handling - Passenger baggage is normally conveyed between the aircraft and the
terminal building in containers on dollies or loose on small trailers, a string of which will be
towed by a small tug. Except for the smallest aircraft, the baggage will be loaded/unloaded
using specialist mobile equipment. Some late baggage may be checked in at the gate and
descend to the apron level by lift or chute.
9.12 Cargo Handling - Much cargo now travels in the under floor holds of passenger aircraft and
on the main deck of combi-aircraft (i.e. where the main deck has separate sections for
passengers and freight), as well as on dedicated cargo aircraft. This will be conveyed between
aircraft and the cargo terminal by vehicle, while loading into the under floor holds will use the
same equipment as for passenger baggage (see above). Main deck loaders are large/wide
vehicles and clearances must allow for their safe passage.

9.13 Catering Supplies - Prepared meals are delivered to the aircraft and empty containers
removed during the turnround by specialist vehicles which can be raised to the upper and
main deck levels.
9.14 Disposal of Aircraft Sewage - This is normally emptied from the aircraft into a specialist vehicle
and taken to the sanitation building.
9.15 Disposal of Refuse Generated during Aircraft Turnround Activities - Aircraft maintenance and
other turnround activities generate waste, particularly hydraulic fluid cans and the boxes they
come in. Some airports do not provide refuse bins on stands as they expect waste to be
removed, but this requires a high level of apron discipline and monitoring. Other airports
provide refuse and FOD (Foreign Object Debris) bins sometimes in pairs for ‘dry’ and ‘wet’
(i.e. any liquid, including oil) waste. In the latter case the bins may be labelled POL (Petroleum,
Oil and Lubricants). Some airports provide large compactors every few stands which take both
aircraft and stand waste. Provision on new stands should take local practice into account.
9.16 Emergency Facilities (particularly at larger aerodromes) - In addition to the VDGS Emergency
Aircraft Stop button the following provisions should be considered:
a) A fuel hydrant Emergency Shut-Off switch. This should be situated alongside the
emergency telephone at the head-of-stand, and clearly signed;
b) Portable fire extinguishers shall be readily available at the head of stands in conjunction
with procedures agreed between them and the airport’s rescue and fire fighting service;
c) The provision of fire hydrant equipment on the apron is explained further in CAR Part
XI;
d) Spillage response kits should be provided.
9.17 Engine Starting – Normally, engine starting uses internal (APU) or external (FEGP or GPU)
power. However, a back-up system requires the use of mobile air-start units providing
highpressure air.
9.18 Fuel Hydrants – Should be provided for each underwing position required by the aircraft types
intended to use the stand. Hydrants should be located no more than 10 metres from the
fuelling points of the aircraft types intended to use the stand. This may require the installation
of more than one hydrant head per stand, as determined by the airport operator and the
airlines utilising the stand.
9.19 Passenger Handling – Passengers arrive and depart from an aircraft in one of three ways;
directly between a pier and an aircraft via an aerobridge, by walking across the pavement
to/from a nearby building or via an Apron Passenger Vehicle (APV). In the latter two cases one
or more sets of aircraft steps will be required to enable them to reach or leave the aircraft
cabin, unless the APV is of the type that can be raised to cabin level, or the aircraft is equipped
with airstairs. Where an aerobridge is not available, or is unserviceable, disabled passengers
will be conveyed to/from the aircraft by specialist vehicles (ambulift) which can be raised to
cabin level. Areas reserved for aerobridge manoeuvring, passenger walkways and/or APV
manoeuvring will be required.
9.20 Pre-Conditioned Air - Low-pressure pre-conditioned air may be required when an aircraft has
been standing for some time in very high or very low temperatures. This can be supplied by a
specialist vehicle or generated locally at each stand.
9.21 Pushback Tractor - Most aircraft types require their own towbar, leading to a requirement for
sections of equipment parking areas to be allocated for their storage. The introduction of
towbarless tractors may reduce this particular need in the future. However, towbarless
tractors tend to be wider than the conventional type leading to a possible need for wider
reserved tug areas.
9.22 Replenishment of Potable (Drinking) Water - Potable water is normally delivered to the
aircraft by a specialist vehicle. Providing potable water as a fixed service directly to stands is
not recommended as water hygiene standards cannot be ensured where water is required to
be put through pipe work and branches to individual aircraft stands.
9.23 Telecommunications - The Stand (Emergency) Telephone is a weatherproof unit, which is

usually restricted to calling airport-only extensions, and is normally provided at apron level
at, or readily accessible from, the head of each stand. The facility should be conspicuously
signed with the emergency numbers and its location prominently marked. Where two remote
stands are located head to head, they could share the telephone, the emergency aircraft stop
button and emergency fuel cut-off button. Consideration should also be given to providing an
intercom system between gate room level and apron level on pier-served stands.
10 Visual Docking Guidance System (VDGS)
10.1 Visual Docking Guidance Systems (VDGS) provide alignment and stopping guidance to an
aircraft entering the stand (also known as Stand Entry Guidance (SEG)). As required by ICAO
Annex 14, and as shown in CAR Part IX, VDGS providing both azimuth and stopping guidance
should be installed where it is necessary to indicate, by a visual aid, the precise positioning of
an aircraft on a stand. All VDGS must meet the requirements specified in ICAO Annex 14,
where aircraft intended to use that stand require precise stop positions, due to aerobridge,
fuel hydrant or stand infrastructure or furniture. On stands where VDGS is not provided, or
where systems are unserviceable or incorrectly calibrated for the type of aircraft assigned to
the stand, an aircraft marshaller or alternative method may be used as appropriate.

10.2 Visual docking of an aircraft involves three elements, aircraft type identification, alignment
(azimuth) guidance and stopping guidance. The type of stopping guidance to be provided
depends on the number of stopping positions required and their location, which in turn
depends on the fixed services to be provided, particularly aerobridge and fuel hydrants and
is achieved by automation with modern and advanced VDGS.
10.3 The accuracy required from VDGS is a maximum aircraft mis-park of 0.6 m to the left, right,
forward or aft. Where a rail-drive aerobridge (‘noseloader’) is involved, the forward and aft
mis-park maximum may need to be reduced to 0.3 m.
10.4 MARS stands should be equipped with a VDGS on all lead in lines, unless aircraft are
marshalled, and there should be an interlock in the switching arrangement such that when
VDGS for the left, right or centreline is selected, VDGS for the main centreline cannot be
switched on, and vice versa. Similarly, Emergency Aircraft Stop signs and buttons will be
provided in association with each centreline. The Aircraft Emergency Stop sign should be
activated by any button on the stand which will cause the STOP signs on all centrelines to be
illuminated and all SEG to be switched off. Similar arrangements will be required on
MultiChoice Apron (MCA) stands.
10.5 To minimise the loss of already scarce equipment parking areas, VDGS should be mounted on
the terminal building or pier structure, wherever practical. Where columns are required, their
number should be kept to the minimum necessary. On stands designed for nose loading cargo
aircraft, special consideration may need to be given to mounting of SEG such that it does not
hinder the loading and unloading of the aircraft.
11 Alignment Guidance
11.1 Alignment guidance is primarily provided by the painted stand centreline. However, to comply
with CAR Part IX requirements, where precise positioning of the aircraft is required on nose-
in/pushback stands, alignment and stopping guidance should be provided in a single unit
mounted directly in front of the cockpit and usable by either pilot. If there is a building located
at the head-of-stand, then the VDGS should be mounted on it, wherever practical. If no
suitable building is available, it should be placed on a column or gantry. However, where
constrained by local conditions and infrastructure, an operational risk assessment may be
utilised in order to determine the optimum position of stand entry guidance, in order to meet
the requirements. It is recommended this assessment be carried out in co-ordination with the
airline(s) and ground handling organisation operating on that stand.
11.2 For other stands, where a combined unit is not provided, alignment guidance, in addition to
a painted stand centreline, should be provided on nose-in/pushback stands. An example of
this is an AGNIS (Azimuth Guidance for Nose-In Stands) unit. If there is a building located at
the head-of-stand, then the AGNIS should be mounted on it, wherever practical. If no suitable
building is available, it should to be placed on a column or gantry, together with any other
VDGS elements provided. Where provided, it should be aligned with the left-hand pilot who
requires an offset from the centreline of, normally, 0.53 m, and mounted at a height within
the angle of view from the cockpits of the types of aircraft for which the stand is intended.
12 Stopping Guidance
12.1 Precise stopping guidance is be required on nose-in/pushback stands equipped with

