Proposal for a

regulation on
nature
restoration

Regulation
establishing the
European
defence industry
Reinforcement
through common
Procurement Act
European Parliament Study Guide
European Union Simulation in Ankara (EUROsimA) 2023

Organized by
Foreign Policy and International Relations Society
Middle East Technical University
Üniversiteler Mah. Dumlupınar Bulvarı No:1
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi B Binası Zemin Kat

06800, Çankaya, Ankara, Türkiye

EUROsimA 2023
Ankara - Türkiye 2023

This document is prepared solely for educational purposes and cannot be used for any commercial purpose. No copyright
infringement intended. Please consider the environment before printing.
 Table of Contents
I. LETTERS
A. Letter from the Secretary-General
B. Letter from the Under-Secretary-General
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
A. History of the Parliament
B. Mandate of the Parliament
C. EU’s Legal Structure
D. Ordinary Legislative Process
III. AGENDA ITEM I: PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION ON NATURE
RESTORATION
IV. AGENDA ITEM II: REGULATION ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
DEFENCE INDUSTRY REINFORCEMENT THROUGH COMMON
PROCUREMENT ACT
V. BIBLIOGRAPHY
 I. LETTERS

A. Letter from the Secretary-General

Dear participants,
Hello, my name is Toprak Sezgin. I am a junior student of International Relations at the
Middle East Technical University, and I am the Secretary-General of the European Union
Simulation in Ankara (EUROsimA) 2023. I would like to start off my letter by wishing you all
well. It truly is a great honour to be standing before you and it feels amazing having the opportunity
to welcome you to the conference that I, alongside the rest of the team, spent many sleepless nights
preparing.
EUROsimA 2023 has truly been a team effort. In this sense, I would like to thank Ms
Shukria Malek Zada first and foremost for her inspired leadership of the Organisation Team and
unwavering support throughout this conference’s preparation phase. Similarly, I would like to
commend the Organisation Team for their hardworking attitude and the efforts they have put into
EUROsimA 2023.
As for my team, the Academic Team, I believe that I do not really have the words to truly
express how highly I think of all of them individually. Not only have they done an utterly fantastic
job in preparing their committees, but they have also demonstrated exemplary behaviour as the
members of a team. Individually, each and every member is amazing, but I believe we truly caught
lightning in a bottle here and it pains me to know that this will be the last time that we will all be
together, banding around EUROsimA. Irrespective of this, working with this team was truly a
pleasure that I would not trade with anything else.
The European Parliament has always stood out to EUROsimA’s participants over the years
(myself included, in 2018 and 2019). It is truly unique and reflects the fact that this is a Model
European Union conference above all. Therefore, it is natural that one expects a lot from this
committee. I believe that Under-Secretary-General Ms Eylül Temizkan and her Academic
Assistants Mr Enes Okkay and Mr Bora Oğuz rose up to the occasion beautifully, delivering an
amazing Study Guide and a committee so well-prepped that I take pride in calling it, alongside the
Council of the European Union, the cornerstone of EUROsimA. Of course, I must also use this
opportunity to thank Ms Temizkan for her friendship since high school, it has been truly a great
pleasure to not just work with her, but to also be her friend. Similarly, Mr Okkay and Mr Oğuz
have also been great friends, though we have not had a lot of time to get to know each other.
Without further ado, I would like to leave you alone with the letter by the Under-Secretary-
General and the Study Guide. It is imperative that, in order to enjoy this conference and truly learn
something from it, you read this Study Guide well and do further preparations if necessary.
Although this may seem daunting, I assure you that the qualified nature of these Study Guides and
the love and care put into them will make the reading process an easy breeze for you. Welcome
again and see you in EUROsimA 2023!
Kind regards,
Toprak Sezgin
Secretary-General of EUROsimA 2023
 B. Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

Most distinguished participants,

I am Eylül Temizkan – a second year architecture student at Middle East Technical
University. My journey within EUROsimA has started as an academic assistant last year and
now, it is my utmost pleasure to be a part of this conference, serving as the Under-Secretary-
General of the European Parliament.

European Parliament and the Council of the European Union act as the two co-
legislators of the European Union and in the 19th annual session of EUROsimA, these two
committees will be discussing two significant agenda items. The first one of these agenda items
is the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Nature
Restoration. Considering the current state of the environmental agendas in today’s world, it is
a crystal-clear fact that we are dependent on the biodiversity concept and the lives that are
created around it. In relation with the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration, the Parliament
and the Council will discuss “nature restoration” this year. The other agenda item is about
establishing a European defence industry reinforcement through common Procurement Act. In
view of the Russia-Ukraine war, it would not be wrong to state that the perspective of the
European Union has changed. In the light of the new developments that has come to the
forefront in the recent years, these vital topics will be tackled in the 19th annual session of
EUROsimA.

I would like to state my appreciation for our Secretary-General, Mr. Toprak Sezgin. Our
friendship goes back a long way but working with him in a professional manner was also a great
pleasure for me. Due to my busy schedule as an architecture major, I was not on good terms
with the deadlines most of the time. However, he has never withdrew his kind support
throughout this process. I also want to thank to my academic assistant Enes Okkay. This was a
long, difficult road and knowing that he was always there for me relieved me a lot. He lessened
the burden on my shoulders and certainly did a great job. My other assistant, Mr Bora Oğuz,
also gave a good account of himself although he joined us after. Finally, I would like to express
my compliment for our hard-working Organisation Team led by our Director-General, Ms
Shukria Malek Zada.
I wish every participant a fruitful, memorable experience. Do not forget, a good idea
only works if we get it right.

Sincerely yours,
Eylül Temizkan

Under-Secretary-General Responsible for the European Parliament

 I. INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament (EP) is one of the seven main institutions of the European

Union (EU). It is also one of the legislative bodies of the EU, and together with the Council of

the European Union, it is tasked to amend and approve the proposals of the European

Commission (EC). The EP is the only directly elected EU institution with 705 MEPs.

A. History of the European Parliament

The European Parliament was formed in 1952 as the Common Assembly of the

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (CVCE.eu n.d.). Among other institutions, the

Common Assembly is the archaic form of the European Parliament, and meetings held at the

Common Assembly included representatives from the member states of the ECSC. The

Common Assembly was renamed in 1962 to its current name: the European Parliament. In

1979, the procedural structure with regards to the MEPs changed and from that time onwards

the Parliament’s members have been directly elected. With the Lisbon Treaty of 1 December

2009, the power of the EP on budgetary tasks concerning the whole EU budget was increased

(Kahraman 2021). Furthermore, the treaty increased the legislative powers of the EP to equal

the Council in most areas as well as linking the appointment of the EC to the Parliament’s

elections.

B. Mandate of the European Parliament

The EP has three main roles: legislative, supervisory, and budgetary. Firstly,

legislative duties of the EP include passing EU laws, deciding on international agreements

and enlargements, and reviewing the work programme of the EC and asking it to propose

legislation. Secondly, the supervisory role of the EP involves democratic scrutiny of all EU

institutions, electing the EC President and approving the Commission as a body. granting

discharge, examining citizens’ petitions and setting up inquiries discussing monetary policy,
questioning EC and Council, and observing elections. Finally, the budgetary duties of the EP

are establishing the EU budget and approving the EU’s long-term budget (European Union

n.d.).

In the process of these actions, the EP works in two main parts, committees, and

plenary sessions. In the twenty committees and three subcommittees concerning particular

policy areas, the legislation is prepared. The proposals are examined, and participants can put

forward amendments or reject bills. In the plenary sessions, Members of the European

Parliament (MEPs) gather to vote on the legislation and proposed amendments (European

Union n.d.).

C. EU’s Legal Structure

The legal structure of the European Union depends on the rule of law, meaning that

every action taken by the EU is based on the treaties democratically approved by its members.

Laws of the EU aid the accomplishment of objectives specifically determined by the treaties.

EU laws are categorized as primary and secondary laws. Primary law consists of the treaties

while the body of law created after the approval of the treaties constitute the secondary law

(European Council 2017). There are certain key definitions which must be understood when it

comes to the EU’s legal structure.

EU treaties: They are the legal documents which draw the objectives of the European Union,

rules for the EU institutions, the way decisions are made, and the relation between the EU and

its member countries (European Council 2017).

Regulations: They are legal acts that are automatically and uniformly binding on all Member

States immediately after approved and implemented. For the regulations, there is no need for

the transition to national law (European Council 2017).

Directives: They are used to call upon Members States to achieve a certain result. However,

the way Member States organise the procedure to fulfil this specific result is left up to the

Member States themselves. The framework created by the directives should be transferred to

the national law of the member countries (European Council 2017).

D. Ordinary Legislative Procedure

The Ordinary Legislative Procedure is also called “co-decision” (European Council

2017). Almost 85 EU policy areas, from the fight against discrimination to the defence

policies, are determined with the ordinary legislative procedure. It was first adopted in 1992,

and its area of the use has been enlarged in 1999. With the Lisbon Treaty, it became the main

procedure for the adaptation of EU legislation.

The OLP has three different reading processes. These stages begin with the

Commission presenting a proposal to the European Parliament. During the 1 st reading, the

European Parliament examines the proposal of the Commission and may directly adopt

proposal or introduce amendments to it (European Council 2017). After the examination of

the Parliament, the proposal is then sent to and scanned by the Council. In this stage, the

Council may decide to accept the Parliament’s position on the proposal, which means that the

act will be adopted, or introduce amendments on top of Parliament’s additions. In the latter

case, the proposal is returned to the Parliament, which starts the 2nd reading process. During

the 1st reading process, there is no time limit (European Council 2017).

In the 2nd reading process, Parliament examines the Council’s proposition on the

proposal (European Council 2017). After this, it can approve the text, reject it, or propose

additional amendments to it. If the Parliament approves, the act is adopted. In the case of a

rejection, the legislative act will not enter into force and the whole procedure fails. If it

introduces amendments, the proposal returns to the Council for the 2 nd reading (European
Council 2017). In the latter case, the Council examines the Parliament’s 2 nd reading

proposition on the proposal, and it can either approve all amendments proposed by the

Parliament or reject them. In the first possibility, the act is adopted. If Council rejects the

proposal goes, the Conciliation Committee is convened, and the 3rd reading stage begins.

The time limit for the 2nd reading is three months which can be extended by one month

(European Council 2017).

The Conciliation Committee consists of equal numbers of members from the

Parliament and Council representatives (European Council 2017). The role of the Conciliation

Committee is to reach a common ground between the Parliament and Council and agree on a

joint text that would be acceptable to both institutions. If the Conciliation Committee cannot

reach a joint text, the act is not adopted. In the opposite case, the text is forwarded to the

Parliament and Council for further examinations. If one of the institutions rejects the joint

text, the whole procedure ends, and the act cannot be adopted (European Council 2017).

Figure 1: The flow of the OLP (European Parliament, The three phases of ordinary legislative procedure, n.d.,
flowchart).
 PROPOSAL FOR A
REGULATION ON NATURE
RESTORATION
 Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC AND RELATED TERMS ............................................................................ 2
A. Glossary ............................................................................................................................................................... 3
B. Conservation Biology ........................................................................................................................................... 4
i. What is Conservation? ...................................................................................................................................... 4
ii. What is Conservation Biology? ......................................................................................................................... 5
iii. The Similarities and Differences of Conservation Biology and Restoration Ecology ........................................... 6
C. Restoration Ecology.............................................................................................................................................. 7
i. Background and History ................................................................................................................................... 7
ii. Theoretical Foundations ................................................................................................................................... 9
iii. Challenges..................................................................................................................................................... 11
D. Ecosystem Specific Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 13
i. Inland Wetlands ............................................................................................................................................. 13
ii. Coastal and Other Saline Wetlands ................................................................................................................. 13
iii. Forests .......................................................................................................................................................... 15
iv. Agro-Ecosystems ........................................................................................................................................... 15
v. Freshwater: rivers, lakes, and alluvial habitats ................................................................................................. 15
vi. Marine Ecosystems ........................................................................................................................................ 16
vii. Urban Ecosystems ......................................................................................................................................... 16
II. EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL’S SIGNIFICANCE FOR NATURE RESTORATION AND THE ACTIONS
THAT ARE TAKEN ...................................................................................................................................................... 17
A. Biodiversity Strategy for 2030............................................................................................................................. 17
B. Agricultural Policies ........................................................................................................................................... 17
i. Common Agricultural Policy .......................................................................................................................... 17
ii. Farm to Fork .................................................................................................................................................. 18
iii. Use of Chemical Pesticides ............................................................................................................................. 18
C. Climate Action ................................................................................................................................................... 18
III. EU’S BIODIVERSITY SPECIFIC PRACTICES & POLICIES ..................................................................... 19
A. Birds Directive ................................................................................................................................................... 19
A. The General Situation in Europe ..................................................................................................................... 19
B. Birds Directive and Its Importance.................................................................................................................. 19
B. Habitats Directive ............................................................................................................................................... 20
A. Purpose of the Habitats Directive .................................................................................................................... 20
B. Habitats Directive and Its Importance ............................................................................................................. 20
C. Natura 2000........................................................................................................................................................ 21
A. Background Information................................................................................................................................. 21
B. General Information ....................................................................................................................................... 22
IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION ............................................................................................ 22
A. Stakeholder Views .............................................................................................................................................. 22
B. Impact Assessment ............................................................................................................................................. 23
V. COUNTRY STANCES.......................................................................................................................................... 24
VI. PARTY STANCES .................................................................................................................................................. 39
 I. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC AND RELATED TERMS

The word “restore” stands for the act of returning something back to its original owners.

Thus, the restoration of nature is crucial for the local biodiversity and the communities that

depend on them. In today’s world, the ecosystems and the lives that are created around them

still form the key aspect of life on this planet. However, planet Earth is face to face with one of

the greatest challenges of all time, which is global warming. There is a severe case of

misunderstanding the formation of nature restoration. Restoring nature is not about

unconsciously coming into the action. To set an example, it is not about leading up to

monoculture after causing deforestation problems. For this reason, comprehending the crux of

the problem and taking a position in this context is a necessity at the present time.

A. Glossary

Ecology: First being introduced as a scientific term by Ernst Haeckel in 1866, ‘’ecology’’ is

the field that focuses on the relationships between living organisms and their biophysical

environments. (Haeckel 1866, 286)

Ecosystem: An ecosystem is a domain where living organisms along with the abiotic factors

interoperate to generate a biological network. (National Geographic Society 2022)

Ecosystem Services: Also known as eco-services, ecosystem services are the goods and

services that are supplied to humans by functioning ecosystems. Regulating services,

provisioning services, cultural services and supporting services are the four main categories of

this concept (The National Wildlife Federation n.d.).

Restoration Ecology: Restoration ecology is the scientific study which works on restoring

ecosystems that are damaged due to human activities. Restoration ecology involves a wide
range of disciplines such as but not limited to reforestation, and remediation. (Smithsonian

Environmental Research Center n.d.)

Good Condition: Good condition is an ecosystem’s state of being stable and resilient by all

means subject to its ecological integrity.

Habitat: In ecological sciences, ‘’habitat’’ defines a particular area where abiotic and biotic

elements provide the convenient environment for an organism to survive. (Krausman, and

Morrison 2016, 1143-1144)

Holocene Extinction: The Holocene extinction, or Anthropocene extinction is the ongoing

extinction of wildlife of the planet Earth arising from the human activities. (Wagler 2011, 78-

83)

Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) is the

cumulative indigenous knowledge regarding the local ecosystems and the relationships of

organisms in those ecosystems. It refers to the practice that is transferred from generation to

generation by the local communities (Berkes 2001, 109).

