Hobsbawm S Social Banditry Myth and Historical Reality A Case in The Malaysian State of Kedah 1915 1920
Hobsbawm S Social Banditry Myth and Historical Reality A Case in The Malaysian State of Kedah 1915 1920
Hobsbawm S Social Banditry Myth and Historical Reality A Case in The Malaysian State of Kedah 1915 1920
To cite this article: Cheah Boon Kheng (1985) Hobsbawm's social banditry, myth and historical
reality: A case in the Malaysian state of Kedah, 1915–1920, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,
17:4, 34-51, DOI: 10.1080/14672715.1985.10409907
Introduction
Social bandits like Robin Hood who rob from the rich to Blok effectively describes the social and economic conditions
give to the poor are a universally familiar type of folk hero which generally give rise to rural banditry.' Banditry and crime
belonging to remembered history as distinct from the official often emerge as a major social activity in rural societies with
history of books. Bandit myths have an appeal wider than their a weak state, in rural societies undergoing social transforma-
native environments and have the power to move us even today. tion, or in those in the process of being integrated and
Why do people, or at least some kinds of people, perpetuate centralized within a formal state. Crime in such a situation
mythical stories about bandits? Ironically, in many instances manifests tensions, conflicts, and accomodation. As the state
the historical bandits were actually in league with the forces seeks to draw the rural hinterland within the framework of its
of reaction, and yet they have been portrayed as defenders of apparatus and impose its laws and institutions upon those
the oppressed. It is significant historically whether the bandits sectors of the territorial area it seeks to integrate, it encounters
were indeed as noble as people later came to feel them to be, the resistance which certain groups in these sectors are willing
but perhaps a more important question is why a society would and able to offer. In order to overcome the obstacles which
glorify bandits, what the romanticizing of bandits might tell will impede its undertaking, the state must then consider under
us about the way people relate to their powerlessness, for what conditions the growth of effective central control is
instance. To study banditry we need to look at both the heroes possible. In self-contained societies where powerful landowners
of the myths and the mythmakers who to varying degrees have have established themselves, the impact of state control will
created these heroes. be unwelcome as it will initiate transformations, including
In tracing the development of the Mafia in Sicily, Anton increasing social differentiation. In other rural societies where
a large population intensifies pressure on land, landlessness
will result, especially as land tax and other new regulations
increase rural indebtedness, displace the lands of smallholders
into the hands of large landowners, and impel landless peasants
to roam large areas to seek employment or to take up a career
* This article is based in part on a preliminary study I made of Nayan, "Social
Banditry and Rural Crime in Northern Kedah, 1909-1929/' Journal of the
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 54:2 (1981), pp. 98-130.
Portions of the present article were read as a paper at the Asian Studies Summer
Conference (August 2-4, 1984) at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
and at a seminar at Australian National University in Canberra in March 1985.
I wish to thank the participants for their helpful comments and suggestions 1. Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1890-1960: A Study of Violent
and Professor James C. Scott (Yale University), who read an earlier draft and Peasant Entrepreneurs (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 93-102.
saved me from many errors. I am grateful for the financial support for my Blok's work is very much influenced by the network theory of Professor Jeremy
research provided by the Universiti Sains Malaysia and the Fulbright Boissevain, who studied the densities of human links and interactions. See
Commission. l would also like to thank Zakaria Ali and Ismail Hashim for Jeremy Boissevain, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and
doing the drawings and photoprints. Coalitions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973).
34
of banditry. 2 When large landowners find their own interests Such discussions seem to undermine Hobsbawm's thesis that
threatened they will refuse to cooperate with state authorities social bandits with Robin Hood legends are symbols of social
and will ally themselves with the bandits and outlaws to resist protest9 Secondly, this paper will argue that social banditry is
and disrupt central control. Such banditry is encouraged and a complex social phenomenon, whose varieties are only slowly
abetted because the situation generates "new niches for violent unfolding through research. In fact, a recently-studied case of
entrepreneurs who could secure control over tensions in this social banditry in Malaysia involving patron-client relationships
configuration, and thus landlords and their retainers would seems to reaffirm the validity of some of the assumptions in
buttress their control with the use of violence." At the same Hobsbawm's thesis. There is also a type of social banditry that
time, landed interests will be making incursions into the public doesn't involve patron-client relationships and is found in
domain. Their intention is not to annihilate the state, but to industrial societies as well as peasant societies. These bandits
render its apparatus subservient to their vested interests. As a nonetheless seem to fit Hobsbawm's pattern of social banditry.
result, there will be collusion and connivance between these
landed interests and the formal authorities.
It is not difficult to imagine how the social and economic
setting described above would also contribute to some of the
bandits becoming highly romanticized folk heroes and Several studies of social bandits involving patron-
defenders of the oppressed. If the common people are feeling
client relationships have revealed that very rarely
helpless in the midst of the chaos of a weak state or social
change, or are feeling powerless in the face of an implacable do the bandits actually live up their legends. For
and oppressive authority, then bandit actions will readily be example, in Anton Blok's study of the Sicilian
seen as blows on their behalf. Eric J. Hobsbawm of the British Mafia, both bandits and local landed elites were
Marxist school of history 3 must be credited as the first scholar shown to be interdependent, so that the bandits
perceptive enough to consider bandit myths worth studying as
became instruments of oppression, retainers and
a special type of peasant protest and rebellion, or in his own
words, as "a form of individual or minority rebellion within 'strong men' of these elites. The ownership of land
peasant societies." By so doing, Hobsbawm has added a new and its redistribution in Sicily were bound up in
and exciting perspective to peasant studies and generated one way or the other by a network of criminal
intense interest in social banditry. In fact, because of his associations involving landholders and their re-
concept of social banditry, Hobsbawm is regarded by some tainers. It is this social network which is called
scholars as "the father of modern bandit studies.'4 Over the
the Mafia.
last twenty-five years Hobsbawm's controversial concept has
had a profound impact on scholars of social protest and peasant
rebellions, an impact not necessarily confined to those in radical
scholarship?
This paper will first review the current scholarly debate
and research on Hobsbawm's model of social banditry,
focusing on the apparent disparity between peasant myths and The Debate
their historical realities. Discussions so far have been confined
Hobsbawm first used peasant perceptions as a criterion
to cases of social bandits involved in patron-client relationships.
for identifying social banditry in his book Primitive Rebels
(1959), based on a study of bandit myths of the Robin Hood
type taken wholly from Europe in the 18th to the 20th centuries.
