Research Briefing

25 July 2024
Number 10002
Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and
By Library specialists
international response

Summary 2

1 Iran–Israeli actions of April 2024 4

1.1 Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria 4

1.2 Iranian missile and drone attack on Iran 6
1.3 UK and foreign participation in Israeli defence 7
1.4 Initial statements on retaliatory Israeli action 9
1.5 Explosion in Iran, 19 April 12
1.6 UK Parliament statements on Iran’s attack 13

2 Statements of G7, UN, Russia, and China 14

2.1 Statement of G7 leaders 14

2.2 UN and UN Security Council 14
2.3 Response of Russia and China 15

3 Current and potential sanctions on Iran 17

3.1 “Snapback” and nuclear agreement sanctions 17

3.2 United States 19
3.3 United Kingdom 21
3.4 UK debate on proscribing the IRGC 22
3.5 European Union 28

commonslibrary.parliament.uk
Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

Summary
On 13 April 2024, Iran launched more than 330 drones and missiles against
Israel in what it said was in retaliation for an attack on its consulate in Syria.
The Israeli Defence Forces say that 99% were intercepted and that minimal
damage was inflicted. One Israeli civilian was severely injured.

Since the 7 October 2023 assault on Israel by Hamas (officially designated a

terrorist organisation by the United States and the UK), Iran-supported armed
and terrorist groups have carried out attacks against Israel and US bases in
the Middle East. The 13 April action was Iran’s first direct attack on Israel
since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979.

The UK, alongside the United States, European partners and the G7 group
condemned the Iranian attack as escalatory and called for restraint. The UK,
US and France provided military support in intercepting Iran’s attack.

This briefing provides background to the attack, existing and new sanctions
against Iran, debates over proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
as a terrorist group in the UK, and information on the Israeli response.

Why did Iran launch the attack?

On 1 April 2024, Iran’s consulate in Damascus was attacked. Iran accused
Israel of conducting the strike, which Israel has neither confirmed nor denied.
The strike killed seven members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), a 200,000-strong armed force of the Iranian state which also works
overseas to support Iranian proxies and other allied groups and coordinate
military action.

Iran has a long-standing presence in Syria to support President Bashar al-

Assad during the Syrian civil war and to maintain a corridor to provide
Hezbollah in Lebanon with weapons to threaten and attack Israel. Israel has
conducted several attacks on Iranian targets in Syria in recent years. Attacks
escalated in late 2023 following the Hamas assault of 7 October and missile
and other fire from Hezbollah against northern Israel. Iran’s Government said
it would respond to the strike. This took the form of the Iranian missile and
drone attack on 13 April.

How has the UK responded?

The UK already has RAF and other military assets in the Middle East region as
part of Operation Shader (against Islamic State/Daesh) in Syria and Iraq.
Additional UK forces have been deployed since 7 October 2023 to deter

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

conflict in the region from escalating. The UK Government says some of these
additional RAF jets and refuelling aircraft intercepted several drones
targeting Israel during the attack on 13 April, alongside the United States and
Israel. Jordan also destroyed some projectiles over its airspace.

The government said it will implement the “strongest” sanctions against Iran,
including new trade sanctions against Iran to limit its drone production. The
UK Government has said it “does not support a retaliatory strike by Israel”
(except in self-defence). It called for de-escalation and has urged Israel to
focus on securing the release of hostages held by Hamas in Gaza.

In July 2024, Foreign Secretary David Lammy said on the actions of the IRGC
and UK response, he would “review the context of terrorist activity and state
threats”, including from Iran, over the “coming weeks and months”.

How are the US, G7 and UN responding?

President Biden says US support for Israel is “ironclad” and convened a G7
meeting to establish a “united diplomatic response” to Iran.

G7 leaders have issued statements condemning the Iranian attack,

committing to further sanctions and other measures against Iran, and calling
for countries to stop supplying Iran’s missile and drone programmes.
European Union leaders will implement further sanctions against Iranian
drones. The US is applying new sanctions and called for further UN action.

The UN Security Council met on 14 April. The UN Secretary General, António

Guterres, condemned the escalation by Iran and called for an immediate
cessation of hostilities. No statements or resolutions were debated.

Risks of further escalation

On 13 April, the Iranian Government said it now considered the issue
“concluded” but if Israel retaliates Iran’s next action will be “much stronger”.
Iran maintains a network of proxy and aligned groups in the Middle East:
Hezbollah in Lebanon continues to launch attacks against northern Israel and
the Houthis in Yemen are targeting shipping in the Red Sea. Militias have also
been attacking US military bases in Iraq and Syria since October 2023.

On 19 April, unnamed US officials said Israel launched a missile against Iran

in response to Iran’s action. No damage or casualties have been confirmed
and media reports say Iran has “downplayed the strike”. The Israeli
Government has also called for more sanctions against Iran.

The Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza continues. Talks on the release of hostages

taken by Hamas and for a ceasefire are ongoing.

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

1 Iran–Israeli actions of April 2024

Background on Middle East conflicts in 2023/24

Following the Hamas assault on Israel on 7 October 2023, Hezbollah in
Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen and the Red
Sea have been attacking Israel, US military bases in the Middle East, and
civilian shipping. These groups have received support from Iran. The following
Commons Library research briefings provide more information on the topics:
• Israel-Hamas conflict 2023/24: UK actions and response
• Israel-Hamas conflict 2023/24: US, UN, EU and regional response
• Houthi attacks in the Red Sea 2024: UK and international response
• Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

1.1 Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria

Iran’s long-standing presence in Syria

Syria is a long-standing ally of the Iranian government, and Iranian advisors
have been active in providing military and other support to the Government of
Bashar al-Assad during the country’s civil war. 1

In addition to supporting President Assad, Iran uses its presence in Syria to

facilitate the flow of arms through Syria to support armed groups such as
Hezbollah in Lebanon (a proscribed terrorist organisation in the UK), which
has been conducting attacks against northern Israel since 7 October 2023. 2

Reflecting the military threat posed to Israel, the Israeli Defence Forces have
long carried out airstrikes against Hezbollah and the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) based in Syria as acts of deterrence. 3
Analysts judge that Israeli strikes against Hezbollah and the IRGC in Syria

1
See Commons Library research briefing, Syria’s civil war in 2023, section 2.3.
2
Where Syria fits into Iran’s Middle East strategy, Radio Free Liberty Europe, 24 February 2024;
Brookings Institute, Will Israel and Iran go to war in Syria?, 5 October 2018; Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), The escalating conflict with Hezbollah in Syria, 20 June 2018
3
Arab Center Washington DC, Israel-Iran shadow war in Syria intensifies, 23 March 2022

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

increased during the Israel-Hamas conflict of 2023/24, in response to

Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel in support of Hamas.4

Strike on Iranian consulate

On 1 April 2024, seven senior officers and advisers of the IRGC were killed in a
strike on the Iranian consulate (diplomatic building) in Syria. 5 These included
a senior figure in the IRGC’s Qud’s Force, which operates outside Iran and
coordinates support for armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The IRGC is an Iranian state military and intelligence service, founded after
the Iranian revolution of 1979 as a balance to Iran’s regular armed forces. The
UK currently sanctions the IRGC in its entirety. There is ongoing debate in the
UK on whether to proscribe it as a terrorist group: see below, section 3.3.