Anthropogenic Impact: Anthropogenic impacts, effects, or processes refer to the activities

that are directly or indirectly arising from humans. In other words, any incident that occurs on

the outside of its natural biophysical environment can be classified in this category. (European

Environment Agency n.d.)

Conservation Biology: “Conservation Biology” is the discipline that works on protecting and

preserving the ecosystems, habitats and the lives that are involved in them. Its main target is

further ensuring the principles and tools for protecting the biological diversity. (Soulé 1986,

727) The political, environmental, and social movement that aims to preserve the natural

resources is called “conservation movement.”

 B. Conservation Biology

i. What is Conservation?

Humanity has always been in contact with the environment and the nature around them,

this connection generally revolved around the fact that nature could provide resources (such as

food and water) for humans. The term, conservation is born as a result of this connection

(Hunter and Gibbs 2006, 4-5).

Conservation has been around since the birth of humanity, but the term that we use today

needs a clearer and more specific definition in order to adapt to the modern day. While defining

the term, we should focus on its aims and goals rather than its impacts. Conserving or protecting

something or someone should be an active act. Not harming the environment and protecting it

is completely different concepts. Conservation is the act of actively trying to preserve and

protect the nature. Ancient tribes who had less of an impact on the nature were not

conservatives, they hunted, they gathered fruits and such and used the resources provided by

the nature, but their actions didn’t have remarkable impacts on the nature. This is not because

of they didn’t want to, rather they were not able to. There may be many reasons that could

provide us with such results, the nature could already be providing them with what they needed

or simply they might be inefficient to achieve their goals (Dyke and Lamb 2020, 3-4). This type

of “passive conservation” would become unsustainable if the nature somehow become less

productive or the people become more destructive (Alvard 1993, 355-387).

The conservation that we are trying to define is a more proactive one. There must be an

act of actively seeking ways to protect nature and to understand the importance of the resources

itself. Conservationists should focus on preserving such resources for the future, regardless of

the fact that they may not be able to use that resources in their lifetimes. Conservation is about

the future rather than today. Farmers who use wise technics and hunters who harvest wild
animals sustainably can be counted as people practicing conservation (Hunter and Gibbs 2006,

4-5). They might not get the maximum number of products that can by being more careless or

they might put in more effort the achieve their goals, but without sacrificing, or without

restraining there can be no real conservation (Dyke and Lamb 2020, 3-4).

ii. What is Conservation Biology?

Conservation Biology is a fairly new discipline. It is constructed in order to address the

connections and the problems of existing species, habitats, and ecosystems. Its main goal is to

ensure the safety and the existence of biological diversity (biodiversity) of the earth (Soulé

1985, 727-734). Even though its main goal is obvious it would be unwise to try to define it with

only its aim. Conservation biology is not just a simple act of trying to protect the nature. It

requires in depth research in the field of biology, and it is an idea or even philosophy rather

than a simple movement (Hunter and Gibbs 2006, 14).

The birth of conservation biology is generally accepted as o the First International

Conference on Conservation Biology held at the University of San Diego in 1978 (Jacobson

1990, 431-440). In the earlier stages of the newly crafted discipline the main aim was to

preserve the wildlife rather than the entirety of the nature. After the scientific developments in

the biology, chemistry and ecological sciences, conservation biology shifted in the direction of

a science that includes the aim to save the earth with every component of it (Hunter and Gibbs

2006, 14).

The structure of conservation biology is different than most of the sciences in the world,

since it has many aspects that are driven by various subjects it tends to be mixture of many

sciences. It focuses on biology, it focuses on the nature, it focuses on the importance and the

potential profits that may be driven by the nature, it focuses on how to preserve these topics and

besides many more aspects it focuses on how to teach every citizen in the world to understand
its aims (Jacobson 1990, 431-440). Susan Jacobson, created a visual representation of the place

of the conservation biology between various subjects. It is probably the best way to describe

and understand the position of this fresh science (Hunter and Gibbs 2006, 14).

Figure 1: Model of cross-disciplinary education in conservation biology (Susan Jacobson 1990).

iii. The Similarities and Differences of Conservation Biology and

Restoration Ecology

The main similarities of these two “new” sciences are the topics that they dwell in to.

Both are trying to preserve or save the nature in their own ways and while doing so both are

trying to use nature’s best aspects to help their purposes. We can also find similarities that are

not directly related to the goals or the areas of the sciences, such as their pattern of growth

throughout the years. Both of the sciences are attracting more and more attention in the current

age of humanity (Young 2000, 73-83).

Figure 2 (a): Three-year running mean of the number of books appearing in

a key word search (‘restoration ecology’) of the University of California

Melvyl© library database, 1986–1998. Figure 2 (b): Three-year running

mean of the number of papers with the title words ‘land

 In order to see the difference between the two disciplines we can take a look at their

approach on several things. In an article “Directions in Conservation Biology” (Caughley 1994,

215-244), there are two paradigms that can show us the distinction between conservation

biology and restoration ecology. One of the paradigms, the declining population paradigm talks

about causes that could result in decreasing the population of a species, nowadays this topic

generally involves restoration ecology. Restoration ecology aims to bring back what is lost. The

second paradigm, small population paradigm, focuses on the risks that revolve around the

populations that are already small and in danger. Today this topic is generally associated with

conservation biology, their aim is to protect what we have right now and reduce the chances of

further harm in that area or population (Young 2000, 73-83).

Even though, today there are differences between the two, many professionals and

scientists believe that in this century both will become more and more related. There are

scientific communities which claim this century will be the era of restoration ecology (Wilson

1994, 250-255). Some of the scientist even takes this idea and combine the two sciences and

claim that the main aspect of the conservation biology will be trying to restore what we have

lost (Young 2000, 73-83).

C. Restoration Ecology

i. Background and History

Humankind and academics in particular have been contending with restoration ecology

for thousands of years now. However, the separation of restoration ecology as a discipline under

ecology had not eventualized until the late twentieth century. United States of America is

acknowledged as the place where modern ecological restoration has first come into prominence.

(Jordan 2011, 50)

 At this point, it would be highly beneficial to mention the “traditional ecological

knowledge.” For a long time now, indigenous people have been in a close relation with the

nature. They have been observing, experiencing, and handling the wildlife in order to supply

the staff of the life. In this way, they had the chance of interfering the environment in a desired

way. The fundamental of those acts lie behind the development of today’s modern agricultural

techniques.

Another matter that is directly connected to the current state of the ‘’ecological

restoration’’ is the political aspect of the topic. It is a crystal-clear fact that it is impossible to

ensure the progress in the affirmative direction without taking actions according to legislative

forces. In this way, EU 2020 Biodiversity Strategy and its outcomes are highly significant. EU

biodiversity Strategy for 2020 was adopted by the European Commission in 2011 with the aim

of tackling the problem of declining biodiversity and ecosystem services (EUROPARC

Federation n.d.). The strategy had six targets in total which were protecting the species and

habitats, maintaining and restoring ecosystems, achieving more sustainable agriculture and

forestry, making fishing more sustainable and seas healthier, combatting invasive alien species,

and helping to stop the loss of global biodiversity. However, the reason did not reach a certain

solution. At least, it was below the mark. According to a report published by the European

Environment Agency (EEA), biodiversity continued its precipitous drop across the EU Member

States. According to the report, a devastating 81% of habitats now have a “poor” or “bad” status,

with more than 1/3 continuing to deteriorate at EU level. For species, over 60% have a “poor”

or “bad” status - only 6% are showing improving trends while 1/3 are still deteriorating (World

Wildlife Fund 2020).

It would also be important to mention the studies apart from all those that were or are

being conducted within the European Union. Under the umbrella of UN Decade on Ecosystem

Restoration which runs from 2021 to 2030, national governments of the member states and
other actors like NGOs & private sector constituents work on this topic. This study is going to

contribute a lot to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). More

particularly, SDG-15 (Life on Land), SDG-2 (Zero Hunger), SDG-6 (Clean Water and

Sanitation), SDG-7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG-12 (Responsible Consumption and

Production), SDG-13 (Climate Action), SDG-14 (Life Below Water) and SDG-17 (Partnerships

for the Goals) will make progress in this way.

ii. Theoretical Foundations

This section will detail some concepts that are interrelated with the topic at hand.

1. Disturbance

Disturbance can be defined as the alteration of environmental dynamics which lead to

deterioration in a particular ecosystem. Disturbance may occur because of anthropogenic acts

but it can also happen naturally and it is highly significant to separate those in the way of

providing necessary conditions for the restoration process. These types of events generally take

place in a really short time period, and they might leave substantial damages. However,

sometimes they may last longer and this might cause a change in biodiversity. To give an

example, fire, insect outbreak, and earthquake are major ecological disturbances. Although

disturbances generally affect populations of resident plants, animals, and other organisms in a

negative way, they might also lead to some positive results in some cases. Some previously

excluded species (because of their biological communities) gain the chance of returning to their

former ecosystems by means of these disturbances and this increases the biodiversity in those

areas. 1988 Yellowstone National Park Fire is an example of this situation. The fires of 1988

created a landscape of burns, partial burns, and unburned areas which is called a mosaic.

(National Park Services n.d.) This mosaic enables natural flora to have a bigger range of

biodiversity among plant and animal species. Previously, Yellowstone National Park’s total
area had mainly been dominated by lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta). After the disaster, a

landscape mosaic of incinerated and unburned pine stands was comprised. After fifteen years,

it was observed that the tree density varied from 566 to 545,000 trees per hectare. (Paine 2019)

2. Succession

Mostly followed by an ecological disturbance, succession is the period which species’

structure in an ecological community changes in time. In many examples it was seen that there

is a gradual transmission from simpler organizations (for example with some pioneer species)

to more complex, stable communities where the living organisms are dependent to each other.

This stage where that very environment ends up with a stable state is called ‘’climax’’.

3. Fragmentation

Habitat fragmentation can be defined as the discontinuities in a habitat, and they might

occur due to natural disturbances or interferences regarding the usage of terrestrial regions

(Rogar and Lacher 2018, abstract). Agricultural activities could be given as an example for the

second one. Because of these types of incidents, some problems occur like the isolation and

consequently, the threat of extinction. According to studies, habitat fragmentation reduces

biodiversity by 13 to 75% and directly affects the primary functions of ecosystems such as

nutrient cycles and the biomass (Haddad et al. 2015, 1 of 9).

4. Ecosystem Function

The term “ecosystem function” defines the fundamental occupations of ecosystems like

nutrient cycles and energy fluxes. In order to have a better understanding of the restoration

ecology and implementing it in a suitable way, it is crucial to consider these ecosystem

functions.
 iii. Challenges

Like many other disciplines, restoration ecology comes face to face with a series of

problems by its nature since it deals with highly complicated issues. Weather conditions, socio-

political environment, current situation of the communities, and climate change can be given

as examples to these circumstances.

One of the most important challenges regarding this topic is the unpredictability.

“Ecosystem” is a highly complex structure intrinsically and every habitat has its own

characteristic. Therefore, it is almost impossible to have a command of every single possibility

that will arise from the interrelation between the members (Kuuluvainen et al. 2009, 254). Even

if we were able to have full knowledge of the ongoing ecological processes in the studied

restoration regions, there could still be some obstacles in this way such as the climate change.

This would lead the incidents to an undesirable way.

It is also a critical point to think about the systems that are “measuring” the functionality

of a natural environment. Many ongoing studies that are pursued focus on to the factors like the

diversity of the plant species. However, it would be more suitable to concentrate on to more

detailed scopes like the wood decomposition data.

Another aspect of this issue is the consideration of the social factors. In theory, the aims

and the scope of the ecological restoration is determined according to biological circumstances

and norms. However, in some cases this system come into its own and sometimes it even

becomes difficult to reach local targets. For instance, the landowners are loath to give approval

for the borders of the selected restoration site. If that very site is close to human population,

things might get even more complicated because people tend to criticize some restoration

techniques especially if those actions affect their mainstays and thus, their incomes. If people

were dependent on those restoration sites previously, then it is crucial to provide them new
opportunities and occupations. It is also significant to take steps in the way of raising awareness

within the public regarding the natural events and processes.

Funding is another side of this topic and most of the times, it underpins the restoration

projects. By the end of the day, funding is mandatory for ensuring the continuity of the process.

Otherwise, the success of the restoration projects is imperilled and in the long term, the revision

of some studies might be necessary. This would lead to the waste of time and resources.

Also, in the name of pursuing “nature restoration” studies, some communities practice a series

of actions which are highly dangerous for the local biodiversities. “Monoculture tree

plantations” is a perfect example of this situation. In the regions where the forest fabric is

damaged or destroyed, some reforestation works are being done. However, in some cases these

studies are held without getting the necessary scientific consultations and the problem called

“the monoculture of deforestation” occurs. These types of events also pose risks for flora and

fauna because they might end up causing pollution and agricultural output problems.

Figure 3: Conceptual figure illustrating the key drivers influencing the success or otherwise of restoration goals

(The Institution of Environmental Sciences 2022).

 D. Ecosystem Specific Analysis

i. Inland Wetlands

A wetland can be defined as an area where the water body covers the soil regularly or

periodically during the natural cycle. Inland or non-tidal wetlands are common among

floodplains along rivers and streams, isolated depressions surrounded by dry land, rands of

small water masses like ponds and lakes, and finally in low-lying regions where the soil facet

gets in touch with the groundwater (Environmental Protection Agency 2022). The scales related

to the entity of the wetland (for example the water quantity & the time water body remains

present throughout the year) specify the characteristics of it as a natural constituent within the

ecosystem. Inland wetlands are examined in two categories which are “Natural Wetlands” and

“Man Made Wetlands.”

ii. Coastal and Other Saline Wetlands

“Coastal wetland” is a term that defines a region where there is fresh, brackish, or saline

water seasonally or permanently and a range of plant species which are specifically adapted to

that very area in connection with the ecological characteristics (The Pennsylvania State

University n.d.). They include seagrass meadows, intertidal flats, tidal saltmarshes, mangrove

forests, and tidal freshwater wetlands (Hopkinson et al. 2019, chapter 1-5).

Coastal ecosystems are highly important because they provide indispensable ecosystem

services that we all need to survive. There are many examples to these services and protection

from flood & erosion could be given as examples. Because of the rise of sea levels or storms,

the residential and commercial buildings are open to threats if the coastal ecosystems do not

function in the desired way. Also, since coastal wetlands can absorb the energy created by ocean

currents, they are crucial in the way of controlling the erosion. The wetlands act as natural water
purifiers as well. They filter the foreign matters and ensure the healthy conservation of river

and shore ecosystems.

Besides, there are economic & commercial aspects of this topic. For instance, more than

50% of the commercial fish and shellfish species in the Southeastern United States depend on

these coastal wetlands (Martin et al. 1996). From this example we can understand that the

coastal wetlands form the core of sustainable fisheries. Therefore, the seafood and the

commercial aspect of it is affected first hand from the present conditions of the habitats like

estuaries which are directly related with the coastal wetlands. Tourism is another important side

of this topic. Especially for the local folks, activities like fishing, photographing and nature

observing are the primary sources of living since they generally subsist on tourism. Also,

beaches are the primary tourism centres for the coastal places where the climate is not harsh

and their cleanliness is essential as well.