The "social bandit" was described as "rather primitive form of
2. An almost identical explanation of peasant recourse to banditry is given peasant rebel," and "banditry" as "a rather primitive form of
by James Scott: "Peasants, whose subsistence formulas are disintegrating due organized social protest":
to climate, land shortage, or rising rents do what they can to stay afloat--this
may mean switching to cash crops, taking on new debts and planting risky 9. . in many societies it is regarded as such by the poor, who
miracle rice, or it may mean banditry.:' See James C. Scott, The Moral consequently protect the bandit, regard him as their champion,
Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 26. idealize him, and turn him into a myth: Robin Hood in England,
3. Some other members of the British Marxist school of history are Christopher Janosik in Poland and Slovakia, Diego Corrientes in Andalusia,
Hill, Rodney Hilton, Victor Kiernan, and E.P. Thompson. For a fine study who are probably all real figures thus transmuted. In return, the
of these historians, see Raphael Samuel, "British Marxist Historians,
bandit himself tries to live up to his role even when he is not
1880-1980," New Left Review, No. 120 (March-April 1980), pp. 21-96.
Hobsbawm is noted for his studies of labor history, capitalist development,
himself a conscious social rebel . . . . However, something like
and social movements. Some of his works are: Labour's Turning Point, an ideal type of social banditry exists, and this is what I propose
1880-1900, Labouring Man: Studies in the History of Labour, The Age of to discuss, even though few bandits of recorded history, as distinct
Revolution, The Age of Capitalism, and Industry and Empire9 from legend, correspond completely to it. Still, some--like Angelo
4. See the tribute by Brent D. Shaw in his article, "Bandits in the Roman Duca (Angiolillo)--do even that. 6
Empire," Past and Present, No. 105 (November 1984), pp. 3-52.
In Bandits (1969), peasant idealization is reaffirmed as
5. The list of scholars in various of research who have used Hobsbawm's
concept has been increasing over the years9 One therefore does not do justice
to the list by including only the following: Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants'
Revolt of Banten in 1888 (1966); Fei-Ling Davis, Primitive Revolutionaries
of China (1977); Edward Friedman, Backward Toward Revolution (1969);
David B. Johnston, "Bandit Nakleng, and Peasant in Rural Thai Society," in 6. E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (Manchester University Press: 3rd ed.,
Contributions to Asian Studies (Vol. XV, 1980). 1974), p. 13.
35
need of him, for he represents justice9
justice." Because of his heavy
reliance on bandit myths to prop up his model of social banditry
as a form of peasant protest, Hobsbawm' Bandits invited
Hobsbawm'ss book Bandits
a detailed critique in 1972
1972 by the Dutch scholar Anton Blok
journal Comparative Studies in Society and
in the journal History. 10
and History.~~
Other scholars have since come out in support of Blok, of
whom the latest is Brent D. Shaw of the University of
Lethbridge (Canada):
Among his criteria for identifying social bandits, Hobsbawm
Hobsbawm places
great emphasis on the perception
perception of these men as something other
than common criminals. An obvious danger with this approach is
perceptions, like ideologies, can be deceptive; even oppressed
that perceptions,
peasants can be mistaken as to who is actually beneficial or
*
~.... destructive of their interests. And if perceptions differ, then which
set of mental images is the historian to take as coherent with the
realities of social exploitation?11
exploitation? '~
f
i:I:i
Bandits to a more critical examination, Shaw
Subjecting Bandits
I: charges Hobsbawm with sometimes confusing myths with
~
reality:
~
t~
£ .9., .. aa methodology
methodology that proceeds from "myth" to "reality"
that proceeds
with no clear break between the two (see, for example, his
~
~ treatment of the act of personal injustice as a motivator, p. 43
~
Bandits). In discussing justice
Bandits). justice and the bandit he begins with a
Robin
Robin Hood
Hood postulate, cites legendary and anecdotal material, and then admits
that behaviour
behaviour was "not always in accord with this model" (p. 53).
All the other chapters are similarly constructed so that it is
the key element in Hobsbawm's definition of social banditry: somewhat startIing
startling to read at the beginning of the final chapter on
"In this book we shall be dealing essentially with some kinds "The Bandit as Symbol" that "We have so far looked at the reality
of robbers, namely those who are not regarded regarded as simple of bandits and at their legend or myth chiefly as a source of of
public opinion."7
criminals by public opinion. ''7 Social bandits were more
information
information about that reality . . " (p. 127),
r e a l i t y. . .. 127), when precisely the
opposite has been the case. The myths, legends and public opinions
explicitly described as "peasant outlaws whom the lord and
have been used, from the beginning, to construct "reality." Perhaps
state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant the most striking and worrisome admission appears earlier in the
society, and are considered
considered by their people as heroes, book (p. 56) where HobsbawmHobsbawm states that if robbers of this type
champions, avengers, fighters for justice,
justice, perhaps even
even leaders did not exist then peasants would have to invent them. Although
of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped Hobsbawm is perfectly aware of this possibility, his book never
Hobsbawm
supported. ''s In Bandits, Hobsbawm cast the net wider and
and supported."8 puts the hypothesis to a rigorous test.'2 test. 12
surveyed bandit myths of the Robin Hood type found in Turkey,
China, India, the Americas, Southeast Asia, and Australia.
Shaw's criticisms have, in fact, bolstered Anton Blok's
Apparently a universal social phenomenon, social banditry is arguments that the historical reality of social banditry has not
said in practically all cases to belong to two or three clearly
always matched its peasant myths. In other words, Hobsbawm's
related types, and socially seems to occur among traditional
model has not been sufficiently tested with in-depth studies of
peasantries during the transition to modem modern industrial and
actual cases of social bandits. It is essential to reconsider the
capitalist society.
society9 Blok-Hobsbawm debate and look at the research done on social
In the two books mentioned above, Hobsbawm repeatedly
banditry since 1972. Firstly, Blok rejected Hobsbawm's thesis
stressed that the myth of the social bandit, like its archetype of social banditry as a form of peasant rebellion; he stated that,
the English noble robber Robin Hood, is an invention of the in fact, few bandits had been genuine figures of social protest.
protest9
peasantry. There has so far been no hard evidence to prove the Based on his own study of the Mafia in rural Sicily, Blok
existence of Robin Hood in England,9
England, 9 but Hobsbawm asserts argued that the social reality was that even Robin Hood type
that the poor peasants have invented him because "they have bandits like the Sicilian Salvatore Giuliano were violent,
antisocial men who preyed on peasants whose interests they
were supposed (in popular myth) to protect.protect9 While Blok
regarded social banditry as a useful sociological concept, he
* From
From Joseph
Joseph Ritson
Ritson (ed.),
(ed.), Robin
Robin Hood,
Hood, A Collection
Collection of Poems,
Poems, Songs,
Songs, and
Ballads (London: George
Ballads (London: GeorgeRoutledge
Routledge && Sons,
Sons, 1884).
1884).
E.J. Hobsbawm,
7. EJ. Hobsbawm,Bandits (Penguin Books:
Bandits (Penguin Books: London,
London, 1972),
1972), p. 17.
