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Unit-13 Structure and Function

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Unit-13 Structure and Function

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priyanshu.g4804
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Socialisation

UNIT 13 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION*

Structure
13.0 Objectives
13.1 Introduction
13.2 From Positivism to Functionalism
13.3 The Premises of Functionalism
13.4 Functionalism in Social Anthropology: Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski
13.5 Functionalism of Talcott Parsons and Robert K.Merton
13.6 Let Us Sum Up
13.7 Check Your Progress
13.8 References

13.0 OBJECTIVES
After going through this Unit, you will be able to:
Explain the premises of functionalism;
Discuss the relevance of the concept of function in understanding society;
and
Compare and contrast the theoretical approach of Radcliffe-brown,
Malinowski and parsons.

13.1 INTRODUCTION
Functionalism is the name of an approach in social anthropology and sociology
according to which a society is a whole of interconnected parts, where each part
contributes to the maintenance of the whole. The task of sociology is to find out
the contribution of each part of society and how society works together as an
ordered arrangement of parts. At the same time ‘function’ is a multi-meaning
and multi-usage term, Levy, Jr. (1968: 22) writers: ‘Perhaps the major difficulty
associated with the general concept of function has been the use of a single term
to cover several distinctly different referents.’

As a distinct approach, as a way of looking at and analyzing society, functionalism


emerged first in social anthropology in early twentieth century, and later in
sociology, beginning in the 1930s. However, its roots are as ancient as the concept
of organic analogy, used in the philosophy of Antiquity by Plato (B.C. 428/7-
345/7) and Aristotle (B.C. 384-322). Some writers regard Claude Henri de
Saint-Simon, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century scholar, writing
after the French Revolution, as the ‘father of sociology’, because in his writings,
one finds a coexistence of two ideas- one from which a scientific study of society
emerged, and the other which contributed substantially to the growth of Marxian
theory (Giddens 1973). The first idea is that ‘scientific methods’ should be used
for the study of society, and the second is that each society contains in it the

* This unit is contributed by Prof. (Retd.) Vinay Kumar Srivastava, DU. The Unit has been
adopted after editing from Unit 6 of MSO-001.
155
Basic Concepts germs of its contradiction, because of which it changes over time. Saint-Simon
also recognizes revolution as an important process of change.

It is the first thought of studying a society scientifically that Auguste Comte


(1789-1857), the collaborator of Saint-Simon and the person who has coined
the term ‘sociology’, fully develops under the rubric of what the calls ‘positivism’
or ‘positive philosophy’. In this view, the methods for the study of society come
from natural and biological sciences. The aim of the study is to discover the
‘Laws of evolution’ as well as the ‘Laws of functioning’ of society, i.e., ‘how
has the society evolved with the passage of time and what are the various stages
through which it has passed’ and ‘how does the society function (or work) at a
particular point of time.’

In this unit we expose the concept of function in sociological writings. We begin


with the basic premises of functionalism and then look into the theoretical
contributions of Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, and Parsons.

13.2 FROM POSITIVISM TO FUNCTIONALISM


The immediate forerunner of functionalism in sociology is Emile Durkheim
(1858-1917), who is a sharp critic of Comte as well as influenced by his ideas.Like
Comte, Durkheim is keenly interested in defining the subject matter of sociology
as distinct from that of philosophy or biology. For him, sociology is a comparative
and an objective study of ‘social facts’, which are the ‘ways of thinking, acting
and feeling’ that have the ‘noteworthy property’ of existing outside the ‘individual
consciousness’. Social facts do not originate in the individual but in the
collectivity, in the ‘collective mind’. Because they exist outside the individual,
they can be studied in the same way as one studies the material objects. Social
facts are ‘things’, perceived objectively and outside the individual. This however
does not mean that they are as tangible as are the ‘material things’. Instead, for
their study one uses the same frame of mind which one uses for the study of
natural and biological objects that constitute the subject matter of natural and
biological sciences. Durkheim’s book titled The Rules of the Sociological method
(1895) was basically concerned with these issues.