According to research, it was reported that the coastal regions of the Atlantic, Pacific,

the Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes; wetlands were destroyed at an average rate of about

80,000 acres per year between the years 2004 – 2009 (Dahl 2013, 58). Human activity is one

of the biggest reasons of the habitat loss in the coastal ecosystems. Agricultural acts and the

urban – rural developments stand as the primary grounds of these human activities. Obviously,

climate change affects this issue in a negative manner and when the human impact is considered

for the climate change, everything fits together. Another human activity that is interrelated with

this problem is the pollution. Every stream come to an end with a bigger water body and in

some cases, it is seen that pollutant substances are transferred through hundreds of miles.

Restoration of the coastal ecosystems can be possible with several methods. First of all,

there could be some alterations within the geomorphological structures of the habitats. For

example, sediments might be added to the land base and by this way, further development of

the plant species is provided. Reviving the former wetlands could be another option. In this
direction, additional small-scale measures could be taken in the way of decreasing the pressure

within the aforementioned landscapes. Suspending the human visitations or the agricultural

processes could be beneficial in this manner (Climate Adapt 2016).

iii. Forests

It is an undeniable fact that the forest ecosystems stand as one of the key aspects of the

life on planet Earth. An important part of the biodiversity of this planet is implicit in the forest

ecosystems. Humanity’s desire “for more” has been affecting the forests alongside the other

constituents of the natural environment for a long time now.

Restoration of the forest ecosystems comprises actions such as reforestation and

enhancing the necessary sustainable conditions for the degraded forests. This should not be

limited with the planting new tree species. Taking precautions for the wild plants and animals,

and also conserving the inorganic components like soil and water are also important points (UN

Decade on Ecosystem Restoration n.d.).

iv. Agro-Ecosystems

An agro-ecosystem can basically be defined as the ecosystem that is used for agricultural

purposes by humans in order to produce food. These are crucial in the way of sustaining the

fundamental human necessities. However, the way they are used poses a lot of problems.

Monoculture, extreme excavation & cultivation of the soil, excessive grazing, destroying the

vegetation are some problems that cause erosion. (UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration n.d.)

v. Freshwater: rivers, lakes, and alluvial habitats

Being another subset of the aquatic systems of the planet Earth, freshwater ecosystems

are highly important since more than 100.000 species -including the humans- depend on this

freshwater. The current amount of the freshwater in the world is not even forms the 3% of the
whole water and less than half of it is ready to be consumed as a liquid. (National Geographic

n.d.) Thus, the factors that are affecting these ecosystems in a negative manner are forming

threats for us as well. In this way, protecting, conserving, and restoring freshwater ecosystems

are crucial.

vi. Marine Ecosystems

Marine ecosystems form the largest part of the world’s aquatic ecosystems. Marine

waters exist in saline waters, and they cover more than 70% of the surface of the Earth &

account for more than 97% of Earth's water supply. (Nunez 2019) There are some factors that

are threatening the marine ecosystems’ biodiversities like the increasing human population in

the coastal regions (especially in the tourism seasons), pollution problem, invasive species, and

above all – climate change. Ecosystems like coral reefs, lagoons, and estuaries are some

prominent marine ecosystem types that are affected negatively in this way.

vii. Urban Ecosystems

Urban ecosystems are the ecosystems where the anthropogenic biomes come forward

and generally, they are highly complex in a structural manner. Living accommodations like

cities and towns or industrialized areas could be counted in this category. Sustainability of the

urban design has been remaining on the academic agendas for a long time now. By the end of

the day, urban ecosystems are the places where the humans live, and people want to maintain

this process in a liveable environment.

 II. EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL’S SIGNIFICANCE FOR NATURE

RESTORATION AND THE ACTIONS THAT ARE TAKEN

A. Biodiversity Strategy for 2030

The EU’s biodiversity strategy for 2030 aims to stabilise Europe’s biodiversity after

enhancing the natural conditions in a desired manner. After the relative ineffectiveness of the

“2020 Biodiversity Framework”, European Union’s target is reaching this goal in every respect

within the member states. As an indispensable part of the European Green Deal as a whole, this

strategy will also support the “Green Recovery from the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic”.

As a part of this very formation, “Nature Restoration Law” is proposed by the European

Commission, and this is the first ever continent-wide law of its kind (European Commission

n.d.). In this way, the European Union aims to restore wetlands, rivers, forests, grasslands,

marine ecosystems, and the species that are involved in them. This law will be an important

step in the way of ensuring the biodiversity, securing the ecosystem services, and tackling with

the global warming.

B. Agricultural Policies

i. Common Agricultural Policy

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was first introduced in 1962 and it provides a

connection between society and agriculture – in other words, between Europe and its farmers.

(European Commission n.d.) The primary aims of the Common Agricultural Policy are ensuring

that the farmers have a reasonable level of income, managing the natural resources in a

sustainable way, supporting the agricultural industry among the European lands. In this way,

many developments are provided in the fields of rural development, sustainable agriculture, and

food production.
Figure 4: The level of support for EU farmers from the overall EU budget reflects the many variables involved

in ensuring continued access to high quality food, which includes functions such as income support to farmers,

climate change action, and maintaining vibrant rural communities (European Commission n.d.).

ii. Farm to Fork

“Farm to Fork” is an important part of the European Green Deal. Its essential target is

ensuring the healthy, sustainable, and safe food system within the European Union. This

strategy is for speeding up the process for transition to a sustainable food system as a whole.

“It sets out both regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives, with the common agricultural and

fisheries policies as key tools to support a just transition” (European Commission n.d.).

iii. Use of Chemical Pesticides

The usage of the chemical pesticides is common especially among the areas where

agriculture is the primary source of living. They can be used to tackle with insects, rodents,

fungi, and unwanted plants etc. Chemical pesticides are harmful for the human health since they

have toxic features. Also, since it is difficult to purify the water and soil from these toxic

chemicals, they affect the food chains and thus, the organisms in a negative way (World Health

Organization n.d.).

C. Climate Action

Climate action is an inseparable part of the nature restoration as a whole. It is impossible

to think one of them independent from the another. To give a basic example, global warming
causes ocean acidification and since this is harmful for the species that are placed in those

habitats, biodiversity is threatened at this point. Thus, we should not forget the fact that these

systems are interrelated, and necessary actions should be taken in this direction.

III. EU’S BIODIVERSITY SPECIFIC PRACTICES & POLICIES

A. Birds Directive

A. The General Situation in Europe

Europe has more than 540 wild bird species in its borders. As an inevitable result of the

human population in Europe, the landscape of the continent has been changed and altered

throughout thousand years. As a result, many natural areas (which are habitats of many bird

species) have been altered and changed into settlements, road, managed woodlands and farmed

lands and pastures. Even though the urbanisation act has always been relevant in Europe, the

rate of change in nature during the past 50 years is the highest. These drastic changes just in a

couple years made a negative impact on several species’ populations (European Commission

2022).

B. Birds Directive and Its Importance

Aforementioned acts of urbanisation resulted in harming the bird population in the entire

Europe. In 1979, European Union, acknowledged the importance of this situation and

unanimously adopted the Birds Directive (Directive 79/409/EEC). Even today the Birds

Directive holds its importance, as it is one of the oldest legislatives that directly focuses on

environmental issues (European Commission). With its main 5 Annexes, the Directive aims to

create an environment where there will be no endangered bird species in Europe. In order to

achieve its goals, with the help of Member States the Directive, creates Special Protection Areas

(SPAs) for 194 species that are defined in Annex I, Plans and programmes hunting periods for
82 species defined under the Annex II, and creates new and protective laws in order to ensure

that the Birds Directive can be followed in each Member State.

Thanks to the Birds Directive, nowadays more than half (%52) of the wild birds in

Europe are considered as secured. There have been many cases where a species was in the brink

of extinction but brought back to its more populous days thanks to the Directive, especially

species stated in Annex I has been the focus of these activities that ensured the safety of the

wild birds. (European Commission 2019).

On the other hand, there have been many cases where species of Least Concern are now

Threatened or Near Threatened. These cases are the results of illegal activities and sometimes

they are the result of pressures outside protected areas. All on all, the general picture is still

mixed, if a specie becomes one of the main focuses of the Directive, the situation of that

particular specie got better thanks to the Directive, on the other hand the same cannot be said

about other wild bird species (European Commission 2019).

B. Habitats Directive

A. Purpose of the Habitats Directive

The Habitats Directive, tries and aims to ensure the safety for more than a thousand

species varying in, mammals, reptiles, amphibians, fish invertebrates, and plants, and 230

habitat types (European Commission). While doing so the Habitats Directive doesn’t negate the

importance of economic, cultural, social, and regional factors (European Commission).

B. Habitats Directive and Its Importance

The Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC) was signed in 1992, just like the

Bird Directive, it requires every Member States to act accordingly and follow the regulations

and establish conservation regime for species listed in Annex IV.

 Member States should prohibit any kinds of disturbances for the species and create

suitable environments and follow if there are any illegal transportation or purchase has been

made for those species. It is important to remember that the Habitats Directive focuses on both

the species and the habitats that the species are living in, with only conserving one of them, the

purpose of the Directive will not be fulfilled.

There are many lists which shows, the endangered species and their natural habitats, Annex IV,

and European Red List of Species can be found as the most important lists that can be accessed

by anyone (European Commission).

C. Natura 2000

A. Background Information

1. Berne Convention on the Conservation of European

Wildlife and Natural Habitats

The Bern Convention is one of the preliminary steps of the Natura 2000 network. It is

one of the most important steps taken to achieve a better conserved nature (Council of Europe

1982). The convention was signed in 1979 and put in effect in 1982. Just like the Habitats

Directive it aims to protect the fauna and flora, and while doing so gives special attention to the

endangered or threatened species (Council of Europe 1982). Just like many other convention or

legal instruments directly related to the European Union, there are several signatories that are

not a member of the European Union.

2. Emerald Network

The Emerald Network is a network similar to Natura 2000. It also focuses on ecological

and natural problems occurring in Europe. It is a direct result and implementation of the Bern

Convention. Before the creation of the Emerald Network, Member States simply followed the
needs and requirements of the Bern Convention. After the creation of the Emerald Network in

1982 (1 month after the Bern Convention took effect) by the Council of Europe every European

Union member State became directly related to the Network. With the help of EU and Emerald

Network in 1992 the Habitats Directive was created with the guidelines provided by the Bern

Convention. After the creation of the Habitats Directive, Natura 2000 was also come to be with

the same manners.

Thanks to the Bern Convention having non-EU signatories, the Emerald Network’s

importance and effectiveness can be seen in other countries and continents (Council of Europe

2022).

B. General Information

In its core, Natura 2000 is a network of core breeding and resting sites of endangered

species. How a site is chosen may vary from site to site, according to their purpose. With over

%18 of the EU’s land area and more than %8 of EU’s marine territory, Natura 2000 is the

largest conservative network of the entire world. Europe’s most threatened and most valuable

species are designated and preserved in these sites.

Protected sites are chosen according to the Birds and Habitats Directives. Member States

choses and creates their preserved sites with the help of the two directives. With this procedure,

the act of preserving becomes more specific and more scientific (European Commission n.d.).

IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION

A. Stakeholder Views

The Commission invited the parties which are connected with the topic as a whole.

Member States, industry representatives from the private sector, non-governmental

organizations, research and academic institutions, and citizens to provide their feedbacks and
thoughts on the proposal. The deadline for stakeholders' feedback on the Commission proposal

was 22 August 2022. Over 200 contributions were posted.

Welcoming many elements in the proposal, such as the time-bound targets, non-

deterioration obligation, binding requirement to reverse pollinator decline, BirdLife,

Client Earth, the European Environmental Bureau and WWF ask to ensure the

enforceability of the overarching objective; to raise significantly the percentage targets

for the different milestones in Articles 4 and 5, and to bring forward the timeline to reach

100% (instead of the proposed 90%) (European Parliamentary Research Service n.d.)

B. Impact Assessment

This proposal is based on an impact assessment. The impact assessment is based upon

a range of scientific documents, stakeholders’ points of views, and analysis of current

legislations regarding nature restoration. EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2020 is one of the things

that has been examined in this manner. The impact assessment focused on the already existing

legislations and analysed the lacking points. The uncertainties regarding the deadlines and

specific requirements apart from the Natura 2000 could be given as examples to this situation.

Four policy options were considered in the way of eliminating these shortcomings. The

first one is the implementation of the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 and relevant EU and

national policies, without setting legally binding restoration targets. Second one is about setting

legally binding targets to restore ecosystems in the EU by 2050. Third option stands for a

number of ecosystem-specific legally binding targets and obligations to restore a broad range

of ecosystems by 2030, 2040 and 2050. The last one is basically a combination of the second

and the third options. Fourth one is rather preferred.

 V. COUNTRY STANCES

A. Austria

Overall, it would be reasonable to see Austria as one of the better countries which

implements EU’s environmental policies (European Commission 2022). Since 2014, Austria

has been taking great steps towards to achieve better implemented National Environmental

Policies (Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022). These steps have been showing their

effectiveness as Austria ranked among the ECO-Innovation Leaders Group (European

Commission 2022).

Especially after the inclusion of Green Party in the government, Austrian policies

regarding the nature became more and more prominent. As a result of these changes, air quality,

efficient ways to handle wastes and quality of water in Austria has increased. Furthermore,

Austria plans to implement more efficient ways to help the environment, such as plans to cover

%100 of energy consumption with eco-friendly sources by 2030 and plans to reach zero

emissions by 2040. Currently, Austria is above average in biodiversity by OECD standards, and

they are seeking ways the make Austria one of the leaders in EU in the field of ecological

policies (SGI 2022).

Even though Austria is getting better and better at dealing with ecological problems the

country still suffers from poor policies, the emissions of greenhouse gases has increased by %5

in the last years (SGI 2022), and within the EU’s standards Austria is below average when it

comes to the territorial coverage of Natura 2000 sites (European Commission 2022). Industry

and commerce are the biggest contributors of CO2 in Austria.

 B. Belgium

Belgium has many obstacles in their ways to achieve better policies regarding the

environment. The density of the country, its reliance on the industry and different political ideas

upon the environment makes Belgium’s work harder. In general Belgium has flawed and

inconsistent law regarding the environmental policies (SGI 2022).

The government is trying to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases all around the

country, but this situation creates inequal conditions throughout the regions of Belgium.

Ministers of environmental and energy in the country has tried to create better national policies

but they faced resistance from some regions (SGI 2022). The air quality in the urban regions of

Belgium is very low when comparing with other EU members. The country does not ensure

conservation of nature in almost %95 of its natural habitats. When all of the problems in the

country have been considered it seems achieving climate naturality by 2050 is almost an

impossible task (European Commission 2022).

Even though Belgium is not the brightest country in most aspects when looking at the

ecological policies, the country is one of the best when it comes to creating a circular economy

and recycling waste (SGI 2022). Belgium is a leading country in the areas of resource

productivity, usage of recyclable secondary materials and waste management (European

Commission 2022).

C. Bulgaria

Bulgaria has one of Europe's highest levels of biological diversity and a wide range of

meteorological, geological, topographical, and hydrologic circumstances. Conserving the

biodiversity in Bulgaria is one of the most important topics for EU, as it is home to 26% of the

species found in Europe. It is essential to try to achieve the best ecological policies in the
country, rather week economical state of the country creates the greatest obstacle in this path

(European Commission 2022).