17. See
See also
also
E.J. Hobsbawm,"Social
E.l. Hobsbawm, "SocialBanditry,"
Banditry," in
in Rural
Rural Protest:
Protest: Peasant
Peasant Movements
Movements and
Social Henry A. Landsberger
Change, ed. Henry
Social Change, Landsberger (MacMillan:
(MacMillan: London,
London, 1974),
1974), 10. See Anton Blok, "The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry
pp. 142-157.
142-157. My italics.
My italics. Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14 (1972),
8. Ibid.
8. Ibid. pp. 494-503;
494-503; see also E.J.
E.J. Hobsbawm, "Social
"Social Bandits: Reply," ibid.,
ibid.,
See the discussion
9. See discussion of the Robin Hood
the Robin Hoodmyth in R.H.
myth in R.H. Hilton
Hilton (ed.),
(ed.), Peasants,
Peasants, pp. 503-505.
503-505.
Knights
Knights and Heretics (Studies in
Heretics (Studies in Medieval
MedievalEnglish
English social
social history), (Cambridge
history), (Cambridge II.
11. Brent D. Shaw, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
4-5.
University Press: New
Universitv Press: York. 1976).
New York. 1976L Ibid .. fn.
12. Ibid..
36
considered bandit myths an inadequate basis for for describing retainers, but he did not have sufficient
sufficient protection,
protection, so that when
social bandits as symbols of peasant protest. Such myths, he Grisafi tried to kill him in a raid on his land, he capitulated. 17~7
Grisafi
argued , might conceal the bandit's anti-peasant or antisocial
argued, The Mafia also recruited bandits to break up peasant efforts
efforts at
features
features and obscure the links that the bandit maintains with mobilization. Trade union and political meetings of peasants
established power-holders for his own protection. Blok did not were frequently
frequently disrupted.
disrupted . The bandits and retainers used
deny that myths do embody a latent protest element and are intimidation to prevent communist and other leftwing candi-
worth studying, but he was of the opinion that "myths are dates from
from being elected to the local town councils.
imperfect mirrors of social reality" and tend to weaken peasant The Sicilian bandit Salvatore Giuliano has been regarded
mobilization.'3
mobilization
mobilization.. 13 by many Sicilians and Western writers as a Robin Hood, Hood , but
Hobsbawm was unconvinced by Blok's arguments. While his involvement in the Labor Day massacre on May 1, I, 1947
he agreed that the myth of the social bandit could not be reflects the disparity between myth and historical reality. The
divorced from historical reality, Hobsbawm argued that what Mafia in league with their political patrons (first the Separatists,
turn the social bandits into "champions of peasant
could tum who campaigned for Sicilian independence, and then the
discontent is the role which peasant society ascribes to them Monarchists) used Giuliano to attack a peaceful crowd of
(and to which, for various reasons, they may tend to conform) peasants assembled to attend a Labor Day meeting organized
together with the arms and independence which enable them by the local Communist party. Giuliano and his men fired fired at
to play it." He also stated that the bandit "is not necessarily the crowd for three minutes, leaving eleven dead and thirty-
or even typically a conscious social protester."~4
protester. "14
" 14 In other words, three wounded
wounded,, among whom were many women and
what Hobsbawm seemed to say was that what the bandit did children. 18~8 Giuliano was . loved by the peasants of his
was.._
is less important than what peasants would wish, or believed, Montelepre area, who gave him shelter and protection. He is
him to be doing. However, he was not unaware that myths still remembered in their stories and songs, but in this incident,
were unreliable due to the distorting tendencies of human which he later regretted, he was used by the Mafia to spread
memory and suggested certain distinctions be made within terror and death. What went to the poor were bribes, while
peasant perceptions of social bandits. most of the loot went to his men to buy arms and for their
survival. When an Italian parliamentary committee began
My discussion fails to distinguish clearly between the versions of
the "myth" which are held about bandits who are personally known investigations into the massacre, the Mafia and their political
to those who hold it, and versions held by those at a more or less patrons panicked. Fearing that Giuliano, who had been
great distance in time and place from
from them; between what is said overcome with remorse over the shooting, might betray them,
now and about the remembered bandit;
about the active bandit now him. The parliamentary committee handed down
they killed him.
about the local or remote bandit. These distinctions have not so far its famous statement on the accommodation and collusion
been adequately investigated to my knowledge. I! see no reason to
believe that such a study would eliminate all living examples of
Robin Hood.
Hood.~SI'15
Blok' s
actually live up to their legends. For example, in Anton Blok's
study ofof the Sicilian Mafia, both bandits
bandits and local landed elites
bandits became
were shown to be interdependent, so that the bandits
instruments of of oppression, retainers and 'strong men' ofof these
elites. The ownership of of land and its redistribution in Sicily
bound up in one way or the other by a network of
were bound of criminal
associations involving landholders and their retainers. It is this
numerous
social network which is called the Mafia. Blok gives numerous
instances of
instances of how these patron-client relationships function,
function , but
but
one example
one example will suffice.
suffice. The noted outlaw Grisafi and his his t:
band were recruited by aa clique of
band put pressure
of landholders to put pressure .g
on aa rival landholder to give upup his land.
land. The latter also had '"
~
~
L;
~
13.
13. A. A. Blok,
A. Blok, "The
"The Peasant and the Brigand,"
Brigand ," op.
op cit., p. 502.
op.. cit., 502. ~
14.
14. E.J.
EJ . Hobsbawm,
Hobsbawm, "Social Bandits:
Bandits: AA Reply,"
Reply ," op. cit., pp. 503-505.
op. cit., 503-505. ~
15.
15 . Ibid.
Ibid .
Ibid. ~
16.
16. "Patron-client relationship"
relationship" is
is here
here defined
defined as
as one
one ofof interdependence inin bandits 'sharing
Italian bandits
Italian loot'
'sharing the loot'
which
which thethe client provides
provides services and
and tributes
tributes in
in exchange for for protection,
protection ,
security
security of of welfare
welfare and
and employment
employment from
from the
the patron.
patron
patron..
37
between bandits and the Mafia: "The Mafia needs banditry and
common criminals who are necessary instruments for its
criminal actions; bandits enjoy its protection and help until the
time comes when they become dangerous for its survival. Those
arrested by the police are criminals no longer needed by the
Mafia, or they have betrayed or are going to betray [the Mafia]
"19 Peasant glorification of Giuliano may be explained by
9 .. •.,,,9
.
38
"settling accounts" with many backlands figures in the establish-
ment quite naturally brought him heroic admiration from the rural
poor, who in given situations logically
logically identified
identified him as a champion
who delivered them from the excesses of such cruel individuals.
individuals.
In most cases, however, their deliverance was only fortuitous
coincidence, for Silvino's motives were dictated by his own
personal considerations of revenge and self-defence ....
