Presumption of Justice

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b.

Presumption of Justice
1. Floresca, et al., v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. L- 30642, April 30, 1985
The Supreme Court ruled that the heirs of employees who died in a mining
accident can pursue their claim for damages under the provisions of the Civil
Code, rather than the Workmen's Compensation Act, emphasizing the
constitutional guarantee of social justice and the protection of workers' rights and
welfare.
Facts: Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its
men working underground.

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said
motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
regular courts.

Held: In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both
the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the
workers and employees.

Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that
"all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail." More specifically, Article
1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.
c. Construction Consistent with the Constitution
1. Beltran, et al., v. Secretary of Health, G.R. Nos. 133640, 133661, and 139147, November
25, 2005
The Philippine Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of a law mandating the
phase-out of commercial blood banks, ruling that it is a valid exercise of the state's
police power to safeguard public health and promote a safe and adequate supply of
blood through voluntary donation.

Facts: Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994," and the validity of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7719. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then
President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette
and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health
(DOH).

Issue: Whether the law and its implementing rules and regulations is constitutional.

Held: Yes; The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions
of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The
ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.56 Those who petition this Court to
declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor

2. Benguet Management Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 153571,


September 18, 2003
Facts: On Nov 29, 1994, petitioner Benguet Management Corporation (BMC) and Keppel Bank
Philippines, Inc. (KBPI), acting as trustee of the other respondent banks, entered into a Loan
Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) whereby BMC, in consideration of the
syndicated loan of P190,000,000.00, constituted in favor of KBPI a mortgage on several lots
located in Alaminos, Laguna and Iba, Zambales.
Facts: On September 28, 2001, for failure of BMC to pay in full the installments due on the Loan
Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture, KBPI filed an application 4 for extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales. On October 29, 2001, a similar application 5 for extra judicial foreclosure of
mortgage was filed by KBPI with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City, docketed as EJF No. Sp-2546 (01). Accompanying the latter application was a
certification 6 from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, stating that
KBPI had paid the corresponding foreclosure fees covering BMC’s properties situated in
Zambales and Laguna.
On October 31, 2001, BMC filed a "Request Not To Give Due Course To The Application for
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure. BMC claimed that the application should be denied because it is
insufficient in form and substance and there is no need to proceed with the foreclosure of its
properties situated in Laguna because it was willing to execute a dacion en pago in place of the
mortgaged properties. Subsequently, BMC filed a "Compliance and Supplementary Grounds to
Disapprove Application for Extra judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage" 8 and a
Memorandum. BMC contended that the application for foreclosure should be denied because
KBPI included unauthorized penalties in the statement of accounts and it did not comply with its
obligation to give BMC a 60-day grace period. BMC further claimed that the MTI securing the
principal loan of P190 Million cannot be foreclosed because it was not registered with the
Register of Deeds.
BMC filed a motion for reconsideration claiming, among others, that Section 47 of the General
Banking Act (Republic Act No. 8791), which reduced the period of redemption for extra-judicially
foreclosed properties of juridical persons from one year to — "until, but not after, the registration
of the certificate of foreclosure sale . . . which in no case shall be more than three (3) months
after foreclosure, whichever is earlier," is unduly discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the RA 8791, abrogating the right to one year-redemption period of
corporate mortgagors, is unconstitutional.

Held: The court have repeatedly held that the constitutionality of a law may be passed
upon by the Court, where there is an actual case and that the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary in deciding the controversy. In this case, the
resolution of the constitutionality of Section 47 of the General Banking Act (Republic Act
No. 8791) which reduced the period of redemption of extra-judicially foreclosed
properties of juridical persons is not the very lis mota of the controversy. BMC is not
asserting a legal right for which it is entitled to a judicial determination at this time
inasmuch as it may not even be entitled to redeem the foreclosed properties. Until an
actual controversy is brought to test the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, the
presumption of validity, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

3. Tanada v. Tuvera, G. R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985


The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, affirming the necessity for the
publication of presidential decrees to ensure the people's right to due process and
information on matters of public concern.
The Court interpreted the phare “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code as
qualifying the period of effectivity, but not allowing dispensing with the publication requirement,
because the latter interpretation dispensing with the publication requirement is inconsistent with
the due process clause of the Constitution.

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