Iran said it would respond to the consulate strike

Iran accused Israel of carrying out the attack on the consulate. Israel has
neither confirmed nor denied involvement. 6

The Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, said the attack “would not go
unanswered”. The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammed Bagher
Ghalibaf, said Iran would carry out a “severe punishment” against Israel. 7

The UN Security Council did not issue a collective

statement on the strike
The UN Security Council discussed the consulate strike on 2 April. Russia,
which alongside Iran provides military support to the Assad government in
Syria, condemned the consulate attack and said it was one of a series of
“incessant missile and bomb attacks” by Israel in Syria.8

Representatives of France, the UK and United States said that consulates

should be protected. They also said Iran must also end its “destabilising”
support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Syria
and Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Syria and Iraq.

4
Chatham House, The strike on Iran’s consulate in Syria could be the spark that ignites the Middle
East, 12 April 2024; Iran’s guard pull officers from Syria after Israeli strikes, Reuters, 1 February
2024; Five IRGC officers […] killed in Damascus strike blamed on Israel, 20 January 2024
5
Iran accuses Israel of killing generals in Syria strike, BBC News, 1 April 2024
6
As above
7
Israel’s heinous crime will not go answered: Raisi, Times of Tehran, 2 April 2024
8
This section from UN, Briefing security council on reported Israeli attacks against Iran’s diplomatic
premises in Syria […], 2 April 2024 and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO),
The UK is deeply concerned about the potential for escalation in the Middle East, 2 April 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

The UN Security Council did not issue a collective press statement

condemning the strike on the consulate, as requested by Russia, due to the
lack of consensus among members of the council. 9

Speaking separately to the UN meeting, the United States Administration said

its longstanding policy is that “Israel has freedom of action to protect itself
and defend itself in Syria and elsewhere”.10

The “shadow war” between Israel and Iran

Iran and Israel have fought what has been described as a “shadow war” or
“war between the wars” for decades through attacks on land, sea, air, and
cyberspace. Analysts warn recent actions have brought this into the open. 11
This “shadow war” has included Israeli attacks on Iran-linked sites in Syria,
cyberattacks against Iran’s nuclear programme, and targeting of IRGC and
other leaders. Iran, through its allies and proxies groups, has presence and
influence in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, from which these armed
and terrorist groups have long conducted attacks on Israel and US forces with
one aim being to compel the US to leave the region. Iran has also conducted
attacks on foreign shipping, threatening freedom of navigation. 12

1.2 Iranian missile and drone attack on Iran

On 13 April 2024, the IRGC launched around 330 missiles and drones against
Israel from Iran, flying over Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. These included around
120 ballistic missiles, 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles. 13

Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is supported by Iran, also said it launched a

series of strikes against Israeli positions in the occupied Golan Heights, 14
while the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq also launched attacks. 15
Hezbollah retains a large arsenal of missiles and rockets capable of targeting
Israel, estimated to number over 100,000. 16

9
UN Security Council fails to condemn strike on Iran in Syria, Reuters, 3 April 2024
10
White House, Background press call by senior administration officials […], 14 April 2024
11
Israel is ratcheting up its shadow war with Iran, The Economist, 4 April 2024; Iran and Israel have a
long history of clandestine attacks, New York Times, 2 April 2024
12
US Institute for Peace, Israel: The Iran threat and options, 11 September 2023 and Timeline: Israeli
attacks on Iran, 30 January 2023
13
Israel says Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles […], AP, 14 April 2024
14
Hezbollah strikes Israeli military bases with dozens of rockets, Al Mayadeen, 14 April 2024
15
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Large scale Iranian attack against Israel, 14 April 2024
16
Lebanon’s Hezbollah: What weapons does it have?, Reuters, 15 April 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

Iran has also been accumulating a substantive stockpile of missiles, rockets,

and drones for several decades, many of which can target Israel. 17 The UK,
among other European states and the United States, sanctions Iran’s missile,
nuclear and other weapons programmes (see below, section 3).

Aside from a 2018 missile attack launched against the Israeli-occupied Golan
Heights (recognised by the UK Government as Syrian territory) by Iranian
forces based in Syria, Iran had not used its own missiles directly to attack
Israel before. 18 The 13 April action is the first time Iran has launched missiles
directly at Israel from Iran and not through proxies or allies.

The Israeli Defence Forces say 99% of the missiles, drones and rockets were
intercepted with only a “few” ballistic missiles entering Israel. Damage was
limited, with an air force base in southern Israel sustaining minor damage.
One civilian, a child, was seriously injured (others sustained minor injuries).19

The attack is the first time since 1991 that Israel has directly come under
attack from another state (as opposed to an armed group). In 1991, Iraq
under Saddam Hussein launched missiles against Israel during the First Gulf
War (US-led coalition forces were already engaged militarily against Iraq). 20

Iranian seizure of civilian ship, 12 April 2024

On 12 April, Iran’s IRGC also seized a commercial ship with links to Israel, MSC
Aries, in the Strait of Hormuz. 21 Iran has a history of targeting shipping in the
region and had seized a ship, St Nikolas, in January 2024. It has also been
providing support for the Houthis to target shipping in the Red Sea. 22

1.3 UK and foreign participation in Israeli defence

The Israeli military intercepted most of the attacks before they reached Israeli
airspace through its “Iron dome” and other anti-missile systems used to track
and intercept in-bound rockets. Israel was also supported by other states:

• The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) says that RAF fighter jets were
deployed over Iraq and Syria to shoot done Iranian drones. 23 The UK also
provided intelligence and surveillance support. 24

17
CSIS, The Iranian missile threat, 30 May 2019; US Institute for Peace, Iran’s missiles: Timeline of
attacks, 12 April 2024
18
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Iran’s miscalculated escalation in the Golan, 10 May 2018
19
Young girl seriously injured in Iran attack, Times of Israel, 14 April 2024
20
Iraqi missiles strike Israel, The Guardian, 18 January 1991
21
Iranian troops descend from helicopter to seize Israel-linked ship, 13 April 2024
22
Commons Library research briefing, UK and international response to Houthis, section 2
23
RAF shot down ‘a number of drones’ in Iran’s attack on Israel, Sky News, 14 April 2024
24
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c23

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

– The MoD also said that it had deployed additional RAF jets and air
refuelling tankers to the region before 13 April to support the existing
Operation Shader (the UK’s counter-Daesh/Islamic State
operation). 25

– Speaking on the Today programme on 15 April, the Foreign Secretary

Lord Cameron said that the UK’s role should not be overstated and
that the UK had provided aircraft “when the Americans asked us to
backfill for them” on Operation Shader. Those aircraft had also been
given approval to shoot down any drones or missiles coming into
their area of operation over Iraq and Syria. 26

• The US Department of Defence says it intercepted “dozens” of missiles

and drones launched against Israel. 27

• French aircraft also participated in patrol operations, according to the

Israeli Defence Forces. 28

• Jordan’s forces intercepted some projectiles over their airspace. 29

• Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly provided intelligence.30

US, UK and European military assets in the region

Since the Hamas assault on Israel on 7 October, the UK has been among the
countries to deploy additional military assets, including personnel, Royal
Navy ships and aircraft, to the Middle East as deterrence against escalation
by Iran and its aligned armed groups and proxies. Additional military forces
were also deployed in the week running up to Iran’s attack on 13 April 2024.
Sections 3.2 and 5.2 of the Commons Library research briefing, Israel-Hamas
conflict 2023/24 and sections 3.2 and 4.1 of the UK and international response
to Houthis in the Red Sea 2024, provide more information on what military
assets have been deployed to the region by the UK and its partners.