Box 13.1: Sociological Explanations


From the study of social facts, sociologists offer what Durkheim calls
‘sociological explanations’. Each sociological explanation is consisted of
two parts: to quote Durkheim (1895: 123) here: ‘ …to explain a social
phenomenon the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills
must be investigated separately,’ the first component of the sociological
explanation is the ‘causal-historical explanation’: to delineate the cause(s)
which produce a phenomenon by examining historical sources rather than
indulging in what Radcliffe-Brown calls ‘conjectural history’. The second
component is ‘functional’, i.e., the contribution that a part makes to society
‘in the establishment of ... general harmony’ (Durkheim 1895: 125).

Durkheim’s definition of function has tremendously influenced the writings of


later functionalists, both in social anthropology and sociology. For him, function
is the ‘contribution’ a part makes to the whole for its ‘maintenance and well
being’. Thus, function is a ‘positive contribution’: it is inherently good for society
156 (the whole), for it ensures its continuity and healthy maintenance.
For instance, in his doctoral work, which was on the division of labour, Durkheim Structure and Function
(1893) rejects Darwin’s idea survival. Instead of lending support to the theory
of competition, conflict and elimination, Durkheim shows that as human
population increases, society becomes more and more differentiated with the
division of labour moving towards the specialization of jobs. Rather than
competing with others for survival, human beings are able to depend on one
another. Specialization makes each one of the beings important for society.

Durkheim is also critical of the utilitarian (i.e., economic) and individualistic


(i.e., psychological) explanations, because according to him none of them actually
explains the real function of the division of labour. For him, the function of the
division of labour is sociological: it contributes to social solidarity. Modern
industrial society is integrated because of the interdependence that comes into
existence with the specialization of jobs. In his study of Australian Totemism,
he shows that the function of religion is to produce solidarity in society, ‘to bind
people in a moral community called church’ (Durkheim 1915).

Durkheim is particularly interested in showing that the function of social facts


is moral. Social institutions work to produce the goal of integration.

With this perspective, he is able to account for such phenomena that to many
may appear ‘unhealthy’ for society. For example, he regards crime as a ‘normal’
and healthy’ feature of all societies, because it reinforces collective sentiments
and works towards the evolution of morality and law. A normal rate of crime
indicates that the society lacks the total authority to ‘suppress’ all ‘divergences’
of the individual to express them as ‘individuals’. However, if crime exceeds
the normal limits, then it becomes unhealthy (or ‘pathological’), jeopardizing
the normal functioning of society. As is clear, Durkheim distinguishes between
the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ forms of social facts. What is general in a
society is normal and what is not is pathological. The former performs the function
of integrating society, whereas the latter, thwarts the process of integration.

13.3 THE PREMISES OF FUNCTIONALISM


Durkheim is not a ‘functionalist’ in the sense in which this term has come to be
used for the approach that the British social anthropologists, A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown (1881-1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), have espoused.
Durkheim does not use the term ‘functionalism’, although he defines the concept
of social function. One comes across in Durkheim’s works a fine coexistence of
the diachronic (genetic, evolutionary, and historical) and the synchronic (society
‘here and now’) approaches. For instance, in his celebrated study of religion, he
begins with a consideration of Australian Totemism as the most elementary form
of religious life, but instead of speculating on origin he is more concerned with
the function of totemism and how its study can help us in understanding the
place of religion in complex societies. This emphasis on the study of synchronous
(or ‘present’) societies exerted a tremendous impact on later scholars.

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of functionalism and
disappearance of evolutionary theory. Adam Kuper (1973) thinks that 1922 was
the ‘year of wonder’ (annus mirabilis) of functionalism, for in this year were
published two monographs that substantiated the functional approach. One was
by Radcliffe-Brown titled The Andaman Islanders, and the other, by Malinowski,
157
Basic Concepts titled Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The impact of anthropological
functionalism was felt in other disciplines, particularly sociology. Sociologists
such as Talcott Parsons were clearly impressed with the writings of functional
anthropologists. As a result functionalism emerged as an extremely important
approach, holding its sway till the late 1960s and the early 1970s. In its history
of about 150 years, first in the positivism of Comte, then in the ‘sociologistic
positivism’ of Durkheim, and then, in the works of the twentieth-century
functionalists, functionalism has come to comprise a number of variants and
fact. Pointed differences exist between different functionalists – in fact, some of
them happen to be archrivals, like Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski.
Notwithstanding their differences, it seems that all functionalists share the
following five propositions:
1) Society (or culture) is a system like any other system, such as solar system,
or organic system.
2) As a system, society (or culture) consists of parts (like, institutions, groups,
role, associations, organisations), which are interconnected, interrelated,
and interdependent.
3) Each part performs its own function – it makes its own contribution to the
whole society (or culture) – and also, it functions in relationship with other
parts.
4) A change in one part brings about a change in other parts, or at least
influences the functioning of other parts, because all the parts are closely
connected.
5) The entire society or culture – for which we can use the term ‘whole’ is
greater than the mere summation of parts. It cannot be reduced to any part,
or no part can explain the whole. A society (or culture) has its own identity,
its own ‘consciousness’, or in Durkheim’s words, ‘collective consciousness’.

