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4 MND OPORD 07
OPERATION IRON
GUARDIAN

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Table of Contents ii
4 MND OPERATION ORDER 07 6
Annex A Conduct of Operations 23
Annex B Task Organization 33
Annex D Intelligence 34
Appendix 1 Intelligence Estimate 43
Tab A Terrain 51
Tab B Weather 57
Appendix 2 Information Collection 59
Tab A Information Collection Plan 63
Appendix 4 Counterintelligence 69
Appendix 5 Signals Intelligence 72
Appendix 6 Human Intelligence 76
Appendix 7 Geospatial Intelligence 79
Appendix 9 Open Source Intelligence 83
Annex E Rules of Engagement 84
Appendix 1 Numbered ROE 89
Annex G Land Operations 93
Appendix 2 Military Deception 94
Annex H Air and Airspace Control 98
Annex J Force Protection 104
Appendix 1 Anti-terrorism 113
Appendix 2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 117

Tab A EOD 9-liner 127

Appendix 3 Air and Missile Defence 128

Annex K Health Services Support 133
Annex L Psychological Operations 137

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Annex O Information Operations 147

Appendix 1 Information Operations Synchronization Matrix 160
Annex P Electronic Warfare 163
Annex Q Communication and Information Systems 170
Annex R Logistics 172
Appendix 1 Sustainment Overlay 179
Appendix 2 Support Dependency Matrix 183
Annex S Movements 185
Appendix 1 Mov Overlay 194
Annex U CBRN Defence 199
Appendix 1 - Arianian CBRN Defence Organization 208
Appendix 2 - CFLCC CBRN THREATCON 210
Appendix 3 - 4 MND CBRN Warning and Report Network 211
Diagram
Appendix 4 - Reconnaissance and Surveillance Tasks 212
Appendix 5 - Planned Decontamination Sites 213
Annex W Civil Military Cooperation 214
Appendix 1 - Humanitarian Organizations Operating in AP 220
Appendix 2 - IDP and Refugee Camps in AP 222
Tab A - HAJAR Camp Corridor 226
Tab B - SABIRA Camp Corridor 227
Tab C - KHALISA Camp Corridor 228
Annex X Public Affairs 229
Appendix 1 – Best Practices in Media Interview s 240
Appendix 2 - Social Media Policy 241
Annex EE Engineer Support 245
Appendix 1 - Enemy (Arianian) Engrs 257
Appendix 2 - 4 MND Engr Capabilities 260
Appendix 3 - 130 MEB Organization 265
Appendix 4 - Mines and Explosives 266
Appendix 6 - Road and Bridge Overlay 267
Appendix 7 – Kura River Crossing Area 274
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Tab A KURA River Crossing Overlay 277

Annex KK Joint Fires and Targeting 280
Appendix 1 - Joint Targeting 285
Tab B - Time Sensitive Targets 287
Tab C - Target Checklist 288
Tab D - Attack Guidance Matrix 295
Appendix 2 - Fire Support Coordination Measures 296
Annex HH Personnel Support 297
Annex II Joint ISR 299
Appendix 1 - ISTAR Synchronisation Matrix 304
Annex MM Detainee Operations 305
Annex PP Military Police 307
Annex TT Host Nation Support 312
Annex UU Reports 315
Appendix 1 Air Defence Report ADREP 317
Appendix 2 Air Request AIRREQ 318
Appendix 3 Air Task AIRTASK 324
Appendix 4 Barrier Report BARREP 327
Appendix 5 Casualty Evacuation Request CASEVACREQ 329
Appendix 6 Civil-Military Cooperation Report CIMICREP 332
Appendix 7 Commander’s Assessment ASSESSREP 333
Appendix 8 Control/Co-ordination Line Report CCLREP 334
Appendix 9 Downed Aircraft Report DOWNAIRREP 337
Appendix 10 Engineer Data Report ENGRDATAREP 338
Appendix 11 Engineer Report ENGRREP 352
Appendix 12 Gun And Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) State
GUNAFVS 355
Appendix 13 Helicopter Acknowledgement HELACK 356
Appendix 14 Helicopter Request Form HELQUEST 357
Appendix 15 Helicopter Tasking Form HELTASK 359
Appendix 16 Host Nation Support Request HNSREQ 361
Appendix 17 Intelligence Report INTREP 362
Appendix 18 Intelligence Summary INTSUM 363
Appendix 19 Location Status LOCSTAT 367
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Appendix 20 Logistics Status Report LOGREP 368

Appendix 21 Medical Evacuation Request / Dustoff MEDEVAC 369
Appendix 22 Medical Evacuation Request - MIST Appendix 23 372
Meteorological Report METREP 373
Appendix 24 NBC Chemical Downwind Report NBCCDR 374
Appendix 25 Obstacle Report OBSREP 375
Appendix 26 Personnel Report PERSREP 377
Appendix 27 Rules of Engagement Request ROEREQ 378
Appendix 28 Restricted Operating Zone Request ROZREQ 379
Appendix 29 Scatterable Minefield Request SCATMINREQ 380
Appendix 30 Situation Report SITREP 382
Appendix 31 Transport Request TRANSREQ 383
Appendix 32 Public Affairs Situation Report PA SITREP 384
Appendix 33 Notice of Casualty Report NOTICAS 385
Appendix 34 Medical Situation Report MEDSITREP 386

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Copy No ___ of 48 copies

Main HQ 4 Multinational Division (MND)

SHEKI 38T PL 801 596
0800 (D-12)
OPS 52

4 MND OPERATION ORDER 07 – OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN

References:
A. CFLCC OPORD 07 (Operation IRON GUARDIAN dated XXXXXX(D-21)
B. Joint Navigation Charts (JNC), Scale 1:2,000,000. Sheets: JNCXX022, JNCXX023.
C. Operational Navigation Charts (ONC), 1:1,000,000. Sheets: F03, F04, F05, G03, G04,
G05.(l).
D. Tactical Pilot Chart (TPC), Scale 1:500,000. Sheets: F03A, F03B, F03C, F03D, F04A,
F04B, F04C, F04D, F05A, F05D, G04A, G04B, G04C, G04D, G05A, G05B, G05C, G05D.
E. Map, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Series 1501A Joint Operations
Graphic-Air (JOG-A), 1:250,000 Scale. Sheets: NJ3801, NJ3802, NJ3803, NJ3804, NJ3805,
NJ3806, NJ3807, NJ3808, NJ3809, NJ3810, NJ3811, NJ3812, NJ3901, NJ3905, NJ3909,
NJ3910, NK3703, NK3706, NK3712, NK3716, NK3801, NK3802, NK3803, NK3804,
NK3805, NK3806, NK3807, NK3808, NK3809, NK3810, NK3811, NK3812, NK3904,
NK3907, NK3910, NK3911, NL3711, NL3712, NL3810, NL3811, NL3812.
F. Nautical Charts, Series 55ACO; Sheet 55001, BLACK SEA (INT 310); Sheet 55040,
Marmara, Denizi.
G. Cartography, Geodesy, and Navigation datum used throughout this OPORD is World
Geodetic System-84 (WGS84), (revised in 2004).
H. 4 MND (Ops 50) WNG O 02 OP IRON GUARDIAN issued XXXXXXX (D-16)
I. CFACC Air Operations Directive 003 issued XXXXXXX(D-21)
J. 4MND FSOP, dated XXXXXXXXX

Time Zone: ZULU

1. SITUATION.
a. Area of Interest. See Annex D (Intelligence).
b. Area of Operations. See Annex D (Intelligence).
c. Enemy Forces. See Annex D (Intelligence).
d. Friendly Forces.
(1) Higher Headquarters Mission and Intent.
(a) CJTF-OIG.
i. CJTF-OIG Mission. When directed, CJTF-OIG
conducts joint military operations to stop Arianian
aggression and expel invading Arianian forces in order
to restore the sovereignty of ATROPIA (AP), and
restore stability in the CAUCASUS.
ii. CJTF-OIG Intent. COM CJTF-OIG has established
favorable conditions to commence his Phase II decisive

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operations. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)

have been successful in meeting the economic and arms
embargo objectives set by the UN. Meanwhile,
Coalition air forces have succeeded in establishing air
parity and can now surge to achieve local air
superiority. CJTF-OIG is now ready to commit the
CFLCC.
(b) CFLCC Mission and Intent.
i. CFLCC Mission. Commander CFLCC has set his
mission to conduct decisive counter-moves and
offensive operations to clear all Arianian forces from
Atropian sovereign territory.
ii. CFLCC Intent and Concept. COM CFLCC intends to
defeat and clear all invading forces through a
combination of manoeuvre, fires and deception. After
completing moves into TAAs supported by joint fires
and local air superiority, 1ID will conduct initial
counter-moves, passing through 82 Abn Div to defeat
AR 23 Mech DTG(+) (area 38S QK 0725) and seize
key terrain to block the withdrawal of 25 Mech DTG
(centred on area 39S UE 0518). 3 CR(-) will conduct a
hasty crossing of River KURA and assist in preventing
the withdrawal of 25 Mech DTG and guard 4 MND
RIGHT flank. 4 MND will be CFLCC main effort in a
LEFT flanking manoeuvre that will destroy OSC 2's
depth formation 24 Mot DTG (centred on 39S UD
1857). Once 4 MND has secured its objectives, 3 CR
complete will advance SOUTH to clear the coastal
highway to the IB. The remainder of the LCC will then
clear to the border and establish a defence. Finally, the
LCC will transition to stability operations and prepare
to conduct a relief-in-place with either the Atropian
Southern Command (ASC) or a follow-on force.
(2) Adjacent Unit and Formations.
(a) The ASC remains in defensive positions NORTH of the River
KURA on the LCC's CENTRE and LEFT flank. Atropian
Supreme High Command (SHC) retains additional brigades
(Bdes) securing their capital and northern border with
DONOVIA. 4 MND will be required to conduct a forward
passage of lines through the AP 350 Mot Bde in its crossing of
the River KURA.
(b) 1ID will move to occupy TAA GOLD, prior to conducting a
series of counter-moves to defeat a sizeable portion of the OSC
2 lead formations. It will be the Main Effort for CFLCC Phase
II operations, and help backstop enemy reinforcement of 24
Mot DTG from the NORTH.

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(c) 82 Abn Div remains in a strong defensive posture astride the

main enemy axis AGHJABADI-BARDA-KIRDVABAD at
approximately 90 percent strength. It will provide a battalion
task force as the CJTF-OIG operational reserve throughout all
phases of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
e. Planning Considerations.
(1) ISR indicates there are no intact bridges on the River KURA. An
assault river crossing will be necessary.
(2) 82 Abn Div will secure both the near and far banks at Objs OPAL and
GARNET with one infantry (Inf) battalion (Bn) at each location.
(3) 4 MND will need to provide the In-place Force at Objectives (Obj)
OPAL and GARNET.
(4) 4 MND will be required to cross the above ground Atropian Natural
Gas Pipeline SOUTHWEST of BAKU. It cannot be damaged.
(5) Tasks common to all phases as issued by COM CFLCC included:
(a) Be prepared to conduct rear area security (RAS) tasks during
all phases;
(b) Be prepared to exchange liaison teams with Atropian forces;
and
(c) Be prepared to conduct or support a forward passage of lines.
2. MISSION.
a. 4 MND will advance to destroy 24 Mot DTG in order to help defeat OSC 2
and set conditions to clear all remaining Arianian forces from the sovereign
territory of AP within boundaries.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Commander’s Intent. The enemy is so-called "near peer" and in essence his
ground forces number almost the equivalent of ours, in other words a corps
against a corps. Therefore, the success of Op IRON GUARDIAN is heavily
dependent upon the synchronized efforts of the CFLCC major formations and
CFACC air support defeating enemy forces in turn, and always causing him to
misread our main effort. Thus, despite a desire to expel the Arianian forces
quickly, the Div will need to move with precision and under control; this is
forced on us because of forces already in place (i.e. ASC), a limited number of
routes and the major obstacle of the River KURA. 4 MND will conduct this
operation in four phases: Phase I - Advance; Phase II - Cross River KURA;
Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG; and Phase IV - Stabilize.
b. Concept of Operations. See Annex A for further detail. The four phases of
the operation are as follows:
(1) Preliminary Moves (D-D+3). After conducting a long preliminary
move from the FAA into TAAs SILVER and BRONZE, the Div will
conduct final preparations for battle. Div Reserve for all phases will
be 4 (CA) CMBG Light (Lt) Inf Bn (3RCR), which must be prepared

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to conduct battalion-level airmobile operations. The Div reserve will

eventually be based out of GUZDEK (39T UE 8767)
(2) Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5). 2 Sqn 3 CR with 7 (GE) Recce Bn
OPCON will secure route SEATTLE and MIAMI SOUTH toward
SALYAN up to Phase Line (PL) COUGAR. Following immediately
behind, 130 Manoeuvre Enhancement Bde (MEB) will establish a
system to allow the Div to conduct tactical movement between TAA
SILVER and Phase Line (PL) COUGAR under electronic silence; this
will include Bde Assembly Areas (AA), Battle Group (BG)-sized
Waiting Areas (WA) and traffic control (TC). 130 MEB will be the
Div's Regulating (Reg) HQ. Bdes will be prepared to move forward
under Div control. Main Effort for this phase is 2 Sqn, 3 CR.
(3) Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8). Div Tac HQ will
command this phase of operations due to the complexity and forces
involved. 3 Bde (-), 82 Abn Div will secure initial bridgeheads at Objs
OPAL and GARNET by air assault. On order, 2 Sqn 3 CR (with 7
(GE) Recce Bn) will advance to link up with 3 Bde (-) 82 Abn Div and
become the In-place Force for the crossing. Concurrently, 3 Bde (-) 82
Abn Div will push forward to the Intermediate Bridgehead Line to
allow bridging operations to commence. Also at the same time Div
Engrs and Arty will be moved forward to support the crossing. Once
bridges are established, 6 (F-G) Bde will cross and expand the
bridgehead to the Final Bridgehead Line (PL LION). Formations
(Fmns) will continue to move forward under Div control, along routes
SEATTLE and MIAMI. The Break-out Force, X (AS) Bde and 12
(UK) AIB will cross into the bridgehead on order. Main Effort for this
phase is 6 (F-G) Bde.
(4) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13). X (AS) Bde followed
by 12 (UK) AIB push through the bridgehead and establish attack
positions along PL LEOPARD (X (AS) Bde RIGHT and 12 (UK) AIB
LEFT). 2 Sqn 3 CR will then cross and provide LEFT flank security,
while 7 (GE) Recce Bn manoeuvres NORTHWEST to screen against
elements of enemy 349 Tk BTG NORTH of BILASUVAR. 6 (F-G)
Bde will remain in depth. Enemy 24 Mot DTG will be destroyed by
manoeuvre and fires. As situation permits 4 (CA) CMBG (-) will
move forward to defend the bridgehead and clear any remaining enemy
from SALYAN to allow Line of Communication (LOC) bridging to be
emplaced at the main E 119 highway crossing. Main Effort for this
phase is X (AS) Bde.
(5) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27)). On order, and once the fighting
elements of 24 Mot DTG are destroyed (Obj PEARL secure), 2 Sqn 3
CR will detach to parent fmn. 7 (GE) Recce Bn will advance WEST
and NORTH to screen the International Border (IB) within boundaries.
6 (F-G) Bde will conduct any necessary clearance operations within
the Div rear. X (AS) Bde will position RIGHT forward, while 12
(UK) AIB will do the same LEFT forward within boundaries. 4 (CA)
CMBG (-) will be in depth. The Div will orient WEST in hasty

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defence and commence planning for transition to stability operations.

Main Effort in this phase will be 12 (UK) AIB.
c. Desired End State. My desired end state will be realized once the following
conditions have been met:
(1) 4 MND is set in a strong defence along the IB within boundaries;
(2) Final clearance of enemy forces has been completed;
(3) Bdes have been reconstituted; and
(4) Atropian territorial integrity has been re-established in the Div sector.
d. Grouping and Tasks.
(1) Grouping. See Task Organization at Annex A.
(2) Tasks
(a) 130 MEB
i. Phase I
aa. Be the Regulating HQ for the Div advance to
Obj PEARL using routes SEATTLE and MIAMI for
Phases I-III inclusive.
ab. Establish bde-sized AAs and BG-sized Waiting
Areas (WA) from TAA SILVER to PL COUGAR along
routes SEATTLE and MIAMI.
ac. Establish Div refuelling point in AA A2 in the
proximity of ALAT.
ii. Phases II-III
aa. Under Div direction, control the movement of 4
MND (less 2 Sqn 3CR and 7 (GE) Recce Bn) from
TAA SILVER to River KURA under electronic silence.
ab. Assume control of 2 Sqn Sector HQ after 6 (F-
G) Bde has crossed River KURA.
iii. Phase IV
aa. Coordinate with CFLCC Engineers on
establishment of LOC bridging area SALYAN.
ab. Handover TC responsibilities for ROUTE
SEATTLE and MIAMI rearward of River KURA to 17
Sust Bde.
ac. BPT identify and secure Arianian and any
unsecured Atropian CBRN weapons in AP.
(b) 2 Sqn 3 CR
i. Phase I
aa. Div Main Effort in Phase I.

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ab. On order, with 7 (GE) Recce Bn OPCON, clear

routes SEATTLE and MIAMI and secure AAs and
WAs along both routes as identified by 130 MEB.
ac. Secure PL COUGAR.
ii. Phase II
aa. On order, clear remainder of route MIAMI and
link-up with elements 3 Bde (-), 82 Abn Div at Objs
OPAL and GARNET.
ab. Be the In-place Force for assault river crossing.
ac. Support 130 MEB as sector TC HQ area
SALYAN.
ad. Handover sector duties to 130 MEB prior to
moving into bridgehead.
ae. Cross to WEST bank behind 6 (F-G) Bde to
provide LEFT flank security,
iii. Phase III
aa. Provide LEFT flank security to the Div.
ab. Secure Line of Departure (LD) for 3 CR
advance to SOUTH.
ac. On order and after Obj PEARL is secure, detach
to 3 CR.
(c) 7 (GE) Recce Bn
i. Phases I and II. OPCON to 2 Sqn 3 CR.
ii. Phase III. Provide RIGHT flank security to the Div by
screening elements 349 Tk BTG.
iii. Phase IV
aa. On order, advance WEST to screen the IB
within Div sector.
(d) 6 (F-G) Bde
i. Phase I
aa. Be prepared to (BPT) advance as lead bde from
TAA BRONZE.
ii. Phase II
aa. Div Main Effort
ab. As lead bde, advance along routes SEATTLE
and MIAMI under control 130 MEB. Hold at PL
COUGAR unless otherwise ordered.

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ac. Cross River KURA and secure Final Bridgehead

Line.
iii. Phase III
aa. Follow and support X (AS) Bde axis of advance.
ab. BPT attack and destroy enemy units
withdrawing SOUTH.
iv. Phase IV
aa. On order, clear remaining enemy pockets within
the Div sector as identified.
ab. Occupy positions in depth behind 12 (UK) AIB.
ac. Provide LEFT flank security to the Div.
(e) X (AS) Bde
i. Phase I
aa. Remain in TAA SILVER and complete
preparations for battle.
ii. Phase II
aa. On order, advance along routes SEATTLE and
MIAMI behind 6 (F-G) Bde to PL COUGAR as
controlled by 130 MEB.
iii. Phase III
aa. On order, cross River KARU and establish
attack position as RIGHT forward bde along PL
LEOPARD (LD) as part of the Break-out Force. Div
Main Effort for remainder of Phase III.
ab. On order, destroy enemy bde (assessed as 241
Mot BTG) centred on 39S TD 9237.
ac. Be prepared to destroy enemy arty bde (assessed
as 245 Arty BTG) centred on 39S UD 0030.
iv. Phase IV
aa. On order, orient NORTHWEST and advance to
PL LEOPARD.
ab. Conduct a hasty defence along IB within
boundaries.
ac. Clear enemy pockets within bde boundaries.
ad. Commence planning to conduct stability
operations within bde sector.

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(f) 12 (UK) AIB

i. Phase I
aa. Remain in TAA SILVER and complete
preparations for battle.
ii. Phase II
aa. On order, advance along routes SEATTLE and
MIAMI behind X (AS) Bde to PL COUGAR as
controlled by 130 MEB.
iii. Phase III
aa. On order, cross River KARU and establish
attack position as LEFT forward bde along PL
LEOPARD (LD) as part of the Break-out Force.
ab. On order, destroy enemy Mot bde (assessed as
242 Mot BTG) centred on 39S UD 2063
ac. Degrade and block advance of 244 Tk BTG to
set conditions for its destruction by 12 (UK) AIB.
ad. Be prepared to destroy enemy arty (assessed as
245 Mot Arty Bde) centred on 39S UD 0030.
iv. Phase IV
aa. On order, orient NORTHWEST and advance to
PL LEOPARD within boundaries.
ab. Conduct a hasty defence along IB within
boundaries.
ac. Clear enemy pockets within bde boundaries.
ad. Commence planning to conduct stability
operations within bde sector.
(g) 4 (CA) CMBG(-)
i. Phases I and II
aa. As agreed, provide one Inf Bn as the CFLCC
reserve in TAA BRONZE for CFLCC Phases I and II.
ab. Remain in TAA SILVER to complete
preparations for battle.
ac. On order, advance to PL COUGAR as
controlled by 130 MEB.
ii. Phase III
aa. Once 4 (CA) CMBG has crossed River KURA,
and on order, clear the town of SALYAN.
ab. Conduct relief in place of crossing sites from 82
Abn Div.

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ac. On order, conduct relief in place with 6 (F-G)

Bde along PL LION
iii. Phase IV
aa. On order, establish hasty defensive positions in
depth behind X (AS) Bde.
ab. As agreed, provide CFLCC reserve of one mech
bn to be established in vicinity of SAATLI.
(h) 3 Bde (-), 82 Abn Div
i. Phase I Commence staging for air assault from
NAFTALAN airfield (38T PK 5587)
ii. Phase II On order by air assault seize Objs OPAL and
GARNET in order to secure the Initial Bridgehead Line
iii. Phase III On order handover crossings to 4 (CA)
CMBG.
iv. Phase IV On order, redeploy to NAFTALAN airfield
using 4 CAB resources.
(i) 4 Combat Aviation Bde (CAB). For all phases, retain one
attack helicopter company for Div Comd employment/tasking,
including support to the Div reserve. In addition:
i. During preliminary moves, deploy to initial staging base
at GUZDEK airfield (39T UE 8767)
ii. Move Div Reserve from staging base SHEKI airfield
38T PL 8156 to GUZDEK staging base.
iii. Phase I
aa. BPT support CFLCC reserve with attack
aviation and resupply
ab. BPT conduct joint fires in support of CFLCC
Phase I intent.
ac. Conduct aerial route recce of route SEATTLE
and part of route MAPLE in support of 130 MEB
ad. Establish attack-by-fire (ABF) positions to
support 2 Sqn route clearance.
ae. Establish FARP in vicinity of
PIRSAAT/PIRSAGAT airfield (39T UE 5813) in
support of aviation operations for Phases II-IV.
iv. Phase II
aa. Support 82 Abn Div air assault onto Objs OPAL
and GARNET with, attack and GS helicopters beyond
the capabilities of 77Avn Bde.

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ab. Establish ABF posns from EAST bank at Objs

OPAL and GARNET.
v. Phase III
aa. Screen along SOUTH flank of the Div.
ab. Attack by fire (in priority):
− Tk units of 241 and 242 BTGs.
− 24 AT Bn.
− 245 Arty BTG.
ac. BPT provide emergency resupply to Break-out
Force Bdes.
ad. Conduct support by fire missions in priority to :
− X (AS) Bde
− 12(UK) AIB
vi. Phase IV
aa. Support the Div screen by 7 (GE) Recce Bn.
ab. Provide LEFT flank security to Div within
sector.
ac. Conduct troop movement of 82 Abn Div
elements back to NAFTALAN airfield.
(j) Div Reserve
i. Phase I.
aa. Conduct airmobile movement GUZDEK and
establish staging base.
ab. Conduct ground security tasks and patrols in
support of 4 CAB when not otherwise tasked.
ii. Phase II. BPT support/reinforce 3 Bde(-), 82 Abn Div
at 60 min NTM at either Obj OPAL or GARNET.
iii. Phase III. BPT reinforce in priority:
aa. X (AS) Bde
ab. 12(UK) AIB

(k) 4 MN Arty Bde

i. Phase I
aa. Support LCC Phase I fire support tasks as
assigned by HQ CFLCC.
ii. Phase II

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aa. On order move under 130 MEB control

(immediately behind 130 MEB) to establish initial
position areas (PA) EAST of River KURA to support
crossing operations.
ab. Support expansion of Bridgehead by 6 (F-G)
Bde and move of Break-out Force.
iii. Phase III
aa. Support attacks by 12 (UK) AIB and X (AS)
Bde (main effort).
iv. Phase IV
aa. BPT support 6 (F-G) Bde in clearance
operations within Div sector.
ab. Establish fire support coordination measures for
Rear Area Security (RAS) operations by 6 (F-G) Bde.
ac. BPT to support target engagements up to FSCL
TUNGSTEN.
(l) 2-43 ADA Bn. Details found at Appendix 12 to Annex E.
i. Phase I
aa. Provide area defence of TAA SILVER and
BRONZE.
ii. Phase II
aa. As coordinated with 130 MEB, provide AD
coverage of routes SEATTLE and MIAMI.
ab. Provide point protection of crossing sites and
area protection out to Final Bridgehead Line (PL
LION).
iii. Phase III
aa. Provide area coverage of bridgehead.
ab. Provide area coverage in priority to:
− X (AS) Bde.
− 12 (UK) AIB.
iv. Phase IV
aa. Provide area protection to forward bdes and
CFLCC reserve.
ab. Provide point protection to River KURA
crossing sites until relieved by LCC/theatre units.
(m) 17 (MN) Sust Bde.
i. Phase I:

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aa. BPT conduct artillery ammo deception dumping

program.
ab. As coordinated with 130 MEB establish vehicle
recovery along MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI
and refuelling point in AA A2, proximity ALAT
GR 39S UE 634 245, to ensure Bdes cross River
KURA fueled to the degree possible.
ac. Establish Division Support Area (DSA), Supply
Points (SPs), Maintenance Collection Point
(MCP), Div/PW Holding Area TAA Silver GR
38T QK 251 929 from D+5.
ad. 553rd CSSB direct and general support to 4
MND Div troops throughout all Phases.
ii. Phase II: BPT conduct emergency resupply to support
expansion of Bridgehead.
iii. Phase III:
aa. BPT relocate DSA, establish SPs, MCP and Div
PW/Detainee Holding Area at ALAT GR 39S
UE 634 245 from D+8.
ab. BPT conduct emergency resupply of
ammunition forward of River KURA.
iv. Phase IV:
aa. Assume TC responsibilities from 130 MEB
from River KURA along MSR SEATTLE to the
rear.
ab. BPT relocate DSA, establish SPs, MCP and Div
PW/Detainee Holding Area in area of SALYAN
GR 39S UD 235 814 from D+11.
ac. BPT conduct ammunition/defensive stores
dumping program to support defence along the
IB.
ad. Support Bde reconstitution as necessary.
(n) 450 (US) CA Bn. See Annex W for further details. CIMIC/CA
priorities are as follows:
i. Coordination with HN authorities to support move
along routes SEATTLE and MIAMI (noting restrictions
and deception plan).
ii. Liaison with HN authorities in SALYAN to establish
HN security and local TC responsibilities.

