SPE-189148-MS

Simultatanous Operations SIMOPS for Drilling & Production: The NPDC

Ogini-Field Approach Planning to Field Execution

Chidi Anselm Chieke, Ndubisi Ubani, Chinyere C. Obi, Chidi Uka Awa, Adelanke G. Bola, Tijanni Modibbo, and
Nura Bello, NPDC O

Copyright 2017, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the Nigeria Annual International Conference and Exhibition held in Lagos, Nigeria, 31 July – 2 August 2017.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
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Abstract
Cluster drilling comes with its own attendant challenges; however, operators usually adopt this option in
order to reduce environmental footprint and optimize cost. Drilling additional wells in an existing cluster
will require simultaneous operation in order to maximize value. The philosophy underlying the rules for
SIMOPS is that the interactions between operations must remain manageable (and can be demonstrated to
be so) under all conditions that can be realistically foreseen. This paper focuses on four (4) activities that
delivered the Ogini field HSE-Case, whose primary objective was to generate an in-house risk assessment
and hazard register for Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) involved in drilling of the five (5) new
Ogini wells namely:- Operational description of Ogini SIMOPS project, Description of HSE-MS, Risk
Assessment and Remedial Action Plan (RAP). The SIMOPS for Ogini-field was limited to those activities
associated with oil production from the existing wells, drilling operations and laying of flowlines for tie-
in of new wells to the flowstation for production.
The Ogini SIMOPS have several HSE components that require critical review; a multi-disciplinary team
was constituted to assess/evaluate the Risks and generate a Hazard register used in Simultaneous Operations
Planning (SIMOPS) for the project. The Scope of work of the team included coming up with the industry-
acceptable strategies to carry out the following operations simultaneously viz:- Flowline Construction, Rig
Move, Well Delivery and Production.
A SIMOPS Planning was developed by NPDC Team and approved by DPR. Five (5) horizontal wells
were drilled in a cluster (of 4.5m apart) with two producing wells; hooking up the new wells to production
facility sequentially while rig was still on site.
Following the review of the distances between the planned five wells and considering future intervention
works in this location, after drilling and completion of first two wells, the rig was skidded some meters
further away from the initial surface location to drill the subsequent wells. Extended well test was carried out
on these completed wells during this operation. This reduced the identified risks associated with SIMOPS
and also provided accelerated returns on initial investments.
2 SPE-189148-MS

Introduction
SIMOPS is short for Sultaneous Operations. It is essentially any situation/ operation where two or more
activities are occurring close enough to each other that there is a risk of interference, clashing, or risk
transfer. For instance, in marine operations, multiple vessels operate in the same area, but are on different
missions or serving different roles, may be a good example of simultaneous operations. However, in this
paper, NPDC Ogini field Simultaneous operations are limited to those activities associated with pipe laying,
drilling and production operations The philosophy, underlying the rules for simultaneous operations is that
the interactions between operations must remain manageable (and can be demonstrated to be so) under all
conditions that can be realistically foreseen.
Prior to the planning of this SIMOPS, referal documents of previous similar operations were scarce
and we needed to satisfy some regulatory requirements. This simultaneous drilling and production
operationsHealth Safety and Environment Case (HSE Case) gives the management of NPDC Ogini field
development the following objectives:

• To demonstrate awareness and readiness to comply with the Department of Petroleum Resources
(DPR) requirements for HSE in its operations.
• To cover concurrent drilling and production operations (SIMOPS) and the response to emergency
situations.
• To develop the overall framework for managing such activities onshore and make reference to
more detailed and specific procedures as appropriate.
• And most importantly, this safetyplanning was expected to give confidence to NPDC Ogini field
management (the holder) (Figure-1) and DPR (Government regulatory agency), that NPDC has
the ability and means to control major accident hazards effectively. It was also expected to provide
an extra level of control in addition to regulations such as MOSR 1997, by DPR, consequent upon
the major accident hazards of the cluster drilling activities.