13.4 FUNCTIONALISM IN SOCIAL


ANTHROPOLOGY: RADCLIFFE-BROWN
AND MALINOWSKI
Both the founders of the British functional approach (Radcliffe-Brown and
Malinowski) were vehemently critical of the nineteenth-century evolutionism.
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) said that it was based on ‘conjectural history’, a term
we used earlier, and not ‘authentic history’. It was ‘pseudo-historical’, thus devoid
of a scientific value. For Malinowski (1944), classical evolutionism was a ‘limbo
of conjectural reconstructions’. With the works of these scholars came a shift
from:

1) Arm-chair anthropology to fieldwork-based studies;

2) The study of the origin and stages of evolution of society and to institutions
(diachronic studies) to society ‘here and now’ (synchronic studies);

3) The study of the entire societies and cultures (macro approach) to the study
of particular societies, especially the small-scale societies (micro approach);
and

158
4) An understanding of society confined to a theoretical level to putting the Structure and Function
knowledge of society ‘here and now’ to practical use, to bring about desired
changes in society. It was believed that the knowledge acquired should be
used for improving upon the conditions of people in society. Malinowski
called this concern of anthropology ‘practical anthropology’.

The functionalists did not leveltheir criticism against the processes of diffusion
and evolution, for they knew that they were important processes of change. In
fact, both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski thought that eventually they would
take up the study of these processes.What they were against was a study of the
past through ‘imaginative history’ rather than empirical studies. If authentic
documents were available about societies, theymaybe used for some insights
into change. But the functionalists noted that these documents were not available
about ‘primitive and pre-literate’ societies.

Structural-functional Approach of Radcliffe-Brown


Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 180) defines each society as a ‘functionally interrelated
system’ in which ‘general laws or functions operate’. He accepts that Durkheim
offered the first systematic formulation of the concept of function and that this
concept is based on an ‘analogy between social life and organic life’.
However,Radcliffe-Brown suspected that functionalism as used by Durkheim
might become teleological. He thus substitutes for the word ‘need’ the term
‘necessary conditions of existence.’ He believes that the question of which
conditions are necessary for survival is an empirical one, and the study of a
society will tell us about this. Radcliffe-Brown recognizes the ‘diversity of
conditions necessary for the survival of different systems.’ Once we have
recognized this, we shall avoid asserting that each item of a culture must have a
function and that ‘items in different cultures must have the same functions’
(Turner 1987: 48)

Radcliffe-Brown dislikes the use of the word ‘functionalism’, which Malinowski


propagated with enthusiasm. His objection is that ‘-isms’ (like functionalism)
are ideologies, schools of thought, philosophies, and realms of opinions. Science
does not have either of them. What it has are the methods of study, opting for
those methods that are regarded as the best for study.

Moreover, Radcliffe-Brown also looks at the distinction between an organism


and society. For instance, an organism dies, but a society continues to survive
over time, although it may be changed and transformed. An organism can be
studied even when its parts have stopped working. In over words, the structure
of an organism can be studied separately from its function, which is not the case
with society. Social structure is observable only when it functions. Structure
and function are inalienable concepts in social-anthropology; that is why
Radcliffe-Brown calls his approach ‘structural-functional’, rather than
‘functional’, as many have done. He writes (1952: 180):

The concept of function…involves the notion of a structure consisting of a set


of relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the structure being maintained
by a life-process make up of the activities of the constituent units.

Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functional approach comprises the following


assumptions:
159
Basic Concepts 1) A necessary condition for survival of a society is a minimal integration of
its parts.
2) The concept of function refers to those processes that maintain the necessary
integration or solidarity.
3) And, in each society, structural features can be shown to contribute to the
maintenance of necessary solidarity.
For Durkheim, the central concept is of solidarity, while for Radcliffe-Brown, it
is the ‘structural continuity’ of society. For example, in an analysis of the lineage
system, according to Radcliffe-Brown, one must first assume that some minimal
degree of solidarity must exist for it to continue. Then, one must examine the
processes associated with the lineage system, assessing their consequences for
maintaining social integration. Then, one will move to the other systems of
society, analyzing at each level the contribution a part will make to the structural
continuity of the whole.

Reflection and Action 13.1


What are the assumptions of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural functional
approach?
Radcliffe-Brown is far from being dogmatic in his assertions. For him, the
functional unity (or integration) of a social system is a hypothesis. That we look
for integration and structural continuity of society does not imply that does not
imply that it does not change, Radcliffe-Brown believes that the states of ‘social
health’ (eunomia), and ‘social illness’ ( dysnomia) constitute two ends of the
continuum, and the actual society seems to lie somewhere in between.

b) The Functionalism of Malinowski


By comparison to Radcliffe-Brown, it is Malinowski who claims the creation of
a separate ‘school’, the ‘Functional School’. Malinowski (1926:132-3) assumes
that In every civilization every custom, material object, ideas and belief fulfils
some vital function, has some task to accomplish and is indispensable within a
working whole.

Whereas Radcliffe-Brown begins with society and its necessary conditions of


existence (i.e., integration), Malinowski’s starting point is the individual, who
has a set of ‘basic’ (or ‘biological’) needs that must be satisfied for its survival.
It is because of the importance that Malinowski gives the individual that the
term ‘psychological functionalism’ is reserved for him, in comparison to
Radcliffe-Brown’s approach which is called ‘sociological functionalism’ because
in this society is the key concept.

Malinowski’s approach distinguishes between three levels: the biological, the


social structural, and the symbolic (Turner 1987: 50-1). Each of these levels has
a set of needs that must be satisfied for the survival of the individual. It is on his
survival that the survival of larger entities (such as groups, communities, societies)
is dependent. Malinowski proposes that these three levels constitutes a hierarchy.
At the bottom is placed the biological system, followed next by the social-
structural, and finally, by the symbolic system. The way in which needs at one
level are fulfilled will affect the way in which they will be fulfilled at the
subsequent levels.
160
The most basic needs are the biological, but this does not imply any kind of Structure and Function
reductionism, because each level constitutes its distinct properties and needs,
and from the interrelationship of different levels that culture emerges as an
integrated whole. Culture is the kernel of Malinowski’s approach. It is ‘uniquely
human’, for it is not found to exist among sub-humans. Comprising all those
things- material and non-material- that human beings have made right from the
time they separated from their simian ancestors, culture has been the instrument
that satisfies the biological needs of human beings. It is a need-serving and
need-fulfilling systems. Because of this role of culture is satisfying biological
needs that Malinowski’s functionalism is also known as ‘bio-cultural
functionalism.’

One more difference between Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski may be noted


here. A concept fundamental to Malinowski- the concept of culture- is a mere
epiphenomena (secondary and incidental) for Radcliffe-Brown. He believes that
the study of social structure (which for him is an observable entity) encompasses
the study of culture; therefore, there is no need to have a separate field to study
culture. Further, whilst social structure is the individual peoples, culture is in
the minds of people, not amenable to observation in the same way as social
structure is. Radcliffe-Brown wants to make social anthropology a branch of
natural science, which would be possible when there is an empirically investigable
subject matter.

Reflection and Action 13.2


What are the major differences between the theoretical approaches of
Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski?

