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Article 32 of the Constitution | 17 Nov 2020
Why in News
Recently, the Chief Justice of India (CJI), during a hearing of a plea, said that the court is
trying to discourage petitions filed under Article 32.
Key Points
CJI’s View: CJI noted that there is a spate of Article 32 petitions and reiterated that the
High Court can also uphold fundamental rights (under article 226).
Article 32 of the Constitution (Right to Constitutional Remedies): It is a fundamental
right, which states that individuals have the right to approach the Supreme Court (SC)
seeking enforcement of other fundamental rights recognised by the Constitution.
The SC has power to issue directions or orders or writs for the enforcement of
any of the fundamental rights. The writs issued may include habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo-warranto.
The right to move the SC shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution provides that the President can suspend
the right to move any court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights during a
national emergency (Article 359).
In case of the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the jurisdiction of the SC is
original but not exclusive. It is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the high
court under Article 226.
Original, because an aggrieved citizen can directly go to the SC, not
necessarily by way of appeal.
Concurrent means when the Fundamental Rights of a citizen are violated, the
aggrieved party has the option of moving either the high court or the
Supreme Court directly.
Since the right guaranteed by Article 32 (ie, the right to move the SC where a
fundamental right is infringed) is in itself a fundamental right, the availability of
alternate remedy is no bar to relief under Article 32.
However, the SC has ruled that where relief through the high court is available
under Article 226, the aggrieved party should first move the high court.
In the Chandra Kumar case (1997), the SC ruled that the writ jurisdiction of both
the high court and the Supreme Court constitute a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution.
Counter-Argument:
Even as the SC underlines the powers of the high courts, it has in the past
transferred cases to itself from the high courts.
Most recently, the SC transferred the case involving land use for the national
capital’s Central Vista project to itself from the Delhi High Court. Incidentally,
the petitioners had not sought such a transfer.
When such transfers are made, the petitioners lose a stage of appeal that would
otherwise have been available had the high courts heard and decided the case.
Recently, the SC also conveyed its concerns that in many matters involving personal
liberty, the High Courts are not exercising their jurisdiction as constitutional
courts.
Article 226 of the Constitution
Article 226 of the Constitution empowers a high court to issue writs including habeas
corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto for the enforcement of the
fundamental rights of the citizens and for any other purpose.
The phrase ‘for any other purpose’ refers to the enforcement of an ordinary legal
right. This implies that the writ jurisdiction of the high court is wider than that
of the SC.
This is because the SC can issue writs only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights and not for any other purpose, that is, it does not extend
to a case where the breach of an ordinary legal right is alleged.
The high court can issue writs to any person, authority and government not only within
its territorial jurisdiction but also outside its territorial jurisdiction if the cause of
action arises within its territorial jurisdiction.
Source: IE
Concept of Bail | 12 Sep 2023
Introduction
The concept of Bail is provided by Chapter XXXIII (Thirty-Three) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) titled ‘Provisions as to Bail and Bonds’. It consists of
Sections 436-450.
Bail means short-term release of an accused person awaiting trial.
Bail is the judicial release of an accused charged with a certain offence by imposing
some restrictions on him and compelling him to remain within the jurisdiction of
court.
The concept of bail has come under the extent of human rights since the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
Legal Position of Bail
The term ‘Bail’ has not been defined under CrPC. Only the term ‘Bailable Offence’ and ‘Non-
Bailable Offence’ has been defined under Section 2(a) of the Code.
Bailable Offences
According to Section 2(a) of CrPC bailable offence means an offence that is classified as
bailable in the First Schedule of the Code, or which is classified as bailable under any
other law.
Under Section 436 of CrPC a person accused of a bailable offence at any time while
under arrest without a warrant and at any stage of the proceedings has the right to
be released on bail.
An accused can claim bail as a matter of right if he is accused of committing a bailable
offence.
The Police Officer or any other authority has no right to reject the bail if the accused
is ready to the furnish bail.
Non-Bailable Offences
Any offence not mentioned as bailable under the First Schedule of CrPC or any other
law is considered as non-bailable offence.
A person accused of a non-bailable offence cannot claim bail as a right. Section 437 of
CrPC provides for when bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.
A person accused of non-bailable offence can be granted bail provided the accused does
not fall under the following grounds:
There are reasonable grounds to believe that he committed an offence
punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.
That the accused has committed a cognizable offence and he had been
previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment of
seven years or more.
That the accused had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of
commission of a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three
years or more but not less than seven years.
There are exceptional cases in which law gives special consideration in favour
of persons i.e., where the accused is a minor, a woman, a sick person etc. by
virtue of Section 437(1) of CrPC.
Who can grant Bail?
In case of a Bailable offence - Officer in charge of Police Station/ Court as per Section
436(1) of CrPC.
In case of Non Bailable offence – Court (of any level) as per Section 437(1) of CrPC.
Anticipatory Bail can be granted by Session Court or High Court according to Section
438(1) of CrPC.
Different types of Bail
Regular Bail: The court orders the release of a person who is under arrest, from Police
custody after paying the amount as bail money. An accused can apply for regular bail
under Section 437 and 439 of Crpc.
Interim Bail: This is a direct order by the court to provide temporary and short-term
bail to the accused until his regular or anticipatory bail application is pending
before the court.
Anticipatory Bail: A person under apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence
may apply for anticipatory bail to the High Court or the Court of Session under
Section 438 of CrPC.
Conditions while Granting Bail
According to Section 437(3), while granting bail to a person accused or suspected of the
commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven
years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the
Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC), the court shall impose following conditions:
Such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed
under this Chapter.
Such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is
accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected.
Such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or
promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him
from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the
evidence.
Special Powers of High Court or Court of Session Regarding Bail
Section 439 of CrPC accords certain special powers to both High Court and Sessions Court
with respect to Bail. They are as follows:
Court may direct that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail
and may impose any condition which it considers necessary.
Court may direct that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person
on bail be set aside or modified.
Landmark Case Laws
Moti Ram & Ors vs State Of M.P (1978):

The right to seek release on bail under Section 436(1) cannot be undermined
indirectly by imposing an unreasonably high bond amount or bail bond
requirement on the individual seeking release.
K. S. Layak v. State of A.P (1981):
It was held by the Andhra Pradesh HC that while granting bail on conditions, any
condition which is in derogation of an accused’s fundamental rights cannot be
imposed.
Gurcharan Singh & Ors v. State (Delhi Administration) (1978): The Supreme Court
(SC) opined that:
There are no provisions in the CrPC that describes time duration for disposal of
grant of pre-arrest anticipatory bail.
The concerned court has the discretion to impose conditions for grant of
anticipatory bail including a limited period of protection etc., subject to considering
any special circumstances required.
Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. The state of Punjab (1980):
It was held by 5 judge constitution bench of the SC that Section 438(1) of CrPC is to
be interpreted in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Cancellation of Bail
The settled doctrine by the Supreme Court of India is that ‘Bail is the rule and jail is an
exception’ but if cogent grounds are established, the courts are enshrined with
powers to cancel the bail of a person.
The Lower Courts, including those of Magistrates, have the authority to cancel bail under
Section 437(5) of CrPC, whereas the High Court and Court of Session have the
authority under Section 439(2) of the Code.
The court needs to consider following circumstances before cancellation of bail:
The nature of the accusation (gravity and severity of offence).
The severity of punishment.
Taking into consideration the position or status of the accused, i.e., whether the
accused can exercise influence on the victim and the witnesses or not.
Capacity of the accused to obstruct the due course of justice.
Possibility of repetition of offence when on bail.
The prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
The different and distinct facts of each case and nature of substantive and
corroborative evidence.
Likelihood of accused to approach the victims/witnesses.
Likelihood of accused absconding from proceedings.
Possibility of accused to tamper with evidence.
Conclusion
The right to life and personal liberty is a fundamental right granted by the Constitution of
India. The Indian judicial and legal systems have time and again given priority to grant of bail
when warranted. As nothing can be understood in absolute sense, in terms of bail as well there
is need to implement checks and balances so that the provisions of law are not misused.
The Centre and the Collegium System | 18 Oct 2023
Source- The Hindu
Introduction
Recently, Justice Siddharth Mridul has been appointed as the Chief Justice of Manipur High
Court.
Justice Siddharth Mridul was appointed as a Judge of the High Court of Delhi on 13th
March 2008 and has been functioning as the seniormost puisne Judge in his parent High
Court.
What is the Background of this Appointment?
On 5th July 2023, the top court collegium headed by Chief Justice of India D Y
Chandrachud recommended the appointment of Delhi High Court Justice Siddharth
Mridul as the chief justice of the Manipur High Court.
On 9th October 2023, the Supreme Court bench had noted that the appointment of the
chief justice of the Manipur High Court had finally received the Centre's attention and
it would be notified shortly.
On 16th October 2023, more than three months after Justice Siddharth Mridul’s name was
recommended by the Supreme Court Collegium, he was appointed as the chief justice of
the Manipur High Court.
The delay in the appointment of Justice Mridul was apparently due to the state
governments taking time to give its view on the proposal.
What is the Conflict between the Government and the Collegium System
Over the Appointment Process?
The conflict between the Government and the Collegium System over the appointment
process is quite pronounced and often reaches a flash point.
The Supreme Court has been vocal about the Government’s selective treatment of its
recommendations.
There have been instances of the government returning names that have been
reiterated more than once.
One of the main reasons for this conflict is the Government supporting the National
Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC) and the judiciary supporting the collegium
system.
A bench led by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul shared its concern with the Attorney
General for India R Venkataramani that seventy recommendations made by the High
Courts' collegium from November 11, 2022, are pending with the Union Government.
What are the Steps Taken by Supreme Court to Prevent the Delay in
Appointments?
The SC in the case PLR Projects Ltd vs Mahanadi Coalfields Pvt Ltd. (2019), has laid-
down the following timeline for clearing collegium proposals:
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) should submit its report/inputs within 4 to 6 weeks
from the date of recommendation of the High Court Collegium, to the Central
Government.
It would be desirable that the Central Government forward the
file(s)/recommendations to the Supreme Court within 8 to 12 weeks from the date
of receipt of views from the State Government and the report/input from the IB
It would be for the Government to thereafter proceed to make the appointment
immediately on the aforesaid consideration and undoubtedly if the Government
has any reservations on suitability or in public interest, within the same period of
time it may be sent back to the Supreme Court Collegium with the specific
reasons for reservation recorded.
If the Supreme Court Collegium after consideration of the aforesaid inputs still
reiterates the recommendation(s) unanimously then such appointment should be
processed and appointment should be made within 3 to 4 weeks.
What are the Legal Provisions in Relation to Appointments?
In India, until 1993, the appointment of judges was done by the President in
consultation with the Chief Justice and two other senior-most judges of the Supreme
Court.
Since 1993, it is the Collegium system evolved by the Supreme Court that decides on
appointments and transfers of judges in the higher judiciary, though the nominal
appointing authority is the President of India.
Collegium System
It is a framework for appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
The Supreme Court Collegium consists of the Chief Justice of India and four other
senior-most judges.
The High Court Collegium consists of incumbent Chief Justice and two other senior
most judges of that court.
Evolution of the Collegium System
First Judges Case (1981):

The matter of S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) is known as the first judges case.
The issue was upon the appointment of judges wherein the court held that
consultation in Article 124 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) does not mean
concurrence.
Second Judges Case (1993):
The matter of Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993) is known
as the second judges case.
The court held that the role of Chief Justice of India is primary in appointment of
judges.
The executive cannot have a higher hand in the judicial space.
Third Judges Case (1998):
It was a case of Presidential reference where the court defined the term
‘consultation’ as consultation with the plurality of judges.
The Chief Justice of India must consult with the four senior-most judges of the
collegium.
Fourth Judges Case (2015):
In the matter of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of
India, the court nullified the constitutionality of the National Judicial
Appointment Commission Act, 2014.
In August 2014, Parliament passed the NJAC Act, 2014 for making
appointments in the higher judiciary. This Act sought to change the
Collegium system by formulating the NJAC, proposed as a committee
comprising of Chief Justice of India, two other senior judges of the Supreme
Court, the Union Minister of Law and Justice and two eminent persons to be
appointed jointly by the Chief Justice of India, Prime Minister of India, and
Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
The court re-established the collegium system for the appointment of the judges
of Supreme Court and High Court.
What are the Constitutional Provisions in Relation to the Appointment of

Judges?
Article 124(2) of the COI deals with the appointment of Supreme Court judges. It states
that every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant
under his hand and seal on the recommendation of the National Judicial Appointments
Commission referred to in article 124A and shall hold office until he attains the age of
sixty-five years. Provided that—
(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his
office;
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4) of
this Article.
Article 126 of the COI deals with the appointment of the Chief Justice of India. It states
that when the office of Chief Justice of India is vacant or when the Chief Justice is, by
reason of absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of his office, the duties of
the office shall be performed by such one of the other Judges of the Court as the
President may appoint for the purpose.
Article 217 of the COI deals with the appointment of High Court judges. It states that-
(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant
under his hand and seal on the recommendation of the National Judicial
Appointments Commission referred to in article 124A, and the Governor of the
State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice,
the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall hold office, in the case of an additional or
acting Judge, as provided in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the
age of sixty-two years.
Provided that—
(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his
office.
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided
in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court.
(c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed by the President to
be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being transferred by the President to
any other High Court within the territory of India.
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless
he is a citizen of India and—
(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or
(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more
such Courts in succession.
Article 223 of the COI deals with the appointment of chief Justice of the High Court. It
states that when the office of Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or when any such
Chief Justice is, by reason of absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of his
office, the duties of the office shall be performed by such one of the other Judges of the
Court as the President may appoint for the purpose.
Conclusion
The NJAC was criticized for politicizing the judiciary and imposing an attack upon its
independence. Whereas the government criticizes the collegium system for its vagueness,
room for favoritism, and distracting judges from doing their actual job as the appointment is
an administrative process and encroaches the precious time of the judiciary.
It is time to think of a permanent, independent body to institutionalize the process with

adequate safeguards to preserve the judiciary’s independence guaranteeing judicial primacy
but not judicial exclusivity.
Anticipatory Bail under BNSS | 18 Jun 2024
Source: Rajasthan High Court
Why in News?
A bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand denied anticipatory bail to the accused in a case looking into several factors
of the offence.
The Rajasthan High Court denied the bail in the case of Dilip Sharma v. State of Rajasthan.
What is the Background of Dilip Sharma v. State of Rajasthan Case?
Multiple First Information Reports (FIR) were registered against the petitioner Dilip Sharma alleging that he
had fabricated and forged certain land pattas (title deeds) which were never issued by the Ajmer Development
Authority (ADA).
The petitioner was arrested and remained in police custody for one week before being granted bail.
Prior to the petitioner's arrest, investigation in all four FIRs was clubbed together by orders of the
Superintendent of Police. However, the petitioner was not arrested in the other three FIRs.
While submitting the chargesheet, the Investigating Agency concluded that after fabricating the documents, the
petitioner had destroyed the evidence and photographs used in preparing the forged pattas and documents.
The petitioner challenged the validity of all four FIRs before the High Court by filing separate petitions, wherein
he was granted interim protection.
While enjoying interim protection, the petitioner allegedly threatened the witness, whose statement was
recorded, and the complainant.
Two criminal complaints were filed against the petitioner before the Additional District Magistrate (City),
Ajmer, who found a prima facie case and directed the petitioner to maintain peace for six months.
An audio conversation surfaced where the petitioner admitted being ready to return Rs. 42 Lakh instead of Rs.
50 Lakh, leading to another FIR being registered against him.
Based on these facts and allegations, the petitioner filed anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 now Section 482 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) applications
before the High Court.
What were the Court’s Observations?
The court rejected the petitioner's anticipatory bail applications in all the FIRs.
The court considered factors like the nature and gravity of allegations, likelihood of influencing witnesses, and
the need for custodial interrogation.
Despite the petitioner's arguments about repeated FIRs and prior availablity for interrogation, the court found
the allegations serious enough to not grant anticipatory bail.
What is the Law Related to Anticipatory Bail under Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita?
Subsection (1): Application for Bail Direction

