Rafael Trujillo, The Domi (15603377)

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The assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overt knowledge of U.S. Government involvement

rRecollections of CIA officials . . . . . . . . . . . .
The organization of the coup group I-—'OfJO\uol\Jl—'
Why a coup failed to follow the assassination . . . . . . . .
International activity in opposition to Trujillo

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The cast . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The first Farland memorandu

..17
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level of CIA activity prior to 1960 . . . . . . . . . .
Approach to Trujillo by General Clark 17

Operation Lancet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...19
‘State asks Farland if he could engineer a coup 2o
Farland replies that he could . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...2l
Farland says the dissidents need guns
_
22
The U.S. is prepared to assist in overthrowing Trujillo . . . . . 2h
Rubottom asks that sniper rifles be supplied the dissidents 25
Acting DCI approves air drop of 12 Springfield rifles . . . . . . 26
Special Group approves small arms for dissidents 29
COS asks that one weapon be sent in each pouch . . . . . . . . 30
Dearborn learns of plan to assassinate by intercepting auto 32
Ebfilasks for submachine guns for plotters
ear orn as s for three 38-caliber pistols for dissidents
. . . . . . - - - :(b)(1
;(b)(?>
The plot to kill Trujillo at his mistress’ apartment . . . . . 36
COS protestsrestriction on pouching weapons 36
Hqs guidance cable on policy and objectives ._, --- . . . . . . . 37'
Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissidents 38
Hqs approves passing carbines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . no
The carbines are passed to the dissidents 1+0
Request for pouch waiver ref pouching submachine guns . . . . . . . M1
Submachine guns pouched 1+2
Pleas from dissidents that submachine guns be passed to them . . 1+2
Hqs informs the station not repeat not to pass submachine guns .L;_3
Post-Bay of Pigs standdown cable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . an
Station acknowledges receipt of submachine guns M4
Draft cable (not sent) approving release of submachine guns . . . #7
State Department disapproves passing submachine guns 1+8
The whereabouts of the three carbines .'. . » . . . . . . . . . . . 1+9
Special Group confirms not passing submachine guns to dissidents 5o
The dissidents‘ assassination plans are firm . . . . . . . . . . . 51
‘U.S. policy does not condone assassination 51
Dearborn and the COS protest . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . 52
Critic No. l on the assassination 53
Vice President Johnson asks about arms delivery
_
. . . . . . . . 51+
Discovery of U.S. involvement with assassination group 55
Recapitulation of arms passed or considered for passing . . . . 59
3 The motivations of the assassins 61
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Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at
about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's
custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal
about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler
with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying
cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San
Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action:
after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a
khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957
Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.

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On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on

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a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight
armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and

his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's
chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins,
and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. One was
never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed
while resisting arrest. The others Llfawere arrested, confessed,
’and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine
others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate
in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while
resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture. k
(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved

in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the
small group that actually did the killing.)
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There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the
U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters.
Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty,
many of the details came out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the
San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic
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issue of l3 April 1963. Excerpts follow:

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The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L.

Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central
Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the
69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highwaynhear his
capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the
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request of the assassins.
The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in

late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry
Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US
Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the_plot was
Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
As TruJillo's political and financial problems deepened,

talks continued between Dearbon, Barfield and leaders of the
anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was
established between Amiama and a CIA agent who was . . .
named Plato Cox.

The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms
5
shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad

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Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated

a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also
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lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but
was later allowed to leave the country:~
The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled

later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for
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the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The
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gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans,

which were later turned over to the conspirators.
Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during

the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being
prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961,
invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was
focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a post-
ponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because
of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the
United States. But the order to hold up came too late. The
needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators,
who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the
assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity
This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out
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into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a
rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate la Fundacion with
Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.
It can be reported on excellent authority that close

associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within
a few days following the killing.
Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed

out of the Dominican Republic by US officials. . . . . .
Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has
returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket,
where he.greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if
Trujillo had never lived.
we interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. c. King (then
Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (thenKChief of Qperations,
WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to

monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not
pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the
Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the
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furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute
tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency

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role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King
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and Esterline. He viewed the Agency’s role as one of giving support
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to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S.
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interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation
involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not
have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons
supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo.
Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however,
has a vague impression that one of them was.

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The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters
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are now widely scattered. was chief of station (b)(3)
until October 1960, is now retired. who was chief (b)(3)
-of station at the time of the assassination, is in U ; U X3)

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station's operations officer, is in
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the station's administrative assistant who was used as a U
communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1961+
and is believed to be living in‘ ‘the head- (b)(3)
quarters branch chief‘, is We elected not to call
back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able -
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to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records,
we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantly
to the quite complete record that appears in the joperational

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files.
Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were

assigned the One segnent ofzwas known as (b)(1)
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cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by (b)(1)

(bl(3\
violent action. We have reviewed the voluminouszfiles. Most (b)(1)
(b)(3)
of‘ this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant
documents were not put into thejfiles but were kept in a .
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us.
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(the operational filesl (bX1)

From the recordsl we can trace the origins and the course of (bxg)
U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can
ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support
of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the
U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the

files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group
was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly
accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in
the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the
U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:
The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of

conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved
too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group
had its purpose and its separate personnel.
The function of the Action Group was to assassinate