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iii. Establish liaison with HN authorities at BILASUVAR

to establish humanitarian, infrastructure and IDP
assistance priorities.
(o) 91st (US) MP Bn. Detached to OPCON 130 MEB for all
phases.
(p) 1st (AS) MP Bn.
i. CO 1st (AS) MP Bn remains 4 MND Provost Marshal
ii. Establish Div PW/Detainee Holding Area as listed at
Annex MM
(q) (US) CBRNE TF 4. Detached to OPCON 130 MEB for all
phases.
(r) 709th (US) MI Bn. Detached to OPCON 130 MEB for all
phases.
(s) C CO, 9 (US) MISB. Detached to OPCON 130 MEB for all
phases.
e. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Control Measures. See Appx 1 to Annex A. TBI
(2) Routes and Boundaries. See Appx 1 to Annex A. TBI
(3) ISTAR. See Annex II.
(4) Rules of Engagement. See Annex E for details. National policies and
caveats have been confirmed, and there are no impacts on Div combat
operations. Should any changes occur or concerns be raised regarding
National ROE, Div G3 is to be advised by the most expeditious means.
National Commanders may also bring changes or concerns to the
attention of the Div Commander directly.
(5) Air Support. Annex H.
(6) EOD. Appendix 2 to Annex J.
(7) Engr Support. Annex EE.
(8) CBRN. Annex U.
(9) KURA River Crossing.
(a) Obj OPAL Crossing Sites
i. Primary - 39S UD 257 905
ii. Secondary - 39S UD 250 899
(b) Obj GARNET Crossing Sites
i. Primary - 39S UD 273 816
ii. Secondary - 39S UD 282 806

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(c) Crossing Tables. Bdes and units will submit Crossing Tables
to combat team level (US terminology company teams) to HQ
4 MND NLT D-6.
(10) Div Order of March for Phases II-III
(a) 2 Sqn, 3 CR
(b) 130 MEB
(c) elements 17 Sust Bde (for div refuelling)
(d) 4 Div Arty Bde
(e) 6 (F-G) Bde
(f) Div Tac CP
(g) elements 4 CAB FARP
(h) X (AS) Bde
(i) 12 (UK) AIB
(j) 4 (CA) CMBG
(k) Div Tps (-)
(l) On order, Div Main HQ
(m) On order, 17 Sust Bde/DISGP
(11) Movement Order. Div Main HQ will issue the order to support the
tactical movement in Phase II in coordination with 130 MEB.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Concept of Support. Support will be affected by maintaining the Division
Support Area (DSA) relatively close, stepping forward as the Div advances.
The DSA will be established as our connection with theatre sustainment, 310th
ESC/15 Sust Bde and TCN NSEs. As such it will contain Supply Points
(SPs), Maintenance Collection Point (MCP) and Div PW/Detainee Holding
Area.
b. Unique National Support. Unique national support will be provided by NSEs.
17 Sust Bde will facilitate TCN NSEs support to Bdes as required. This will
include arranging 310th (US) ESC (through 15 and 230 Sust Bdes) support as
necessary.
c. Replenishment.
(1) SPs will hold 3 DOS of supplies and a minimum of 1 DOS of combat
supplies on wheels or packed in PLS compatible containers to facilitate
rapid movement. In Phase IV the SPs will hold 7 DOS. As DSA
moves forward, 310th ESC will maintain 3 DOS in the previous DSA
location to ensure support if LOCs are compromised.
(2) Locations and Opening Times of DSAs, SPs and MCPs:
(a) Phase I. TAA Silver location GR 39T TE 817 929, from D+5

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(b) Phase III. BPT in area of ALAT GR 39T UE 648 305, from D +
8
(c) Phase IV. BPT in area of SALYAN GR 39S UD 241 825, from
D+11.
d. Maintenance, Recovery and Repair. TCN responsibility but to the rear of the
DSA MCP, TCNs will assisted in back loading by 15 Sust Bde.
e. Medical.
(1) Medevac. Preferred medevac is by air. 57 (US) Aviation Company
and Light Transport Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE) will provide
aeromedevac services to Role 3. Evac requests are to be submitted to
the PECC at Div Main HQ using the standard nine line Med Evac
Request found at Tab A, Appendix 2 Annex XX.
(2) Role 3. Currently 21 and 31 (US) Combat Support Hospitals are
established at MARNEULLI, GO and TSNORI, GO. However, to
better support 4 MND operations, Fd Hosp Regt 41 (GE) will deploy
to the area of SANGACHAL GR 39T UE 692 426 (estimate D + 8)
f. Prisoner of War (PW)/Detainee Ops.
(1) 18 MP BDE will establish two CJTF-OIG EPW/CPERS Theatre
Detention Facilities (Canadian terminology "Camp") one in GORGAS
at MARNEULI and the other in ATROPIA at GAZAKH. 16 MP BDE
will establish and operate the CFLCC EPW/Detainee Holding Area in
MINGECEVIR, ATROPIA (38T PL 641 149). 1st (AS) MP Bn will
establish a Div PW/Detainee Holding Area in each DSA (and re-
established as the DSA moves).
(2) PWs. 1st (AS) MP Bn is prepared to accept transfer of PWs from
TCNs at the Div Holding Area if TCN national policy allows.
(3) Detainees. TCN Detainee facilities may be co-located at the Div
Holding Area. Notwithstanding, detainees will remain under TCN
authority and custody and handled IAW TCN Policy. Detainees will be
treated as PW, until such time as it is determined that they do not have
PW status IAW Geneva Convention.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Command
(1) Div Commander will be located with Div Tac CP throughout Phases I-
III
(2) Div Tac CP opens at ELABAD (39T TE 764 960) (D-1)
(3) Div Main HQ closes area SHEKI (38T PL 801 596) (D Day)
(4) Div Main HQ opens area AGSU (39T TE 791 939) (D+2)
(5) Succession of Command
(a) Comd X (AS) Bde
(b) Comd 12 (UK) AIB

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(c) Comd 4 (CA) CMBG

(6) Alternate HQ
(a) Div Alt HQ
(b) X (AS) Bde HQ
b. Signal
(1) Signal Support. 63 (US) Expeditionary Signal Bn is attached to 4
MND for the provision of communications and information systems
connectivity, extension of CENTRIXS-OIG via LANDWARNET and,
mission-command signal support in order to ensure effective C2 of
assigned forces. Technical configuration of signal resources will be
centrally coordinated by CFLCC signal authorities, but prioritization of
63 (US) ESB signal effort will remain within 4 MND.
(2) Integral CIS. 4 MND formations will provide their own integral CIS,
less F-G Bde. Direct CIS support to F-G Bde will be provided by 63
(US) ESB through forward deployment of Command Post Node (CPN)
extension packages as required.
(3) EMCON Orders
(a) Preliminary Moves- EMCON 1
(b) Div Phase 1-II EMCON 1, broken on contact up to Bde level
only. Lifted on authority of Div Comd only.
(c) Phase III-IV- EMCON 4
(4) Codewords

SERIAL CODE WORD MEANING ISSUED BY

1 Antigua Commence Div Phase II Div Tac CP
2 Barbados Initial Bridgehead 82 Abn/2 Sqn
Established 3CR
3 Cuba Lift EMCON 1 Div Tac CP
4 Dominica Final Bridgehead Established 6 (F-G) Bde
5 Grenada Commence Phase III Div Tac CP
6 Haiti 3 CR LD secured 2 Sqn, 3 CR
7 Jamaica Phase III Complete X (AS) Bde,
12(UK) AIB
8 Lucia Commence Phase IV Div Tac CP
9 Martinique Div Screen along IB 7 (GE) Recce
Established Bn

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OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Acknowledge Instructions: ACKNOWLEDGE to G3 Ops

XXXXXXX
Major-General (AS)
Comd

Annexes:

Annex A Conduct of Operations

Annex B Task organization
Annex D Intelligence
Annex E Rules of Engagement
Annex G Land Operations
Annex H Air Airspace Control
Annex J Force Protection
Annex K Health Services Support
Annex L Psychological Operations
Annex M Operational Assessment (Not issued)
Annex O Information Operations
Annex P Electronic Warfare
Annex Q Communication and Information Systems
Annex R Logistics
Annex S Movements
Annex U CBRN
Annex W Civil Military Cooperation
Annex X Public Affairs
Annex AA Legal (To be issued)
Annex DD Space Operations (To be issued)
Annex EE Engineer Support
Annex FF Finance (To be issued)
Annex KK Joint Fires and Targeting
Annex HH Personnel Support
Annex II Joint ISR
Annex MM Detainee Operations
Annex PP Military Police
Annex RR Strategic Communications (Not issued)
Annex TT Host Nation Support
Annex UU Reports

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Annex A
4 MND Op O 07 – OP RESOLUTE GUARDIAN

4 MND OUTLINE PLAN

A-1/11
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PHASES
• Prelim Moves - into TAAs (D-D+3)
• Phase I - Advance to River KURA (D+3-D+5)
• Phase II - Cross river (D+6-D+8)
• Phase III - Destroy 24th Mtzd DTG (D+9-D+13)
• Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27)

A-2/11
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4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – Prelim Moves (D-D+3)

X
III(-) X
344
3CAV X 354
TAA MN(Res)
TAA GOLD BRONZE XX(-)
X
II(-)
4MN
X 99
3CAV
346 TAA SILVER
X
X
X 348
352
X
341
356

Fires
X X
X 350
351
Fires XX
353
25 Inf
DTG
Fires
X Fires
349
Tk BTG

CJTF-OIG OP Res CFLCC TAC Res PH 1 - XX

throughout- Bn TF 82 Mech Bde- 4 MND 24 Inf
ABN DIV DTG

A-3/11
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4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – PHASE I - Advance to River KURA (D+3-D+5)

Air Aslt III(-) II(-)
Staging Area X- X
82 MN(Res) 3CR XX(-) 3CR
4MN
(TAA BRONZE)
TAA SILVER

AH Obj TOPAZ
X
X
351
353
AH
Obj XX
DIAMOND 25 Inf
XX DTG
1 ID

X
349
Tk BTG Obj OPAL
Obj SAPPHIRE AI

Obj GARNET

AI
CFLCC TAC Res – PH 2 XX
- Mech Bde- 4 MND 4 MND Res PH 1 – Lt Obj PEARL 24 Inf
Bn 4 CMBG DTG

A-4/11
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4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – PHASE I - Advance to KURA River (D+3-D+5)

Air Aslt XX(-)
X-
Staging Area 4MN
82 X
II(-)
MN(Res)
3CAV
TAA BRONZE TAA SILVER

X AH
X
351 AH
353
XX
25 Inf
Obj DTG III(-)
DIAMOND
XX 3CR
1ID
Obj OPAL
X
349
Tk BTG
Obj SAPPHIRE AI X-
82
Obj GARNET

XX AI
CFLCC TAC Res – PH 3 - 4 MND Res PH 1 – Lt Obj PEARL 24 Inf
Mech TF 1 ID Bn 4 CMBG DTG

A-5/11
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TAA SILVER
ADVANCE TO RIVER KURA
130 MEB Regulating HQ Tactical Mov along Rtes SEATTLE & MIAMI
BG WA (Kurdamir)

BG WA (Sigirli)
A1 - Bde AA (Garasu)
91 MP Bn TC Sector

RTE SEATTLE
BG WA (Navahi)
120 kms
BG WA (Atbulak)

A2 - Bde AA (Alat)
AS FP BG TC Sector BG WA (Pirsaat)
RTE MIAMI
A3 - Bde AA (Hesenli)

PL COUGAR 60 kms

2 Sqn 3 CR TC Sector

UNCLASSIFIED
A-6/11
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 OFFICIAL

4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – PHASE II – Cross KURA River (D+6-D+8)

Air Aslt
Staging Area TAA SILVER

AH XX
X
X 4MN
351
353
XX
25 Inf
Obj III(-)
DTG II(-)
DIAMOND
XX 3CR
3CR
1ID
X Obj OPAL
349
Obj SAPPHIRE Tk BTG
AH X-
82
Obj GARNET

AI
CFLCC TAC Res – PH 3 - 4 MND Res PH 2 – Lt Obj PEARL
XX
24 Inf
Mech TF 1 ID Bn 4 CMBG DTG

A-7/11
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 OFFICIAL

4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – Phase III - Destroy 24 Mtzd DTG (D+9-D+13)

TAA SILVER

X AH
X X
351
353 350
Obj
DIAMOND XX
25 Inf
DTG X
XX 352
1ID
Obj OPAL
X
349
Tk BTG
Obj SAPPHIRE AH X-
82
Obj GARNET
7 (GE)

XX

XX 4MN
CFLCC TAC Res – PH 3 - 4 MND Res PH 3 – Lt Obj PEARL 24 Inf III
Mech TF 1 ID Bn 4 CMBG DTG
3CR

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4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – Phase III - Destroy 24 Mtzd DTG (D+9-D+13)

XX

AH
XX
25 Inf
DTG

III(-)
X 3CR II
349 X (-)
Tk BTG 82
AI 4 CMBG
X

6 (FG) II
7 (GE) X 82
X 12 (UK)
X (AS) X

242

241 II

2 3CR
X

244

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4 MND Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN – PHASE IV (STABILIZE) (D+14-D+27)
ASC
X XX
X
X (AS) 4 (CA)
CMBG

X
7 (GE)
6 (FG)
X

12 (UK)

III
3CR
4 MND Res PH 4 – Lt
Bn 4 CMBG

A-10/11
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 OFFICIAL ANNEX B OF
OPORD 07
(Insert date)
ANNEX B (TASK ORGANISATION) OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

B1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN
INTELLIGENCE
References: A. CFLCC Op O 07 OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN
B. Map, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Series 1501A Joint Operations
Graphic-Air (JOG-A), 1:250,000 Scale. Sheets: NJ3801, NJ3802, NJ3803, NJ3804, NJ3805,
NJ3806, NJ3807, NJ3808, NJ3809, NJ3810, NJ3811, NJ3812, NJ3901, NJ3905, NJ3909,
NJ3910, NK3703, NK3706, NK3712, NK3716, NK3801, NK3802, NK3803, NK3804,
NK3805, NK3806, NK3807, NK3808, NK3809, NK3810, NK3811, NK3812, NK3904,
NK3907, NK3910, NK3911, NL3711, NL3712, NL3810, NL3811, NL3812.
C. Cartography, Geodesy, and Navigation datum used throughout this OPORD is World
Geodetic System-84 (WGS84), (revised in 2004).

Time Zone: ZULU

1. SITUATION
a. Friendly. The combined efforts of 82 Abn Div, CFACC, CFMCC and the
Atropian Armed Forces (AP Armed Forces) have successfully stalled the
Arianian advance. 4 MND, as part of CFLCC, will conduct decisive counter-
moves and offensive operations to help clear all Arianian forces from Atropian
sovereign territory.
b. Enemy. Elements of the Arianian OSC 2 have now culminated in terms of
their advance to seize the key transportation and oil center of KAZI-
MAGAMED (on Route M2) on the approaches to BAKU. The lead enemy
formations facing 4 MND consist of elements of 24 Motorized DTG,
including 242, and 243 Infantry (Inf) BTG and 244 Tank (Tk) BTG, are
occupying defensive positions along the KURA River and to the SOUTH as
far as the border with ARIANA. The 24 Anti-Tank (AT) Bn provides depth to
the OSC 2 defence. 349 Tk BTG is the most likely counter-moves force in our
area and is assessed at 60 percent strength. OSC 2’s corps troops are centrally
located north of BILASUVAR. The depth formation of OSC 2, 24 DTG
remains to the southeast in the area of GYRAPE; it currently estimated to be at
70 percent combat effective. Although OSC 1 has withdrawn from ATROPIA
(AP), it still poses a significant threat and could cross the border into 4 MND’s
AO at any time.
(1) Asymmetric/Irregular Threats. The two most significant irregular
threats to 4 MND operations are as follows:
(a) South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA). SAPA operates in
three separate units—Northern, Central, and Southern
Commands. The group conducts most of its training in
ARIANA (AN), where it receives its equipment and supplies.
Reports indicate that Arianian SPF or other “advisors” may
support SAPA with logistics and some in-country training.
SAPA also clashes violently with Salasyl over ideology,
limited resources, and similar recruiting pools. SAPA is
D-1/8
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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 OFFICIAL
ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

assessed as being a medium threat to 4 MND operations in

Southern Atropia, although they will be active throughout the
AO.
(b) Salysal (SAL). SAL is one of the largest groups within AP,
second only in size to SAPA. Its major support comes from the
southeast portion of the country and they are expected to be
most active in KURDAMIR and ZARDAB rayons within our
AO. The group may have ties to transnational criminal and
terrorist actors. For the last two decades, SAL has engaged the
current Atropian regime in a low-level insurgency in response
to the government’s taxation, judicial and critical infrastructure
policies. It is assessed that SAL will initially wait to see if
western intervention will have any influence on the
Government of AP. The threat from SAL is initially assessed
as low; however, this could change to medium should SAL not
be satisfied that the Coalition is having a positive influence on
the provision of services by the Government of AP.
2. MISSION. 4 MND intelligence staff will provide the commander, staff and
subordinate units and formations of the Division (Div) with accurate and timely intelligence
on the intent and capabilities of all enemy forces in our AO in order to ensure mission
success.
3. EXECUTION
a. Scheme of Support. 4 MND will have access to a robust intelligence
capability that will provide timely and accurate intelligence in support of
operations. 4 MND G2 will take full advantage of inherent assets as well as
available subordinate, lateral, Coalition and strategic intelligence capabilities
to support Div operations. Subordinate formation integral, and as possible
national, intelligence capabilities will be leveraged to support operations.
Intelligence products will be written with the intent of releasing to all partner
nations and will use the release caveats directed by G2 CFLCC.
b. Priority of Intelligence support:12 (UK) AIB, 4 (CA) CMBG, 6 Franco-
German Inf Bde, X (AS) Bde, 4th MN Avn Bde and 7 (GE) Recce Regt
c. Intelligence Acquisition Tasks to Subordinate Units
(1) 4 MND G2 Staff
(a) Support Comd 4 MND and staff by providing accurate and
timely intelligence in support of operations planning and
mission execution;
(b) Coordinate the collection efforts of all assigned Div
intelligence assets;
(c) Provide interrogation support to the Div PW and Detainee
Holding Area.
(2) Subordinate Formations and Units Intelligence Staffs

D-2/8
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

(a) Conduct robust collection operations, within boundaries (Area

of Responsibility), in support of 4 MND PIRs and against other
activities that could affect 4 MND operations;
(b) Ensure relevant intelligence and information is sent to 4 MND
G2 in a timely manner;
d. Intelligence Acquisition Requests
(1) CFLCC G2 Staff
(a) 4 MND G2 staff request strategic threat indications and
warning (I&W) intelligence for all activities that have the
potential to affect or influence the 4 MND tasks; and
(b) 4 MND G2 staff request timely access to reporting from
Coalition and strategic assets from both inter-departmental and
international partners.
(2) 709th MI Bn
(a) 4 MND G2 staff request access to FVEY national strategic
intelligence assets in support of 4 MND collection
requirements; and
(b) 4 MND G2 staff request assistance with exploitation of
personnel, documents and material as needed.
e. Counter-Intelligence. See Appendix 2 (Counter-Intelligence (CI)) to Annex B
(Intelligence) to CFLCC Op O 07 for more detail.
(1) The CFLCC G-2X will coordinate requests for and monitor all CI
activities of national agencies and supporting forces to ensure CI
coverage within the CFLCC AO.
(2) Subordinate formations will ensure adequate procedures are
established in their respective units for obtaining and disseminating CI
information.
(3) All 4 MND CI plans, programs and projects will flow through 4 MND
G-2 staff prior to being sent to CFLCC for review and approval before
implementation.
(4) Tactical Exploitation and CI Source Operations. Prepare detailed and
coordinated plans for the seizure and exploitation of CI targets. Target
lists should include responsibilities for:
(a) interrogation of hostile force detainees and defectors;
(b) screening indigenous refugees, displaced persons and detained
suspects;
(c) debriefing of US or other friendly personnel who evade, escape
or are released from hostile force control; and
(d) exploiting captured hostile force documents and materiel
f. Coordinating Instructions
D-3/8
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

(1) Area of Intelligence Interest (AII). The 4 MND AII extends 50 kms
beyond Div boundaries (the area bounded by the ARAS and KURA
Rivers to the west and north, the CASPIAN Sea Coast on the east and
the area along the border with AN including the TALISH Mountains in
the south) and the associated airspace above it.
(2) Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR). The 4 MND AIR is the
landmass and the associated airspace within Div boundaries and the
CASPIAN Sea coastline that is within the Div’s responsibility.
(3) Intelligence Requirements. All Div assets are to collect and report
intelligence and information in a timely manner that will address Div
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). The Div Intelligence
Collection Plan (ICP) at Appendix 2 to Annex D directs specific
collection tasks and responsibilities. 4 MND PIRs are as follows:
(a) AN Armed Forces.
i. What are the capabilities, intentions and location of the
Arianian military forces (241 and 242 Inf BTGs, 244 Tk
BTG and 24 AT Bn) opposing 4 MND?
ii. Where are the primary defensive positions that will
affect 4 MND offensive operations?
iii. Where is the OSC countermove force deployed (349 Tk
BTG) and what support could it provide to the forces
opposing 4 MND?
iv. What is the current location and disposition of elements
of 355 Helicopter Bde units in our AO?
v. What is the morale of the Arianian units in our AO and
can it be exploited through subversion or IA?
vi. What is the chemical weapons threat to 4 MND forces
and operations from elements of 361st Chemical
Defence Brigade (Arianian) located in our area? Are
there any Atropian chemical or biological weapons
facilities within our AO that could be activated and
exploited by the Arianian forces?
vii. Which enemy air defence capabilities can affect 4 MND
aviation and UAV operations?
viii. Which formations from OSC 1 are most likely to
reinforce OSC 2 and what routes will they use to enter
our AO?
(b) Irregular Forces.
i. What are the capabilities, intentions and location of
insurgent forces in our AO, in particular the SAL and
SAPA forces?

D-4/8
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

ii. What connections do hybrid or insurgent forces have

with local authorities or criminal organizations?
iii. What equipment and infrastructure do insurgent forces
or criminal organizations have at their disposal to
conduct operations?
iv. What is the level of training and proficiency of the
various insurgent forces?
v. What are the inter-relationships between the factions
and where are these relationships exploitable?
(c) Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE).
i. What is the current state of the displaced person and
refugee (DPRE) situation and how will it affect 4 MND
operations?
ii. Where are the DPREs located?
iii. What armed factions intend to disrupt the provision of
humanitarian aid?
(4) Measures for Handling Personnel
(a) Enemy Combatants (Uniformed Enemy Prisoners of War and
Deserters (Lawful Combatants) and Non-Uniformed Armed
Groups (Unlawful Combatants). Enemy Combatants will be
screened by appropriate HUMINT personnel as soon as
possible following capture. Those found not to have
intelligence value must be transported to the 4 MND
PW/Detainee Holding Area within 24 hours of capture.
Subordinate formations may request to hold those identified for
further interrogation for an additional 24 hours, but not
exceeding 48 hours past time of capture. 4 MND subordinate
formations are authorized to conduct Tactical Questioning
(TQ).
(b) Captured Documents. Formations to report immediately to 4
MND G2 any captured and/or exploited documents indicating
attack against friendly forces, or any exploited documents that
can further answer 4 MND PIR or support decisive action
operations
(c) The capturing formation is responsible for conducting the
initial exploitation of the captured documents IOT determine if
the documents contain any information of immediate
intelligence value.
(d) After initial exploitation, the documents need to be forwarded
to 4 MND G2 for further exploitation, archiving and production
of the appropriate document exploitation report to be

D-5/8
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
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ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

disseminated back to the capturing formation via the

Intelligence Staff section on the 4 MND Web Portal.
(e) Captured Material. Formations are to report immediately to 4
MND G2 any captured materials, electronic storage media, or
military equipment that can assist in further supporting our
operations or that may contain any threat or indication of attack
against friendly forces. Summaries of any materials, storage
media or equipment found should be included in the daily
INTSUM.
(f) Briefings. G2 Intelligence Synchronization Update will be
conducted by secure means with all subordinate G2s beginning
(insert date), with subsequent briefings to be conducted every
72 hrs. The purpose of this synchronization update is for
subordinate G2s to provide 4 MND G2 staff with a current
through next 72 hrs intelligence picture IOT identify
intelligence gaps. The update will be conducted via the
following means: Primary: SVOIP (tbc); Alternate: (tbc);
Contingency: (tbc).
(g) Distribution of Intelligence Products. Subordinate formations
may use their existing standardized products for intelligence
sharing to 4 MND G2.
(h) Weather Outlooks, Advisories and Warnings. Weather
Outlooks are issued to subordinate formations NLT 2359 local
time daily via 4 MND G2 webpage. Any Weather Advisories/
Warnings will be issued via FM or VOIP as necessary.
(i) CIMIC/HA. Large numbers of Atropian citizens are literally
“on the move” - driven from their homes by this conflict
Humanitarian Assistance operations will be carried out within
the context of the UN Humanitarian Principles with an aim to
provide the immediate and essential humanitarian response and
to reduce the restrictions that the humanitarian situation may
impose on our military operations.
(j) Preliminary IDP Assistance Centres. Initial IDP reception and
assistance centers have been established inside our AO near the
towns of SABIRA (KURDAMIR) and KHALISA
(HAJIGABUL). Additional centers may be established as
necessary and if warranted by changing humanitarian factors
and conditions.
(5) Information and Equipment Requirements. All 4 MND assigned
formations and units will develop, maintain and collect within
capabilities a list of PIRs reflecting their specific requirements. These
PIRs will be forwarded to the Div G2 for consideration and when
appropriate inclusion into the 4 MND collection plan. Equipment

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integral to each subordinate 4MND brigade and unit will be provided

by its parent TCN.
(6) Reports and Distribution. Due to the multi-national makeup of 4MND,
all intelligence will be prepared in a manner to be shared with
Coalition partners and will be clearly marked with the necessary
caveats - as issued by G2 CFLCC. Subordinate formations are
requested to follow the same guidance, within the bounds of individual
national policies. INTSUM Timings are:
(a) 4 MND – as of 0800Z, released by 1100Z;
(b) Subordinate formations and Div units – as of 0800Z, released
by 0930Z; and
(c) Graphic Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). Daily Div Graphic
INTSUM (period covered: 0001-2400) are disseminated NLT
1200 local time via the 4 MND G2 webpage. Subordinate
formations will provide their daily Graphic INTSUM (period
covered: 0001-2400) to 4 MND G2 NLT 0600 local time each
day digitally. Minimum requirements for Graphic INTSUM
must include a summary of all significant activity within
subordinate formations AO, a current near-term assessment of
the AO, and a rollup of all reporting across every intelligence
discipline (SIGINT, HUMINT, etc., and any interrogation
summaries) originating within the AO during the last 24 hrs.
(d) Information of immediate tactical value, no matter the source,
will be forwarded to the 4 MND G2 ASAP.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See Sustainment Annex R to this order.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Communications
(1) Intelligence Network. To facilitate intelligence sharing and
dissemination, 4 MND will provide all Coalition partners with access
to a Level II Wide Area Network (WAN) named XXXXX. This will
be the primary means to disseminate intelligence throughout the Div.
Chat and email capability will also be resident on the system to
facilitate dialogue and communication between organizations. System
administration will be coordinated through 4 MND G2 and G6
sections.
(2) National Systems. It is expected that Coalition partners will use their
national systems to support Coalition intelligence requirements and
operations. There will be no direct connectivity between national
systems and the Div WAN; however, local processes to transfer
material between systems are encouraged.
(3) Direct Liaison. Direct Liaison is authorized between all 4 MND
assigned intelligence units. Should there be a requirement for liaison
outside the Div chain of command, approval from the Div G2 is
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required. Under no circumstances will assigned formations directly

liaise with CFLCC HQ intelligence staff without approval of the 4
MND G2. Coalition formations are encouraged to and clearly
authorized to liaise with their national command intelligence
capabilities (in accordance with national policies), to ensure all
relevant and releasable intelligence is forwarded up national chains of
command in a timely manner. It is requested that all releasable
national intelligence be shared within the CLFCC.