Any person who believes they might be arrested for a non-bailable offence can apply to the High Court
or the Court of Session.
The court, if it deems appropriate, may direct that the person be released on bail in the event of their
arrest.
Subsection (2): Conditions for Bail Direction
When issuing a direction for bail under subsection (1), the court can impose conditions based on the
specifics of the case, including:
(i) The person must be available for police interrogation whenever required.
(ii) The person must not threaten, induce, or promise any person related to the case to prevent them
from revealing facts to the court or police.
(iii) The person must not leave India without the court's prior permission.
(iv) Any other condition that could be imposed under subsection (3) of section 480, as if bail were
granted under that section.
Subsection (3): Arrest and Bail Procedure
If the person is arrested without a warrant by a police officer on the stated accusation and is willing to
provide bail either at the time of arrest or while in custody, they should be released on bail.
If a Magistrate, upon taking cognizance of the offence, decides a warrant should be issued initially, they
must issue a bailable warrant according to the court's direction under subsection (1).
Subsection (4): Exclusion for Specific Offences
This section does not apply to cases involving arrests for offences under section 65 and subsection (2) of
section 70 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
What are the Landmark Judgments on Anticipatory Bail?
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr. (2010):

The Supreme Court highlighted the factors to be considered for anticipatory bail, including prima facie
grounds for accusation, nature and gravity of accusation, severity of punishment, likelihood of
absconding, conduct of accused, likelihood of influencing witnesses, and danger of justice being thwarted.
Masroor v. State of U.P. (2009):
The Supreme Court observed that while granting bail, elaborately examining evidence should be avoided
to not prejudice the accused, but reasons for prima facie concluding bail should be indicated, especially in
serious offences.
Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI (2013):
The Court stated that while granting bail, the nature of accusations, evidence, severity of punishment,
character of accused, possibility of securing presence, apprehension of influencing witnesses, public
interest, etc. must be considered.
Only reasonable belief of a genuine case, not evidence establishing guilt beyond doubt, is required at this
stage.
Article 42 of the Constitution | 01 Jan 2024
Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court
Why in News?
Recently a bench of Justice Vivek Singh Thakur of Himachal Pradesh High Court observed that “To conceive, to give
birth and take care of a child is not only the fundamental right of the woman but also a pious role to be performed
by her for the existence of Society”.
The HC gave this observation in the case of The Secretary, Managing Committee of Loreto Convent Tara
Hall School v. Sharu Gupta and others.
What is the Background of The Secretary, Managing Committee of Loreto Convent Tara Hall
School v. Sharu Gupta and others Case?
The respondent woman was appointed in the school of one of the petitioners as an Assistant Teacher on
contract basis.
She was working on extended probation period and later her services were terminated when she was on
leave.
Petitioners contended that as per Service Rules, an employee, on an application, is entitled for maternity leave
but in present case, complainant never informed the petitioners about her pregnancy and she never applied
for any maternity benefits and filing of complaint by her is an afterthought in order to receive benefits from the
petitioners for which she was not entitled at all.
Respondent said that the fact that she was pregnant was in the knowledge of Management as well as
Principal.
Labour Commissioner-cum-Chief Inspector of Factories-cum Appellate Authority gave order in favor of the
respondent, the petitioners approached HC to set aside the order.
HC observed that “The right to become a mother is also one of the most important human rights and this right
must be protected at all costs and therefore, provisions of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 must be enforced
strictly wherever applicable”.
The court held that in case petitioners do not intend to accept joining of the respondent, as directed by the
Authorities below, then they shall, in addition to the maternity benefits already granted by the Authorities
below, shall pay compensation to the respondent amounting to Rs.15.00 lakhs (fifteen lakhs) in lieu of her
reinstatement because any intent to thwart the grant of maternity benefits should be dealt with seriously in
order to ensure implementation of the Act in letter and spirit.
What is Article 42 of the Constitution of India, 1950?
Article 42 as Directive Principles of State Policy:

Article 42 of the Constitution of India is related to the DPSP.
The DPSPs are a set of guidelines and principles given to the state to be followed in the governance of the
country.
They are not enforceable by any court, but the government is expected to keep them in mind while
formulating policies and making laws
Constitutional Provision:
Article 42 specifically deals with the provision of just and humane conditions of work and maternity
relief. It states -
Factors to Decide Remission | 22 Mar 2024
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, a bench of Justices B R Gavai, K V Vishwanathan and Sandeep Mehta decided the case of remission of an accused
convicted for murder.
The Supreme Court held this in the case of Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala.
What was the Background of Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala Case?
The prosecution alleged that the accused had previously engaged in an illicit relationship with Latha, leading to
pregnancy and subsequent termination.
After Latha distanced herself, tensions arose, culminating in the tragic events of 3rd November 2005.
On the aforementioned night, the accused allegedly trespassed into the victims' house armed with knives and an iron
rod, resulting in the deaths of the victims and injuries to a person named Karthiayani Amma.
The next morning, domestic help discovered the gruesome scene, prompting neighbors to alert the police.
The police arrived at the scene, finding evidence of forced entry and discovering the deceased victims.
Following investigation and trial, the accused's version of events was deemed implausible, leading to his conviction
primarily based on circumstantial evidence.
Upon confirmation before the High Court, the conviction was upheld but the sentence was modified.
The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment with a direction that the accused shall not be released
for 30 years, including the period already served.
The accused approached the Supreme Court after being aggrieved by the judgment issued by the High Court.
The accused pleaded that the sentence of 30 years without remission is excessive and prayed that the sentence
may be appropriately tailored to meet the ends of justice.
The court did not interfere with the sentence imposed on the accused
The court agreed with the High Court's application of the principle established in the case of Swamy Shraddananda.
However, the court decided to modify the sentence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) imposed by
the High Court.
Instead of 30 years imprisonment without remission, the court reduced it to 25 years imprisonment without
remission, including the period already undergone by the appellant.
What were the Landmark Judgments cited in the Case?
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980):

The Supreme Court established the principle of sentencing in cases where the death penalty is not warranted by
classifying crimes into the "rarest of the rare" category.
It held that the death penalty should be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases and laid down guidelines for the
application of the death penalty, considering both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983):
This case further elaborated on the principles laid down in Bachan Singh regarding the imposition of the death
penalty, emphasizing the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008):
In this case, the Supreme Court held that to avoid a sentence of death, it is possible for the courts to devise a
graver form of sentence of imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years.
The purpose of such a sentence is to ensure that the society is insulated from the criminal for such a period as
the court may specify, including, if warranted by the facts, the entire rest of his life.
Haru Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2009):
The court, while commuting the death penalty, imposed a sentence of 35 years of actual jail sentence without
remission, considering factors such as the lack of premeditation and the accused being the sole bread earner
for his family.
Mulla & Another v. State of U.P., (2010):
The court reduced the sentence from death to life imprisonment for full life, subject to any remission by the
Government for good reasons, considering the socioeconomic background of the appellants.
Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and Others, (2016):
The court affirmed the principle established in Swamy Shraddananda and emphasized the necessity of
considering a sentence between fourteen years of imprisonment and the death penalty in cases that fall short of
the "rarest of the rare" category but where a mere sentence of fourteen years may be grossly
disproportionate.
Magistrate Can Take Cognizance of Protest Petition | 01 Sep 2023
Why in News?
In the case of Zunaid v. State of UP, the Supreme Court has observed that on the receipt of final report,
Magistrate has discretion to treat protest petition as a complaint case.
Background
The appellant (Zunaid) in the present case had lodged a First Information Report (FIR) alleging that the
accused respondents armed with sharp-edged weapons had attacked him and his family and also abused them
due to an old enmity.
FIR was registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324, 504 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC).
Final Police Report was submitted by the Investigating Officer (IO), after completing the investigation.
Being aggrieved by the Final Report, the appellant filed a Protest Petition before the concerned Chief
Judicial Magistrate (CJM).
The concerned CJM rejected the Final Report of the IO and directed that the Protest Petition be registered
as the Complaint Case.
The CJM, taking recourse of Sections 200 and 202 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and after
recording the statements of the complainant and other witnesses, issued summons to the accused respondents.
Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondents-accused preferred an application under Section 482 CrPC
before the High Court (HC) which was allowed by the Allahabad HC.
Hence the present appeal by appellant (Zunaid) in SC arises out of the orders passed by the HC.
Court’s Observations
The bench comprising of Justices Bela M Trivedi and Dipankar Datta of SC made note of the case Rakesh &
Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (2014) in which it was held -
There remains no shadow of doubt that on the receipt of the police report under Section 173 CrPC, the
Magistrate can exercise three options:
Firstly, he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action.
Secondly, he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC based on the police
report and issue process; and
Thirdly, he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC on the basis of the
original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under
Section 200.
SC therefore while allowing appeal against the HC order, observed that the CJM was just, legal and proper
in rejecting the Final Report of the IO and taking recourse of Sections 200 and 202 CrPC under the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Police Report
A police report is an official record made to report on the findings of the investigation carried out under CrPC
for the commencement of proceedings before Magistrates.
It is defined under Section 2(r) of CrPC as a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-
section (2) of section 173 CrPC.
Section 173 - Report of police officer on completion of investigation.

(2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward it to a Magistrate empowered
to take cognizance of the offence on a police report; a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating
—
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties;
(g) whether he has been forwarded into custody under section 170.
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an
offence under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860)].
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action
taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first
given.
Protest Petition
CrPC does not provide a specific definition for a Protest Petition but is a significant part of criminal law.
When the Police investigates a case, after its completion, the Police Report is submitted to the Magistrate under
Section 173(2) of the CrPC.
The aggrieved or the complainant, if not satisfied with the police report, may file a protest petition before the
Magistrate concerned stating his/her dissatisfaction and may pray for further investigation. At the same
time the aggrieved person may also pray for further proceedings under Section 200 and 202 of CrPC.
Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 focuses on the postponing of the issue of process
(against the accused) on the part of the Magistrate.
If the protest petition is accepted, then the Magistrate takes cognizance of the matter under Section 190 of
CrPC, and issues notice to the accused person.
Indian Penal Code, 1860
The FIR pertained to Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324, 504 which are as follows:
Section 147 - Punishment for rioting —Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 148 - Rioting, armed with deadly weapon—Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly
weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 149 - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common
object —If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common
object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the
same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
Section 307 - Attempt to murder.— Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to 2 imprisonment for life, or
to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life-convicts — When any person offending under this section is under sentence of
imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Section 323 - Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt —Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Section 324 - Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means —Whoever, except in the case
provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or
cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or
any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive
substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to
receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 504 - Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace —Whoever intentionally insults,
and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will
cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Presumption of the Guilt of the Accused | 21 Mar 2024
Source: Jharkhand High Court
Why in News?
Recently, the Jharkhand High Court in the matter of Suresh Prasad v. The State of Jharkhand has held that once the basic
ingredient of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) is proved by the prosecution then the Court will presume
the guilt of the accused.
What was the Background of Suresh Prasad v. The State of Jharkhand Case?
The prosecution case was instituted on the basis of written report of the informant Dwarika Mahto, alleging therein
that his daughter Lakhiya Devi was married to the appellant one year ago as per Hindu rites and customs.
After five months from the date of marriage, the appellant along with his family members started torturing her to
enforce the demand of a color television and a motorcycle and on 24th March 2011, she was found murdered in her
matrimonial home.
After investigation, the police found the occurrence to be true and submitted the chargesheet against the appellant
under Section 304B of IPC.
The Trial Court holding the appellant guilty of offence under Section 304B of IPC and thereby, sentencing him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he was
further directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Against this judgment, the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Jharkhand.
Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed with modification of sentence.
The bench comprising of Justices Ratnaker Bhengra and Ambuj Nath observed that the provision of Section 113B
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) manifests the intention of legislature making mandatory application on the
part of the Court to presume that death has been committed by a person who had subjected her to cruelty and
harassment in connection with demand of dowry.
It was further held that once the basic ingredient of Section 304B of IPC is proved by the prosecution then the Court
will presume the guilt of the accused. At this stage, the burden shifts upon the accused to rebut this presumption of
guilt and to prove his innocence.
What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involved in it?
Section 304B of IPC
This Section deals with dowry death. It states that -
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry, such death shall be called dowry death, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
death.
Explanation. —For the purpose of this sub-section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
In the case of Bansilal v. State of Haryana (2011), the Supreme Court held that, to attract the provision of Section
304B of the IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that soon before her
Principles of Natural Justice | 29 Nov 2023
Source: Allahabad High Court
Why in News?
Recently, the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Maa Vindhya Stone Crusher Company v. State of U.P. and
Anr., has held that in a civilized society, principles of natural justice ought to be followed in order to maintain
rule of law.
What was the Background of Maa Vindhya Stone Crusher Company v. State of U.P. and Anr.?
The petitioner was granted a mining lease for 10 years commencing from 15th July 2016 and ending on 14th
July 2026 for the purpose of mining and crushing stone.
On 17th July 2023, the petitioner received a notice on his e-mail id where the allegation was that illegal mining
had been done by him outside the area for which the mining lease was granted.
Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed a writ petition.
Subsequently, the petitioner was blacklisted for 2 years, and its lease cancelled.
The counsel for the petitioner stated that his side was not heard and there was non-compliance of principles
of natural justice.
Allowing the petition, the Allahabad HC directed that the petitioner be allowed to function on his land
with immediate effect.
The Bench consisting of Justices Siddhartha Varma and Shekhar B. Saraf, observed that, it may seem to a few
that the observance of the principles of natural justice is a cumbersome process, but we do find that in a
civilized society, the rule of law has to be there and the principles of natural justice should compulsorily
be followed.
The Court further held that violation of principles of natural justice was sufficient cause to set aside the
order of cancellation of lease and blacklisting.
What are the Principles of Natural Justice?
About:
Natural Justice is a common law concept which emphasise on fair, equal and impartial delivery of justice.
It has been derived from the words ‘jus-naturale’ and ‘lex-naturale’ which emphasize the principles of
natural justice, natural law and equity.
Rules of Natural Justice:
Nemo Judex In Causa Sua – It means that no one should be a judge in his own case because it leads to the rule
of biases.
Audi Alteram Partem – It means that no person can be condemned or punished by the court without having a
fair opportunity of being heard.
Case Laws:
In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1977), the Supreme Court held that the concept of
natural justice should be in every action whether it is judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative and or quasi-
Principles of Natural Justice | 29 Nov 2023
Why in News?
Recently, the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Maa Vindhya Stone Crusher Company v. State of U.P. and
Anr., has held that in a civilized society, principles of natural justice ought to be followed in order to maintain
rule of law.
What was the Background of Maa Vindhya Stone Crusher Company v. State of U.P. and Anr.?
The petitioner was granted a mining lease for 10 years commencing from 15th July 2016 and ending on 14th
July 2026 for the purpose of mining and crushing stone.
On 17th July 2023, the petitioner received a notice on his e-mail id where the allegation was that illegal mining
had been done by him outside the area for which the mining lease was granted.
Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed a writ petition.
Subsequently, the petitioner was blacklisted for 2 years, and its lease cancelled.
The counsel for the petitioner stated that his side was not heard and there was non-compliance of principles
of natural justice.
Allowing the petition, the Allahabad HC directed that the petitioner be allowed to function on his land
with immediate effect.
The Bench consisting of Justices Siddhartha Varma and Shekhar B. Saraf, observed that, it may seem to a few
that the observance of the principles of natural justice is a cumbersome process, but we do find that in a
civilized society, the rule of law has to be there and the principles of natural justice should compulsorily
be followed.
The Court further held that violation of principles of natural justice was sufficient cause to set aside the
order of cancellation of lease and blacklisting.
What are the Principles of Natural Justice?
About:
Natural Justice is a common law concept which emphasise on fair, equal and impartial delivery of justice.
It has been derived from the words ‘jus-naturale’ and ‘lex-naturale’ which emphasize the principles of
natural justice, natural law and equity.
Rules of Natural Justice:
Nemo Judex In Causa Sua – It means that no one should be a judge in his own case because it leads to the rule
of biases.
Audi Alteram Partem – It means that no person can be condemned or punished by the court without having a
fair opportunity of being heard.
Case Laws:
In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1977), the Supreme Court held that the concept of
natural justice should be in every action whether it is judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative and or quasi-
administrative work which involve civil consequences to the parties.
In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981), the Supreme Court held that the Principles of Natural
Justice are considered as fundamental and are therefore implicit in every decision-making functions.
In the Union of India v. W.N Chadha (1992), the Supreme Court observed that since the purpose of the
Principles of Natural Justice is to ensure justice and prevent and prevent miscarriage of justice, these rules do
not extend to those areas where their application may lead to injustice.
Bail under New Criminal Law and CrPC | 27 Feb 2024
Why in News?
Recently, the bench of Justices B R Gavai and Sandeep Mehta held that it is a settled law that the judgment and order
granting bail by a single judge cannot be reviewed by the single judge of same court passing such judgment and order.
The aforesaid observation was made in the matter of Himanshu Sharma v. Union of India.
What was the Background of Himanshu Sharma v. Union of India Case?
The appeals challenge the 12th December 2023 orders by a single judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at
Gwalior.
The judge cancelled bail granted to the appellants under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC).
The appellants were arrested for various offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1960 (IPC), and the Arms Act.
They were implicated solely on confessional statements made by co-accused.
The original bail was granted on 8th September 2022, and 14th September 2022, by a different single judge.
The state sought bail cancellation, citing the appellants' potential involvement in serious crimes.
The appellant approached Supreme Court stating that the decision to cancel bail by assessing the case's merits was
inappropriate and an act of judicial impropriety.
The court emphasized the well-established principle that the considerations for granting bail and its cancellation are
distinct.
It asserted that bail can only be cancelled under specific circumstances, including misuse of liberty, flouting bail
conditions, ignorance of statutory provisions, or through misrepresentation or fraud.
The court expressed concern over the jurisdictional impropriety of the bail cancellation application being heard by
a different single judge.
It noted that the cancellation disregarded the progress of the trial and concluded that the orders cancelling bail
were grossly illegal and quashed them.
Consequently, the appeals were allowed.
What is the Concept of Bail in New Criminal Law and CrPC?
Concept:
Bail, a legal provision within the CrPC and BNSS facilitates release from prison pending trial or appeal upon
depositing security.
Bailable offences guarantee the right to bail, as per Section 436 of the CrPC, while non-bailable offences grant
discretion to courts or designated police officers, as outlined in Section 437.
Justice V R Krishna Iyer in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Balchand (1977) held that the basic rule is bail, not
jail. It referred to a concept which is ‘Bail is a Right and Jail is an exception”.
Power of High Court to Grant Bail:
Provision
Under Section 439(1) of CrPC, a High Court or Court of Session holds the authority to grant bail.
Section 483 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) covers these special powers of High
Court and Court of Session to grant bail.
Granting Bail
A High Court or Court of Session may direct:
Release on bail of any person accused of an offence and in custody.
Imposition of conditions for certain specified offences under Section 437(3) of CrPC.
Modification or setting aside of conditions imposed by a Magistrate when releasing a person on bail.
Cancellation of Bail
Section 439(2) empowers the High Court or Court of Sessions to order the arrest of individuals previously
released on bail under Chapter XXXIII.
Anticipatory Bail:
Provision
Section 438 of CrPC enables individuals fearing arrest for non-bailable offences to seek interim or
anticipatory bail, that is pre-arrest bail.
Section 482 of BNSS covers this provision.
It states that where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having
committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction
under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail.
Eligibility
Anyone anticipating charges, enmity, or wrongful arrest may apply.
In State of M.P v. Pradeep Sharma (2013), SC held that “When a person against whom a warrant had been
issued and is absconding or concealing himself in order to avoid execution of warrant and declared as a
proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of CrPC, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail”.
Factors
The nature and gravity of the accusation;
The antecedents of the applicant;
The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and
Where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him
so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory
bail.
Mandatory Bail:
Magistrates shall grant bail if investigations extend beyond prescribed periods under Section 167 (2) of CrPC. The
use of word ‘shall’ makes it mandatory to grant bail under this Section.
It is also known as Default Bail.
Accused are entitled to bail if investigations are not completed within specified durations.
Section 187 of BNSS covers this provision.
Refreshing Memory | 27 Feb 2024