Figure 1—Command Structure/ Management of Combined Operations

On the basis of the aforementioned, the HSE Case for NPDC Ogini demonstrated that there are controls
in place to manage risks associated with the SIMOPS and that those risks have been reduced (de-risked)
to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
The OGINI HSE Case addressed all critical HSE activities, which were defined as activities required in
putting in place and maintaining control along the paths that lead to major consequences.
SPE-189148-MS 3

The physical boundaries of the Ogini SIMOPS were:

▪ Flowlines Construction.
▪ Drilling and completion of 5 wells.
▪ Concurrent production from 2 wells.
▪ Flowline manifold.
▪ Oil and gas reception in main and test manifold.
▪ Oil and gas separation at high pressure and low pressure.
▪ Oil storage.
▪ Oil pumping and metering.
▪ Gas delivery to gas compression facility and re-injection lines.
▪ Piping, up to the oil export manifold.
NPDC Ogini SIMOPS team (Figure 2) believes that functional HSE-Management System (HSE-
MS), Quality Management System (QA-MS) and Permit to work (PTW) system depends on good
implementation of Safety Managemnent System (SMS). Thus, some implementation rules were put in place
and were enforced at all times during Ogini SIMOPS. Noteworthy of mention is that Security is also a part
of Emergency Response (ER) Plan, but it is not part of the OGINI HSE Case.

Figure 2—Organization Structure for the SIMOPS.

Statement of Theory and Definitions

The objective of Operational description of Ogini SIMOPS was to demonstrate that any hazards which
could arise as a result of the drilling, production, and construction activities have been identified and that
suitable controls have been identified and put in place, and that the risks to both drilling and installations
are minimized if not controlled
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The (Health, Safety and Environment Management System (HSE -MS) of NPDC is a system with which
identifies and managed risks in the SIMOPS Planning, in order to ensure the protection of people, assets,
environment and reputation within the area of our operation. Incorporated in the HSE-MS are the means
to meet the requirements of the NPDC Ogini SIMOPS planning. HSE Policy Statement, and Commitment,
includes those of Continuous Improvement and Compliance with the law (Figure 3).

Figure 3—Key Elements of NPDC Ogini SIMOPS HSE-MS

The HSE Planning within NPDC in the context of HSE-MS involves the development of strategies to
meet the objectives and targets for the organization as a whole, each department and each section of it. The
use of planning at all levels is critical in improving safety and environmental performance as reduction in
LTI, waste and emission is often a long term process requiring budgeting and allocation of resources well
in advance.
HSE task level planning consists of determining:

• Adequate personnel resources to do the work.

• Adequate equipment, tools, services, etc. to do the work.

• A safe method of working.

• A safe work place.

• Procedures to do the work.

• An adequate time scale for the work.

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Similarly, HSE at the process level consists largely of this framework:

• Organization, role and responsibilities.

• Communications.

• Standards

• Contractor management.

• Waste management.

• Competence and training

• Emission discharge/control.

• Rehabilitation.

The company HSE Plan contains a number of specifications designed to improve HSE performance
across all NPDC operations. Some of these actions relate to improving the performance of the HSE MS,
some to specific locally sponsored HSE initiatives.
The process as integrated into the business Planning Process ensured that a corporate HSE Plan applies
to all NPDC operations including major projects. The HSE plan has a five –year currency and contains
in detail actions to be executed in the following 12 months and in broader outline, actions to be executed
in the following 24 to 60 months. The plan is owned and approved by the HSE Management Committee.
Performance against the Corporate HSE plan was reviewed at the HSE MC. The QHSE Manager via the
DM QHSE monitored all performance against all plans and reports progress back to the HSE Management
Committee.
Supporting the corporate HSE Plan are lower level operational HSE Plans. These were the responsibility
of Asset Management to develop along with their teams. They were consistent with and in addition to the
Corporate Plan. Asset managers are free to integrate into their asset HSE any HSE action they considered
necessary at their level to ensure the HSE Policy and Objectives are met. Asset HSE Plans may go down
to personal task and target level. Asset Manager reviews performance against his own plans at their HSE
meetings. However, at operational level it is necessary to detail the actual steps necessary to achieve targets
set in the Asset/Project Service HSE Plan. These were recorded in local Management Improvement Plans/
Programme (MIPs) so that performance of the actions necessary to achieve the plan was trackable. MIPs are
conceived, tracked and managed locally with performance reported through the line back to the Plan owner.
The objective of the HSE-MS was to provide the assurance that risks associated with all NPDC Ogini
projects are continuously identified, assessed, controlled and reduced to a level As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP). This ensured that the asset's Design basis and Technical integrity are maintained.
The reason for the HSE-MS is because NPDC Ogini SIMOPS appreciates that there are hazards in its
SIMOPS and does not want these to impact on its people, assets, reputation and the environment within
which it operates.
Therefore, Ogini SIMOPS implemented the NPDC HSE-MS for the following reasons:

• To control risks

• To demonstrate that it is controlling risks ALARP

• To show synergy between HSE and other business objectives

• To learn from past lessons

6 SPE-189148-MS

Table 1—Summary of the NPDC Ogini SIMOPS HSE-MS

Description and Application of Equipment and Processes

An emergency response organisation (Figure 4) was put in place with arrangements that interface with those
of individual contractors and provides for coordinated efforts between the Rig and Production Operations;
logistics support from the supply base and for coordination between contractor management at the head
office in Benin. Company head office was also responsible for the interface with the Nigerian regulators
in the event of an emergency, in particular, with Fideral Ministry of Environment (FMEn) and Directorate
of Petroleum Resources (DPR.)

Figure 4—Emergency Response Organisation

SPE-189148-MS 7

The arrangements are fully documented in Company Incident Management Plan. An oil spill contingency
plan was also developed which interfaces with the general emergency response plans. The RIG management
was mandated to manage any emergencies that affect the rig or the wellhead location during the period
of SIMOPS and the rig Company Man was the on-scene commander. The Operations & Maintenance
Contractor was also on ground and liaised fully with the RIG Company Man in dealing with any emergency
situation and the recovery to normal operations. An organisation chart illustrating the emergency response
organisation is shown in (Figure 4).
For all anticipated emergencies that could occur on the Rig or within the 500-meter safety zone, the RIG
Company Man was the On-scene commander. For all anticipated emergencies that could occur on the Flow
Station, the Flow Station Supervisor acts as the On-scene commander and was to liaise fully with the RIG
Company Man as required to recover. Where required and practicable, in-field support was provided in the
first instance from the other assets. In the event of further support being required from other Oil companies
Company Man will refer to the NPDC Incident Management Plan and was to call the emergency duty phone
for support. But for all emergencies that cannot be managed on-site, the NPDC Incident Management Plan
was in place to be activated. NPDC had the primacy for all emergency response. Contractors and was to
send representatives to the NPDC emergency response centre to assist in the response. Only the NPDC
Emergency Response Management Team was responsible for escalating the emergency response and for
notification of NPDC partners, and contractor response teams. Emergency response arrangements were
equally in place for Helicopter Operations, Supply Vehicles, Standby Vehicles, Crane Operations, Heavy
Lift Procedure, Drilling and Production Shutdown, and Pressure Testing
The drilling operations were carried out during the Flow Station hook-up and commissioning in
accordance with NPDC requirements and the Rig Well Operations Policies and Procedures. The Well
Operations Policies and Procedures addressed requirements such as:

• Well control procedures, including a well control-bridging document.

• Other contingency procedures.

• Requirements for anti-collision analyses for adjacent wells.

• Well suspension procedures.

• Acceptable well barriers.

• Pressure testing BOPs, riser and wellhead.

• Use of radioactive sources.

• Use of explosive wireline cutting or perforating tools.

It will be the responsibility of the NPDC Rig Drilling Supervisor to assess the suitability of these
procedures as the situation dictates and to ensure that adequate materials are available to perform the work
programme in a safe manner. Any conflicting requirements shall be discussed at the pre-job meeting.
Noteworthy is that during well testing and clean-up only essential personnel were allowed access to
the Ogini Rig site and Flow Station. For personnel awareness of the SIMOPS, copies of the Simultaneous
Operations Matrix was posted in the control rooms on all Installations and other key workplace locations
such as; driller's shack on the rig floor, mud room, radio room, locker rooms etc. The Drilling, Maintenance/
Construction Supervisors and Production Supervisor were responsible for ensuring that all personnel are
made aware of the Simultaneous Operations Matrix and their corresponding responsibilities through formal
training, safety meetings and toolbox talks etc.
Also, during combined operations, the producing wells were on production while the Rig was
simultaneously conducting operations in accordance with the SIMOPS Matrix. The NPDC Representative
8 SPE-189148-MS