25
Ministry of Defence, UK military activity in the Middle East, 13 April 2024
26
BBC Sounds, Radio 4 Today Programme 14 April 2024, from 2:12:00
27
US Department of Defence, Statement by Secretary of Defence, 13 April 2024
28
IDF: France helped in defence of Israel […], Times of Israel, 14 April 2024
29
Jordan “dealt with projectiles” to protect own safety […], BBC Monitoring, 14 April 2024. Jordan
signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.
30
How the US forged a fragile eastern alliance to repel Iran […], Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

1.4 Initial statements on retaliatory Israeli action

Israeli statements on potential responses

The Israeli war cabinet met to consider a range of responses to Iran’s missile
attack, but no public decisions were issued. An attack on Iran on 19 April has
been widely linked to Israel (see below, section 1.5). 31 A military response was
expected: following the Iranian attack, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said
that “if Iran attacks Israel, Israel will attack Iran”. 32

The Israeli Foreign Ministry has also urged countries to impose additional
sanctions to ensure “Iran […] pays a price for its aggression”. These include:

• Recognizing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation (neither the UK nor

European Union proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist group, while the US did
so in 2019, but all three apply sanctions). 33

• Applying new sanctions against Iran’s missile programme.

• Applying the “snapback” provisions of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran
(see below, section 3.1), which would include an UN embargo on
conventional arms transfers from Iran (this embargo expired in 2020). 34

The Israeli Foreign Ministry also emphasised that the attack demonstrated
why Iran “must never obtain nuclear weapons” (Iran has consistently denied
that its nuclear programme is for military purposes). While talks on restoring
the nuclear agreement with Iran have stalled since 2022, the UK, US, EU, and
other states agree that Iran should never have nuclear weapons. 35

The US will not participate in any attack on Iran

As summarised by US Administration officials, President Biden told Prime
Minister Netanyahu that the United States has an “ironclad commitment” to
Israel and that the country “came out far ahead” in its exchange with Iran: 36

Israel took out the IRGC’s — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ leadership
in the Levant. Iran tried to respond, and Israel had clearly demonstrated its
military superiority, defeating this attack, particularly in coordination with —
with partners.

31
Israel at war: What role does its war cabinet play?, DW, 16 April 2024
32
Israel’s foreign minister says reprisal against Iran is possible, Wall Street Journal, 14 April 2024
33
White House, Statement from the President on the designation of the IRGC […], 8 April 2019
34
Commons Library research briefing, What is the status of the Iran nuclear deal?, section 4.3
35
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Large scale Iranian attack against Israel, 14 April 2024; FCDO, We
remained determined that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon […], 18 December 2023
36
This section from White House, Background press call by senior administration officials […], 14 April
2024

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

The US Administration said while Israel can count on its full support in case of
further attacks by Iran or its allies, its “goal remains to de-escalate
immediately and halt further attacks”. It said the United States will “not be
part of any response” the Israelis undertake against Iran.

The US was also in discussions with Israel on its potential response which it
said should be thought “carefully and strategically about”.

UK opposition to a “retaliatory strike” on Iran

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has condemned the “reckless attack” by Iran and
said that its scale risked “catastrophic” consequences for Israeli civilians and
regional security. 37

He said that UK action will be guided by three priorities:

• Ensuring the security of Israel

• Supporting a two-state solution and reforms to the Palestinian Authority

so it can govern the West Bank and Gaza

• Removing Hamas from Gaza and ending the conflict there. 38

Mr Sunak also noted the increasing ties between Russia and Iran, with Iran
providing Russia with drones for use in Ukraine. He said the UK would
continue oppose their actions, in both Ukraine and the Middle East.39

In a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on 16 April

Mr Sunak “stressed escalation [following the Iranian attack] was in no one’s
interest and […] this was a moment for calmer heads to prevail”. 40

Speaking on 15 April, Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said that the UK

Government does not support a retaliatory strike by Israel and called for de-
escalation:

We are saying very clearly we don’t support a retaliatory strike. We don’t think
they should make one […] if they [Israel] come under attack, that’s a different
issue […]

What we are saying very clearly to the Israelis is ‘we respect your right to take
action, you are an independent, sovereign country’ […]

37
Prime Minister’s Office, PM statement on Iranian regime’s reckless attack […], 13 April 2024; HC Deb,
15 April 2024, c23
38
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c23
39
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c24
40
Prime Minister’s Office, PM call with Prime Minister Netanyahu, 16 April 2024

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

The right thing to do, the tough thing to do now is not to escalate further but to
switch the focus back on to getting the hostages [held by Hamas] home […] 41

Lord Cameron also condemned the Iranian attack in a call with the Iranian
Foreign Minister, Amir-Abdollahian, on 14 April. Lord Cameron told the
Minister that “Iran must stop these reckless attacks” and “deescalate”. 42

Iranian statements and actions

Iran’s mission to the UN said that its attack was a direct response to the strike
on its consulate in Syria, and it now considered the matter “concluded”. 43

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warned that the “tiniest invasion” by Israel in
response to the attack will produce a “massive and harsh response” by Iran. 44
Iranian Foreign Minister, Amir Abdollahian, also said that if US bases or the
airspace of Middle Eastern states were used to attack Iran, “we would have
no choice but to target American bases in those countries”. 45 He also warned
that:

In case the Israeli regime embarks on adventurism again and takes action
against the interests of Iran, the next response from us will be immediate and
at a maximum level. 46

Iran and its network of allies maintain a significant capacity to attack Israeli,
American and other targets in the Middle East, as well as further abroad. 47

On 14 April, Iran also summoned the ambassadors of the UK, France, and
Germany to question what it termed their “irresponsible stance” on its attack.
All three countries have condemned the Iranian attack on Israel. 48

Statements by Arab states

In the Gulf Cooperation Council, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, all issued statements calling for restraint
and to avoid military escalation. Egypt and Jordan have offered similar
statements. In line with earlier statements issued by these states during the
Israel-Hamas conflict, several also reiterated calls for a ceasefire in Gaza. 49

41
“RAF jets could defend Israel again, says Lord Cameron”, (9:14) The Telegraph, 15 April 2024
42
Lord Cameron on X/Twitter, Today I formally condemned in the strongest terms […], 14 April 2024
43
Iran to respond “more severely” if Israel reacts to embassy attack retaliation, 14 April 2024
44
Iran president warns of “massive” response, Asharq Al-Aswat, 17 April 2024
45
World leaders urge restraint as Israel weighs retaliation, New York Times, 15 April 2024
46
Iran’s military response will be “immediate and maximum level”, CNN, 18 April 2024
47
Atlantic Council, Four ways Iran could retaliate against Israel’s latest strike, 10 April 2024
48
Iran summons the British, French and German ambassadors […], Reuters, 14 April 2024
49
Arab states call for “restraint” after Iran’s attack on Israel, BBC Monitoring, 15 April 2024

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Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza

Fighting in Gaza continues. No pause was implemented following the passage
of UN Security Council Resolution 2728, which called for an immediate
ceasefire and the immediate and unconditional release of hostages by
Hamas. 50

Negotiations between Israel and Hamas are ongoing.