aerobridges and/or hydrant refuelling, due to the variety of positions and accuracy required
in the stopping of aircraft. On these stands, ICAO Annex 14 compliant systems are necessary
and such devices must provide guidance to both pilot positions without turning his/her head.
12.2 On self-manoeuvring stands and on nose-in/pushback stands without aerobridges or hydrant

refuelling, stopping guidance may be provided by units offset from the stand centreline, a
mirror, a paint marking in the form of one or, occasionally, two stop lines, which usually takes
the form of a Stop Arrow (also known as Stop Line). These are aligned with the pilot’s eye
position when parked and are normally located to the left of the stand centreline, but may be
provided on the right or both sides as circumstances dictate. The mirror is normally used on
stands with a rail-drive aerobridge (‘noseloader’) where there would be a small number of
stopping positions close together. A Parallax Aircraft Parking Aid (PAPA) unit is normally
required where there are a number of widely spaced stopping positions due to the slope
requirements in an apron drive aerobridge and/or fuel hydrant requirements. A Stop Arrow
(stop line) is appropriate where there are few such limitations or where a small group of
similarly sized aircraft are served by an apron-drive aerobridge, such as on the left-hand
centreline of a MARS stand.
13 Stand Identification
13.1 Stand identification is provided by a Stand Number Indicator Board (SNIB) displaying the stand
designation which should be located close to the stand centreline where it can be seen both
by the pilots of an aircraft approaching along the taxiway and, on nosein/pushback stands,
from the cockpit of a parked aircraft prior to pushback. In exceptional circumstances it may
be necessary to provide two SNIBs. The SNIB will need to be illuminated (normally internally)
if the stand is to be used at night, with lighting control usually by a photo-electric cell.
13.2 European aerodrome certification specifications allow other conspicuous combinations to be

used, except for combinations including red’.
13.3 Additionally, the stand designation should be painted beside the taxiway centreline directly
opposite the stand together with a lead-in arrow aligned with the stand centreline. On MARS

and MCA stands, the designation for each stand centreline should be repeated beside the
stand centreline at the double white lines marking the tail of stand.
14 Pushback Allowance
14.1 The normal pushback manoeuvre requires the aircraft to be turned through 90° and aligned
with the taxiway centreline. When pushing-back from the last stand in a cul-de-sac to a blast
screen, the space required to carry out this manoeuvre is ideally about one and a half times
the length of the aircraft, measured from the stand centreline. However, this can be reduced
if the airlines and handling agents are prepared to adopt the ‘snaked’ or ‘swanneck’ method,
particularly if it involves a small aircraft being pushed back into a taxiway wide enough for a
much larger aircraft.

Chapter 4 Aircraft Turnround
1 Introduction
1.1 The aircraft turnround is a complex, busy and a potentially hazardous activity involving
people from various companies working together in close proximity to aircraft, vehicles and
equipment. The hazard associated with the aircraft turnround may be affected by time
constraints, environmental factors such as noise and weather and the adequacy of lighting.
This chapter addresses the turnround of aircraft for the purpose of providing generic
information to assist airport and aircraft operators and ground handling organisations when
developing their own plans. It focuses on the activities undertaken on the ramp so that risks
are properly identified and appropriate measures taken, with the aim of reducing aircraft
damage and the number of personal injuries and other incidents connected with the aircraft
turnround, which, apart from the pain and suffering caused to individuals and their families,
may also cause significant disruption and financial loss to various stakeholders. Whilst the
UAE aviation industry has an excellent safety record, in some areas the challenge is to create
a similar safety culture on the ramp. The provision of this guidance does not infer a
requirement; it is recognised that there are complexities and sensitivities in both the
provision of plans and the accountabilities of turnround coordination; nevertheless, this
guidance seeks to reflect what may be considered good practice, where such plans exist.
Further guidance on aircraft turnround may be obtained from the IATA Airport Handling
Manual (AHM) and IATA Ground Operations Manual (IGOM).
1.2 The guidance in this chapter is intended to provide a common framework for those
organisations involved with the turnround of aircraft.
1.3 The responsibility upon all parties to conduct the turnround procedure safely is enshrined in
the Safety Management System (SMS). Effective safety management within the turnround
procedure will not only reduce the number of accidents and incidents but also improve
efficiency and on time performance.
2 Turnround Plan
2.1 Where more than one company or organisation is attending an aircraft, effective
coordination and cooperation between all parties is essential in order to prevent vehicles,
equipment or people striking aircraft. Airlines and airport operators have a key role in this as
part of their safety management systems for assessing, controlling and monitoring third party
contractors operating in the airside environment. The aircraft turnround plan is therefore a
key document in describing how an aircraft turnround shall be carried out safely, in describing
the roles and responsibilities of each contractor. All contractors involved in aircraft turnround
should have a copy of the plan, or have developed their own company procedures in
accordance with a higher level turnround plan produced by either the airport operator, or
their customer airline.’
2.2 An aircraft turnround plan should describe the activities involved in the generic aircraft
turnround process and what should be considered at each stage. Individual airlines, ground
handling organisations and ramp service providers should produce their own detailed
turnround plans. The plan for the turnround should describe how the turnround will be
carried out, and should enable every contractor to carry out their work safely and without
endangering others. All the contractors involved should either have a copy of the plan, or
have ready access to it.
2.3 The turnround plan should cover the processes involved in an aircraft turnround, for which
each company and/or operator will have their own procedures for carrying out the activities
below:
1. Pre-flight planning;
2. Pre-aircraft arrival;
3. Aircraft arrival;
4. Aircraft on stand;
5. Passenger disembarkation;
6. Catering;
7. Baggage offload/onload;
8. Refuelling;
9. Cleaning;
10. Toilet and potable water servicing;
11. Engineering maintenance;
12. Passenger embarkation;
13. Aircraft stand departure;
14. Post-aircraft departure;
15. Emergency procedures.
2.4 Additionally, airlines and/or ramp service providers should be responsible for the following
on each turnround operation:
a) Ensuring that risk assessments for all activities are in place;

b) Identifying and appointing a competent Turnround Co-ordinator;
c) Ensuring that staff roles, responsibilities and risks are defined;
d) Ensuring that all staff are correctly trained and are doing the right job in the safest
way;
e) Ensuring that the plan is confirmed by the Turnround Co-ordinator and any deviations
communicated to the relevant parties;
f) Ensuring that the appropriate correct and sufficient Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) is provided for all staff;
g) Ensuring sufficient human and equipment resources and contingency plans for any
shortfalls
h) Ensuring all incidents are reported
3 Co-ordination of the Turnround
3.1 The airport industry is continually being challenged to improve its safety performance, so
effective safety can only be provided through co-operation and co-ordination between all
organisations and companies involved during the turnround process, i.e. a ‘total system’
approach. Therefore, the provision of a ‘Turnround Co-ordinator’ appointed to be in control
of the activity should be considered as best-practice. The Turnround Co-ordinator’s role is to
ensure that safe practices of work (as detailed in the plan) are adhered to and that the
turnround plan is as efficient as possible. The co-ordinator is deemed to be in control of all
co-ordination aspects of such turnround.
3.2 The airline or ground handler in charge of the turnround should nominate an individual to be
the Turnround Co-ordinator who will be in overall control of the ground handling activity of
the aircraft turnround. The co-ordinator should have sufficient knowledge and authority to
control the activities around the aircraft. The requirements and nature of the aircraft
operation and, on occasion, the operating procedures of the airline operator, may result in
the Turnround Co-ordinator responsibilities being transferred from one member of staff to
another. On such occasions transfer of the role must be clearly understood and
acknowledged by both parties. The Turnround Co-ordinator should be clearly identifiable to
all other companies involved in the turnround and they should ensure that work proceeds in
accordance with any agreed turnround plan.
3.3 The Turnround Co-ordinator is also responsible for ensuring that all required resources are
in place and that individuals are aware of their tasks and responsibilities. The Turnround