was onsite to provide 24-hour coverage during production and made routine inspection tours of the Flow
Station every day. The NPDC Drilling Supervisor, Company Man and rig contractor Representative had the
authority to request a routine production shutdown at any time when they judged that conditions are, or had
the potential to be, unsafe; albeit, this did happen at one instance. Production resumed after their combined
approval. Emergency shutdown related to well head location, which would have necessitated production
ceasing automatically did not come up. Even if it did, only the NPDC Asset Manager has the authority to
allow production to be reinstated. Flow Station production Facility Shutdown Systems during the combined
operations, production shutdown will be possible from the Flow Station and the rig
In order to effect the Rig skidding, Drilling and Completion Sequence in Ogini SIMOPS Case, the Rig
was positioned to rig-up at Ogini-X and skid to Ogini-V and W to drill and complete while the existing
well 2/21 was shut-in and separated from the drilling and completions operations with Tick metallic Cover
(Figure-5). Subsequently, after completion of Ogini-V and well unloaded to Ogini flowstation for post
completion tests, thereafter well was shut-in both at Surface and Subsurface.

Figure 5—Rig skidding, Drilling and Completion Sequence in Ogini SIMOPS

The rig was skidded back to Ogini-W for drilling and completion, while Ogini-V (Ogini-22) was shut-
in and separated from the drilling and completions operations with Thick-metallic-Cover while Ogini 2/21
was back to production. The same operational process applied to Ogini-X, Y and Z.
The critical HSE point is that the rig was at its maximum skid point at Ogini-V and Z. We finally rigged-
down at Ogini-X after drilling and completing Ogini-V, W, X, Y and Z on the same terms and conditions.
In order to meet Operational Requirements, the Ogini SIMOPS was operated in accordance with
NPDC's Safety Policy integrated in the company's HSE Policy. The HSE policy required compliance with
all applicable laws and regulations. Safety policy requires that facilities are designed and modified in
accordance with standard codes, operated and maintained with systematic identification and management
of health, safety and environmental risks. NPDC's HSE policies provide a structured approach to meeting
this commitment.
SPE-189148-MS 9

The Regulatory Considerations made were:-

• Section 44 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 (that mandates licensee or
lessee to implement any written directive from DPR)
• Regulation 2 of the MOSR 1997(that prescribed some method of achieving safety provisions in
facilities development/modification projects)
• Regulation 17-21 of the MOSR 1997 (that specifically prescribed some the offshore operational
procedures)
• Regulations 44, 45, and 58 of the MOSR 1997 (that prescribed some strategies for achieving good
operation)
• Regulations 17: Discussed in details the duties of offshore Installation Manager that includes the
use of PPEs and strategies for controlling any pollution
• Regulation 18: Stated Requirement of Offshore Training.

• Regulation 19: Air Travel Safety

• Regulation 20: Offshore Management System Manual

• Regulation 21: Waste Management

• Regulation 44: Discusses in detail the procedure for reporting accident

• Regulation 58: Prescribed other safety measures

The seven (7) critical Safety elements installed/considered during the safety Assessments were:
a. Detection Systems
b. Ignition control Systems
c. Shut Down Systems
d. Emergency Response Systems
e. Protection Systems
f. Process Containment Systems
g. Structural Integrity Systems
These were assessed against their performance standards to ensure their efficiency.
A comprehensive Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD) and Emergency Response Plan for company's
operations, including Ogini SIMOPS. These included the NPDC Emergency Procedure Guide and the
Emergency Response Management Plan. These plans were regularly tested at the SIMOPS along with other
external parties such as Medical, external emergency services such as the Delta State Fire Service and
Federal Fire Service, to ensure efficient and effective response and to reduce the consequence should a
potential major incident occur.
All required Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) adequate for safe working operations at the SIMOPS
were made available to site workers as per the list below. SIMOPS HSE Manager was responsible for
ensuring that all staff wore PPE during working hours, and was properly trained in its correct use.
10 SPE-189148-MS