Appendices:
Appendix 1 Intelligence Estimate
Appendix 2 Information Collection Plan
Appendix 3 NAI Trace (TBI)
Appendix 4 Counter Intelligence
Appendix 5 Signals Intelligence
Appendix 6 Human Intelligence
Appendix 7 Geospatial Intelligence
Appendix 8 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (not issued)
Appendix 9 Open Source Intelligence

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Appendix 1
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Reference: CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) (insert date)
1. ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO).
a. Topography General.
(1) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. The River KURA provides the basis
for the enemy defence in the 4 MND AO, running across his front and
right flank. At almost 150 kms of frontage in the 25 DTG sector, the
defence on the river line will be limited to only a very light screen.
Behind this significant obstacle the terrain is open, with few urban
areas. As such, 25 DTG's positions and counter moves will be difficult
to conceal. Although this area is open it is criss-crossed by numerous
irrigation canals and movement will be restricted. Further to the south
in the 24 DTG sector the terrain becomes more complex with lakes,
swamps and more urbanization. This will allow a stronger defence
with the ability to canalize advancing friendly forces and conceal
forces in towns. Finally the TALISH Mountains running along the
international border (IB) limits movement between Ariana (AN) and
occupied Atropia (AP). This will affect enemy replenishment and
movement of reinforcements or counter moves to a very limited
number of routes. The mountains could also be the basis of a
defensive line prior to a full withdrawal cross the IB back into AN.
(2) Effect on Friendly Course of Action (COA). Movement out of the Div
Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs) will be canalized by the almost
single route available, SEATTLE/MIAMI. Movement forward of
assembly areas will be difficult to conceal as the terrain along these
routes is very open. This will force 4 MND to move forward using
Tactical Road Movement and emphasis must be placed on deceiving
the enemy as to where the CFLCC main effort is being placed. As
there are expected to be no bridges remaining over the River KURA, a
full assault river crossing will be required. Once across the KURA in
the relatively open terrain of the lowlands, the Div will be able to
manoeuvre at the formation level much of the time. However, swampy
terrain and urban areas further to the south will likely slow the
advance. Finally, the TALISH Mountains although difficult to clear if
the enemy decides to defend there, conversely could provide the Div
with a solid defensive position along the IB once it is secured
b. Hydrography.
(1) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Aside from the River KURA
covered above, two other hydrological features will affect the enemy.
The area of the ARAS-KURA lowlands in the 25 DTG and OSC 2
Corps Troops sectors is criss-crossed by numerous small rivers and
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irrigation canals. These restrict manoeuvre significantly as vehicles

must drive along dykes and cross canals at bridges and crossings that
are not designed for heavy vehicles. Secondly the River ARAS which
bisects the OSC 2 AO is crossed at only a few places and thus the
enemy's reinforcement and/or counter moves are very canalized.
(2) Effect on Friendly COAs. Again 4 MND will be forced to conduct an
assault river crossing of the River KURA. Once over the river the Div
will face the same mobility problems as the enemy moving through
areas criss-crossed with canals and irrigation ditches. If the enemy
conducts a coherent defence, assault bridging and fascines will be in
high demand. The existing bridges over River ARAS should be
targeted if there is a desire to restrict lateral movement by OSC 2.
c. Weather. Refer to Tab B (Weather) of this Appendix.
d. Civil Considerations. Refer to Tab C to Appendix 1 (Civil Considerations) to
Annex B (Intelligence) of the ref.
e. Terrain. The Terrain Assessment is divided into three segments: approach to
the River KURA; crossing of the river; and terrain to IB. The assessment will
utilize the FLOCARK approach: Features, Lanes, Objectives, Avenues of
Approach, Rating of Avenues of Approach and Key Terrain (including Vital
Ground).
(1) Approach from TAA SILVER to the River KURA Crossings near
SALYAN.
(a) Features. The main features are the highways on which the
Bdes of the Div will have to travel. The routes are generally
good MLC 100 paved roads with open terrain to either side.
Waiting areas or assembly areas that may be established along
this route will likely be open areas located in or on the outskirts
of towns. Air superiority and air defense coverage will be
essential for moves along this route. There is some
mountainous terrain to the NORTH along Route SEATTLE,
WEST of the city of ALAT. This may provide ambush/IED
emplacement sites for irregular forces; tasked security forces
should be cognizant of this.
(b) Lanes. Not applicable.
(c) Objectives. Not Applicable.
(d) Avenues of Approach. The highways M2 (MSR SEATTLE)
and M3 (MSR MIAMI) are essentially the only existing routes
forward to the River KURA for road movement. Deception
will be essential as this singular approach is also obvious to the
enemy.
(e) Rating of Avenues of Approach. The above described Avenue
of Approach to the river allows two-way traffic and would be
able to pass vehicles at speeds of 60 kph during daylight hours.
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It is assessed that a Bde could move from TAA SILVER to the

river in about four hours without stops.
(f) Key Terrain. The key terrain along this Avenue of Approach is
the towns. They essentially provide the only cover. As such
they will be the primary choice for potential waiting areas,
assembly areas and DSAs. They will need to be cleared and
then secured.
(2) Crossing of the River KURA.
(a) Features. The average width of the KURA River in the 4 MND
AO is 150 meters. The mean velocity of river is about 1.65 m/s.
It should be assume that all 12 bridges in the Div sector will be
destroyed as part of the enemy defence. The river's depth and
speed will allow float bridging. The banks of the river on the
near bank are slightly elevated and should allow an In-place
Force to provide direct fire onto the far side.
(b) Lanes. Approaches to the river do provide some cover with a
mix of buildings and vegetation but they will not fully mask
crossing operations. Consideration should be given to either
crossing at night or using smoke. Routes do exist to the river's
edge but they are not MLC 70 and will certainly need
maintenance as the Div's heavy vehicles cause them to
deteriorate.
(c) Objectives. In conducting any assault crossing of the river
objectives will need to be chosen that allow an initial
bridgehead. They will need to prevent direct fire and observed
indirect fire onto the crossing sites. Given the relative
openness of the far side of the river this means objectives for
this phase will need to be 1-2 kms from the river. Air assault
may be the best way to achieve this and distances would
indicate that no less than a Bn would be needed for each
crossing.
(d) Avenues of Approach. Although the river can be bridged
throughout the Div sector, the key will be trafficable routes
leading down to the river and then routes that exist on the far
side. Near the city of SALYAN (39S UD 271851) these
conditions exist both north and south of the city. Additional
routes exist, running parallel to the river which will allow
lateral movement between potential crossing sites. It should be
noted that the main highway, M3 (E119), passes through and
then exits out of SALYAN, providing a suitable MSR for the
Div's advance.
(e) Rating of Avenues of Approach. Crossing the KURA River
will become a choke point that sees essentially a single vehicle
frontage over each bridge. An efficient traffic control system

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of multiple routes and waiting areas will be required.

Additionally, point AD and spare bridging (to replace damaged
parts) will be needed. Exits both north and south of SALYAN
will allow battle-group (BG) manoeuvre; and
(f) Key Terrain. The town of SALYAN is the major urban area
along the River KURA. Given that the main route through the
sector, M3/E 119 goes directly through the city, it will likely be
defended and clearly this urban area would be difficult to clear
and nothing less than a Bde task. Although it must be secured
to allow the continued advance of the Div, the crossing sites
should not initially be located in or too near the city. The city
will need to be taken at some stage but isolating it and taking it
once the advance has moved forward may be the most feasible
approach.
(3) Advance to IB.
(a) Features. See Objectives.
(b) Lanes. See Avenues of Approach.
(c) Objectives.
i. The first objective once the River KURA has been
crossed will be the Final Bridgehead Line that provides
sufficient room for the Breakout Force to adopt attack
positions. Assuming a depth of no less than 10 kms, the
terrain is open providing little concealment. The
Breakout Force will need to manoeuvre (rather than any
type of road movement) and be well dispersed. Using
the existing canals and vegetation that grows along
them the Bridgehead Force should be able to establish
an effective hasty defence.
ii. A subsequent physical objective, about 30 kms from the
KURA River, is a 10 km gap between the
MALMUDALA Lake and a major swamp astride the
ARMYANKA creek. Trafficability through either of
these areas would be extremely poor. It should be
expected that the enemy will defend this gap.
iii. The next physical objective is the town of
CALILABAD (39S TD 838434) about 20 kms beyond
the above mentioned gap. This town begins a string of
urbanization that runs SE towards the CASPIAN Sea
and then along a narrow coastal plain that extends all
the way to the AN border. It should be expected that
the enemy will conduct an effective delay battle from
town to town.

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iv. Finally the IB must be considered an objective. In the

NORTH, within the 4 MND sector, it is relatively open
and will require a more mobile defence and thus
mechanized forces. In the SOUTH the TALISH
Mountains provide very complex and difficult terrain.
Again a delay battle by the enemy through this
mountainous terrain will be effective. Our subsequent
defence in this area could be accomplished with light
forces and aviation.
(d) Avenues of Approach. For the first 30 kms beyond the River
KURA the terrain is very open and manoeuver with two Bdes
up is possible, although the many canals will slow movement.
As described in the paragraphs above, at this 30 km mark a gap
of only 10 kms exists between two water features. At this point
4 MND's avenue of approach will be reduced to a Bde frontage.
Beyond this choke point the terrain opens up for about 20 kms,
again allowing more than one Bde up. Going WEST the Div
could manoeuvre three Bdes up to the IB, although only in the
NORTH is the terrain open. The turn to the SOUTH is
essentially a second avenue of approach down to the southern
AP/AN border. This avenue is restricted to about a 10 km wide
coastal plain and no more than a Bde can manoeuvre through
this string of towns.
(e) Rating of Avenues of Approach. See Avenues of Approach;
and
(f) Key Terrain. Key terrain is first considered the final
Bridgehead Line about 10 kms beyond the River KURA. The
vital terrain is likely the gap described in the preceding
paragraphs. If this is defended, it may be a more difficult
objective than the River KURA itself. Finally the town of
CALILABAD is also key terrain as its seizure provides a hinge
that the Div can manoeuvre through both WEST and further to
the SOUTH.
2. ENEMY.
a. Current Situation. Having failed to achieve its strategic objectives, the
Arianian SHC will likely defend aggressively the area it has occupied in
southeastern AP with a view to annexing this territory as a new province of
AN.
b. Threat Characteristics/Order of Battle. Refer to AN Land Force ORBATs for
organizational diagrams of the OSC 2 and its formations (DTGs and BTGs).
c. Current Disposition.
(1) OSC 2.

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(a) 24 DTG, assessed to be at 75% strength, is believed to be

defending in depth the SE sector of the occupied territory in AP
including the coastal line of communication from AN.
(b) It is assessed that 242 BTG (Motorized Infantry Brigade) is the
right front formation defending along the River KURA from
the area SOUTH of SALYAN to the coastline on the
CASPIAN Sea.
(c) 241 BTG is likely located left front of 24 DTG with its left
flank anchored on the TALISH Mountains.
(d) 244 BTG (Tank Bde) is likely located in depth along the
coastline with its forward elements located somewhere in the
area of Port ILIC (39S UD 102077). It is possible that 244
BTG will be employed as the 24 DTG countermove force, with
a secondary task to guard the approach to the ASTARA (39S
UC 145581) border crossing into AN.
(e) 349 Tk BDE, assessed to be at 70% strength, is the OSC 2
reserve and has likely been tasked to prepare to
reinforce/counter attack into in priority the 25 DTG then 23
DTG sectors.
(f) 25 DTG which is assessed at 65% strength is likely the OSC 2
Main Effort. It will likely defend on the River KURA. Both
deception as to the CFLCC main effort and fixing 25 DTG in
its current location will be critical for 4 MND's operations.
(g) 23 DTG, which is at 65% strength, is the OSC 2 secondary
effort. It has established a defence oriented to the NW with its
rear boundary on the River ARAS. Its main task is to protect
western approaches to the Arianian border along the ARAS
River Valley and to protect the WEST flank of 25 DTG.
(h) OSC2 is estimated to have 25-30 SPF teams from 3961 SPF
BDE infiltrated into unoccupied AP. Additionally, SAPA could
be expected to operate independently and also cooperate with
Arianian SPF. These forces will look for soft targets, using
direct action and IED/mines. Assembly Areas, Waiting Areas,
the DSA, HQs and routes in the rear area will need to be
protected.
(i) The OSC 2 defence is supported by the 3 Reconnaissance,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RISTA)
Command (CMD), the 27 Integrated Fires Command (IFC), the
355 and 357 Independent Combat Aviation Brigades (ICAB),
the 28 Integrated Air Defense Command (IADC), and the 3
Engineer CMD (Mobility/Counter Mobility/Survivability,
Pontoon, Deception). The 3rd Integrated Support Command
(ISC) will support OSC2 from within AN likely from the town
of ARDABIL.
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(j) The 26 DTG is held back in ARDABIL in AN, protecting a

major logistic distribution point. The capabilities of 26 DTG is
estimated at 50% as most of its capable Units and equipment
have been used to reinforce 2 OSC DTGs in AP.
(2) OSC 1. The OSC 1 is believed to have remained in AN to defend the
border in depth along the River ARAS and to secure its crossings. The
OSC 1 defence is supported by Fires, 1 RISTA CMD, 1 Integrated
Fires Command (IFC), 311 and 313 Independent Combat Aviation
Brigades (ICAB), 16 IADC, and 1 Engineer CMD. The 1 ISC will
support the defence from within AN.
(3) Air Threat.
(a) Arianian Air Force (AN Air Force).
i. Currently, the AN Air Force has no air bases established
inside AP. Although it is expected that the Coalition
will establish and maintain air superiority over the
CFLCC AO, the AN Air Force has a reputation for
flying skill and the ability to conduct aggressive air
interdiction and close air support As such, 4 MND
should expect the AN Air Force will attempt to strike
high payoff targets such as moves along major routes,
the crossing of the River KURA and other choke points;
dispersion and camouflage/concealment will be
important.
ii. Attack Aviation. Arianian helicopters are capable of
attack in packages of two to four, ingressing at nap of
the earth, gaining elevation prior to ordnance release at
200 feet AGL. Enemy attack helicopters will target
armored/mechanized formations. FARPs will likely be
established for attack helicopters within 50-75
kilometers of the FEBA and could be lucrative targets
for deep strikes if they can be identified.
(4) Arianian Navy. The Arianian naval forces in the CASPIAN Sea have
inflicted significant damage on the Atropian Navy, whereby the latter
can now only protect the port of BAKU. However, the Arianian Navy
must now operate under the threat of Coalition air. If the AN Air
Force can achieve local air superiority they do however retain the
capability to conduct limited amphibious operations, delivering an
infantry battalion equivalent with light armor vehicles; although not a
significant threat there does remain the possibility of a raid-like
operation along the Div's coastal flank.
(5) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses.
(a) The enemy command, control, communications, and
intelligence system is integrated and redundant allowing
maximum flexibility and responsiveness.
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(b) Enemy DTGs have organic engineers at all levels down to and
including Bdes.
(c) The DTGs have a large number of main battle tanks and AT
systems. Therefore, their commanders believe they can fight
Coalition forces on a linear battlefield and win. The training
and equipment of the enemy is however, below the level of 4
MND.
(d) The enemy possesses chemical weapons and their doctrine
supports first use of this capability.
(e) 3961 SPF BDE (Abn) and SAPA forces are fully capable of
conducting effective attacks against our rear areas.
(f) 24 DTG is a motorized formation with its guns, mortars and AT
systems being towed. This will to a degree limit its offensive
capability.
d. Threat Capabilities.
(1) Information Operations.
(a) The Government of AN will aggressively exploit any situation
in which collateral damage is caused by 4 MND forces. The
remnants of 24 and 25 DTGs opposing 4 MND will likely place
some High Pay-off Targets in locations that could result in
collateral damage when targeted by 4 MND. The enemy will
then use the news media and regional/ international political
organizations, such as the UN, to spread propaganda regarding
Coalition actions within the AO.
(b) The DTGs of OSC 2 have the capability to electronically attack
non-secure communication nodes.
(c) The enemy force has the capability to conduct localized
electronic attack on secure military networks but it does not
have the capability to exploit secure signals intercept or secure
computer networks.
e. Logistics. Enemy formations facing 4 MND will likely use two MSRs
extended from logistical nodes inside AN. The main operational supply center
is probably located in the city of ARDABIL inside AN, with a secondary
location in PARSABAD. 3 ISC will likely operate a forward logistic base
near BILOSUVAR to support 25 and 24 DTG to the EAST of the River
ARAS and another to the EAST of the ARAS (location tbc) to support 23
DTG.
f. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The enemy could employ a variety of
WMD in support of its operations. However, in the 4 MND AO, the most
probable type of WMD is non-persistent chemical. The most probable means
of delivery is either SS-26 or SS-21, although the enemy possesses several
other forms of rocket, artillery and mortar delivered chemical munitions.

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g. Operational Center of Gravity. It is assessed that the Arianians consider their

operational center of gravity as the OSC 2 defence. The enemy intent will be
to decisively defeat CFLCC forces in order to fracture the Coalition’s
integrity.
h. Tactical Center of Gravity. It is assessed that the enemy considers 25 DTG as
its tactical centre of gravity. The enemy understands the importance of the
defence along the River KURA and the relatively high speed avenue of
approach along the CASPIAN Sea coast deep into AN. It should be noted that
4 MND/CFLCC's assessment is that 24 DTG is the actual tactical centre of
gravity.
i. Critical Vulnerabilities. The enemy’s critical vulnerabilities include the ease
with which it can be located and thus attacked; the limited number of MSRs
and key routes in his defensive zone allowing detection and interdiction,
especially as he withdraws back to the IB; insufficient numbers and overuse of
key equipment and assets due to previous attrition; his vulnerability to
jamming and destruction; log bases that can be located and attacked; and
relatively vulnerable towed artillery.
j. Critical Requirements. These include reserves, freedom to manoeuver forces,
engineer forces (Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability), Integrated Air
Defense Systems (IADs), and an ability to supply his forward units and
support them by
k. Intelligence Capabilities. The enemy will rely heavily on HUMINT and
SIGINT to report on the movement, disposition and deployment of 4 MND.
SPF and irregular forces (SAPA and Salaysl) operating in the AO will be a
major source of that HUMINT. These teams are deployed by OSC 2 HQ and
will likely coordinate their operations with 24 and 25 DTGs. Enemy forces
will focus their intelligence collection efforts on 4 MND precision weapons
systems, air defense assets, intelligence gathering assets (UAVs, SIGINT,
etc.), and Bde and Div Command Posts, as well as the location and
movements of artillery batteries and Div reserve. The enemy’s aerial
reconnaissance includes visual observation, aerial imagery, UAS
reconnaissance and signals reconnaissance.

Tabs:
Tab A Terrain
Tab B Weather

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Tab A
Appx 1
Annex D
4 MND Op P 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN
TERRAIN
1. 4 MND AO. The CASPIAN Sea Coastline and the vast flatlands (sometimes referred
to as the KURA-ARAS lowland) form the northern and western boundaries of, and are the
key features of, the AO. In terms of climate, the area of SIRVAN National Park, east of
SALYAN lies in an area of moderate warm semi-desert and arid steppe. Summers are hot and
dry and winters are cool and dry. The eastern reaches of the Lesser CAUCASUS Mountain
ranges dominate the Southern edge of the AO and form part of the International Border (IB)
of ATROPIA with ARIANA in that area. To the extreme southeast, the TALISH Mountains
form part of the border with ARIANA.

2. RELIEF. The Lesser CAUCASUS Mountain range runs parallel to the greater range
along the Limarian border at an average distance of about 100 km (60 mi) to the south and
with the MESKHETI Range as a part of the Lesser CAUCASUS system. The Greater and
Lesser CAUCASUS ranges are connected by the LIKHI Range, which separates the
KOLKHIDA Lowland from the KURA Depression (KURA-ARAS Lowland). The lowest
terrain is found in the east, central-eastern portion astride the banks of the KURA River.
3. DRAINAGE.
a. KURA River. The KURA rises in northeastern TURKEY in the KARS
Upland of the Lesser CAUCASUS. It flows east from GORGAS before it
empties into the MINGACHEVIR reservoir, the largest body of water in
ATROPIA. After leaving the dam the river meanders southeast and continues
across a broad irrigated plain for several hundred kilometers, turning east near
Lake SARYSU, and shortly after, intersects the ARAS River, at the city of
SABIRABAD. At the ARAS confluence it makes a large arc to the north and
then flows almost due south for about 60 kilometers (37 mi), passing the west
side of SHIRVAN National Park, before turning east and emptying into the
CASPIAN Sea at NEFTCALA.

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b. River Width. The average width of the KURA River from the
MINGACHEVIR Reservoir to the delta is around 150 meters, with some
sections of the river, particularly the sections east of YEVLAHK (38T 819
976) prior to the confluence with the ARAS where irrigation is at its largest,
can be as little as 90 meters in width. The river is navigable for the last 300
kilometers, to just below the town of MINGACHEVIR.
c. River Banks. The banks of the KURA from MINGACHEVIR Reservoir to its
outflow on the CASPIAN Sea have little slope that would affect crossing. The
KURA flows through farmlands at this point in its course. There are few
covered and concealed locations along the banks of the KURA, especially on
its southwestern banks. The limited concealment is provided by brush and
trees along the bank, particularly in areas where canals or tributaries meet with
the river, which poses additional concerns for mobility in those areas. The
northeastern bank has some areas where the terrain rises in hills close to the
bank, providing any enemy forces advantage to defending crossing sites.
d. Bank Soil. The KURA River is one of the most turbid rivers in the world,
moving over 100,000 cubic meters of silt annually The KURA has three main
types of soil. The first is alluvial sand, which is abundant along the tributaries
running off of the Lesser CAUCASUS ranges into the KURA. The second
type of soil is found along the majority of the river, which consists of silt and
loam deposited by the river and the continued farming. The final type of soil
occurs in the oxbow areas along the river. These areas are a mix of clay and
humus, soil in this area generally retains water, leading to swampy conditions.
e. Flow Rate. The mean velocity of the KURA River is about 1.65 m/s. Typical
flooding for the region occurs in June and July when snow melt in the Lesser
CAUCASUS ranges are at their greatest.
f. Existing Crossing Sites. There are 14 existing bridges on the KURA River.
These bridges are currently assumed to be Military Load Classification (MLC)
100.
g. ARAS River. The ARAS river source is south of ERZURUM in the mountains
of TURKEY; it flows eastward, forming for approximately 440 kms (275
miles) the international boundary between LIMARIA and ATROPIA on the
north and TURKEY and ARIANA on the south. After a course of about 665
miles (1,070 km), the ARAS joins the KURA River in ATROPIA near
SABIRABAD 75 miles (121 km) from its mouth on the CASPIAN Sea. The
swift-flowing, un-navigable ARAS provides most of the sediment forming the
KURA-ARAS delta.
h. River Width. The ARAS River is approximately 60 meters at its narrowest
points along its flow through the AO. The river also contains several areas
where the river is braided. At these points the multiple channels narrow but the
total gap distance is increased.
i. River Banks. The banks of the ARAS are susceptible to erosion.
Reconnaissance of potential crossing sites is required to determine bank
potential for trafficability and abutments.

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j. Bank Soil. The soil along the ARAS consists of gravel and sand with a top
layer of loam and humus.
k. Flow Rate. The ARAS River has a discharge of approximately twice that of
the KURA. With a smaller channel area, it would imply that the current could
be as much as four times the speed of the KURA.
l. Existing Crossing Sites. There are ten existing bridges crossing the ARAS
River and all are assumed to be MLC 100.
4. VEGETATION. Forests cover only about 10% of ATROPIA. The Greater
CAUCASUS Mountains possess vast forest areas on the northern slopes of their eastern
section. In ATROPIA’s southeast region, the forests disappear and more arid areas generally
dominate. While the forests exhibit a very diverse variety of trees, the main broad-leaf trees
include hornbeam, pistachio and oak.
5. MAJOR CITIES. Most cities in the AO are located along the KURA and ARAS
River. Some of the major cities in the 4 MND AO include:
a. ALI BAYRAMLY (SIRVAN) – (39S UE 216 227) population of 81,200 in
2010.
b. ASTARA - (39S UC 145581) population 16,200 as of 2008. ASTARA on the
other side of the IB in ARIANA has a population of 86,700 as of 2011.
c. BILASUVAR – (39S TD 898705) population of 95,000 as of 2013.
d. LANKARAN – (39 S UC 130911) population of 220,000 as of 2015.
e. NEFTCHALA – (39S UD 494616) population of 20,000 as of 2010.
f. SABIRABAD – (39T TE 844320) population of 30,000 as of 2008.
g. SALYAN – (39S UD 264847) population of 36,000 as of 2008.
6. MAJOR ROUTES. The major routes in the 4 MND AO are:
a. Route M2 (MSR SEATTLE). Route M2 runs east to west beginning in
BAKU and running southwest along the coastline to the area of KIRTCHU
until it turns northwest and ends on the ATROPIA – GORGAS border before
it enters the town of KIRACH-MUGANLO, GORGAS. Route M2 is rated at
MLC 100.
b. Route M3 (MSR MIAMI). Route M3 runs north to south beginning just West
of ALAT on the CASPIAN Sea Coast past SALYAN and then turns away
from the coastline near BILASUVAR to end near the Arianian border at the
CASPIAN Sea port of ASTARA. Route M3 is rated at MLC 100.
7. RAILROADS. Atropian Railways is the national state-owned rail transport operator
in ATROPIA. . The national network has no high-speed lines and is not served by high-speed
trains. The 188-km sector of BAKU-ASTARA railway area from OSMANLY Station to
ASTARA Station is a single-line, non-electrified railway line and well-equipped with
automatic traffic control signals. The branch line from SALYAN to NEFTCALA is of similar
construction. The major railway lines running in the 4 MND AO are shown below:

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8. BRIDGES. There are eight bridges across the KURA River in 4 MND AO. All are
MLC 100. They are:
a. Two bridges North of the town of SABIRABAD;
b. Two bridges in the town of ALI BAYRAMLY (SIRVAN);
c. Two bridges in the town of SALYAN (one a rail bridge);
d. One bridge South of KUR QARABUCQ; and,
e. One bridge in the town of BANKA.
9. AIRFIELDS. There are several major airports in the 4 MND AO which are listed
below. The KYUDAMIR Military Airfield is close to the town of SAATLY near the
confluence of the KURA – ARAS Rivers. The Arianian forces are presently in control of
LENKORAN International Airport on the CASPIAN Sea Coast.
ATROPIAN AIRFIELD DATA

Name Number Elevation Latitude Longitude Length Width Surface

DOLLYAR 205 1099 40 58 45 57 8182 135 Concrete
15.44N 25.25E
GANJA 206 1083 40 44 46 19 8202 148 Concrete
06.00N 06.00E
LENKORAN 207 30 38 44 48 49 5172 148 Asphalt
46.70N 04.61E
SANGACHALY 208 UNK 40 07 49 27 7619 UNK PEM
46.00N 16.00E
SITAL CHAY 212 UNK 40 48 49 25 8199 UNK Concrete
30.00N 55.00E
KYURDAMIR 213 -3 40 16 48 09 8200 130 Concrete
24.92N 48.84E

10. AGRICULTURE. While 38% of Atropians work in agriculture-related occupations,

farming only produces 5.5% of the country’s GDP. The agriculture sector employs over
three times the number involved in industry. The arable land and variable climate allow for
diverse crop cultivation that includes vegetables, fruits, tea, grains, and nuts, but cotton reigns
as ATROPIA’s largest agricultural product. Agricultural fields are trafficable only during the
late summer months or when frozen during the winter.

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11. HYDROGRAPHY.
a. Coastal Features. The coastline of ATROPIA is 930 km long and occupies the
central and southern parts of the CASPIAN Sea. The sea is stormy for 250
days a year and sometimes the severe winds cause huge waves to arise. The
average summer temperature of the water in the south of the sea is 77-86 F°
and 55.4 F° in winter. The water never freezes close to the coastline of
ATROPIA, but freezes in its northern section. The CASPIAN Sea has
fluctuations of up to 3 meters, because of wind action and barometric pressure.
Tide ranges are small, only a few centimetres. Prevailing easterly winds
produce strong wave action and occasional storm surges.
b. Drainage. The southeastern part of ATROPIA is crisscrossed by numerous
canals and irrigation ditches that are created by farmers who use the water
from the KURA and ARAS Rivers and their numerous tributaries to water
their crops. This will create canalizing ground especially during the rainiest
months of the year. The months of Sep, Oct and Nov bring rains of between
140 millimetres (5.6 inches) and 160 millimetres (6.6 inches) per month.
12. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. Atropian Government sources indicate that the
Atropian areas in the 4 MND AO most directly affected by the conflict so far are as follows:

Province Rayons
KURDAMIR JALILABAD (outflow of IDPs)
ZARDAB SALYAN (inflow of IDPs)
HAJIGABUL IMISHLI, BILASUVAR, SAATLY (outflow of IDPs)
GOYCHAY KURDAMIR, ZARDAB (inflow of IDPs)
a. The humanitarian situation in the most-affected Atropian Rayons is dire.
Significant numbers of Atropian citizens have been driven from their homes
by the conflict. The fighting has created a significant humanitarian crisis with
the following characteristics:
(1) Widespread civilian casualties (fatalities and wounded);
(2) Significant damage to/destruction of all types of Atropian facilities
(hospitals, schools, public and private buildings) and infrastructure
(communication, transport routes, water, power, sanitation, etc.);
(3) Complete disruption of normal commercial and economic activity in
the conflict affected area (harvests, markets etc.);
(4) Minefields and unexploded ordnance; and,
(5) Significant movement of local population from combat zones into safer
areas (real or perceived) – IDP crisis.
b. There is no non-combatant access into the conflict-affected areas at this time.
OCHA staff on the ground has been interviewing IDPs who are crossing into
Atropian-controlled territory. Anecdotal evidence indicates that significant
numbers of IDPs are seeking to exit the combat-affected areas south of the
KURA River line and are moving north in numbers that could range from 40-
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80,000 (estimate only). Rayon Councils are struggling to cope with the
humanitarian situation. The Ministry of Emergency Situations and the state
sponsored Committee for Refugees and IDPs (CRI) are spearheading the
government response in cooperation with the Atropian Red Crescent Society.
c. There appear to be two main flows of IDPs into the 4 MND AO at this time:
(1) Inflows to GOYCHAY Province – IDPs from IMISHLI,
BILASUVAR, SAATLY Rayons and surrounding areas – numbers in
the 20-25,000 range (estimate only) – moving north on route R11.
(2) Inflows to ZARDAB Province – IDPs from the BILASUVAR,
SALYAN, SABIRABAD Rayons and surrounding areas – numbers in
the 20-30,000 range (estimate only) – moving northeast on route M6
and east on E119 and north on route R45.

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Tab B
Appendix 1
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN
WEATHER
13. CONDITIONS. Nine out of the world’s eleven existing climate zones are present in
ATROPIA; the conditions can vary greatly depending in which part of the country operations
are being conducted. In the central and eastern regions, the climate is generally dry and
semiarid (little annual rainfall). In the southeast, the climate is arid and sub-tropical. Along
the shores of the CASPIAN Sea it is temperate (moderate), while the higher mountain
elevations are generally cold. The CASPIAN Sea coastline and the vast flatlands (sometimes
referred to as the KURA – ARAS lowland) are key features of the 4 MND AO, while the
eastern reaches of the Lesser Caucasus Mountain Range (including the TALISH Mountains)
dominate the southern edge along the International Border (IB) of ATROPIA with ARIANA.
The KURA-ARAS River Lowland exhibits a dry-subtropical climate, while the TALISH
Mountains feature a wet-subtropical climate. The maximum annual precipitation in the area
falls in LANKARAN (1,600 to 1,800 mm) and the minimum in the ABSERON Peninsula
(200 to 350 mm).
14.