1.5 Explosion in Iran, 19 April

On 19 April, two unnamed US officials were quoted in international media

saying that Israel had launched a missile striking Iran’s Isfahan region (where
Iran has several military and nuclear facilities). An unnamed Israeli official
said it was “intended to signal to Iran that Israel can attack its territory”. 51

Israel has neither confirmed nor denied the attack. Iran has acknowledged
that an explosion took place but says this was linked to its air defences
intercepting drones. Iran’s Foreign Minister told the media that “it has not
been proved to us that there is a connection between these [attacks] and
Israel”. This statement has been widely interpreted as meaning Iran will not
respond any further. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken says the US was
“not [...] involved in any offensive operations” by Israel. 52

Further reading and analysis on Iran’s attack

• Atlantic Council, Israel just conducted a limited strike on Iran. Is this the
end of the tit for tat?, 19 April 2024
• Foreign Policy, Iran shrugs off Israeli strike […], 19 April 2024
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran-Israel confrontation
heads down perilous path, 18 April 2024
• US Institute for Peace, Iran’s attack and the new escalatory cycle in the
Middle East, 16 April 2024
• Brookings Institute, The impact of Iran’s attack on Israel, 15 April 2024
• Chatham House, Iran’s attack on Israel was not the failure many claim
but it has ended Israel’s isolation, 15 April 2024

50
Commons Library research briefing, Israel-Hamas conflict 2023/24, section 4.2
51
This section from Israeli missile hits Iran, US officials confirm, CBS News, 19 April 2024; Iran’s foreign
minister downplays drone attack, Reuters, 20 April 2024
52
US State Department, Secretary Antony Blinken at a solo press availability, 19 April 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

• Middle East Institute, […] Israel should draw the right lessons from its
success, 14 April 2024
• DW, Why did some Arab countries appear to help Israel?, 14 April 2024

1.6 UK Parliament statements on Iran’s attack

The Prime Minister made a statement in the Commons on 15 April 2024.

The Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, condemned the attack by Iran
and backed the actions of the Government to defend Israel and the
deployment of additional RAF forces to the region. He said the Labour Party
supported measures to de-escalate and called on Israel to show restraint. 53

While stating nothing could justify Iran’s actions, he called for an immediate
ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages, an increase in humanitarian
aid to Gaza, and renewed diplomatic engagement. He also said the principle
of not targeting diplomatic premises should be respected.54

The Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, also renewed Labour’s call for
the proscription of the IRGC (see section 3.4) and for additional sanctions
against Iran, including its drones. 55

Scottish First Minister and Leader of the SNP, Humza Yousaf, condemned the
Iranian action and called for a “political and diplomatic solution”. 56 The SNP
leader in Westminster, Stephen Flynn, said that the “bedrock” of stopping
regional escalation is an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. 57

The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns, said Iran continues
to pose a “significant threat”, and that the UK should develop a
“comprehensive strategy” against Iran internationally to address its actions. 58
The Prime Minister committed to lead this action internationally. 59

Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Ed Davey condemned the Iranian attack and said
that the UK must be focused on preventing escalation and arranging an
immediate bilateral ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza. 60

53
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c25
54
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c25
55
Labour calls for further sanctions on Iran after attack, ITN, 14 April 2024
56
Humza Yousaf calls for ‘diplomatic’ solution after Iran strikes, The Herald, 14 April 2024
57
Stephen Flynn MP on X/Twitter, “Just as we rightly hold Israel to account […],” 14 April 2024
58
Alicia Kearns MP X/Twitter, “The threat from Iran as a de-establishing […],” 13 April 2024
59
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c27
60
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c28

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2 Statements of G7, UN, Russia, and China

2.1 Statement of G7 leaders

Following the Iran attack, US President Joe Biden convened a meeting of G7

leaders on 14 April.

In addition to the United States and United Kingdom, the G7 includes Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the European Union.

The group issued a collective statement condemning the Iranian attack. 61 The
G7 also said it was ready to take further measures now and in response to
further destabilising initiatives.

The group said they remained committed in Gaza to work “towards an

immediate and sustainable ceasefire and the release of hostages by Hamas,
and [to] deliver increased humanitarian assistance”. 62

The US said at the G7 it is seeking “a coordinated effort” on new sanctions

targeting Iran. Discussions have included designating the IRGC as a terrorist
group (which is currently not the case in the UK and European Union). 63 In a
meeting of 19 April G7 leaders also reiterated their position that Iran should
never be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon and called on other states not
to supply Iran with material for its drone and missile programmes. 64

G7 members also issued individual statements condemning Iran’s attack. 65

2.2 UN and UN Security Council

UN Secretary General statement

On 13 April, the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, condemned the
“serious escalation” by Iran and called for an immediate cessation of
hostilities. He called for all parties to exercise “maximum restraint” to avoid
“major military confrontations on multiple fronts” in the region. 66

61
Prime Minister’s Office, G7 statement on Iran’s attack against Israel, 14 April 2024
62
Prime Minister’s Office, G7 statement on Iran’s attack against Israel, 14 April 2024
63
White House, Background press call by senior administration officials […], 14 April 2024
64
FCDO, G7 foreign minister’s meeting communiqué: Middle East, 19 April 2024
65
How world leaders responded to Iran’s drone attack on Israel, Euro News, 14 April 2024; Iran’s
attack on Israel: World leaders react, Reuters, 14 April 2024
66
UN, Statement by the Secretary General, 13 April 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

He also said the principle of “inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises

and personnel must be respected” (in reference to the 1 April strike on the
Iranian consulate in Syria) and that “acts of reprisal involving the use of force
are barred under international law” (Iran had claimed to act under self-
defence provisions in the UN Charter). 67

Following the reported explosion in Iran on 19 April, the spokesperson for the
Secretary General said he “condemns any action of retaliation”. 68

UN Security Council meeting

At Israel’s request, the UN Security Council met on 14 April 2024. No
resolutions or statements were debated.69

The Israeli representative condemned the attack and called for new sanctions
against Iran and for the “snapback” sanctions under the 2015 nuclear
agreement to be applied (see below, section 3.1).

Iran’s delegate said the attack was in “self-defence” and “necessary and
proportionate” and that Iran does not seek “escalation or war”.

The US condemned the Iranian attack and said the Security Council must act
against Iranian support for Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and its
transferring of drones to Russia. They said the US will be seeking additional
measures to ensure the accountability of Iran at the UN.