Figure 6—Typical Safety Signs

Figure 7—NPDC OGINI SIMOPS – FIRE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE

Presentation of Data and Results

The purpose of developing the Hazard And Effect Management Process was for NPDC Ogini SIMOPS
team to have a system of identifying hazards as defined by the objective of the safety case, assess them
via quantitative and qualitative risk analysis in order to control and/or mitigate the causes, and also to put
in place recovery preparedness (contingency) measures, if loss of control were to ever occur. This process
also determines the operating risk from these hazards and identifies any actions/improvements required to
reduce this risk to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The process involved crude receiving manifolds, crude stabilization, crude export and gas compression
facilities through a network of pipelines, separators, automated and manually controlled valves and pumps.
Process safety was assured through our constant monitoring of pipes, manifolds, separators, flanges and
pumps for leaks and damages.

Definitions of Some Terms

An accident is general term for an unplanned event with undesirable consequences.
SPE-189148-MS 11

A hazardous property (or hazardous condition) is a physical or chemical property of a substance or

situation that has the potential to cause harm. For example, a substance may be flammable or it may be
contained under a high pressure.
A hazard is the combination of a hazardous property with an outcome that can cause damage or harm
to people, property, or the environment. For example, a material, which is flammable may ignite and result
in a fire. Or a material at high pressure may release the pressure quickly, resulting in an explosion. Thus,
it is common to speak of ‘fire hazards’ or ‘explosion hazards’ or to discuss the hazard of fire or the hazard
of explosion.
A hazard event (or initiating event or just event) is an occurrence involving equipment failure, human
action or external cause that results in a hazard. For example, the ignition of a flammable material can cause
a fire, while the rupture of a pressure vessel can result in an explosion.
The hazard probability is the chance that the hazard will occur. The hazard probability may be thought
of as the combination of a hazardous property with the probability of one or more initiating events. For
example, the probability of a fire may depend on the probability that oil spill could occur coupled with the
probability that an ignition source is available. Hazard probability may be expressed in purely numerical
terms, such as the number of expected events per year or by using the qualitative or quantitative scales.
The severity of a hazard is a measure of the possible consequences of that hazard in terms of property
damage or the amount of injury. For example, the severity of a fire hazard may be ranked by the Naira value
of the property, which may be destroyed. Other qualitative or quantitative scales of severity may also be
used. A given hazard often has many possible consequences, so the severity of a hazard often depends on
the hazard scenario. For example, for a given type of crude oil, fire hazard severity may be greater if the
amount of oil is greater or if the equipment configuration allows it to burn more rapidly, or, the severity of
an electrical shock hazard is usually greater if the voltage is greater.
Risk is the combination of a hazard, hazard probability, and a consequence. In other words risk is the
possibility of loss, damage or any other undesirable event. For example, the risk of a vehicle fire is a
combination of;
a. The hazard of the vehicle burning, the hazard probability
b. The chance of this event occurring
c. The severity of the damage, the amount of damage to the vehicle and/or the extent of injury to the
occupants.
Risk assessment, in the context of this paper, is simply a careful examination of what in work/operation
could cause harm to people, destroy assets and environment, so a facility operator can weigh up if adequate
precautions have been taken or perhaps more should be done to prevent harm.
Below is a compilation of hazards identified in the analysis of critical sub-processes/activities and
associated risks applicable to the NPDC Ogini SIMOPS HSE Case. This was achieved with the aid of
Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) methodology whereby each hazard is subjected to
five stages of analysis involving:
▪ Identify Hazard: (What is the root cause; what could go wrong)
▪ Assess Hazard: (How serious will it be; what is the probability of its occurrence, how may it be
prevented or eliminated)
▪ Control Hazard: (Prevent, eliminate or reduce probability of occurrence)
▪ Recover: (Methods of limiting the consequences and how to recover e.g. mitigate consequences,
provide emergency response, re-instate and/or provide contingencies)
▪ Review: (Review risk assessment and update)
12 SPE-189148-MS

Table 3—Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM)