Why in News?
Recently, the bench of Justices MM Sundresh and S V N Bhatti held that the accused can cross-examine a police officer of
case diary if the police officer has used that case diary to refresh his memory under Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The aforesaid observation was made in the matter of Shailesh Kumar v. State of UP.
What was the Background of Shailesh Kumar v. State of UP Case?
The case revolves around the tragic death of Gajendra Singh on 21st June 1992, after being attacked by the appellant
over a financial dispute.
Gajendra was assaulted with a knife by the appellant, resulting in fatal injuries to his chest and stomach.
The initial medical treatment and subsequent transfer to another hospital, along with the delay in filing the First
Information Report (FIR), raised questions about the investigation's integrity.
Discrepancies in witness testimonies, manipulation of the case diary, and doubts regarding the motives behind the
attack further complicated the trial.
Despite reliance on evidence like the recovery of the vehicle and post-mortem reports, the defense highlighted
significant flaws in the investigation and witness accounts, advocating for the appellant's acquittal.
The major contention regarding the case diary revolves around the absence of crucial details like time, date, and
adequate particulars, indicating a deficient investigation.
The appellant argued that the courts overlooked the significance of Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1872 (CrPC), along with refreshing of memory Sections 145, 161, and 165 of the IEA, which emphasize the importance
of maintaining accurate records and conducting thorough investigations.
The Supreme Court observed that when a police officer refers to a case diary to refresh memory, the accused is
entitled to a right to peruse relevant portions under Section 145 or Section 161 of the IEA.
Section 172(3) of CrPC explicitly mentions Sections 145 and 161, extending their benefits to the accused.
Thus, the accused has the right to cross-examine the police officer regarding the case diary's contents used for
memory refreshment.
Section 161, while not limited to diary perusal, allows it.
Similarly, if the court uses the case diary to contradict the police officer, the accused may examine and cross-
examine relevant statements.
This right aligns Sections 145, 161 of the Evidence Act, and Section 172(3) of CrPC.
Court referred to Balakaram v. State of Uttarakhand (2017) where SC observed,
In case the police officer uses the entries in the diaries to refresh his memory or if the Court uses them for the
purpose of contradicting such police officer, then the provisions of Sections 145 and 161, as the case may be, of
the IEA would apply.
It can, therefore, be seen that, the right of the accused to cross-examine the police officer with reference to the
entries in the police diary is very much limited in extent and even that limited scope arises only when the Court
uses the entries to contradict the police officer or when the police officer uses it for refreshing his memory.
What are Provisions Related to Refreshing Memory under Law?
Section 159 of IEA:

A witness can refresh their memory during examination by referring to writings made by themselves or others
at the time of the transaction or shortly afterward.
If a witness read another person's writing within that timeframe and knew it to be correct, they can also refer to
it.
The witness can use a copy of the document to refresh memory if permitted by the Court, provided there is a
valid reason for not producing the original.
Additionally, an expert witness can refresh their memory using professional treatises.
Section 162 of Bharatiya Skashya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) covers this Section.
Section 160 of IEA:
Section 160 specifies that a witness may also testify to facts mentioned in any such document as is mentioned in
section 159, although he has no specific recollection of the facts themselves, if he is sure that the facts were
correctly recorded in the document.
For example, A book-keeper may testify to facts recorded by him in books regularly kept in the course of
business, if he knows that the books were correctly kept, although he has forgotten the particular transactions
entered.
Section 163 of BSA covers this Section.
Section 161 of IEA:
This section deals with the right of the adverse party to cross-examine a witness about the document used for
refreshing memory.
It allows the opposing party to question the witness about the contents of the document and to produce any
other evidence to contradict the witness's testimony.
Section 164 of BSA covers this Section.
Private Defence | 08 May 2024
Source: Kerala High Court
Why in News?
The recent ruling by the High Court of Karnataka in the case of C. Ganesh Narayan v. State of Karnataka stated
that pepper spray cannot be used for private defence in situations where there is no immediate threat to life. The
court deemed pepper spray a dangerous weapon in such circumstances.
What was the Background of C. Ganesh Narayan v. State of Karnataka Case?
The complainant, Rajdeep Das, an employee of the company, engaged in a dispute with Vinod Hayagriv,
resulting in an injunction suit against the company's director, C. Ganesh Narayan, to prevent property
alterations obstructing movement around the building.
The court granted an interim injunction on 28th March 2023, barring property changes. On 07th April 2023,
Vinod Hayagriv attempted to construct a wall at the company's gate, leading to a confrontation.
On 29th April 2023, employees of Vinod Hayagriv allegedly interfered with the company's property, leading
to a physical and verbal altercation wherein pepper spray was purportedly used by the petitioners.
Consequently, the petitioners faced charges under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). They
claimed self-defence under Section 100 of the IPC, arguing pepper spray use in response to property
interference.
However, the Karnataka High Court refused to dismiss the criminal case against C. Ganesh Narayan and his
wife for allegedly using pepper spray against the complainant and security personnel. The court considered
pepper spray use in this context potentially illegal, rejecting it as self-defence.
Justice M Nagaprasanna observed that the use of pepper spray as private defence, as prima facie there was no
imminent threat or danger caused to her life. Therefore, the case at hand would require investigation in the
least.
The Court observed that there is no determination by law in this country regarding usage of pepper spray
being a dangerous weapon.
Further the Court referred the case of the United States of America in People v. Sandel 84 N.Y.S. 3d 340 (N.Y.
Sup.Ct.2018) wherein it was held that noxious chemical sprays, like pepper sprays, are dangerous weapons.
What is the Provision of Private Defence in IPC?
About:
Sections 76 to 106 in chapter IV of IPC deals with General Exceptions which are exempted from the category
of offences under IPC.
Section 100 of IPC deals with when the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.
Under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) the circumstances wherein the right of private defence of the
body extends to causing death has been covered under Section 38.
Private Defence:
The term private defence is not explicitly defined in the IPC.

In simple terms it refers to the use of force by an individual to safeguard their life, liberty, or property.
Section 100 of the IPC grants the right to self-defence against individuals who endanger life or property. In
such cases, individuals are permitted to use defensive force, which may otherwise be considered unlawful.
Section 100 of IPC:
Section 100 of the IPC grants individuals the right to defend their body, which may involve causing harm or
death to the assailant, provided the offense falls within certain categories such as assault likely to cause death,
grievous hurt, rape, unnatural lust, kidnapping, wrongful confinement, or throwing acid.
This Section deals with the situation in which the right of private defence of the body extends to causing
death.
It states that the right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the section
99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the
exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely: —
Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence
of such assault.
Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the
consequence of such assault.
An assault with the intention of committing rape.
An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust.
An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting.
An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may
reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for
his release.
An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may
reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.
Essential Conditions for section 100 of IPC:
For Section 100 of IPC, the following conditions should be fulfilled: -

There must be an immediate risk of life or grievous hurt to the body.
There must be no reasonable means to escape available.
There must be insufficient time to seek assistance from the authorities.
Causing the death of the assailant must have been unavoidable.
Right to Plead Guilty | 08 May 2024
Source: Kerala High Court
Why in News?
Recently, the Kerala High Court in the matter of Chekkutty v. State of Kerala has held that the right to plead guilty
shall not be used as a device to get a lesser sentence.
What was the Background of Chekkutty v. State of Kerala Case?
In the instant case, the accused remained absconded for a long time and did not appear before the trial
court, though the offence alleged are very serious offences which would come under the purview of the
provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
The injury alleged to have been inflicted on the victim as evident from the wound certificate shows the
manner in which the injuries were inflicted which are on the vital part, the head of the victim.
The Magistrate awarded a lesser sentence of fine only because the accused pleaded guilty before the Trial
Court.
Thereafter, the complainant filed a criminal revision petition before the Kerala High Court.
Allowing the petition, the High Court set aside the impugned order of sentence and the matter is remanded
back to the Trial Court for fresh consideration and to order a proper sentence.
Justice P Somarajan observed that the right to plead guilty shall not be used as a device to get a lesser
sentence. In the case of pleading guilty by the accused, the court should not adopt a liberal approach and no
concession can be given simply on the reason that the accused pleaded guilty in the matter of awarding
sentence. On the other hand, the sentence should reflect a proper balance.
What is the Right to Plead Guilty?
About:
The right to plead guilty is a right that has been provided under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC)
wherein the accused has been given a chance, after framing of chance either to plead guilty or not guilty.
Once the accused pleads not guilty, the Judge proceeds with the trial of the case.
If the accused pleads guilty, then the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him.
Relevant Legal Provisions:
Trial Section Purpose
If the accused pleads guilty, the Judge

Trial Before a Court of Session Section 229 of CrPC shall record the plea and may, in his
discretion, convict him thereon
If the accused pleads guilty, the

Magistrate shall record the plea and
Section 241 of CrPC
may, in his discretion, convict him
thereon,
If the accused refuses to plead or does
not plead or claims to be tried or the
Magistrate does not convict the
Trial of Warrant Cases Section 242 of CrPC
accused under section 241, the
Magistrate shall opt the evidence for
prosecution.
If the accused pleads guilty, the
Magistrate shall record the plea as
Trial of Summon Cases Section 252 of CrPC nearly as possible in the words used
by the accused and may, in his
discretion, convict him thereon.
It deals with procedure when the
Section 254 of CrPC
accused does not plead guilty.
Irregularity in Disciplinary Proceedings | 08 May 2024

Why in News?
Recently the Allahabad High Court held that the petitioner by merely putting allegations of irregularity in
disciplinary proceedings cannot escape his responsibility to show that prejudice has been caused to him by the
same.
What was the Background of Mohd. Asgar Ali v. Union of India Through Home Secy. and
others case?
The petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable in CISF on 12th April 1987.
In 1996 he was on election duty and the allegation was that petitioner was assigned to be on duty at Quarter
Guard and from 9.00pm to 5.00am. Hawaldar Major checked the Quarter Guard around 2.00am and petitioner
was not present there and found sleeping with rifle on his side in his room No. 22.
He was placed under suspension and served with a charge sheet.
One, Mr. I.P Singh, Inspector, was appointed as Inquiry Officer.
However, the petitioner requested the higher authority to change an inquiry officer. The petitioner alleging
the inquiry officer to be biased.
His request to change inquiry officer was rejected and he participated in the enquiry proceedings.
Thereafter, the statement of the petitioner was recorded, and a copy of the inquiry report was supplied to him.
And giving him an opportunity to give his explanation.
The explanation did not favor him, and he was punished by removal from his service in 1996.
He filed an appeal against the said order which was rejected by the appellate authority in 1997. Against the
said appellate order, the petitioner preferred a revision, which was also rejected in 1998.
The present appeal was filed before the High Court and petitioner challenging all these three impugned orders.
Two main contention of the petitioner was that:
The petitioner has sent representations to the higher authorities for change in the inquiry officer on the
ground that he is biased, but the same was not allowed.
The opportunity to defend was not adequately provided to the petitioner as documents were not
supplied to him.
The High Court held that the petitioner has participated in the proceedings as well as cross-examined seven
departmental witnesses and relied on several documents during the departmental proceedings. There had been
no report of biasness by the petitioner during the said proceedings.
Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. This
Court finds no basis for any bias or prejudice in the appointment of the inquiry officer in the enquiry
proceedings.
Regarding the second contention, the court stated that the petitioner, during the inquiry has admitted that he
had received all documents and was also allowed inspection of all records.
The contention of the petitioner relating to non-supply of documents, without any specific enumeration, is
devoid of merits and as such, the petitioner's present ground fails.
There is absolutely no ground nor any iota of mention as to how the same has caused prejudice to the
petitioner.
What are the Landmark Judgments Cited in this Case?
B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Others, (1995):

When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is
concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held that the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority
is based on no evidence.
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar, (1993):
The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have evolved to uphold the
rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights.
They are neither incantation to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all sundry occasions.
What are the Legal Provisions Involved in this Case?