. . . . '"~"
Linda Lewin's
Lewin's description seems to put Silvino into the
same category as Salvatore Giuliano, a landlords' bandit in
reality and a peasants' bandit in myth. The
The description might
also fit another Brazilian social bandit, Lampiao
Lampigto (full name,
name,
Virgulino Ferreira da Silva), whose
whose career of
of banditry spanned
spanned
the years 1918-1938
1918-1938 and who
who has been
been called the "King of
of
the Cangaceiros." He had patron-client relationships identical *...
to those of
of Silvino and was so shrewd
shrewd in his dealings with his ~
.r~
political patrons that in 1926 he obtained a brief commission \..J
as a captain of federal troops to help crush
crush a communist
communist '"
"-
t:
rebellion in the northeastern
northeastern region. Lampiao
Lampigo is idealized in ~
myths and popular songs as a manifestation of protest, while ~
his atrocities are glossed over or gradually forgotten. He was ~
a bandit whose
whose courage was as much
much admired as his cruelties '"
2~
..t:)
~
were feared. Peter Singelmann
Singelmann in his study of Lampiao
Lampifio brings <:)
...
. . . the cangaceiro was not, as a rule, what Barroso called
the 'romantic bandit' or the primitive representative
representative of a class
struggle which some authors such as Faco and Menezes see them
as. He treated the poor, the women and the children as cruelly
and sadistically
sadistically as he treated the rich fazendeiros--if
Jazendeiros-if they were Lampiiio makes the front cover of a popular
Lampido popular Rio de Janeiro
Janeiro weekly magazine,
magazine, 1932.
not his friends. He served as a hired killer for the powerful, he
was willing to take up arms against true revolutionary
revolutionary movements
such as the Coluna Prestes and he was feared by segments of all
classes in the sertoes. If he extorted money and supplies from the June 1980,
in June 1980, in the revised edition of Bandits. We
book Bandits.
of his book We
rich, it was because they, and not the poor, were able to provide need only to concern ourselves with his replies to Anton
Anton Blok
Blok
these things. If he complained about social injustice and economic and Linda Lewin:
inequities, it was not to change the existing order but to find a
place for himself within it. For him the cangaco was his personal ... Dr. Anton Blok, the eminent expert on the Sicilian Mafia,
9 . .
mode of advancement and perhaps of gaining a measure of justice 9.. challenges the concept of the 'noble bandit.' To put his point
. .
and dignity. If he was a hero, he was an anarchist hero who went simply-perhaps
simply--perhaps too simply-he
simply--he argues that Robin Hood was
out for himself in an anarchic political
political environment where always an invention of the public ... . . . in one respect criticism of
else.212'
everybody placed his particular interests above everything else the 'noble bandit' and other such stereotypes is well taken. In no
The
The examples of Salvatore Giuliano, Antonio Silvino, and case can we infer the reality of any specific 'social bandit' merely
from the 'myth' which has grown around him. In all cases we
Lampiao
Lampifto suggest that they are not only landlords' bandits, but
need independent evidence of his actions. The Brazilian can-
within the realm of peasant perceptions are also peasants'
of peasant
gaceiros have lately been surveyed accordingly by sceptical eyes.
bandits, due to fortuitous circumstances
circumstances in which which poor peasants Were they driven by the compUlsion
compulsion to revenge an injustice done
believe these bandits to have been been helping them.
them. They
They are thus to themselves or to their family?
f a m i l y ? . ..
. . Did 'the good bandit' Antonio
who can be bboth-bandits
bandits who who help the poor but also
o t h - - b a n d i t s who Silvino, often contrasted as Robin Hood with the admittedly
abuse the poor. TheThe above examples clearly illustrate the Lampifio, live up to his reputation? Dr. Linda Lewin
ambiguous Lampiao,
importance ofof examining
examining criticaiIy
critically each each particular bandit myth does not deny that he distributed money and booty to the poor and
and the peculiar circumstances
circumstances of of the patron-client relationships was admired by them for settling accounts with many a brutal
which each
which each bandit enters into for his protection. chieftain9 Yet she rightly points out that he, like
back-country chieftain.
Lampiao
Lampifio and indeed any backwoods band-leader who wished to
The make a clear distinction between
The need to make between myth and
survive and flourish, had to manage their alliances and enmities
reality in every known
known case of of social banditry has now now been
been primarily in terms of the oligarchic politics of the region. The
primarily
accepted by Hobsbawm
Hobsbawm himself in a lengthy postscript, written protection of a suitable, and perhaps changing, selection of the
powerful 'colonels' was more vital to him than the support of the
poor. Were the great cangaceiros
cangaceiros primarilyprimarily rebellious victims of
society? In the anarchic and virtually
virtually stateless sertao, as in highland
Lewin, 'The
20. Linda Lewin, "The oligarchical
oligarchical implications
implications of social
social banditry
banditry in Brazil:
Brazil: Eritrea, brigandage was also a promising career for tough young
case of the 'good'
The case 'good' thief Antonio
Antonio Silvino," Past
Past and Present, Vol. 82
Present, Vol.
(Feb. 1981),
(Feb. 1981), pp9
pp. 116-146. It is is a tribute
tribute to Hobsbawm's
Hohsbawm's humility
humility that he
acknowledges the significance
acknowledges significance of Linda
Linda Lewin's study
study in the postscript his
postscript of his
of Bandits (P"nthcon
1981 revised edition of (Pantheon Books: New York, 1981),
1981 ), p. 142.
21. Peter Singelmann, "Political Structure and Social Banditry in Northeast ** Photo and caption, Billy Jaynes Chandler, The Bandit King Lampigto of
Lampiiio of
Brazil," Journal of
of Latin American Studies, VII, No.11 (May 1975), pp. 59-83.
Vll, No. 59-83. Brazil (College Station: Texas A and M University Press, 1978), p. 155.
39
men, and Lampi~o himself as well as others saw it as a profession roles from a landlords' bandit to become a peasants' bandit.
or business . . . it is important that myth and fact should not be Nayan is now a Malay folk hero who is romanticized in comics
too readily confused in practise; that readers remote from the and children's stories and is the subject of poems and songs.
hard-nosed and violent environment in which back-country peasant Before World War II he was also glorified in local plays by
outlaws operated, should not be tempted into excessive idealisation; travelling troupes in Kedah when these were in vogue in the
and that the complexities of social banditry as a phenomenon
rural areas. Nayan can be seen as a social bandit who to some
should not be underestimated. ~'-~
extent deserves his status as folk hero, and his life and times
graphically demonstrate the kinds of economic and social
Social Banditry in the Malay State of Kedah:
circumstances that can give rise to banditry and the glorification
A Special Case
of some bandits as symbols of social protest.