The basis of Malinowski’s approach is a theory of ‘vital sequences’, which have


a biological foundation and are incorporated into all societies. These sequences
number eleven, each composed of an ‘impulse’, an associated physiological
‘act’, and a satisfaction which results from that act. For instance, the impulse of
somnolence accompanies the act of sleep, resulting in satisfaction by ‘awakening
with restored energy’ (Malinowski 1944: 77; Barnard 2000:68). Malinowski
follows this eleven-fold paradigm with a set of seven biological needs and their
respective cultural responses (see Table 6.2).
Basic Needs Cultural Responses
1) Metabolism Commissariat
2) Reproduction Kinship
3) Bodily comfort Shelter
4) Safety Protection
5) Movement Activities
6) Growth Training
7) Health Hygiene
For example, the first need is of food, and the cultural mechanisms are centered
on the processes of food getting, for which Malinowski uses the term
‘commissariat’, which means the convoy that transports food. Similarly, the
second need is of reproduction (biological continuity of society) and the cultural
response to which is kinship concerned with regulating sex and marriage. From 161
Basic Concepts this, Malinowski goes on to four-fold sequences, which he calls the ‘instrumental
imperatives’, and associates each one of them with their respective cultural
responses. The four-fold sequence is of economy, social control, education, and
political organization. From here, he shifts to the symbolic system – of religion,
magic, beliefs and values – examining its role in culture.

13.5 FUNCTIONALISM OF TALCOTT PARSONS


(1902-1979) AND ROBERT K. MERTON (1910-
2003)
In 1975, in an important article, Parsons labels his student, Robert Merton and
himself ‘arch-functionalists’. For him, structure refers to ‘any set of relations
among parts of a living system’. On empirical grounds, he says, it can be assumed
or shown that these relations are stable over a time period. By process, which is
the correlative concept with structure, one refers to the ‘changes’ that occur in
the state of the system or its relevant parts. With respect to structure, the key
concept is of stability, and with respect to process, it is of change. Thus, by
structure, we refer to a pattern of relationships in a social system, and process
refers to the changes occurring in that system. A significant characteristic of
‘structural functionalism’ has been that it has stressed ‘structure’ over ‘process’.

Parsons thinks that his original formulation under the rubric of ‘structural
functionalism’ tends to analyze society as if it is static, but the new formulation,
where stress is laid on the concept of function than structure, in the name of
functionalism, takes much more account of change and evolution. For example,
one may examine in the American context, the function of the process of education
of women on ‘static’ structures like family.

Parsons’ functionalism is best known in terms of the ‘functional imperatives’,


the essential conditions required for the enduring existence of a system (Parsons
1951). Also known as the ‘AGIL model’ (based on the first letters of the four
functions that Parsons has devised) or the ‘four-function paradigm’, it evolved
from Parsons’ collaborative work with Robert F.Bales in experiments on
leadership in small groups (Rocher 1974).

All ‘action systems’ – and society is one of them – face four major ‘problems’
(or have four major ‘needs’), namely Adaptation (A), Goal Attainment (G),
integration (1), and Pattern Maintenance, or, as Parsons later renamed it, Latent
Pattern Maintenance-Tension Management, or simply, Latency (L). Parsons
pictures society (or the social system) as a large square, which he divides into
four equal parts. The underlying idea is that all systems need to accomplish
these four functions in order to survive. The meaning of these four ‘functional
imperatives’ is as follows:

1) Adaptation: By this is meant the problem of securing sufficient resources


from the society’s external environment and distributing them throughout
the system. Each society needs certain institutions that perform the function
of adaptation to the environment-which is an external function. Adaptation
provides the means – the instrumental aspects – to achieve goals. Biological
organism performs the function of adaptation in the general system of action.
In the context of society, economic institution performs this function.
162
2) Goal Attainment: This function is concerned with the need of the system Structure and Function
to mobilize its resources to attain the goals and to establish priorities among
them. It mobilizes motivations of the actors and organizes their efforts. In
the general system of action, personality performs this functions, while in
case of society this task is given to the political institution, because power
is essential for implementation and decision-making. Goal attainment is
concerned with ends – the consummatory aspects. Since goals are delineated
in relation with the external environment, it is, like adaptation, an external
function.

3) Integration: Tt is regarded as the ‘heart’ of the four-function paradigm


(Wallace and Wof 1980: 36). By integration is meant the need to coordinate,
adjust, and regulate relationships among various actors (or, the units of the
system, such as the institutions), so that the system is an ‘ongoing entity’.
According to the general theory of action, the social system performs this
function, whereas in society, legal institutions and courts are entrusted with
this task. Integration is concerned with ends, and the internal aspects of the
system.