The current policies in Bulgaria regarding the nature can be described as ineffective and

insufficient. Bulgaria still needs to create site-specific conservation objectives and try to adopt

the principals of Natura 2000. Bulgaria is dire need of direct involvement regarding the urban

wastewater problem, as 70% of the wastewater in the urban regions are not collected or doesn’t

get the required attention from the government. Air pollution in the country is also one of the

most problematic concerns (European Commission 2022).

Even though Bulgaria has a lot of way to go, the current government has been adopting

aggressive ecological policies, and trying to make the situation in the country better (SGI 2022).

In 2020, the country exceeded its goals for renewable energy and almost 20% of their energy

came from eco-friendly sources (SGI 2022). They are now implementing new policies, such as

The Waste Management Plan 2021-2028, INSPIRE Directive and policies that tries to create

circular economy (European Commission 2022).

D. Croatia

With its fresh and coastal waters, plenty of natural parks and various ecosystems both

on land and water Croatia has an immensely rich natural heritage. Croatia’s tourist related

economy is generally based on these features of the country, thanks to this relation between the

two topics its economy and natural sites are boosting each other (European Commission 2022).

Croatia already has some policies that are helping its nature. With the help of those

policies, almost 30% of the energy consumption of the entire country comes from green energy.

To implement more and more successful ecological acts in the country Croatia is trying to

reduce their coal usage to minimal by the year 2033 and reduce methane emissions by 2030

(SGI 2022).
 The country suffers from some bureaucratic problems and as a result of it, necessary

policies or laws for nature can sometimes be inefficient (SGI 2022). Besides that, two of the

most important ecological problems in the country are poor condition of air and waste

management (European Commission 2022). However, there are some minor improvements in

waste management in the country (SGI 2022).

E. Cyprus

Cyprus is a country which has a rich marine environment, and significant numbers of

protected areas. It is hard to say that the country accomplishes what it needs to in order to

preserve the rich nature of it (European Commission 2022).

High population density, unstable economy, invasive species, illegal hunting, and forest

fires in the region make it harder to achieve a sustainable environment in the island (European

Commission 2022). With these obstacles in the way, the country does not focus on EU’s

ecological aims, and generally tries to create a more stable economy. Even though there are rich

habitats which are in need of protection, Cyprus’s government and officials believe without

having a stable and reliable economy they cannot even try to preserve those areas. So, they tend

to prefer anti-ecological policies which are bringing them more profits (SGI 2022).

F. Czechia

In the last years, ecological problems were never the number one priority in Czechia.

Generally, the country fulfilled its duty when it comes to achieving EU’s goals in the area of

ecology, but with minimal effort. All in all, the current government always put Czechia’s

automotive industry over environmental problems (SGI 2022).

Smaller steps have been taken in order to fulfil Natura 2000 networks goals and to create

a circular economy (European Commission 2022). As for usage of energy, renewable energy is

only the %16 of the entire energy consumption and future plans about CO2 does prohibit usage
of coal but does not prohibit the usage of harmful gasses. On the bright side of the things for

the nature, Czechia was one of the predominant countries which implemented the usage of

Nuclear Energy in EU, and 40% of the energy used in the entire country comes from Nuclear

Energy (European Commission 2022).

Czechia also has conflicting ideas about the European Green Deal, as they believe

without the contributions of bigger contributors, such as USA and China, Europe can’t achieve

a climate neutral world by itself (Radio Prague International 2021).

G. Denmark

Denmark is one of the leaders of the ecological movement in the entire world. The

country has been an important environmental figure in the EU, the UN, and other international

bodies. As a result of this leadership roles, Denmark has been in the ECO-Innovation Leader

Group for the last years (European Commission 2022). In 2022, they have become the number

one spot in Environmental Performance Index, showing their dedication to the matter at hand

(Environmental Performance Index 2022). Over the years, the situation in Denmark has always

got better and their greenhouse-gas emissions decreased in a great amount. The country now

aims to decrease the emissions more and more by 2030. On top of that Denmark aims to reach

climate neutrality by the year 2050 (SGI 2022).

Denmark is also one of the most efficient users of renewable energy in the EU. More

than 30% of the country's entire energy consumption comes from renewable energy. One of the

main reasons behind this successful ecological movement in Denmark is, the current status of

the parliament. Even though their ideological places may differ all the members of the national

parliament acts in favour of the nature. Unanimously they signed an agreement which aims to

produce 100% of the electric consumed in Denmark from renewable sources by the year 2030

(SGI 2022).
 The two major problems in Denmark are its waste production and worsening conditions

in many natural habitats. In the recent years the country focused on renewable energy, and it

created an environment where habitats became less prioritized (European Commission 2022).

H. Estonia

Estonia has many obstacles in its way to achieve a more green-friendly environment. Its

small size, the countries dependency on oil shales and poor waste management. In general

Estonia is following the goals set by EU when it comes to the ecological ones but fails to achieve

waste management goals (European Commission 2022). The economic dependence on oil

shales results in high emissions of greenhouse gases, and its smaller size results in, various

problems. The most preliminary one would be the construction of roads harming the

biodiversity (SGI 2022).

Even with these problems occurring Estonia is one of the countries that puts ecology in

front of other things. By 2030, Estonia aims to increase their renewable energy up to 50% of

the entire energy consumption and while doing so they are also aiming to decrease their

greenhouse gas emissions (SGI 2022).

I. Finland

Just like the other leaders in the field Finland also has a high rate of cooperation in the

ecological problems. The unity in the entire country resulted in high rates of success in their

ecological projects, they have been ranked as one of the highest countries both in the ECO-

Innovation Scoreboard and the Environmental Performance Index (European Commission

2022).

In the international field, Finland has always been one of the important figures about the

ecological problems, but they generally don’t tend to be the leaders of many projects. But this

does not mean that they did not lead any important agreements. Throughout 2017 to 2019
Finland chaired the Arctic Council and currently promoting various nature related laws and

agreements in the entire world (SGI 2022). The country has been showing positive results of

their implementations, already having 40% of their energy consumption via renewable energy

and they are aiming to reach carbon neutrality by the year 2035.

Current problems in Finland are about biodiversity and deforestation. The government

is aware of these problems and are actively trying to implement new and fresh solutions to the

topics (SGI 2022).

J. France

One of the most important aspects of France in the field of nature restoration is that it

has more international activity and presence when compared with the other leaders of ecological

reforms. France is one of the most efficient countries in when it comes to successfully

implementing EU’s goals towards achieving a greener Europe (European Commission 2022).

Their strong economy and international power alongside with their people who also desires a

better future, creates one of the greatest opportunities for reaching the nature related goals of

the country (SGI 2022).

The country already has low amounts of carbon emissions, but this is only thanks to the

immense amount of nuclear energy in the country. While the nuclear energy is green and clean,

it is not one of the renewable energy types. France is currently searching ways to decrease their

nuclear energy consumptions while trying not to increase their carbon emission (SGI 2022).

The problem in France is derived from its population and size. The high amounts of agriculture

and crowded urban areas result in high amounts of anti-ecological actions. As an example, the

varying ideologies about nature in its parliament can be shown as the result of the high

population. As France is one of the most populous EU countries, it is expected that different

voices will arise from all over the country (SGI 2022).
 K. Germany

Just like other bigger and more populous European countries, Germany also suffers from

intensive agricultural activities, thus resulting in pressure put on biodiversity and water

resources. Even with these problems occurring, with the help of great implementations of EU’s

ecological laws, strong national policies and high environmental awareness amongst the

citizens Germany manages to be one of the leaders in the field of nature restoration (European

Commission 2022).

The new coalition in Germany, has made climate-related policies one of their priorities.

Creating and implementing new and important laws both in the country and in an international

scale Germany is an important figure in this field (SGI 2022). The country aims to reduce their

CO2 emissions by the year 2030 and they aim to become greenhouse-gas neutral by the year

2045. One of the main obstacles in this goal is its dense and high population (SGI 2022).

L. Greece

Even though Greece is one of the most important countries in the field of biodiversity,

with its poor administrative capability and unstable economy it becomes harder to implement

EU’s goals regarding the nature (European Commission 2022). The current situation of Greece

in the field of nature restoration is one of the weakest ones in the European Union.

The country is behind the EU average in many of the ecological aspects. Its carbon

emission is one of the highest, transport stations and power stations in the country pollutes the

air. Lack of proper policies regarding the tourists, paves way for harming the natural beauties

of Greece. Unregulated agriculture, transportation, tourism, and fishery is an important and

dangerous facts of current age Greece (SGI 2022).

 Even within these facts, there have been fresher attempts to preserve the nature. New

laws regarding the protection of the land and biodiversity have been introduced but it would be

unwise to call them efficient (SGI 2022).

M. Hungary

In the recent years Hungary became one of the countries that had worse natural policies

when compared with previous years (SGI 2022). Many of the positive policies had been

negatively affected, the country halted or puts less of an effort their actions for eco-friendly

policies (SGI 2022). Its dependency on industrial and agricultural activities, and fossil fuels are

the dominant factors in the ways of nature restoration (European Commission 2022).

The main reason behind this unfortunate situation is deep within its governance.

Environmental policies in general suffered from lack of commitment, and poor implementation

besides coordination. Hungary has been trying to set new goals for them but the earlier weak

attempts from the country created disbelief in their credibility (SGI 2022).

N. Ireland

Ireland is in a rather different spot when it comes to nature restoration. The country and

its government want to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and preserve the environment in

an effective way. The problem with these plans is that Ireland is a highly agricultural country,

and their current ways of agriculture tends to create approximately %35 the countries entire

greenhouse gas emissions. Displacing the entire production may seem like a possible solution,

however Ireland stated that this method would create more emissions. The country is now trying

to change their methods of agriculture, but their methods create controversies among the people

of Ireland (SGI 2022). Once again Ireland is in a unique spot about the Natura 2000 network,

their effectiveness has been increasing in the fields of Birds and Habitats Directives, but their

activities becomes less and less effective in the marine environment. Poor water treatments and
high demands of agricultural activities causes these marine related problems (European

Commission 2022).

O. Italy

When talking about Italy, it would be logical to divide the country into two, the north

side of the country and the south side of it. In the northern part of the country the dense

population is causing environmental pressures, but having better understanding of what needs

to be done, and the concerns of the people in that region helps the country (European

Commission 2022). For both regions Italy manages to create a respectable amount of renewable

energy, almost %35 of the entirety of the country’s energy consumption (SGI 2022).

On the other hand, the south suffers from poor administrative and financial management

(European Commission 2022). As a result of these problems in the region, water efficiency and

waste management related problems are rising. As the current government strongly showed

their interest in restoring the nature, the recycling rate in Italy, especially in the southern part,

has increased (SGI 2022). Even with some problems in the country, Italy remains as one of the

countries that are actively aiming to create a better ecological Europe.

P. Latvia

Latvia is one of the countries that has a rich biodiversity. Nearly half of the country is

covered by forests, and this creates suitable habitats for various flora and fauna (European

Commission 2022). Currently the country has been producing vast amounts of renewable

energy, even though they are also creating lots of harmful gasses and Latvia has shown signs

of increasing ambitions towards a greener Latvia (SGI 2022).

Acknowledging their lacking parts, such as, poor waste management, the country is

trying to implement new laws that crates a better environment for everyone. One of the strongest
suits of the country, is that they are successfully following the principles of nearly every

agreement that they are part of regarding the ecology (SGI 2022).

Q. Lithuania

In general Lithuania can be seen as an average country in the field of nature restoration.

Especially when looking at the ECO-Innovation Scoreboard, the country is listed in the Average

Group (European Commission 2022). However, Lithuania has shown their resolve to get better

at what they are doing, setting ambitious long-term goals, and progressing in various fields such

as, recycling and increasing the water quality in general (SGI 2022).

While looking more carefully, it becomes clearer that Lithuania, is not backing up its

claims with its actions. Many of the policies are underwhelming and even the better-quality

water is still not easily accessible in the urban regions (SGI 2022).

What makes Lithuania eco-friendly, is that even with lacking implementations of laws

and policies they manage to lower their CO2 emissions, and they have been showing positive

results in various fields. Lithuania has a lot more potential, and it is reasonable to say that they

achieve more than what they currently have (SGI 2022).

R. Luxembourg

Even with its remarkably small size, Luxembourg has some crucial issues within this

field. The country is currently thriving towards a greener Luxembourg. They have been ranked

as number 1 in ECO-Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission 2022), and number 6 on

the Environmental Performance Index (Environmental Performance Index 2022). The current

state of the country is above average when compared with other EU countries, but it seems like

they will have a hard time for their future plans. The government aims to achieve climate

neutrality by 2050, and to achieve 55% renewable energy by 2030. With Luxembourg’s current

strategies and implementations these aims seems unlikely to achieve (SGI 2022).
 S. Malta

With its smaller size and dense population Malta suffers from overdevelopment, the

current state of the island-country is not bright. Compared with other nations Malta’s future

goals seem more realistic but also less effective, by 2030 they aim to achieve 11.5% renewable

energy, which most of the countries already achieved (SGI 2022).

They are trying to focus on solar power, free public transportation, and electric cars, but

their emissions driven by the transportation sector has been increasing in the last years (SGI

2022). On the brighter side, environmental public awareness has been increasing in the country,

whether it is about hunting or it is about construction and urbanization, the people of Malta get

better and better at understanding the current situation regarding the ecological problems

(European Commission 2022).

T. Netherlands

As a densely populated country Netherlands have been dealing with ecological problems

in the recent years (European Commission 2022). As a result of dealing with the density and its

needs, such as high amounts of agricultural activities and their harmful side effects to nature,

the country faced many problems. Most recently there have been legal battles regarding the

ecological situation of the Netherlands.

After the court gave its judgement, the government is seeking ways to increase air

quality by decreasing the emissions and ways to deal with agricultural pollution by handling

waste management both on land and in water (SGI 2022). The new coalition of the state has

shown its interest in ecological matters and have been showing improvements, but still, it would

be unreasonable to call these efforts effective (SGI 2022).

 U. Poland

As one of the biggest countries in Europe Poland is an important country in order to be

able to ensure biodiversity in Europe (European Commission 2022). By not agreeing with the

European Green Deal, Poland stated that they cannot simply deal with the ecological problems

in this current age (SGI 2022).

According to Poland, it is almost impossible to reach EU’s goals by their designated

years. Poland heavily relies on coal production and other various anti-ecological substances. As

a still developing country relying on its industry and infrastructure can only be seen as natural.

All in all, Poland has been trying to reduce their emissions, the difference is that they are not

moving with EU’s standards (SGI 2022). Their acts have been harming the rich nature of Polish

lands and especially biodiversity of the region is direly being affected by infrastructure (SGI

2022).

V. Portugal

After its crisis-like situation Portugal started to become better in the field of ecology.

Even though they still have ways to go in many fields, such as nature conservation, waste and

water management, urbanization, and sustainable development in general, the country manages

to thrive in marine conservation (SGI 2022).

In the recent years the government has been focusing on marine conservation, water

management and circular economy. Even though Portugal is still below average in the fields of

water management and circular economy, there have been positive results in both of those (SGI

2022). Portugal still struggles with various ecological problems, but there have been efforts to

solve those problems and it is believed that they are getting better and better at what they are

doing (European Commission 2022). They are currently promoting the importance of

conservation of marine environment throughout the world (SGI 2022).

 W. Romania

Currently Romania is on the weaker side of the ecological implementations and policies.