Average monthly Temperature and15.

Rainfall for Atropia from 1990-2012

16. SKY COVER. Summer skies are fair, mostly sunny to partly cloudy. Mostly cloudy
skies below 1,000 feet are extremely rare, providing favorable conditions for all air support
operations.
17. VISIBILITY. Morning fog tends to develop less than five times in June throughout
ATROPIA. Morning fog generally dissipates before mid-morning. Pollution is the main
cause of restricted visibility occurring 30-40 percent of the time during the day and 75
percent of the time at night.
18. PRECIPITATION. The location and the season dramatically affect precipitation
throughout ATROPIA. May has the most precipitation in summer, although it tapers off late
in the month as the area of high pressure strengthens. Largely due to the terrain, frontal

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systems are rare in June. Locally generated rain showers and isolated thunderstorms bring
the only rain. In the east, along the CASPIAN Sea, most precipitation occurs in the fall and
winter. In that period, communication systems can lose effectiveness. Along the CASPIAN
Sea in the south, precipitation can reach 47 to 55 inches annually.
19. WIND. In the lowlands, winds usually blow in the southeastern and northwestern
directions. In the valleys of Atropia, surface winds tend to flow from the east at less than 10
knots. Winds reach higher speeds on the ABSERON Peninsula where strong, stormy winds
are considered normal. Generally, the winds would allow air assault, airborne and aviation
operations.
20. MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS. The weather in ATROPIA's mountainous regions is
variable with the season and time of day. These conditions can greatly affect mobility and
tactical operations. Even under nonviolent conditions, operations in a mountainous
environment may pose significant risks and dangers.
21. EFFECT ON ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES.
a. Low temperatures will adversely affect troop morale of the DTGs of OSC 2,
especially the unprepared and poorly supplied. Snow in the TALISH
Mountains will probably limit off road movement. Heavy snowfalls and icy
conditions may close some mountain passes through the LESSER
CAUCASUS Mountains for three to six months.
b. Enemy Su-24 FROGFOOT CAS, MI-8 HIP, MI-24 HIND aircraft lack all-
weather capabilities. That said, enemy air assault insertions can be expected
during hours of limited visibility.

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Appendix 2
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 - OP IRON GUARDIAN

Information Collection

References:

A. 4 MND OPORD 07 Op Iron Guardian, Annex D

B. CFLCC OPORD 07 – Annex B

Time Zone: ZULU

1. SITUATION.
a. Area of Interest. Refer to Annex D.
b. Area of Operations. Refer to Annex D.
c. Terrain. Refer to Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex D.
d. Weather. Refer to Tab B to Appendix 1 to Annex D.
e. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex D.
f. Friendly Forces. Refer to Annex D.
g. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Refer
to Appendix 1 to Annex W – HA Organizations in Atropia.
h. Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex W.
i. Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A to OPORD 07.
j. Assumptions. Refer to the OPORD 07.
2. MISSION. 4 MND G2 staff will help shape the operational environment to ensure the
success of the division’s combat operations in support of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations. 4 MND collection assets will provide coverage for the
4 MND AO. Collection assets will assist the commander in making key
decisions at critical points in the battle and in answering his PIRs. But, just as
the commander’s PIRs change, the assets’ focus will adapt as 4 MND
advances across its AO.
b. Movement and Maneuver. Refer to OP O 07.
c. Intelligence. Refer to Annex D.
d. Fires. Refer to Annex KK – Joint Fires and Targeting.
e. Protection. Refer to Annex J – Force Protection.
f. Engineer. Refer to Annex EE - Engineer.
g. Soldier and Leader Engagement. Refer to Annexes X (Public Affairs) and W
(Civil Military Cooperation).

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h. Tasks to Subordinate Units. Refer to Appendix 1 of this annex.

i. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Brigades will develop collection plans for their integral assets that will
begin collecting immediately upon arrival in the 4 MND AO. These
collection plans will be developed 24 hours prior to arrival and 72
hours in advance of requirement thereafter.
(2) Named Area of Interest (NAI) Numbering Convention. 4 MND will
use the CFLCC four digit numbering system as the basis for allocating
NAIs within the AO. The first three digits are based on the
subordinate unit and, the last two digits are the actual NAI.

4 MND HQ 320XX
7 (GE) Recce Regt 321XX
6 F-G Bde 322XX
12 (UK) AIB 323XX
4 (CA) CMBG 324XX
X (AS) Bde 325XX
4 MN Arty Bde 326XX
4 (MN) CAB 327XX
709 MI Bn 328XX
Other 4 MND units 329XX

(3) Subordinate unit commanders are authorized to coordinate across their

formations with an information copy to the 4 MND G-2.
(4) Specific requests for national assets will be sent through the 4 MND G-
2.
j. Priority Intelligence Requirements.
(1) AN Armed Forces.
(a) What are the capabilities, relative strengths, intentions and
current locations of the Arianian military forces (241 and 242
Inf BTGs, 244 Tk BTG and 24 AT Bn) opposing 4 MND?
(b) Where are the primary barriers and obstacles that will affect 4
MND offensive operations?
(c) What is the current strength, disposition and location(s) of the
OSC 2 countermove force (349 BTG) and what are its likely
priorities as assigned by OSC 2?
(d) What is the current location and disposition of elements of 355
Helicopter Bde units in our AO?

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(e) What is the morale of the Arianian units in our AO and can it
be exploited through subversion or IA?
(f) What is the chemical weapon threat to 4 MND forces from
elements of 361st Chemical Defence Brigade (Arianian) located
in our area? Are there any Atropian chemical or biological
weapons facilities within our AO that could be activated and
exploited by the Arianian forces?
(g) Which enemy air defence capabilities can affect 4 MND
aviation and UAV operations, particularly in Phase III?
(h) Which formations from OSC 1 are most likely to reinforce
OSC 2 and which routes will they use to enter our AO from
inside Ariana?
(2) Irregular Forces.
(a) What are the capabilities, intentions and location of insurgent
forces in our AO, in particular the SAL and SAPA forces?
(b) What major activities have irregular and Arianian Special
Purpose Forces been engaged in within southern Atropia within
the past 30 days?
(c) What connections do hybrid or irregular forces have with local
authorities or criminal organizations?
(d) What equipment and infrastructure within our AO do irregular
forces or criminal organizations have at their disposal to
conduct operations?
(e) What is the level of training and proficiency of the various
irregular forces?
(f) What are the inter-relationships between the factions and where
are these relationships exploitable?
(3) Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE).
(a) What is the current DPRE situation and how will it affect 4
MND operations?
(b) Where are the DPRE camps/facilities located?
(c) What armed factions intend to disrupt the provision of
humanitarian aid?
(4) Essential Elements of Friendly Information.
(a) Location and disposition of the 4 MND Reserve.
(b) Status of attack aviation assets within 4MND and at Corps
level.
(c) Location and disposition of alternate crossing sites over the
Kura River that may permit hasty crossings.

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(d) Evacuation routes and collection points for DPREs.

(e) Locations and dispositions of IO/NGOs in the AO.
(5) Rules of Engagement. Refer to Appendix 1 to Annex E.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT Refer to Annex R.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Refer to the main order and Annex Q.

Tabs:
Tab A - Information Collection Plan

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Tab A
Appendix 2 Mission: Operation IRON GUARDIAN
Annex D 4 MND Information Collection Plan
Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN

PRI PIR IR INDICATORs 7(Ge) Recce 6 F-G Bde 12(UK)AIB 4 CMBG X (AS) Bde 4 (MN) Arty 4 (MN) CAB 130 (US) MEB 709 MI Bn 450 CA Bn Flanking LTIOV Reports Remarks
1 Terrain - Where are Located in larger Obstacles and reports of
the major choke centres of Garasu, irregular forces active in
points from TAA Hajigabul Alyat and these areas. Confirm with
UAV
SILVER to the Div WAs Hesenli x x x x x x x x Ongoing Atropian Southern
Recce
along MSR SEATTLE Command (ASC)
and MSR MIAMI?

2 What is the status of Size and capability Infrastructure available

Bde Assy Areas A1 to support brigade in each location
Garasu, A2 Alyat and size elements Confirm with
UAV
x x x x x x x x Ongoing Atropian Southern
A3 Hesenli? Recce
Command (ASC)

3 What is the status of Confirm the width, Engineer reports or Engr

the river crossings depth, current, Recce of the sites in the Confirm with
UAV
along the Kura River? banks (height and area x x x x x x x x Ongoing Atropian Southern
Recce
steepness) Command (ASC)

4 Where are the enemy Confirm any Minefields, minor

defensive dispositions engineer obstacles obstacles, defensive
Confirm with
in the area of the and defensive works and major UAV
x x x x x x x x Ongoing Atropian Southern
OPAL and GARNET works in the area engineer obstacles in the Recce
Command (ASC)
crossing sites? of the sites area

5 What is the status of Confirm status of MLC of major roads

the routes from the 4 routes and their (MSR MIAMI) and
Confirm with
MND crossing sites to abililty to handle bridges and crossings on UAV
x x x x x x x x Ongoing Atropian Southern
the border with tactical movement canals and irrigation Recce
Command (ASC)
Ariana? of bdes of 4 MND. ditches

6 What is the status of Confirm status of Military and civilian

the main crossing border crossing reports on the status of
sites into Ariana from sites at Astara (39S these towns Confirm with
UAV
Atropia? UC 145581) and x x x x x x x x Ongoing Atropian Southern
Recce
Bileh-Suvar (39S TD Command (ASC)
726619)

7 Arianian Army. What Confirm that 244 244 BTG employs a

are the capabilities, BTG is in depth combination of BTR 80s
intentions and along the Caspian and T90s, MT-12R and
location of the coast has two infantry and two
Arianian 24 DTG (241 tank battalions
Recce
and 242 Inf BTGs, 244 x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
Tk BTG adn 24 AT Bn)
opposing 4 MND?

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PRI PIR IR INDICATORs 7(Ge) Recce 6 F-G Bde 12(UK)AIB 4 CMBG X (AS) Bde 4 (MN) Arty 4 (MN) CAB 130 (US) MEB 709 MI Bn 450 CA Bn Flanking LTIOV Reports Remarks
8 Confirm that 241 is 241 and 242 BTG employ
LEFT and 242 is a combination of BTR 80s
RIGHT fwd in and T90s, 2A65 Arty, MT-
defence 12R and have three
Recce
infantry and one tank x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
battalion each

9 Confirm location of 241 Atk Bn is attached to

units of 24 AT Bde. 241 Mech Inf Bde, 242
Atk Bn is attached to 242
Mech Inf Bde and 244
Atk Bn is attached to 244
Recce
Tank Bde and they are all x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
equipped with MT-12R

10 Confirm the 242 likely located

location of the 24 forward to c-atk into our
DTG countermove bridgeheads. Unit is
force based on 242 equipped with T-90S Recce
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Tank Bn Engr Recce

11 Where are the En MDA likely Movement and

primary defensive focused on the employment of engineer
positions that will major routes into troops with bridging,
affect 4 MND and out of the construction or digging
Recce
offensive operations? defensive zone equipment along MIAMI
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Engr Recce
from ARIANA and and other routes in our
Contact
crossings on Kura AO

12 Where are the Likely located near Movement of resupply

primary positions of larger urban convoys or other large
support orgs such as centres or major groups of vehicles. Recce
Supply, Maint, facilities near cities Medical facilities likely x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Engr Recce
Transport and and towns. located near hospitals. Contact
Medical Facilities?

13 Confirm the state MLC and state of repair

of MSR MIAMI and of the major routes in
the other major the AO
routes leading into Recce
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
our AO from Ariana Engr Recce

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PRI PIR IR INDICATORs 7(Ge) Recce 6 F-G Bde 12(UK)AIB 4 CMBG X (AS) Bde 4 (MN) Arty 4 (MN) CAB 130 (US) MEB 709 MI Bn 450 CA Bn Flanking LTIOV Reports Remarks
14 Confirm the state MLC of major bridges at
of bridges and Sabirabad (39T TE 843
crossings in our AO 343), Sirvan (39S UE 209
over the Kura River 222), Salyan (39S UD 265
875), Qarabucq(39S UD
299 694) and Banka(39S Recce
x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
UD 486 641) Engr Recce

15 Where is the OSC 2 If it moves to 349 BTG employs a

countermove force support 25 DTG, it variety of eqpt. A
(349 BTG) deployed could confirm that combination of BMP2,
and what support 25 DTG defence on AMX-10 HOT 3, with
could it provide to the the Kura is the ME T90A supported by G6 Recce
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
forces opposing 4 of OSC 2 defence Arty might indicate a Contact
MND? move by this BTG

16 What is the current Confirm the Temporary FARPs being

location and location of 1 and 2 set up in the enemy rear
disposition of Bns (AtK) of 355 area for use by Atk, Util
elements of 355 Combat Hel Bde. or Recce Hels. Equipped
Helicopter Bde units Need to ensure it with MI35M2 Recce
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
in our AO? can't defeat our Contact
bridgehead

17 What elements of 25 Confirm the Inf BTGs are equipped

DTG could we face in locations of each with BTR 80-A and T-90S
our AO? 251, 252 or element in the while Tk BTGs are Recce
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
253 Inf BTG or 254 Tk defensive zone equipped with T-90S Contact
DTG?

18 Where are the major Confirm state of Major bridging eqpt and
crossings on the Aras crossings on the engineer assets moving
River that could allow river to the Aras River bridges Recce
the enemy to enter or crossing sites x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
our AO?

19 What is the chemical En could resort to Deployment of Smoke,

weapons threat to 4 using non- Decontamination, or
MND forces from persistent Chemical assets to our
elements of 361st chemicals to front
Chemical Defence prevent crossings
Recce
Brigade (Arianian) on the Kura River. x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
located in our area?

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PRI PIR IR INDICATORs 7(Ge) Recce 6 F-G Bde 12(UK)AIB 4 CMBG X (AS) Bde 4 (MN) Arty 4 (MN) CAB 130 (US) MEB 709 MI Bn 450 CA Bn Flanking LTIOV Reports Remarks
20 Are there any Confirm the Govt of Atropia
Atropian chemical or location of any confirmation that there
biological weapons Atropian chemical are such facilities still in
facilities within our or biological operation in the
AO that could be facilities in the 4 southeast of Atropia
Recce
activated and MND AO. x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
exploited by the
Arianian forces?

21 Which enemy air Confirm where Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 FO) is

defence capabilities elements of 28th employed by 282 Bde
can affect 4 MND Air Defence Comd while the FM-90 w/SA-
aviation and UAV are in the 4MND 18 is employed by 283 Recce
x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
operations? AO Bde Contact

22 What is the morale of Determine how Reports of an increase in

the Arianian units in hard the enemy is desertion, incarceration
our AO and can it be likely to fight to or mutiny among the
exploited through hold on to ranks of the Arianian Recce
subversion or IA? Atropian territory military x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact

23 Which formations of Confirm where the Construction of bridges

OSC 1's 13 DTG are BTGs of this DTG or improvised roads
most likely to are located and along the border that
reinforce OSC 2 and which routes will would allow military
Recce
which routes will they they use traffic to cross or any x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
Contact
use to enter our AO improvements to the
from inside Ariana? few existing routes into
Atropia

24 Irregular Forces What Confirm what An increase in the

are the capabilities, weapons and number, types and
intentions and training they have sophistication of
location of irregular had since Atropia weapons captured in our
forces in our AO, in was invaded operations Recce
particular the SAL and x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Contact
SAPA forces? HumInt

25 What connections do Confirm who An increase in the level

hybrid or irregular these factions align of support of the local
forces have with local with and who the population for these
authorities or criminal leaders in the local factions Recce
organizations? area are x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Contact
HumInt

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PRI PIR IR INDICATORs 7(Ge) Recce 6 F-G Bde 12(UK)AIB 4 CMBG X (AS) Bde 4 (MN) Arty 4 (MN) CAB 130 (US) MEB 709 MI Bn 450 CA Bn Flanking LTIOV Reports Remarks
26 What equipment and Confirm what The level of modernity
infrastructure do facilities and eqpt and robustness of
irregular forces or are avail to these equipment (individual
criminal organizations organizations and crew-served) and
Recce
have at their disposal weaponry used by the
x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Contact
to conduct criminal elements and
HumInt
operations? insurgents in our AO

27 What is the level of Confirm if The level of tactics and

training and elements of 3961 weapons used by Recce
proficiency of the SPF Bde are insurgent forces in our x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Contact
various irregular involved in the trg AO HumInt
forces?
28 What are the inter- Determine the Indication that provincial
relationships between hierarchial or rayon authorities are
the factions and structure of the being usurped by the
where are these local factions leaders of the factions Recce
x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing Contact
relationships
exploitable? IO/NGO Reports

29 DPREs Where are the Confirm if HA DPREs moving along the

Recce
DPREs located in the 4 Reports are correct few routes available in
Contact
MND AO? on location of our AO x x Ongoing
UN Agencies
refugees
HumInt
30 What is the current Confirm the IA and NGO reports on
state of the displaced immediate aid the state of the
person and refugee needs of the DPREs displaced and refugees
Recce
(DPRE) situation and who come into our
Contact
how will it affect 4 AO as we gain x x Ongoing
UN Agencies
MND operations? territory
Humint

31 What armed factions Confirm if factions Level and sophistication

intend to disrupt the are organized of operations and the
Recce
provision of gangs or individual level of violence used in
Contact
humanitarian aid in criminals attacks by factions x x x x x x x x x x x Ongoing
UN Agencies
the 4 MND AO?
Humint

32
33
34
35

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Appendix 4
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)
References:
A. Provisional CDI Guidelines CFNCIU on International Operations dated 17 Apr 05
B. CDI Functional Directive: Execution of CF Exploitation Activities during Expeditionary
Operations, 21 November 2012
C. PW, Internees, and Detainees Joint Doctrine Publication: 1-10, 1-10.1, 1-10.3, May 2006
D. CDI Functional Directive on Intelligence & Intelligence Derived Information Sharing
With External Entities, 14 June 2010
E. CFJP 3-14 Prisoner of war handling, Detainees and Interrogation & Tactical Questioning
in International Operations, 1 August 2004
F. DND/CF Security Orders and Directives for Classified Information Systems.
G. Canadian Forces Special Material Directives (CFSMD) – Chapter 2 – DND Special
Material Authority. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
1. SITUATION.
a. Foreign Intelligence and Security Service (FISS).
(1) Threat. Hostile forces operating within the 4 MND Area of
Operations/Area of Interest (AO/AI) are capable of significant human
intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Intelligence operatives and
irregular forces such as Salasyl and SAPA operating in the 4 MND
area may use "third parties" in an attempt to impede, disrupt and/or
degrade friendly operations;
(2) Counterintelligence matters concerning citizens of the provinces of
ATROPIA (AP) in which the formations of 4 MND will operate,
including the provinces now occupied by ARIANA (AN), shall be
handled in accordance with existing agreements between the
Combined Joint Task Force Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CJTF –
OIG) command structure and the Government of AP.
b. Friendly.
(1) CFLCC CI Structure.
(a) The CFLCC Counterintelligence Staff Officer (CISO) will
assist and advise subordinate commands by functioning as the
Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
(TFCICA). The TFCICA conducts liaison with all friendly
agencies that have CI capabilities and/or functions in the
CFLCC AO. Coordination will ensure receipt of the
appropriate information required to support the successful
execution of operations.
(2) 4 MND CI Structure.
(a) The 4 MND G2 will coordinate requests for and monitors CI
activities and CI coverage within the 4 MND AO.
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2. MISSION. To provide for the receipt and dissemination of counterintelligence

information in a coordinated and timely manner in support of 4 MND operations.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations. The 4 MND G2 staff will issue a summary of the
objectives for obtaining and disseminating counterintelligence information in
the 4 MND AO;
b. Procedures.
(1) Prisoners of War (PW)/Detainees. Initial interrogation/interviews are
to occur as soon as practicable and in the case of Detainees prior to
authorized release or handover to local security forces. Interrogation
or interviews of PW/Detainees and their overall handling will be in
accordance with Annex MM (PW and Detainee Operations);
(2) Returned Own Forces. Coalition personnel that were captured,
missing or detained and have returned to national control are to be
transferred to parent unit as soon as possible for debriefing. Essential
life-saving or pain reduction medical treatment for those requiring it
shall take precedence over debriefing;
(3) Counterintelligence plans, programs and projects are to be submitted to
4 MND G2 for review before implementation;
(4) Counterintelligence matters concerning personnel from Troop
Contributing Nations (TCNs) are handled in accordance with existing
agreements between the concerned nations.
c. Tasks. 4 MND G2 is to coordinate, develop and implement divisional CI
activities to support:
(1) Counterintelligence Collection and Reporting.
(a) Targets. Priority Information Requirements (PIRs) and a
thorough review of available CI reports will determine targets.
Targets will include personalities (Black, Gray and White lists),
as well as installations, organizations, groups, documents and
materials; and
(b) Priorities. CFLCC priorities shall take precedence over those
of 4 MND when assigning targets and collection missions. 4
MND G2 will coordinate other requests with CFLCC staff on
an individual basis.
(2) Counterintelligence Analysis and Production.
(a) Investigative Memorandum for Record (IMFR) and Reports of
Investigation (ROI) shall be written by 4 MND staff in
conjunction with routine non-critical investigative actions.
Initial, interim and terminal spot reports shall be submitted, as
required, for critical non-routine actions;

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(b) 4 MND formations shall maintain liaison with intelligence

agencies in their areas of responsibility to ensure timely receipt
and dissemination of counterintelligence information bearing
on military operations specified in this plan;
(c) 4 MND G2 staff will ensure commanders are advised of
available counterintelligence capabilities and resources;
(d) Formations of the division are to submit CI plans, programs
and projects through 4 MND G2 staff for review before they
are forwarded to CFLCC for approval; and
(e) Publications, reports and communications that contain
classified information shall be marked, controlled, transmitted
and safeguarded in accordance with security regulations.
(3) Counterintelligence Investigations. All incidents conducted by
organizations or personalities directed against 4 MND forces, which
could disrupt operations, and/or activities, will be reported
immediately to G2 staff;
(4) Counterintelligence Operations. Detailed and coordinated plans for
seizure and exploitation of counterintelligence targets in support of
Tactical Exploitation and CI Source Operations are to be prepared.
Target lists should include responsibilities for:
(a) interrogation of hostile force detainees and defectors; screening
indigenous refugees, displaced persons and detained suspects;
(b) debriefing of friendly personnel who evade, escape or are
released from hostile force control; and
(c) exploiting captured hostile force documents and materiel.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Refer to Annex R (Logistics).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Refer to Annex Q (CIS).

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Appendix 5
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)
References:
A. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
B. Joint Pub 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations, 7 April 2000.
C. DIAM 58-17, Defense Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Requirements Manual, May 2001.
D. USSID SP0018, Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures, 25 Jan
2011
1. SITUATION. This appendix provides a general statement of responsibility and
planning guidance for the use of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) resources.
2. MISSION. SIGINT organizations and forces shall conduct collection activities to
satisfy the intelligence needs of 4 MND and subordinate formations.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations.
(1) Conduct cryptologic operations in accordance with the above
references.
(2) Commence SIGINT operations upon flow of forces into the CFLCC
AO.
b. Tasks.
(1) CFLCC G-2.
(a) Determine intelligence staffing requirements.
(b) Coordinate Liaison Officer (LO) and personnel requirements
between the subordinate units and the Analysis and Control
Element (ACE).
(c) Prepare a SIGINT summary every 12 hours.
(d) Conduct emitter mapping and relay information to the DCGS-A
architecture within 15 minutes of receipt.
(e) Responsible for intelligence oversight and must:
i. Safeguard the rights and privacy of relevant signals
intelligence directives (SID), policies, and intelligence
oversight in all operations involving collection
processing, dissemination and retention of SIGINT.
ii. Ensure Chain of Command and command staff
awareness of intelligence oversight for SIGINT
operations.

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iii. Provide required annual, periodic, or special

intelligence oversight training to all SIGINT personnel.
iv. Ensure the units handle SIGINT as required by policy
and guidance provided by 4 MND and CFLCC
oversight.
v. Ensure SIGINT information is not disseminated outside
of SIGINT reporting channels or the SIGINT
production chain and that SIGINT technical or
production information is not shared except by
established procedures.
vi. Review the information needs for the AO and respond
to those information needs and other advisory taskings.
(2) 4 MND SIGINT Section.
(a) Collect, record, decrypt and analyze target signals IAW
applicable management directives.
(b) Conduct time-sensitive reporting and analytical collaboration of
previously unevaluated and non-disseminated SIGINT. The
SIGINT section may issue the following reports as delegated
by 4 MND HQ:
i. Tactical Reports (TACREP), and Tactical ELINT
Reports (TACELINT) in accordance with (IAW)
published directives.
ii. Report distress signals in accordance with USSID
CR1521.
iii. Notify 4 MND Ops Centre immediately of an
immediate threat to operational security that requires
Comd 4 MND attention.
(3) Subordinate Units.
(a) Deploy SIGINT collection teams.
(b) Deploy assets to provide SIGINT mission management,
collection, processing, analysis and reporting; EAC high
frequency direction finding; and to establish communications
with theater subscribers.
(c) Identify and allocate collection teams to maximize collection
capabilities.
(d) Establish TROJAN SPIRIT II connectivity.
(e) Report the employment, targets and status of assigned SIGINT
assets to 4 MND HQ.
(f) Report all TACREPs and TACELINTs to 4 MND HQ within
10 minutes of identification.

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(g) Send an equipment status report every 12 hours to 4 MND HQ,

CFLCC and the appropriate overseers.
(h) Prepare a SIGINT Summary every 12 hours to 4 MND HQ and
CFLCC.
(i) Prepare Informal Technical Notes that answer commander’s
priority intelligence requirements and submit to higher
commands as appropriate.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) National signal intelligence support requirements and advisory tasking
of SIGINT collection assets shall be coordinated through CFLCC ACE
Chief.
(2) Monitor and report via Satellite Communication (SATCOM), Digital
Secure Voice Terminal (DSVT), organic communications or National
Security Agency Time Sensitive System (NTSS).
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Procedures for specialized technical logistics support to be
published by the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) in coordination with Chief,
Central Security Service (CHCSS).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Communications Systems.
(1) The cryptologic communications architecture shall include:
(a) Defense Special Security Communications Systems (DSSCS).
(b) Ultra High Frequency (UHF) SATCOM.
(c) Digital Secure Voice Terminal (DSVT).
(d) Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems
(JWICS), including Joint Deployable Intelligence Support
System (JDISS) capability.
(e) Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information Keyed STU-
III.
(f) AUTODIN/GENSER record message traffic.
(g) National Security Agency Time Sensitive System (NTSS). The
National Security Agency shall establish the requirements for
telecommunications support to the signals intelligence
resources designated to support this OPORD.
(h) Integrated Broadcast Service – Simplex.
(i) Integrated Broadcast Service – Interactive.
b. The SIGINT section has access to the following communications networks:
(1) Single Source Workstation (SSWS).