Although Hobsbawm clearly concedes that myths alone
are insufficient to describe the social bandit as a symbol of Kedah Under Siamese Suzerainty
social protest, he had in P r i m i t i v e R e b e l s quite perceptively
At the turn of the last century the social structures of the
visualized the existence of both landlords' bandits and peasants'
bandits, and the possibility of a bandit changing from one role Siamese and Kedah Malay kingdoms were hierarchical, with
the king at the apex, and political power was concentrated either
to the other:
in the hands of the ruler or in the hands of those aristocrats to
In any peasant society there are landlords' bandits as well as whom he delegated some of his powers, such as government
peasants' bandits, though only the peasant bandits receive the ministers, provincial governors, and district chiefs. In the
tribute of ballads and anecdotes.., one sort of bandit can easily districts, power from the center normally devolved upon
turn into another--the 'noble' robber and smuggler into the
recognizable personalities within the local aristocracy, and their
bandolero, protected by the local rural boss or cacique . . . . ~
authority usually was commensurate with their ability to
Unfortunately, like several of Hobsbawm's other assumptions, enforce it. In practice, however, the chiefs maintained law and
this statement is not supported by any evidence of actual cases. order by entering into partnerships with professional criminals.
In fact, most of the book B a n d i t s is drawn from published Those criminals who failed to purchase the immunity offered
material; only chapter eight is based on firsthand research. The by the chiefs' patronage and protection were ruthlessly
lack of relevant cases of social bandits in patron-client suppressed.
relationships is one of the major weaknesses of the book. Writing about the 1890s and 1900s as a time of unusually
widespread crime and banditry in rural Siam, a British
observer, W.A. Graham, observed in 1912 how these alliances
between chiefs and rural criminals "exercised a sort of check"
on lawlessness:
The examples of Salvatore Giuliano, Antonio With the time-honored collusion between officials and professional
Silvino, and Lampi(to suggest that they are not criminals strong in the land, from which indeed many of the old
chiefs derived considerable profit, it was scarcely to be expected
only landlords' bandits, but within the realm of that any genuine effort really to suppress crime would be made
peasant perceptions are also peasants' bandits, by the country justices of the old school, even at the urgent
due to fortuitous circumstances in which poor command of the king. But though permitting and encouraging
lawbreaking amongst those who belonged to their own family or
peasants believe these bandits to have been helping who had made it worth their while, they were ruthless in their
them. They are thus bandits who can be b o t h - - suppression of criminals who had neglected to purchase immunity,
bandits who help the poor but also abuse the poor. and by thus creating a monopoly of this form of industry, the
chiefs no doubt exercised a sort of check and restricted evil-doing
to some extent, for it was very noticeable that with the
reorganization of rural officialdom, and the removal of the chiefs
or the curtailment of their powers of authority, violent crime of
every description increased to an alarming extent and very soon
passed altogether beyond the control of the authorities. 24
I now wish to suggest, based on my own research, that
not all social bandits who enter into patron-client relationships Many of Graham's observations regarding the ill effects of the
fall into the category of landlords' bandits in reality but reform program for the district administration in the 1890s have
peasants' bandits in myth like Salvatore Giuliano, Antonio been borne out in a recent study by David Johnston. 25 The
Silvino, and Lampiao. It is possible for a bandit to be more central government in Bangkok had initiated the reforms to
independent of his patron and in some senses genuinely be a increase its power at the expense of local institutions, but this
peasants' bandit. This fact is well illustrated by a historical
case which I have been studying over the last five years. The
case occurred in the state of Kedah (West Malaysia) between
1915 and 1920. The social bandit Nayan bin Derani changed
24. W.A. Graham, Siam, Vol. 3, Third Edition (London: AlexanderWoring,
1924), pp. 325-6. The first edition of Graham's book appeared under the title
Siam: A Handbook of Practical. Commercial and Political Information in 1912.
25. David B. Johnston, "Bandit, Nakleng and Peasant in Rural Thai Society,"
in Contributions to Asian Studies XV (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), pp. 90-101.
22. Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York), pp. 142-143. See also his "Rural Society and the Rice Economy in Thailand, 1880-1890,"
23. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p. 13. (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1975).
40
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Nayan as a cartoon hero. Montage and print by Ismail Hashim, Fine Arts Department, Universiti Sains Malaysia.
courtesy of Cheah Boon Kheng
Map of Kedah courtesy of Cheah Boon Kheng
led to the breakdown of the existing order in rural areas. The side, especially in the border areas between Kedah and Siam.
traditional pattern of compromise and collusion was disrupted, Weak state formation which was reflected by almost nonexistent
and many bandits came into conflict with newly-appointed police protection in many rural districts enabled crime to
chiefs. It was this period which brought the rise of several flourish, abetted in many cases by the protection afforded
social bandits in the areas of Ayutthia, especially Aisua Thuam criminals within traditional patron-client relationships. The
and Dokrak, who were regarded by their peasant communities failure of the Siamese reforms of the district administration
as heroes. 26 caused serious repercussions, leading to "an increase of crime
of all kinds during the decade 1912-1920 which at one time
Elite Patrons of Crime in Rural Kedah reduced the rural administration to a condition bordering on
A similar lawless situation existed in the Kedah country- chaos. ''27 From the southern Siamese provinces, the crimes
42
spilled over into the Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, and allowed a commission of twenty percent upon the collections.
Kelantan. 28 In fact, in 1898 Kubang Pasu province, which had What actually happened was that the penghulus would work
reverted to Kedah's rule from Siam, already had a reputation in partnership with the cattle thieves and, in some cases, they
as a hideout for dangerous bandits. The villagers petitioned the were actually leaders of the gangs and issued 'registration'
Sultan to erect a police station in the district. ~-~The involvement documents in respect of the stolen animals, thereby enabling
of district chiefs in cattle and buffalo stealing became a the thieves to dispose of them with ease. This malpractice was
frequent occurrence. An official Kedah report for 1906-1908 greatly reduced in 1907 when the Veterinary Department was
describes the case of a penghulu (village headman) who had made the only licensing authority. 34
been successful in cattle stealing: "For cattle stealing which was
in the past becoming the chief industry of North Kedah under
the guidance of a p e n g h u l u . . , a minimum of penalty of five
years' imprisonment has been imposed. ''~' Official reports
spoke of the ambivalent attitude of both the Siamese nai-bans
The bandits thus performed a symbolic, ideological
(village headmen and elders) in Singgora and their Malay
counterparts, the penghulus on the Perlis and Kedah side of the role regardless of intention, and support for them
border, with regard to criminal activities. These headmen would should be seen as part of the repertoire of conflict
either close an eye to what was happening, or would connive strategies available to the dominated classes. In
in these criminal activities by becoming partners. An official this sense, the bandit who preys on the rich, even
Kedah report in 1907 described the majority of the penghulus if he invokes a "Robin Hood" imagery, is not
as "illiterate scoundrels":
automatically a social bandit. Only where domi-
The question of the penghulu is a more difficult one; some few nated class ideologies provide an appropriate class
are honest and reliable men of good family, but the majority are
illiterate scoundrels who shut their eyes to, if they do not actually
meaning to his actions and lead to the provision
encourage, cattle thieving and gang robbery, provided, of course, of strategic intervention on his behalf is the bandit
they get a fair share of the profits. The influence of these penghulus, transformed into a class representative.
and the fear of incurring their ill-will is so great amongst the
villagers that to detect their malpractices and bring the offenders
to justice, has proved up to the present too severe a task for the
somewhat languid methods of the Police?'