Even though they are one of the richest countries in regards of biodiversity, they lack in

protecting and preserving it. The main reasons behind this situation can be seen as lack of

planning, coordination, and prioritization. Romania has been criticised for its “weak”

administrative capacity (European Commission 2022). Romania believes that these claims are

essentially not true. They believe that without achieving a stable and strong economy they

cannot achieve a sustainable environment. Even in its current state Romania tries to implement

as many as environmental acts in its activities (SGI 2022).

The country agreed to accelerate its aim to reduce the usage of coal power and fossil

fuels in the Glasgow COP26 meeting. Romania aims to achieve to cut their emissions by 40%

in 2030. While dealing with more economic problems Romania believes that these are the

realistic and achievable goals (SGI 2022).

X. Slovakia

After the changes in its government, Slovakia found itself in a distinct spot. Predecessor

of the current government did not act upon the ecological issues in the country, but still tried to

act accordingly with EU’s standards. While doing so they failed to convert to renewable energy,

and today Slovakia is one of the countries that rely on nuclear energy the most. (SGI 2022).

The current government aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, but they are

acknowledging the fact that this goal may not be the most realistic one. After coming to the

power, the new government showed that they are more involved with the environmental

problems and they introduced new laws regarding the plastic containers, improving waste

management, and stopping the import of nuclear waste. The other fields still remain as obstacles

in the way of achieving climate neutrality (SGI 2022).

 Y. Slovenia

Slovenia is one of the countries that showed remarkable improvements throughout the

decade in the field of nature restoration. The country has introduced new and effective laws and

policies in the last decade and trying to promote waste prevention and circular economy with

recycling (SGI 2022).

The current status of Slovenia in general might not be the brightest one but it has reasons

behind it. Slovenia has been dealing with keeping up with Natura 2000’s requirements but, also

showing great improvement in that field (European Commission 2022). In 2021, a project

which would open new ways to harm bodies of water was rejected by a referendum (SGI 2022).

Z. Spain

Spain has been passing new policies and laws that would suit their ambitious goals for

2030. New climate law and energy transition law has been introduced in the recent years. They

have been trying to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and implementing a system where

they are getting 75% of their energy from renewable sources (SGI 2022).

In general, investments in the eco-friendly sectors are rising, the government has been

trying to implement more help towards these investments and after they have successfully

achieved their national goals, they will start the seek ways to help other countries. Spain aims

to achieve an important role in the field of nature restoration (SGI 2022).

Main obstacles in Spain’s way are water and waste management. Spain could not

achieve EU’s goal for 2020 and they need significant efforts in order to achieve goals for 2025

(European Commission 2022).

 AA. Sweden

Sweden is one of the most important countries in the field of nature restoration, being

ranked at number 5 both at ECO-Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission 2022), and in

Environmental Performance Index (EPI 2022). Sweden is a significant energy consumer in

Europe, but they are managing their emissions, and the greenhouse gas emissions are declining

each year. They have implemented various policies regarding the circular economy, energy

transition, and usage of plastics in the country (SGI 2022). Sweden generally achieves more

than what it needs in the environment related goals and acts as a leader in this field (SGI 2022).

Main problems for the country would be, preserving its rich environment and managing

waste in the country, as it is a bigger country these problems still need to be addressed

(European Commission 2022).

VI. PARTY STANCES

A. European People’s Party (EPP)

European People’s Party asserts that “Now is not the time to cut food production.”

Therefore, they are not in favour of the whole situation about the proposal of the Nature

Restoration Law. As there is a current food crisis in the world in relation with the Russo-

Ukranian War, EPP Group thinks that a situation regarding the restriction of food might not be

a logical angle to take. “We have to take steps towards better controlled and targeted use of

plant protection substances, but measures without wise consideration may only deepen the

problems of our domestic food production and lead to growing imports. This is not in our

common interest”, says Herbert Dorfmann – a member of the European Parliament who

represents EPP regarding this situation (EPP Group n.d.).

 B. Socialists & Democrats (S&D)

The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats welcomes the initiative of

establishing a Nature Restoration Law. Stating that the European Union had not met the

necessary conditions in the way of achieving the biodiversity objectives for 2020, it was also

added that reversing the current trends related to biodiversity is crucial by César Luena - S&D

rapporteur for the Biodiversity Strategy (S&D 2020).

C. Renew Europe

Renew Europe asserts that they are ready to take action in the way of preserving the

environmental systems and establishing a sustainable economy for future generations. They

pursue a policy following the Paris Agreement and the aim of reaching a net-zero emission by

2050 (at the latest). The green transition is essentialised within the Group of Renew Europe

(Renew Europe n.d.).

D. Greens/European Free Alliance

Greens/EFA is a strong supporter of the EU Nature Restoration Law as a whole. They

allege that this law is actually overdue and the rates regarding the biodiversity in Europe clearly

show that. Greens/EFA asks for six improvements in the way of ensuring the new nature

restoration law. Those are rewetting the bogs, providing free rivers, bringing nature back to the

farmlands, restoring the marine ecosystems, increasing the blue and green spaces in urban

ecosystems, and healing the forests. It is highlighted that these actions to take are urgent and

cannot wait more (Greens/EFA 2023).

E. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

European Conservatives and Reformists takes the side of “affordability” regarding the

proposal of establishing a Nature Restoration Law. They assert that the global environment can
be protected but the European Union should take measures which will not cause “unnecessary”

burdens on businesses and Member States (ECR Group n.d.).

F. Identity and Democracy Party (ID)

Regarding the issue of Nature Restoration Law, it should be considered that the ID

Group is a right-wing populist party with a nationalistic background. Therefore, delegates

should get prepared with keeping this situation in mind.

G. The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL

GUE/NGL represent the left-wing of the European Parliament and they are highly

sensitive regarding the environmental topics. In cooperation with the Greens/EFA, the

amendments of GUE/NGL propose defining the activities that should be prohibited so that

Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are truly ‘protected’, reserving the 12 nautical mile coastal

waters for the exclusive use of vessels of less than 25 meters, and banning destructive fishing

methods.
REGULATION ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
REINFORCEMENT THROUGH
COMMON PROCUREMENT ACT

8
 Table of Contents
I. GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................10
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL ON ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY
REINFORCEMENT THROUGH COMMON PROCUREMENT ACT (EU) 2022/0219 (COD) 13
III. HISTORICAL SCOPE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE..........................................................14
A. Bratislava Declaration........................................................................................................16
B. Warsaw Joint Declaration ..................................................................................................17
C. The EU Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 .................................................................................18
D. The Versailles Declaration .................................................................................................18
IV. EUROPEAN UNION DEFENCE PACKAGE .....................................................................19
A. Financial Stream to the Defence Industry ...............................................................................19
i. Pilot Project and Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) ...................................19
ii. European Defence Industrial Development Program (EDIDP)............................................20
iii. European Defence Fund (EDF) ..........................................................................................20
B. Policies and Previous Initiatives ............................................................................................20
i. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) ..................................................................20
ii. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) .....................................................................21
iii. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) .............................................................24
iv. EU-NATO Cooperation .....................................................................................................26
C. Push Factors ..........................................................................................................................29
i. Brexit ................................................................................................................................29
ii. Russian – Ukraine War ......................................................................................................31
iii. Strategic Compass .............................................................................................................31
V. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION ...........................................................34
A. Objectives and Basis of the Proposal .....................................................................................34
B. Results of the Stakeholder Consultations and Impact Assessment ..........................................36
C. Detailed Explanation of the Specific Provisions of the Regulation .........................................38
VI. COUNTRY STANCES........................................................................................................39
VII. PARTY STANCES ..............................................................................................................48

9
 III. GLOSSARY

This section will provide definitions which are key to the understanding of the regulation at

hand.

Associated country: A non-EU country that is a member of the European Free Trade

Association and the European Economic Area.

Capability gap: A gap in military capability resulting from years of underinvestment in defence

expenditure by Member States, leading to a lack of adequate defence equipment stocks and

urgent need for replenishment.

Common procurement: A process of joint procurement of defence equipment and materials

by Member States to improve value for money, enhance interoperability, and avoid conflicts in

demand for limited resources.

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD): A process aimed at identifying new

opportunities for defence cooperation.

Defence expenditures: The budget allocated to military and defence purposes.

Defence industry: The companies and organisations involved in the design, manufacture, and

sale of military equipment and services.

Defence investment gaps: The financial, industrial, and capability deficiencies in the EU's

defence sector resulting from underinvestment and budget cuts.

Defence Investment Gaps Analysis: An analysis conducted by the European Commission and

the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to identify

financial, industrial, and capability gaps in the European defence industry resulting from years

of underinvestment and recent conflicts.

10
Defence Joint Procurement Task Force: A coordinating body aimed at supporting the

procurement needs of Member States to face the new security situation.

EDTIB: The European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, which has suffered from

industrial gaps as a result of underinvestment in defence expenditure by Member States,

requiring replenishment of stocks and increased investment in a collaborative way.

EU capability development plan (CDP): A plan identifying the defence capability priorities

at the EU level.

European Defence Fund: An initiative that incentivises cooperation on defence research and

development projects, complementing the Instrument which supports cooperation on common

defence procurement.

European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act: A short-

term instrument proposed by the European Commission to incentivise common procurement

via the EU budget to tackle the adverse effects and consequences of the Ukraine war on the

Union.

European Defence Investment Program (EDIP): A proposed regulation aimed at supporting

future joint development and procurement projects of high common interest to the security of

the Member States and the Union.

Financial envelope: The budget allocated for the implementation of the Instrument for a

specific period.

Financial gap: A gap in defence investment resulting from years of substantial cuts and severe

underinvestment in defence expenditure by Member States, leading to industrial and capability

gaps in the EU and low levels of defence equipment stocks.

11
Industrial gap: A gap in the European defence industry resulting from years of

underinvestment in defence expenditure by Member States, leading to inadequate defence

equipment stocks and urgent need for replenishment.

Interoperability: The ability of defence equipment and materials to function together

effectively and efficiently, allowing for greater cooperation and value for money.

Joint Communication: A communication presented by the European Commission and the

High Representative in response to the invitation from the Council to put forward an analysis

of the defence investment gaps and propose any further initiative necessary to strengthen the

European defence industrial and technological base.

Joint projects: Collaborative initiatives involving multiple countries or organizations.

Non-associated third country entity: A legal entity that is established in a non-associated third

country or, where it is established in the Union or in an associated country, that has its executive

management structures in a non-associated third country.

Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: A process aimed at defining the EU's future

security and defence priorities and identifying areas for cooperation.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): A framework for defence cooperation among

EU Member States.

Proportionality: The principle that measures taken to achieve a particular objective should be

proportionate to the goal pursued.

Third country: A country that is not a member of the Union.

Short Term Instrument: A tool proposed by the European Commission to incentivize common

procurement among Member States to fill defence investment gaps.

12
SMEs: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

Subsidiarity: The principle that decisions should be taken at the most local level possible, while

also considering the need for collective action.

IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON ESTABLISHING THE

EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY REINFORCEMENT THROUGH

COMMON PROCUREMENT ACT (EU) 2022/0219 (COD)

The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) starts by stating the following: “We

live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under

threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity, and

democracy, is being questioned” (Wilkinson 2020). Its emphasis on the increased importance

of the strong defence industrial base providing strategic autonomy and technological benefits

after the world has become more “volatile, uncertain, and fractured.” Moreover, for many years,

Europe’s neighbouring regions were identified by unstable situations and complex,

unchallenging environments (Wilkinson 2020). Especially after the Russian military aggression

against Ukraine deepened the territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare in the region, the

EU realised that it must reconsider its policies in the defence plans and capacities to increase

the cooperation among Member States (Commission 2022).

Although the coordination between the Member States is required to sustain more strong

defence policies, there have been many challenges in both political and economic senses, which

causes the members to act in a national manner rather than with the considerations of the EU in

mind (Commission 2022). Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU

Lisbon), which has never been a subject to change since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, indicates:

13
 Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection

of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production or trade

in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the

conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not

intended for specifically military purposes. (“Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union” 2012).

This article has resulted in missed opportunities in economies of scale for industry and

production, which hinders competition in the market. Many of the Member States with

significant defence industries are continuing to resort to Article 346 (Wilkinson 2020). Europe

has been affected from the persistence of some countries on national procurement where

possible. Recently, the European Union suffered from inefficiency in spending caused by

duplications, lack of interoperability, technological and industrial gaps. As published by the

European Commission in 2018, defence expenditure comparison between European Union and

United States is almost €320bn while the duplication of the systems in EU is nearly 20% higher

than in the US (Wilkinson 2020).

Moreover, the data published in 2016 considering the military expenditure China’s

expenditure nearly doubled between 2008 and 2016. At the same time interval, EDAP noted

that the EU Member States have decreased their expenditure on defence nearly by 12% in real

terms (Wilkinson 2020).

V. HISTORICAL SCOPE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE

“European defence” refers to the efforts made by European countries to collaborate and

coordinate their defence and security policies. This includes developing common defence

capabilities, sharing intelligence and information, and cooperating on military operations and

missions.

14
 The devastation caused by World War II, coupled with the emergence of the United

States and Soviet Union as superpowers, led to a realization that Europe needed to work together

to ensure its own security. In 1948, the Treaty of Brussels was signed by Belgium, France,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, creating the Western European Union

(WEU) as a defence alliance.

In 1952, the European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed as a way to integrate

the armed forces of these countries and create a European Army, along with the emphasis on

the need for standardization and joint procurement of defence equipment among European

states mentioned in Articles 107 and 109 of the failed Treaty for a European Defence

Community (Fiott 2019).

With the end of the Cold War, there was a renewed push for European defence

integration. The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union in 1992, included

provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the eventual creation of a

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Based on the historical development of European defence policies, it can be stated that

as time went on, the EU, along with its new members, strengthened its position. The most

important aspects of this development have always been the funding of defence policies and the

research conducted accordingly. In 2017, under the European Defence Agency, the process of

“Coordinated Annual Review on Defence’’ was commenced in order to “ensure greater

synchronization between the national defence planning processes of EU member states” (Fiott

2019).

Fiott (2019) also emphasises the European Defence Fund, established in 2016 by the

European Commission. Initially, €90 million for defence research was committed until the end

of 2019. This total was planned to increase to €500 million per year after 2020, making the

15
European Commission the fourth largest investor in defence researching in the EU when

compared to the Member States. In addition, under the fund, the Commission has set aside €500

million from 2019 to 2020 to support the development of joint capability programs in the EU,

and after 2020, the Commission expected this total to rise to €1 billion per year. In other words,

this initiative seeks to enhance European cooperation through the use of financial incentives.

One other notable initiative that emerged in December 2017 is the agreement between

25 EU Member States to engage in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is part of the European Union’s Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in which 25 of the 27 national armed forces pursue

structural integration (the exceptions being Denmark and Malta).

Especially in recent years, there has been renewed interest in European defence

integration, driven in part by concerns about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The EU increased

its support for the development of the European defence industry and capability through

initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation

(PESCO) framework. These initiatives aim to improve the EU's ability to respond to security

challenges, including those posed by Russia.

In conclusion, the history of European Defence has been one of gradual integration and

cooperation, driven by a desire to ensure security and stability in the region. While progress has

been slow at times, the EU has made significant strides in recent years towards a more unified

and integrated defence policy. The upcoming subsections will detail important turning points in

the history of European defence.