Rule 7-A of the Central Industrial Security Rules, 1969:
This Section deals with the duties of Deputy Commandant. It states that-
(1) The Deputy Commandant shall assist the Commandant in the discharge of his duties; and where he is
placed as head of the unit, he shall discharge all the duties of a Commandant and shall exercise only those
financial powers that are delegated to him under the relevant rules.
(2) The Deputy Commandant shall be responsible for the efficiency, discipline, and morale of the personnel
under him and shall also be responsible for the security of the undertaking or its part entrusted to him.
Section 9(3) of the Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968:
This Section deals with the appeal and revision. It states that the Central Government may call for and
examine the record of any proceeding [under section 8, 8, sub-section (2), sub-section (2A) or sub-section (2B)
of this section and may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made and subject to the provisions of
this Act, may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit.
Provided that no order imposing an enhanced penalty under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) shall be made
unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard has been given to the person affected by such order.
Definition of Public Servant | 16 May 2024
Why in News?
A bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya held that an employee of Cooperative Bank not controlled of funded
by government is not a public servant under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
The Calcutta High Court made this observation in the case of Malda District Central Cooperative Bank
Employees Association and others v. The Election Commission of India and others.
What was the Background of Malda District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association
and others v. The Election Commission of India and others Case?
The members of the petitioner association no. 1, who were employees of a District Cooperative Bank, were
appointed as Polling Officers for the ongoing parliamentary election under Section 26 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act).
The Election Commission of India (ECI) relied on Section 21 of the IPC to appoint the employees of the
Cooperative Bank as Polling Officers.
The petitioner no. 1 is an association of employees of the District Cooperative Bank, representing the
interests of such employees.
The petitioner no. 2 is the Secretary of the petitioner association no. 1.
The Cooperative Bank is registered under the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006, but it is not
controlled or funded by any government.
The petitioners filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court, challenging the appointment of the members of
the association as Polling Officers.
Another writ petition was also filed in the Calcutta High Court on the same issue, involving employees of
the Mugberia Central Cooperative Bank.
The petitioners argued that the employees of the Cooperative Bank cannot be appointed as Polling Officers
under Section 26 of the RP Act, as the Bank does not come within the purview of Section 159(2) of the Act.
The petitioners contended that the Cooperative Bank is not established under a Central, Provincial, or State Act,
and is merely registered under the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006.
The petitioners challenged the ECI's reliance on Section 21 of the IPC to appoint the employees as Polling
Officers.
The court observed that Section 21 of the IPC defines the term "public servant" within the context of the IPC
itself, and this definition cannot be extended to a different statute like the RP Act, which operates in a
different field altogether.
The court observed that the Cooperative Bank was not controlled or financed by any government and was
merely registered under the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006, but not established by or under that
Act.
The court allowed the writ petitions and set aside the requisition and appointment of the members of the
petitioner associations working for the Cooperative Banks as Polling Officers.
However, to avoid hampering the ongoing election process, the court allowed the appointments to be valid for
the present ongoing election but directed that the observations shall be given effect from the next elections.
Who are Public Servants under New and Old Criminal Law?
Old Law (IPC)

Section 21 of the IPC states that the words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions
hereinafter following, namely:
Military Personnel (Second Clause):

Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, Naval or Air Forces of India
Judges and Judicial Officers (Third Clause):
Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of
any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions
Officer of Court of Justice (Fourth Clause):
Every officer of a Court of Justice (including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner) whose duty it is, as
such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any
document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer
any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court, and every person specially authorized by a
Court of Justice to perform any of such duties
Jurors and Assessors (Fifth Clause):
Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of Justice or public servant
Arbitrators and Persons Appointed by Courts (Sixth Clause):
Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by
any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority
Persons Empowered to Confine Others (Seventh Clause):
Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in
confinement
Law Enforcement and Public Safety Officers (Eighth Clause):
Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information
of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience
Government Revenue and Property Officers (Ninth Clause):
Every officer whose duty it is as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of the
Government, or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of the Government, or to execute
any revenue process, or to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of the
Government, or to make authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of the
Government, or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of the
Government
Local Authority Revenue and Property Officers (Tenth Clause):
Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any
survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or
district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of
any village, town or district
Electoral Officers (Eleventh Clause):
Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or
revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election
Government and Public Sector Employees (Twelfth Clause):
Every person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the
performance of any public duty by the Government
Every person in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central,
Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956.
New Law (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023)
Section 28 of BNS defines public servant.

Section 28 uses updated terminology compared to Section 21 of the IPC.
For example, it refers to “Government company as defined in clause (45) of Section 2 of the Companies Act,
2013” instead of the Companies Act, 1956 mentioned in Section 21 of the IPC.
Section 28 defines “local authority” by referring to clause (31) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
Section 21 of the IPC does not provide a specific definition for "local authority".
Grounds of Arrest | 16 May 2024

Why in News?
Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Prabir Purkayastha v. State of NCT of Delhi has held that there
exists a significant difference between the phrases 'reasons for arrest' and 'grounds of arrest'.
What was the Background of Prabir Purkayastha v. State of NCT of Delhi Case?
In this case, the officers of the PS Special Cell, New Delhi carried out extensive raids at the residential and
official premises of the appellant and the company, namely, M/s. PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd.( company) of
which the appellant is the Director in connection with FIR registered for the offences punishable under the
sections of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
The appellant was arrested in connection with the said FIR on 3rd October 2023 and the arrest memo was in a
computerised format and does not contain any column regarding the grounds of arrest of the appellant.
This very issue is primarily the bone of contention between the parties to the appeal.
The appellant was presented in the Court of Learned Additional Sessions Judge and the appellant was
remanded to seven days police custody vide order dated 4th October 2023.
The appellant promptly questioned his arrest and the police custody remand granted by preferring criminal
appeal in the High Court of Delhi which stands rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Delhi.
The said order is subjected to challenge in the present appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal.
The Bench comprising of Justices BR Gavai and Sandeep Mehta observed that there is a significant
difference between the phrases reasons for arrest and grounds of arrest.
The Court explained that the reasons for arrest are formal and could apply generally to any person arrested
for an offence. On the other hand, grounds of arrest are personal and specific to the person arrested.
The Court also held that the grounds of arrest would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be
equated with the reasons for arrest which are general in nature.
It was further held that the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all
basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against
custodial remand and to seek bail.
What are the Provisions Relating to Arrest?
Introduction:
Arrest means the deprivation of a person of his liberty by legal authority or by an apparent legal authority.
The provisions of the CrPC that deal with arrest range from Section 41 – 60A under Chapter V of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).
Under CrPC arrest can be made by:
Police Officer (Section 41)
Private Person (Section 43)
Magistrate (Section 44)
Persons Authorized to Arrest:
Police Officer
Arrest without warrant – Any police officer may arrest without an order of Magistrate and without a warrant when
any person (Under Section 41 CrPC)
Commits cognizable offence in his presence,

Commits cognizable offence punishable with less than or equal to 7 years of imprisonment with or
without fine:
Against whom reasonable complaint is made
Credible information has been received
Reasonable suspicion exists, if:
Police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion
that such person has committed the said offence
The police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary:
To prevent such a person from committing any further offence.
For proper investigation of the offence.
To prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering
with such evidence in any manner.
To prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the
Court or to the police officer.
As unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be
ensured.
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of
this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.
The police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:
Against whom a complaint has been received or credible information has been received and a reasonable
suspicion exists that such person has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for
more than 7 years with or without fine and on the basis of that information the police is of the opinion
that such person has committed the said offence.
When such person is a proclaimed offender.
In whose possession some stolen property is found and there exists a reason to believe that such person
has committed an offence in relation to that stolen property.
When such person obstructs the police officer while in the execution of his duty.
Who has escaped or attempted to escape from lawful custody.
When such person is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from the armed forces of the union.
When such person is concerned with an act committed outside India that is an offence in India and
against whom a reasonable complaint has been received or some credible information has been obtained
or a reasonable suspicion exists and for the same, he is liable for extradition or apprehension under any
law in force in India.
When such person is a released convict and has breached some rules related to his release.
When he is arrested under a requisition made by a police officer to arrest such a person who may be
arrested without a warrant.
Arrest with warrant (Subject to Section 42):
No person concerned in a non-cognizable offence or against whom a complaint has been made or credible
information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists of his having so concerned shall be arrested
without a warrant or order of the Magistrate.
Private person
A private person can make an arrest by virtue of Section 43 of CrPC when a person:
In his presence commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence.

Is a proclaimed offender.
Magistrate
A Magistrate (Executive or Judicial) can make an arrest under Section 44 of CrPC of a person:
Either himself or may order any other person to arrest the offender within his local jurisdiction.
He may at any time arrest or direct the arrest, in his presence, within his local jurisdiction, of any person
for whose arrest he is competent at the time and in the circumstances to issue a warrant.
Procedure of Arrest:
The procedure for how arrest is to be made is provided under section 46 of the Code.
Section 46 - Arrest How Made -
(1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of
the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action:
Provided that where a woman is to be arrested, unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary, her submission to
custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless
the police officer is a female, the police officer shall not touch the person of the woman for making her arrest.
(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or
other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.
(3) Nothing in this section gives a right to cause the death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable
with death or with imprisonment for life.
(4) Save in exceptional circumstances, no woman shall be arrested after sunset and before sunrise, and where such
exceptional circumstances exist, the woman police officer shall, by making a written report, obtain the prior
permission of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed, or the
arrest is to be made.
Requisites Regarding Arrest:
Where arrest is not required, notice must be compulsorily issued before arresting.
According to Section 41B of CrPC - Every police officer while making an arrest shall:
Bear accurate, visible and clear identification of his name.
Prepare memo of arrest, attested by at least one witness and countersigned by the arrested person.
Inform person arrested his right to have a relative informed.
Police control rooms are to be established in every district and at the state level according to Section 41C of
CrPC.
An arrested person is entitled to meet an advocate during interrogation, not throughout the interrogation as
per Section 41D of CrPC.
A Police Officer may, in addition to arrest, exercise following powers:
May search a place entered by person sought to be arrested.
May pursue any person into any place in India.
Shall not subject person to more restraint than necessary.
Inform arrested person the grounds of arrest.
Inform arrested person of right to bail.
Has an obligation to inform about the arrest to a nominated person.
Search for the arrested person.
Seize offensive weapon.
Medical examination of accused at the request of police officer.
Medical examination of person accused of rape.
Medical examination of arrested person.
Duty of person having the custody to take reasonable care of health and safety of arrested person.
A person arrested must be taken before the magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest as per Section 57 of CrPC.
Officer in charge shall report to District Magistrate of all arrests without warrant.
Person arrested to be discharged on his own bond/bail/special order of magistrate
Power to pursue and retake in case of escape.
Arrest to be made strictly according to the CrPC according to Section 60A.
In Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014), Supreme Court of India ordered to ensure that police officers
do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and magistrate do not authorize detention in such cases.
Termination of Agency Section 201 and 202 | 16 May 2024

Why in News?
In a recent hearing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that even in the event of the principal's death, the agency
remains legally binding if the agent maintains a vested interest in the property outlined in the contract.
This reaffirmation was made in the case of P. Seshareddy (D) Rep. By His LR. Cum Irrevocable GPA Holder
And Assignee Kotamreddy kodandarami v. State of Karnataka.
What was the Background of P. Seshareddy (D) Rep. By His LR. Cum Irrevocable GPA Holder
And Assignee Kotamreddy kodandarami v. State of Karnataka & Ors. Case?
P. Seshareddy (appellant) appointed Kotemreddy Kodandarami Reddy as his General Power of Attorney for a
contract with the State of Karnataka (respondent).
Disputes arose, leading to arbitration initiated by Seshareddy.
After his death, his legal heirs took over, but the case was dismissed.
Kodandarami Reddy filed for restoration, granted by the Trial Judge.
The respondent filed writ petitions against the Trial Judge's orders, which the Single Judge allowed, setting
aside the Trial Judge's orders.
The appellant argued that the Single Judge only considered Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act,1872 (ICA)
and overlooked Sections 202 and 209. It was emphasized that the appellant had a legitimate interest in the
contract, enabling them to continue proceedings despite the principal contractor's death and allowed the writ
petition(s) filed by the respondent-State.
The Supreme Court deemed the Single Judge's interpretation as flawed, highlighting Section 202 of ICA. The
assignment deed established the appellant's interest in the contract, allowing continuation of the agency absent
express provisions to the contrary. The Trial Judge's decision was deemed appropriate, and the Single Judge's
ruling was overturned.
The appeals are disposed of.
The Supreme Court remarked that the learned Single Judge erred by solely considering Section 201 of ICA
without considering Section 202.
Additionally, the Court noted that the learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that an interest had been gained
by the appellant in the contract due to the assignment deed.
It is undeniable that the contract in question was the focal point of the agency. Therefore, without any explicit
provision indicating otherwise, the appellant had the rightful entitlement to proceed with the agency.
The bench, overturned the High Court's conclusions, asserting that if the agent has a personal interest in the
property specifically outlined in the contract, which serves as the focal point of the agency, then the agency
contract would not be terminated under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 ("1872 Act") upon the
principal's death.
The appellant asserted that under Section 202 of the Act, their interest in the property forming the agency's
subject matter prevents termination of the agency without an explicit contract, which would unfairly impact
their interest.
The Supreme Court highlighted that the demise of the primary contractor wouldn't hinder the agent (power of
attorney) from instigating proceedings arising from the contract if the agent possesses a specified interest
within the contract.
In the current scenario, the principal contractor granted power of attorney to the appellant.
Following the principal contractor's demise, the respondent sought to terminate the agency, i.e., the power of
attorney.
However, the appellant argued that since they maintain a vested interest in the contract, the termination of the
agency upon the principal contractor's death wouldn't be applicable under Section 201 of the Act.
What is Section 201 and 202 of Contract Act, 1872?
About
Section 201 of ICA, 1872 states that an agency relationship is terminated by the principal's death or insanity.
Section 202 of ICA, 1872 deals with termination of an agency where the agent has an interest in the subject
matter of the agency.
It specifies that if the agent has a personal interest in the property, which is the agency's subject matter,
the agency cannot be terminated to the prejudice of such interest unless there is an express contract
allowing such termination.
Legal Provision
Section 201 deals with termination of agency.