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(2) Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System –

Operation IRON GUARDIAN (CENTRIXS-OIG) (CENTRIXS-OIG
is integrated into the EUCOM Mission Secret Network (EMSN)).
(3) SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).
(4) Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).
(5) NSA/CSS Secure Telephone System (NSTS).
(6) Defense Wide Area Network (DWAN).
(7) Secret and Top Secret Voice Over Internet Protocol (SVOIP/TSVOIP)

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Appendix 6
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)
1. SITUATION. Refer to main order.
a. Assumptions.
(1) HUMINT uses humans as both sources and as collectors of intelligence
information. It includes, but is not limited to, the gathering of foreign
intelligence information through observation, elicitation, exploitation
or the acquisition of material and documents.
(2) HUMINT assets will be employed by national collectors and AN FOR
elements before and during execution of this Op O.
(3) All HUMINT operations conducted by 4 MND personnel are directed
and coordinated by the 4 MND HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC).
2. MISSION. HUMINT organizations and forces operating in the 4 MND AO shall
conduct collection activities to satisfy the intelligence needs of the Division (Div) and
CFLCC.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Organization.
(1) Elements of HUMINT organizations assigned to or under the OPCON
of the subordinate formations of 4 MND during this operation are
tasked to collect information in response to Information Operations
(IOs), Operations Directives (ODs) and Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIRs).
(2) Specific language qualifications and technical skills in speaking
languages used in the 4 MND AO will be identified by the 4 MND
staff to the CJ-2 at CFLCC.
b. Concept of Operations. Overt and clandestine HUMINT operations will be
managed by the 4 MND G2 in coordination with the CFLCC G-2.
c. Tasks.
(1) Subordinate units will ensure that information derived from HUMINT
operations is reported through their G2 cell to the 4 MND G2.
(2) Exploitation of PW/detainees and debriefing of refugees:
(a) To ensure maximum intelligence exploitation, subordinate units
shall prepare plans and procedural instructions required for the
screening, identification, segregation, and treatment of
PW/detainees, apprehended agents, defectors and inhabitants.
(b) Exploitation of PW/detainees shall be coordinated with
counterintelligence, psychological operations, and other
PW/detainee exploitation operations.
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(c) All interrogations will be conducted according to the provisions

of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. All PW/detainees shall be
accorded humane treatment and interrogations shall not
interfere with necessary medical treatment.
(d) Within 48 hours, the extent of the source’s knowledge of
priority intelligence information shall be determined and
reported to the G2 4 MND for transmission to CFLCC G2,
HOC as necessary.
(3) Captured Documents.
(a) Subordinate units shall develop procedural instructions to
ensure documents are expeditiously processed, exploited for
their tactical intelligence value, and subsequently forwarded to
the appropriate echelon that can fully exploit them.
(b) Technical documents of material design shall be forwarded to
higher HQ along with the equipment or with photographs of the
equipment when possible.
(4) Captured Materiel.
(a) Subordinate units shall develop procedural instructions to
ensure that acquired foreign materiel is properly protected and
fully exploited by qualified personnel.
(b) Procedures shall be established to turn over to the Atropians
any captured weapons, munitions, documents, and equipment
that are not required for further exploitation.
(5) Provide support to and maintain mutual activities with other LCC
intelligence collection activities such as Measurement and Signature
Intelligence and Signals Intelligence. Coordination between HUMINT
and other intelligence collection activities will be conducted in order to
utilize a multi-discipline approach to intelligence collection. All
intelligence collection activities will be coordinated by the 4 MND G2
staff with the CFLCC Collection Manager.
(6) Debriefing of Returnees.
(a) Subordinate units will have their intelligence specialists
conduct an intelligence debriefing of all 4 MND military
personnel upon their return to 4 MND control and forward
information on high value targets to 4 MND G2 immediately.
(b) Debriefings will be conducted in accordance with survival,
evasion, resistance and escape (SERE).
(c) Intelligence debriefings of returnees must be conducted in
coordination with SERE/ Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
(JPRA) and involve CI personnel.

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(d) Coalition military personnel will be debriefed by appropriate

SERE/CI personnel from the Troop Contributing Nation's
(TCN) soldier’s country.
(7) Requirements and Reporting.
(a) Upon execution of Op O 07, HUMINT organizations shall
submit their acquisition of material and documents plans to the
4 MND G2 for coordination with the CFLCC G2.
(b) HUMINT reports will be prepared and forwarded through
HUMINT channels in Intelligence Information Reports (IIR)
format. CFLCC HQ shall send reports of immediate tactical
value to subordinate units in SALUTE format.
(c) G2 4 MND will validate all HUMINT requirements within the
AO with CFLCC HQ.
(d) Requirements for validation shall be nominated through
collection management channels.
(8) Coordination. HUMINT liaison with the Atropian government or
military forces is the responsibility of the CLFCC staff. Any
subordinate formation wishing to conduct such liaison is to coordinate
with the G2 staff at 4 MND.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Transportation. Transportation requirements for HUMINT personnel are the
responsibility of the supported command.
b. Accommodation. Billeting requirements for HUMINT personnel operating in
the 4 MND AO in support of Op IRON GUARDIAN are the responsibility of
the supported command.
c. Clothing. 4 MND HUMINT personnel are not authorized to use civilian
clothing except when it is deemed advantageous to the mission and only
within the areas of the 4 MND AO that are in control of 4 MND forces. The 4
MND G2, in coordination with the CFLCC G2, is the approval authority for
exceptions to this policy.
d. Equipment. Equipment requirements for HUMINT teams are the
responsibility of the supporting command. HUMINT teams will be issued the
equipment required to accomplish their military mission, for example,
automation systems, communication devices, weapons etc.
e. Operational or Contingency Funds. These will be managed in accordance
with authorized accounting procedures as outlined by existing regulations.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Refer to Op O 07 and Annex Q (CIS).

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Appendix 7
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE (GEOINT)
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
b. Friendly. The following organizations provide Geospatial Intelligence
(GEOINT) support to CFLCC and its subordinate units.
(1) National Agencies. Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
(TENCAP) will be used to the fullest extent.
(2) CJTF-OIG 416 Engr Command. 70 Engineer Company (Topo) is
available to provide theater-level geospatial support.
(3) CFLCC.
(a) CFLCC has Medium Range UASs to provide tactical imagery
intelligence (IMINT).
(b) The Divisions of CFLCC have both medium range and tactical
UASs to provide tactical IMINT.
2. MISSION. 4 MND G-2 will establish GEOINT tasking, collection, processing,
exploitation, and secondary imagery product and dissemination instructions for the Division
(Div) and its subordinate commands. In coordination with the CFLCC and other Div G2s, 4
MND G-2 will develop, maintain, and sustain a flexible GEOINT architecture to meet
collection efforts in the 4 MND AO and beyond.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations.
(1) The Division Combined Intelligence Support Element (DISE) will be
the focal point for the conduct of GEOINT fusion within 4 MND. It
will rely, in part, on all national partner assets in theatre.
(2) Collection Management & Dissemination (CM&D) Cell will
coordinate day to day control of GEOINT tasking to meet CFLCC and
subordinate formation requirements.
(3) 4 MND G-2, through the CM&D Cell will request, allocate, or assign
GEOINT platforms based on the Comd 4 MND Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIR) and collection requests from subordinate
formations.
(4) Neither GORGAS nor ATROPIA Armed Forces will be able to
provide any host nation GEOINT support.
b. Data and Products.
(1) Full Motion Video (FMV) obtained by CFLCC forces will be posted
on an URL by CFLCC CISE. 4 MND will retain a smaller storage
capacity for FMV collected with Div assets.
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(2) 4 MND G2 will have access to the Tactical Exploitation of National

Capabilities Program (TENCAP) imagery made available IAW most
current Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM), which is held
by 4 MND DISE.
(3) Moving Target Indicator (MTI)/NATO Imagery will be made available
IAW most current DIAM.
(4) Reconnaissance Exploitation Reports (RECCEXREP) will be
forwarded and/or generated by CFLCC CISE.
c. Employment.
(1) CFLCC. IAW guidance from CFLCC G-2 Collection Manager.
(2) 4 MND Assets. IAW guidance from 4 MND G-2 Collection Manager.
(3) Interoperability. As with previous orders, the geographic datum used
in support of Op Order 07 is WGS84.
d. Geospatial Engineering Activities.
(1) Generate, manage, analyze, and disseminate accurate GEOINT that is
tied to some portion of the earth’s surface.
(2) Provide mission-tailored data, tactical decision aids (TDAs), and
visualization products that enable the commander and staff to visualize
the area of operations (AO).
(3) Provide the foundation for developing shared situational awareness,
improve understanding of capabilities and limitations for friendly
forces (as well as the adversary), and highlight other conditions of the
AO.
(4) Employ the resources of the organic Geospatial Team to develop and
distribute near real-time tactical decision products and terrain/weather
affects visualization products to support planning, military decision-
making and the execution of operations.
e. Tasks.
(1) Review incoming requests to ascertain if GEOINT could assist in
satisfying the supported unit’s Essential Elements of Friendly
Information (EEFIs).
(2) Obtain target and en-route mission-driven conditions that will
influence sensor selection and/or collection asset utilization. Identify
both theatre and national collection assets and supporting systems and
how and when employed.
(3) National Technical Means (NTM) and Commercial. G2 will submit
NTM requirements to CFLCC G-2 for approval and onward
transmission to the GEOINT Information Management System
(GIMS).

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(4) Subordinate brigades (Bdes) will report any long term shortfall in
processing and exploitation capability to 4 MND G-2.
(5) Determine the best source of GEOINT (NTM, Airborne or
Commercial) and best GEOINT strategy to satisfy the supported unit’s
requirement.
(a) End of Mission Reports (EOMs). Bdes and CFACC will
submit EOMs using Jabber Chat on the UAS web portal
provided by CFLCC either upon completion of mission (to
include relief on station) or upon change of mission
commander for UASs that are direct support to the 4
MND/CFACC.
(b) Bdes will immediately notify the 4 MND DISE when a
GEOINT asset or one of their tasked elements answers a 4
MND or CFLCC PIR.
f. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Collection requirements will be maintained within the DISE for
synchronization and tasking with other intelligence disciplines.
(2) Subordinate units are responsible for submitting Collection Plans for
IMINT platforms 24 hours prior to arrival of assets in theater and 72
hours in advance thereafter.
(3) Subordinate units are authorized to request a UAS diversion across
command. Dynamic re-tasking of an UAS asset is at the discretion of
the mission commander or 4 MND DISE Chief. 4 MND and CFLCC
G-2 will be copied on all requests for diversion.
(4) Immediate requests for all other GEOINT assets will be sent to 4 MND
DISE Chief.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Logistics. Refer to Annex R (Logistics).
b. Supply and Storage. Refer to the most current DIAM for guidance.
c. Intra-theater Distribution Plan. Refer to the most current DIAM.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Reporting.
(1) 4 MND GEOINT section is responsible for responsive and timely
reporting and dissemination of IMINT collection results and updated
Geospatial Information. A copy of all reports will be forwarded to
CFLCC G-2 GEO.
(2) The 4 MND GEOINT section will produce Imagery Interpretation
Reports (IIR) via the Imagery Exploitation Support System (IESS) as
directed by the CFLCC Imagery Requirements Manager. Primary
reporting formats:

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(a) In-flight Report.

(b) Mission Report.
(c) RECCEXREP.
(d) Initial Photographic Interpretation Report (IPIR).
(e) Supplemental Photographic interpretation Report (SUPIR).
b. Dissemination.
(1) All GEOINT products will be reviewed for quality and classification
prior to being uploaded to the designated URL. Classification of the
Secondary Imagery Products must be coordinated with the CFLCC
Classification Authority.
(2) 4 MND DISE is responsible for disseminating imagery products
produced by organic assets to the originating requester and any other
organization that requires the product.
c. Communications. Automated Data Processing Systems Requirements.
(1) Brigade G-2 sections/cells will ensure that “Windows Media Player”
v10 is uploaded on devices intended to receive/display FMV.
(2) TENCAP will publish GEOINT images.

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Appendix 9
Annex D
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date
OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)
1. SITUATION. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is an essential and critical
component in intelligence analysis and operational support. It is the most fundamental and
expeditious means of satisfying basic informational needs. Its unclassified nature encourages
and enables information sharing across all the formations of 4 MND, as well as with other
CFLCC nations, partners in the Government of ATROPIA (AP) and International and Non-
Governmental Organizations (IO/NGOs).
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.
a. General. 4 MND will leverage information from all available sources within
the AO. Although 4 MND G2 staff will conduct the detailed analysis,
responsibility for collection of OSINT data does not lie solely with the
intelligence staff. Every soldier in 4 MND is to report any information from
open sources that they discover and consider relevant to the mission.
b. Scheme of OSINT Support.
(1) The 4 MND OSINT program is a component of the G2 All Source
Team;
(2) The 4 MND OSINT program is managed by the G2 who is responsible
for the planning and coordination of OSINT products. The G2 will
ensure that the 4 MND Commander and commanders of subordinate
formations are provided with timely, mission relevant and AO-focused
open source information, assessments and products; and
(3) OSINT Information is derived from, but not limited to, traditional and
non-traditional publicly available domestic and foreign published hard
and soft copy information, broadcast media, grey literature, Facebook,
Twitter, and the internet.
c. Tasks.
(1) G2 OSINT will coordinate information operations at the 4 MND Main
HQ in order to facilitate coordination with the CFLCC staff sections
responsible for Inform and Influence Activities;
(2) OSINT products and analysis are to be integrated into the overall 4
MND information operations (see also Annex O (Information
Operations)); and
(3) OSINT reports will be published and disseminated at times TBD on
the 4 MND G2 SIPR/CENTRIX SharePoint Portal.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Refer to main order and Annex R (Logistics).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Refer to main order and Annex Q (CIS).

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Annex E
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROEs)

References:
A. UN General Assembly Resolutions: National Sovereignty Principles (A/RES/50/172) and
(A/RES/63/308) Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
B. UNSCR Resolution 7739
C. UNSCR Resolution 7752
D. Charter of the United Nations 26 Jun 45
E. Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) to CFLCC OPORD 07 Op
IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)
F. ADDP 06.1 Rules of Engagement 06 Aug 19
G. ADDP 06.4 Laws of Armed Conflict 11 May 06
6. SITUATION. No change from Annexes A, B and D to main order.
7. MISSION. 4 MND will apply Rules of Engagement (ROE) to support military
operations against Arianian Armed Forces (AN Armed Forces), enemy surrogate forces and
non-military adversaries within the Area of Operations (AO).
8. EXECUTION
a. Legal Foundation. 4 MND will conduct operations abiding by the body of law
known as International Law, supported by UNSCRs, as described at
references, whether or not troop contributing nations (TCN) have ratified
applicable laws. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and Their
Destruction is included in International Law.
b. Concepts and Principles. ROE are consistent with the following concepts and
principles as described at references F and G and similar TCN national
doctrine:
(1) Inherent Right to Self-defence. Included are provisions for Personal
and Collective Self-defence and the principles of De-escalation,
Military Necessity and Proportionality.
(2) Status. Distinctions are made for Combatants (including Paramilitary
or Armed Enforcement Agencies), Unlawful Combatants and Non-
combatants. Provisions are defined for Military Objectives and
Civilian Objects. A list of NO STRIKE targets will be maintained by 4
MND in support of this operation.
(3) Use of Force. Key concepts include Levels of Force, Minimum Force,
Hostile Acts and Hostile Intent.
(4) Operational Principles. Principles are Distinction, Non-discrimination,
Proportionality and Reciprocity.
c. ROE. ROE are based upon legal, political/coalition, operational and tactical
requirements.
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d. Applicability
(1) These ROE apply to all forces OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM or
TACON to 4 MND until superseded.
(2) ROE used by one national force may not be applicable to other
national forces. Some Coalition forces may have a national obligation
to abide by treaties and other international agreements to which
another force is not a party and/or does not recognize as expressions of
customary international law. Refer interoperability problems arising
from these differing legal obligations to 4 MND Legal Advisor
(LEGAD).
(3) Where a conflict exists between nationally approved and any other
operational or tactical ROE, nationally approved ROE have
precedence. However, as a general rule, the most restrictive ROE shall
normally be followed where such conflict exists.
e. Authorities
(1) Demolitions, Mines and Obstacles
(a) COM CFLCC retains approval of use of self-deactivating
mines and anti-tank (AT) mines. Although the AP Government
has approved the use of Anti-Tank (AT) scatterable mines,
these are again subject to COM CFLCC approval.
(b) Explosive demolition of infrastructure is delegated to
Formation Commanders.
(c) Employment of defensive command detonated weapons is
delegated to Company Commanders.
(2) Electronic Warfare (EW)
(a) Electronic Protection (EP) Authorized. Included are actions to
protect personnel, facilities or equipment from effects of
friendly or enemy EW that degrades, neutralizes or destroys
friendly combat capability.
(b) Electronic Warfare Support (EWS) Authorized. Included are
actions by, or under the control of, an operational commander
to search for, intercept, identify and locate sources of radiated
electro-magnetic energy for immediate threat recognition in
support of EW operations and other tactical actions such as
threat avoidance, targeting and homing.
(c) Electronic Countermeasures (EC) Authorized
(3) Air Defence Artillery. Weapons control status (WCS) is Tight.
(4) Close Air Support Targets. Positive target identification is required
prior to engagement.
(5) Weapons Release Authority Matrix (TAB A). This matrix directs the
level of command with release authority to employ various weapons
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systems in operations other than self-defence. "X" marks the lowest

level of release authority. Subordinate commanders may further
restrict release authority below their level. Weapon systems used
should be proportional to the threat and consider collateral damage.

Serial Weapon Level of Command With Release Authority Notes

CJTF CFLCC Div Bde Bn Coy Pl IND
-
(a) (b) (c)
OIG (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)
1. Personal CO X
Weapon MJ
2. Machine TF X
Gun
3. Grenade X

4. Light AT X
Weapon
5. Heavy AT X
Weapon
6. Mortar X
(Illum/Smk)
7. Mortar X
(HE)
8. Artillery X
9. Air X
Defence
10. Attack X
Helicopters

11. Close Air X

Support
12. Mines X Subject to
emplacement
restrictions.

13. Demolition X

f. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Amplifying Instructions. Subordinate headquarters and supporting
commands will disseminate this annex and supplemental ROE
authorization serials to subordinate organizations. Subordinate
headquarters and supporting commands will ensure that their soldiers
know, understand and follow all ROE. Subordinate headquarters and
supporting commands will prepare ROE cards. Cards will be
submitted to 4 MND LEGAD for review and approval prior to

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distribution. Provisions for supplementation or interpretation will not

have the effect of circumventing any part of these ROE. Such
documents may be more restrictive, but shall not be more permissive,
than the approved numbered ROE.
(2) Request for Changes to ROE. Commanders may request changes to
current ROE. Supplemental measures consist of detailed instructions
established by senior authorities to keep the actions of subordinates
within political and military policies. Subordinate commanders will
only modify ROE to make modifications more restrictive. Subordinate
commanders will not make modifications less restrictive than the
original Commander 4 MND ROE authorization. Subordinate
commanders may request that their higher command issue a specific
ROE provision that is less restrictive than the original ROE in the Op
O. Submit requested changes with rationale and conditions through
the chain of command to Commander 4 MND.
(3) Commanders can expect to receive amended supplemental ROE
measures from higher authority that provide modifications, deletions or
additions to current ROE. ROE may be modified by:
(a) Direction of high authority.
(b) Subordinate commanders can modify this ROE, provided such
modifications are compatible with the intent of these ROE and
readiness procedures, result in a more restrictive or definitive
rule, enhance mission accomplishment, and do not impair the
inherent right of self-defence.
(c) Subordinate commanders will develop additional
ROE/amplified ROE guidance applicable to forces under their
command and will submit them to Commander 4 MND for
review/approval as required. Commanders will be instructed to
ensure that modified ROE:
i. Remain compatible with the intent of these ROE.
ii. Result in more definitive guidance to subordinate
commanders.
iii. Do not impair the inherent right of self-defence.
(4) 4 MND forces should not assume future changes to these ROE are
approved by all other national forces. Coalition force commanders
reserve the right to seek guidance or clarification of ROE through their
national chains.
(5) Subordinate and supporting commands will submit requests for
supplemental ROE when necessary. Requests in narrative format are
authorized. Should situation require immediate response, voice
requests for supplemental ROE may be submitted by 4 MND to COM
CFLCC via the command net. Voice requests will be followed by an
amplifying message.
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(6) Violations of ROE will be reported immediately through command

channels to Comd 4 MND for investigation.
9. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change.
10. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. National Commanders may discuss any concerns regarding interpretation and
limitations on issued ROE at any time with Div Comd.
b. Div issued ROE will always have been pre-screened by national LEGADs
prior to their issuance.

Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Numbered ROE

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Appendix 1
Annex E
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

NUMBERED ROE

References:
A. MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement dated 23 July 2003
B. Appendix 2 (Decisive Offensive Operations) to Annex E (Rules of Engagement) to CJTF-
OIG OPORD 01 (insert date)
11. The following ROE are issued under the authority of Commander 4 MND. They
were developed and approved in consultation with the COM CFLCC and the Troop
Contributing Nations (TCNs).
12. The ROE listed below are designed to encompass combat operations by Atropian
Armed Forces (AP Armed Forces) and CFLCC forces during CJTF-OIG Phase II, Decisive
Offensive Operations (CFLCC Operation IRON GUARDIAN).

GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING OF FORCES

100 – Entry into the landmass of Ariana (AN) by CFLCC forces or AP Armed Forces is
prohibited without COM CFLCC approval.

101 – Entry into the landmass, airspace and littoral waters of AN for the purposes of
conducting combat search and rescue operations is authorized.

103 – Entry into the airspace of AN by CFLCC and Atropian aviation forces is authorized.

104 - The use of force, up to and including deadly force for the protection of AP Armed
Forces and Atropian law enforcement members stationed within the landmass of AP is
authorized.

RELATIVE POSITIONING OF OWN FORCES

111 – Within the limitations placed in 100, 101 and 103, positioning of CFLCC forces and
AP Armed Forces relative to any Arianian Armed Forces (AN Armed Forces) occupying the
sovereign territory, airspace and/or littoral waters of AP is unrestricted.

PREVENTION OF BOARDING, DETENTION, OR SEIZURE OF AP OR CJTF-OIG

PROPERTY

132 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention or
seizure of Atropian military or civilian vessels under contract carrying military equipment,
aircraft or vehicles is authorized.

133 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the boarding, detention,
or seizure of CJTF-OIG military vessels, aircraft or vehicles is authorized.

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INTERVENTION IN NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

145 – The use of non-deadly force to detain persons for force protection purposes in AP is
authorized.

146 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to disarm persons for force
protection purposes in AP is authorized.

147 – The use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of unarmed individuals for force
protection purposes is authorized.

148 – Intervention in Atropian civilian law enforcement activities is prohibited.

DIVERSIONS

161 – The ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles and
persons for force protection purposes is authorized.

162 – The use of force, up to and including deadly force, to compel compliance with the
ordering of diversions to all commercial and private vessels, aircraft, vehicles and persons for
force protection purposes is authorized.

DETENTION OR SEIZURE

181 – The detention and/or seizure of Arianian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods,
cargos and/or equipment within the landmass or littoral waters of AP is authorized.

183 – The detention and/or seizure of Arianian vessels, aircraft, vehicles, personnel, goods,
cargos and/or equipment for the purposes of enforcement of UNSCR 7739 is authorized.

184 – The use of force, up to and including disabling force to detain or seize Arianian
vessels, aircraft, vehicles and/or personnel is authorized.

187 - The use of restraints such as Flex Cuffs and mechanical restraints on PW/detainees is
authorized for force protection purposes. Once brought into a secure holding area, restraints
shall normally be removed, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise.

188 - If there is doubt of PW status, CJTF-OIG forces will treat a detainee as a PW until a
competent tribunal is able to determine his/her status IAW Article 5 of Geneva Convention
III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III).

ILLUMINATION

221 – The illumination of AN Armed Force vessels, aircraft, personnel and equipment by
white light, spotlight, projectiles or infrared means is authorized.
222 – The use of lasers and laser target markers against AN Armed Forces vessels, aircraft,
personnel and equipment is authorized.

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IDENTIFICATION OF TARGETS

232 - Identification is to be established visually or by at least two of the following means: IFF
(or other systems that require a response from an unidentified unit); electro-optical, electronic
warfare support measure; track behavior, flight plan correlation; thermal imaging; acoustic
intelligence; or other secure active/passive systems not requiring a positive response from an
unidentified unit prior to an engagement.

DESIGNATION OF TARGETS

280 – Designation of targets by any means is authorized.

USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

321 - Use of pepper spray in self-defence and for force protection is authorized.

USE OF FORCE IN DESIGNATED OPERATIONS

337 – Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the commission of serious
crimes that are occurring or about to occur is authorized.

339 – Use of ASP batons in self-defence and for force protection is authorized.

PROHIBITING OR RESTRICTING USE OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS IN DESIGNATED

CIRCUMSTANCES

351 – The use of anti-personnel mines by CFLCC, less AP Armed Forces, is not authorized.

352 – The use of cluster munitions by CFLCC and AP Armed Forces is in accordance with
national policy.

353 – The use of weapons of mass destruction to include chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear by CJTF-OIG forces is prohibited.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

361 – The control of Arianian military information distribution mechanisms with the intent to
disrupt and deny Arianian command and control nodes is authorized.

366 – Conduct of Computer Network Attack (CNA) against Arianian adversary computers or
computer systems that have intruded into and damaged CJTF-OIG computers, computer
networks, or information in CJTF-OIG computers or computer networks, including actions
that may result in intrusion into Arianian intermediary systems or networks and damage to
Arianian systems or networks is authorized subject to COM CJTF-OIG approval.

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367 – The use of electronic warfare measures by CFLCC forces and AP Armed Forces is
authorized.

368 – Psychological operations directed against Arianian military forces is authorized.

369 – The use of physical military deception through the use of dummies and/or decoy
equipment by CFLCC forces and AP Armed Forces is authorized.

USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

374 - The unrestricted use of ECM against Arianian military targets is authorized.

ATTACK

421 – Attack against AN Armed Forces demonstrating hostile intent against CFLCC or AP
Armed Forces is authorized.

422 – Attack against AN Armed Forces which commit or directly contribute to a hostile act
(not constituting an actual attack) against CFLCC or AP Armed Forces is authorized.

425 – Attack against AN Armed Forces which have previously attacked, or directly
contributed to an attack, is authorized.

426 - COM CFLCC is authorized to judge whether an attack is the first of a series and, in
this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing threat.

427 - Attack on AN Armed Forces military installation(s), facility(ies), equipment, and

unit(s) which are engaged in or make an effective contribution to military activity that
threatens CFLCC
or AP Armed Forces person(s) or property is authorized.

428 – Attack on AN Armed Forces, which make an effective contribution to the conduct of
hostile military operations against CFLCC forces or AP Armed Forces, or persons or property
designated special status is authorized.

430 - Pursuant to 426 above, COM CFLCC has authorized Comd 4 MND to judge whether
an attack is the first of a series and, in this event, to attack all units constituting a continuing
threat.

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ANNEX G OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex G
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
LAND OPERATIONS
References:
A. B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations 2008-01-01
B. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) date
13. GENERAL. All relevant aspects of land operations have been detailed in the main
order and are not amplified further in this annex, less for the attached appendices.

Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Crossing Operations (Not issued)
Appendix 2 - Military Deception

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Appendix 2
Annex G
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

MILITARY DECEPTION

1. SITUATION
a. General. During OP IRON GUARDIAN, deception will play an important
role towards the achievement of our military success. Arianian Armed Forces
have occupied portions of southern AP for more than six months. Arianian
forces have culminated and have shown intent to retain the occupied territory
as a challenge to the resolve of the United Nations generally, and CJTF-OIG
specifically. The continued build-up of CJTF-OIG forces, supported by
existing UNSCRs, signals an impending CJTF-OIG offensive. Deception
operations will be employed to manipulate the enemy’s decision-making
processes to set the conditions for CFLCC and 4 MND success. The overall
intent during the CFLCC Phases I and II is to deceive the enemy with regard
to the nature of our defensive posture as well as where the main effort will lie.
In CFLCC Phase III, the nature of deception will focus on what the future
intentions of 1ID will be. In CFLCC Phase IV, deception will be required
along the southern border area of AP to make the enemy believe there is a
stronger defensive force protecting the border area.
b. Enemy
(1) Capabilities. Ariana (AN) has the capability to employ all aspects of
information warfare against friendly forces, the civilian population of
AP and social media writ large. AN can and will continue to employ a
wide range of HUMINT operatives through its SPF forces, co-opted
Atropian civilians, members of their proxies (SAPA, SAF etc) and
military eavesdropping and jamming assets. The AN Air Force has
very limited assets available to conduct EW operations.
(2) Vulnerabilities. AN military vulnerabilities currently include:
(a) Difficulties in communicating rapidly over long distances while
under electronic attack.
(b) A preponderance of non-compatible, unprotected, off-the shelf
types of electronic equipment from multiple sources.
(c) A heavy reliance on international media to provide the
“Arianian Story” and direct messaging to international
audiences and stakeholders.
c. Deception Targets. CFLCC intended targets are:
(1) Senior leadership of OSC 1 and OSC 2.
(2) Senior leaders of the Arianian government.
(3) Enemy HUMINT operatives and SPF forces operating inside of AP.