The UK Ambassador to the UN condemned Iran’s attack and said Iran had
long supported armed groups which are destabilising to the Middle East. She
called for “all parties” to “exercise maximum restraint” and reiterated UK
support for UN Security Council resolution 2728, for an immediate ceasefire
and unconditional release of hostages in Gaza. 70

The French representative also condemned Iran and said they were
committed to finding a settlement to the situation.

2.3 Response of Russia and China

Both China and Russia have been strengthening ties with Iran:

67
UN, Secretary Generals’ remarks to the Security Council […], 14 April 2024
68
UN, Statement attributable to the spokesperson for the Secretary General, 19 April 2024
69
The below section is sourced from UN, Warning Middle East at full scale conflict […], 14 April 2024
70
FCDO, The UK condemns unequivocally Iran’s reckless attack, 15 April 2024

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

• With Russia, this is primarily a security relationship: Iran has provided

drones for use in Ukraine (both countries deny this). 71

• China is an increasingly important economic partner. Despite US and

other sanctions against Iran, China is the main market for Iranian oil. 72

Neither Russia nor China condemned Iran’s attack on Israel, but both called
for restraint:

• China said it was “deeply concerned” and that it was the “latest
spillover” from the Israel-Hamas conflict. It said UN Security Council
Resolution 2728 for an immediate ceasefire and the unconditional release
of hostages should be immediately implemented: 73

– China’s delegate to the UN Security Council also cited Iran’s

statement on the matter being “concluded”. 74

• Russia called on all sides to “show constraint” and said the lack of
resolution to the conflict in Gaza would “lead to growth in instability”. 75

– At the Security Council meeting on 14 April, Russia criticized other

council members, arguing they should have agreed a Russian-
drafted statement condemning the strike on the consulate on 1 April.

– Russia’s representative noted Iran’s statement that it considers the

matter “concluded” and called on Israel to reject the use of force. 76

Further reading on the response of China and Russia

• Chatham House, Iran-Israel exchanges are test of China’s influence in the
Gulf, 19 April 2024
• Washington Institute, China’s response to Iran’s attack is an opportunity
for Washington 16 April 2024
• How the Kremlin stands to gain from Iran’s attack on Israel, Radio Free
Liberty Europe, 15 April 2024
• Russian weapons help Iran harden defences against Israeli airstrike, The
Washington Post, 15 April 2024

71
US Institute for Peace, Iran-Russia collaboration on drones, 10 August 2023; Iran admits providing
drones to Russia but denies involvement in Ukraine, Politico, 5 November 2022
72
US Institute for Peace, Iran’s deepening strategic alliance with Russia, 25 April 2023; Atlantic
Council, China doesn’t have as much leverage in the Middle East as one thinks […], 1 February 2024
73
People’s Republic of China embassy to Norway, Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson’s remarks on
Iranian attack on Israeli territory, 14 April 2024
74
UN, Warning Middle East at full scale conflict […], 14 April 2024
75
Russia urges ‘restraint’ after Iranian attack on Israel, The Moscow Times, 14 April 2024
76
UN, Warning Middle East at full scale conflict […], 14 April 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

3 Current and potential sanctions on Iran

3.1 “Snapback” and nuclear agreement sanctions

In response to the Iranian attack, at the UN Security Council in April 2024 the
Israeli Government called for the “snapback” measures in the 2015 nuclear
agreement with Iran to be implemented (see above, section 2.2). Restrictions
on Iranian arms have gradually expired under the timetable of the
agreement, and snapback measures would re-apply these restrictions.

What UN measures have expired?

The nuclear agreement with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)), intends to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for
sanctions relief. Under its terms, two restrictions on Iranian arms have
expired:

• UN arms embargo, in 2020. This banned Iran from importing

conventional weapons and any state from exporting most conventional
weapons to Iran. In August 2020, China and Russia vetoed a US-
proposed extension at the UN Security Council, while the UK and all other
members except two abstained.77 The UK supported an extension but
said it abstained on the vote as “it was clear that it would not attract the
support” of the council. 78

• Missiles and drones, in October 2023. This prohibited Iran from exporting
or importing certain missiles, drones, and related technologies without
the permission of the UN Security Council. Russia has said it would not
observe the resolution; the UK and others have judged Russia to have
broken the resolution by importing Iranian drones since 2022. 79

What are “snapback” measures?

Under the terms of the JCPOA, all previous UN sanctions related to Iran’s
nuclear programme, including the embargo on conventional arms transfers
and the restrictions on missile and drone technologies, can be re-imposed in
the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments”

77
UN Security Council votes not to extend arms embargo against Iran, CBS News, 14 August 2020
78
PQ HL8919 [Iran: Arms trade], 22 October 2020
79
International institute for Strategic Studies, Experts on the expiry of UN limitations on Iran’s missile
exports, 24 October 2023

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

(the ‘snapback’ provisions). This provision remains in place until the tenth
anniversary of the agreement (“termination day”), in October 2025. 80

Analysis for the Washington Institute think tank has argued the use of the
mechanism would suggest negotiations on restoring a nuclear agreement
have failed.81

Alternatives to the snapback mechanism are a state deciding to implement

its own sanctions or the UN Security Council passing a new resolution
imposing sanctions against Iran. This would require the support of at least
nine of the 15 council members and could be vetoed by any of the five
permanent members (US, UK, France, China, Russia). 82

The EU, UK and US have continued these sanctions

While the UN measures have expired, individual states, including the UK, US
and European Union have continued the measures:

• Conventional arms embargo: From October 2020, all three continued an

arms embargo against Iran, as well against the proliferation of weapons
to armed and terrorist groups it supports in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. 83

• Missiles and drones: The UK, EU and the United States were among those
to announce they would continue these sanctions in their domestic law
from October 2023. 84 This included sanctions targeting their export to
Russia for use in Ukraine (see below for sanctions by these states). A
total of 47 states, including Argentina, Bahrain, and Japan, also signed a
statement committing to “take steps to counter Iran’s destabilizing
ballistic missile-related activities” when the UN sanctions expired. 85

US and UK statements on snapback, April 2024

On 15 April 2024, the Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said the UK Government was
committed to “using all diplomatic tools to ensure that Iran never develops a
nuclear weapon”. He said this included using the snapback mechanism, if
necessary. 86

80
EU External Action, Nuclear agreement-JCPOA, 18 August 2021; US State Department, JPCOA, July
2015, Annex 5
81
Washington Institute, Snapback sanctions on Iran: More bark than bite?, 25 October 2022
82
Security Council Report (not an official UN organisation), UN Security Council working methods
83
See section 3.2 to 3.5 of this research briefing for sanctions by individual states.
84
FCDO, UK to bring UN sanctions on Iran into UK law, 14 September 2023; FCDO, UN Security Council
resolution 2231 transition day: Joint statement, 18 October 2023
85
US State Department, Joint statement on UNSC Resolution 2331 transition day, 18 October 2023
86
HC Deb, 15 April 2024, c27

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

The US Administration says snapback “remains in place and it is an available

option” but would not “preview [its] actions”. 87

Iran’s nuclear programme is now well-developed, though it denies seeking

nuclear weapons. The Commons Library research briefing, What is the status
of the Iran nuclear deal?, has an assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme
and current status of the stalled negotiations.