Trujillo and imediately present proof of its succes, in
the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the
Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup,
taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed
Forces. '
The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to

have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert
Barreras and Salvador Estrella. They were joined . . . . .
by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military

corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio
de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been
killed by the government because of his involvement in the
* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of
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Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966;
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Galindez case} Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro

Livio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in
Moca on the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.
The Political Group had a less distinct membership. It

included Luis Amiama Tio, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomas
Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support
of General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Armed
Forces, and his brother Bibin. . . . . .
The over-all authority appears to have centered principally

in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient
prestige to command authority. . . . . .
The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When

information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going
to drive to Estancia Fundacion Garcia Guerrero in the . . .
Palace would inform the others by personal message."; . . .
The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace

came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening
of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at
this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza
threatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In any
event, the plan went into execution. Each of them . . . . .
had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own
sawed-off shotgun and two M-l semiautomatic rifles. . . . . .
The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never

very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely
to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was
now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Immediately after
the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to
reach General Roman. . . . . .
The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its

planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as
wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of
de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of General Tomas Diaz,
where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators
were all hunted down very quickly, except for Amiama and
Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until
the danger had passed.
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The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took
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place against a background of international activity in opposition

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to the Trujillo regime, with both the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-
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cut stands. These are some of the highlights:
a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned
for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed
pending receipt of arms from Venezuela. The plot was discovered

and wasrolled up-in January; Venezuela brought charges in the
OAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of
human rights, freedom,- and democracy" following the mass arrests
in the Dominican Republic in January l960. A committee of the
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OAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June

1960
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that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.
b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President

Betancourt on 2h June 1960 killed two in his entourage and
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injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government
announced after capture of most of the assassins that the
Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betan-
court's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the
OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under
Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture
Committee on 2A August in support of a request by President
Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota,
is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic
sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictator-
ship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The

United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican
Republic on 26 August l960, although consular relations were
continued.
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As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation

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[::::::::::::::]we think it would be useful to identify the people b)(3)
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involved, especially since officers of the_Department of State
played a very prominent role.
Washington - Department of State
Roy R. Rubottom Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-American Affairs
Frank Devine J
Special Assistant to Rubottom
John C. Hill Special Assistant to Rubottom
Washington - CIA
J. C. King Chief, WH Division
Chief, Branch III, WH Division (b)(3
Ciudad Trujillo — Department of State
Joseph S. Farland Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is

pertinent to note that King and Ester-
line attribute U.S. and CIA involvement
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with the plotters in the Dominican

Republic to Ambassador Farland. They
describe him as a former FBI employee
who considered himself quite a clandestine
operator. E:::::::::]who later served (bX6)
under him in Panama, called him "a wild
man who bugged the Agency to support a
move to assassinate Trujillo." He had
direct dealings with a number of the key
plotters.
Henry Dearborn Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August

l96O and Consul General thereafter. He
used the code name[:::::]in correspondeflb)
with the plotters.
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Chief of Station until October 1960 (W3)
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Chief of Station from 20 January until (b)(3)

A June l96l. Code name used with the ,
plotters: E::::::] (bX1) '
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Operations Officer (bX3)
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Administrative Assistant (bxg
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Key Dominican Plotters
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Two documents provide a useful point of depafiure, from an
historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from
Ambassador Farland in the .5;‘Dominican Republic to Assistant
Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal
CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had
been played by CIA prior to l960.
16 November 1959
Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum

to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today
than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the
principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:

"
. within this group there is growing militant anti-
. .
American feeling based on the premise that the United States

should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the
overthrow of the Trujillo regime; Discussions I have heard on
this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the
position of the "United States and its adopted doctrine of non-
intervention. . This group is in possession of
. . . .
clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation

when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with
me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."
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15 Februa Ty 1 9 60
A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses

a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic
in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives
stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event
Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by
Castro-type forces.
‘
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
l0 March 1960
This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files
of a plan to persuade ‘Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft

is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President E'i-senhower
from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years
of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo,
with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to
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persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was
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no one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and
to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and

allow asylumn to be arranged for him. His family would have the
wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune
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inside would be placed in trust, to be administered/internationally-
known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.
This proposition received high-level attention in Washington,
including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter,
and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo,
the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative
of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the
President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and
met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it

appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented
as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done.
The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official
U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the

meeting.
22 March 1960
Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom,
forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow
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bearing the code name "Operation Lancet. It was basically a
proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat
of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin with the

who
arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy"/would tell Trujillo
to leave the country. ."He tells it plainly and decisively; he will
give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that
if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which
nwould be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming

Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatun, the plan then outlined steps
for transition to an operating representative government. The army
would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for

flee elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the-plan with these
comments of his own to Rubottom:
"
. this segment of the dissidents is psychologically
. .
conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the

ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect
United States assistance. . . . . .
’
"Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of

our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement
a definite constructive program to influence the course of events
in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary
and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities
of this type of approach. "
. . . . .
30 March & 7 April 1960
The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the
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event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. -On 30 March, fearing
that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S.
civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the
possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic

4
from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On
7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo
fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving
willingly:
"
. it is evident that Trujillo will not consider
. .
making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but