An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority; or by the agent renouncing the business
of the agency; or by the business of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying
or becoming of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions of
any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors.
Section 202 deals with termination of agency, where agent has an interest in subject-matter.
Where the agent himself has an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, the
agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest.
What are the Various modes for Termination of Agency?
Section 201 of ICA, 1872 describes the various modes of termination of agency.
Termination of agency by act of the parties: -

Agreement
The relation of principal and agent, like any other agreement, may be terminated at any time and
at any stage by the mutual agreement between the principal and the agent.
Revocation by Principal
According to Section 203, ICA, 1872 the principal may revoke the authority of the agent at any
time before the agent has exercised his authority so as to bind the principal unless the agency is
irrevocable.
Renunciation by Agent
An agent is entitled to renounce his power by refusing to act or by notifying the principal that he
will not act for the principal.
Termination of agency by operation of law-
Performance of the Contract-
Where the agency is for a particular object, it is terminated when the object is accomplished or
when the accomplishment of the object becomes impossible.
Expiry of Time-
When the agent is appointed for a fixed period of time, the agency comes to an end after the expiry
of that time even if the work is not complete.
Death and Insanity-
As per Section 209 of ICA,1872, When the agent or the principal dies or becomes of unsound
mind, the agency is terminated.
Insolvency-
The insolvency of the agent, it is accepted, also terminate the agency unless the acts to be done by
the agent are merely formal acts.
Destructions of Subject matter-
An agency which is created to deal with a certain subject-matter comes to an end by the destruction
of the subject-matter.
Principal and Agent becoming Alien company-
The contract of agency is valid so long as the countries of the principal and the agent are at peace.
If war breaks out between the two countries, the contract of agency is terminated.
Dissolution of a Company-
When a company is dissolved, the contract of the agency with or by the company automatically
comes to an end.
Case Law
In the case of Bhagwanbhai Karamanbhai v. Arogyanagar Co-op. Hsg. Socy. Ltd. (2003) an irrevocable power of
attorney was executed by all landowners for the sale of land. Also, the landowners relinquished their authority in
favor of the power of attorney holder. The Gujarat High Court determined that upon the death of one of the
landowners, there was no requirement for the power of attorney holder to seek consent from the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased landowner. This was because there was no explicit contract stipulating the
termination of the agency.
Doctrine of Mens Rea | 22 Mar 2024
Introduction
The doctrine of mens rea, a fundamental principle of criminal law, delves into the state of mind of the perpetrator at
the time of committing a crime.
It is latin term which means guilty mind.
It encapsulates the idea that for an act to be deemed criminal, there must be a corresponding criminal intent or
mental state behind it.
What is Concept of Mens Rea?
At the heart of the doctrine of mens rea lies the recognition that criminal liability should not be imposed solely based
on the commission of a wrongful act.
Instead, it requires a subjective assessment of the perpetrator's mental state, exploring factors such as intention,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.
In essence, mens rea reflects the principle that culpability is not merely determined by the action itself but also by
the perpetrator's culpable state of mind.
This ensures that individuals are held accountable only for acts they consciously and voluntarily commit with
criminal intent.
What are Provisions under Criminal Law Dealing with Mens Rea?
Section 299 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Culpable Homicide:

This section defines culpable homicide as the act of causing death with the intention of causing death or with
the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.
Here, the presence of intention or knowledge of the likely consequences reflects the requirement of mens rea.
Section 100 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) covers culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Section 300 - Murder:
Murder is defined as culpable homicide committed with specific intentions, such as intention to cause death,
intention to cause bodily injury resulting in death, or intention to commit an act known to cause death.
Mens rea is evident in the deliberate intention behind the act.
Section 101 of BNS defines murder.
Section 304A of IPC - Causing Death by Negligence:
Under this provision, causing death by a negligent act is punishable. However, the negligence must be of such a
degree as to indicate a disregard for human life or safety.
Mens rea is thus inferred from the reckless or negligent conduct of the accused.
Section 106 of BNS covers causing death by negligence.
Section 34 - Acts Done by Several Persons in Furtherance of Common Intention:

This section holds individuals liable for criminal acts committed in furtherance of a common intention.
It underscores the collective mens rea shared by the perpetrators in pursuing a common unlawful objective.
Section 3 of BNS covers acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
Section 120A - Criminal Conspiracy:
Criminal conspiracy involves an agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act.
Mens rea is inherent in the conspirators' intention to engage in unlawful conduct, irrespective of whether the
conspiracy culminates in the commission of the intended offence.
Section 61 of BNS covers offence of criminal conspiracy.
Section 415 - Cheating:
To establish the offence of cheating, the prosecution must prove that the accused acted dishonestly with the
intention of deceiving another person.
Mens rea is thus integral to determining the fraudulent intent behind the act.
Section 318 of BNS defines cheating.
Section 499 - Defamation:
Defamation involves the intentional publication of false statements that harm the reputation of an individual.
Mens rea is evident in the deliberate dissemination of defamatory material with the intent to injure the
reputation of the victim.
Section 356 of BNS defines defamation.
Conclusion
The doctrine of mens rea serves as a cornerstone of criminal jurisprudence. It means having a guilty mind or intention.
This helps make sure that punishment matches the mental state of the person who committed the crime. Within the
framework of the IPC, mens rea permeates various provisions, guiding the assessment of criminal intent and culpability.
Introduction
criminal intent.


Conclusion
Introduction
criminal intent.


Conclusion
Article 31C of the Constitution of India | 30 Apr 2024
Source: Indian Express
Introduction
A nine judges' bench of Supreme Court of India on 23rd April 2024 commenced the process for
the interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. The question was whether the provisions
of Article 39(b) from Directive Principles of state Policy (DPSP) allow government to treat and
redistribute privately owned properties under the garb of "material resources of the
community" in the name of serving the greater common good.
What is Article 31C of the Constitution of India, 1950?
Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles
Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the
State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to
be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 and no law containing a declaration that it is
for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that
it does not give effect to such policy:
Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this
article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the
consideration of the President, has received his assent.
What is the History of Article 31C?
25th Amendment:
Article 31C was added to the Constitution by the 25th Amendment in 1971.
It sought to prevent laws related to the acquisition of private property from being
challenged in courts on the grounds that they violated the Fundamental Rights
granted by the Constitution.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973):
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Article 31C, allowing laws related to
acquisition of private property to be immune from judicial review on grounds of
violating Fundamental Rights.
However, the court clarified that the power of Parliament under Article 31C is not
absolute. Any law seeking to acquire property must ensure that it does not violate
the 'basic structure' of the Constitution.
The court ruled that the right to property is not part of the basic structure, but the
principles of equality, liberty, and judicial review are essential features that cannot
be compromised.
What is the Current Status of Article 31C?
Currently, the Supreme Court is deliberating on the validity of Chapter VIII-A of the
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, which leverages Article 31C to justify
property acquisition for public welfare, notably in Mumbai's cessed properties.
Conclusion
Article 31C stands at the intersection of constitutional interpretation and legal evolution,
embodying the enduring quest for equitable governance and social justice. As the Supreme
Court has interpreted its complexities, it reaffirms the judiciary's role in safeguarding
constitutional principles and upholding the integrity of India's democratic framework.
Gyanvapi Mosque Case | 27 Feb 2024
Source: Indian Express
Introduction
In a significant ruling, the Allahabad High Court has upheld the right of Hindus to continue offering worship in the
southern cellar of the Gyanvapi mosque, dismissing an appeal by the Anjuman Intezamia Masjid Committee against the
Varanasi district court's initial decision. This verdict marks a historical moment in the ongoing dispute over the religious
character of the mosque, underscoring the principles of religious freedom and coexistence.
What is the History of Gyanvapi Case?
The roots of the Gyanvapi mosque dispute trace back to a suit filed by the Vyas family in September 2023, asserting
their ownership of the cellar known as 'Vyasji ka tehkhana'.
They claimed possession of the property since 1551, with a history of routine prayers until the 1993 Uttar Pradesh
government order, which barred religious activities in the cellar. The Varanasi District Court's ruling on January 31,
permitting worship in the cellar, intensified the legal battle.
What were the Legal Arguments and Counterarguments on Gyanvapi Matter?
Mosque Committee:
The mosque committee contested the district court's decision, citing the 1937 Deen Mohammed case formally
known as Deen Mohammad v. Secretary of State (1936), which declared the mosque as Hanafi Muslim Waqf
property.
Mosque committee also argued that the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, preserved the
religious character of places of worship as of 15th August 1947, making the court's findings in Deen Mohammed
definitive.
Vyas Family:
In contrast, the Vyas family leveraged the absence of their involvement in the Deen Mohammed case,
highlighting a map submitted by the Secretary of State for India, which delineated the cellar.
They contended that the state's order infringed upon their religious rights and altered the religious character of
the tehkhana.
What are the Implications of the Verdict of Allahabad High Court?
The Allahabad High Court's interim ruling acknowledges the prima facie evidence of the Vyas family's continuous
possession of the tehkhana until 1993.
It condemns the state government's actions since 1993, characterizing the restraint on religious practices as a
sustained injustice.
This verdict not only safeguards the rights of Hindus to worship in the tehkhana but also raises broader questions
about religious freedom and property rights.
It prompts reflection on the delicate balance between preserving historical religious sites and respecting the rights of
all religious communities.
What can be an Easy Way Forward in Gyanvapi Case?
As the legal battle continues, it is imperative for all parties to prioritize dialogue and mutual understanding.
Respect for diverse religious traditions and adherence to constitutional principles should guide the resolution of such
contentious disputes.
Collaborative efforts, grounded in empathy and respect, offer the most viable path forward in fostering communal
harmony and social cohesion.
The religious battle must walk through the legal way like several other disputes concerning religion in Ram
Janmabhoomi Case, Sabarimala Case and Triple Talaq Dispute.
Conclusion
The Gyanvapi mosque dispute serves as a microcosm of broader societal challenges surrounding religious pluralism and
identity. The Allahabad High Court's verdict underscores the importance of upholding the fundamental rights of all citizens,
irrespective of religious affiliation.
Monetary Policy | 26 Feb 2024
Source: Hindustan Times
Introduction
In recent times, India has seen a drop in core inflation (which excludes food and energy prices) but persistent challenges
with food inflation. Food inflation, a persistent concern plaguing India's economic landscape, continues to defy
conventional remedies and elevating inflationary pressures. At 7.6%, food inflation remains elevated as of January 2024,
presenting a formidable obstacle to achieving targeted inflation rates. The Reserve Bank India (RBI) continues to monitor
these trends closely and adjust monetary policy as needed to maintain stability and support sustainable economic growth.
What are the Solutions for Food Inflation?
Efforts to mitigate food inflation require a multi-pronged strategy encompassing supply-side interventions,
investment in agricultural infrastructure, and measures to enhance supply chain efficiency.
Strengthening resilience against weather-related disruptions and bolstering agricultural productivity emerge as
imperative priorities in addressing the structural drivers of food inflation.
What is Monetary Policy?
About and Role of RBI:

Monetary policy leads to economic governance of country and encompasses a set of measures wielded by central
banks to regulate money supply, interest rates, and credit availability.
In India, the RBI is vested with the authority to formulate and execute monetary policy, governed by the
provisions delineated in the RBI Act, 1934.
RBI's Amendment for Flexible Inflation Targeting:
In May 2016, an amendment to the RBI Act, 1934 established the framework for flexible inflation targeting,
aiming to anchor monetary policy around inflation control.
Inflation Target Determination:
Section 45ZA of RBI Act, 1934 empowers the Central Government, in collaboration with the RBI, to set the
inflation target using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) every five years.
The target, notified on 5th August 2016, set CPI inflation at 4% with a 2-6% tolerance band till 31st March 2021.
This was reaffirmed till 31st March 2026.
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC):
Section 45ZB mandates a six-member MPC to set the policy rate necessary for meeting the inflation target.
Consequences of Missing Targets:
The RBI must report to the Central Government if inflation strays from the target, outlining reasons, proposed
actions, and estimated recovery time.
Operating Framework:
The operational objective is to align the weighted average call rate (WACR) with the policy repo rate through
liquidity management, facilitating transmission of rate changes to influence aggregate demand, crucial for
inflation and growth.
What is the Monetary Policy Committee?
Composition:
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is constituted under Section 45ZB of the amended RBI Act, 1934.
It comprises six members, empowered by the Central Government through an official notification in the
Gazette.
The first MPC came into existence on 29th September 2016. The current composition, as of 5th October 2020,
includes the
Governor of the RBI (ex officio Chairperson),
Deputy Governor of the RBI in charge of Monetary Policy (ex officio member),
One officer nominated by the Central Board of RBI (ex officio member),
And three external members.
Function:
The primary function of the MPC is to determine the policy repo rate necessary to achieve the inflation target set
by the government.
Meeting:
The MPC is mandated to convene at least four times annually to deliberate on monetary policy decisions. The
meetings are important for assessing economic indicators and devising appropriate strategies to maintain price
stability and economic growth.
Voting Power:
Introduction
criminal intent.