3.2 United States

Current sanction regime and designation of IRGC

The United States has imposed an extensive sanctions regime against Iran
since the overthrow of the last Shah and the establishment of the Islamic
Republic in 1979. As set out in the US Congressional Research Service briefing
on US sanctions, they:

• Ban most US trade and investment with Iran (except food and
agricultural commodities, medicine, and humanitarian-related goods).
This includes Iran’s energy sector.

• Prohibit foreign assistance (aside from humanitarian aid) and the trade
of arms and other military goods to and from Iran.

• Target the country’s nuclear programme, drone programmes, and

ballistic missiles. 88

Many elements of Iran’s Government, including the supreme leader, Ali

Khamenei, and the IRGC, are also subject to US sanctions. The US also
imposes sanctions on human rights grounds and because of Iran’s support for
armed and terrorist groups abroad.89

The Trump Administration designated the IRGC a foreign terrorist

organisation in 2019. The Biden Administration has retained the designation.
The US has also designated groups supported by Iran and the IRGC, including
Hezbollah, Iraqi militias including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad as foreign terrorist organisations. The Houthis in Yemen are
designated as a specially designated global terrorist group. 90

87
US State Department, Press briefing-17 April 2024
88
Congressional Research Service, US sanctions on Iran (PDF), 20 July 2023 [three page summary] and
Congressional Research Service, US sanctions on Iran, February 2022, Annex A [99-page document]
89
As above
90
Congressional Research Service, US sanctions on Iran, February 2022, p6; Commons Library
research briefing, UK and international response to the Houthis in the Red Sea 2024, section 6.3

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

The Biden Administration says it has sanctioned around 600 individuals since
2021, in addition to new missile and drone sanctions against Iran. 91

For a timeline of US sanctions on Iran from the mid-2000s, see the US Institute
for Peace, Timeline of US sanctions, April 2024 and US sanctions and Iran’s
drones to Russia, February 2023.

Statements and debate on further actions

The Biden Administration says it will announce further sanctions, both in
coordination with its allies but also unilaterally. It will not preview these
sanctions in advance, but officials have confirmed they will include Iran’s
missile programme and new sanctions against organisations supporting the
IRGC and Iran’s Defence Ministry. 92

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has also said her department “will not
hesitate to work with our allies to use our sanctions authority to continue
disrupting the Iranian regime's malign and destabilizing activity”. 93

Updates can be found on the US Department of State, Iran sanctions, website.

As noted by analysts, the extent of existing American sanctions means there

are few options to expand these further, and the focus could lie on better
enforcement or encouraging US partners to introduce similar restrictions. 94

In the United States, Republicans in Congress have argued the Biden

Administration should strengthen or re-impose sanctions in two areas to
weaken Iran’s economy:

• Iran’s export of electricity to Iraq: in 2018 and 2023, the US has allowed
Iran to access funds held in Oman generated from electricity shipments
to Iraq. The funds are only allowed to be used for humanitarian
purposes, but critics argue this frees up spending elsewhere for Iran. 95

• Iran’s export of oil, especially to China: US sanctions on Iran’s oil were re-
instated in 2018 when the Trump Administration announced it would
withdraw from the 2015 nuclear agreement. However, Iranian oil exports
have grown and are currently at level seen in 2018 (around US$35 billion
a year). Strengthening sanctions may push up global oil prices and

91
White House, Statement by national security advisor Jake Sullivan, 16 April 2024
92
White House, Briefing by press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre […], 15 April 2024; Statement by
National Security advisor Jake Sullivan […], 16 April 2024
93
Yellen warns of new sanctions against Iran [...], Voice of America, 16 April 2024
94
What are US sanctions?, Reuters, 16 April 2024; Washington Institute, Coordinated Iran sanctions
require coordinated enforcement, 19 April 2024
95
Joe Biden told to cancel $10bn sanctions relief for Iran, The Telegraph, 15 April 2024

20 Commons Library Research Briefing, 25 July 2024

 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

create tensions between China, which is Iran’s main buyer, and the
United States. 96

The Biden Administration says it has not removed any sanctions against Iran
and continues to enforce them, though it acknowledges some UN sanctions
have expired since it has been in office. 97

New sanctions announced in April and June 2024

On 18 and 25 April, the US introduced sanctions against those involved in the
manufacture of drones and the attack against Israel. In coordination with the
UK and Canada (see below), it sanctioned 24 individuals and 18 entities
(organisations and companies), including manufacturers of drones,
companies providing material to the IRGC and drone manufacturers, and new
restrictions on Iran’s access to related technologies. 98

In June, the US introduced more measures against drone manufacturers. 99

3.3 United Kingdom

Current sanctions regime

In December 2023, a new UK sanctions regime against Iran came into force.

The legislation expanded the criteria under which entities and individuals
linked to Iran can be sanctioned. These include:

• Iran’s undermining of peace and stability in the Middle East.

• The use and spread of weapons and technologies from Iran.

• Hostile threats towards the UK and its partners emanating from Iran. 100

The first designations under the new regime were made in December, and
whose targets included IRGC members. 101

The Government says it currently applies more than 400 sanctions against
Iran. These sanctions allow for asset freezes and travel bans.102

96
Iran exports hit 6-year high as west prepares sanctions, Financial Times, 18 April 2024
97
US State Department, Press briefing-17 April 2024
98
US State Department, Targeting Iran’s UAV programme, steel industry […], 18 April 2024; Treasury
Department, Treasury targets networks facilitating illicit trade […], 25 April 2024; US issues new
Iran-related sanctions, Reuters, 25 April 2024
99
US State Department, US announces designations on Iran’s UAV industry, 3 June 2024
100
FCDO, New Iranian sanctions regime comes into force, 14 December 2023
101
As above
102
FCDO, UK and US step up action to tackle domestic threat from Iran, 29 January 2024

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 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

The UK applies sanctions against the entirety of the IRGC, an arms embargo,
and restrictions on Iranian drones (including in relation to Russia), missiles,
and nuclear programme. 103

The UK also applies sanctions against arms exports to Iran-supported groups

such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as on human rights grounds. 104

Further sanctions announced and expected in 2024

Following the Iranian attack on Israel the UK Government said it is
“campaigning” in the G7 for coordinated sanctions against Iran.105 The
Foreign Secretary, Lord Cameron, said the UK will impose the “strongest
package of sanctions” against the country. 106

On 18 and 25 April, the UK announced it had sanctioned:

• Seven individuals and six entities (organisations) who have played a

destabilising role in the Middle East. This included further sanctions on
the IRGC navy, the Armed Forces General Staff of Iran, and Iran’s Defence
Minister.