The situation was still the same after the British takeover of
the two states in 1909. The British Adviser to Perlis in a report One reason for the penghulus' involvement in crime was
for 1914-15 said of the penghulus in his state: "The work of that they were not paid salaries but were instead exempted
the penghulus in the detection of crime was far from satisfactory from the payment of land rent or land tax. They were also
and there are grounds for the suspicion that some of them and allowed to enforce corv~e (forced labor) on the raavat (the
their assistants connive at theft. ''3~ Even as late as 1919 the peasants). An official Kedah report for the years 1906-08
British Consul in Singgora told both the Perlis and Kedah recommended the payment of salaries to the penghulus, but
governments that he saw no way of keeping the Siamese border this was not put into effect until the British takeover in 1909
nai-bans from getting involved in crimes of robbery and cattle when corv~e was also abolished. In fact, before 1909 the
stealing. He pointed out that the post of headman was an mukims had been farmed out by the Sultan to leading members
honorary one, police protection was nonexistent, and the of the aristocracy who were described by the British Adviser
headmen were therefore forced to 'live and let live' with the as "the rajas, syeds and persons of good birth. ''35 These
border bandits. 33 The involvement of the Kedah penghulus in mukim-holders were allowed to collect the revenue of the
cattle and buffalo stealing was also facilitated by the state's mukim. They appointed and dismissed their penghulus at will,
licensing system which required the penghulu to register their and the penghulus recognized no authority except that of the
cattle sales in the mukim (a sub-district comprising several mukim-holder. Since the penghulus were unsalaried, they not
villages) and to issue a 'registration' document to the purchaser only enforced corvOe but also levied a tax known as ripai over
upon payment of a fee of twenty-five cents. The penghulu was which the state government had no control. Similarly, the men
of the nobat (the royal orchestra) were allowed by the Sultan
to levy from every house a tax, known as the nobat tax, over
which again the state government had no control ~6 These
traditional practices were abolished by the British, but until
28. The effects are still noticeable today to any visitor to the towns in the then the economically depressed peasantry had to work corvOe
Thai southern provinces. if they wanted to be exempted from paying land tax or land
29. See the petition in the Sultan of Kedah's correspondence, dated 23hb
Ramadhan A.H. 1315 (1898), National Archives Malaysia Branch, Alor Star,
Kedah.
30. Annual Report Jor Kedah (1906-1908) p. 9.
31. Ammal Report Jor Kedah (Sept. 1905-August 1906) by G.C. Hart, 34. Annual Report jor Kedah (23 January 1909-12 January 1910, by the
Siamese Adviser to Kedah Government, p. 12. British Adviser, W.G. Maxwell, p. 43.
32. Annual Report for Perils ( 19 November 1914- 8 November 1915), p. 34. 35. Ibid., pp. 1-14. A r~0ll is someone of royal descent or a member of the
33. "Memorandum on cattle stealing in the Singgora District," by F.G. royal family. A syed is a Muslim Arab said to be descended from the Prophet
Gorton, British Consul, 6 May 1919, in HCO (Kedah), 609/1919, National Mohammed.
Archives of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 36. Ibid.
43
rent. Because of unlimited demands on their services, the moves did not go far enough because the chiefs could still
peasants could not grow more rice than what was required for exact corv~e from those peasants who wished to be exempted
their own needs; even if they did so, surpluses could be from paying land tax or land rent. The territorial and village
confiscated by the state. 37 Later, under the British, although chiefs had, in fact, been made responsible for the maintenance
the peasants were freed from corvOe, they faced the burden of of law and order. Superficially, a 'peaceful and stable' situation
making regular payments of land tax and land rent. This meant existed in the countryside, but the chiefs, like their counterparts
a further dent in their already depressed incomes, and the tax in Siam, indulged in crime and used retainers to bolster their
was not a popular measure. With new government regulations power and influence. Much the same situation prevailed from
curbing the use of forest resources, the peasants in most cases 1905 until after the British takeover in 1909. However, as the
found it difficult to make a decent living. Conditions in some British officials stepped up their efforts to centralize the
areas were such, due to poor soil, occasional drought, or poor government in Kedah, the territorial chiefs became increasingly
rice harvests, that the only recourse for peasant survival was redundant, and soon they were either appointed as district
theft, and in the border areas with Siam the most lucrative officers or were cut off altogether from State stipends to prevent
crime was cattle stealing. Such theft served not only as a source dilution of State authority. The penghulus were retained since
of food but also commanded the high ransoms which owners the post of village headman was still regarded as essential.
were prepared to pay to recover their animals. Furthermore, a Both the territorial and village chiefs were now deprived
bustling cattle trade was underway between Singgora and of their traditional powers to exact corv~e from the peasantry.
Penang via Kedah. 38 District Officers and other full-time officials began assuming
Patron-client linkages in Kedah continued after the British a greater role in local government. However, despite these
takeover in 1909 despite British-initiated measures to weaken changes, the district and village chiefs seemed reluctant to
traditional patronage structures and replace them with imper- abandon their former influence on the peasantry. For their part,
sonal bureaucratic ones. The old power domains continued the peasants were not used to the new, impersonal government
simply because some of the traditional elites, who had moved structure, so that the old and familiar patron-client relationships
into the new bureaucratic positions, were challenging the continued. This situation between 1912 and the 1920s led to
innovations. For example, in 1905, foreign pressure forced the the emergence of rival landed elites who vied with the district
Kedah government to reorganize the state apparatus following and village chiefs for regional power and influence.
its failure to repay debts owed to foreign creditors. In particular,
British authorities in the nearby trading port of Penang Island, The Patron of the Social Bandit Nayan
acting on behalf of the creditors, some of whom were British
One of the landed elite vying for power and influence was
nationals, influenced Siam to assist Kedah in putting her
Nayan's patron, the landlord Sulaiman bin Saad, better known
finances in order. As a result, Siam imposed a State Council
as Sulaiman Kerekau. Following British intervention in Kedah
to act in the name of the Sultan, who had fallen ill and whose
in 1909 he had become aware of the dwindling powers of the
extravagance had led to the state's bankruptcy. 39 The Council
traditional Malay chiefs and saw an opportunity to rise by using
was presided over by the forward-looking Raja Muda (Heir
violence to attack the chiefs and robbing rival rich landlords.