Conclusion
December 2023 | 17 Jan 2024
Mohit Singhal v. State of Uttarakhand
Date of Judgement/Order – 01.12.2023
Bench Strength – 2 Judges
Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Pankaj Mithal
Case In Brief
The widow of the deceased (third respondent) borrowed a sum of Rs. 40,000 from a
person named Sandeep Bansal and later borrowed another sum of Rs.60,000.
The third respondent said that the first appellant is the son of Sandeep, he threatened
the third respondent for non-repayment of loan amount, assaulted her and her in laws.
The third respondent alleges that Sandeep had taken 10 to 12 cheques from her.
One cheque was dishonored, so Sandeep issued a legal notice dated 27th June 2017
to the deceased.
The third respondent alleges that her husband was under tension due to these events
and, therefore, he was very upset.
The deceased due to this committed suicide on 4th July 2017. The prosecution relied on
a suicide note written by the deceased on 30th June 2017.
The High Court rejected the plea of appellants to quash the offence, allowing the case
to proceed.
The court emphasizes that for abetment, there must be a specific act of instigation with
mens rea, pushing the deceased to a point where suicide becomes the only option.
The alleged acts of the accused took place over two weeks before the suicide, and there
was no evidence of subsequent contact or instigation in close proximity to the suicide and
was concluded that the acts of the accused did not amount to instigation under Section
306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
The court allowed the appeal and quashed the summoning order, observing that the
continuation of the prosecution will be "nothing but an abuse of the process of law”.
The present appeal was thus filed in the Supreme Court.
Verdict
The SC observed that to attract the first clause under Section 107 of IPC, there must be
instigation in some form on the part of the accused to cause the deceased to commit
suicide.
Hence, the accused must have mens rea to instigate the deceased to commit
suicide.
The act of instigation must be of such intensity that it is intended to push the deceased to
such a position under which he or she has no choice but to commit suicide.
Such instigation must be in close proximity to the act of committing suicide.
The SC did not find close proximity between act of appellants and suicide, hence allowed
the appeal.
Relevant Provision
Section 107: Abetment of a thing.
A person abets the doing of a thing, who:
Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the
doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of
that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanations:
A person who, by willful misrepresentation, or by willful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or
attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of
that thing.
Illustration: A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of
Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, willfully
represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C.
Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C.
Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does
anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby
facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
Section 306: Abetment of suicide.
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[Original Judgement]
In Re Article 370 of the Constitution of India
Composition of Bench – Chief Justice of India (CJI), Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv
Khanna, B R Gavai and Surya Kant
Case In Brief
Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) incorporated special arrangements
for the governance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The President issued Constitutional Orders 272 and 273 during the subsistence of a
Proclamation under Article 356(1)(b) of the COI.
These orders have the effect of applying the entire COI to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir and abrogating Article 370.
Contemporaneously, Parliament enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act
2019, which bifurcated the State into two Union territories.
The petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of these actions.
In July 2023, the Supreme Court listed the matter to a Constitution Bench led by Chief
Justice of India (CJI) D Y Chandrachud.
Verdict
The Constitution Bench of SC upheld the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of
India.
The SC clearly quoted that Article 370 of the Constitution of India was a feature of
asymmetric federalism and not sovereignty.
The court said that Article 370 was enacted as a transitional provision and did not have
permanent character.
The abrogation of Article 370 does not negate the federal structure, as the citizens living
in Jammu and Kashmir do and will enjoy the same status and rights as given to citizens
residing in other parts of the country.
SC in respect of Article 370(3) said that it contained the mechanism to bring the
temporary arrangement to an end, and in turn, to de-recognize the internal sovereignty
of the State and apply the Constitution of India in toto.
The SC finally considered the step towards constitutional integration.
Relevant Provision
Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019

On 5th August 2019, Parliament passed the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Bill
that led to bifurcation of the erstwhile state (into Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh)
and the effective abrogation of Article 370 of the COI that gave the region its special
status.
Containing provisions to reconstitute Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, this Act
became effective on 31st October 2019.
The act consists of 103 clauses, extends 106 central laws to the UTs, repeals 153 state
laws, and abolishes the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Council.
The act has also given powers to the Central government to pass a number of
executive orders in relation to both the union territories.
Cox and Kings Ltd v. SAP India Pvt Ltd
Composition of Bench – Chief Justice of India (CJI), Justices Hrishikesh Roy, P S Narasimha, J B
Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
Case In Brief
On 14th December 2010, Cox and Kings Ltd. (C&K), a travel firm, entered into a software
licensing agreement with SAP India Pvt. Ltd., a company specializing in software
solutions for marketing, finance, and HR in large enterprises.
In October 2015, while developing its e-commerce platform, C&K decided to incorporate a
new software suggested by SAP India, resulting in three additional agreements utilizing
SAP’s ‘Hybris Solution’.
SAP asserted a 90% compatibility, necessitating an additional 10 months for
customization.
The overall agreement, encompassing General Terms and Conditions, included an
arbitration clause mandating dispute resolution through the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, (A&C Act) in Mumbai.
Faced with challenges in the project, C&K sought assistance from SAP SE, SAP India is a
subsidiary of SAP SE, but despite intervention, the project ultimately failed.
In November 2016, C&K terminated the contract, seeking a refund of ₹45 crores.
Subsequently, SAP India initiated arbitration, alleging wrongful termination and
demanding ₹17 crores.
In the midst of financial difficulties, C&K resumed arbitration in November 2019.
Despite SAP's failure to appoint an arbitrator, C&K invoked Section 11 of the A&C Act in
the Supreme Court, arguing for SAP SE's inclusion based on implied consent and the
‘Group of Companies Doctrine’.
On 6th May 2023, a three-judge bench heard an arbitration petition under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act).
The bench referred the matter to a larger bench in context of application of Group of
Companies doctrine on the case and upon a few questions of law.
Verdict
The Constitution Bench of SC referred the matter for disposal to regular bench.
However, it determined the question of law related to Doctrine of Group of Companies
and said that the doctrine should be retained in the Indian arbitration jurisprudence
considering its utility in determining the intention of the parties in the context of complex
transactions involving multiple parties and multiple agreements.
At the referral stage, the referral court should leave it for the arbitral tribunal to
decide whether the non-signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement.
Relevant Provision
Doctrine of Group of Companies:

The "Group of Companies" doctrine generally refers to a concept where multiple
entities within a corporate group may be considered as a single economic entity
for the purposes of arbitration.
This doctrine allows a party to an arbitration agreement with one entity in the
group to seek arbitration against another entity within the same group, even if the
latter is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement.
Koushik Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society v. Ameena begum &

Anr.
Composition of Bench – Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Case In Brief
The appellant approached the Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking a
decree of specific performance of an agreement to sell.
An ex-parte decree was passed by the Civil Court in his favor.
Hence, the respondents filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for setting aside the ex-parte decree along with an application
for condonation of delay of 5767 days in filing the application for setting aside ex-parte
decree.
Application of respondents seeking condonation of delay was dismissed and the petition
filed under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC seeking setting aside of the ex-parte decree also stood
dismissed by the Civil Court.
Consequently, one of the respondents approached the Telangana High Court under
Section 115 of CPC for Civil Revision of order of dismissal of ex-parte decree. And HC set
aside the decision of the lower court.
Hence, the appellant filed an appeal against the order of HC before SC.
Verdict
Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the impugned order on the ground that the said
order was passed in a Civil Revision Petition which was not at all maintainable under
Section 115 of the CPC.
The Court further held that when there is an express provision available under the CPC
for appeal, by-passing the same, a Revision Petition cannot be filed.
Relevant Provision
Section 115 of CPC: Revision
(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any
Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such
subordinate Court appears
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity.
the High Court may make such an order in the case as it thinks fit.
Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order
made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except
where the order, if it had been made in favor of the party applying for revision would
have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.
(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order
against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.
(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court
except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.
Explanation- In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes
any order made, or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other
proceeding.
Kunal Choudhary v. State of Jharkhand & Anr.
Composition of Bench – Justice Bela M Trivedi and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Case In Brief
The accused husband (appellant) had applied for anticipatory bail before the High
Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Bench.
The High court had granted bail to the husband who was accused under Section 498A of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and imposed a peculiar condition that the husband
was required to take his wife to his home and maintain her with dignity and honor.
The appellant again approached the High Court, praying for modification of the order.
In a petition filed for modification of order, the husband contended that he had hired a
house and was ready to maintain his wife.
The High Court dismissed his plea while observing that the appellant is resolute in not
resuming his life with his wife at his own house.
While setting aside the impugned order, the court granted bail to the accused.
Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Verdict
While allowing the appeal, the Court held that while granting anticipatory bail to the
accused husband, a condition that the husband shall take his wife to his house and
maintain and honor her, cannot be imposed.
The Court further stated that neither such condition should have been imposed by the
High Court while granting an anticipatory bail, nor such could be a ground for rejection
of the petition filed by the appellant.
Relevant Provision
Section 498A of IPC: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to

cruelty.
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, cruelty means—
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand.
In Re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under The Arbitration And

Conciliation Act 1996 And The Indian Stamp Act 1899
Composition of Bench – Chief Justice of India (CJI) DY Chandrachud, Justices Sanjay Kishan
Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, B R Gavai, Surya Kant, JB Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra
Case In Brief
Challenge by Petitioners:
The petitioners contended that the deficiency in stamping is a curable defect, the
effect of which ceases to operate as soon as the revenue interest of the state is
secured.
The non-payment of stamp duty, being a temporary affliction, cannot affect the
validity of an arbitration agreement.
Petitioners said that mandating the courts at Section 8 or Section 11 stage of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) to examine the issue of stamping
will defeat the legislative purpose of minimal judicial interference enshrined in
Section 5 of the A&C Act.
The arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule under its own jurisdiction, including on
issues pertaining to stamping under doctrine of competence-competence.
Reference by Supreme Court:
SC was called upon to resolve an issue which arose in the context of three statutes
that are A&C Act, Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA).
The major issue before the court under reference was whether such arbitration
agreements would be non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid if the underlying
contract is not stamped?
Challenge to Landmark Judgments:
N N Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. (2023):
Judgment given by a constitutional bench of SC was taken under consideration
where the SC held that an unstamped instrument containing an arbitration
agreement is void under Section 2(g) of the ICA.
The court further said that a court acting under Section 11 of the A&C Act
cannot disregard the mandate of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899
requiring it to examine and impound an unstamped or insufficiently stamped
instrument.
SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd (2005):
SC considered its Judgment where it held that an arbitration agreement in an
unstamped contract could not be acted upon.
Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engg. Ltd (2019):
In this case SC said an arbitration agreement in an unstamped commercial
contract would not “exist” as a matter of law and could not be acted upon
until the underlying contract was duly stamped.
Verdict
The Difference Between Inadmissibility and Voidness:

The court said when an agreement is void, we are speaking of its enforceability in a
court of law. When it is inadmissible, we are referring to whether the court may
consider or rely upon it while adjudicating the case.
This is the essence of the difference between voidness and admissibility.
Primacy of A&C Act:
The Court said that the A&C Act is a legislation enacted to consolidate the law
relating to arbitration in India. It will have primacy over the Indian Stamp Act, 1899
and ICA in relation to arbitration agreements as the latter are general laws.
It is trite law that a general law must give way to a special law.
Position of Unstamped Arbitration Agreement:
Agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible
in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
Such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable.
Court’s Power to Examine Arbitration Agreement:
An objection to stamping does not fall to a determination under Sections 8 or 11 of
the A&C Act.
The court concerned must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie
exists.
Overruled Landmark Judgments:
The SC overruled its judgment given in N N Global Mercantile Case (2023), SMS Tea
Estate Case (2005) and Para 22 of Garware Wall Ropes (2019).
Relevant Provision
Section 8 A&C Act: Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an

arbitration agreement
It addresses the issue of referring parties to arbitration and staying court
proceedings when there is an arbitration agreement.
It typically emphasizes the importance of respecting arbitration agreements and
allowing the arbitration process to proceed as agreed upon by the parties.
Section 11 of A&C Act: Appointment of Arbitrators
It outlines the procedure for the appointment of arbitrators in cases where the
parties are unable to agree on the appointment themselves.
The section provides for the intervention of the SC and the High Court to have the
power to designate, arbitral institutions, from time to time and appoint arbitrator.
January 2024 | 19 Feb 2024
Asma Lateef & Anr. v. Shabbir Ahmad & Ors.
Composition of Bench – Justices BR Gavai, Dipankar Datta and Aravind Kumar
Case In Brief:
The suit was related to a property gifted to the appellants by their great-grandmother.
In response to their suit, two of the three defendants did not file a written statement
resulting to which the trial court pronounced judgment against them.
SC was dealing with the scenario where defendant fails to submit written statement.
Verdict:
The SC gave the following directions regarding not granting interim relief without deciding the
question upon maintainability of the suit:
Recording of Prima Facie Satisfaction:

Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and the party to be
affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to the suit, raises a point of
maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis
that interim relief should not to be granted, grant of relief in whatever form, if at all,
ought to be preceded by formation and recording of at least a prima facie
satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law.
Grant of Interim Relief on Assumption:
It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from recording its prima facie
satisfaction on the question of maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro
tem on the assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided as a
preliminary issue under Rule 2 of Order XIV, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).
That could amount to an improper exercise of power.
Appropriate Order in Extraordinary Situations:
The SC said that if an extraordinary situation arises where it could take time to
decide the point of maintainability of the suit and non-grant of protection pro tem
pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the court may
proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner indicated above justifying
the course of action it adopts.
In other words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid
irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming the relief
and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous by reason of
non-interference by the court.
Failure to File Written Statement:
The SC held that “mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement
controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a
judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim”.
The SC dismissed the appeal.
Legal Provision:
Order 8 Rule 10: Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for
by Court.—
Where any party from whom a written statement is required under rule 1 or rule 9
fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case
may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in
relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a
decree shall be drawn up:
Provided further that no Court shall make an order to extend the time provided
under Rule 1 of this Order for filing of the written statement.
Sanjay Upadhya v. Anand Dubey
Composition of Bench – Justices B R Gavai and Sandeep Mehta
Case In Brief:
The accused (appellant), facing prosecution under Section 500 of IPC lodged by the
complainant, filed an instant appeal.
Allegedly, the appellant, owner of 'Sunday Blast' newspaper, published a defamatory
article without verifying facts.
Despite a complaint dismissed by the Magistrate in 2017, a revision procedure reversed
the decision in 2018.
The appellant's plea to the High Court was dismissed in 2020.
Verdict:
The SC held that “As a consequence, all proceedings sought to be taken against the
accused appellant in pursuance of the complaint filed by the respondent-complainant
under Section 500 of the IPC are also quashed”.
SC based its decision on the ground that the initial dismissal was well-grounded,
considering freedom of speech.
The publication was in good faith, exercising constitutional rights.
Thus, the lower court's decision remained justified, warranting no further interference.
Legal Provisions:
Section 499 of IPC:

Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will
harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter
excepted, to defame that person.
Explanation 1.—It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased
person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is
intended to be hurtful to the fellings of his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a
company or an association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3.—An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically,
may amount to defamation.
Explanation 4.—No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that
imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or
intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in
respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it
to be believed that the body of that person is in a lothsome state, or in a state
generally considered as disgraceful.
Section 500 of IPC:
Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Baharul Islam v. Indian Medical Association
Composition of Bench – Justices B R Gavai and B V Nagarathna
Case In Brief:
The present appeals and transferred cases stem from the enactment of the Assam Act by
the Assam Legislature on 18th September 2004.
This Act aimed to establish a regulatory authority in Assam to register Diploma holders in
Medicine and Rural Health Care (DMRHC), regulate their practice in rural areas, and
oversee the opening of medical institutions offering the Diploma course.
Subsequently, the Director of Medical Education, Assam, advertised admissions for the
Diploma in Medicine and Rural Health Care at the Jorhat Medical Institute in 2005.
The Indian Medical Association, Assam State Branch, challenged the Assam Act and the
advertisement in a writ petition before the Gauhati High Court.
Despite the challenge, admissions proceeded.
The HC eventually declared the Assam Act unconstitutional, citing conflicts with the
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (IMC Act).
As a result, diploma holders appealed against the judgment.
Additionally, the Assam Legislature passed the Assam Community Professional
(Registration and Competency) Act, 2015, attempting to address the issues raised in the
judgment.
This Act also faced challenges in court.
Verdict:
The SC held that Entry 25 of List III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India,
1950 pertains to education, falling under the Concurrent List.
Both the Parliament and State Legislatures hold legislative competence over this
subject.
However, Entry 25 is subject to Entry 66 of List I, the Union List, which deals with
coordinating standards in higher education and research institutions.
Laws under Entry 25 are subordinate to those under Entry 66.
The Indian Medical Council (IMC) Act, 1956, is a Parliament-enacted legislation for
standardizing medical education nationwide.
State laws concerning allopathic medicine must comply with the IMC Act and its
regulations.
Any conflicting state law is invalid.
The Assam Rural Health Regulatory Authority Act, 2004, was declared void due to
legislative overreach.
However, SC said that the Assam Community Professionals (Registration and
Competency) Act, 2015, is valid as it complements the IMC Act without conflicting.
It allows community health professionals to practice in rural areas, falling within
the State Legislature's jurisdiction.
Moreover, while dismissing the appeals, the SC held that “The Legislature cannot directly
overrule a judicial decision. But when a competent Legislature retrospectively removes
the substratum or foundation of a judgment to make the decision ineffective, the said
exercise is a valid legislative exercise provided it does not transgress on any other
constitutional limitation”.
Legal Provisions:
Entry 66, List I (Union List):

Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or
research and scientific and technical institutions.
Entry 25, List III (Concurrent List):
Education, including technical education, medical education and universities,
subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and
technical training of labour.
Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh
Composition of Bench – Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Satish Chandra Sharma
Case In Brief:
In this case, the appellants had abducted a Class 12th student.