_
that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the

w
I
country on short notice, a la Batista."
9 April 1960
(bX3
from which
the following is an extract:
-"Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements

within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military
,
dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized
to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they
should imediately request United States recognition, and ask for
United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio
i
Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored

invasfions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro
or pro-Comunist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . . .
"What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements

prior to takeover " '
. . . . .
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"FYI wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency

planning purposes only and in no way indicates higher authority
at present contemplates such action. . "
. . . .
11 April 1960
(b)(3
‘n part as follows:
"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make

arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders
are known to me including names their selectees for top <
governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a

general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose
secret discussions. . . . . . '
"Regardless of seething unrest which exists,

. . .
indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly

poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with
military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take-
over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of
following developments (which we summarize below):
(l) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.
(2) ‘An invasfion to serve as a signal to the populace.
(3) Implementation of the dissidents’ "Operation Lancet."
Advance psychological conditioning by radio.

d
(N)
_
(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."
(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding

~
the coup and for the period following it.
Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican
military dissidents. He added: _
"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to

dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist
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them; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could

fully substantiate this cooperation. ,.
" . . . .
9 May 1960
(b)(1
( b )( 3
A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads,

in part, as follows: ,
"The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United

-
States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered

rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw
no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the
arms to the dissidents, But he said, of course, this raises
the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in
this activity. A
"Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He

said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is _the group we want
to support.
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(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations.
Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28
June 1960, it appears that he did not actually return to duty
in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated
l3 June, but he never took the post.)
3 June l96O
Farland met with‘ (b)(3
in WH Division.
(b)( )
('Q@
(b)( )
£:::::::]memorandum of the )(3)

O"
(
2
meeting includes this comment: "
"Farland then told me that the underground opposition are

i
I planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to

use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of
Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-
control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty
well along and could be executed at any time."
Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and l3 June)
The author is not identified nor is there any indication that
the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To
i
precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by l August or as
soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a

I
prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo
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refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or
overt actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A

deadline of l July was proposed for completing arrangements.
17 June 1960
Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence,
queried‘ asking for confirmation on ‘l

(bX3)
L
certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader,
He stated his understanding of the U.S. position )
as follows :
a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against

the Trujillo government while it is in full control.
b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely

to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.
c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly

until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional
I
government which controls a substantial section of the

Domini can Republi c .
20 June 1960
(bX6)
asked Rubottom and Farland
if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a _
meeting dissident leader. Farland replied

in the affirmative.
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28 June 1960
Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with[:::::]

b)(1)
£::::::::]He said thadUUUUUUUUfelt that the time to concentrate on,
E b)(3)
for planning purposes, was the period extending through the '
"incapacitatiod'of Trujillo; too much planning for what would

I
follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.
Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is
a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C.
King that the Government of the United States was prepared to

I participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following
extent;J "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices
for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. . . . . . ",
Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this
time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the
undergpund to accomplish a revolt. T’ .
29 June 1960
Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with{:::::::::::] He /\
E
226»
said that{::::::]had recommended a temporary standdown on "action
oO:/\/
»~»~EZ£Z
toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's

>
reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.

1
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Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking

in
up arms at sea and for caching/nearby caves. He also described an
airdrop site.,
1 July 1960
7
A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval

for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.
I
"It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground

opposition forces in the Dominican Republic l2 sterile U.S. -
rifles, Model l903_(Springfield), with telescopic sights, together

with five hundred rounds of amunition for same. . . . . .
It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD

facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the
opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by
air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for’
delivery by sea.
"Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by
R
.Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that

the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the
i
earliest possible moment. "
The memorandum was signed (bX3

by[::::::::::]fbr Chief;\WH Division; was
concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by
c. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.

'
(bX6)
to airdrop twelve
»
30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and

I
sighted. II
The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop
i
5
site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable
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added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studying
means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."
8 July 1960
Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:

" '
tive learn from[:::::::::::::]and/or (
'-\
;AfAlmDQrTwhat plans and

[I
0-0-
capabilities are to be ( 22* /T/T;

co-F’
emp oye simu taneously with action to incapacitate Trugillo )
and what is needed in way of material support for implementation

of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent
of military participation in preparations. In spite of ( b)(1)
apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most (b)(3)
logical that he is actively collaborating with a group that
must have some plan and capability for action which will assure
stable interim gove ter f Trujillo.
In your opinion arefnmfiniaf]andIemQyalTmembers of same group ( b)(1)
. . . . .
or if not could the two groups be merged? "

( b)(3) . . . . .
8 September l96O
The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department
of State for delivery to Trujillo‘(copy in CIA files dated 6 September)

\
proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom
of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal
approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be
best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.
l8 October 1960
Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandu summarizing approvals
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obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition.
The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your
"
(
verbal request on 13 October l96O . . . This is the memorandum
to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.
29 December 1960
The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read,
in part:
‘
"Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan

for procee d'ing wit h cer ta‘in 1'imi'te d cover t ac t'1v1't'ies d'irec t e d
'
against the Trujillo regime. He em hasized that although

support would be given to
intention of establishing a parami itary force as such
is no Eipjthere . . . . .
(bX1
(bX3
He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of them-
selves bring about the desired result in the near future,
lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
"
. . It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that
. . .
overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be

mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations. . . . . .
it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time

no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention
may be." ,
(Comment: we find nothing in the files identifiable with
such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific
plan of about this date.)
12 January 1961
The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the
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Special Group on this date:

V
"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of
State that limited supplies of small arms and other material
should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican
Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed
securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final trans-
portation into the group being provided by the dissidents
themselves. The Group approved the project."
19 January. 1961 \
Cable from headquarters:
"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,

authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal front
of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition
that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms.
. . Above coordinated with State."
. . .
2% January 1961
Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Pr0ject[::::::]by (bX1

(b)(3
members of the CA Staff and of WH Division:
-
_"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the
Special Group now has approved that a ‘limited supply‘ of
small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to
the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been
dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval
on 29 December 1960 of our Operational Proposal."
(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know
none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.),
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31 January l96l
"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State
Department:
'
"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my

friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been
Amade. »I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too
long the question of actual delivery since they are eager
and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only
lead them to question our sincerity."
6 February 1961
Cable from_headquarters:
u
-
"1. Realize details not now.available but Hqs would
appreciate Zdissidentsl7 reaction to offer of armed assistance
to include Zdissidentsl7 current plan . . .
."2. Also requestljalinitial

Zdissidentsl7 capabili y carry out p
assessment (b)(3
n of action once limited
armed assistance provided."
l0 February 1961 1
The station cabled its reply:
"No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb. "
»"Initial assessment is t (
'
carry out plan. But with access now (

O"
) \/(;Q@
))
/\é\/
approaching point when will better be able evaluate group

O“/-\g
(
EB
potential for action. We some weeks away from being able
make solid preliminary assessment. J _
."Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small
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size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right

direction can be made if we all thrown out. Ammo could
'
come later."
in February 1961
R
At the Special Group meeting of”this date, Mr. Bundy:

we
"
asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher
. . .
authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a

successor government to Trujillo."
(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum
in CIA files.)
15 February 1961
bX3
[:::::::::::]the headquarters branch chief, met with[:::::]
(
(b)(1)
‘in New York City. Excerpts from his
( b)(3)
‘
memorandu record of the meeting follow:

"
.[::::::]played down somewhat the necessity for (bX1)
1
. . . .
delivery of arms, although he did say that it is desireable (bxs)

and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of
the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities
of arms from Army contacts but that any arms so obtained . . .
would have to be used very quickly before their loss is

discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to
have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any
moment desired. "
[iiiiiijsaia that the object of obtaining this kind of help (bX1)

anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms (bX3)
or grenades he began to speak or more exotic materiels and methods
. a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of
. .
Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby
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electronic device (or) . the possibility of poisoning
. . . . .
'
the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles

of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take '
regularly. . . . . .
"A less exotic and more practical plan that

'
they put forward

was one that they said had already been planned at one time
before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for
his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the
dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in
the fdllowing two. The idea that has been discussed internally
is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a
1
given intersection at which time young men who belong to the

action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and
r
grenades to finish off the dictator."

i
h March l 9 61
i
Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of[:::::::]memorandum (bxg)

of his meeting On M March, the chief of staticgggggg
|
l
cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage
and kill him with guns and grenades:
1:1dea . almost certain fail if applied. That

. .
type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified

(W1)
(DX3)
cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles
plus olice practice detour traffic bloc way from entourage
idea fatally childish in '
(W1) (b)(3
(b)(3)
_ (Comment: The assassination was actually carried out
through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and

took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements
in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)
-32-
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The station cabled headquarters on l1 March: '
"
. if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost,
. .
believe imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for

. . .
"
immediate entry DomRep if necessary at air drop sites . . . . . .
5 March 1961
As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication

l
"We have in our hands chance to speedup
events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be
assured as much as human fallibilityppermits. . . .

"
7 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the field, in part:
v
"Existing.authorization precludes introduction arms into
'
Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans

for possible alternate delivery method, request station
determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned
. . Request type and quantity arms desired.
. . .
"
. . . . .
8 March 1961
I
Cable from the station: .
group
Stold
Dearborn on Y March that
~
‘
and(
"llo by [intercepting his car at point L -
CTCT
\\/\_/
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near Date not set and obviously depends .
on Tru J‘illo travel not aware - has tol b >< 1 > 1 >3)
- - 1<
us but interesting that Charge’ Papal Nunciatura also aware plot(b)(3)3)

exists but possibly not of personnel involved."
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8 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:

"Hqs deeply interested plan and request urgently . . .
additional details in order make plans timely assistance.

Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes
Hqs seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that
requested "
4 . . . . .
13 March 1961
\ \
<1>
<8>
l5 March 1961
Cable from the station:
\asked‘ ‘for ( X1)

small supply fragmentation grenades ‘for use in next week or so.
\
By note, the chief of station checked back

learned the dissident group must[:::::::::][Ei11 TrujillQ7 this
withgand /\/-\/\/_\/\
EZ§ZE3Z5T3‘7§’T
month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths

,-\»\§ZEZlZ_E§§Z
are ‘apparently aware renewal plan

1+5 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar,
for five . . . . gasked )
1,500 rounds ammo for )
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same, . . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . . ten 6km tank ’
rockets. .
"
. . .
"
16 March 1961
Headquarters cabled its reply:

A"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and will
. advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is
making reguest on own initiative or is he speaking for
Egggg
If
(bX3)
17 March 1961
-
1:
>
-
Cable from the station: I
"For issue to several [of the dissident group7 Consul

General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson
Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges.
If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try
get from Marines.
"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion [Eb send in each

pouch one small size high fire power weapon7 as Dearborn
increasingly concerned lest momentu which group has now for
Zassassination7 decline result lack tangible or too slow action
on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people
increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day
more involved in [the operation7{ Loss of one of ke o le
thru capture could lead revelation details 0DYOKE[::7:fijF (bX1).
activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend (bX3)
themselves against SIM."
18 Ma rch l96l
Chief of Station[::::::::::]met for the first time with Dr. (bxs)
(bX1)
[:::::::::::::1 He cabled the results:
»
(bxs)
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His group [assassination7 plan now this: Group knows

II
identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once

week or once in two weeks. ¢Goes her apartment incognito and
lightly guarded. Group apprently has someone in building who
4
can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group

will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext dispatch him
or them in silence, enter apartment and try do Zgssassination7,
possibly including mistress, in silence.
"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and -
1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefi ht. Will
use quiet weapons for basic job. . . .
.E::::::::::%::::]finaKb)(U .
position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch (bX3)
or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by,
other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can
count on only one group both receive arms and do La-ssassinatio_1;17.
[:::::::::::::::::1expects and willing risk chaos for period(bX1)

of undetermined length after [assassination] mainly because for (bX3)
security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to
1
get decisive agreement support before Zassassination7.
20 March 1961

"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations
cg against shipment of arms Will deliver to the group's
. . .
representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible.

Coordinated with State Department."
22 March 1961
The station replied, in part:

"
we realize permission does not now exist but
. . .
Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols

via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from
ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then
1
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3please continue try get authorization for air drop of
. . or import arms by [other-7 means. Completely negat'
.
for arms, whatever deliver

a nd p robably by
March 1961
t cooperation
*
. .
.
.
. . . arms
(b)(1)
(W3)
The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable,
but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the
cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P
(Bissell) undertook to setjstraight.

ofj
The cable gives a fairly _
(b)(3)
complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and (b)(3)
responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to

replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if
planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine
guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the
dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters

is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by
the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government. 4
"If above clarifies Hqs position,

\:|should proceed accordingly. (b)(3)
In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing
orders permit return for consultations."
(Comment: we do not know whethergeplied to this cable (W3)

or not. We do not find a reply in the files. jdid go to (b)(3)
headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot

A
- 37 -
* It is apparent from the operational files that no arms were (b)(1)

ever air-dropped or delivered by sea. (b)(3)
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establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There
is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in
connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine
guns.)
26 March 1961

'
request permission pass three semi- (b)(1)

automatic M-l carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which availabl(b)(3)
consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs
nine O cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by
note 25 March which says he cannot hold group (b)(1)
"
together beyond April 15 without arms delivery. . (b)(3) . . . .
(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology
at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were
actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of
‘
‘who worked out the details of the assassinatioggggg
and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly
were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have
no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting.
The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually
used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various
sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no
evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)
-38..
c/a l"‘V"i ms F"'*“8 ms EF'§F“il @: wa 5‘“‘l7“‘D
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27 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station: ‘
FYI, ref hardware [the three pistols the station asked be

II
pouched7 makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment.

Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package;
|
I
or whether split shipment preferable."
(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these

|
.revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not,
I
because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)
29 March 1961
I

"
. Hqs inclined to favor passingE::::::::::::]ref
. . (bX1)
carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation flfl(3)
inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's
l
1
ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure

manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming
witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require
Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. Advise. . . . . .
Pouching nine magazines . .."

'
. . . .
31 March 1961
The station replied: ,
1
"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act
in anyway. Plan file off serial nubers. Will handle packaging
after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is
Dearborn. Delivery to!
|
(bX1) \
\depending on what (b)(3)

steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this
\
message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of
,
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good will to£:::::::::::::]now. These items are not what he (bX1)

asked for but they are an iE¥Estment in operational c0ntinuity.(bX3)
The security risk in his having these items is no greater than
his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated
and less secure cache or drop."
Headquarters cable to the station:
'Q§%ssing the three carbine§7 approved. Advise Hqs when

passing of this equipment completed.
(Coment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)
7 April 1961
>
"ZThe pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbine§7

'
contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines

as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-l carbine
magazines."
9 April 1961

i
_¢ passed
i
[the three carbinesf to L444444444444lApril T.

O'D-
/\/-\
No complications /-\/\\_/
U'U"\
\/\/i
/-\/\\_/
OO—\
\/\/
(Comment: The files do not contain an account of how the
carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters

subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents.
Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the
submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose

use essentially same technique as that for [the three carbines7.
_ ho _
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(b)(3
7 April 1961
Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting

v
waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. “The above request

l
is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has

requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and
!
1
211-O
i
rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action
group to be used for self protection."