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d. CFLCC Deception Goal. The CFLCC deception effort will portray the
CFLCC main effort to be in the WEST, encouraging the already demonstrated
desire of AN to seize GLOCs centered on
YEVLAKH/KHALDAN/MINGECEVIR.
(1) CFLCC Phase I Objective. Deceive the enemy leadership of OSC 2
that CFLCC and Atropian forces are strengthening their defense along
the FEBA rather than conducting preliminary moves in preparation for
a decisive counter attack.
(2) CFLCC Phase II Objectives.
(a) Portray 1 ID counter-attack in the WEST as the CFLCC main
effort in order to cause OSC 2 to commit their assessed Reserve
(i.e. 349 Tank BTG and possibly 24th Mot DTG).
(b) Subsequently portray 3 CR's hasty crossing of the Kura River
in the NORTH as the CFLCC main crossing (4 MND then
crosses the Kura River further to the SOUTH).
(3) CFLCC Phase III Objective. Continue to portray 1 ID in the WEST as
CFLCC main effort to fix OSC 1.
(4) CFLCC Phase IV Objective. Depict defence along the AN/AP border
as stronger than it is and portray main effort in the WEST in order to
discourage commitment of OSC 1.
e. Friendly Forces. Key staff in the development, execution, monitoring and
assessment of the deception plan for Op IRON GUARDIAN will include:
(1) CFLCC G5 Military Deception (MD).
(2) CFLCC G2.
(3) 4 MND:
(a) 4 MND G5, who will coordinate all aspects of Divisional MD.
(b) 4 MND G2.
(c) 130 MEB
(d) 63 (US) Expeditionary Sig Bn.
(e) 709 (US) MI Bn.
(f) C Coy 9 (US) MISB.
f. Attachments and Detachments: Nil.
2. MISSION. 4 MND will conduct military deception operations in support of Op
IRON GUARDIAN in order to mask friendly force intentions and influence Arianian actions.
3. EXECUTION
a. General. 4 MND will conduct MD in accordance with the coordinated
CFLCC taskings. In addition, the deployment of 3 Bde (-) 82 Abn Div to Objs
OPAL and GARNET and the deployment of the remainder of 4 MND from

G2-2/4
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
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TAA SILVER until the breakout of the bridgehead during Phase III will be
conducted under electronic silence.
b. Groupings and Tasks.
(1) 63 (US) Expeditionary Sig Bn. As coordinated by 10 Sig Bde during
the period D-1 to D+3, conduct decoy Mov Con CPX from area TAA
BRONZE.
(2) 4 MND. During the period D to D+2 in accordance with the CFLCC
Mov O and supported by 16 MP Bde, conduct move from FAA to
TAA SILVER under electronic silence.
(3) 3 Bde, 82 Abn Div. Conduct the deployment to Objs OPAL and
GARNET under radio silence.
(4) 4 MND. Conduct the deployment from TAA SILVER during Phase III
in accordance with the 4 MND Mov O under electronic silence.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Timings. Timings for all tasks and activities will be established as part
of the task matrix at Tab A.
(a) Mov Con CPX – in accordance with instructions issued by 10
Sig Bde.
(b) 4 MND Move FAA to TAA SILVER – in accordance with
instructions issued by CFLCC.
(c) 3 Bde, 82 Abn Div Deployment – in accordance with the Air
Assault Order (notional).
(d) 4 MND Deployment from TAA SILVER – in accordance with
the 4 MND Mov O.
d. Assessment. Bdes and selected 4 MND elements will participate in the
assessment process. 4 MND G5 MD will prepare a daily assessment report in
coordination with 4 MND G2 and G3 Current Operations cells to highlight the
following:
(1) An evaluation of the deception measure(s) in place to ensure it
continues to support Commander’s and higher Commander’s intent.
(2) An evaluation of how the target (enemy) is acting or not acting in
response to the deception measure(s).
(3) Monitoring for unintended consequences of the deception measure
effected.
(4) A determination of when criteria for termination are met.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Note there will be some selected ammunition dumping that
occurs when the Division is in TAA SILVER. Although it will be part of normal sustainment
it will be done in daylight to support the deception of the Division adopting a defensive
posture in depth behind the Atropian Southern Command (ASC). The ammunition will be
uploaded onto vehicles during the night.
G2-3/4
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.
(1) CFLCC POC for MD is G5 MD, Col XXXXXXXXX
(2) 4 MND POC for MD is G5 MD, Maj XXXXXXX
(3) Bdes to nominate and inform POCs for MD to 4 MND G5 MD.
b. Signal. No change.

G2-4/4
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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Annex H
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

AIR & AIRSPACE CONTROL

References:
A. CJTF OIG CFACC Air Operations Plan dated XXXXXX
B. CJTF OIG CFACC Airspace Control Plan dated XXXXXX
C. CFLCC OPORD 07 Appendix 7 (Air Operations & Air Support) to Annex C (Operation
IRON GUARDIAN) dated XXXXXX
D. CFLCC OPORD 07 Appendix 10 (Airspace Control) to Annex C (Operation IRON
GUARDIAN) dated XXXXXX
1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces. No change.
b. Friendly Forces. No change.
c. CFLCC Scheme of Air Support. CFLCC will utilize apportioned and integral
air support to achieve decisive effects on Arianian (AN) Armed Forces
occupying ATROPIA (AP) or capable of influencing operations in AP. Air
support extends CFLCC’s area of influence thus enabling CFLCC to dominate
the battlespace. Specifically, air operations will isolate AN Armed Forces in
AP from reinforcement and resupply thus contributing to a sense of
hopelessness and despair among Arianian military leaders and soldiers.
Compounding the fear of AN Armed Forces, air operations will support the
defeat of the 23 and 25 DTGs while destroying the 24 DTG. Air support will
also facilitate force protection through the provision of defensive counter air
(DCA) over friendly forces, gradually expanding to include the landmass of
AP. Finally, air support, both apportioned and integral to the LCC, will
provide close air support (CAS) for friendly forces in contact. The CFLCC
ASOC Cell will be the point of coordination for air support within the CFLCC
AO.
d. CFLCC Scheme of Airspace Control. Airspace usage above the Coordinating
Altitude (CA) or forward of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) must
be requested through the CFLCC ASOC. Approval of the airspace below the
CA and within the Div AOs has been delegated to the Divs. The CFLCC G3
Airspace Control (AC) Cell will be the point of coordination for airspace
within the CFLCC AO. To enable coordination, the Battlefield Coordination
Detachment (BCD) will be established in the CAOC by the CFLCC. The
airspace below the CA and forward of the Divs forward boundaries (to the
CFLCC forward boundary/FSCL as applicable) will be managed by the
CFLCC AC Cell using procedural airspace control methods.
e. Supporting/Supported Relationship. CFLCC will become the supported
Component during CJTF-OIG Phase II operations (Decisive Operations).
During this Decisive Operations Phase (4 MND phases I through IV), the

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CFACC air apportionment will be weighted towards AI and CAS tasks in

support of CFLCC and ultimately 4 MND objectives.
2. MISSION. Provide effective airspace control and air support control/coordination in
order to ensure optimum integration of air capabilities with the execution of 4 MND
operations aimed at the destruction of 24th Mot DTG and the setting of conditions to clear all
remaining Arianian forces from the sovereign territory of AP within boundaries.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Commander’s Intent. No Change.
b. Concept of Operations. As per the 4 MND op order main body, 4 MND will
conduct this operation in four phases: Phase I - Advance; Phase II - Cross
River KURA; Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG; and Phase IV - Stabilize. In
all four phases the primary focus of air resources allocated to 4 MND as part
of the CFLCC apportionment will be to support the Div’s ground scheme of
manoeuvre as described in the op order main body, through the provision of a
mix of AI and CAS sorties, both pre-planned and immediate. 4 MND pre-
planned and immediate AI missions will consist of those that assist in the
destruction of forces in the 4 MND AO that are not in contact with 4 MND or
other CFLCC forces. CFLCC will control all AI operations within the CFLCC
AO short of the FSCL (the CFACC will control all AI operations beyond the
FSCL). AI allocation not required to service pre-planned AI targets will be
pushed as Killbox/immediate air interdiction (XAI) sorties. CAS missions
consist of those that assist in the destruction of forces that are in contact with 4
MND or other CFLCC forces. CFLCC will allocate air sorties daily to 4 MND
and the other Divs for pre-planned CAS as well as immediate CAS (XCAS)
requests, based on Comd CLFCC priorities. These will supplement the
available attack helicopter sorties resident within 4 MND and those tasked to
support 4 MND from within CFLCC aviation resources, and be allocated
consistent with Div and CFLCC priorities. Lethal CAS options are also
available from some CFACC ISR platforms (the priority for these assets will
be collection and SOF operations).
c. Airspace Control. Airspace Control within 4 MND will coincide with the
divisional ground boundaries (below the Coordinating Altitude) in all phases
governed by this op order. This is delegated to the Div level for management
on behalf of the CAOC through the use of the Airspace Control Measure
Requests (ACMRs) process, as will be managed by the G3 AC Cell associated
with the 4 MND Airspace Element. The ACMR process enables overall
airspace management for all Coalition forces in the JOA, provides for safe
aviation operations, and will maximize the ground commander’s intent for
forces and effects.
d. Air Support Priorities. 4 MND air support priorities for AI and CAS by phase
are as follows:
(1) Phase I - Advance (D-D+5).
(a) Degradation of 24 DTG;

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(b) Other pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at Bde and Div

level through the ATO cycle; and
(c) Other XAI and XCAS sorties as required to support the
advance and engage targets of opportunity
(2) Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8).
(a) Further degradation of OSC 2 ‘Corps’ troops and Fire Support
assets;
(b) Pre-planned CAS and XCAS to counter moves by the 349 Tank
BTG;
(c) Other XCAS sorties as required to support 4 MND units
committed to the River KURA crossing;
(d) Other pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at Bde and Div
level through the ATO cycle; and
(e) Other XAI sorties as required to engage targets of opportunity.
(3) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13).
(a) Degradation/destruction of 24 AT Bn;
(b) Degradation/destruction of 242 Infantry BTG;
(c) Degradation/destruction of 245 Artillery BTG;
(d) Degradation/destruction of 244 Tank BTG in depth;
(e) Degradation/destruction of 241 Inf BTG;
(f) Other pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at Bde and Div
level through the ATO cycle; and
(g) Other XAI sorties as required to engage targets of opportunity.
(4) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27)).
(a) XAI and XCAS sorties as required to support 4 MND units
committed to clearance operations, particularly in the area of
Obj TOPAZ;
(b) Pre-planned CAS and AI as coordinated at Bde and Div level
through the ATO cycle; and
(c) Other XAI sorties as required to engage targets of opportunity.
e. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Air Control System. USAF ASOSs/Tactical Air Control Parties
(TACPs) are aligned with and integral to all CFLCC/4 MND echelons
down to brigade (bde) level, to assist units with preplanned request
process in the ATO planning cycle, as well as to submit immediate
CAS requests as necessary
(2) Joint Tactical Airstrike Requests (JTAR). Airstrike requests must be
submitted through HQ 4 MND to CFLCC ASOC NLT 1200Z hours
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the day prior to execution to ensure requests are included in the Air
Tasking Order (ATO) if prioritized at the CFLCC level. Failure to
meet the ASOC’s pre-planned JTAR timeline may result in unfilled
JTARs due to higher priorities in adjacent Div AOs
(3) Pre-planned CAS Target Nominations. Preplanned CAS will be
included in the Target Synchronization Board nominations. The JTAR
numbering system will be used. Updates to the JTAR numbering
system will be published in the SPINS. Requests for pre-planned CAS
are to be submitted through fire support cells from Battalion through
Bde/Div to CFLCC. Army Fires channels, not attached TACP
personnel, are responsible for tracking and submitting pre-planned
JTARs for CAS. Requests reaching CFLCC Fires after 1200Z hours
will be denied and must be re-submitted as immediate requests to the
ASOC.
(4) Immediate Air Support Requests. Immediate requests for air support
(XAI and XCAS) are those requests made after the deadline for
inclusion in the ATO, typically less than 72 hours prior to ATO
execution. XCAS requests may be routed through Army Fires
channels, or by TACP/ASOS via USAF support channels. Immediate
requests are sourced by the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) at
CFLCC HQ. Be aware that Comd CFLCC priority of fires for
unallocated CAS sorties are: 1) High Payoff Targets; 2) Time Sensitive
Targets requiring rapid lethal response; 3) Massed Forces; 4) Point
Targets, to include armor, buildings, tracked vehicles, and other soft
targets; 5) Moving Targets; 6) Interdiction targets or second echelon
forces. XCAS/XAI aircraft will launch to a Contact Point to be on call
for CAS or AI missions In addition to XCAS and XAI, a small number
of sorties will be maintained on Ground CAS (GCAS) and Ground AI
(GAI) alert. These missions will be capable of being airborne in less
than 30 minutes from notification.
(5) CAS Execution. CAS will be executed with a certified Joint Terminal
Attack Controller (JTAC) utilizing Types I, II, and III controls, as
required, IAW JP 3-09.3. Utilizing CAS to strike targets without
control from a qualified JTAC should be considered an extreme
situation with enhanced probability of fratricide. The supported
commander will delegate weapons release clearance authority to his
JTACs to facilitate CAS attacks .The JTAC will provide CAS aircrew
with clearance to expend ordnance and will use the best available type
of control (see SPINs).
(6) Observer Plan. Mission planners must ensure friendly observers are
able to see the target area and report details directly to the JTAC.
JTACs are a unique fires enabler and difficult to replace.
Consequently, planners must balance mission priority against JTAC
safety when developing an observer plan and when considering JTAC
location(s).

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(7) Requests for Forward Air Controller-Airborne (FAC-A). FAC-A

support requests are to be submitted through the Brigade Air Liaison
Officer (ALO) to the Div ALO for approval, and should be annotated
on the associated JTAR.
(8) Requests for Specific Ordnance. Requests for specific ordnance
should be submitted through the Bde ALO to the Div ALO for
coordination and approval through the CAOC.
(9) Target Updates. Location and status of targets which are moving or
the exact location is not known must be updated with the Battlefield
Coordination Detachment (BCD) collocated with the CAOC 24, 12
and 6 hours prior to execution.
(10) Air Reconnaissance Operations. Air RECCE targets that support
operations and future planning will be nominated through G2 channels
to 4 MND G2 for prioritization prior to onward submission to CFLCC
G2. CFACC will provide resources on a case-by-case basis consistent
with CJTF-OIG higher priorities.
(11) UAS Mission Requests. Likewise, 4 MND G2 will coordinate with the
CFLCC G2 for all 4 MND UAS mission requests requiring CFLCC
airspace that are developed during the ISR Collection Working Group.
The information may be contained in a storyboard format. 4 MND
UAS requests must be submitted to the CFLCC G2 the day prior to
execution. Any requests submitted late will require a justified task and
purpose that should be briefed by the 4 MND G3 to the CFLCC G3.
(12) 4 MND Airspace Control. The 4 MND Airspace Element’s associated
G3 AC Cell will coordinate and integrate airspace requirements within
the Div AO and identify/resolve airspace user conflicts.
(a) Airspace Control (AC) responsibilities include:
i. maintaining AC overlays and information displays, and
forwarding AC overlays to the CFLCC ASOC;
ii. developing AC procedures, plans, SOPs, and annexes
for the 4 MND Div airspace;
iii. advising subordinate and higher headquarters of
significant activities affecting airspace use and the
impact of airspace control measures on the Div ground
battle; and
iv. Compiling and submitting the Div Aviation flight
schedule for the following day, in accordance with
CFLCC guidance, for situational awareness and de-
confliction in the ATO.
(b) Airspace Control Measure Request (ACMR) process. Requests
for ACMs must be submitted to the 4 MND G3 AC Cell to
enable submission to the CFLCC ASOC 72 hours prior to ACO
execution. ACMRs that are not received within the timeline
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will be considered immediate and must be requested from the

CFLCC G3 through the ASOC. Approval authority for
forwarding immediate requests is the 4 MND G3 and is based
on the mission requirements. All ACMRs must contain the
following information at a minimum:
i. A 6 digit UTM grid or ACPs to outline the operating
area;
ii. A minimum of a 500ft buffer;
iii. Altitude boundaries;
iv. Effective times in ZULU;
v. Operating frequency/channel;
vi. Purpose of the ACMR;
vii. Accurate point of contact information (phone number
and email address); and
viii. Any special instructions/restrictions.
(c) Coordinating Altitude. 18,000 ft MSL.
(d) Coordination Level. 3000 ft AGL. Fixed wing aircraft will
operate 3500 ft AGL and above and rotary wing aircraft will
operate 2500 ft AGL and below.
(e) Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The minimum vertical
separation between UAS is 500 feet. The minimum vertical
separation between UASs and manned aircraft is 1000 feet,
unless otherwise directed or coordinated. The minimum
vertical separation between manned aircraft is 500 feet. The
normal altitude blocks unless otherwise coordinated or
superseded by the SPINs are as indicated in Appendix 10 to
Annex C of the CFLCC Op Ord 07.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Joint Air Request Net (JARN) will be maintained by 13
ASOC down to Bde level: (1) Chat, (2) Voice, and (3) TACP-CASS. Remainder no change.

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Annex J
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
FORCE PROTECTION
References:
A. ADDP 3.22 Force Protection 10 Mar 15
B. FM 3-37 Protection Aug 2012
C. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) date
1. SITUATION
a. Friendly Forces. No change from Annex A.
b. Threat and Risk Assessment.
(1) Conventional Threats. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence). The ARIANA
(AN) Armed Forces essentially represent a “near peer” threat with a
wide range of capabilities. As they have demonstrated, they have
sufficient land forces' capability to seize and control key infrastructure
and large areas of terrain. They also possess the necessary capabilities
to destroy key infrastructure using weapons based within their national
boundaries (i.e. TBM/IRBM). For more detailed analysis of the
specific Arianian Armed Forces' threats facing 4 MND see Annex D
(Intelligence).
(2) Unconventional Threats. For the most part, insurgent groups within
ATROPIA (AP) use Direct Action to destabilize local governments by
targeting Atropian security forces through the use of IEDs, small arms
and RPGs. In addition insurgent groups will take advantage of every
opportunity to seize arms and other military equipment. Criminal
organizations will also target Atropian security forces (law
enforcement in particular) and engage in illegal activities (drugs,
robberies, corruption, etc) that contribute to further de-stabilization.
Groups include:
(a) South Atropian People's Army (SAPA) Insurgents. AN
exploits SAPA as a method of creating unrest/lack of
confidence in the Atropian government and its policies. SAPA
receives most of its training, equipment and supplies from AN;
(b) Salasyl Insurgents. Operating in southeast AP with nation-
wide capabilities, Salasyl insurgents seek to target Atropian
government facilities and leaders;
(c) Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade (BFB) Insurgents. Operating in
northern VETLIA and ERDABIL provinces of AP, Donovian-
supported BFB insurgents seek to target Atropian government
facilities and leaders;
(d) Provisional Army of Lezgin (PAL) Insurgents. Operating in
southern ERDABIL and western SIRVAKI provinces of AP,
PAL insurgents also target Atropian government facilities and
leaders;
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(e) Bocyowicz Crime Family. Operating in the Ungoverned

Territories, the Bocyowicz Crime Family seeks to acquire
political power in poorly-governed regions and is a threat to
Atropian police and security forces;
(f) Atropian Organized Crime (AOC). Operating in BAKU, AOC
has taken advantage of the recent growth of illegal narcotics,
smuggling and human trafficking channels. Many of those
involved in Atropian illegal activities live in communities of
displaced Atropians from LOWER JANGA and persons who
fled DONOVIA. AP serves as a transit point for narcotics
travelling to DONOVIA and Western countries; and
(g) Al Iksir Cartel Criminals. Operating in northern AP and
southern DONOVIA, the Al Iksir Cartel is exploiting the recent
growth of illegal narcotics, smuggling and human trafficking
channels.
(3) Non-Military Threats. See also Annex K (Health Services Support):
(a) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs)/Contaminated Grounds. AP
produces a large amount of TICs for multiple purposes,
including hydrocarbon production activities, water purification,
wastewater management and fertilizer;
(b) Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipelines. The hydrocarbon
industry is critical to AP’s economic well-being and is heavily
reliant upon land pipelines to transport petroleum and natural
gas to foreign markets. Pipelines can be attractive targets for
insurgent groups and enemy forces with a consequent effect on
4 MND operations. Host Nation (HN) demands for assistance
in protecting pipelines, transfer stations and other oil
infrastructures can be expected to occur. In addition, in the
wake of a significant pipeline attack, environmental impacts
and consequence management requirements could adversely
affect 4 MND operations. Pipelines of primary concern to 4
MND are:
i. The Trans-Caucasus Petroleum (TC-P) pipeline moves
oil from the CASPIAN SEA fields to tankers in the
MEDITERRANEAN SEA. The pipeline stretches
1,110 miles from BAKU through GORGAS (GO) to
TURKEY, essentially following the northern part of the
KURA River valley. A second petroleum pipeline,
referred to as the Trans-Caucasus 2 Petroleum (TC2-P),
is being constructed and will follow TC-P’s path.
ii. The Caspian and Black Seas Petroleum (CBS-P)
pipeline begins at BAKU and runs over 516 miles to the
BLACK SEA port at SUPSA, GO, and again essentially

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follows the KURA River valley (albeit south of the TC-

P).
iii. The natural gas pipeline in AP and GO is the Trans-
Caucasus natural gas (TC-G) pipeline, which follows
the same paths as the TC-P pipeline. A second natural
gas pipeline (TC2-G) is under construction.
(c) Pollution. All five CAUCASUS-region countries face
significant pollution problems stemming from poor industrial
practices. High levels of air pollution require mitigating
measures to ensure soldier health and safety;
(d) Potable Water. The majority of the CAUCASUS region’s
urban population has access to potable water. In rural areas
people must rely on local sources such as rivers, streams and
wells to obtain water for cooking, drinking and washing.
Currently, about 78% of all Atropians can access potable water,
with 95% of the population in urban areas and 59% of the
population in rural areas. Heavy pollution, especially in areas
that contain oil and gas fields, has contaminated the
groundwater. All water sources are considered to be potentially
contaminated and not potable until tested;
(e) Sewage. The Atropian citizens’ access to modern sewage
services, like almost all other communal services, depends on
their location. About 90% of all urban Atropians can access
improved sanitation infrastructure, but only 70% of rural
Atropians. Poor sewage treatment methods lead to pollution,
ground water contamination and increased likelihood of some
diseases; and
(f) Disease. The following diseases are known to be present in
AP:
i. Diarrheal diseases;
ii. Hepatitis A;
iii. Malaria;
iv. Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic fever;
v. Cutaneous Leishmaniasis;
vi. Leptospirosis;
vii. Schistosomiasis;
viii. Hepatitis;
ix. Tuberculosis; and
x. Q Fever.

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2. MISSION. 4 MND will protect assigned forces and preserve combat power against
threats and risks associated in the conduct of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. EXECUTION
a. General. Force Protection (FP) is the preservation of the effectiveness of
mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities,
information and infrastructure deployed within or outside the AO. FP is an
element of combat power and is associated with the operational function
Shield. It is to be integrated with the application of military force against an
enemy or adversary to protect the force and preserve combat power. The
following are the principles of FP: comprehensive, integrated, layered,
redundant and enduring. Commanders are to develop and then implement
protection systems for each phase of the operation.
b. Protection Tasks. Protection tasks are to be synchronized to result in reduced
risk, identified and mitigated vulnerabilities, and exploited opportunities. The
principal protection tasks to be carried out by commanders are:
(1) Air and Missile Defence (AMD). (See Appendix 3). Large troop
concentrations and sustainment facilities will be protected from
Arianian missile/CBRN attacks by establishing an integrated Air
Missile Defense system. Operational threats from enemy UAVs/UASs
must be determined and mitigated;
(2) Personnel Recovery (PR). 4 MND bdes are to be prepared to execute
or assist in the recovery of isolated personnel;
(3) Information Protection. This includes computer electronic protection,
network defence and information assurance;
(4) Fratricide Avoidance. Special consideration will be given when
conducting operations with Atropian forces as their equipment is often
the same as the enemy's;
(5) Operational Area Security. Bdes will ensure that within their sectors
area security operations are conducted within capabilities. Given the
irregular threat there may be no "safe rear areas";
(6) Anti-terrorism. (See Appendix 1);
(7) Survivability. Given the so-called "near peer" capability of the enemy,
employing frequent movement, using concealment, deception and
camouflage, and constructing fighting and protective positions needs to
be more consistent than our troops are accustomed;
(8) Force Health Protection. (See Annex K);
(9) Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN). (See Annex U);
(10) Safety. Although 4 MND is about to undertake combat operations,
casualties as a result of avoidable accidents would result in
unnecessary and unacceptable casualties; and
(11) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). (See Appendix 2).

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c. Protection by Phase of Op IRON GUARDIAN

(1) Preliminary Moves (D-D+3). Currently established in TAA SILVER
and BRONZE, 4 MND units are conducting final preparations for
battle. Protection focus will be on AMD, operational area security,
anti-terrorism and OPSEC;
(2) Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5). After Routes SEATTLE and MIAMI
south are secure, the Div will conduct a tactical movement between
TAA SILVER and Phase Line (PL) COUGAR. The protection effort
during this phase will emphasize OPSEC, AMD, operational area
security and safety;
(3) Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8). In this phase bridgeheads
at Objectives OPAL and GARNET will be seized by air assault
followed by a crossing in force of the River KURA. The protection
effort during this phase will emphasize AMD and survivability;
(4) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mtzd DTG (D+9-D+13). In this phase the
Arianian 24 Mot DTG will be destroyed by manoeuvre and fires.
Protection priorities will be AMD and fratricide avoidance as the battle
becomes more fluid. Of significance, as Arianian forces are defeated,
their use of chemical weapons may become more likely; and
(5) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27). In this phase Arianian forces will
have been defeated and withdrawn. A defence will be established
along the International Border and sectors assigned within the Div AO
to conduct stabilization operations. Protection measures during this
phase will begin to put greater emphasis on non-conventional threats:
health, crime, safety, protection of captured enemy personnel, and
operational area security against irregular forces/terrorism. There will
be a significant requirement to coordinate protection measures with
HN as they assume more responsibility for their own security. The
potential for kidnapping or capture of friendly forces increases
significantly in this phase requiring coordination with CFLCC’s Joint
Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).
d. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Multinational Considerations. 4 MND is composed of forces from six
(seven if NZ BG is included) nations. While the tasks related to the
protection function are based on Australian Army and US Army
doctrine, the tenets are applicable and relevant to other troop
contributing nations (TCNs). Within the constraints of own national
direction, 4 MND TCNs are to incorporate and adopt protection
measures as ordered. If differences in interpretation or application of
specific measures occur, FP and Information Conditions for example, 4
MND TCNs are to advise this HQ of what national actions have been
implemented. Notwithstanding, following an internal threat and risk
assessment, senior national commanders may increase 4 MND FP
measures within their national elements;

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(2) Non-combatants. In addition to the civilian Atropian population,

(including Internally Displaced Persons), there are numerous non-
governmental/international organizations (NGOs/IOs) workers
throughout AP. As the protection function prioritizes 4 MND assigned
forces, requests from civilians for protection are to be forwarded to HQ
4 MND for consideration. This does not preclude the requirement to
respond to "serious crimes" in accordance with ROE (See Annex E
Appendix 1);
(3) FP Posture. The FP posture should be based on risk management, not
risk elimination. Deliberate or accidental casualties are a reality of
military operations, as are material and equipment losses and an
overemphasis in avoiding them will impact adversely on the
achievement of the mission. Commanders therefore must balance risk
within the context of mission accomplishment;
(4) Electronic Counter Measures (ECM). In order to prevent mutual
interference between other ECM equipment and communications
systems, coordination between nations and other agencies will be
affected through Spectrum Management control;
(5) Training. Personnel and units are to receive appropriate FP training,
particularly in Escalation of Force procedures;
(6) Criticality Assessment. Commanders at all levels are to conduct a
Criticality Assessment of key assets and capabilities to establish a
Critical Asset List (CAL) and a Defended Asset List (DAL). The CAL
is a prioritized list of assets that should be protected; it is to be
identified by the phase of the operation and approved by the relevant
commander. Critical assets are generally specific assets of such
extraordinary importance that their loss or degradation would have a
significant and debilitating effect on operations or the mission. The
DAL is a listing of those assets from the CAL, prioritized by the
commander, to be defended with the resources available. This allows
the commander to apply finite protection capabilities to the most
valuable assets. This should also be considered in conjunction with
ROE's property with "designated special status" and personnel with
"designated special status". A Critical Assessment must:

(a) Determine if critical functions or combat power can be

substantially duplicated with other elements of the command or
an external resource;
(b) Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key
assets and capabilities in the event of temporary or permanent
loss; and
(c) Set priorities for response to threats toward personnel, physical
assets and information.