• Individuals and companies in Iran’s drone and missile industries.107

On 25 April, the Government also announced it plans to expand trade

sanctions against Iran by introducing bans on the export of components used
in drone and missile production. Companies already subject to sanctions
include those involved in the production of Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones
which were used in Iran’s attack against Israel and by Russia in Ukraine. 108

3.4 UK debate on proscribing the IRGC

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Activity in the Middle East in support of armed and terrorist groups
The IRGC is an Iranian state military and intelligence service, introduced
following the 1979 revolution as a counterweight to Iran’s regular armed
forces. The IRGC has ground forces in Iran totalling more than 100,000
personnel, as well as naval and air forces. 109 It also controls the paramilitary
Basij force, which can mobilise up to 600,000 volunteers, and supported the
suppression of the protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. 110

109
Council on Foreign Relations, Iran’s revolutionary guards, 8 January 2024

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

As set out in the US State Department country report on terrorism: Iran, the
IRGC’s Qod’s Force (its external arm), designated a foreign terrorist
organisation by the United States in 2019, is Iran’s “primary mechanism for
cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad”, including in Syria and
Iraq. 111 In December 2023, the UK and US also announced new sanctions in
response to the IRGC Qod Force’s support for Hamas in Gaza. 112
As set out in section 2 of the Commons Library research briefing on Houthi
attacks on shipping in the Red Sea since November 2023, both the US and UK
governments judge that the Houthi attacks have been supported by Iran.
Media reports say IRGC support has included training and providing
intelligence to the Houthis to help them identify and target shipping. 113

IRGC threats and actions in the United Kingdom

In the UK, the IRGC has also been linked to kidnap and assassination plots.
In February 2023, UK counter-terrorism police said there had been 15 such
plots by Iran since 2020. 114 These included threats to journalists and attempts
to collect intelligence on UK-based individuals linked to Iran or Israel. 115 In
January 2024, the Charity Commission also launched an investigation of
antisemitic speeches by members of the IRGC, given to students in the UK. 116

What is proscription?
There has been a long-standing debate in the UK over whether to proscribe
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation under the
Terrorism Act 2000.

Proscription would put the IRGC on the same standing as Hezbollah and
Hamas, two groups supported by Iran. Proscription creates offences such as
being a member or encouraging support for the organisation and allows

104
Commons Library research briefing, Iran’s influence in the Middle East, section 3.2
105
FCDO, Foreign Secretary to urge G7 partners to hold firm […], 17 April 2023
106
Netanyahu rebuffs Cameron’s call for restraint over Iran, The Times, 17 April 2024
107
FCDO, The UK and US sanctions leading Iranian military figures […], 18 April 2024; FCDO, UK targets
Iran’s ability to launch drones […], 25 April 2024
108
FCDO, UK targets Iran’s ability to launch drones […], 25 April 2024
109
Council on Foreign Relations, Iran’s revolutionary guards, 8 January 2024
110
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, The IRGC and Iran’s [...] uprisings, 4 January 2023
111
US State Department, Country reports on terrorism 2021: Iran, 2022
112
FCDO, New Iranian sanction regime comes into force, 14 December 2023; US Treasury Department,
US and UK target IRGC-QF support to Hamas and other proxy groups, 14 December 2023
113
Houthi rebels who attacked British ship trained at elite Iran academy, The Telegraph, 10 January
2024; Iranian and Hezbollah commanders help direct Houthi attacks […], Reuters, 21 January 2024
114
Hostile-state threat probes grown fourfold—police, BBC News, 16 February 2023
115
HC Deb, 20 February 2023, c50
116
UK officials probe Iran generals’ antisemitic talks to students, BBC News, 23 January 2024

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

sanctions to be applied against it (though these are already applied in the

case of the IRCG – see section above).

Proscription is a decision for the Home Secretary, if they judge an

organisation meets the criteria under the Act. These include the threat of
actions involving serious violence again a person or property or creating a
serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public
(this is not an exhaustive list of the criteria).

For an explanation of the Act and the criteria, see the Commons Library
research briefing Proscribed terrorist organisations.

What arguments have been put in favour of

proscription?
The IRGC meets the definition of terrorism and it would send a message
Research for the Tony Blair Institute think tank in 2023 argues that the group
meets the criteria for proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000 and that
proscribing the IRGC would “send a clear message” that Iranian activity in the
UK “will not be tolerated”. 117

Analysis for the Washington Institute think tank notes the practical effects of
the US decision to designate the IRGC a foreign terrorist group in 2019 were
limited in the context of wider sanctions already been applied, but also
argued it sent, and continues to send, an important message to Iran about its
actions both abroad and at home. 118

Logical extension of existing sanctions

Previously, in 2020, the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee argued
proscribing the IRGC was “a logical extension of the existing restrictions
placed” on IRGC members. 119

It is in the UK’s national interest as the IRGC supports other proscribed

groups
In September 2023, the UK’s Commissioner for Countering Extremism, Robin
Simcox, argued it was in the “national interest” to proscribe the IRGC as it
supports proscribed groups around the world and it currently remains legal
to be hosted in UK institutions. 120

117
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, Making the case for the UK to proscribe Iran’s IRGC, 17
January 2023
118
Washington Institute, What will IRGC designation actually do?, 8 April 2019 and Don’t drop Iran’s
revolutionary guards from FTO list, 21 March 2022
119
Foreign Affairs Committee, No prosperity without justice: The UK’s relationship with Iran, HC 415,
2020, para 50
120
RUSI, Countering extremist threats in the UK: An address by Robin Simcox, 19 October 2023

24 Commons Library Research Briefing, 25 July 2024

Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

What arguments have been put cautioning against

proscription?
The UK already sanctions the entirety of the IRGC
The IRGC is currently sanctioned in its entirety by the UK Government. These
sanctions apply asset freezes and other financial measures against the IRGC
and individual members. 121

Proscription may threaten diplomatic relations with Iran

The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns, supports IRGC
proscription (see above). However, in January 2024 she warned “Iran will see
it as an act of war […] [and] we will likely have to close our embassy”. 122

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, has previously said

labelling the IRGC as a terrorist organisation would be interpreted by Iran as
a “serious escalation”. 123

In November 2022, the government said retaining diplomatic relations with

Iran is important for allow the UK to address issues such as human rights, UK
security, consular cases, and Iran’s role in the region. 124

It would risk “upsetting” the definition of terrorism in the UK

In January 2023, the Independent newspaper cited an assessment by the UK’s
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, that advised
proscribing the IRGC, as a state entity of Iran, under the Terrorism Act would
be “at the risk of upsetting the settled meaning of terrorism in domestic law”
which had, to date, excluded the armed forces of nation-states. 125

He reiterated this position in September 2023, arguing that “proscription is

saying that these groups shouldn’t exist at all […] no one is saying that Iran
should not have a security department, we just need to change its
behaviour”. 126

What is the position of UK parliamentarians?