Coordinator should be clearly identifiable to all other companies involved in the turnround
and they should ensure that work proceeds in accordance with the appropriate policies.
3.4 As the role is important to ensure safety and that the turnround plan is as safe and efficient
as possible, the co-ordinator role should fulfil the following requirements:
a) Competence: It is important that the role profile/job description and person appointed
to undertake the role has the necessary competencies to understand and manage the
safety and operational aspects of the turnround process. This includes an understanding
of risk assessments and the mitigations built into the turnround plan.
b) Authority: It is essential that the co-ordinator has the authority to manage and direct
the wide range of contractors and sub-contractors that may be involved in the
turnround process. This authority should be formalised and, in the event of an airline
delegating this task to one of its service suppliers, the delegation of authority to manage
the turnround process should be covered within any contractual arrangements;
c) Workload: The co-ordinator should have sufficient available capacity to fulfil the
obligations of this role as priority. A risk assessment of the complexity and timescales of
the turnround to be managed will be able to inform the ability of the co-ordinator to
undertake additional duties.
3.5 It is recognised that the turnround plan will address a typical aircraft turnround and other
associated activities that may be involved. In these circumstances, together with the ramp
service providers, it is the airline’s responsibility to produce a plan that ensures that all
activities are properly controlled and co-ordinated accordingly. A key element to ensure both
aircraft and personal safety will be to identify who is responsible at each stage of the
turnround.
3.6 Similarly, for operators of non-commercial aircraft it is the airline or ramp service provider’s
responsibility to have a turnround plan that complies as much as possible with the guidance
contained in this document.
4 General Turnround Planning
4.1 Airlines and/or ramp service providers should be responsible for the following on each
turnround operation and should have plans that include the following:
a) Identification of and confirmation that the Turnround Co-ordinator function is

discharged. Where provided, the co-ordinator should be clearly visually identifiable, for
example: different coloured vest with title or specific recognised headwear;

b) Ensuring that the appropriate authorities are informed of company flight schedules in
advance, to allow for any special arrangements;
c) Ensuring that both the load plan and the turnround plan are confirmed by the
Turnround Co-ordinator and any deviations communicated to relevant parties;
d) Ensuring that the appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is provided for all
staff and is being utilised effectively;
e) Ensuring that sufficient resources (staff and equipment) are in place, along with
contingency plans for any shortfalls;
f) Ensuring that all staff and contractors are familiar with the aerodrome rules and
emergency procedures;
g) Ensuring that risk assessments are in place;
h) Agreed parking arrangements where possible, giving as much prior notice as possible;
i) Ensuring that the necessary security arrangements are in place;
j) Ensuring that all staff are competent and tasked to do the job.
k) Ensuring that any safety related hazards or incidents during the turnround are duly
reported through the company’s corporate safety reporting system.
5 Turnround Process
5.1 Additional to generic planning for the operation the turnround may be divided into separate
phases, as shown below:
a) Pre-stand arrival;
b) Aircraft arrival on stand;
c) Aircraft on stand;
d) Aircraft stand departure;
e) Post-aircraft stand departure.

5.2 Shown below is a generic list of turnround activities (not exhaustive). It is recognised
however, that the various third parties operating on the ramp may have their own set of
standard operating procedures and checklist for aircraft pre-arrival. The turnround process
depends upon the allocation of all necessary roles and suitable co-operation to ensure a
workable contractor/client relationship.
5.3 It should be the Turnround Co-ordinator’s responsibility to monitor the turnround process
and report back failures of contractors so that non-compliance or safety issues can be
resolved.
5.4 Typically, the aerodrome operator’s main considerations, which may impact upon the
turnround process, are the timely allocation of stands and effective communication and
coordination of any changes.
6 Pre-Stand Arrival
6.1 Immediately prior to aircraft arrival on stand, a turnround coordinator/procedure should be

in place to ensure the following:
a) Turnround plan confirmed by Turnround Co-ordinator and

any deviations communicated;
b) All safety and security procedures are in place;
c) Communication of any special loads, dangerous goods, and any procedures which must
be followed in relation to these;
d) During periods of low visibility and/or the hours of darkness, check that the parking
stand is sufficiently well lit and (where applicable) the aircraft Stand Number Indicator
Board (SNIB), if available, is illuminated;
e) The Turnround Co-ordinator must consider adverse weather conditions when planning
the turnround, ensuring the safety of the passengers, staff and the aircraft. This may
include thunderstorms, strong winds, heavy rain, excessive heat etc. Weather must also
be considered with regard to unloading of items such as animals and dangerous goods;
f) The Turnround Co-ordinator must ensure that all resources are in place and individuals
are aware of their roles;
g) Ensure correct use of PPE and the safety of all staff, contractors and equipment
providers undertaking the aircraft turnround, high visibility vest should be fastened to
ensure conspicuity;

h) Walking inspection of the stand to remove FOD and report spillages or obstructions;
i) Confirm stand equipment availability (e.g. chocks, cones, Passenger Inbound Guidance
(PIGs) etc);
j) Check that there is sufficient access; no trip, slip or fall hazards;
k) Ensuring all equipment is parked within vehicle parking bays;
l) Ensure correct position and serviceability of aerobridge or other passenger

embarkation/disembarkation equipment.
m) Person near emergency stop button to manage aircraft arrival;
n) When the stand is clear, give instruction to, or activate the VDGS, if available. Where a
VDGS is unserviceable or is not available marshalling assistance should be sought.
7 Aircraft Arrival on Stand
7.1 Once indication has been provided by the aircraft commander that engines are off and
anticollision beacons extinguished:
a) Monitor the safe arrival of aircraft ensuring all staff and equipment remain clear;
b) Where VDGS is available, a nominated person should be in position to activate the VDGS
emergency stop. (Where a VDGS is unserviceable or is not available then Airfield
Operations should be contacted);
c) The emergency stop button must not be used to stop aircraft on the nose wheel mark;
d) Use of aircraft marshalling hand signals where appropriate for initial communication
with pilot;
e) Nominated person to chock aircraft;

f) Nominated person to connect Ground Power Unit (GPU or FEGP) if available, or
requested;
g) Authorised person to communicate with flight deck crew, either through hand-signals,
or on a headset (if available);
h) When the aircraft engines have shut down and reached a safe condition to approach,
the anti-collision lights are off and chocks are in place, the aircraft can be approached
and coned as required. Some airlines may require permission to be given by engineers
or ground staff to confirm it is safe to approach, particularly in the case of propeller
aircraft or helicopters;
i) Switch off VDGS.
8 Aircraft on Stand
8.1 Once the aircraft is parked on the stand, with its engines and anti-collision lights off and
chocks in place, unloading and servicing can proceed as is highlighted below. Not all events
will occur in the same sequence and some will occur concurrently. There will also be some
variations dependent on type of aircraft and the length of the turnround period. This stage is
often carried out over a very short time scale and this coupled with increased vehicle activity
around the aircraft and passenger movement leads to an inherently hazardous environment.
Procedures should be developed to ensure that a thorough damage inspection of the ‘work
areas’ such as cargo doors and servicing panels are conducted by the ground handling
personnel. The ground engineer should also conduct a thorough inspection of the aircraft
fuselage.
Any damage must be reported immediately to the engineer and airline representatives and a safety
occurrence report filed through the airport/company safety reporting system.
There are three elements listed here:
a) Offload
b) Servicing
c) On load
9 Offload Process

a) Ensure equipment is in position; serviceability of brakes checked on equipment prior to
positioning on the aircraft;
b) Check that the offload and emergency routes are available for passengers, and that all
safety measures are in place including Passenger Inward Guidance Systems (PIGS)
c) Position rear and front steps where applicable;
d) Communicate ready to proceed;
e) Aircraft doors opened;
f) Information passed to airline representative regarding disembarkation;
g) Appropriate control measures utilised when manoeuvring vehicles (e.g. the use of
banksman);
h) Re-assess plan in respect to any unplanned changes;
i) Co-ordinate offloading needs:
i) People
a) Special needs wheelchairs, hi-lifts, ambulance dispatched first;
b) Very Important Persons (VIPs), Unaccompanied Minors (UMNRS) etc;
c) Monitored safe exit of passengers to bus or terminal, marshalling passengers