A. Bratislava Declaration

The Bratislava Declaration was a joint statement issued by the 27 heads of state or

government of the European Union on September 16, 2016, following a summit held in

16
Bratislava, Slovakia. The declaration was intended to chart a course for the EU following the

UK’s vote to leave the bloc in the Brexit referendum and to address a range of challenges facing

the EU, including economic growth, security, migration, and the rise of populist movements

across Europe. The declaration affirmed the EU's commitment to unity and solidarity, while

also acknowledging the need for reform and improved communication with citizens with the

following words: “Although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable

for the rest of us. In the aftermath of the wars and deep divisions on our continent, the EU

secured peace, and democracy and enabled our countries to prosper” (Council of the European

Union n.d.). It outlined a roadmap for the EU to deliver results in areas such as security and

defence, migration, and job creation, and called for renewed efforts to strengthen the EU's

external borders, address the root causes of migration, and enhance cooperation on security and

defence (Council of the European Union n.d.).

B. Warsaw Joint Declaration

The Warsaw Joint Declaration was a statement issued by the heads of state and

government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on July 8-9, 2016, following a summit

held in Warsaw, Poland. The declaration was designed to reaffirm NATO's commitment to

collective defence and deterrence in the face of evolving security challenges (Fiott 2019). The

declaration acknowledged the significant changes in the security environment since the

previous summit in 2014, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the rise of

terrorism and instability in the Middle East and North Africa (NATO and European Union n.d.).

The declaration also outlined NATO’s strategy to address these challenges, which included

increased defence spending and military readiness, enhanced cooperation with partners, and the

deployment of multinational battalions to Poland and the Baltic States to provide a credible

deterrence against potential threats. Additionally, the declaration reaffirmed NATO's

17
commitment to working with the European Union and other international organizations to

promote stability and security in Europe and beyond (NATO and European Union n.d.).

C. The EU Strategic Agenda 2019-2024

The EU Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 is a comprehensive plan outlining the European

Union's strategic priorities for the period of 2019 to 2024. The agenda “sets out the priority

areas that will steer the work of the European Council and provide guidance for the work

programs of other EU institutions” (Council of the European Union 2019). It also creates a

roadmap for the EU to address various challenges and opportunities, such as climate change,

digitalisation, and security threats. The EU Strategic Agenda also aims to foster economic

growth, innovation, and competitiveness, while promoting democracy, rule of law, and human

rights. This ambitious agenda serves as a guide for the EU's policies and actions, both

domestically and internationally, and represents a collective effort to shape the future of Europe.

The EU Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 is a key document that provides insight into the EU's

objectives and priorities for the coming years (Council of the European Union 2019).

D. The Versailles Declaration

The Versailles declaration is a document that was issued after the Russian invasion of

Ukraine on 11 March 2022 by leaders of the European Union. The declaration emphasised the

necessity of support for Ukraine and outlined the Union’s plans for “bolstering defence

capabilities, reducing energy dependencies and building a more robust economic base”

(“Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government Versailles Declaration” 2022).

Three main topics that were discussed before the Declaration were:

a) Bolstering the EU’s defence capabilities;

b) Reducing the EU’s energy dependencies; and

18
c) Building a more robust economic base. (“Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or

Government Versailles Declaration” 2022).

Figure 2: EU leaders come together in Versailles (European Parliament, title unknown, 2022, photograph,
Versailles).

IV. EUROPEAN UNION DEFENCE PACKAGE

A. Financial Stream to the Defence Industry

i. Pilot Project and Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR)

Since 2015, efforts to build European Union defence integration and a much stronger

European Defence Technology and Industrial Base have been increased among the member

states with EU policies (Wilkinson 2020). The first recognisable step was the Pilot Project and

Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR). This project consists of EUR 1.4 million

from both 2015 and 2016 EU budgets from the European Commission. However, the Pilot

Project was replaced with PADR in order to sustain a more substantial funding stream. PADR

has expanded the rate of investments and received EUR 90 million in funding to date (Wilkinson

2020).

19
 ii. European Defence Industrial Development Program (EDIDP)

European Defence Industrial Development Program (EDIDP) is a plan to increase

applicability and focus on capability development. With the integration of this industrial

program, it is aimed to bolster competitiveness and innovation capacity on the market in

technological and industrial base (Wilkinson 2020). It has three main points. Firstly, the EDIDP

is a co-funding model, which requires the participation of at least three Member States since

the program will only provide up to 20% of funds. Secondly, it sustains a strict control over the

organisations to determine whether they are based in the EU and/or controlled by a third

country. Finally, in order to support wider cooperation between Member States on defence

industry and technology, a bonus of 10% is available for the projects organized by PESCO

(Wilkinson 2020).

iii. European Defence Fund (EDF)

In 2018, European Defence Fund (EDF) was established based on three previous

funding streams to run from 2021 to 2027 with the motivation of streamlining and simplifying

the current structure by creating a single fund (Wilkinson 2020). A total budget of €13 billion

is proposed under the next EU multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027. It is a signal of

serious financial and political commitment for an integration of cooperative and coordinated

defence industrial structure, and of the intention to increase the competitiveness of the EDTIB

(Wilkinson 2020).

B. Policies and Previous Initiatives

i. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The beginnings of the Common Security and Defence Policy goes back to the end of the

World War II. It was discussed after the war when Treaty on Economic, Social, and Cultural

20
Collaboration, and Collective Self Defence, also known as the Treaty of Brussels, was signed

by the United Kingdom, France, and Benelux countries in 1948 at first (“Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP)” n.d.). Following this, the Western European Union was formed. In

1993, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced with Article J.4 of

Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (“Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),” n.d.). Following

the crises in Kosovo in that same decade, there appeared an urgent need for the EU to have the

capacity to act autonomously, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them, and

the readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises. This resulted in a decision of

Member States to build a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). ESDP was renamed

to the CSDP, and the notion of “political and military solidarity” was added to the body of new

policy with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (“Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)” n.d.).

The framework of the CSDP consists of maritime security, terrorism, regional conflict,

organised crime, border management, and state failure (“What We Do: Policies and Actions |

EEAS Website” n.d.). Although the invitation directly comes from local authorities, the EU

works in coordination and cooperation with the United Nations (“EU Security, Defence and

Crisis Response | EEAS Website,” n.d.). The main objectives of the CSDP can stated as follows:

“promotion and protection of the human rights, and support for democracy, along with the rule

of law” (“The Common Security and Defence Policy | EEAS Website” n.d.).

ii. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was first introduced by article 42(6)

of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU). According to this article, “those Member States

whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding

commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall

establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.” After this provision,

21
PESCO was established on 11 December 2017 by a European Council decision in the

framework of security and defence (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Today, with its 25 EU Member

States, it creates a jointly agreed legal ground to develop shared capability projects in the

defence industry, to enhance the operational readiness and contribution of the armed forces.

Currently, PESCO arranges 60 different projects in the areas of security and defence. The

initiative does not envisage the creation of an EU army (BBC News Türkçe n.d.), however, each

signatory country is required to prepare their national plans as to how they can contribute to the

EU’s common defence. In return, the EU commits to support PESCO with a budget of 5 billion

euros to be collected from 2020 (“Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

and Determining the List of Participating Member States” 2017).

Cooperation among the Member States is not a new project and has been conducted in

different formats in the past, such as joint training and exercise, or development of military

equipment (Giuglietti 2021). In this respect, PESCO aims to shift the nature of EU Member

State cooperation on isolated projects to impact-based cooperation activities with the objective

to create a more harmonised European capability landscape. Moreover, it reflects the support

for capability development and, at the same time, increases the provision of substantial support

with the capabilities of CSDP operations due to its very nature (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Apart

from this, PESCO complements two other important recent initiatives, which are the European

Defence Fund and the Coordinated Annual Review for Defence (CARD).

The commitments of the Cooperation can be listed as such:

- To increase cooperation for the purpose of achievement of the approved objectives

concerning the level of investment expenditures on defence equipment, and constantly

review these aims, in the light of security environment and Union’s international

responsibilities,

22
 - To harmonise the identification of the Member States’ military needs by pooling and

specialising the defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging the cooperation

between them in the fields of training and logistics,

- To take necessary measures to sustain the availability, interoperability, and flexibility of

the Member States’ defence plans and operations,

- To participate in, where appropriate, in the development of major joint, or European

equipment programs without prejudice to undertaking in this regard withing the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (“Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation

(PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating Member States” 2017).

However, PESCO shares the same challenges and negative aspects for its objectives like

any other proposed initiative in the defence industry field. Firstly, there is an absence of

European strategic culture in the defence area. Since there is no list for the European Union

priorities of the strategies in the security and defence field, it becomes more challenging for EU

institutions to create any suitable initiatives (Giuglietti 2021). Secondly, although the idea for

the creation of PESCO is not a recent decision, there is a risk for the duplications as happened

many last initiatives. For instance, despite the fact that the Franco-German launch of the Crises

Response Operation Core (CROC) under PESCO focuses on forcing generation in

expeditionary operations, Berlin is simultaneously involved in a project aiming the same

objectives with the launch (Giuglietti 2021). Finally, there is a risk of reaching agreements based

on the lowest common denominator. Consensus among the Member States remain the main

challenge for the initiative, while at the same time it reflects the lack of focus and accountability.

Therefore, these challenges should be discussed, and an urgent solution is expected (Giuglietti

2021).

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 iii. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was launched in 2017 as an

implication of European Union Global Strategy, serving as an important tool in furthering the

EU Strategic Compass (“2022 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence Report” 2022). The

main push factor for this initiative is the isolated approach of the Member States’ Ministries of

Defence towards defence planning without any concern for cooperation between themselves.

Because of this, CARD provides an overview for the EU defence landscape and facilitates

coordination between Member States by identifying collaborative opportunities (“2022

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence Report” 2022). The logic behind the initiative is to

sustain coherence serving as a pathfinder for defence activities. At the end of the CARD process,

it is planned that a gradual synchronisation and mutual adaption of national defence cycles and

capability development practices can be achieved. The CARD process has three stages:

- First Stage: This phase of the process can be summarised as the information gathering

part. In this stage, along with the European Defence Agency, the CARD Secretariat

collects data related to defence expenditures and capability development efforts of the

individual Member States (Van Reybroeck 2019). To gather necessary information,

CARD makes use of all available sources such as the Defence Data Analyses work

strand, the Collaborative Database (CODABA), Member States’ responses to the EU

Military Capability Questionnaire, and other sources provided by the Member States

related with the topic, including open sources (“Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

(CARD)” n.d.).

- Second Stage: This phase creates the first attempt of the CARD for the creation of

common ground based on cooperation in defence industry between the Member States.

In this stage, gathered information is divided into three blocks identified in the Council’s

decision: aggregated defence plans, contribution to implementation of the Priority

24
 Actions from the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP), and the development of

European cooperation (Van Reybroeck 2019). After this, divided data is integrated in a

dedicated CARD Initial Information document. This final document further will be used

as a basis for the Bilateral Dialogues in several capitals, during which the CARD team

meet with relevant authorities to review possible opportunities for cooperation among

the EU defence landscape, and capability development to the objectives of each

individual Member State (“Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)” n.d.).

- Third Stage: In this stage, the gathered information is shared with the relevant

ministries of the Member States in the bilateral communication sessions. The aim of the

CARD Test Run Aggregate Analysis is to provide the European defence spending and

capability development landscapes, as well as Member States’ participation in the CSDP

and other multinational operations and missions (Van Reybroeck 2019). Especially, this

stage focuses on promoting greater coherence between national defence plans and

capability development efforts (“Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)”

n.d.).

The last CARD cycle was completed in 2022. The published report provides recommendations

on several areas, such as defence cooperation, operation and missions, defence planning and

spending (“Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)” n.d.). Recently, CARD

recommended Member States to:

- Ensure that the increase in defence spending to close the capability gaps, which can

contribute the attempts for reducing the fragmentation of the EU defence landscape

through joint capability projects;

- Determine milestones to achieve the agreed collective benchmarks for defence

investment by 2025 in line with PESCO’s more binding commitments;

25
 - Continue to harmonize the type of data and information on actual and forecasted defence

spending (short, medium and long-term), to facilitate the analysis of trends and to

identify priorities and improve opportunities for cooperation (“2022 Coordinated

Annual Review On Defence Report” 2022).

iv. EU-NATO Cooperation

The current environment and political challenges necessitate the cooperation between

European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the help of this cooperation,

symmetry between NATO’s Defence Planning Process and the European Defence Agency’s

Capability Development Plan has become main objective for the organisations. The common

ground in both the EU and NATO, such as countering Russia and aiming for peace and stability

in Europe, reflects a vital importance in enhancing European military capabilities (Diplomatic

Service of the European Union 2020). Since 21 EU Member States are also allies of the NATO,

their ability to mobilise a broad range of tools and make the most efficient use of resources to

address challenges and enhance the security of their citizens can increase. The integral pillar of

the EU-NATO cooperation resembles an importance for the objectives of EU, which is to

strengthen European security and defence. The partnership between two organisations can be

regarded as a transatlantic bond, meaning they are mutually reinforcing (Diplomatic Service of

the European Union 2020). So far, five separate joint report has been published by the High

Representative-Vice President and the Secretary-General of NATO to the respective Councils,

emphasizing key achievements and concrete deliverables across all areas of agreements.

The first declaration signed in Warsaw in July 2016, identifying seven concrete areas for

enhanced cooperation between the EU and NATO. These fields can be listed as countering

hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security and defence, defence industry and

research, exercises, and supporting eastern and southern partners’ capacity-building efforts

26
(Diplomatic Service of the European Union 2020). In December 2017 and 2018, the concrete

objectives of the cooperation were increased to 74 new goals in a more expanded ground for

implementation and agreement. The two organisations prioritise several principles such as

openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and reciprocity to sustain full respect toward the

autonomy of both sides on the decision-making process without prejudice to the specific

character of the security and defence policy of any Member State (Diplomatic Service of the

European Union 2020).

However, concerning the strategic autonomy of the EU in the defence industry, the

presence of the PESCO in the security and defence field as an alternative to NATO for the US,

and possibility for a challenge toward the NATO’s leadership and United States’ position in the

defence market creates several suspicions in the current environment (BBC 2017). The

realization of a project concerning the creation of the cooperation between Member States goes

back to the Donald Trump’s statements considering the transatlantic security field. Ursula von

der Leyen, reminding that the USA has been keeping an increasing distance from the North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation during Donald Trump's presidency, stated that PESCO would be

an alternative for Europe (BBC 2017). Moreover, the indication of the US during the Donald

Trump period indicating that “U.S. administration clearly does not want to pay for its empire

any longer” played a key role in the establishment of PESCO. After the creation of PESCO,

when the cooperation between EU and NATO had become common objective, the main

argument towards defence cooperation revolves around the possibility for significant strategic

divergences on either side of the Atlantic, which are ultimately weakening to both US and EU

military capabilities against potential rivals, such as Russia and China (“About | PESCO,” n.d.).

Apart from the presence of PESCO, within NATO, a line of tension “West-East” or “old-new

members” has been identified, due to both economic and political reasons (Vorotnikov,

Yakutova, and Petlyaeva 2020). According to the NATO, real strategic autonomy of Europe

27
cannot be realized in the medium and long-term measures despite the EU-NATO cooperation

aim to strengthen support for the military-industrial complex of the largest European states. The

EU-NATO cooperation is also evaluated by experts from an economic standpoint, revolving

around possible effects on the US defence market. The US sees such a policy as a challenge.

Under conditions of increasing uncertainty and a crisis of globalisation, support for defence

industry enterprises can create an additional impetus for the internationalisation of this

economic sector, while new obstacles are created by this cooperation (Vorotnikov, Yakutova,

and Petlyaeva 2020).