Apparent) Raja Abdul Aziz. In order to raise revenue to repay
He augmented his income by his activities as a rural
the debts and to put Kedah's economy on a sound basis, he
entrepreneur, especially by organizing illegal cockfights and
had the Council reimpose the land tax on all classes in the
bullfights, which were popular forms of entertainment in the
state--the same tax which the Sultan himself had proclaimed
rural areas. These fights attracted large crowds and involved
in 1883 soon after his installation to raise revenue--but once
gambling and the selling of opium. It was inevitable that
again the conservative aristocrats, which included "the rajas,
members of the rural underworld would gravitate to such social
syeds and persons of good birth," blocked the move and the
functions, particularly since as cattle rustlers they usually bred
tax was shelved? ~ The Council also unsuccessfully attempted
the best bulls. Gradually Sulaiman gathered the rural toughs
to reduce the powers of the Sultan and the territorial chiefs
who attended these celebrations into a secret criminal
in the area of local government. These moves brought the
organization to commit robberies of rich homes in the district.
Council into conflict with local power-holders. In order to
This secret society was believed to have control of several
strengthen central control, the Council decided to curb the
gangs whose activities were duly described in a 1920 official
powers of the chiefs and now appointed them as salaried
report:
officers. At the level of the mukim (sub-district), the sub-district
headman or penghulu became a salaried official who was to The object of these gangs was not entirely robbery but, rather, the
be assisted by two panglimas or assistant penghulus. These intimidation of people unwilling to join the society. In most cases
only a gun or a few pieces of clothing or a little cash were removed.
There were nineteen such cases in North Kedah police district
during the last quarter and people were so terrorised that it became
impossible to obtain evidence of identification. Owing to the fact
37. Sharom Ahmat, "Transition and Change in a Malay State: A Study of the that the head men [of the society] were well armed and left their
Economic and Political Development of Kedah, 1897-1923," (Ph.D. diss., houses and lived in the thick jungle it was extremely difficult to
University of London, 1969), p. 29. take successful action against them . . . . 4,
38. There was in normal (disease-free) years a large cattle trade between
Singapore and Penang. Under the cattle licensing system, 16,741 head of cattle
were licensed in 1910, either as imported into Kedah or as being bred in the
country, as compared to 11,125 in 1909. Annual Report for Kedah (22
December 1911-10 December 1912). p. 15.
39. Sharom Ahmat, op. tit., pp. 121-122.
40. See Maxwell's Annual Report for Kedah (1909-1910), pp. 14-16. 41. AnnuaIReportjbrKedah(26September1919-14September1920). p. 5.
44
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Artist's impression of Nayan by Zakaria Ali, Lecturer in Art History, Universiti Sains Malaysia
c·
42. My peasant informants are of two categories: old and young. The above
information was from older peasants, who were mostly laborers or
smallholders. I had no problems discussing Nayan's career with them as he 44. Ibid.
is their favorite topic of conversation whenever they wish to pass their time. 45. Here it might be pertinent to refer to Hobsbawm's statement made in reply
Older informants who lived during Nayan's time were somewhat divided in to Anton Blok:
how they felt about him. While some spoke of his Robin Hood legend, a few "My discussion fails to distinguish clearly between the versions of the
described Nayan as a "'dangerous bandit" who terrorized the rural areas. I 'myth' which are held about bandits who are personally known to those
might add, however, that all youthful peasant informants, between 15 and 21 who hold it, and versions held by those at a more or less great distance
years of age, saw Nayan as a "hero" and a "good bandit." The youths here in time and place from them; between what is said about the active bandit
apparently appropriated the bandit whom they have never seen as a symbol now and about the remembered bandit; about the local or remote bandit.
of protest against wealth and exploitation. These distinctions have not so far been adequately investigated to my
43. See Mansor Abdullah, PanglimaNayan:Robin HoodMalaya(Sinaran knowledge. I see no reason to believe that such a study would eliminate
Brothers: Penang, 1960), p. 16. all living examples of Robin Hood."
46
her only on payment of ransom.
ransom. "We
"We got no peace from him on such part-time
part-time work as tapping rubber
rubber in Chinese
Chinese and
around here,"
here," recalled
recalled an old landlord,
landlord, who was still in his European rubber
rubber estates,
estates, apparently in disguise,
disguise, and at night
teens when
when Nayan raided
raided his area. robbed the houses of the rich. Wherever
Wherever he struck his reputation
reputation
had preceded
preceded him; it was said that in some areas gangs
The government records began to report on Nayan only
committed robberies
robberies in his name. His reputation
reputation rested on his
after a raid he made in 1920, although he was known publicly
habit of leaving 'calling cards'; he would send a note to his
to have been active several years earlier. earlier. It was this raid which
intended
intended victim threatening
threatening to call on a particular
particular time and
authorities' attention to him and brought about his
drew the authorities'
day. This showed he was not afraid of the police. The Kedah
end. In this particular
particular incident
incident Nayan and his gang had fired
government helped to spread
spread his fame when
when they circulated
circulated a
on the police and wounded wounded a village chief who was known to
notice offering a reward
reward of $1 ,000.00 for his capture,
$1,000.00 capture, dead or
harassed Sulaiman
have harassed Sulaiman Kerekau.
Kerekau. The shooting incident,
incident, which
alive. 48
48
capped a series of such incidents, incidents, alarmed British police
alarmed the British Informants at Kerekau village said that Sulaiman
Sulaiman Kerekau
officials who thought a 'reign of terror' now existed existed in the
46
Kedah countryside. 46 Police patrols
patrols were stepped
stepped up in the
districts,
districts, and his police informers advised Sulaiman Sulaiman to lie low.
When a police party headed headed by a European
European official entered
entered
Kerekau,
Kerekau, they received little support.
support. copy of the notice
48. See a copy notice in
in the Kedah
Kedah secretariat
secretariat file
file K/SUK
K/SUK 564/1339,
564/1339,
Sulaiman's
Sulaiman's special relationship
relationship with Nayan did not last. National Archivesof Malaysia.
National Archives Malaysia.
He was very fond of the bandit, bandit, but
but this seemed
seemed to have
emboldened
emboldened the bandit bandit to act independently
independently of Sulaiman's
Sulaiman's
wishes. He would rob certain areas or landlords
wishes. landlords without
Sulaiman's
Sulaiman's orders in order to carve his own niche of power power
and influence. His weakness weakness for women led him to kidnap
several Chinese
Chinese and Malay women. He would not give in to
entreaties
entreaties from the women or their families, and anyone who
resisted would be shot or killed. "It is true that Sulaiman Sulaiman liked
to have men like Nayan in his organization because he wanted
power and respect," respect," said his grandson. "But "But gradually
Sulaiman
Sulaiman found Nayan difficult to handle and trouble flared up
between
between them when Nayan not only defied his orders, but
began a liaison with one of his wives." wives." This was regarded as
d e r h a k a (defiance of traditional
derhaka traditional authority or treason) and within
Malay custom used to be a punishable punishable offence. 47 47 When Nayan
was reprimanded,
reprimanded, he left the village and operated on his own.