to ensure they remain within the designated safe areas;
d) Crew issued with local instructions.
ii) Animals:
a) Quarantine procedures in force;
b) Appropriate unloading, cages/containers;
c) Hazardous material awareness.
iii) Cargo Load:

a) Positioning of equipment correctly;
b) Order of work scheduling followed, taking sequential unloading into

consideration to avoid the risk of tipping;
c) Offload of any dangerous goods following procedures laid out in the
IATA Dangerous Goods Manual;
d) Offloading bags/freight/cargo/mail/value goods complete.
e) Check aircraft hold(s) are empty (where applicable).
10 On Load Process
a) Reposition equipment if required;
b) Loading Instruction Report Form completed and passed to relevant people;
c) Re-check aircraft hold(s) are empty (where applicable);
d) Co-ordinate onloading:
i) Cargo Load
a) Awareness of dangerous goods and special loads and any relevant procedures
which need to be followed;
b) Check order of work scheduling, taking into consideration sequential loading to

avoid the risk of tipping;
c) Positioning of equipment correct;
d) Load bags/freight/cargo/mail/value goods complete and correctly secured.
ii) Animals
a) Quarantine procedures followed;
b) Appropriate loading, safe cages, animal welfare (water food).
iii) People

a) Special needs loading;
b) Monitor safe arrival of passengers for boarding.
c) Ensure the passengers have not been able to deviate from the departure route.
e) All documentation checked and details to aircraft Commander:
i) Loading instruction report form must be signed to show it has been loaded in
accordance with the instructions shown, and any deviations reflected and
communicated to load controller;
ii) Weight and Balance document completed, including any Last Minute Changes
(LMCs);
iii) Maintenance sheet signed off;
iv) Fuel report sheet;
v) Other, i.e. firearms (where located);
vi) Cargo manifest;
vii) Passenger manifest (if required by the airline);
viii) Information provided to the pilot-in-command concerning dangerous goods and any
special loads.
11 Aircraft Departure
11.1 Once loading is complete, the aircraft is ready to depart and the final checks below should be
completed.
11.2 Aircraft departure is a critical phase of any flight. The pressures for quick turnrounds to meet
schedules, clearances and slot allocations highlight the need for safe management of the
departure procedure. For the purposes of this guidance the departure starts from checks of
security of dead loads and nets (if applicable) or doors closing.
a) Check dead loads secure and net sections are in place;
b) Clear signal to close doors, close aircraft doors;

c) Check hatches and latches are all secure and any damage reported immediately to the
engineer and airline representative;
d) Check the stand is clear of FOD and obstructions;
e) Steps removed and equipment (including cones and chocks) parked or positioned safely
(banksman used if required);
f) Monitor to ensure correct pushback procedures are followed;
g) Pushback must not start until:
i) Communication has been established between ground crew and the flight
deck;
ii) Ground crew have completed an inspection of the aircraft, checking all doors and
latches are secure, there are no leaks, loose wires etc and any damage reported
immediately to the engineer and airline representative;
iii) The head set operator is on the ramp and ready to walk alongside the
aircraft;
iv) Wing walkers, if required, are in place;
v) Aircraft anti-collision lights are on;
vi) The aircraft commander has indicated that clearance to pushback has been
received from ATC;
vii) Any aircraft approaching the stand along the taxiway/apron taxiway has passed
well clear of the vicinity of the planned pushback, unless ATC instructions to each
applicable aircraft indicate otherwise.
viii) All vehicles and equipment have been withdrawn to the equipment areas;
ix) Pushback clearance and any special instruction therefore must be heard and/or
confirmed by the tug driver and head-set operator;
x) Carry out pushback/self-manoeuvring procedures;
xi) Signal pilot all equipment clear, headset un-plugged and by-pass pin removed.

12 Post-Aircraft Stand Departure
12.1 Shown below is what the Co-ordinator should check at this stage:
a) That a walking inspection is undertaken to check that the stand is clear of obstruction
and FOD;
b) That all equipment has been shut down and correctly parked or stored and the
equipment areas are free of FOD;
c) That any safety management shortfalls or near misses (e.g. fuel spills, trips, slips) are
reported through applicable reporting systems to the aerodrome operator or
appropriate control authorities.

Chapter 5 Airside Vehicle Standards
1 Introduction
1.1 Every vehicle operating in airside areas should have an individual Airside Vehicle Permit (AVP)
to meet GCAA security requirements. These should be conspicuously displayed in the vehicle
and be visible to a person standing on the ground at all times when the vehicle is operating
airside. The requirement for an aerodrome to have an Airside Driving Permit (ADP) scheme
is contained in CAR Part IX.
1.2 The aerodrome operator should establish and promulgate local minimum standards for
vehicles operating in airside areas. These standards should ensure that each vehicle is fit for
its intended purpose and that its condition is such that it will not endanger vehicle users,
other vehicles, pedestrians, aircraft or property. Airside vehicle permits should not be issued
to any vehicle which cannot meet the specified standards.
1.3 Before a permit is issued a vehicle should be inspected by a competent person appointed by
the applicant. Periodic inspections should be conducted thereafter to ensure that it continues
to meet the minimum standards. An inspection should also be conducted if information or
reports indicate that a particular vehicle may not be meeting the specified standards.
1.4 All vehicles should normally be required to meet the requirements appropriate for the grant
of a UAE Department for Transport Test Certificate.
1.5 The AVP displayed on a vehicle must include a clear identification and details of any
limitations imposed. Additionally, vehicles should be readily identifiable by their specific
equipment number, livery or by the prominent display of the vehicle operator’s name.
1.6 The aerodrome operator must ensure operators are aware of requirements for the maximum
height, width and length of vehicles for airside operations or for operation within specific
areas. Height is particularly significant where airside bridges exist, and should be displayed in
the driver’s cab. It may be necessary for the aerodrome operator to specify minimum
manoeuvrability standards. It is important that companies’ operating vehicles airside ensure
that their drivers are fully aware of any limitations imposed by the manoeuvrability or size of
particular vehicles.
1.7 Because of the potential for serious damage to aircraft and their engine caused by foreign
objects it is essential that all practical steps are taken to minimise the risk of such damage
from vehicle operations. The aerodrome operator must ensure that all vehicle operators are
aware of the need for strict control of the security of loads, as well as vehicle equipment and
FOD on and in the vehicle. This is particularly important in respect of items such as chocks,
fuel tank caps and hub caps, the loss of which is not particularly significant during normal
road operations; the standards set by the aerodrome operator may include a requirement
that such items are secured in such a way as to ensure that they cannot become
unintentionally detached from the vehicle.
1.8 Vehicles holding AVPs should normally be equipped with flashing yellow obstruction lights
which meet the specification published CAR Part IX.
NOTE: Additional lighting requirements apply to vehicle trailers.
2 Vehicle Operating Rules
2.1 The following paragraphs set out definitions and operating rules, which have proved to be
satisfactory over many years of operation at aerodromes in Europe. Whilst local operating
conditions determine the exact procedures at individual aerodromes, it is recommended that
the basis of this guidance material be considered for incorporating into an airport local
instruction for UAE airside rules at all aerodromes.
2.2 The following colours should be used to distinguish between ground surface markings used
by aircraft and those applicable to the movement and control of vehicles and equipment:
YELLOW: Markings for the guidance of aircraft;
WHITE: Markings for the guidance of vehicles and equipment, and where applicable,
pedestrians (for pedestrian crossings for example).
2.3 The boundary between the apron and the manoeuvring area (vehicle limit line) should be
indicated by a continuous double white line, to indicate DO NOT CROSS. Entry into and
movement between these areas should be strictly controlled. Apart from pushback vehicles
and crews, no vehicle (other than RFFS, other allocated vehicles and with freeranging
privileges) should normally enter the manoeuvring area other than at designated vehicle
crossing points unless the vehicle driver is in radio contact with air traffic control and has
been cleared to enter the manoeuvring area.
2.4 No markings or signage of any sort should be permitted in the airside area without the
express permission and approval of the aerodrome operator.
3 Traffic Rules
3.1 General