The abduction, as per the prosecution, was for ransom, and a dastardly attempt was also
made by the accused to kill the victim, although the victim miraculously escaped, but not
before sustaining grievous injuries, which eventually led to the amputation of his
right leg.
During the night, when the complainant was trying to ease himself, the two appellants
attempted to kill him by throttling his neck by the clutch wire of the motorcycle. As a
result, the complainant fell on the ground unconscious, and the appellants thinking
that the complainant had died, poured petrol on his body and set him on fire.
The complainant managed to escape and was taken to hospital.
The Trial Court convicted the appellants for an offence under section 364A of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) which has also been upheld by the High Court of
Chhattisgarh.
Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and the
High Court.
Verdict:
The Supreme Court observed that the necessary ingredients which the prosecution must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the Court are not only an act of kidnapping or
abduction but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the threat to life of a
person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must be there.
Therefore, the Court converted the findings of conviction under Section 364A to that of
Section 364 IPC.
Legal Provisions:
Section 364 of IPC - Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.

Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be
murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered, shall
be punished with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 364A of IPC - Kidnapping for ransom, etc.
Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such
kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by
his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to
death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the
Government or 4 [any foreign State or international intergovernmental organisation
or any other person] to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be
punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat & Anr.
Composition of Bench – Justices B R Gavai and Sandeep Mehta
Case In Brief:
In this case, the appellant was prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) before the Trial Court.
The Trial Court proceeded to convict the appellant.
The appellant preferred an appeal before the Principal Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar and
during pendency thereof, he filed an application under Section 391 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) for taking additional evidence at appellate stage.
Such application preferred by the appellant was rejected by the learned Principal
Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar.
Thereafter, the appellant filed the Criminal Application before the High Court of
Gujarat which was also dismissed.
Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court which was
later dismissed by the Court.
Verdict:
The Supreme Court observed that power to record additional evidence under Section 391
of CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented
from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the
facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the
appeal and that nonrecording of such evidence may lead to failure of justice.
Legal Provisions:
Section 391 of CrPC - Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to be
taken.
(1) In dealing with any appeal under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks
additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons and may either take such
evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate or, when the Appellate Court is a
High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate.
(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or
he shall certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon
proceed to dispose of the appeal.
(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present when the additional
evidence is taken.
(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter
XXIII, as if it were an inquiry.
Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Composition of Bench – Justices V. Ramasubramanian, S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai, A.S.

Bopanna and B.V. Nagarathna
Case In Brief:
On 29th July 2016, a young girl and her mother were allegedly gang-raped on National
Highway 91.
Though an FIR was registered for various offences and newspapers and the television
channels reported this ghastly incident, the then Minister for Urban Development of
the Government of U.P. called for a press conference and termed the incident as a
political conspiracy
In August 2016, the victims approached the Supreme Court and filed a writ petition,
seeking action against the minister for making such remarks about the incident.
On 17th November 2016, the Court ordered an unconditional apology to be submitted by
the then Minister for Urban Development of the Government of U.P.
On 20th April 2017, the Court referred the matter to a five-judge constitution bench and
requested the Amicus Curiae to formulate questions of law for the Bench to consider.
On 23 October 2019, the Constitution Bench began hearing the matter.
Verdict:
The majority judgment observed that a mere statement made by a Minister, inconsistent
with the rights of a citizen under Part III of the Constitution of India,1950, may not
constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and become actionable as
Constitutional tort. But if as a consequence of such a statement, any act of omission or
commission is done by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, then the
same may be actionable as a constitutional tort.
Justice BV Nagarathna, dissented with this view of the majority and held that a well-
established legal framework is essential for delineating the actions or failures to act that
could be considered constitutional torts, as well as for establishing how such issues would
be addressed or resolved through prior judicial rulings.
Legal Provisions:
Constitutional Tort
A constitutional tort is a legal tool that provides for the state to be held vicariously
accountable for the actions of its agents.
Decree, Judgment and Order | 07 Jun 2024
Introduction
The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) provides for the procedure that must be followed in case a person is
required and willing to file a civil suit.
While the institution of a civil suit usually happens with the filing of plaint it finally concludes with passing of a
judgment followed by a decree.
Section 2 of CPC gives the definition of decree, order and judgment.
What is a Judgment?
Section 2(9) of CPC lays down the definition of judgment.

“Judgment” means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order.
Judgment provides reasons for passing a decree or order.
Section 33 of the CPC provides that the Court shall after the case has been heard pronounce the judgment and
on such judgment decree shall follow.
Order XX Rule 1 of CPC provides that judgment must be pronounced in open Court either at once or as soon
thereafter as may be practicable.
The Proviso to Order XX Rule 1 provides that where the judgment cannot be pronounced at once it must be
pronounced within 30 days from the date on which hearing of case was concluded and this period should not
extend beyond 60 days from the date on which hearing of case was concluded (in case of exceptional
circumstances and due notice of the date fixed must be given to the parties or their pleaders).
Order XX Rule 2 of CPC provides that the Judge shall pronounce the judgment written but not pronounced
by his predecessor.
Order XX Rule 3 of CPC provides that the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court and
once signed it shall not altered or amended except as provided under Section 152 of CPC or on review.
Order XX Rule 4 of CPC provides that Courts other than Courts of Small Causes must contain:
Concise statement of the case
Points for determination
Decision thereon
Reasons for such decision
Judgment delivered by Court of Small Causes need not contain more than points for determination and decision
thereon.
In the case of Gajraj Singh v. Deohu (1951), the Court held that the judgment must be intelligible and must
show that the judge has applied his mind.
What is a Decree?
Section 2(2) of CPC defines decree.

The essential elements of decree are as follows:
There must be a formal expression of adjudication
There must be judicial determination of the matter in dispute.
Also, all the requirements of form must be complied with i.e. it should be formally drawn up in terms
of judgment.
Such adjudication must have been given in a suit
It is necessary that the adjudication must have been given in a suit
It must have determined the rights of the parties with regards to all or any of the matters in controversy in
the suit
The term ‘right’ means substantive rights of the parties and not merely procedural rights.
The expression ‘matters in controversy’ refers to subject matter of the suit with reference to which
relief is sought.
Such determination must be of a conclusive nature
Determination of rights of the parties must be conclusive and not interlocutory.
An interlocutory order which does not decide the rights of the parties finally is not a decree
An order refusing adjournment, order refusing or granting interim relief are not decree.
What are the Types of Decree?
As per Section 2(2) of CPC following are the types of decree

Preliminary Decree
Such a decree does not completely dispose of the suit but determines the rights with regard to some
or one of the matters in controversy.
Order XX Rule 15 provides that in cases of a decree in a suit for dissolution of partnership the Court
may pass preliminary decree.
Order XX Rule 18 provides that in case of decree in a suit for partition the Court may pass
preliminary decree.
Final Decree
A final decree is one which finally settles all questions in controversy between the parties.
Partly Preliminary Partly Final
Such a composite decree is passed in certain cases like in a suit for possession of land and mesne
profits.
The first part is final as it directs delivery of possession, and the second part is preliminary as it
directs an enquiry as to mesne profits.
Deemed Decree
The term ‘deemed’ is generally used to create a statutory fiction.
Section 2(2) of CPC provides for two types of deemed decree:
Rejection of plaint under Order VI Rule 11 of CPC
Determination of any question under Section 144 of CPC
Section 2(2) of CPC expressly provides that decree shall exclude the following:
Any adjudication from which appeal lies as an appeal from order
Any order of dismissal for default
What are the Contents of a Decree?
Order XX Rule 6 of CPC provides that the decree shall agree with the judgment and shall contain:
The name of the suit
The name and description of parties
Their registered addresses
Particulars of the claim
Specify the relief granted or other determination of the suit
Order XX Rule 6A provides that the decree shall be drawn up within 15 days from the date judgment is
pronounced.
Order XX Rule 7 provides that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.
What is Order?
Section 2(14) of CPC defines order.

“Order” means formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree.
Therefore, adjudication which is not a decree is order.
What is the Distinction Between Decree and order?
The distinction between decree and order is as follows:

A decree can only be passed in a suit which commences on presentation of a plaint. An order may
originate from a suit or may arise from proceeding commenced by presentation of application or petition.
A decree may be preliminary, final or partly preliminary and partly final. An order cannot be a
preliminary one.
Usually, one decree is passed in a suit. However, several orders can be passed in a suit or proceeding.
A first appeal invariably lies from a decree unless it is expressly provided that appeal shall not lie (for
example Section 96(3) provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed with the consent of the
parties). However, only those orders are appealable which are expressly provided in the Code. (Section
104 and Order 43 Rule 1).
A second appeal lies to the High Court on certain grounds in a decree. However, there is no second appeal
in case of appealable orders.
What is the distinction between Decree, order and Judgment?
Decree or order shall follow the pronouncement of judgment.

Judgment is followed by a decree.
It is not necessary to give a statement by the Judge in a decree/order although the statement is necessary in a
judgment.
Conclusion
A civil suit is instituted by presentation of a plaint and ends with a judgment followed by a decree.
While judgment provides for grounds of a decree, decree is a formal expression of adjudication which
conclusively determines the rights of the parties.
Formal expression of any decision which is not a decree is order.
Thus, all three are very important in a civil suit and have their own significance.
Inherent Powers of the High Court | 27 Mar 2024
Introduction
The term inherent means existing and inseparable from something, a permanent attribute or quality. Inherent powers are
the powers which are inalienable from Courts and may be exercised by a Court to do full and complete justice between the
disputed parties before it. The Court has inherent power to mould the procedure to enable it to pass such orders as the
ends of justice may require.
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) deals with the inherent powers of the High Court.
Section 482 of CrPC
This Section deals with the saving of inherent powers of the High Court.
It states that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make
such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
This section does not confer any inherent power on the High Courts, and it only recognizes the fact that High Courts
have inherent powers
This Section is silent as regards inherent powers of subordinate courts.
The use of the word "otherwise" in this Section has the avowed effect of boundlessly broadening the boundaries of
inherent powers of the High Court in exercise of its criminal jurisdiction.
No limitation period has been prescribed for making an application under this Section. However, the application is
to be filed within a reasonable period.
Purpose of Section 482 of CrPC
Section 482 lays down as to when the inherent power may be exercised.
It enumerates three purposes for which the inherent power may be exercised.
The first purpose is that the inherent power may be exercised to make orders necessary to give effect to any
order under the Code.
The second purpose is that the inherent power may be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
The third purpose is that the inherent power may be exercised otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Principles for the Application of Section 482 of CrPC
In the case of Madhu Limaye v. Maharashtra (1977), the Supreme Court enumerated the following principles that
would govern the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction:
That inherent power must not be resorted to, if specific provision for redressal of grievances has been given.
That it should be carefully used to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
That it should not be exercised against the express provision given in any other statute.
Exercise of Inherent Powers of High Court
As stated by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), the inherent powers under Section 482 can
be exercised in the following cases: -
Where the allegations in the FIR/complaint, even if they are taken at their face value, do not prima facie
constitute any offence against the accused.
Where the allegations in the FIR or other materials do not constitute a cognizable offence justifying an
investigation by the police under Section 156(1) of the CrPC. except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the CrPC.
Where the unconverted allegations in the FIR/complaint and the evidence collected thereon do not disclose the
commission of any offence.
Where the allegations in the FIR/complaint do not constitute any cognizable offence but constitute only non-
cognizable offence to which no investigation is permitted by the police without the order of Magistrate under
Section 155(2) of the CrPC.
Where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Statute concerned
(under which the proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the code or in the statute concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide intentions and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him
due to private and personal vengeance.
The list is not exhaustive but only illustrative in nature.
In the following cases, the inherent powers of the High Court cannot be invoked:
To quash the proceedings in police investigation consequent upon a FIR made to the police in a cognizable
case; to interfere with the statutory rights of the police to investigate a cognizable case.
To quash an investigation just because the FIR does not disclose any offence when investigation could be
carried out on the basis of other materials.
To embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint.
Inherent jurisdiction can be invoked only against final orders and not against interlocutory orders.
To order stay of arrest of accused during investigation.
Section 482 of CrPC and Bail Provisions
The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used by the High Court to reopen or alter an order, after
disposing a bail petition decided on merits.
Bail cannot be granted by virtue of Section 482 CrPC.
If bail is granted in a bailable offence, there is no provision in CrPC to cancel it. However, the High Court can cancel
it by invoking inherent power on the grounds of tampering with the witness, bribing the officials, or an attempt to
abscond etc.
Section 482 of CrPC and Quashing of the Proceedings
In the case of R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab (1960), the Supreme Court ruled that in the following cases the inherent
jurisdiction of High Court could be exercised to quash the proceedings:
Where there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of proceedings.
Where the allegations in the FIR or complaint do not constitute the offence alleged.
Where either there is no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly failed
to prove the charge.
Case Laws
In the case of M/s Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998), the Supreme Court held that a fresh
investigation or re-investigation after filing of chargesheet by police can be ordered by High Court under Section
482 of CrPC to secure the ends of justice.
In the case of Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P and Ors. (2008), the Supreme Court cautioned against entertaining Section
482 CrPC petitions if the FIR remains unregistered, advocating for the pursuit of alternative remedies like
approaching police officers or the Magistrate.
In the case of Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.,(2023), the Supreme Court held that a second
petition under Section 482 of CrPC would not be maintainable on grounds that were available for challenge at the
time of filing of the first petition.
Procedure of Investigation under CrPC | 12 Dec 2023
Introduction
In India, the crimes are investigated by the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
Section 2(h) of the code defines the term ‘investigation’ as all the proceedings
conducted by the police officer to collect the evidence associated with the crime.
At the beginning of any investigation, the crimes are identified as cognizable and non-
cognizable offenses, and then, according to the nature of the crime, the investigation
proceeds.
The authority of the police to investigate a crime is mentioned in Section 156 of CrPC.
Generally, the investigation mainly consists of the following steps:
Filing of a First Information Report (FIR).
Investigating the location of the crime.
Collecting evidence and interrogating the relevant persons.
Finding the suspect.
Filing of chargesheet.
If found innocent, then acquitted.
If found guilty, then punishment is given.
Cognizable and Non-Cognizable Offences
Cognizable offences
It is defined under Section 2(c) of the CrPC. These are the wrongs done against society
i.e., against the public at large.
These are the serious kind of offences in which the punishment is more than 3 years
with or without fine. Crimes like dowry, murder, rape, etc. fall under this category.
The offences in which the police can arrest a suspect even without an arrest
warrant.
Non-Cognizable Offences
It is defined in Section 2(i) of the CrPC. In these kinds of crimes, an arrest warrant is
required to make the arrest. Crimes like defamation, battery, and assault come in this
category.
Non-cognizable offences are less serious in nature for which the punishment is less
than 3 years with or without the fine.
Authority to Investigate
Section 156 of the code confers upon the police officer the power to investigate a
cognizable offence.
In the cases of cognizable offences, the officer in charge of the police station has to file
the FIR in written form and get the same signed by the petitioner, only then the
investigation can start.
A magistrate can also order the investigation of cognizable offences under the power
given to him by Section 190 of CrPC.
Information of the Crime
This is the first and the most important step of the investigation.
The police will file the FIR as per the information provided by the victim. Also, a copy
of the FIR will be given to the victim free of cost.
Procedure of the Investigation
Section 157 of the CrPC provides the preliminary inquiry method.