4) Latency (Pattern Maintenance and Tension Management): This function


pertains to the issues of providing knowledge and information to the system.
In the general theory of action, culture – the repository of knowledge and
information – accomplishes this function. Culture does not act because it
does not have energy. It lays hidden, supplying actors (who are high in
energy) with knowledge and information they require for carrying out action.
Because culture exists ‘behind’ the actions of people, it is called ‘latent’.
Integration takes care of two things: first, it motivates actors to play their
roles in the system and maintain the value patterns; and second, to provide
mechanisms for managing internal tensions between different parts and
actors. The problem that every society faces is of keeping its value system
intact and ensuring that theare property transmitted and imbibed. The
institutions that carry out this function are family, religion, and education,
and education. Latency gives means to achieve ends; it is internal to the
system.
AGIL Model
Means (Instrumental) Ends (Consummatory)
External A Adaptation Goal attainment G
Internal L
Latency (Pattern
maintenance and
tension-relieving
mechanisms) Integration I

General Level of Action Theory


Organism Personality
Culture Social System

163
Basic Concepts
AGIL Functions in the Social System
Economy Polity
Fiduciary System Societal Community

For the purpose of analysis, Parsons identifies sub-systems corresponding to


the AGIL model in all systems and their sub-systems (see Diagram 1). As we
have seen, at the general level of action theory, the biological organism performs
the function of adaptation, the personality system, the function of goal attainment,
the social system integrates different units, and the cultural system is concerned
with pattern maintenance. Then, the social system is broken down into the four
AGIL functions. We noted earlier that economy performs the function of
adaptation, whereas, polity (or political institution), the function of goal
attainment. For the sub-system that carries out the function of integration, Parsons
uses the term ‘societal community’, which reminds one of Ferdinand Tonnies’s
ideas of gemeinschaft (‘community’). ‘Societal community’ produces solidarity,
unity, cohesiveness, and loyalty to norms, values, and institutions. The function
of pattern maintenance, Parsons says, is the task of what he calls the ‘fiduciary
system’, which pertains to the nature of a trust or a trusteeship. This system
produces and legitimizes moral values, beliefs, and expressive symbols.
Each of the sub-systems of the system can be taken up for analysis by treating it
as a ‘system’, and then, breaking it down into four parts looking for its
components that respectively perform the functions of adaptation, goal
attainment, integration, and latency. This way of analyzing society is known as
the systemic approach.

13.6 LET US SUM UP


Parsons’s AGIL model is an ideal type, applicable to differentiated societies
than simple societies. It is popularly known as a ‘grand theory’ – an all-
encompassing, unified theory – which is believed to have a large explanatory
power. Parsons’ student, Robert Merton, is skeptical of such a theory, for it is
too general to be of much use (Merton 1957). Instead, he expresses his preference
for mid-level (middle-range) theories, which cover certain delimited aspects of
social phenomena (such as groups, social mobility, or role conflict). Partially
because of this middle-range strategy, Merton’s functionalism is quite different
from that of Parsons. For instance, Merton abandons the search for any functional
prerequisites that will be valid in all social systems. He also rejects the idea of
the earlier functionalists that recurrent social phenomena should be explained
in terms of their benefits to society as a whole. For criticism, Merton identifies
the three postulates of earlier functionalists given below:
1) Postulate of the functional unity of society. It is an assumption that there is
unity in society, which comes about because of the contributions that parts
make to the whole.
2) Postulate of the universal functionalism. It is an assumption that all social
or cultural forms have positive functions, which are for the maintenance
and well being of society.
3) Postulate of indispensability. It is an assumption that the function that a
social or cultural from performs is an indispensable precondition for the
164 survival of society.
Merton notes that none of these postulates are empirically justifiable. For instance, Structure and Function
there is no reason to suppose that particular institutions are the only ones to
fulfill the functions. Empirical research shows that there may be a wide range of
what Merton has termed ‘functional alternatives’ that may be able to perform
the same function.