a) The aerodrome operator should determine speed limits applicable to the airside area.
Different limits may be applied to sections of roadway subject to local conditions. This
information should be published and signs displayed as appropriate;
b) On the airside road system vehicles should always keep to the right when passing an
approaching vehicle, particularly to avoid confusion where there are no road markings.
On apron areas different rules may be promulgated;
c) No vehicle should be left unattended anywhere on the airside area with its engine
running. This is to prevent risks such as overheating and consequent fire in the vicinity of
aircraft, and uncontrolled or unauthorised vehicle movement;
d) Vehicles should remain in the airside area only long enough to conduct their legitimate
business;
e) To ensure that no object is dropped on the apron or manoeuvring area, all doors and
shutters on vehicles must be closed while the vehicle is moving. All loads and equipment,
and all parts of the vehicle must be properly secured and checked for potential FOD
Hazards before a vehicle enters the apron or manoeuvring area. Objects dropped can
cause serious hazards to aircraft and personnel;
f) Obstruction lights meeting the UAE requirements must be displayed at all times by
vehicles operating on the manoeuvring area. Unless there are specific instructions to the
contrary, dipped headlights should always be used in conditions of darkness and reduced
visibility;
g) All parking restrictions must be strictly observed;
h) Vehicle drivers should follow designated routes, giving way, where appropriate, to routes
provided for pedestrians and aircraft;
i) Vehicles must not be driven across aircraft stands, unless they are directly involved in the
operation of the aircraft using or about to use the stand;
j) Vehicles must give way to aircraft at all times;
k) When aircraft engines are running, vehicle drivers must ensure that they stay well clear
of areas behind the aircraft where slipstream and jet efflux may cause damage or danger
to the vehicle or its occupants. The minimum safe distance should be determined (usually
by the aerodrome operator) and promulgated to all vehicle drivers;
l) Vehicles should not be driven in reverse on the manoeuvring area or apron unless directly
engaged in aircraft manoeuvring or servicing, or during parking positioning. When
reverse movement is essential, guidance should be provided to the driver by a person
outside the vehicle (banksman) or other means. The fitting of reversing alarms and CCTV
cameras should be considered as part of risk management of reversing operations;
m) Vehicles must remain at least one metre away from any part of an aircraft unless they
are engaged in a task that specifically requires them to operate closer to the aircraft.
4 Control of Vehicles
4.1 Control of vehicles on the manoeuvring area is normally the responsibility of Air Traffic Control. On
apron areas, control of taxying aircraft and aircraft under tow is the responsibility of Air Traffic
Control but the control of vehicles is subject to rules and instructions issued by the aerodrome
operator.
4. 2 Irrespective of any clearance or instruction issued by Air Traffic Control, drivers of vehicles and of
vehicles towing aircraft are responsible for ensuring that their vehicle (and any part under tow) does
not collide with any other vehicle, aircraft, people, building or obstruction.
4.3 In all cases, signs displayed at airside area entry points, and at crossing points within the area,
must give adequate information to drivers about the procedure to be followed for movement
into and within the airside area. Signs should describe any relevant control methods, such as
traffic lights or signal lamps. Uncontrolled crossings should be clearly marked as such, and the
conditions of use displayed. Particular attention should be given to the need for the clear
statement of prohibition of entry to airside areas by unauthorised pedestrians.
4.4 Aerodrome operators may wish to issue specific instructions about the classes of vehicle
permitted to access the movement area (including active runways), subject to the issue of a
clearance by Air Traffic Control. The conditions for entering or crossing active runways should
be clearly set out in a document published by the aerodrome operator and signed by the
relevant vehicle operators and drivers.
5 Operations at Night and in Poor Visibility
5.1 The aerodrome operator should promulgate instructions dealing with vehicle operation at
night and in conditions of poor visibility.

5.2 Instructions for operations at night should include descriptions of the airport lighting,
including that which is displayed in areas that are not normally used by vehicles, and the
lighting required on vehicles.
5.3 Where practicable trailers operating at night should display red rear lights, or be fitted with
conspicuous retro-reflective markings.
5.4 Certain navigational aids for the operation of aircraft in conditions of reduced visibility are
provided in accordance with the requirements of the UAE AIP and CAR Part IX. Airport
authorities must ensure that all drivers are aware of the meaning of aids such as runway
guard lights where these are provided, and of the significance of ILS protection areas. Access
to the manoeuvring area in conditions of reduced visibility should be limited to experienced
and suitably trained drivers, and permitted only in exceptional circumstances.
5.5 Low Visibility Procedures implemented by the Air Traffic Control and the aerodrome operator
should include the following procedures for vehicle control:
a) Confirmation that all entry points into the movement area are either brought under
positive control or closed off;
b) Confirmation that all runway guard lights or holding point board lights, that are required
under operational procedures, are fully operational;
c) Warnings given and confirmations are received to ensure that all parties operating
vehicles have been removed from the movement areas, with the exception of safety
critical operational vehicles;
d) Assure that all apron and taxiway crossings are under positive control by ATC.
5.6 It is important that communication of the introduction and cancellation of Low Visibility
Procedures is fast and effective, but must include procedures to ensure that physical barriers
have been placed and/or removed and that this has been communicated to ATC and airside
operations prior to releasing those areas back for aircraft or vehicular traffic use.
NOTE: Full details of the general requirements for Low Visibility Procedures are included in CAR Part IX
and AMC-44 – Low Visibility Procedures (LVP). Site-specific Low Visibility Procedures should be included
in the relevant aerodrome manual and should be reflected in the procedures of all companies that are
permitted to operate vehicles in airside areas.
6 Radio-Telephony (R/T) Equipment and Mobile Telephones
6.1 When operating on certain parts of the airport it will be necessary to use radiotelephony or
mobile telephone communications equipment. This may introduce additional risks whilst
driving and vehicle operators must ensure that the use of such equipment does not distract
the driver from the primary task of driving the vehicle.