The four colours in the application of the RAM mean the following:
SPE-189148-MS 13

The hazards were risk-assessed according to the following impact categories in table 3b

Table 3B—Risk Assessed Hazards

Table 4—Summary of major accident hazards history and high-risk incidents

14 SPE-189148-MS

Regulations, Activities and Management of Hazards for OGINI SIMOPS are:

1. HSE –MS
2. Work Permit System (PTW)
3. HSE Case
4. Hazard and Effects Management Process
5. Medical Emergency Response
6. Integrated Operations Guide (IOG)
7. Mineral Oils Safety Regulations (MOSR), 1997.
8. Safety training: firefighting Requirements for statutory inspections
9. DPR EGASPIN, 2002. VIII-B Requirements for contingency planning for the prevention, control
and combating oil and hazardous Substances spills.
10.Emergency Response Plan
11.Petroleum (Drilling & Production Regulation) 1969.
12.National Oil Spill and Response Agency 2010(NOSRA)
13.Factory Acts: Requirements for Statutory inspections.
Hazard Management Table. This HSE Case only contains the Hazard and Effect Management table for
the identified hazards that are termed Major Accident Hazards applicable to Ogini field operations. Low
and Medium Hazards are managed through the HSE MS system

Summary Of Studies and Results

Bowtie for Major Accident Hazards (MAHs)
The major accidents hazards identified during workshops and Hazop studies of OGINI SIMOPS are
summarized in table 4 above; bow-tie method was used to show the visualization of the relationships
between the causes of operational upsets, the escalation of such events, the controls preventing the event
from occurring and the preparedness measures in place to limit the business impact of the hazards when it
occur. Detailed of the Bow-tie for all the MAHs are in Figures 8 to Figure 13.
Table 5—Hazard Summary Tables
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Table 5 (Continued)—Hazard Summary Tables

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Table 5 (Continued)—Hazard Summary Tables
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Table 5 (Continued)—Hazard Summary Tables

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Table 5 (Continued)—Hazard Summary Tables
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Table 5 (Continued)—Hazard Summary Tables

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Table 5 (Continued)—Hazard Summary Tables
SPE-189148-MS
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22 SPE-189148-MS

Figure 8—Bowtie for Flowline Construction

Figure 9—Bowtie for Land transport

SPE-189148-MS 23

Figure 10—Bowtie for Interface

Figure 11—Bowtie for Well Delivery and Production

24 SPE-189148-MS

Figure 12—Bowtie for Drilling Operations

Figure 13—Bowtie for Organized Crime Attack

The Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) (Flowstation Vs Rig Activities) prepared for OGINI
SIMOPS Operations is as shown below in Table 6:
SPE-189148-MS 25

Table 6—MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATING PROCEDURES for OGINI SIMOPS (Flowstation Vs Rig Activities)
26 SPE-189148-MS

Table 7—DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP

On the Safety Critical Equipment (SCEs), it is noteworthy to mention herein that all the facilities in ogini
flowstation were designed and built by Shell Exploration and Production Companies in Nigeria (SEPCiN)
but now handed over to NPDC. Each facility has 72 defined Safety Critical Element categories, which fit
into 8 general barrier groups based on similar function shown in Figure 16.

Figure 14—Safety Critical Equipment (SCEs)

SPE-189148-MS 27

Performance Deviation Control is important in the management of Major Accident Hazards. This
procedure is very essential and was followed.

Table 8—Performance Deviation Control

References
Ataya, Z. M. 2008. New Technique for Addressing SIMOPS Challenges During Installation of New Offshore Platform.
Society of Petroleum Engineers. http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.2118/120796-MS
Ogoke, V., Schauerte, L., Bouchard, G., & Inglehart, S. c. 2014. Simultaneous Operations in Multi-Well Pad: a Cost
Effective way of Drilling Multi Wells Pad and Deliver 8 Fracs a Day. Society of Petroleum Engineers. http://dx.doi.org/
doi:10.2118/170744-MS
Salman, M. W. 2012. Simultaneous Drilling & Productions Operations (SIMOPS). Society of Petroleum Engineers. http://
dx.doi.org/doi:10.2118/155026-MS