In contrast to common belief on the negative impacts of EU-NATO cooperation, there

are several arguments supporting the relation and possible advantages of current cooperation.

According to this view, the presence of PESCO can potentially increase Transatlantic

cooperation, strengthen EU’s objectives on defence and security, and foster better relations with

NATO (“About | PESCO,” n.d.). However, to realize this, EU should spell out its priorities in

the wake of current global challenges and pledges for a reformed and strategic approach. By

doing this, the new partnership can contribute the ability for tackling with more complex

contemporary challenges. The US does not desire for the EU to act alone, as the EU’s success

in becoming a truly autonomous strategic actor would potentially reduce US influence over

European military affairs (Herrera 2019). It therefore supports that all PESCO projects should

be in close coordination with NATO, where Washington D.C. has a significant influence

(Herrera 2019). Therefore, the cooperation between the European Union and NATO will both

increase the cooperation of the Member States of the Union in the defence industry and will

lead to important developments in Transatlantic security by strengthening communication with

the countries within NATO but not members of the European Union, such as Albania, Canada,

Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Türkiye, and the US (Herrera 2019).

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 C. Push Factors

This section will analyse those factors which have played an important role in

convincing the European Union and its member states to invest in the present regulation, i.e.

to pursue common defence industry procurement. These factors are mainly international in

nature and reflect a change in the context of the EU’s security.

i. Brexit

After Brexit, the EU and UK have been affected on several points, from economy to

policy regulations. After the 2016 referendum in UK, there was an urgent alarm for the EU

because the ensuing withdrawal of a major security actor from the EU was considered a

potential division in European and Western unity amid mounting security challenges, including

wars in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods of the EU (Jokela 2020). At the same time,

the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States cast a shadow over the

Transatlantic security relationship. The United Kingdom was one of the two Member States

possessing nuclear capability in the form of Trident nuclear ballistic missiles (Oleksiejuk 2020).

According to the data published in the Global Firepower Military Strength Index (2012), the

UK was ranked as the world’s 5th greatest military superpower after France among the EU

Member States. At the same time, it was key for the creation of an of immense advantage in

military and peacekeeping operations in the far corners of the globe. As an important actor of

the EU, the UK was a supporter of the EU Defence Budget and one of the seven countries in

NATO spending 2% of its annual GDP on defence (Oleksiejuk 2020). Considering the size and

capabilities of the British Army and its financial contribution to the defence budget of EU and

towards the CSDP, which is approximately 2.3% of the total budget annually, the short-term

effects of the Brexit can be evaluated as a shock for the Union (Oleksiejuk 2020). Furthermore,

the overall profits of the entire EU’s defence industry were significantly reduced in the

29
beginning of the 2020 because a UK based company, BAE Systems, changed its investments

dramatically after Brexit. The most major negative effect that resulted from the divorce of the

EU and the UK is seen as the fact that less resources will be available to prepare future

peacekeeping/advisory operations run by the EU worldwide. This will also affect the finances

available for these operations coming from the CSDP since UK was a consistent contributor for

the EU budget on security and defence (Oleksiejuk 2020).

On the other hand, many scholars still argue that the destructive effects of the Brexit on

security and defence area will be important only in the short-term, and that in the long run, the

environment will change in a more constructive manner. According to these arguments,

increasing the EU-NATO cooperation will lead Union to sustain more deeper relationship with

United Kingdom (Jokela 2020). Moreover, the shortfall caused by the Brexit can be tolerated

as the majority of the technologies and components can be sourced from alternative Member

States. Apart from defence technology, the financial gap created after the divorce can be closed

by contributions of the remaining EU27 states. However, the effects of the Brexit on the EU are

observable from the increasing attitudes of the Union towards the security and defence

cooperation among its Member States (Jokela 2020).

Figure 3: One of the leaders of the Brexit movement, Nigel Farage (Sebastien Bozon, title unknown, 2017,
photograph, Brussels).

30
 ii. Russian – Ukraine War

Putin’s aggression toward Ukraine has already caused several damages in separate

fields. It caused thousands of deaths, but also economic damages internationally. The European

Union has been specifically affected from the conflict, as it was and still is one of the major

energy trade partners of the Russian Federation (Besch 2022). Moreover, the war poses a major

challenge to Western international values and norms, such as territorial sovereignty of the

countries, which are supported by the EU continuously. As a result of this, Union has started to

look ways to overcome this third asymmetric shock in 15 years at home and abroad (Borrell

2022). At this point, European Member States agreed at summit in Versailles with the object of

finding further possible ways to handle the economic condition of the EU and eliminate

dependence on Russian oil by enhancing the transition toward renewable energy sources, and

to strengthen the European Security and Defence Industry (Borrell 2022). After this summit,

EU Member States published the Strategic Compass.

iii. Strategic Compass

The EU is planning to mark a high level of ambition for security and defence agenda

and the Strategic Compass is a product of this ambition. The Compass revolves around the

intention to provide necessary assessment for the security environment of the EU, to bring

greater coherence and common sense for the joint actions, to set out new ways to improve the

collective ability of the EU for securing the EU citizens, and to specify clear targets to measure

the progress (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence | EEAS Website” n.d.). This new

initiative focuses on four main objectives to develop security and defence industry among the

EU Member States, which are “act, secure, invest, and partnership.”

31
- Act

The main logic behind the notion of “act” is that whenever crises erupt, the Union is

expected to act rapidly and robustly. In order to make this decision comprehensively, the

Member States declared that they would reinforce civilian and military CSDP missions and

operations by making decision-making process more flexible. Moreover, for this stage, the

EU has considered to establish Rapid Deployment Capacity that will allow countries to

swiftly deploy up to 5,000 troops into non-permissive environments for different types of

crises. For enhancing military mobility and regular live exercises, they decided to strengthen

command and control structures, in particular the Military Planning and Conduct Capability.

Therefore, under the “act” objective, the EU focused on the mobility of the military (“A

Strategic Compass for Security and Defence | EEAS Website” n.d.).

- Secure

Under this part, hybrid threats and cyberattacks are evaluated and solutions for possible

conflicts are considered. The main aim is to secure EU environment and citizens from

aforementioned threats, to enhance the ability to anticipate conflicts, and to guarantee secure

access to strategic domains. To this end, EU’s Single Intelligence and Analysis Capacity

(SIAC) plays an important role. By boosting intelligence capacities, the EU aimed to

enhance its situational awareness and strategic foresight (“A Strategic Compass for Security

and Defence | EEAS Website” n.d.). To deal with the broad range of hybrid threats, Member

States considered to create the EU Hybrid Toolbox, which brings together different

instruments to detect and respond possible conflicts in this area. In order to further develop

solutions for cyberattacks, EU decided to establish a separate Cyber Defence Policy to be

better prepared for and respond to possible attacks. By doing so, strengthening actions in

the maritime, air and space domains has become the main objective of the Union.

Furthermore, expanding Coordinated Maritime Presences to other areas, starting with the
32
Indo-Pacific is considered as a key solution (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence

| EEAS Website” n.d.).

- Invest

For the investment part, Union considered to invest more and better in capabilities and

innovative technologies, fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial

dependencies. For doing this, the main goal was perceived as spending more and better in

defence and security sector and improving capability development and planning to better

address operational realities, and new threats (“A Strategic Compass for Security and

Defence | EEAS Website” n.d.). Therefore, PESCO and the European Defence Fund have

the important responsibilities of jointly developing cutting-edge military capabilities and

investing in technological innovation for defence and create a harmony with the European

Defence Agency (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence | EEAS Website” n.d.).

- Partnership

After the Russian-Ukraine war affecting many states and organisations, it became more

obvious that EU had to strengthen cooperation with other partners to address common

threats and challenges. For this purpose, the EU sought to reinforce strategic partnerships

with NATO and the UN through more structured political dialogues, along with operational

and thematic cooperation since these two organisations share common ground with EU on

several points (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence | EEAS Website” n.d.). Apart

from NATO and UN, regional partners, including the Organisation for Security and Co-

operation in Europe, African Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations were

evaluated as possible partners of EU on defence and security fields. Therefore, another

object of the EU can be recognised as boosting cooperation with bilateral partners that share

the same values and interests as itself. Moreover, the development of an EU Security and

33
 Defence Partnership Forum is necessary to work more closely and effectively with partners

to address common challenges (“A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence | EEAS

Website” n.d.).

V. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION

A. Objectives and Basis of the Proposal

As stated in Versailles on 11 March 2022 by the Member States after the Russian-

Ukraine war, there is an urgent need for a cooperative assistance on the defence industry.

Moreover, without coordination and cooperation, national investments on defence industry

incentivised by several concerns of the Member States, the fragmentation of the European

defence sector will deepen (European Commission 2022). Notably, the declaration of the

Versailles indicates that the Member States should increase cooperation among themselves with

joint actions and expand expenditure on the defence sector, to close shortfalls, to meet capability

objectives, and to strengthen the EU defence industry, along with SMEs (European Commission

2022).

After this declaration, the European Commission and the High Representative presented

a Joint Communication on the Defence Investment Gaps and Way Forward on 18 May

2022. According to the joint declaration, there are mainly three types of gaps which can be

classified as financial, industrial, and capability. The defence industry of the European Union

cannot be improved if the necessary requirements for elimination of these gaps (European

Commission and High Representative of The Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

2022). The declaration also proposes the solution for increasing gaps problems. In this

framework, Member States are called for an urgent action to replenish their stockpiles, increase

the quantity of their defence equipment, and act in a collaborative way (European Commission

and High Representative of The Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2022). With the

34
elimination of the gaps, the value for money will increase in the defence market, interoperability

can be sustained, and the conflicting interests of the Member States resultant from their separate

demands in the defence industry will be turned into joint interests. The actions of the Members

States in this short-term are considered critical since they will be effective in long-term

increasing competition for European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (European

Commission 2022).

According to the Defence Data published by the European Defence Agency, EU

Member States invested €4.1 billion in collaborative defence equipment procurement, which is

almost 11% of their total spending. This data shows that there is a 13% decrease compared to

2019, meaning a 35% benchmark difference to which Member States committed (European

Defence Agency 2022). If this recent tendency is not addressed, the competitiveness of the

EDTIB will be significantly undermined, resulting an increase on risks affecting defence market

prospects in the next decade.

Given the need to support the Member States in a timely and efficient manner for

reinforcing their defence capacities in emergency situations, the European Commission

proposed common procurement via the EU budget through a dedicated Short-Term Instrument

establishing the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act

(“the Instrument”), based on the Article 173-Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(European Commission 2022). In this Article, “The Union and the Member States shall ensure

that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist” (European

Union 2012). The Instrument, along with the financial support, aims to stimulate cooperative

defence procurement process from Member States, to benefit EDTIB by increasing the

opportunity for competition, and to improve the interoperability while ensuring that EU

Members States’ armed forces are capable to act. Therefore, the Instrument aims to create long-

term benefits for the defence industry by proposing short-term changes, which can empower

35
the state of the EU on the Russian-Ukraine war, and other conflicts in the neighbouring areas.

Overall, the Instrument is the best legal tool since it has a legal provision ground that is

applicable directly, and potential for providing necessary degree of uniformity needed to

accomplish cooperation, enhancing market conditions (European Commission 2022).

The Instrument will be consistent with the existing policy provisions in the policy area and other

Union policies. In this framework, the European Defence Fund and Instrument are consistent

with one another. They rely on the same legal basis in the sense that the EDF incentivises

cooperation of legal entities by ensuring required support while the Instrument supports

cooperation on common defence procurement. Apart from the EDF, the Instrument will

complement existing collaborative EU defence initiatives, such as PESCO, Strategic Compass

for Security and Defence, and other EU programs in this specified area (European Commission

2022).

B. Results of the Stakeholder Consultations and Impact Assessment

There is no previous legislation or initiatives in defence that aim to enhance the

competitiveness of the EDTIB or foster cooperation in the defence procurement process. As a

result, there have been no ex-post evaluations or fitness checks of existing legislation for this

legislative initiative (European Commission 2022).

The European Commission has proposed a regulation for a short-term instrument

without including an impact assessment to meet the urgency called for by the European

Council's conclusions in May 2022. The proposed performance-based approach is expected to

simplify the implementation of the instrument and not increase administrative burden

(European Commission 2022).

The Instrument, which is aimed at enhancing the security of EU citizens by safeguarding

their fundamental rights, prohibits support for actions related to the common procurement of

36
goods or services that violate applicable international law. It also prohibits support for actions

related to the common procurement of lethal autonomous weapons without meaningful human

control. The budget for the implementation of the Instrument for the period from XX 2022 to

31 December 2024 is EUR 500 million. The legislative financial statement annexed to the

proposal provides more details on the impact on the multi-annual financial framework period

in terms of required budget and human resources (European Commission 2022).

The European Commission (2022) must monitor its actions regularly, review progress

and examine synergies with other Union programs. An evaluation report should be created and

shared with the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, which will assess

the progress made towards achieving the objectives set in the proposal.

For more than 70 years, our continent has marched towards democracy. But the gains of

our long journey are not assured. Many of us have taken democracy for granted for too

long. Especially those, like me, who have never experienced what it means to live under

the fist of an authoritarian regime. Today we all see that we must fight for our democracies.

Every single day. We must protect them both from the external threats they face, and from

the vices that corrode them from within. It is my Commission's duty and most noble role

to protect the rule of law. So let me assure you: we will keep insisting on judicial

independence. (Ursula von der Leyen, 14 September 2022, Strasbourg).

Figure 4: Ursula von der Leyen giving a speech (Reuters, title unknown, 2021, photograph, Brussels).

37
 C. Detailed Explanation of the Specific Provisions of the Regulation

- Article 3 - Objectives

Under the Article 3 of the Regulation, no 2022/0219, the objectives are clearly defined.

According to this, fostering the competitiveness and efficiency of the European Defence

Technological and Industrial Base to sustain a more resilient Union in a collaborative manner,

the adjustment of industry to structural changes, including ramp-up of its manufacturing

capacities, and encouraging cooperation in defence procurement process between participating

Member States contributing to solidarity, interoperability, avoiding fragmentation and

increasing the effectiveness of public spending are the main goals determined by this Regulation

(European Commission 2022).

- Article 4 - Budget

The financial allocation for this Instrument from its entry into force until 31 December

2024 shall totally be EUR 500 million in current prices. This amount of money will be spent on

technical and administrative assistance for the implementation of the Instrument, such as

preparation, monitoring, control, audit, and evaluation activities including corporate

information technology systems (European Commission 2022).

Resources allocated to Member States under shared management may, at their request,

be transferred to the Instrument. This may happen if the conditions set out in the relevant

provisions of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 are provided. During this

transition process, the Commission shall implement those resources directly, which are

determined by the Regulation No 2018/1046. Under the Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom),

Article 62(1) proposes that the Commission shall implement the budget directly (‘direct

management’) by its departments, including its staff in the Union delegations under the

authority of their respective head of delegation, or through executive agencies (European

38
Parliament and European Council 2018). Those resources shall be used for the benefit of the

Member State concerned (European Commission 2022).

- Article 5 - Third countries associated to the Instrument

Under the Article 5, it is decided that the Instrument will cover Member States, members

of the European Free Trade Association, and members of the European Economic Area

(associated countries) in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Agreement on the

European Economic Area. However, the inclusion of third countries poses an important point

for the cooperation between EU and other partners in the defence industry (European

Commission 2022).