6.2 Drivers of vehicles requiring to cross or enter active runways and taxiways (except at
designated uncontrolled taxiway crossing points) must normally be in two-way
communication with Air Traffic Control and must comply with any clearance issued to them.
6.3 With regard to other vehicles, the aerodrome operator should decide the basis on which R/T
equipment is provided and used. In some cases a listening watch may be required of vehicles
on certain parts of the movement area. In other cases vehicles may be required only to carry
R/T equipment to satisfy the need of the company operator. The procedures for use of R/T
equipment must be clearly promulgated by the aerodrome operator.
6.4 It is recommended that users of R/T equipment who communicate with Air Traffic Control or
transmit on any frequency used by aircraft must comply with the requirements provided in
AMC-69 (UAE Radiotelephony Standards).
6.5 The aerodrome operator should establish a system of allocating R/T call signs to be used by
vehicles so that the potential for confusion between vehicles and, where relevant, between
vehicles and aircraft, is minimised. This is particularly important at aerodromes where the
R/T frequency used by vehicles is the same as that used by aircraft or where the R/T
frequency used by vehicles is re-broadcast on the R/T frequency used by aircraft.
6.6 In the interests of safety it is essential that Air Traffic Control is made aware of all radio
facilities being used at the airport, whether or not these facilities are used for communication
with Air Traffic Control.
7 Vehicle Accident Reporting Procedures
7.1 Every aerodrome operator should publish rules for the reporting of accidents involving
vehicles operating on the airside.
7.2 Under the provisions of the UAE General Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents)
Regulations, aircraft operators have responsibilities for the reporting of certain accidents
involving damage to aircraft.
7.3 Under the provisions of the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority’s ROSI Scheme, aerodrome
operators and managers, and certain other classes of persons including ground handlers, are
required to report occurrences and defects which could endanger aircraft or their occupants.
7.4 There is, therefore, a requirement under legislation for the reporting of accidents and
incidents where vehicles damage or otherwise cause danger to aircraft, but as legal
requirements do not cover all vehicle events it is essential that aerodrome operators provide
their own scheme for the reporting of airside vehicle accidents not included in the scope of
AAI or ROSI accidents/incidents (typically this process may be established as part of an
aerodromes safety management system) The scheme should cover the reporting of accidents
between vehicles, vehicles and aircraft, vehicles and equipment or buildings, and vehicles
and pedestrians. Records of occurrences should be kept for at least three years. They should
be reviewed regularly to establish whether any steps could be taken to eliminate the causes
of accidents in the airside area. Chapter 7 of this document discusses reporting in further
detail).
7.5 If a person has been injured, there may be legislative requirements for the injury to be
reported to the relevant health and safety enforcing operator. At most airports this could be
the local police or the office of the Health and Safety department, although at some airports,
it may be the Environmental Health Office of the local Operator or Municipality.
8 Monitoring of Standards
8.1 The aerodrome operator should establish procedures for the monitoring and assessment of
airside vehicle operating standards.
8.2 All vehicle/equipment operators and their maintenance providers should have facilities
commensurate with the type and size of vehicle and equipment it operates and maintains
and should be able to demonstrate compliance with the appropriate airport operator and
Department of Transport (DOT) standards, where applicable.
8.3 Inspections - Vehicle operators should ensure that persons carrying out safety inspections
are appropriately trained and technically competent on the complexity and type of vehicle
being inspected. Therefore evidence of individual competencies should be made available, if
requested by the airport operator or other agency during audit.
8.4 Records - Individual vehicles and equipment should have their own records containing all
maintenance records where relevant.
8.5 Daily Inspections - It is important that all vehicle owners and operators ensure their drivers
and other personnel are aware of the airport operator’s requirements for vehicle
maintenance and standards.
8.6 Routine daily inspections of vehicles and equipment should be the responsibility of vehicle
owners and operators. It is therefore the responsibility of vehicle operators to ensure checks
are carried out and any defects recorded and corrected. Walk round checks should include
the whole vehicle including any combination of trailers or dollies. It is also important that a
‘nil’, or ‘no faults/defects found’ entry is included in the recording system.

8.7 Vehicle defects should be recorded and reported to a competent person who has the
authority to ensure that appropriate action is taken to rectify any defects found. As
determined by local policies, vehicles or equipment found to be unserviceable may be
required to be removed from the airside environment by the operator until maintenance
work has been completed to the required vehicle and equipment standards for operating
airside.
8.8 Vehicles and equipment deemed to be in a dangerous condition by having a safety defect
may be issued with a ‘Prohibition Notice’ and the local airside vehicle permit withdrawn, in
accordance with local airport operator instructions and policies.
8.9 Conventional road vehicles that have been modified for airport use should still comply with
the standards contained in the UAE Department for Transport Construction and Use
Regulations, irrespective of whether the vehicle is being used on public roads or not.
Operators of non-conventional vehicles should ensure that the appropriate and relevant
paperwork is held, covering change of use notifications and the relevant insurance and
modification certification.
8.10 The aerodrome operator should establish procedures for the monitoring and assessment of
airside vehicle operating standards. These procedures should include a review of the
increase/decrease in the number of valid ADPs and the reasons for the change. An
assessment of the impact on overall airside safety should be conducted if the number of
vehicles operating in airside areas changes significantly.
9 Performance Management
9.1 The aerodrome operator should publish any penalties it has established for noncompliance
with the rules and instructions for the use of vehicles on the airside. These may include
temporary or permanent exclusion from the airside area of individuals, particular vehicles, or
group of vehicle controlled by a specified vehicle operator.

Chapter 6 Training for Safety
1 Objective
1.1 Working in the airside environment is inherently hazardous therefore all organisations have
a duty to ensure that their employees are competent to work safely within their operating
environment and all undertake a safety induction to raise the awareness of the hazards
associated with working airside. To ensure this competence each organisation will be required
to provide adequate training to each employee that is proportionate and commensurate with
their role and responsibilities and to ensure they understand that
Safety is all airside users’ responsibility.
This means:
• Identifying safety skills and training required for each role (typically identified by way of
a task and role analysis);
• Developing and co-ordinating training programmes in co-operation with employees,

airport certificate holders and business partners;
• Delivering appropriate training in a timely fashion;
• Regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the programme and providing adequate

reinforcement training as necessary;
• Ensuring the training takes account of the capabilities of the individuals being trained;
• Maintaining adequate records of the training undertaken;
• Making all apron users aware of the non-punitive safety culture;
• Ensuring all staff understand the reporting safety related hazard and incidents (overview
of the corporate safety reporting system and the GCAA ROSI Scheme)
2 Introduction Objective
2.1 All employers have a responsibility to provide information, instruction training and
supervision to their employees. Having a competent and safe workforce makes good business
sense as incidents and injuries damage lives and are a needless expense for an organisation.

2.2 Organisations need to set clear training policies and objectives that are supported and driven
at Board level and by senior management. It is critical that these policies include the
monitoring of the effectiveness of any training.
2.3 In developing training for working in the airside environment organisations should consider:
i) Whether staff undertaking different roles airside require different training, and whether
it is adequately provided;
ii) What specialist training is required and by whom;
iii) Whether there are sufficient resources (financial, human and equipment) available to
provide training;
iv) Whether there is a structure in place to deliver the relevant safety training;
v) Whether the organisation has the knowledge, competence and skills to design and deliver
the training;
vi) Assess whether the balance of theoretical and practical training is adequate;
vii) Determine what level of supervision is required and who will provide it;
viii) Determine what oversight monitoring is in place that will ensure that key airside safety and
performance objectives continue to be met and to ensure that there is good cooperation and
co-ordination to meet the objectives.
2.4 The aerodrome operator should lead in determining the compatibility of airside training
between all airside service providers in order to foster standardisation and to ensure safety
training delivers a safe working environment.
3 Evaluate/Measure Effectiveness
3.1 Safety training should be reviewed at least annually to ensure that training needs are being
met and that the training is effective in bringing about desired changes in behaviour and
safety awareness. Systems to measure these changes should be in place and methods of
measuring achievement need to have been set at the training objectives stage within this
module. A system of feedback from employees will enable employers to assess whether the
courses are meeting their objectives and changes identified by training evaluation or audit
should be fed back into the course design administration.
4 Categories and Timing of Training
4.1 Health and safety training needs to be tailored to the individual and the role, and needs to
take account of the whole term of employment.
• Induction Training - On employment with the organisation, as part of the induction
process;
• Specialist Training - When there are specialist requirements, new systems or tasks are
introduced to the person's role;
• Refresher Training - At periods throughout employment to reinforce the health and
safety message;
• As required to maintain competence;
• When a person changes job.
4.2 Induction Training
4.2.1 Safety induction training should be carried out for every person who is new to an organisation or
department (this includes contractors). The induction training should be carried out by a
suitably qualified and competent ‘trainer’. It should not be assumed that because an
individual has worked in airside areas in the past that they will already be familiar with these
topics. The following list of training areas should to be considered (this list is not exhaustive):
• The company health and safety policy;
• Safety responsibilities;
• Local emergency procedures;
• Incident reporting;
• Main hazards and risks of the job;
• Welfare arrangements;
• Key safety procedures;
• Rules and the names of key safety personnel and safety representatives within the
organisation;
• Airside safety and familiarisation training;
• Provision and use of personal protective equipment;
• Emergency procedures (low visibility/inclement weather);
• Flight safety/ Occurrence Reporting procedures;
• Environmental related considerations.
4.3 Specialist Training - Specific training should be provided where specialist skills are required
to work safely, with requirements identified as part of a task-focused training needs analysis,
for example: pushback and headset operations.
4.4 Refresher Training - Refresher training should be provided where necessary to ensure safety
competencies are maintained. The frequency will vary according but not to exceed 24 mths
to the degree of risk, the use of the skills and the rate at which skills can be forgotten and
when any significant changes to procedures are made. Refresher training should be
programmed and recorded when completed.
5 Conclusion - By following the general guidance and advice contained within this chapter, airside
operators at all size and complexity of aerodromes should be able to develop a systematic
approach to assessing training, delivering training needs and evaluating its effectiveness.
Chapter 7 Safety Performance Management and Measurement
1 Introduction
1.1 The term ‘Safety Performance Management’ is used here to reflect a structured process of
management and involves policy and target setting, activity monitoring, measuring and
reviewing performance against targets, supervising, rewarding and disciplining.
1.2 This Chapter provides guidance on safety performance management, within the aerodrome
safety management system. It includes the following topics:
a) The fostering and maintenance of safety discipline;