According to this, after receiving the information about the crime, the officer in
charge of the police station is empowered to investigate the case and to send the
report of the same to the Magistrate, who would then take cognizance of the case.
The police need to go to the crime scene to collect evidence and arrest the suspect if
needed.
They can also deny investigation on the grounds that the case involves some non-
cognizable offences, which cannot be investigated without the order of the
Magistrate.
If the investigating officer does not find any reasonable grounds to investigate, then
he is not bound to investigate, and he can inform the reasons for the same to the
magistrate.
Sending the Reports to the Magistrate
Under Section 157 of CrPC, ‘police report’ needs to be sent to the magistrate to inform
him of the reasons on whose basis the suspicion of a crime having been committed, is
founded. Thus, it informs the Magistrate that the particular case is being investigated by
the police.
The Magistrate cannot stop the investigation process once it has been started, hence
this sending of the police report is merely a formality.
Apart from this report, a ‘final report’ is also sent to him at the end of the investigation
under Section 173.
The Order to Investigate by the Magistrate
Section 159, the Magistrate receiving the report of a police officer under Section 157,
may direct an investigation, or if he thinks fit, may at once proceed to depute any
subordinate magistrate to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry.
Section 159 is primarily meant to give to the magistrate the power of directing an
investigation in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case under the
proviso (b) to Section 157(1). He can also order investigation by an officer-in-charge of
a police station, but not by senior police officer.
Identification & Attendance of the Witnesses
The power to identify and address the witnesses is enshrined under Section 160 of CrPC.
After investigating the crime and finding all the necessary pieces of evidence, suspects,
and witnesses, the police officer has the authority to call any person who appears to be
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case, to be present for interrogation.
Examination of Witnesses by Police

Section 161 deals with the oral examination of witnesses by the police. They are
required to answer each and every question asked by the police during the
interrogation.
However, they are not bound to answer such questions the answers to which have a
tendency to expose him to a criminal charge, or to a penalty, or forfeiture. In such cases,
the person may refuse to answer the question.
Recording of Statements or Confession by Magistrate
Section 164 empowers the Magistrate to record the statements, or the confessions
made by any person during the whole investigating process, or before the
commencement of the inquiry or trial.
If someone does not want to make a confession, then the magistrate cannot force him
to do so.
Cases where Investigation Cannot be Completed within 24 Hours
When an investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours, Section 167 provides the
Magistrate with certain powers in relation to the procedure. In the following situations,
Section 167 is invoked:
When a suspect is arrested without a warrant and taken into custody by a police officer.
The investigation took more than 24 hours.
The accused is brought before the Magistrate by the official in charge of a police station
or an investigative officer not below the level of sub-inspector.
The Judicial Magistrate to whom the accused is transferred may order that he can be
held in custody for a period of not more than 15 days (about 2 weeks). If the Magistrate
does not have jurisdiction to try the matter and believes that continued detention is
unjustified, the accused will be forwarded to the Magistrate who does have jurisdiction.
If the Magistrate has reason and grounds to believe that detention of the accused is
necessary, he may do so. However, in any case, the Magistrate cannot order detention
for more than:
For serious offences with a punishment of imprisonment for more than 10
years, or life imprisonment or death penalty, in such cases, a person can be kept
in custody for 90 days (about 3 months).
For less serious offences with a punishment of less than 10 years of
imprisonment, custody should not exceed 60 days (about 2 months).
Case Law
Balak Ram v. The State of U.P l(1974):

The Supreme Court held that evidence of witnesses cannot be discarded merely
because their statement was recorded under Section 164. Their evidence must be
approached with caution.
Writs | 20 Jul 2023
Introduction
Writs are constitutional remedies designed to look after the violation of fundamental
rights enshrined in part III of the constitution.
It is a written order in the forms mentioned in the constitution.
It is an order to do a particular thing or stop from doing it.
It can be issued by the Supreme Court under Article 32 and under 226 by the High Court.
These are the remedies entrusted by the constitution for the enforcement of fundamental
rights.
It can be in the form of orders, warrants, directions, summons, etc.
The aggrieved person applies for issuance of a writ through presenting a writ petition
before the competent authority.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar remarked Article 32 as the heart and soul of the constitution.
Types of Writs
1. Habeas Corpus
2. Mandamus
3. Certiorari
4. Quo Warranto
5. Prohibition
Habeas Corpus
The literal meaning of Habeas Corpus is “to have the body”.

The objective of this writ is to remove a person from unlawful detention or custody.
The court orders that person before it to inquire into the legitimacy of the detention.
The competent court orders the release of the person in custody if it finds it arbitrary.
The cardinal principle of this writ is the right to freedom.
The writ cannot be invoked if the order to arrest the person from competent authority
seems under jurisdiction and prima facie legal.
The writ can be issued against public authorities and individuals.
The writ of Habeas Corpus can be filed by the detained person, his family or friends.
Conditions
There are three major conditions upon which this writ can be issued:
The detained person is not presented before the magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest.
The arrest was made under an unconstitutional law.
The person was arrested without any violation of the law.
Case Laws
1. In the case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980), an application in the form of a
letter was filed before the apex court by a prisoner in the place of his prison inmate
stating the manhandling by the jail officials. The apex court issues the writ of Habeas
Corpus upon the application which clarified that the writ is not only available against
wrongful detention but for the protection against indecent behavior during the period of
detention.
2. In the matter of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), it was held that Article 21 can
be restricted by the state. The case is known as the darkest judgment in history. It is also
known as the habeas corpus case
Mandamus
The literal meaning of mandamus is “we command”

The court issue is the form of a direction to public authority to perform a particular task.
It must be filed in good faith by the person having the legal right.
It can be issued against government, public officials, inferior courts, tribunals and public
corporations.
It is issued against the public authority denying performing its duty or has failed to do so.
It cannot be issued against private individuals, President and Governors, and Chief
Justice.
Exceptions
Non-statutory departmental functions

It cannot be invoked in matters where the duty is discretionary
Against right of private nature
It the direction will be in contravention with the law
In the matter of an alternative remedy available
Case Laws
1. In the case of Union of India v. S.B. Vohraxi (2004), the Supreme Court upheld the
exceptions denying the presenting of writ of mandamus on the exempted ground.
2. In the case of Suganmal v. State of M.P (1965), the apex court clarified that if an
alternative legal remedy is available writ of mandamus cannot be invoked.
Certiorari
It stands for “to certify”

The writ can be issued when the court finds the decision of the lower court erroneous or
beyond its authority.
It is used as curative writ petition
The court has the authority to take charge of the case by transferring it before itself or
quashing the verdict of another inferior court.
Before 1991 the writ was only allowed to be issued against the judicial authority or quasi-
judicial authority and not the administrative authority but post 1991 1it can be issued
against the administrative authority as well.
It cannot be issued against private people.
Grounds
When the inferior court lacked jurisdiction while giving a judgment

When the inferior court performed beyond their jurisdiction
When the inferior court acts against the procedural law
When principle of natural justice is not performed by the court
Procedure
Filing of petition in the court by an advocate

The petition must include all the required information related to the accused
Notice is sent to the opposite party
Court passes the judgment in the format of writ after hearing both parties
Case Laws
1. In the case of Yekoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (1965) the court stated that this writ cannot
be invoked for appeal.
2. In the matter of Radhey Shyam and anr. v. Chhabi Nath and Ors. (2015) the court said
that power under Article 227 cannot be used for writ filed under Article 226.
Quo warranto
Quo- warranto stands for “by what authority or warrant”

It is used by the court to stop the excessive use or abuse of authority
The court issues the writ to ask the public official to table his authority of holding that
office, and court can suspend his authority.
It cannot be issued against private individuals.
Grounds
A person has held a public office without authority.

The person is unqualified under the Constitution of India to hold the office.
Permanent term
It must be a public office
Case Laws
1. The writ of Quo warranto can be invoked against private office was held in the case of
Amarendra Chandra v. Narendra Kumar Basu, (1951). The same ratio was decided in
the case of Jamalpur Arya Samaj Sabha v. Dr D Rama (AIR 1954).
2. It was held in the case of University of Mysore v. CD Govinda Rao, (1963), that the public
office must be of a statutory nature to issue the writ of Quo warranto.
Prohibition
It stands for “to forbid”

Th writ aims to stop the judicial, quasi-judicial authorities along with tribunals from
exceeding their authority.
It works opposite to mandamus as it directs the authority to prohibit any activity.
The higher court can issue this against the lower court.
The objective to direct the inactivity is to prevent the excessive application of one’s
jurisdiction.
It cannot be invoked against legislative bodies, administrative bodies and private
individuals.
Conditions
Application of power beyond the jurisdiction

Infringement of Principles of Natural Justice
Using invalid law
Conducting in contravention of basic legal rights
Performed error based on record
Case Laws
In the case of Hari Vishnu v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque (1955) it was held by the court that
this writ can be issued only when the decision has not been given by the court.
Writ cannot be issued after the execution of the order was confirmed in the case of
Prudential Capital Markets Ltd v. The State of A.P. and others, (2000).
Dying Declaration | 20 Dec 2023
Introduction
The word dying declaration is derived from the word ‘leterm motem’ which means words
said before death. It means the statement of the person who is dead explaining the cause of
death.
The term dying declaration has not been defined in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 but
Section 32(1) of the Act contains provision in relation to dying declaration.
Section 32(1) of IEA
This section states that when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death,
or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases
in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant
whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under
expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of
his death comes into question.
Characteristics of Dying Declaration
Dying declaration is one of the exceptions of the rule of excluding hearsay evidence.
It is not necessary that the dying declaration is relevant only in a particular kind of
proceedings. The proceedings may be civil or criminal.
There is no absolute rule of law that a dying declaration, unless corroborated by other
independent evidence, is not fit to be acted upon.
By Whom the Dying Declaration is Recorded
It is best that it is recorded by the magistrate.

If there is no time to call the magistrate, keeping in view the deteriorating condition of
the declaration, it can be recorded by anybody.
It cannot be said that a dying declaration recorded by a police officer is always
invalid.
If any dying declaration is not recorded by the competent Magistrate, it is better that
signatures of the witnesses are taken who are present at the time of recording it.
Procedure for Recording Dying Declaration
There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying

declaration nor is it required to be recorded only by a Magistrate.
A dying declaration cannot be discarded only on the ground that it was not recorded in
question-answer form.
A statement recorded in a narrative form may be more natural and may give a true
version of the incident as perceived by the injured person.
Multiple Dying Declarations

Law in regard to multiple dying declarations has been well settled as per the various
decisions delivered by the Supreme Court time and again.
In such cases reliability of such statements must be measured very carefully.
Hence there can be two cases i.e., where multiple dying declarations which are
consistent with each other and secondly case of inconsistent multiple dying
declarations.
In the cases of inconsistent dying declarations, the extent of the inconsistencies would
then have to be considered by the court.
The inconsistencies may turn out to be reconcilable. In such cases, where the
inconsistencies go to some matter of detail or description but is incriminatory in nature
as far as the accused is concerned, the court would look to the material on record to
conclude as to which dying declaration is to be relied on unless it be shown that they are
unreliable.
Case Laws
In Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2001) it was held by the Supreme Court that the
admissibility of dying declaration rests upon the principle that a sense of impending
death produces in man’s mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous
man under oath.
In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958), the Supreme Court laid down the following
principles related to dying declaration:
There is no absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be the sole basis
of conviction unless corroborated. A true & voluntary declaration needs no
corroboration.
A dying declaration is not a weaker kind of evidence than any other piece of
evidence.
Each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances
in which the dying declaration was made.
A dying declaration stands on the same footing as other pieces of evidence & has
to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances & with reference to the
principle governing the weight of evidence.
A dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the
proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, &, as far as
practicable in the words of the maker of the declaration stands on a much higher
footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may
suffer from all the infirmities of human memory & human character.
Culpable Homicide | 26 Mar 2024
Introduction
Culpable Homicide is one of the gravest offences against the human body. The word culpable comes from the Latin word
"culpe”, which signifies punishment. The Latin word “Homo + Cida”, which means human being + killing, is where the
term homicide originates. It refers to the killing of a human being by a human being. Homicide may be lawful or unlawful.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) deals with the provision of Culpable Homicide.
Section 299 of IPC
This section deals with Culpable homicide.

It states that whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause
death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Explanation 1. —A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily
infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2. —Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed
to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been
prevented.
Explanation 3. —The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may amount to
culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child
may not have breathed or been completely born.
Illustrations
A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely
to be thereby caused. Z, believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence
of culpable homicide.
A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely to cause Z's death,
induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence
of culpable homicide.
Essential Ingredients of Culpable Homicide
The following are the essential ingredients of culpable homicide:

A person must be dead.
The death must have been caused by the act of another person.
The act causing death must have been done with:
The intention of causing death; or
The intention of causing bodily injury likely to cause death; or
With the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death.
Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder
Exceptions to Section 300 of IPC, enumerates certain cases in which culpable homicide is not murder:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender is deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden
provocation and causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other
person by mistake or accident. This exception is subject to the following provisos:
Provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender.
Provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exer-
cise of the powers of such public servant.
Provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Culpable homicide is not murder, if it is the exercise of the right to private defence.
Culpable homicide is not murder, if it is done by the public servant acting in good faith.
Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel.
Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years,
suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Culpable Homicide by Mistake or Accident
Section 301 of IPC deals with the culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was
intended.
It states that if a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable
homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause,
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Article 32 of the Constitution | 17 Nov 2020

Article 226 of the Constitution

The concept of Bail is provided by Chapter XXXIII (Thirty-Three) of the Code of

Legal Position of Bail

Who can grant Bail?

Different types of Bail

Conditions while Granting Bail

Special Powers of High Court or Court of Session Regarding Bail

Landmark Case Laws

Moti Ram & Ors vs State Of M.P (1978):

What is the Background of this Appointment?

What are the Legal Provisions in Relation to Appointments?

Evolution of the Collegium System

First Judges Case (1981):

What are the Constitutional Provisions in Relation to the Appointment of

It is time to think of a permanent, independent body to institutionalize the process with

What is the Background of Dilip Sharma v. State of Rajasthan Case?

What were the Court’s Observations?

Subsection (1): Application for Bail Direction

What are the Landmark Judgments on Anticipatory Bail?

Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee & Anr. (2010):

Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court

What were the Court’s Observations?

What is Article 42 of the Constitution of India, 1950?

Article 42 as Directive Principles of State Policy:

Source: Supreme Court

What was the Background of Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala Case?

What were the Court’s Observations?

What were the Landmark Judgments cited in the Case?

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980):

Source: Supreme Court

Section 173 - Report of police officer on completion of investigation.

(a) the names of the parties;

(b) the nature of the information;

(e) whether the accused has been arrested;

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Source: Jharkhand High Court

What were the Court’s Observations?

What are the Relevant Legal Provisions Involved in it?

Section 304B of IPC

This Section deals with dowry death. It states that -

Source: Allahabad High Court

What were the Court’s Observations?

What are the Principles of Natural Justice?

Rules of Natural Justice:

Source: Allahabad High Court

What were the Court’s Observations?

What are the Principles of Natural Justice?

Rules of Natural Justice:

What was the Background of Himanshu Sharma v. Union of India Case?

What were the Court’s Observations?

What is the Concept of Bail in New Criminal Law and CrPC?

Refreshing Memory | 27 Feb 2024

What was the Background of Shailesh Kumar v. State of UP Case?

What were the Court’s Observations?

What are Provisions Related to Refreshing Memory under Law?

Section 159 of IEA:

Source: Kerala High Court