I
(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request

4
for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station.
This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was
v
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at headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made the
plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-
called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval was
never given the station to pass them to the plotters.)
12 April 1961
"Equipment for[::::::::::::flZsubmachine gun§7 which subject(bX1)

of Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched 1A
April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme of
. . . b3
(X)
delivery proposed."
(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on
the 9 April entry.)
13 April 1961
An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from

(W)
<8>
"The three Leica cameras, model M-l [the three carbine_§7,
with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day
or two. . . With the small amount of equipment which they
. . .
are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places
and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and
,
the time factor considerably extended accordingl With the .
rest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) Z%he submachine

gun§7 the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost
‘time greatly reduced."
11+ APrl 1 1 9 61
Extract from a note from <b(b)(1>
<b>
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Eonsul General Dearbor_r_i_7:
"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands

of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras V
in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo

we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."
17 April 1961
Note frori and O

O" _\
i
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U0"
\/\./\/\/ \/\./\/\/
/T/T/T/T /T/T/T/T
rbor_r_17 : _
O"
(,9
"The last word. up to the te in the matter of cameras:

‘
says that with the 3 Leica (bX1)

cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the photographfi(b)(3)
\
job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 1+ M-3

Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered
he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he
needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my
belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological
purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the
good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in
several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they
see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing
is waiting for the heavy cameras." V,
17 April 1961

"
repeat not
portant [the submachine guns] not/be
'
.
passed Hqs approval. Please (b)(1)

advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of (b)(3)
delivery."
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20 April 1961

"
[ J
Submachine guns should be held in station custod t'll
further no etice and not repeat not be passed to < 1
>'
This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum crea ed(b)(3)
by [§ssassination7 now bigger question than ever view unsettled
conditions in Caribbean area.
"Request station provide foll info soonest:

[Details on an alternate
the three carb‘1ne_§7 b een de l‘ivere d to
l iver
a
submachine gun§7
Have
(b) (
which would involve " '

(
/\/“Q3
2263
oO:/\/
\/\./
(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sent -
just three days after the failure of the landing at the Bay of
Pigs.)
20 April 1961
Note from\\ L
"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not

only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery
of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and
disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."
T
20 April 1961 -
"£0-ubmachine gun§7 here l9 April with no entry problems

whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can
be simplified even more.‘
bX1)
\
'
Request Hqs advise when we may begin." (b)(3)
_L;J4._
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(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic

wrapping" is not ‘further clarified in the file.
E Ni
Norman Gall,
writing in Republic, said -that the weapons were shipped
to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the sub-
machine guns were packed in food containers for
pouching. If so,
we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair
confidence that these submachine guns were never
passed out of
the consulate. As late as the very of the assassination M
jsent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his
passing
/\/'\ CTCT
\_/\/
(1)
(3)
them. ’I'his sounds as if there must have been a leak from the
consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the

I
submachine
guns .
1 ‘Z
QZQZ
3)
/T/T /T/T
LCTCTL
|
21. April 1961
I
1
Cable from headquarters to the station:
"L§ubmachine gun§7 should be held in statio

1
1
'
further notice and not repeat not be passed

(b)(1)
22 April 1961 (b)(3)
The station replied to headquarters‘

query of 20 April
regarding disposition of the three carbines:
" @
- - - -
iven t ree carbine§7 CTCT
to intermediary w o holding until "

picks up . . . .
E
.
A’XX g\w /\/\/\/
w@
)
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(Comment: This "intermediary".appears to have beenj

significance of this and the security problem it
posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for
31 May.)
’
’
25 April 1961
"Foll from Dearborn: ‘I believée political consequence of not

delivering Eubmachine gun§7 so serips I plan go Washington within
next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"
26 April 1961
Cable from the station :A
Maza
fig£_]told Chief of Station Antonio de la
ans r assassination between 29 April and 2 May.
. . .
(DX1)
(b)(3)
not yet a plan. No solid other (b)(1)
'
members assassination effort butwyare umTprobab1(b)(3)

will aid. Will use t e carbines plus whatever else can (hvm
get. De la Maza the submachine guns if possible
II
30 April l96l
"Follo ing from De April as emissa -

@@
[:::::::::::Tand called on me with foll info: . . .

CTCTCT
main mission was plead with me release submachine guns the

O-/\/\*'\
c,/\/\-\
Q)
/\\/\/_/ /\\/\/_/
)
believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3
0O—\
\/
)
carbines, 1+ to 6 12-gflflge shotguns with l20 rounds and some small
arms. . . Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal
. . .
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and few additional weapons could be important. I replied . . . . .
I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S.

controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released
on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that
since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had
occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study
"
and assessment.
'
. . . . .
2 May 1961
Cable from the station: “
" .*.
suggest Hqs review decision not pass submachine
. . .
guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly\inadequate

means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the
overthrow of the Trujillo regime."
2 May 1961
Draft cable prepared at headquarterszp

"
. Since it appears that EMOTH group has committed
. . . .
itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with

fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal
defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to[:::::]for (bX1
their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . .(bX3 . .
(Cement: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated
by Ray Herbert for J. C. King,and Richard Bissell coordinated on
it. It was forwarded to the DDCI for release., General Cabell
attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div.,
unacted upon.")
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A May 1961 .
The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a
new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these
would work or not.
5 May 1961
Headquarters cabled the station: 1
(bX1
8 May 1961