In January 2023 and February 2024, the Commons debated, and agreed to,
motions on Iran which included a request for the Government to proscribe the
IRGC. 127

121
HM Treasury, Financial sanctions, Iran relating to nuclear weapons, updated 14 December 2023
122
HC Deb, 24 January 2024, c361
123
Terrorist’ designation for Iran’s IRGC would harm EU security, Al-Jazeera, 23 January 2023
124
PQ 83808 [Iran: Diplomatic relations], 16 November 2022
125
Declaring Iran’s IRGC a terrorist group would destabilise UK’s definition of terrorism […], The
Independent, 11 January 2024; Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, IRGC, 11 January 2023
126
Iran guards ‘shouldn’t be treated as a terror group’, The Times, 20 September 2023
127
HC Deb, 12 January 2023, c772; HC Deb, 1 February 2024, c1094

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

Members from across the House of Commons have called for the proscription
of the IRGC:

• The Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, has said Labour would
support proscription, “either by using existing terrorism legislation or by
creating a new process of proscription for hostile state actors”. 128

• The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alicia Kearns, has said the
group should be proscribed. 129

• The former Defence Secretary, Dr Liam Fox and former Home Secretary,
Suella Braverman, have argued the IRGC should be proscribed. 130

• The SNP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Brendon O’Hara, and the Leader
of the Liberal Democrats, Sir Ed Davey, have also backed proscription. 131

What is the UK Government’s position?

In January 2023, both the Telegraph and the BBC reported that the UK
Government was preparing to designate the IRGC a terrorist organisation,. 132
However, no change in policy was announced.

In February 2023, the Minister for Security, Tom Tugendhat, cited the potential
for an international agreement on proscribing the group:

It is interesting to note that, of the so-called E3+3 [UK, US, China, France,
Germany and Russia], Germany and France appear to be looking at
proscribing the IRGC, as the United States has already done. It seems that not
only is there international agreement on the point the hon. Member [Virendra
Sharma] raises, but that action is absolutely ready to go. 133

However, neither France, Germany, nor the European Union has since
announced plans to proscribe the IRGC. 134

In July 2023, when announcing the new sanctions regime against Iran, the
former Foreign Secretary James Cleverly also expressed caution on
proscription. He said he recognises some see this as the “desired outcome”:

128
HC Deb, 31 January 2023, c186
129
HC Deb, 24 January 2024, c361
130
HC Deb, 16 October 2023, c37, HC Deb, 16 April 2024, c30
131
HC Deb, 6 July 2023, c1001; HC Deb, 16 October 2023, c28
132
Iran’s Islamic revolutionary guards set to be proscribed as terror group, The Telegraph, 2 January
2023; Iran’s revolutionary guards set to be labelled as terrorist group by UK, BBC News, 3 January
2023; White House, Statement from the President of the designation of the IRGC as foreign terrorist
organisation, 8 April 2019
133
HC Deb, 6 February 2023, c638
134
Verfassungsblog, Why declaring the IRGC a terrorist group is trickier business […], 2 February 2023

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Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

without necessarily understanding that much of what they suspect they want
to see [as] […] the outcome of proscription is actually already in place, such
as asset freezes and travel bans [under the sanctions regime]. 135

In November 2023, the government also emphasised new powers under the
National Security Act and the existing sanctions regime for Iran:

The National Security Act will provide another significant toolkit in the fight
against individuals working for state entities such as the IRGC; it criminalises a
wide range of hostile activities conducted by, for or on behalf of foreign
powers. Materially assisting a foreign intelligence service in any activity in or
related to the UK will be a crime.

We continue to make use of any and every opportunity to call out Iran’s malign
activity […]. 136

In December 2023, Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron restated the

Government’s position, saying proscribing the IRGC was “not something that
either the intelligence agencies or the police are calling for”. 137

In response to the Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, the Prime Minister
said on proscription that the UK has strengthened its sanctions regime:

[…] we have already sanctioned over 400 Iranian individuals, including the
IRGC in its entirety. We put in place at the end of last year a new sanctions
regime that gives us more extensive powers to designate sanctions, and of
course, the National Security Act 2023 created new offences for espionage and
foreign interference, and means that our security services have the powers
that they need to deter, disrupt and detect threats of a more modern nature
from states such as Iran. […]

[…] I am confident that the police, security services and courts all have the
tools they need to sanction, prosecute and mitigate the threats from Iran. We
strengthened our sanctions regime recently, including sanctioning the IRGC in
its entirety. 138

On taking office in July 2024, the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said he
“stood by” what he said in opposition on the IRGC. He said he would be
working with the Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, to “review the context of
terrorist activity and state threats” over the “coming weeks and months”. 139

135
HC Deb, 6 July 2023, c1001
136
HL Deb, 29 November 2023, cc1082-3
137
David Cameron: When Rishi asked me to do this job, my instant reaction was to say yes, The
Telegraph, 23 December 2023
138
HC Deb, 16 April 2024, cc26 and 30
139
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c304

27 Commons Library Research Briefing, 25 July 2024

 Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

3.5 European Union

Existing sanctions against Iran

The EU has a wide range of measures in place which target Iran over its
human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation activities and military support for
Russia. These are listed on the Council of the European Union page, EU
sanctions against Iran and include:

• Sanctions targeting Iran’s support for Russia, including on drone-related

technology and an export ban from the EU to Iran of components used in
the construction of drones.

• Sanctions on Iran’s nuclear proliferation, including on those involved in

Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

• Bans on the export of arms to Iran and material that could be used for
military purposes or in nuclear enrichment activities.

• Bans on the import of Iranian oil, the sale of equipment used in the
energy sector, and limits on transfer of funds to Iranian banks.

Under its human rights sanctions regime, the EU sanctions 42 entities

(organisations and groups) and 227 individuals, including both the IRGC as an
organisation and individual members. The sanctions include asset freezes,
and prohibition on making available any funds or economic resources. 140

Commitment to introduce new sanctions

Following the Iranian attack in April, on 17 April the European Council said it
had agreed to take additional measures against Iran, “notably in relation to
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and missiles”. 141

On 22 April, the EU High Commissioner for Foreign policy, Josep Borrell, said
EU leaders had reached an agreement to expand its existing sanctions regime
to cover Iranian missiles and their potential transfer to Russia and the whole
of the Middle East (covering Iranian supported groups such as the Houthis in
Yemen), as well as components used in Iranian drone production. 142

In May 2024, the EU expanded its sanctions regime against Iran to specifically
target its actions in the Middle East. 143 It listed six individuals and three

140
European Council, EU sanctions against Iran, accessed 18 April 2024
141
European Council, Special European Council, 17-18 April 2024, 17 April 2024
142
EU External Action, Press remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell, 22 April 2024
143
European Council, EU sanctions against Iran

28 Commons Library Research Briefing, 25 July 2024

Israel-Iran April 2024: UK and international response

organisations in Iran for their role in transferring unmanned aerial vehicles,

both to Russia and to groups across the Middle East. 144

Debate on proscribing the IRGC

Like the United Kingdom, the European Union applies sanctions against the
IRGC and many of its individual members but does not proscribe it as a
terrorist organisation.

In April, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borell, said
some EU states had raised the possibility of designating the IRGC as a
terrorist group, but said this would first require the decision of an EU court. 145

144
European Council, EU lists more individuals and entities for the transfer of drones, 31 May 2024
145
EU plans sanctions, urges calm after Iran strikes Israel, DW, 18 April 2024

29 Commons Library Research Briefing, 25 July 2024

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