VI. COUNTRY STANCES

A. Austria

Austria has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1995. Due to the 1955

Austrian Law of Neutrality, which declares no membership in a military alliance, no permanent

deployment of foreign troops, and no participation in foreign wars, there were questions about

Austria’s membership in the EU, which was then named European Communities. The question

still stands, considering the European ambition of becoming a fully defensive alliance.

However, the Austrian Armed Forces takes a part in Common European Security and Defence

Policy missions and further shows interest in aiding European cooperation in defence. Austria

spent 0.8 percent of its GDP on military expenditures in 2021 (“Common European Security

and Defence Policy (CSDP)” n.d.). This accounts for 3.83 billion US Dollars (“World Bank

Open Data” n.d.).

39
 B. Belgium

Belgium has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1958 as one of the six

founding countries. As a founding member, Belgium supports European cooperation deeply. As

such, it is a part of CSDP missions and a participant of the Permanent Structured Cooperation

(“About | PESCO,” n.d.). Belgium’s military expenditure was 1.1% of its GDP, which accounts

for 6.31 billion USD (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.). The Belgian defence industry mainly

focuses on military fixed-wing, naval vessels and surface combatants, and military land

vehicles. Military fixed-wing, naval vessels and surface combatants, and military land vehicles

feature as the top three largest sectors in the market.

C. Bulgaria

Bulgaria has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 2007. It is a part of the

European Defence Agency (EDA) and PESCO (“About | PESCO,” n.d.). Bulgaria’s military

expenditure was 1.6 percent of its GDP in 2021 which accounted for 1.22 billion USD (“World

Bank Open Data” n.d.). The Bulgarian defence industry mainly focuses on the production of

small arms.

D. Croatia

Croatia has been a member of the EU since July 1st of 2013. It participates in PESCO,

EDA and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO,” n.d.). Croatia’s military expenditure was 2.7

percent of its GDP in 2021 which accounted for 1.74 billion USD (“World Bank Open Data”

n.d.). The Croatian defence industry mainly focuses on land-based defence systems. Croatian

defence industry has the capability to produce tanks, armored vehicles, mortars and mortar

shells, artillery shells, small naval vessels, and various small arms (“Croatia - Defence Industry”

n.d.).

40
 E. Cyprus

Cyprus has been a member of the EU since May 1st of 2004. Cyprus participates in

PESCO and EDA as well as CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Cyprus’ military

expenditure in 2021 was 2 percent of its GDP which accounted for close to 518 million USD

(“World Bank Open Data” n.d.). The Cypriot defence industry mainly focuses on radar and

information systems. At present, several military and civilian missions are underway under the

CSDP, and several missions have already been successfully completed. In the framework of this

support of CSDP and international crisis management efforts, Cyprus has participated in several

missions (“Defence Policy” n.d.).

F. Czechia

Czech Republic has been a member of the EU since May 1st of 2004. Czech Republic

participates in PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Czechia’s military

expenditure in 2021 was 1.4 percent of its GDP which accounted for 3.94 billion USD (“World

Bank Open Data” n.d.). The Czech defence industry mainly focuses on military land vehicles,

military infrastructure and logistics, and military fixed wing (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

G. Denmark

Denmark has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1973. Denmark participates

in PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Denmark’s military expenditure

in 2021 was 1.4 percent of its GDP which accounted for 5.39 billion USD (“World Bank Open

Data” n.d.). The Danish military industry mainly focuses on military fixed-wing, naval vessels

and surface combatants, military land vehicles, with military fixed-wings being the leading

sector (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

41
 H. Estonia

Estonia has been a member of the EU since May 1st of 2004. Estonia participates in

PESCO, EDA and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Estonia’s military expenditure in

2021 was 2.2 percent of its GDP which accounted for around 764 million USD (“World Bank

Open Data” n.d.). The Estonian defence industry mainly focuses on anti-ship missile (AShM),

small calibre ammunition, tactical trucks, and MANPAD (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

I. Finland

Finland has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1995. Finland participates in

PESCO, EDA and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Estonia’s military expenditure in

2021 was 2 percent of its GDP which accounted for 5.9 billion USD (“World Bank Open Data”

n.d.). The Finnish defence industry mainly focuses on military fixed wing, military

infrastructure and logistics, and naval vessels and surface combatants. Military fixed wing,

military infrastructure and logistics, and naval vessels and surface combatants feature as the top

three largest sectors in the market (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

J. France

France has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1958. As a founding member

of the EU, France participates in PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.).

France’s military expenditure in 2021 was 1.9 percent of its GDP which accounted for around

57 billion USD (“World Bank Open Data” n.d.). The French defence industry mainly focuses

on military fixed-wing, military infrastructure and logistics, and submarines. The key sectors in

the France defence market are military fixed-wing, military infrastructure and logistics,

submarine, naval vessels and surface combatants, and military land vehicles (“ShieldSquare

Captcha” n.d.).

42
 K. Germany

Germany has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1958. As a founding member

of the EU, Germany participates in PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.).

Germany’s military expenditure in 2021 was 1.3 percent of its GDP which accounts for 56

billion USD (“World Bank Open Data” n.d.). The German defence industry mainly focuses on

military fixed-wing, military infrastructure and logistics, and naval vessels and surface

combatants. Military fixed-wing, military infrastructure and logistics, and naval vessels and

surface combatants feature as the top three sectors in the market (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

L. Greece

Greece has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1981. Greece participates in

PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Greece’s military expenditure in

2021 was 3.9 percent of its GDP which accounted for 8.08 billion USD (“World Bank Open

Data” n.d.). The Greek defence industry mainly focuses on naval vessels & surface combatants,

military land vehicles, submarines, and military fixed-wing with the naval vessels & surface

combatants leading the sector (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

M. Hungary

Hungary has been a member of the EU since May 1st of 2004. Hungary participates in

PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Hungary’s military expenditure in

2021 was 1.6 percent of its GDP which accounted for 2.78 billion USD (“World Bank Open

Data” n.d.).

N. Ireland

Ireland has been a member of the EU since January 1st of 1973. Ireland participates in

PESCO, EDA, and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Ireland’s military expenditure in

43
2021 was 0.3 percent of its GDP which accounted for 1.27 billion USD (“World Bank Open

Data” n.d.). The Irish defence industry is mostly dual-use technologies that serve non-military

purposes (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

O. Italy

Italy has been a member of the Eu since January 1st of 1958. Italy participates in

PESCO, EDA and CSDP missions (“About | PESCO” n.d.). Italy’s military expenditure in 2021

was 1.5 percent of its GDP which accounted for 32 billion USD (“World Bank Open Data”

n.d.). The Italian defence industry mainly focuses on naval vessels and surface combatants,

military fixed wing, and military infrastructure and logistics (“ShieldSquare Captcha” n.d.).

P. Latvia

Latvia's defence budget in 2021 was €676 million, which represents approximately 1.8%

of its Gross Domestic Product. Latvia is a member of NATO and the European Unio, and it also

participates in the Nordic-Baltic Eight initiative, which promotes cooperation and coordination

among the Nordic and Baltic states on issues such as defence and security. The country is a part

of the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation and participates in several PESCO projects

related to defence research and development. Latvia's defence industry is relatively small and

primarily focuses on maintenance, repair, and overhaul activities.

Q. Lithuania

Lithuania is a member of NATO and the EU. Lithuania's defence budget in 2021 was

€1.36 billion, which represents approximately 2.03% of its GDP. The country is part of the Joint

Expeditionary Force (JEF), a UK-led initiative that aims to enhance the military capabilities of

its members through joint training and exercises. Lithuania is also part of the EU's PESCO and

participates in several PESCO projects related to defence research and development. The

44
country’s defence industry is relatively small and primarily focuses on MRO activities

(Palavenis 2019).

R. Luxembourg

Luxembourg is a member of NATO and the EU. And it does not have an independent

military but participates in the defence of the EU and NATO through its financial contributions.

Luxembourg's defence budget in 2021 was €290 million, which represents approximately

0.55% of its GDP. The country’s defence industry is very small and mainly focuses on providing

support services to other countries' defence industries (“Luxembourg” n.d.).

S. Malta

Malta is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program and the EU. Malta's

defence budget in 2021 was €74 million, which represents approximately 0.4% of its GDP. The

country’s defence industry is very small and primarily focuses on maritime security and search

and rescue operations (“The Armed Forces of Malta and Military Doctrine” n.d.).

T. Netherlands

The Netherlands is a member of NATO and the EU. The country’s defence budget in

2021 was €11.5 billion, which represents approximately 1.5% of its GDP and it has a close

defence partnership with the United States and is a member of the Joint Strike Fighter program,

which aims to develop and produce a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The Netherlands is part

of the JEF and participates in the EU's PESCO as a country with a well-developed defence

industry that produces a range of military equipment, including aircraft, ships, and armoured

vehicles.

45
 U. Poland

Poland is a member of NATO and the EU. Poland's defence budget in 2021 was €13.8

billion, which represents approximately 2.2% of its GDP. The country has a close defence

partnership with the United States and hosts a significant number of US troops as part of

NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence initiative. Poland is part of the Visegrad Group, a political

and military alliance comprising Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. In

addition, Poland is also part of the EU's PESCO and has been involved in several PESCO

projects related to defence research and development. It can be said that the country has a well-

developed defence industry that produces a range of military equipment, including aircraft,

ships, and armored vehicles (“Polish Defence in the Perspective of 2032 - Ministry of National

Defence - Gov.pl Website” n.d.).

V. Portugal

Portugal's defence budget in 2021 was around €2.9 billion, representing approximately

1.3% of its GDP. Portugal is a member of the European Defence Agency and participates in

various EU defence initiatives, including the PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative.

The country has a significant defence industry, primarily focused on shipbuilding and

maintenance, but also includes aerospace, electronics, and cyber security (“Overview of the

Portuguese Defence Industry” n.d.).

W. Romania

Romania's defence budget for 2021 is around €4.3 billion, which represents

approximately 2% of its GDP. Romania is also a member of the EDA and participates in PESCO

initiatives and its defence industry is focused on aerospace, land systems, and electronics

(“Romania Ministry of National Defence The Military Strategy Of Romania - Modern Armed

46
Forces for a Powerful Romania within Europe and around the World - BUCHAREST 2016”

n.d.).

X. Slovakia

Slovakia's defence budget for 2021 is around €1.3 billion, which represents

approximately 1.2% of its GDP. Slovakia is a member of the EDA but has not participated in

PESCO initiatives. The country’s defence industry is relatively small and mainly focused on

land systems (the Global Firepower Military Strength Index 2012).

Y. Slovenia

Slovenia's defence budget for 2021 is around €900 million, which represents

approximately 1% of its GDP. Slovenia is a member of the EDA but has not participated in

PESCO initiatives and its defence industry is small and focused on land systems and electronics

(“International Cooperation | GOV.SI” n.d.).

Z. Spain

Spain's defence budget for 2021 is around €13.9 billion, which represents approximately

1.2% of its GDP. The country is a member of the EDA and participates in various PESCO

initiatives, including the European Medical Command and the European Secure Software-

defined Radio program. Spain's defence industry is significant and encompasses aerospace, land

systems, electronics, and naval systems (“IEEE - Spain and Its National Security Strategies

(2000-2017) (DIEEEO75-2018)” n.d.).

AA. Sweden

Sweden’s defence budget is around €6.56 billion, which represents approximately 1.3%

of its GDP. The country has the ambition to increase its defence expenditures significantly by

2026 to make it constitute 2% of its GDP (Nezirevic 2023). Sweden is also a member of PESCO

47
and the EDA. Stockholm’s resolve to join NATO has made defence investments popular for the

Swedish government, as it remains concerned of Russian aggression (O’Dwyer 2023).

Stockholm is thusly interested common defence industry procurement in the EU.

VII. PARTY STANCES

A. European People's Party Group (EPP)

European People’s Party is aware of the fact that the security situation in and around

Europe has significantly worsened and risks deteriorating further. Since no single country or

organisation is able to face this alone, need for building up European defence capabilities is

seen even more urgent than before (“European Defence Union: EU Must Invest in Its Own

Defence” n.d.). EPP evaluates current regulations as an opportunity for Europe to ensure the

necessary stability in the world for Europe’s future. Considering the position of the EPP on the

future in Europe, they support making a new start for a common defence union, and ultimately

spending the money on security for Europe in a meaningful way (“European Defence Policy:

Only Smarter Spending Will Bring down Costs” n.d.).

B. Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) always show its support for a

stronger Europe whose voice can be determinant and hearable by the global stage. For the EU

to be a credible and influential actor in the international arena, it needs to speak with one voice.

This means developing a unified foreign policy that promotes the EU's values, interests, and

priorities. Therefore, they consider that each Member State should use and increase its resources

to improve the defence of its interests on the global stage. This is what they want to achieve:

the ability to act autonomously when and where necessary, and with partners whenever possible,

in all matters of strategic significance (“Open Strategic Autonomy – Making Europe a Stronger

Global Player” n.d.).

48
 C. Renew Europe (Renew)

Renew Group is one of the political groups in the European Parliament stating its

comprehensive position towards the European security and defence. In their position paper

(Towards a European Defence in 2030), the party members have indicated current problems,

such as the instability in the EU’s neighbourhood, the terrorist threats, hybrid threats, new

security risks caused by the climate change. As a solution for these obstacles, demonstrating

political will and leadership among Europeans towards a real European Defence Union while

respecting Member States constitutional constraints is seen as essential. Therefore, as a solid

solution, the Renew members support the Strategic Compass (“POPA 220112 - towards a

European Defence in 2030 - EN.pdf | Powered by Box” n.d.).

D. The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)

Greens/EFA can be counted as a political group among the others stating its position on

the European defence and security fields. As stated in their published position paper on

European Security and Defence in 6th July 2022, the members of the Greens/EFA want to build

a reliable and holistic policy that complements multilateral organizations like the UN, the OSCE

and NATO, a policy that serves both the security needs of EU citizens, and of those in need

abroad, and which clearly addresses new dimensions of human security, such as the climate

crisis (“Greens/EFA Position Paper on European Security and Defence EUROPEAN

SECURITY UNION CONTENTS” n.d.).

E. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)

European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) proposes four-dimensional framework

for the evaluation of the European security and defence actions. These dimensions are

cooperating with global actors, improving the union’s efficiency and effectiveness, respecting

49
the rights of the member states, safeguarding citizens, and borders (“Who We Are? // ECR

Group” n.d.).

F. Identity and Democracy (ID)

Identity and Democracy Group in the European Parliament have five different but

related concepts they want actions of the European Union should revolve around. These can be

counted as democracy, identity, sovereignty, borders, and budget. As long as the actions of the

EU on security and defence sector is in consistent with these lines of the party, they will support

the Union’s initiatives (“Identity and Democracy Group - English,” n.d.).

G. The Left in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL)

The most controversial political group in the Parliament is the Left, especially on

defence field. The members of the party believe that the EDF is not only a breach of the EU

treaties but is a fundamental violation of the “so-called EU peace project” that will only benefit

the arms industry. They see the European Defence Fund as an expression of the increasing

militarization of EU foreign and security policy. The EDF, for GUE/NGL, is an instrument for

large-scale funding from EU budget to the military and defence industry. The EDF will mean

the development of dangerous new weapons systems such as AI-supported armaments, the

controversial Future Combat Air System, and Eurodrone (“European Defence Fund: Immoral

& Illegal” n.d.).

50
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