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(7) Vulnerability Assessments (VA). Vulnerability assessments for any

semi-permanent sites (FOBs, main camps, etc.) will be held in
abeyance until the later stages of Phase IV;
(8) Protection Cell. The integration of the many disparate protection tasks
and systems into operations will be through a designated Protection
Cell and a G3 Force Protection. At Div level the Protection Cell will
be of a more formal nature and be the core for a regularly scheduled
Protection Working Group (PWG). At the bde and below, a Protection
Coordinator will be designated from among the bde staff and be
responsible for liaison with the Div Protection Cell and PWG. The
Protection Cell will monitor and evaluate several critical ongoing
functions associated with execution for operational actions or changes
that impact protection cell proponents. Some of these functions
include:
(a) Ensuring that the protection focus supports the decisive
operation;
(b) Reviewing and adjusting the CCIRs derived from protection
tasks and systems;
(c) Reviewing changes to graphic control measures and boundaries
for the increased risk of fratricide;
(d) Evaluating the effectiveness of command and control battle
tracking for constraints on PR;
(e) Monitoring the employment of security forces for gaps in
protection or unintended patterns;
(f) Evaluating the effectiveness of liaison personnel for protection
activities;
(g) Evaluating movement coordination and control to protect
critical routes;
(h) Monitoring adjacent unit coordination procedures for terrain
management vulnerabilities;
(i) Monitoring readiness rates of response forces involved in fixed-
site protection; and
(j) Monitoring FHP.
(9) PWG. A PWG has been established at HQ 4 MND under an officer
designated as G3 Force Protection.
(a) Tasks. The tasks of the PWG are:
i. Determine likely threats and hazards from updated
enemy tactics, the environment and accidents;
ii. Determine vulnerabilities as assessed by the
vulnerability assessment team;

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iii. Establish and recommends protection priorities, such as

the CAL;
iv. Provide recommendations for the CAL and DAL;
v. Review and coordinate unit protection measures;
vi. Recommend FPCONs and random anti-terrorism
measures;
vii. Determine required resources and make
recommendations for funding and equipment fielding;
viii. Provide input and recommendations on protection-
related training;
ix. Make recommendations to commanders on protection
issues that require a decision;
x. Focus efforts in the Operational Planning Process (OPP)
to produce plans and orders;
xi. Develop protection strategies to effectively use
resources in support of a protection concept of
operations;
xii. Contribute to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
(IPB) and situational understanding;
xiii. Identify vulnerabilities, hazards and gaps in
information;
xiv. Participate in targeting processes and the ISR
synchronization process; and
xv. Coordinate with various working groups to further
synchronize protection with the other operational
functions.
(b) Composition. The PWG is led by the G3 Force Protection and
normally consists of:
i. AMD officer;
ii. Anti-terrorism officer;
iii. CBRN officer;
iv. Engineer officer;
v. EOD officer;
vi. OPSEC officer;
vii. Provost Marshal;
viii. Intelligence representative;
ix. PAO;

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activities only.
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x. G-6 representative;
xi. Public Affairs Officer; and
xii. LEGAD.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See Annex R (Logistics).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Deviations from the prescribed FP measures, changes
in threat and FP incidents are to be reported via the 4 MND reporting chain. CBRN incidents
are to be reported to COM CFLCC via the CFLCC CBRN Warning and Reporting chain.

Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Anti-terrorism
Appendix 2 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix 3 - Air and Missile Defence

J-9/9
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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Appendix 1
Annex J
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

ANTI-TERRORISM
References:
A. ADDP 3.22 Force Protection 10 Mar 15
B. FM 3-37.2 Antiterrorism, Feb 2011
1. SITUATION
a. General. 4 MND will be conducting full spectrum operations in a complex
threat environment. The presence of active and capable adversarial non-state
actors within the Area of Operations (AO) poses a significant threat to 4 MND
personnel, infrastructure and operational functions in general.
b. Area of Interest. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
c. Joint Operations Area. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
d. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
e. Friendly Forces. Refer to Annex B (Task Organization).
f. Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex W (Civilian Military Cooperation).
g. Assumptions
(1) Available Class IV material is on-hand for improvements to base
clusters and hardening of defensive positions.
(2) Atropian Armed Forces (AP Armed Forces) will cooperate with and be
receptive to 4 MND anti-terrorism (AT) measures and activities.
2. MISSION. No change from Annex J.
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations
(1) General. AT is 4 MND’s defensive program to protect against
terrorism. The combination of AT, Counter Terrorism (CT),
consequence management and intelligence support constitute the
overall Combating Terrorism Program. AT plans must incorporate its
five principles: assess, detect, defend, warn and recover. As an
element of the Shield operational function, AT will be integrated
throughout the operations process and across full spectrum operations.
AT tasks play a critical role in the defence against terrorist acts and
how 4 MND will preserve combat power against actions by non-state
actors. AT will likely play one of the bigger roles in a commander’s
actions to protect the force when the likelihood of conventional enemy
contact is minimal. AT continues to serve as a foundation for 4 MND
security posture and how it applies to actions within the Shield
operational function, even as forces transition to offensive operations.
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(2) Phases. Op IRON GUARDIAN will be conducted in four phases –

Phase I - Advance; Phase II - Cross River KURA; Phase III - Destroy
24 Mot DTG; and Phase IV - Stabilize. AT tasks and processes will
continue throughout all phases, but will be more critical in Phases I
and IV.
(3) Priorities. Priorities for AT and Force Protection units are to C2,
aviation assets, vehicle convoys, Class V and Class III storage
locations, and rear operations. Throughout all phases of the operation,
AT operations will focus on identifying and reducing friendly
vulnerabilities, collection and dissemination of threat information,
assessing and reducing identified critical vulnerabilities and
maintaining a defensive posture. Essential is the implementation of
Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) and Random Antiterrorism
Measures (RAM), physical security of property, operations security
(OPSEC), information security (INFOSEC) and protection of critical
information lists (CIL). Field and base security operations are critical
to the success. In Phase IV Stabilize, units will frequently operate
from base locations. Units within staging bases or established in hides
and waiting areas will conduct patrolling, establish early warning and
establish QRFs. In conjunction with the defeat of enemy threats,
commanders must implement area damage control measures
immediately.
(4) Tasks. Commanders are to communicate the spirit and intent of AT
doctrine throughout the chain of command by establishing AT tasks
and measures to develop and disseminate terrorist-related information.
(a) Commanders are to:
i. Establish an AT Program for their formation/unit.
ii. Collect, analyze and disseminate threat information.
iii. Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities.
iv. Increase AT awareness.
v. Maintain defences taking into account the AT threat.
vi. Establish partnerships with AP Armed Forces and local
police forces when and where feasible.
vii. Develop terrorist threat incident responses.
viii. Conduct exercises and evaluate/assess their AT plan.
ix. Provide specific direction/guidance regarding:
aa. Intelligence focus for AT efforts.
ab. Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
ac. Critical assets and high-value targets.
ad. Force Protection Condition (FPCON) status.

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ae. Random AT Measures (RAM) implementation.

af. CBRN risk guidance.
ag. Information operations condition.
ah. OPSEC risk tolerance.
ai. Rules of Engagement and interaction.
(b) AT Program. The key to an effective AT program is a
comprehensive plan. Commanders are to develop an AT plan
which addresses:
i. Application of AT measures.
ii. Terrorist threats and other threat activities.
iii. Measures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts and
attacks.
iv. AT physical security measures.
v. AT measures for critical asset security.
vi. Entry Control Point (ECP) procedures.
vii. Force Protection Condition (FPCON) implementation
measures, including site-specific AT measures.
viii. On-site security elements.
ix. Operations and information security.
x. AT measures for High-Risk Personnel (HRP), when
appropriate.
xi. Reaction to terrorist incidents.
xii. CBRN plans and measures.
xiii. Alert notification procedures.
xiv. Incident response management procedures.
xv. AT measures for logistics and other contracting.
xvi. AT measures for in-transit movement, when
appropriate.
(c) AT Working Group (ATWG). ATWG will be established at
4 MND. Bdes and bns are to establish AT organizations to
both advise respective commanders and feed into 4 MND
ATWG. ATWG composition includes representatives from
Operations, Intelligence, Civil Affairs and CBRN. The ATWG
will provide vulnerability mitigation measures to help reduce
risks associated with a particular course of action and conduct
planning and oversight for full spectrum operations that are
specific to irregular threats

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4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Damage control will be supported by military police, engineer

units, medical units and aviation assets providing medical evacuation as applicable and
appropriate to the circumstances.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. No change.

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Appendix 2
Annex J
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

References.
A. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) (enter date)
B. 4 MND Op O 07 (OP IRON Reconnaissance and Disposal
D. STANAG 2389 Minimum Standard of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Personnel
E. Weapons Technical Intelligence IED Lexicon
F. ADDP 3.17 Counter Improvised Explosive Device 19 Dec 16
1. SITUATION.
a. Area of Interest / Operations. Refer to 4 MND OPORD 07.
b. Terrain. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). The Atropian terrain alternates
between rugged mountain and relatively flat lowlands.
(1) Mountainous terrain will channel 4 MND forces along roads, through
valleys and over numerous waterways which will provide opportunity
for the employment of IEDs to disrupt and delay movement.
(2) The road networks of Atropia (AP) are mainly paved; however, there
are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the area. In
the KURA-ARAS lowland, many of the unimproved roads are located
on berms. Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging
paved roads through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads
do not receive proper maintenance, leaving them susceptible to damage
from the weather and overuse.
(3) The KURA-ARAS lowland is composed primarily of agricultural
fields divided by berms and irrigation ditches which will restrict
movement. Agricultural fields are trafficable only during the late
summer months or when frozen during the winter.
c. Weather. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
d. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
e. Explosive Threats.
(1) IED.
(a) IEDs have been used by various anti-government guerrilla
groups for several years. The two primary groups of concern
are Salasyl which operates in southeastern AP and advocates
the violent overthrow of the Atropian Government, and South
Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) which is a group with cultural
ties to Ariana (AN) who advocates creating a separate country
out of southern AP and northern AN provinces. These IED
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attacks, not coordinated between the two groups, were focussed

on Atropian government officials, military forces and against
other guerrilla groups.
(b) IED incidents have been initiated against CJTF-OIG forces in
Gorgas (GO) over the past three months by Arianian Special
Purpose Forces (SPF) and anti-government guerrillas. Arianian
SPF has been using sophisticated TTPs and devices involving
military components. Devices have been primarily VBIED and
ordnance IEDs that are command detonated either through the
use of hardwire or remote control devices. Ordnance IEDs
have been primarily used in road ditches and culverts as well as
in urban areas. Use of victim actuated devices including anti-
disturbance/anti-open switches and trip wires is increasing.
There has been little use of suicide vests at this time. IEDs
employed by SAPA and Salasyl are less sophisticated, involve
homemade materials, and have largely been employed
ineffectively.
(c) 82 Abn Div was targeted upon arrival in AP, and in the past
month attacks have increased with the move of CFLCC forces
into AP. Technical exploitation of recovered IEDs and
materials has been incorporated into render safe procedures.
(d) It is likely that Arianian SPF will continue to operate in both
GO and AP and target Coalition soft targets and high value
targets such as communications and headquarters units, air
defense equipment, and medical, POL, and ammunition assets
with the goal of disrupting the CFLCC deployment into AP and
Coalition cohesion. Once Coalition forces cross into AP, IED
efforts will become more aggressive, and may include the
potential targeting of TICs. Salasyl and SAPA guerrilla groups
will likely expand targets to include industrial facilities and soft
civilian targets such as mosques and large crowds to deflate
civilian support for the Atropian government and Coalition
operations.
(2) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). There are explosive remnants of war
remaining in AP from previous conflicts as well as current operations.
The Atropia National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has been
actively conducting mine clearance operations in northwest AP in
accordance with International Mine Action Standards. Most of the
remaining explosive hazards are located in the Rayons along the
LOWER JANGA-AP border. The most likely UXO threats in theater
are: RPG 7 and RPG 9 HEAT projectiles, BK881 HEAT recoilless
rifle projectiles, 82mm Mortars rounds, 122mm rockets, 152mm arty
projectiles, various foreign AT and AP mines, and POM-2S AP and
PTM-3 AT scatterable mines.

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(3) CBRN and TIC Threats. Refer to Annex U.

f. Friendly Forces.
(1) Atropia. AP has rudimentary EOD capabilities in their Army Engineers
and CivPol.
(2) CFLCC. 415 CBRNE Bde.
(3) Other Organizations. ANAMA is conducting demining operations in
the Rayons bordering LOWER JANGA.
g. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Org) of 4 MND Op O 07.
2. MISSION. 4 MND will conduct counter-explosive hazard operations in order to
maintain combat power and mobility during the execution of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. EXECUTION.
a. 4 MND Concept of Operations. 4 MND will conduct a tactical road move, a
deliberate crossing of the River KURA, and then breakout to destroy 24 Mot
DTG, followed by the re-establishment of the International Border (IB) and
defensive operations. The four phases are: Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5),
Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8), Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG
(D+9-D+13), and Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27). See the main body of
Reference B for further details.
b. CFLCC Concept of EOD Support. HQ 415 CBRNE Bde will coordinate and
control the CFLCC counter-explosive hazard operation. EOD elements as part
of CBRNE TF1, TF4 and TF82 will be detached OPCON to CFLCC divisions
and then placed in Direct Support (DS) of brigades (bde) as necessary. 79
EOD Bn supports other CFLCC organizations, maintains mobility on MSRs
and supports rear area security operations.
c. 4 MND EOD Support Concept. 130 MEB will coordinate and control 4 MND
counter-explosive hazard operations. Some EOD elements from CBRNE TF4
will be in DS of bdes while other EOD elements will be centrally controlled
for rear support tasks. EOD forces must focus on protecting the force and
maintaining mobility during Phase I-III. During these Phases, explosive
hazards should not be allowed to hinder 4 MND operations. Hazards that do
not constitute an immediate, grave or direct threat to 4 MND personnel and
mission success will be marked, bypassed and dealt with when the situation
permits. EOD forces will identify ordnance and attempt to identify IED
system components/operation as much as possible to assist in the development
of friendly TTPs to respond to enemy TTPs. Phase IV will include a more
deliberate effort to deal with the anticipated increase in IED threats and UXO
with more focus on attacking IED networks and exploiting captured material
and forensic evidence.
d. EOD Priority of Effort by Phase.
(1) Phase I.
(a) TAA SILVER.
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(b) MSR SEATTLE and MIAMI route opening.

(2) Phase II.
(a) Assembly Area (AA) A3.
(b) River KURA crossing area.
(3) Phase III.
(a) River KURA crossing area.
(b) Breakout force – X (AS) Bde and 12 (UK) AIB.
(4) Phase IV.
(a) 4 MND defensive areas on the international border.
(b) Division Support Area in the vicinity of SALYAN and the
River KURA.
e. Grouping. 130 MEB will detach DS the following EOD elements for Phases
I-III unless otherwise indicated.
(1) 731 Ord (EOD) Co (-) (with 2xEOD Pls) to 2 Sqn 3 CR for Phase I,
and for Phase II up until 2 Sqn 3 CR crosses the River KURA.
(2) 38 Ord (EOD) Co (-) (with 2xEOD Pls) to the 6 F-G Bde.
(3) 1xEOD Pl, 38 Ord (EOD) Co to X (AS) Bde.
(4) 1xEOD Pl(4), 38 Ord (EOD) Co to 4 CMBG.
(5) 2xEOD Pl, 731 Ord (EOD) Co to 12 (UK) AIB.
(6) 1xEOD Pl, 705 Ord (EOD) Co to 17 Sust Bde.
(7) Direction on regrouping during Phase IV will be issued at a later date.
f. Common Tasks to Subordinate Formations.
(1) Receive attached EOD forces.
(2) Provide logistical, medical, and communications and electronic
warfare support for EOD elements.
(3) Provide security for EOD teams during EOD operations.
(4) Conduct EOD and route clearance operations within assigned AOs.
(5) Support the recovery and exploitation of IEDs and foreign ordnance
for intelligence purposes.
(6) Submit appropriate EOD reports and returns.
g. Specific Tasks.
(1) 2 Sqn 3 CR.
(a) Conduct EOD recce and clearance of Bde Assembly Areas and
Battle Group (BG) Waiting Areas along MSRs SEATTLE and
MIAMI.
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(b) Conduct EOD recce and clearance of the River KURA crossing
area routes and waiting areas.
(2) 130 MEB.
(a) Detach EOD elements DS 4 MND formations.
(b) Coordinate and control the 4 MND counter-explosive hazard
operations.
(c) BPT conduct CBRN munition disposal.
(d) BPT support Host Nation (HN) civilian authorities.
(3) 4 Cbt Avn Bde (MN). Support EOD/C-IED operations by assisting
with air security at incident sites. Move EOD teams by air if
necessary.
(4) X (AS) Force Protection BG. BPT provide security for EOD missions
in the 4 MND rear area.
(5) 1 (AS) MP Bn. BPT provide security for EOD missions in the 4 MND
rear area.
(6) 17 Sust Bde. BPT to assist CBRNE TF4 with the destruction of
abandoned weapons and munitions.
h. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) EOD Priority Intelligence Requirements.
(a) Arianian SPF capacity, techniques and procedures for
employing explosive hazards.
(b) Guerilla group capacity, techniques and procedures for
employing explosive hazards within AP.
(c) Employment of IEDs and booby-traps targeting CFLCC forces
in AP.
(d) Employment of IEDs and booby-traps targeting Atropian
civilians and infrastructure.
(e) Employment of mines in the JOA.
(f) Cache locations of bomb making materials, munitions and
weapons.
(g) Type, location, status and composition of Arianian obstacles
within AP.
(h) CBRN, TIC and environmental hazards in AP.
(2) EOD Friendly Force Information Requirements.
(a) Restrictions on the employment of national EOD assets.
(b) Loss of friendly EOD assets.

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(c) The development of new EOD equipment and render safe

procedures.
(d) Status, locations and activities of Atropian EOD elements.
(3) Categories. EOD categories will be established in accordance with
NATO doctrine at reference C.
(a) Category A. EOD threats that constitute a grave and immediate
threat to 4 MND personnel, critical assets and mission
completion. These incidents may cause mass destruction,
widespread contamination and significant reduction of combat
power or loss of critical infrastructure. Category A incidents
will be given priority over all other tasks. Render safe and
disposal operations will be started immediately regardless of
personal risk upon request from the Supported Commander and
on order of the EOD Tp Leader or Squadron CO.
(b) Category B. EOD threats that constitute an indirect threat to
CFLCC personnel and mission completion. These incidents
impair unit manoeuver and mission capabilities. Before render
safe and disposal operations are started a safe waiting period
may be observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel. EOD
mission conducted upon request from the Supported
Commander and on order from the EOD Squadron CO.
(c) Category C. EOD missions that constitute little threat to
CFLCC personnel or mission completion but reduces unit
manoeuver and mission capabilities or threatens non-critical
infrastructure. These incidents will normally be conducted after
Category A and B incidents are resolved, as the situation
permits and with minimum hazard to personnel. These
missions will be executed upon request from the Supported
Commander and with the authority of the formation COM
CBRNE TF4.
(d) Category D. Assigned to EOD missions that constitute no
threat at present. These EOD missions will not be conducted
without authority of COM 415 CBRNE BDE. NOTE: These
threats are still deadly, and will be marked and left to EOD
forces for disposal.
(4) EOD Priorities. EOD categories are not to be confused with EOD
priorities. EOD forces establish categories while Commanders set
priorities. The five EOD priorities are:
(a) Priority 1 - Immediate. The EOD threat stops manoeuver and
significantly degrades mission capability, or causes the closure
and evacuation of critical assets.

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(b) Priority 2 - Direct. The EOD threat reduces the manoeuver and
mission capability or threatens critical assets important to the
mission.
(c) Priority 3 – Exploitation. Intelligence gathering on first-seen
and unusual ordnance and IEDs.
(d) Priority 4 - Minor. The EOD threat reduces manoeuver and
mission capability or threatens non-critical assets of value.
(e) Priority 5 - No Threat. EOD threats that have little or no effect
on tasks, capabilities or assets. This includes the destruction of
unserviceable equipment and ammunition.
(5) EOD Tasks. EOD units undertake the following tasks in DS of 4
MND.
(a) Conduct IED mitigation and disposal.
(b) Conduct UXO render safe procedures and disposal missions.
(c) Conduct post blast investigations of all types of IED incidents.
(d) Conduct an assessment and disposal of designated munitions
caches throughout the AO.
(e) Clear MSRs and essential operational areas and facilities.
(f) Recover and exploit IEDs and foreign ordnance for intelligence
purposes.
(6) EOD Standards and Safety. Formations and EOD forces must adhere
to EOD cordon and safety actions to prevent unnecessary risk and
possible fratricide.
(a) Only properly qualified EOD personnel that meet the standards
stated at reference D and EOD units shall conduct EOD
procedures against UXO or IEDs.
(b) The IED Lexicon at reference E which is used by US Forces
and has been approved for use by NATO will be used to
facilitate a common understanding.
(c) EOD forces must conduct operations IAW the 60-series and
command directives. Units must use robotic platforms, call for
backup robots and check with their Company HQ prior to
attempting a manual approach on an IED.
(d) EOD forces must check with CBRNE TF4 HQ prior to
downgrading of any prescribed personal protective equipment
(PPE).
(e) The testing of homemade explosives (HME) samples by flame
is prohibited.

J2-7/10
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.

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(f) EOD forces should attempt to use a trailer or external container

when moving ordnance.
(7) Electro-magnetic Spectrum. EOD forces will employ their counter-
IED electronic warfare equipment in accordance with national and HN
regulations. During an EOD incident, EOD teams will control and
provide direction on the electro-magnetic spectrum around the site due
to remote control threats, and effects on communications and robotics.
(8) Disruptive Direct Fire. Formation and Unit Commanders are
authorized to employ direct fire against identified Category A and B
UXO and IED threats during Phase I-III while in contact or
manoeuvering into contact against the opposing force provided the
action will not threaten 4 MND forces, the local population, and
restricted or critical infrastructure.
(9) Counter-IED. In addition to EOD, Counter-IED operations involve
attacking the IED network and adapting the force to changing
explosive threats. HQ 415 CBRNE Bde will establish the CFLCC
Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information,
and coordinate CFLCC EOD and Counter-IED operations. HQ 415
CBRNE Bde will publish guidance and coordinate C-IED operations
and sensitive site exploitation within the CFLCC AO to defeat
insurgent IED networks. This function will be performed by HQ 130
MEB within 4 MND.
(a) Intelligence and Collection. EOD forces will identify ordnance
and strive to identify IED components/operation during Phase
I-III, and will focus on this during Phase IV.
(b) Exploitation and Analysis. All EOD forces will be prepared to
conduct level 1 exploitation and analysis of devices during
Phases I-III, and level 2 exploitation and analysis during Phase
IV.
(c) Counterterrorist Operations. EOD forces will mitigate
explosive hazards employed by terrorist/insurgent activities.
Minimal effort will be placed on material exploitation, forensic
prosecution and targeting IED networks by conventional forces
until Phase IV.
(10) CBRN and TIC. All EOD forces will be prepared to respond to a
CBRN event and conduct initial hazard containment, sealing of leaking
ordnance, and packaging for transport. Chemical units should BPT
assist with CBRN operations and overall decontamination efforts.
(11) Vulnerability Assessments. Subordinate formations will coordinate
with supporting EOD forces to conduct vulnerability assessments on
critical infrastructure and bases as appropriate.
(12) Host Nation Support.

J2-8/10
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.

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(a) Counter-explosive hazard operations will be coordinated with

HN authorities to ensure the safety of CFLCC and HN
personnel.
(b) HN requests for EOD support will be submitted to HQ 415
CBRNE Bde prior to any action being taken.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Detached EOD elements will deploy with their basic load, and will receive
logistic and medical support from supported formations.
b. EOD forces will deploy with all available robotic platforms.
c. Only qualified technicians will repair specialized EOD equipment such as
robots.
d. All specialized EOD equipment Operational Needs Statements will be
submitted to 415 CBRNE Bde for CJTF-OIG approval.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) 4 MND EOD Staff Officer. Maj XXXXXX (AS).
(2) COM 130 MEB. Colonel XXXXXX (US).
(3) COM CBRNE TF4. LTC XXXXXX (US).
b. Location. HQ 130 MEB will be established south of ALYAT in AA A2 by
XXXXXX. 130 MEB Alternate CP remains TAA SILVER until D+8 when it
relocates to AA A3 east of the River KURA.
c. Control. HQ 415 CBRNE Bde will coordinate and control the CFLCC
counter-explosive hazard operation. EOD forces as part of CBRNE TFs will
be detached OPCON to CFLCC formations and then placed in DS of
manoeuver bdes.
d. Reporting.
(1) Formations will submit EOD support requests as per the EOD 9-Liner
message as per Tab A to this Appendix.
(2) Formations and units will provide a daily summary of EOD
incidents/responses to HQ 4 MND and HQ 130 MEB.
(3) EOD forces will provide a SPOTREP within four hours to HQ 130
MEB and a comprehensive report within 24 hours.
(4) EOD forces will employ the EOD Information Management System
(EODIS).
e. Reachback. HQ 415 CBRNE Bde will facilitate EOD reachback support.
f. EOD Liaison.
(1) CBRNE TF4 will provide a liaison cell to the 4 MND Tac CP.

J2-9/10
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.

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(2) EOD forces must provide a concept of EOD support brief to their
supported organization. Companies will liaison with their supported
bdes as required to ensure EOD operations are integrated.
g. Communications. Refer to Annex Q (Communications). Supported
formations will provide communications and electronic warfare support to
assigned EOD forces. The primary means of communication is secure E-mail
followed by secure voice. EOD forces require both NIPR and SIPR access.

Attachments.

Tab 1. EOD 9-Liner

J2-10/10
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.

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Tab A
Appendix 2
Annex J
4 MND Op O 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN insert date

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 9-LINER

Line 1 Date Time Group 131200ZAUG13

Line 2 Reporting Unit/Location 11 CAV 39T TE 7514 6247
Line 3 Contact Method F400, Sapper Six, CPT Windsor
Line 4 Type of Ordnance /quantity 82 mm Mortar 1 each
Line 5 CBRN Contamination Yes, M8 paper confirms H
Line 6 Resources Threatened Personnel, engineer equipment
Line 7 Impact on Mission Mine clearance operations halted
Line 8 Protective Measures Personnel evacuated to 300m
Line 9 Recommended Priority Immediate

Line 1 - Date Time Group. The DTG when the item was discovered.
Line 2 - Reporting Unit/Explosive Location. The reporting unit designation and the 8-digit
grid reference of the explosive ordnance location.
Line 3 - Contact Method. Provide the radio frequency and the call sign, and/or the telephone
number and name of the point of contact.
Line 4 - Type of Ordnance /Quantity. The size, quantity, type of ordnance (dropped, thrown,
projected, placed, or possible IED). Indicate the emplacement method and type of initiation
device.
Line 5 - CBRN Contamination. Indicate the type of CBRN contamination, and/or symptoms
being experienced by personnel.
Line 6 - Resources Threatened. Report any equipment, facilities, or other asset that are
threatened.
Line 7 - Impact on Mission. Provide a short description of your current situation and how the
presence of explosive ordnance affects the mission, such as delayed, diverted, or cancelled.
Line 8 - Protective Measures. Describe measures taken to protect personnel, equipment or
facilities.
Line 9 - Recommended Priority. Immediate (Category A), Indirect (Category B), Minor
(Category C), and No Threat (Category D. Ensure the recommended priority matches the
situation described in Line 7. Priorities refer only to the impact of explosive ordnance on the
current mission.

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Appendix 3
Annex J
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

Instructors wishing to inject AS GBAD may amend this Annex in order to

achieve the required learning outcomes

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENCE

References:
A. CJTF OIG Air Operations Plan
B. CJTF OIG Airspace Control Plan
C. CFLCC OPORD 07 Appendix 12 to Annex E (Operation IRON GUARDIAN dated
XXXXXX
1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex D (Intelligence).
b. Friendly Forces
(1) CFLCC Air Defence Forces.
(a) 11 AD BDE (-) (DS CFACC) (DAADC) (TAAMDCOORD)
i. 3-43 AD (PATRIOT)
ii. 5-52 AD (PATRIOT)
iii. A/2 AD (THAAD)
iv. A/4 AD (THAAD)
(b) 1-43 AD (PATRIOT) (GS CFLCC)
(c) 3-4 AD (AVENGER) (DS 82 ABN DIV)
(d) 2-43 AD (AVENGER) (DS 4 MND)
(e) 1-62 AD (AVENGER) (DS 1 ID)
(2) Atropian Air Defence Command (TACON to CFAAC).
(a) 361 AD BDE (SA-20)
(b) 362 AD BDE (SA-11)
(c) 363 AD BDE (SA-22)
(3) Every Atropian maneuver brigade contains 6 x SA-15 and 12 x 2S6.
(4) Naval Air Defence. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) is
provided by TG 150.1, TG 150.2, TG 160.1 and TG 160.2. However,
naval forces are unable to provide TBMD coverage over the landmass
of Atropia (AP).