b) Just Culture;
c) Active performance monitoring and management;
d) Investigation of accidents and incidents;
e) Enforcement of regulations;
f) Implementation of remedial action.
1.3 Any system to manage safety and to measure and monitor safety performance will have a
number of common elements. There are many texts which describe both theoretical aspects
and practical application of safety performance management and this document seeks to
illustrate some of these principles. It must be remembered, however, that only the
aerodrome operator and managers of airside operators can determine the most appropriate
systems for their organisations and environment.
2 The Fostering and Maintenance of Safety Discipline
2.1 One of the prime contributory factors in the establishment and maintenance of effective
safety discipline is an open and honest occurrence reporting system. Such a system creates
an environment of trust at all levels and facilitates learning from common experiences and
contributes to the prevention of accidents. A sound reporting system should make due
allowance for the honest genuine mistakes. However, there is no place in the air transport
industry for ill-discipline or lack of professionalism.
2.2 Industry sources considered that one of the major issues on the ramp is the threat to safety
posed by aircraft damage that is not reported, but is subsequently ‘found’. It is therefore
important that stakeholders provide education and awareness training so that all personnel
understand the safety significance of reporting all incidents. It follows that the most
important task is to establish a non-threatening or a ‘just’ culture for the genuine mistake
which is honestly reported. It is in the general interests of the industry to reduce damage (and
thus costs) to aircraft and equipment and it is everyone’s duty of care and responsibility to do
their utmost to prevent injury to personnel. However, of paramount importance is the need
to avoid aircraft departing with unreported and unknown damage. Such incidents can
potentially lead to catastrophic accidents. Experience has shown that the major disincentive
to reporting accidental ground damage is the fear of dismissal or other punishment.
2.3 Not only is unreported damage potentially lethal but it also precludes timely investigation and
subsequent remedial action aimed at preventing a recurrence; a significant disadvantage
when statistics show that accidents have often been presaged by earlier similar incidents.
Everyone must be made aware that in any incident in which an aircraft is damaged, the most
serious offence is failure to report. It follows that keeping quiet about an accident or incident
would be considered as a ‘wilful violation’ under a Just Culture policy and any subsequent
disciplinary action would reflect the seriousness of the failure to report.
2.4 To foster the comprehensive reporting of accidents and incidents, aerodrome operators
should encourage the adoption of effective safety reporting systems. These systems should
be brought to the attention of every employee and adopted by all the other organisations
that have an airside role. The safety reporting system should be headed by a formal
statement, and signed by the company Accountable Manager. What should flow from this
policy statement is an instruction to all staff on the subject of the reporting of aircraft ground
damage. In addition, the GCAA introduced the Voluntary Occurrence Reporting System
(VORSY) further details are available on the GCAA website www.gcaa.ae
2.5 Safety awareness and an understanding of reporting procedures should be fostered by all
staff as part of normal working activity. Both are a function of line management and should
not be regarded by either management or employees as separate issues that are the sole
responsibility of specialist safety staff. The aerodrome operator should take particular care to
see that its own safety management arrangements and staff attitudes are exemplary and that
they are seen to be so by other organisations and persons working airside.

2.6 Although this Chapter sets out a number of recommended practices on enforcement of
regulations, fostering and maintenance of safety discipline should also operate on the reward
principle. Good standards and operating practices should be recognised when observed and
promoted to others. Safety management should not be confined to seeking out low
standards, bad operating practices and breaches of regulations, but the overall safety
performance system should include procedures for recognising, highlighting and possibly
rewarding good performance.
2.7 One cause of airside accidents is where personnel trained for low skill tasks are required to
carry out these tasks in a ‘high-tech’ environment. Managers and supervisors must ensure
that selection and training recognise the full operational safety requirement: that is, selection
and training satisfy the needs of the task and the environment within which the task is to be
undertaken.
3 Just Culture
3.1 The GCAA encourages a ‘Just Culture’ in the interests of the on-going development of flight
safety. This means the GCAA supports the development, within all areas of the aviation
community, of a culture in which:
a) Individuals are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are
commensurate with their experience and training but which result in a reportable event;
but
b) Where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.
3.2 Just Culture has evolved from a ‘No-Blame’ approach and recognizes that there are instances,
such as gross negligence, where even though an incident has been reported the
circumstances are such that the responsible individual should face disciplinary or punitive
action. Such action should, however, be the exception rather than the norm and a transparent
process to make such determinations is necessary. The point is that staff are encouraged to
report incidents without fear of unfair punitive action.
4 Active Performance Monitoring and Management
4.1 Airside safety performance and management should be pro-active, rather than reactive, at all
levels of the management structure. Monitoring should be part of the daily routine, not a set
piece procedure for use only following an incident or accident. Performance monitoring and
management should be an accepted part of the overall responsibilities of all management
and supervisory personnel. Although large organisations might have staff dedicated to full-
time safety performance monitoring, safety performance monitoring and management is a
line management responsibility - it should not be delegated.