With a critical look, Merton tries to attempt what he calls a ‘codification of


functional analysis in sociology’, a functional paradigm (for perspective) (which
is not a grand theory) that takes into consideration the actual dimensions of
social reality, of conformity and deviance, understanding and explaining them.
Like other functionalists, he views society as a system of interconnected parts,
where the functioning of a part has implications for the functioning of other
parts and the entire system. Like his predecessors, he is interested in the concepts
of equilibrium and integration, and the contribution of customs and institutions
to the persistence of societies. His definition of function is also in terms of the
‘positive contribution’ of a part to the whole: functions are those contributions
or consequences that ‘make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system.’

While agreeing with other functionalists on certain points stated above, Merton
has made a distinct contribution to a set of two typologies, namely, the distinction
between ‘function’ and ‘dysfunction’, and between ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’
functions. Most functionalists think that all contributions are inherently good or
‘functional’ for society, a proposition Merton finds difficult to accept. He thinks
there are acts that have ‘consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment
of the system’. Such acts have harmful consequences, the technical term for
which is ‘dysfunction’. It is, therefore, expected that the sociologist will always
ask the following question: ‘For whom are the consequences functional or
dysfunctional?’ The same institution can be functional in one context and
dysfunctional in another. All social institutions are expected to have some mix
of functions and dysfunctions. Whether the institution tilts to the pole of function
or dysfunction in a continuum will depend upon the net balance between the
functional and dysfunctional consequences.

Box 13.2: Manifest and Latent Function


The distinction between manifest and Latent functions has its roots in the
writings of the funders in sociology. In his study of religion, for example,
Durkheim (1915) makes a distinction between ‘what people do of which
they are aware’ and ‘what emerges from their collective acts which they had
not intended and anticipated.’ When people assemble for collective totemic
rituals, their explicit aim is to honour their totem, but what these rituals
produce is a sense of we-ness, which is an unintended, unrecognized, and
unanticipated consequence. Following this, one can say that manifest
functions are those consequences people observe or expect, while latent
functions are those consequences that are neither recognized nor intended.

Merton was able to advance four types of explanations in terms of the two
dichotomies (function and dysfunction; manifest and latent functions). The earlier
functionalists put forth only one explanation and that too with respect to latent
functions. Merton’s conceptual scheme guided empirical research, rather than
remaining a theory with several explanatory claims, like the ‘grand theory’ of
Parsons.
165
Basic Concepts
13.7 CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
1) What are the assumptions of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural functional
approach?
2) What are the major differences between the theoretical approaches of
Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski?
3) Examine Parsons’ model of AGIL.

13.8 REFERENCES
Barnard, Alan. (2000). History and Theory in Anthropology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Davis, Kingsley. (1959). The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method
in Sociology and Anthropology. American Sociological Review, 24: 757-72.
Durkheim, Emile. (1893). The Division of Labour in Society. Glecoe: The Free
press.
.................................. (1895). The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York:
The Free Press.
...................................... 1915. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
London: Allen and Unwin.
Giddens, Anthony. 1973. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. London:
Hutchinson.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973. For Sociology. London: Allen Lane.
Kuper, Adam. 1973. Anthropologists and Anthropology: The Modern British
School. London: Routledge.
Levy, Jr., Marion J. 1968. Functional Analysis: Structural-Functional Analysis.
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. McMillan Co. and Free Press.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: George
Routledge sons.
.................................., 1926. Anthropology. Encyclopedia Britannica. First
Supplementary Volume.
............................, 1944. A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The
Free Press (Revised and Enlarged Edition).
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: The Free Press.
............................., 1975, The Present Status of Structural-Functional Theory in
Sociology, in Lewis A. Caser (ed), The Idea of Social Structure: Papers In Honor
of Robert K. Merton. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Parsons, Talcott and Gerald M. Platt. 1973. The American University. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
166
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1922). The Andaman Islanders. Cambridge: Cambridge Structure and Function
University Press.
............., (1952). Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and
Addresses. London: Cohen # West.
Rocher, Gay. (1974). Talcott Parsons and American Sociology. London: Nelson.
Turner, Jonathan H. 1987. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Jaipur: Rawat
Publications.
Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison wolf. (1980). Contemporary Sociological Theory.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

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