While he was under Sulaiman's patronage, Nayan had enjoyed
Sulaiman's patronage,
his protection and hospitality.
hospitality. No policeman
policeman dared arrest him
as he was regarded as "Sulaiman's"Sulaiman's man,"man," but with this break
break
such protection was to be denied him. One may therefore view
Nayan as a landlord's bandit bandit up to this moment becausebecause of the
patron-client relationship,
patron-client relationship, even even though he was a troublesome
troublesome
client for Sulaiman.
Sulaiman. ButBut without this protection his career soon
came to an end.
At the time of their their breakup,
breakup, Sulaiman's
Sulaiman's own position
was said to be insecure.
insecure. Territorial
Territorial chiefs came searching for
him. On one occasion, they were followed by a police party
headed by a European officer who wanted
headed wanted to take Sulaiman
Sulaiman in
for questioning because of rumors of his connections with
questioning because ~
Nayan. Each time, however, however, Sulaiman
Sulaiman eluded
eluded them by hiding ~'"
in the forests. Sulaiman
Sulaiman was, was, therefore,
therefore, forced to reduce the :::
~
activities of his secret society. Meanwhile, wandered
Meanwhile, Nayan wandered Q;)
-:::
on his own into the southern districts. districts. During the day he took ~
(5
'&
~
~
46. See
See the memorandum
memorandum of the two BritishBritish Assistant Commissionersof Police
Assistant Commissioners Police 8
for North
for and South
North and South Kedah, dated 3 August
Kedah. dated 1920, in which
August 1920, which they appealed to
they appealed Nayan: the end of of invulnerability.
invulnerability.
the British
British Adviser
Adviser inin the state
state capital
capital of Alor Star to put up offers
Alor Star offers of rewards
rewards Artist's impression
impression of Nayan' s corpse by Zakaria Ali, Lecturer in Art History,
of Nayan's
for the arrest
for arrest of the bandits.
bandits. File
File K/SUK
K/SUK 2889/1339.
2889/1339. National
National Archives
Archives of Universiti Sains Malaysia. The legend is that during the struggle leading to
Malaysia,
Malaysia, Kuala
Kuala Lumpur.
Lumpur. his capture, cuts were made on Nayan's body to invalidate
invalidate his powers ofof
47. Within
Within traditional
traditional Malay society, say
Malay society. say from
from the fifteenth
fifteenth to the early
early invulnerability. According to Nayan's martial arts teacher.
invulnerability. According teacher, Nayan could be
twentieth
twentieth century,
century, a Malay
Malay who
who rebelled
rebelled against
against his chief or ruler
ruler was
was guilty
gUilty killed only if his shin was cut, but the captors took no chances and slashed
and put to
of derhaka and to death.
death. A son's or daughter's
daughter's defiance
defiance of a parent
parent was
was at various other parts of of his body as well.
also viewed
also viewed asas derhaka. though the
derhaka, though the punishment
punishment was less harsh.
was less harsh.
47
completely to the will of his patron. He displayed a streak of
independence. He had his own agenda of action quite different
from his patron's and he also established his individuality when
he left his own 'calling cards.' In addition, Nayan had his own
charismatic qualities. Although he carried out some jobs for
Sulaiman, such as wounding the uncooperative p e n g h u l u ,
Nayan finally defied his 'boss' and broke off the patron-client
relationship. Thereafter, Nayan's legend as a local Robin Hood
continued to grow as he was really living up to his legend.
Peasants who perceived him thus were either indifferent to or
unaware of the earlier patron-client relationship between Nayan
and Sulaiman, most peasants regarding them as members of
the same gang. In this respect the bandit himself had helped
to blur the lines between his roles as a landlord's bandit and
a peasants' bandit, between reality and myth.
50. Pat O'Malley, "The Suppressionof Social Banditry: Train Robbers in the
U.S. Border States and Bush Rangers in Australia, 1865-1905," Crime and
Social Justice, No. 16 (1981), pp. 32-39. See also Pat O'Malley, "'Social
* William A. Settle, Jr., Jesse James Was His Name (Columbia: University Bandits, ModernCapitalismand the TraditionalPeasantry,"Journal of Peasant
of Missouri Press, 1966), p. 126. Studies, Vol. 6 (July, 1979), pp. 489-500. The best account of Ned Kelly is
49. The details are found in the British Assistant Commissionerof Police's J. McQuilton, The Kelly Outbreak, 1878-1880. The Geographical Dimensions
reports, in K/SUK 564/1339. of Social Banditry (Melbourne UniversityPress: 1978).
48
of intention, and support for them should be seen as part of the
repertoire of conflict strategies available to the dominated classes.
In this sense, the bandit who preys on the rich, even if he invokes
a "Robin Hood" imagery, is not automatically a social bandit.
Only where dominated class ideologies provide an appropriate
class meaning to his actions and lead to the provision of strategic
intervention on his behalf is the bandit transformed into a class
representative.5'
5 I. Ibid.
54. See John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (International Publishers: New York,
52. For dctail~ of the White Wolf, see Edward Friedman, Buckward Toward
1969), pp. 122-126; See also Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, The Great Rebellion:
Revolution (University of California Press: 1974), pp. 121, 144-164.
Mexico, 1905-1924 (W.W. Norton: New York, 1980), pp. 185-198, for a
53. Ibid. critical account of Villa.
49
in a class sense, within the realm of peasant perceptions, or
within the perceptions of any social group which sees the bandit
as its hero or champion.
The historical reality of Hobsbawm's concept of social
banditry as a form of social protest is only partially true,
however. As the table on p. 51 indicates the myth of the social
bandit is not always verified by historical reality. Since only
some social bandits have lived up to their legends, it would
be erroneous to accept Hobsbawm's thesis that all bandits with
Robin Hood myths or legends are in fact 'peasant rebels.' The
examples of Salvatore Giuliano, Silvino, and Lampiao clearly
illustrate that the underlying assumptions of Hobsbawm's thesis
are flawed. He himself has now recognised this.
Is social banditry no longer useful as a sociological
concept? It is possible to salvage Hobsbawm's thesis if it is
redefined within Pat O'Malley's rigid parameters, so that the
term 'social bandits' is understood to mean those who not only
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Pancho Villa
50
Comparative Table of Social Bandits
)
WOMEN IN THE LABOUR FORCE,
We Invite e o n t d b u t l o n s
PROBLEMS OF URBANIZATION, o n a n y of t h e s e
LABOUR MIGRATION, topl 9
FORMS OF UNORGANIZED PROTEST,
WORKERS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR~
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT,
WAGE LABOUR IN EVOLUTION.
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