4.2 Very few, if any, airside operations procedures or working practices occur in total isolation.
Many airside operations involve co-operation, both formal and informal between two or
more departments of an organisation and often between two or more separate organisations.
This is a complex matrix that requires cooperation, co-ordination and good understanding
and agreement. It is clearly advantageous, and in many cases necessary, for line managers to
work closely with their counterparts from other departments and third party organisations.
The benefits of co-ordination are obvious: increased rapport, a mutual exchange of safety-
related information and the same standards of safety discipline applied across the whole
aerodrome operation. The aerodrome operator should act as the focal point in coordinating
best practice for all organisations on the aerodrome; for example, by acting as the Chairman
of the Airside Safety Committee (see Chapter 2, Appendix 2A). Where appropriate and
practicable, managers and supervisors of airside operators should ensure that they maintain
a suitable level of visibility on airside working areas. Their role should include observation of,
and participation in, all aspects of airside work carried out by their staff and indeed the staff
of other organisations where it can be seen that airside safety could be improved.
4.3 Wherever practical, aerodrome operators should collate safety performance data from all
airside operators and co-ordinate an overall safety performance programme. Such a system
will identify those organisations that operate best practice and will enable lessons from
incidents to be shared by all airside operators. In order to do this it is essential that all
operators collect comparable data and the aerodrome operator should define the data to be
collected as part of a total system approach.
4.4 Accident investigation looking into causal factors suggest that as much as 50% of all serious
aircraft accidents have resulted from non-compliance with procedures at some point. Clearly
it is important that all safety-related activities are described by documented procedures. Such
procedures should include defined performance measures and monitoring systems where
appropriate.
4.5 Companies operating on the apron should establish measures to ensure and monitor that
safety performance procedures are implemented correctly and are achieving their intended
objective. The aerodrome operator should conduct a similar programme of audits to assess
the effectiveness of aerodrome-wide procedures. Any deficiencies that are identified in an
audit should be considered and appropriate remedial action or measures taken. The audit
should be followed up to ensure that these remedial actions and measures are effective. In
this way deficiencies in procedures that could lead to an unsafe situation should be remedied
before an incident or accident occurs.
A Local Proficiency Check (LPC) is a useful self-audit mechanism which also identifies
noncompliance of ground handlers and airport operators.
A set of local level safety KPI’s can provide greater insight into safety and risk management at
a local airport level and implement areas and measures for improvement.
5 Investigation of Accidents and Incidents
5.1 It should be the primary aim of any investigation following an accident or incident to establish
the facts of the matter in order to prevent a recurrence. Managers are reminded that beyond
the requirement for internal procedures, some occurrences and accidents fall within statutory
reporting requirements. This includes occurrences that take place on the apron. These
requirements are set out in the GCAA ROSI scheme. Accident or incident investigation will
usually be best conducted by a line manager or supervisor. Such persons will almost certainly
be most familiar with the type of operation or working practice during which the accident or
incident occurred. In some cases, it may be preferable for the investigation to be carried out
by a manager from a different department from that involved in the accident or incident. It is
important that managers do not assume that investigations into accidents and incidents
conducted under statutory provisions will necessarily meet the requirements of their own
internal investigation procedures.
5.2 ‘Accidents’ and ‘Incidents’ in the context of this Chapter should not be limited solely to
occurrences where physical damage or injury is sustained to equipment, structures or
persons. Occurrences exhibiting a possible risk of damage or injury will also merit formal
investigation, where managers consider there has been exposure to unacceptable but
avoidable risk. Managers should also be aware that where an accident occurs airside it might
be necessary to co-ordinate the airside safety investigation with parallel investigations by
others.
6 Enforcement of Regulations
6.1 It is essential that a ‘just-culture’ accident and incident reporting policy is not confused with
the necessity for sanctions that preserve airside safety against indiscipline. Establishing a ‘Just
Culture’ needs to have formal disciplinary procedures that, at their extreme, might have the
force of criminal law under airport bye-laws or legislative provisions. It is this area of safety
performance management that requires the greatest management expertise, clear thinking
and well-documented procedures. It is imperative that all staff are aware of the Just Culture
principles to give them the confidence to report incidents without fear of punitive action,
while acknowledging that there is no place for gross negligence, wilful violations or
destructive acts. Fundamentally, Just Culture should be understood as being fair.
6.2 Accidents and incidents will come under the jurisdiction of the GCAA, the AAI, or Police and
these organisations should be involved during the course of any investigation as required.
6.3 Each organisation needs to establish processes to support their Just Culture, including what
is considered as gross negligence, wilful violation or a destructive act. Examples of situations
where punitive or disciplinary action may be appropriate are: a) Failure to report damage to
an aircraft;
b) Smoking airside;
c) Driving on the manoeuvring area without permission;
d) Failure to report a potentially hazardous incident;
e) Driving in front of, or behind, an aircraft with aircraft engines still running and/or
anti-collision warning lights on;
f) Parking in areas marked as ‘parking unsafe’ or ‘prohibited’;
g) Leaving vehicle unattended with engine running on movement area.
6.3.1 All employers at each aerodrome will need to consider their disciplinary structure in order to
ensure that it is appropriate and fair. Procedures should provide proper opportunities for
individuals to put their side of the case.
6.3.2 The aerodrome operator should publish details of any penalties it has established for non-
compliance with the rules and instructions whilst working airside including the use of vehicles.
These may include temporary or permanent exclusion from the airside area of individuals,
particular vehicles, or group of vehicles controlled by a specified vehicle operator.
6.3.3 In the interests of natural justice it will be important for any penalty system to include an
appeal procedure. However, this should not prejudice the immediate exclusion of a particular
individual or vehicle where, in the opinion of the aerodrome operator, this is necessary in the
interests of safety.
6.4 The aerodrome operator is responsible to the GCAA for ensuring that the aerodrome is safe
for use by aircraft. The continuance of the aerodrome operating certificate depends on the
aerodrome operators (or certificate holder’s) ability to secure the continued maintenance of
safety for aircraft. The aerodrome operator should make this responsibility for safe operation
quite clear to all third parties and seek compliance with appropriate safety management and
safety performance standards.
6.5 Whilst the aerodrome operator is responsible to the GCAA for the safe operation of the
aerodrome with respect to aircraft, all organisations and operators at an aerodrome are
collectively and individually responsible for safety in its widest sense. It should be noted that
nothing said here or within this document as a whole can absolve any person from his
responsibility and accountability under the law.
6.6 Clearly, disciplinary offences against safety regulations may be reported by anyone, but
should be directed in the first instance via the alleged offender’s supervisor or manager.
Subsequent action will depend on what arrangements are in force for disciplinary offences at
each particular aerodrome. However, it is the aerodrome operator who carries the
responsibility and he may require to know how disciplinary offences against aerodrome safety
regulations have been dealt with, in pursuit of his responsibilities. It is a matter for service
providers and aerodrome operators to reach agreement about how accidents and incidents
are to be reported, recorded and investigated. Participation in the Airside Safety Committee
(as described further in Appendix 2A of Chapter 2) is a good vehicle for this action.
6.7 In some circumstances the aerodrome operator may take action against a company or
organisation, as opposed to an individual.
7 Implementation of Remedial Action
7.1 The objective of any accident or incident investigation should be to identify the root causes
and produce findings which facilitate further action aimed at prevention of recurrences. Such
findings should focus on how procedures, practices, or regulations failed to prevent the
accident or incident. The report should list recommendations and nominate those responsible
for taking corrective action. The whole proceedings should be reviewed at senior
management level with the intention of establishing what subsequent
actions are required. The loop should then be closed by ensuring that all line managers and
safety specialists are aware of the changes so that they can monitor their effectiveness. It is
equally important to determine whether the changes identified require any changes to
training syllabuses and to action accordingly.
8 Conclusion
8.1 Whatever systems are implemented, airside safety performance management essentially
consists of two fundamental and key elements:
a) A ‘just’ culture, based on company policy to ensure that accidents affecting aircraft and
airside safety are reported, in order to protect the public and the workforce from
preventable injury;
b) A code of discipline to secure a safe airside working environment for everyone.
8.2 The outcome of effective safety performance management should be seen by everyone to
be:
a) Educational and developmental;

b) Encouraging and rewarding;
c) Active rather than reactive;
d) Constant rather than intermittent;
e) Continuing rather than currently fashionable;
f) Part of normal work rather than an isolated activity;

g) A means of reducing or containing costs rather than costing money itself;
h) Everybody’s concern rather than that of specialists, or worse, nobody’s concern; i)
Punitive only as a last resort.

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GUIDANCE MATERIAL

Airside Safety Management

Issue/Revision Date of issue/revision and date of applicability

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Issue initial Initial publication of the document

Issue 01 Update of references to new AMCs

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21st April 2021

4.1 Useful References and Further Reading

4.2 Legislation (as amended)

UAE Civil Aviation Law – Federal Act No 20

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4.3 Reference Documents

Aeronautical Information Publication (UAE AIP)

Abu Dhabi Department of Transport, Environment Health Safety Management System

ACOP Approved Code of Practice

CAR Civil Aviation Regulation

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1 Origin and History

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In many cases the responsibility for performing a particular function is delegated to a

4 The Status of this document - Airside Safety Management

5 Compliance with Statutory Requirements

6 The UAE Civil Aviation Law

7 CAR Part IX, Chapter 2 Certification of Aerodromes

In relation to aircraft safety, an aerodrome certificate is issued by the GCAA when in

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This document is subject to continuous review and amendment if so required. Questions,

Chapter 1 General Principles of the Management of Health and Safety Airside

b) Costs of replacing and compensating injured employees or others;

c) Contractual penalties or loss of revenue if flights are delayed or cancelled;

d) Damaged assets (including aircraft and equipment);

f) Loss of existing and future contracts.

1.4 The key elements in an SMS acceptable to the GCAA are:

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• Safety risk management;

• Planning and implementing;

• Auditing and reviewing performance.

• A way of identifying hazards, assessing risks and introducing control measures;

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2.1 ‘So far as is reasonably practicable’

3 Risk Assessment – as part of a Safety Case

1. Identify the hazards;

Note: ICAO Doc. 9859 contains a suggested Risk Assessment Process

• Avoiding the risk;

• Evaluating those risks which cannot be avoided;

• Combating risks at source;

• Adapting the work to the individual;

• Adapting to technical progress;

• Replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous;

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• Giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures;

• Giving appropriate instructions to staff.

3.8 In reality, a combination of such measures is likely to be required or be in place. Furthermore,

4 Health and Safety

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5.2 Key amongst these are:

• The responsibility of the aircraft operator (airline) to operate aircraft in a safe