(bX1)
16 May 1961
"For Achilles and Coerr ‘from Dearborn:

on me night May 15." Stated he emissary from action group which /%
/%/%
$/&/
plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. E;E;EZEZ

><><¢°-*
mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine Q)

&/&/
guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep "

. . . . .
(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible
memorandum in thejfiles. It is dated 17 May l96l and con /-\/-\
a meeting witli The -transmittal dispatch mak(D

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it clear that the authorwas‘

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This is our interpretation of what

‘ ‘
trying to say: Sometime during the second (b)(1)

(b)(3)
week of May,[:::::::::::]asked{:::::::::::::::]t0 return the thrfggxg
carbinesjhad givenj for the plotters. (b)(1)

(b)(3)
first refused but finally agreed.‘ /firesumablyz then passe<(D)('|)
(h\(Q\
Maggjagain
;
them to Antonio de la Mazaj On 15 saw REM?

( )( )
‘
‘said he had the carbines back in his posses:(E)(;)
( )( )
and his group planned to carry out the assassination the following
night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that
Shad been working with on behalf of the consulate. (b)(1)
jwas
\
/|'\\/Q\
315
arrived stiJ('-b‘)("i‘)
withj ‘Afterj
.
(b)(3)
left, he (b)(1)
b 3
had given the Carbines back he was £03“
(b)(3)
certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and was
to do the job did not know each ~other's.identities. whilej

Zwas talking withthe man to whom Shad last H
given the weapons Qresumably Antonio de la
0 I
Maz_a_7 arrived
‘asked him if he had returned the carbin

O" _\
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U0"
He replied that had not that that, if she wante

/T/T/T/T
\./\./\/\/ \./\./\/\/
/TD/-K/T/T
O"
(,9
confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he
always carried them.)
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18 May 1961
I
There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with
respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought

|
that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious
paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded
the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that
impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:
"General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were

pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in
U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the
feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be
passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary
position at this time." *
25 May 1961
The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed
‘
discussion of "further guidance\to Dearborn re contacts with
dissidents." The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention
I
of the subject.
1
27 May 1961
The station cabled:
"Departmenfi from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with H

~-
, _ \ ,
-K:::::1 made no request for arms whid (bX1)

I S
E - -
indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has. (bX3)
1
-50..
* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine
guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the
dissidents.
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His only statement on this subject was that group has arms but is
somewhat concerned whether enough.
"He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for

past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic
elements of which he member remains on brink final performance
and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because
action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which
not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed
sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once
signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-
United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow
Trujillo.
"I replied speed with which assistance could be
. . .
given would be increased considerably if we could have prior

info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities
involved and identity of proposed junta. . He replied . . . .
participants were not prepared give their names until afterward

and could not give time for reasons stated earlier. . . . . .
"Re timingE::::::]stressed event could happen any day and (bX1)

could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that (DX3)
necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize." ,
29 May 1961

"For Dearborn from State We must not run risk . . . . .
of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S.

as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This
last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful
situation. . . . You must request and receive further
. .
specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the

present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. . . . .
"
(Coment: Both Dearborn and the chief of station sent
cables commenting on this guidance cable. -Their cables were filed
,— 51 -
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in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington

1
until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours

»
i
after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)
m
31 May 1961
."State from Dearborn

l
If attempt is made by U.S.

. . . . .
friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against

i
us and best we can d ‘s see there is no proof. Greatest danger

point isE:::::::::::?:i:] He was given small number arms by (b
dissident agent to hold several days and has told several person /\
dissidents obtained these items from consulate. E:::::::]told me

/\/\g\./
0O;\/\/
E233
)
same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know
)
and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents
I told him this impossible. -
"
. . . .
Cable from chief of station:
;"Assume [the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn7 is

final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based.
This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy.
However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already
associated with assassination. If we are to at least try ‘cover
'
up tracks,‘ CIA personnel directly involved in assassination

preparation must be withdrawn now. If assassination . . . . .
tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of

station, the operations officer, and the administrative
assistant mandatory. ". . . . .
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31 May 1961
Received in Headquarters Signal Center at O3l+l hours,

Washington .time:
FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER l. APPR 2.

SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C
SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL
WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KILLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN

CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON. CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO
HAINA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY.
i INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY

I
>
FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS omens WITH MACHETES. N0
CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED o6ooz.
[6200 Washington @197 -
?
(Comment: The station's follow-'-up operational cable
I
identified the source of Critic No. l as Eb)(1)

b)(3)
who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn
and Chief of Stationjat the consulate. At about OlOO hours, (b)(3
Dominican time Dearborn "to ask j&/
Eb
jsaid
/1/T
cr‘yptically whether we had the news." he would add

>i€x<'°—‘
)
Q)
)
details when he had them.)
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3 June 1961
Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:

"The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediatel in
move ou o tr
Case Officer
‘can epu ic thStt
'
e a ion ie an
It was also decided that Administrative
Rbl chffia (bX3)
\DA°)
Assistant should not return to Tru'illo.‘
J Accord- (DX3)
ingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station
the afternoon of 2 June issuing appropriate instructions."
9 June 1961
Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject:
"High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:

r"The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June l96l in Room
75lh of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice
President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer,
Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson,
Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard
Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion
and Mr. Jameson.
"Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message
from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to
the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of
arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what
was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms."
(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson
referred is not in the[:::::]operational files. We did not

Egggg
find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake
Esterline, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination
planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's
_5u_
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query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now
remember. There is an unsigned memorandu in the[::::::1file (DX1)

(b)(3)
dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject:
"ODACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents."
The memorandum summarizes State Department—Consulate involvement
in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and
record sheet attached to the memorandum shows it was originated

(bxs)
by[::::::::::::]WH3/DR&H, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH
(Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record sheet
and returned the memorandu to[::::::::] This suggests to us (b)(3
that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked
Esterline to have a summary pulled together.
J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President
asked about the delivery of arms.‘ He does not now recall the
specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting
leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was
directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that,
if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of
that fact in his record of the meeting.
A memorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White
House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention
of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting
was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.
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The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary
account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting
the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination.
Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow
the assassination never took place. wAnother essential part of the
story is thexroll-up of the assassination group and the discovery
of U.S. involvement with them. The consulate cabled through CIA
channels -on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issue of the
Dominican newspaper _L§_ _Nacion carried a story

"
. . . based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel's statement
to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo _A. Berry)
provided the caliber 30 M-l Garand automatic carbines used
to kill Trujillo." ~
(b)(7)(d)
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(b)(3)
his wife, and their children were allowed to
leave the Dominican Republic. They went to Florida and subsequently
visited Washington. (bX1
(b)(3§
‘
‘
After amnesty was granted the plotters in
December l96l,[}eturned to Santo Domingo and resued (b)(?>)
(b)(\b)(?>)
They, continued
to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch
supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin
y Wessin faction
and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the
governments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.
To recap:
a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King

on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to partici-
pate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of
providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of
key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting

DCI, on l July 1960 approved delivering l2 Springfield rifles to
the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. .The rifles
were never delivered.
b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled a
suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be
forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon.
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c. On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request
of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber
Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members

I
of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch

1
the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication
r
in th%[:::::::hperational files that the pistols were actually
I
I
Egggg
Y pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken
by‘ a subsquant request for submachine guns.
d. On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for

1
permission to pass three semi-automatic M-l carbines plus
ammunition to[::::::::::::::::::] The carbines and ammunition (b)(1)~

(b)(3)
were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel.
The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Head-

I
quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched
the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was
released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file
off the carbines’ serial numbers. The station cabled that the
i
carbines were passed to /\/'\ CTCT

\_/\/
/\/'\
0O—\
\_/\/
\
‘on 7 April 1961. [::::::]at the reques cf" CT —\
of the dissidents, gave the carbines to[:::::::::::::::::]for CU

I
-00
/-\/\/\/-/-\/\
U/\/\/\/-/\/\
CTCT —\0O
temporary safekeeping. {:::::1later recovered the carbines froB

/\/“\/\/\./\.\/\./ /\/“\/\/\./\.\/\./
CT
[:::::::1and gave them to Antonio de la Maza, who reportedly ke pt )

\/\-00
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them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least
one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination
by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used

in the shooting.
(b)(7)(¢|)
I
v e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April
l96l, Chief of Station[:::::::::::]evidently prevailed upon (b)(3)
headquarters,to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition

K
to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived
at the station on l9 April l96l. Headquarters cabled the station

I
k
on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to
the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite
repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul -
General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass
them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns
were never passed to the dissidents.
A final, and rather sorry, footnotezd We do not know the

motivations of men such as Eb;
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Rafael Trujillo, The Domi (15603377)

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C066129S3

Overt knowledge of U.S. Government involvement

The organization of the coup group I-—'OfJO\uol\Jl—'

Why a coup failed to follow the assassination . . . . . . . .

International activity in opposition to Trujillo

The first Farland memorandu

level of CIA activity prior to 1960 . . . . . . . . . .

Approach to Trujillo by General Clark 17

about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's

custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal

about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler

with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying

cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San

Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action:

after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a

Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.

On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on

armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and

in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while

resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture. k

(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved

can F91 era :2: F7’? ~ma —E‘a’ ﬁ"“F“ﬂ c/a as

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C06612953

There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the

Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty,

issue of l3 April 1963. Excerpts follow:

The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L.

The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in

As TruJillo's political and financial problems deepened,

named Plato Cox.

shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad

Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated

The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled

the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C06612953

gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans,

Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during

It can be reported on excellent authority that close

Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed

we interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. c. King (then

Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (thenKChief of Qperations,

WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to

pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the

Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the

"Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C06612953 Y =

furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute

tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency

interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation

involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not

have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons

supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo.

has a vague impression that one of them was.

are now widely scattered. was chief of station (b)(3)

until October 1960, is now retired. who was chief (b)(3)

-of station at the time of the assassination, is in U ; U X3)

the station's administrative assistant who was used as a U

communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1961+

and is believed to be living in‘ ‘the head- (b)(3)

quarters branch chief‘, is We elected not to call