J3-1/5
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
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(5) Counter-Air Forces (TACON to CFAAC). Fighter Engagement Zones

(FEZ) and Combat Air Patrols (CAP) will consist of fighter aircraft
from AP, France, Great Britain, Australia and the United States.
Sensors include E-3C AWACS, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135 Rivet Joint,
CP140 Aurora, MQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper and the WK-450
Watchkeeper. Electronic warfare is provided by the EA-18G Growler.
(6) Coalition Air Defence Vulnerabilities.
(a) Atropian Armed Forces (AP Armed Forces) use Donovian
aircraft, which include Flankers, Fencers, Backfires, Hips, and
Hinds. Since the Arianian Air Force (ANAF) flys the same
types of aircraft, the risk of fratricide is greatly increased.
Systems that rely on a visual identification (VID) prior to
engagement, such as Short Range Air Defence systems, will be
adversely impacted with delayed or aborted engagement
attempts.
(b) AVENGER weapon systems and SENTINEL radars are
lightweight and extremely vulnerable to direct and indirect fire.
(c) With a full PATRIOT battery normally requiring a site of one
square km, this makes it a high payoff target for the enemy.
PATRIOT equipment is vulnerable to both direct and indirect
fire, enemy Special Purpose Forces and they are well within
Arianian surface to surface missile (SSM) threat rings.
(d) The CJTF-OIG PATRIOTS have overlapping Missile
Engagement Zones (MEZ) with Atropian SA-20 and SA-11
rings. Atropian AD systems cannot be networked with CJTF-
OIG systems. This results in two separate AD operating
pictures and C2 with associated delayed engagement decisions
and an increased risk of fratricide.
(e) In a more general sense, AP Armed Forces are unable to link
with NATO Data Link, which results in a dependency on voice
communications and liaison officers.
(7) Critical Coalition Air Defence Capabilities. Aegis TBMD, PATRIOT,
and THAAD are the only CJTF Ballistic Missile Defence capabilities.
3-4 AD, 2-43 AD and 1-62 AD SENTINEL C2 nodes broadcast digital
air picture over the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS) to AVENGER batteries, platoons, fire units, and Air Defence
Airspace Management (ADM) cells after correlation with their
respective Air Battle Management Operations Center’s (ABMOC)
integrated air picture.
(8) Higher-Level Concept of Operations. PATRIOT forces at the CJTF
and CFLCC levels provide TBM area and point defence for
operationally significant assets including ports, airbases, senior
echelon command posts, and assembly areas. Army Joint Tactical
Ground Station (JTAGS) provides satellite-based integrated, in-theater
J3-2/5
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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missile warning to provide near real-time dissemination of ballistic

missile threats. CFACC conducts Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) to
maintain local air superiority over CJTF-OIG and AP Armed Forces,
gradually extending DCA and air superiority over the landmass of
Ariana (AN). Concurrently, CFACC conducts Offensive Counter-Air
(OCA) to defeat the air and missile threat presented by AN Armed
Forces. See Annex DD (Space Operations).
2. MISSION. On order, 4 MND air and missile defence supports active force protection
measures within the area of operations (AO).
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations. During 4 MND Phases I-IV, air defence forces defend
troop concentrations, command posts and sustainment assets to defeat
Arianian Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), rotary wing, and low level fixed
wing aircraft attacks. MANPADS, with the most survivability and stealth,
will be used to protect maneuver elements during these phases. SENTINEL
radars will protect friendly forces from fratricide, provide situational
awareness, and early warning.
b. Tasks. 2-43 AD tasks in accordance with Main Body 4 MND Op O as
follows:
(1) Phase I. Provide area defence of TAA SILVER and BRONZE.
(2) Phase II.
(a) As coordinated with 130 MEB, provide AD coverage of routes
SEATTLE and MIAMI.
(b) Provide point protection of crossing sites and area protection
out to Final Bridgehead Line (PL LION).
(3) Phase III.
(a) Provide area coverage of bridgehead.
(b) Provide area coverage in priority to:
i. X (AS) Bde.
ii. 12 (UK) AIB.
(4) Phase IV.
(a) Provide area protection to forward Bdes and CFLCC reserve.
(b) Provide point protection to River KURA crossing site(s) until
relieved by LCC/theatre units.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) The Engagement Authority for PATRIOT Air Breathing Threat
engagements is Commander, CFAAC. At no time will TBM defence
be denied.

J3-3/5
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activities only.
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(2) Counter-air Target Nominations should be submitted through the 4

MND FSCC to the CFLCC FSCC in advance of the Air Tasking Order
cycle. Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) and strike actions are the
preferred method to preclude the enemy from using air and missile
systems against friendly forces and assets. Dynamic targets should be
selected and nominated for inclusion in the ATO.
(3) All commanders are responsible for passive air defence to minimize,
mitigate or recover from aircraft attack. Passive air defence measures
include early detection, early warning, camouflage, concealment,
deception, dispersion and the use of protective construction.
Commanders should assess if passive air defence measures alone
satisfy an asset’s required defensive posture and only then submit
considerations for additional active air defence through the 4 MND
FSCC.
(4) Strict compliance with the ATO, airspace control order (ACO), and
airspace control measures (ACMs) are vital to preclude fratricide.
Aircraft traveling towards friendly lines should follow Safe Passage
Procedures and observe Missile Engagement Zones (MEZs) within
which engagement is designated to a SAM equipped unit. Each Army
aircraft flight must be included in the ATO or dynamically coordinated
with CFAAC. Input to the CFAAC Airspace Control Plan, including
FSCMs and ACMs, should be submitted through the 4 MND FSCC.
(5) Positive Identification is derived from visual recognition, electronic
support systems, non-cooperative target recognition techniques, IFF
systems or other physics-based ID techniques. To prevent fratricide or
undesired engagements, positive ID is required prior to engagement.
Mode 1, 2 or 4 Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) will be used on all capable
aircraft, regardless of destination or route, to minimize the potential of
fratricide. If AD sensors cannot cover desired airspace NAIs, requests
for aerial sensor coverage should be sent through 4 MND FSCC.
(6) All units are responsible for disseminating Air Defence Warning
(ADW) /Weapons Control Status (WCS). Units will promulgate via
any and all available means. ADW conditions are degrees of enemy
air strike probability, while WCS prescribes the relative degree of
control of AMD fires depending on the tactical situation.
(7) AD units are subject to weapons control status established by the
CFACC.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Logistics. Refer to Annex R (Logistics).
b. Personnel. Refer to Annex HH (Personnel Support - TBI).
c. Health Services Support. Refer to Annex K (Health Services Support).

J3-4/5
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal
(1) Air Defence frequencies, identifiers and participants will be detailed in
the CFAAC’s TACOPDAT, OPTASKLINK Messages and ATO
SPINS.
(2) RF-LINK-16 will be the primary means of information exchange
between all air defence resources that share that capability. Should the
RF-LINK-16 capability fail, the secondary method of information
exchange would be via Data Link 11. LOS limitations must be
considered.
(3) Emission Control for all air defence emitters shall be consistent with
those techniques commonly practiced by the respective emitter types
and shall not violate right of self-defence.

J3-5/5
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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ANNEX K OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex K
4 MND Op O 07 – OP IRON GUARDIAN

HEALTH SERVICES SUPPORT (HSS)

References:
A. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) insert date
B. CFLCC OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) insert date
C. 4 MND Op O 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) insert date
6. SITUATION. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (ref A) Annex K remains in effect except for
the following:
a. Para 1.f. (5) has been amended to read “Legal authorization has been granted
for the provision of non-emergency medical support to foreign nationals
assigned to CJTF-OIG by US medical facilities.”
b. Para 3.a. (7) has been amended to read “The CJTF-OIG Surgeon will establish
an area Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO) and Blood Trans-shipment Center
(BTC) that will coordinate blood management procedures within Component
Commands. 1st Medical Brigade (1 Med Bde) will establish Blood Supply
Units (BSU) as needed and notify CJTF-OIG Surgeon of the location of BSU.
The use of whole blood or blood products from other than US sources is not
authorized. Blood donations from TCN force members (AUSTRALIA,
CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, NEW ZEALAND, and UK) collected in
theater by JBPO are considered to be from a US source.”
7. MISSION. To provide HSS for 4 MND.
8. EXECUTION.
a. General. While Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) retain overall
responsibility for the medical support of their troops, economies of effort will
be achieved as coordinated by 1 Med Bde. As such, 4 MND will field fully
integrated, medical and dental components to address the requirements for
HSS for TCNs;
b. Role 1 and 2E. National Role 1 and 2 (with an Enhanced or Forward Surgical
capability) Medical and Role 1 Dental capability will deploy as an integral
part of TCN formations;
c. Role 3 Hospitals.
(1) US 31 Combat Support Hospital (CSH) currently established in
MARNEULI, GORGAS;
(2) US - 21 CSH currently established in TSNORI, GORGAS; and
(3) GERMANY (GE) - Field Hospital Regiment 41 (Fd Hosp 41) (GE) –
in reserve at KUTAISI, GORGAS. To be deployed on order in
vicinity of SANGACHAL, ATROPIA GR 39T UE 692 426 (estimate
D + 8).

K-1/5
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activities only.
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d. Role 4. Initial Role 4 support to 4 MND will be provided at LANDSTUHL,

GE Regional Medical Centre (LRMC), for all TCNs before evacuation to TCN
home country;
e. Holding Policy. Maximum three days at Role 2E Medical Treatment Facility
(MTFs);
f. Dental Treatment. Dental treatment is a TCN responsibility. Dental care
provided within the Area of Operations (AO) will be restricted to emergency
treatment necessary to relieve suffering and allow continued mission
performance:
(1) Role 1. Role 2E HSS elements will provide Role 1 Dental support;
(2) Role 2 and 3. US and GE Role 3 Hospitals will provide up to Role 3
dental support as required; and
(3) Dental Evacuation. Evacuation of dental casualties is a unit
responsibility. Exception is maxillofacial type medical patients who
are to be evacuated through the Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC)
chain.
g. MEDEVAC.
(1) Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell (PECC). A PECC will be
established at HQ 1 Med Bde to coordinate all medical evacuations (air
and ground) to 31 and 21 CSHs and Fd Hosp Regt 41 (GE);
(2) National Medical Liaison Team (NMLT). TCN HSS Units will assign
a NMLT to the PECC to track TCN patients. Each nation will also
supply a National Medical Liaison Officer (NMLO) to be employed
within the 1 Med Bde PECC;
(3) Ground MEDEVAC. Ground MEDEVAC from Role 1 to Role 2
MTFs is a unit responsibility. Ground MEDEVAC to US CSHs and
GE Fd Hosp is to be coordinated through the 1 Med Bde and 14
Evacuation Battalion (14 EVAC Bn); and
(4) Aeromedical Evacuation (AE).
(a) Tactical AE. Tactical wing medical evacuation is the preferred
method of evacuation for Category A and B casualties.
Requests for forward and tactical AE within the AO are to be
coordinated though the 1 Med Bde PECC. There will be an AE
capability from 31 and 21 CSH and Fd Hosp Regt 41st (GE)
Role 3s. 1 Med Bde has OPCON of:
i. 57 Aviation Company (Medevac) - 15 HH60; and
ii. Det Light Helicopter Regiment 10 (GE) (Medevac) - 15
NH90.
(b) Strategic Aeromedical Evacuation. This is a Logistics Lead
Nation (LLN) or TCN responsibility to be coordinated with 1
Med Bde PECC.

K-2/5
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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h. Use of Civilian Health Facilities. The use of civilian health facilities is not
authorized, except for emergency treatment when military resources have been
exhausted. The 4 MND G1 and Senior Medical Advisor (SMA) are to be
immediately advised when 4 MND personnel are being treated and/or have
been admitted to a civilian health facility;
i. Geneva Conventions. HSS personnel and non-HSS personnel assigned to
HSS units are to carry a Geneva Conventions identification (ID) card and
wear, on the left arm, an armlet bearing the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red
Crystal emblem as appropriate. They will carry small arms for self-defence
and protection of the wounded and sick under treatment;
j. Medical Handling of Prisoners of War (PW)/Detainees.
(1) Casualties.
(a) PW/Detainee casualties will be medically treated in accordance
with the Geneva Conventions;
(b) PW/Detainee casualties will be evacuated through the same
channels as 4 MND casualties but will be kept segregated as
much as possible. Depending upon their medical condition,
PW/Detainees admitted to 4 MND MTFs will be evacuated to
the PW/Detainee Medical Treatment facilities co-located with
higher level PW/Detainee facilities. Surgical care will be
provided at 31 CSH or 21 CSH as appropriate;
(c) Handling of detainees is a national prerogative and is governed
by each nation’s arrangement with the applicable Host Nation
(HN) and/or other Coalition partners. As a matter of general
policy and guidance within 4 MND, sick or wounded
PW/Detainees will not be transferred as long as their recovery
may be endangered by the journey, unless their safety, or the
safety of others, imperatively demands it. Arrangements to
transfer wounded or sick PW/detainees will be expedited in
order to reduce risk to their health or facilitate medical
treatment. Authorized release or handover to local security
forces of injured Detainees will not be carried out until the
individual’s health permits as assessed by a competent medical
authority from the holding nation. The assessment is to include
a consideration of the availability, suitability and quality of
local health care at the point of release/handover; and
(d) 4 MND MTFs are not responsible for the security of
PWs/Detainees. The delivering units must provide the
necessary security.
(2) Captured Supplies. Captured enemy medical supplies may be provided
to and then used by enemy medical personnel at the PW/Detainee
Medical Treatment facilities.

K-3/5
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activities only.
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k. Medical Rules of Eligibility (MedRoE), Assistance to Non-Government

Agencies (NGOs) and Humanitarian Aid (HA).
(1) While the priority is proper care of 4 MND members, 4 MND Health
Services personnel may, based on 4 MND Surg priorities, provide care
to NGO civilians, other TCN civilians, and local population or
civilians accompanying the force; and
(2) Support to Civilian Personnel. This will be limited to emergency
treatment and may include evacuation to civilian or aid agency medical
facility.
l. Mass Casualties (MASCAL). 4 MND SMA will produce a MASCAL plan in
coordination with CFLCC and 310 ESC;
m. Medical Intelligence. 4 MND SMA will provide, on an as-required basis, a
medical intelligence assessment of the issues that may affect the health of
deployed 4 MND forces including advice on preventive medicine and
necessary prophylactic measures. Throughout the deployment period,
personnel are required to notify unit medical staff of any issues that may affect
medical readiness. Bde Surgeons will collate data and inform 4 MND SMA
who will institute a medical tracking system to provide the earliest possible
warning of epidemics (i.e. trends); and
n. CBRN. Casualties contaminated by CBRN material must be decontaminated
prior to entering medical treatment facilities. Contaminated casualties will not
be evacuated on tactical or strategic aeromedical evacuation aircraft without
approval from appropriate level command authority. Forward medical
units/facilities will be prepared to provide patient decontamination and care
for CBRN injured patients and function in a CBRN contaminated
environment.
9. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Medical Stocks. 1 Med Bde, 13 Medical Logistics Battalion will:
(1) Manage distribution of medical logistics stocks in AO;
(2) Coordinate medical logistics matters with TCN national authorities;
and
(3) Maintain and manage the theatre JBPO.
b. Medical Logistics.
(1) Class VIII Supplies. (See para 4 of Annex R):
(a) Controlled Substances and Medications. TCN Health Support
Unit (HSU) Medical Depots will coordinate procurement,
holding and distribution. Consumables will be reordered
through TCN HSU Medical Depots;
(b) Blood and Blood Products. 4 MND replenishment will be on a
seven-day cycle. The TCN HSU Medical Depots will
coordinate procurement, holding and distribution; and

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(c) Delivery. Unit configured panniers will be placed on push

replenishment for forward delivery using returning MEDEVAC
assets. Resupply will be coordinate through TCN HSU
Medical Depots.
c. Medical Equipment Repair. Equipment will be back loaded through the
medical chain to TCN HSU Medical Depots. Limited medical repair will be
available through technicians attached to Role 2 facilities; and
d. Outdated Medications. Time expired medications and dental materiel will not
be issued to any external agency, even for humanitarian reasons. If acceptable
disposal methods are not available, expired materiel will be back loaded to the
TCN HSU Medical Depots for disposal.
10. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Medical Situation Report (MEDSITREP). Bde MEDSITREPs are to be
forwarded in accordance with established 4 MND Battle Rhythm in format as
per Tab HH, Annex UU to this Op O.

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Annex L
4 MND Op O 07 - Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

References:
A. LWP-G 2-1-1 Psychological Operations, 04 Jun 18
B. JP-3-13.2 Psychological Operations 07 January 2010
C. US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities 25 January 2013
D. Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011
E. Appendix 13 (MISO) to Annex C (Operations) to CFLCC OPORD 07 Op IRON
GUARDIAN) (insert date)
1. SITUATION
a. General. See paragraph 1 of the OPORD main body;
b. Host Nation Considerations. The size of the Area of Operations (AO) and
nature of the information environment and the population of ATROPIA (AP)
will necessitate some reliance on the Host Nation’s (HN) means to broadcast
and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences (TAs). AP has
openly agreed to cooperate with CFLCC formations and has granted Coalition
forces access to approved state controlled media as a means to address Target
Audiences. 4 MND will leverage this support;
c. Threat Considerations (See also Annex D (Intelligence)).
(1) The Arianian information environment is strongly influenced by strict
censorship with the resultant self-censorship of the actors in the media
domain. Consequently, the PSYOP ability to penetrate, influence and
ultimately change audience behaviour is highly limited and requires
indirect/intermediate audiences and methods to achieve the desired
effects;
(2) The Arianian regime has historically used propaganda and
disinformation to influence or attempt to influence the Atropian
populace and the International Community and it is expected that they
will continue such activities. The Arianian government and the South
Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) have mounted a carefully
constructed, well-orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as
part of their strategic agenda. Arianian information activities (IA)
have already successfully affected the information environment of HN,
mainly leveraging ethnic, political, security, and commercial issues,
leading to further de-stabilization. Arianian state broadcasting services
and military forces undertake extensive measures to understand,
paralyze, and persuade their adversaries. Arianian military PSYOP
elements provide a coordinating function for overarching information
operations, including the systematic disinformation of a range of
Target Audiences using multiple social media platforms; and

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(3) Arianian PSYOP products and activities are spread through an

extended use of local radio, national TV, social media, Key Leader
Engagements (KLE) and interviews with foreign press. There have
been indications of undercover Arianian Special Purpose Forces,
agents and proxies engaging with and influencing local Atropian
populations as well as International Organizations (IOs) and Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs). It is assessed that the Arianian
government will continue to mount, both regionally and world-wide, a
carefully constructed, well-orchestrated propaganda campaign in an
attempt to:
(a) Justify its incursion into Atropian territory;
(b) Undermine the premise for and legitimacy of the UN-
sanctioned Atropian Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM);
(c) Deny and discredit allegations leveled at ARIANA (AN) by
AP, the UN and the International Community;
(d) Undermine the legitimacy and credibility of CJTF-OIG and
CFLCC as a well-organized, trained, capable, determined UN-
sanctioned multinational force;
(e) Undermine government and public support in AP for CFLCC,
especially its support and cooperation as a HN;
(f) Support claims of abuse and denial of rights of Arianian
minorities in AP;
(g) Undermine Atropian claims and correspondingly support
Arianian claims to petroleum assets in the CASPIAN SEA; and
(h) Undermine the impartiality of the International Community,
state actors, and media organizations reporting on AN’s actions
in the region.
2. MISSION. C CO 9 MISB supported by 4 MND enablers and operating as part of an
integrated Influence Activities campaign within the AO, conducts operations to minimize the
impact of the Arianian PSYOP narrative and weaken the will and efficiency of the AN
Armed Forces and other threat elements, while gaining, maintaining and increasing popular
support for Coalition actions.
3. EXECUTION
a. Commander’s Intent. Throughout Op IRON GUARDIAN, C CO 9 MISB
operating as part of an integrated 4 MND Influence Activities campaign, will
be employed with a focus on combat PSYOP (US Army terminology Military
Information Support Operations (MISO)), and perception management to
multiply the effects along the operational functions of command, sense, shield,
and act. I want to control, at the Division level, the narrative of the mission
but allow the Brigades to engage approved audiences to get messaging
dominance in our AO, seize opportunities and counter the Arianian narrative.
We must convey the perception that our presence is legitimate and that we are
here to help the people of AP, and we must convince AN Armed Forces to the
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maximum extent possible that their cause is illegal and their position highly
untenable;
b. Concept of Operations.
(1) General. PSYOP/MISO are planned activities using methods of
communication and other means directed at approved audiences to
influence perceptions, attitudes, and behavior, affecting the
achievement of political and military objectives. Operating as part of
an integrated CFLCC MISO campaign (reference D), C CO 9 MISB
and enablers will contribute to Coalition achievement of Information
Superiority in the Information Environment (IE) through the
development of enhanced situational awareness, influence activities
and exploitation of the Human Terrain (HT). PSYOP/MISO elements
will ensure coordination with Atropian authorities to set the stage for
Influence Activities to support 4 MND and CFLCC operations.
Particular attention to Arianian offensive cyber activities and attacks is
required and all PSYOP/MISO elements, in close coordination with
Info Ops, should be prepared to plan and execute mitigating actions.
PSYOP/MISO will make use of existing Atropian media. All activities
and messaging will be conducted in partnership with local authorities
and AP Armed Forces. Own media capabilities for production and
dissemination/broadcast require radio (including FM, Radio In a Box
(RIAB) and short-wave broadcast), video/TV, print, and tactical
PSYOP/MISO equipment including loudspeakers and Internet/Social
Media; and
(2) Approach. PSYOP/MISO will follow a phased, building-block
approach. PSYOP/MISO will first focus on gathering atmospherics in
the AO, identifying the motivations and vulnerabilities of insurgents
and AN-sponsored agents, and countering Arianian messaging.
PSYOP/MISO will also support the effort of CIMIC elements in order
to facilitate the initial movements of 4 MND by conducting outreach
programs (as possible within the limited time period) at the provincial
and rayon level. As 4 MND transitions to decisive operations, the
focus will be on attaining and maintaining messaging dominance,
neutralizing Arianian messaging capacity in AP, and enhancing the
messaging capacity of Atropian security forces and local governance.
Then, to support stability, PSYOP/MISO will highlight AP Armed
Forces’ achievements and promote a safe and secure environment,
thereby setting the stage for transition to a follow-on force and the
redeployment of CFLCC and 4 MND.
c. PSYOP/MISO Support to 4 MND Scheme of Manoeuver
(1) Preliminary Moves (D-D+3). C CO 9 MISB and PSYOP/MISO
enablers will contribute to the continuous development of a shared
understanding, confirm Target Audience Analysis identification, and
contribute to the Information Preparation of the Operating
Environment (IPOE). PSYOP/MISO will confirm liaison with

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Atropian Governmental agencies and AP Armed Forces, and ensure a

coordinated approach regarding messages, utilizing dedicated slots and
space in Governmental media. Concurrently, PSYOP/MISO will
mitigate the effectiveness of Arianian propaganda and disinformation
directed against 4 MND/CFLCC and AP. Special attention is to be
paid to the Arianian ethnic minority in southern AP. PSYOP/MISO
Objectives to be stressed in this phase will focus on supporting
Coalition unity and resolve, legitimacy and credibility of the 4
MND/CFLCC, securing and maintaining Atropian support, countering
Arianian propaganda, and attacking AN Armed Forces will to fight.
PSYOP/MISO will also support the CFLCC Military Deception Plan
throughout;
(2) Phase I Advance (D+3-D+5). PSYOP/MISO operations will continue
and consolidate activities from the Preliminary Moves. During Phase
I, C CO 9 MISB will begin to conduct full spectrum PSYOP/MISO
operations within the Information Environment and consistent with the
CFLCC PSYOP/MISO campaign, to contribute to the achievement of
Information Supremacy and intensive support to the 4 MND and
CFLCC tactical plans. This will be done through combat
PSYOP/MISO, counter-PSYOP, and a targeted psychological
campaign. Information superiority will be gained and maintained to
ensure that the Arianian PSYOP narrative is neutralized and its
offensive posture is degraded. To support 4 MND/CFLCC decisive
operations, PSYOP/MISO will affect the morale and the cohesion of
Arianian security forces, especially HQs, first echelon elements,
tactical reserves, communication nodes and logistics centres. This
approach could also indirectly influence Arianian leadership.
PSYOP/MISO will support counter-insurgent activities by exposing
the links between AN and its proxies operating in AP. Information
Operations will disrupt Arianian C4I by supporting physical
destruction , Electronic Warfare (EW), and PSYOP/MISO to diminish
its propaganda, disrupt C2, degrade situational awareness and delay its
decision-making in order to compel the withdrawal of Arianian
military forces from AP;
(3) Phase II (Cross KURA River) (D+6- D+8). Same as for Phases I, plus
the focus will be on maintenance of Information Supremacy and
domination of the Information Environment to reinforce complete 4
MND/CFLCC tactical success, bolster Atropian resolve and support,
and to deter any decrease in Arianian compliance with the will of the
International Community. Special attention will be paid to asymmetric
threats inside AP during this phase. The role of the Atropian
government and AP Armed Forces in supporting 4 MND/CFLCC to
achieve the Arianian withdrawal from AP will be highlighted;
(4) Phase III (Destroy) (D+9-D+13). In this Phase PSYOP/MISO
activities will continue to build and consolidate on previous activities.
In addition, PSYOP/MISO will support Civil Affairs Operations
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(CAO) as they start to prepare the way and lay the foundation for
eventual transition to post-combat stabilization efforts; and
(5) Phase IV (Stabilize) (D+14-D+27)). Same as Phase III, in addition
PSYOP/MISO will directly support any 4 MND / CFLCC roles in
stabilization activities in AP. PSYOP/MISO main effort of this phase
will be the improvement of the perception and achievements of the
Government of AP and AP Armed Forces. In this phase, messaging
will emphasize the successes of the Coalition in restoring Atropian
sovereignty, facilitating reconstruction and humanitarian aid, and
assisting in the capacity building of local authorities. Early attention
is to be paid to the capture of lessons learned and best practices,
shaping regional and international perceptions of the mission and
establishing a positive legacy for ASAM, CJTF-OIG, CFLCC and 4
MND.
d. PSYOP/MISO Pychological Opjectives (POs) and Supporting Psychological
Objectives (SPOs). The following are approved POs and SPOs in the 4 MND
AO and will be used to coordinate, integrate, synchronize and evaluate
PSYOP/MISO activities. Should PSYOP/MISO elements need further POs
and SPOs, they are to be forwarded to 4 MND HQ for approval:
(1) Effect. Support for ASAM as a legitimate mission and CJTF-OIG /
CFLCC as legitimate, determined and capable forces is increased;
(a) PO: Increase legitimacy of campaign.
i. SPO: Target Audience (TA) reports enemy activity to
authorities;
ii. SPO: TA decreases support to Arianian forces; and
iii. SPO: TA surrenders to CFLCC forces and HN security
forces.
(2) Effect. Effectiveness of Arianian hostile propaganda and
disinformation directed against CJTF-OIG / CFLCC / 4 MND and AP
is reduced.
(a) PO: Decrease support to Arianian campaign.
i. SPO: TA obeys all CFLCC instructions;
ii. SPO: TA reports Arianian propaganda; and
iii. SPO: TA uses CFLCC media for news/information.
(3) Effect. Arianian offensive posture directed towards AP, CJTF-OIG,
CFLCC and IC is reduced.
a. PO: Decrease of AN Armed Forces and other threat elements
activity.
(i) SPO: TA surrenders to CFLCC forces; and
(ii) SPO: TA deserts and/or resumes a normal peaceful life.

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(4) Effect. AN is compelled to withdraw from occupied Atropian territory.

(POs and SPOs are still in development).
(5) Effect. Arianian influence into AP is degraded.
(a) PO: Decrease support for Arianian intervention.
i. SPO: TA organizes/participates in anti-Arianian
protests;
ii. SPO: TA reports on enemy activity; and
iii. SPO: TA openly criticizes Arianian government.
(6) Effect. Atropian civil and military authorities’ legitimacy and integrity
is promoted.
(a) PO: Increase support for Atropian Government.
i. SPO: TA attends Atropian Government sponsored
meetings and events;
ii. SPO: TA utilizes existing national government
institutions or services;
iii. SPO: TA joins or works for national government
institutions or services;
iv. SPO: TA organizes/participates in pro-Atropian
rally/organizational event;
v. SPO: TA seeks employment with Atropian
Government; and
vi. SPO: TA sends children to school.
(b) PO: Increase in Humanitarian Assistance Activities.
i. SPO: TA audience participates in humanitarian aid
distribution;
ii. SPO: TA reports aggression against humanitarian aid;
iii. SPO: TA publically condones humanitarian assistance;
iv. SPO: TA registers to voluntarily leave IDP/Refugee
camps; and
v. SPO: TA participates in in IDP relocation/return to
home programs.
(7) Effect. The perception of AP Armed Forces is enhanced.
(a) PO: Increase support for AP Armed Forces.
i. SPO: TA supports person enlisting in AP Armed
Forces;
ii. SPO: TA enlists in AP Armed Forces; and
iii. SPO: TA re-enlists in AP Armed Forces.
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e. Target Audiences (TAs). The following UN International Committee for

Atropia Sovereignty and Security (ICASS)-approved Target Audiences are
authorized for PSYOP/MISO:
(1) General populations within the AO;
(2) Atropian political and governmental decision makers, influencers and
communicators;
(3) Atropian religious/ethnic/community/group influencers;
(4) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees;
(5) AP Armed Forces;
(6) Atropian media;
(7) Arianian Government and AN Armed Forces;
(8) Arianian civil Institutions and political parties; and
(9) Arianian paramilitaries, proxy forces and cyber assets operating within
the AO.
f. Themes to Avoid.
(1) Any discrepancy or disagreement within the Coalition or TCNs or
between the Coalition and TCNs;
(2) Any discrepancy or disagreement between CJTF-OIG /TCNs and HNs;
(3) Any criticism of the UN, ASAM, ICASS or other IOs;
(4) Any comments on the national policy of CJTF-OIG TCNs;
(5) Any religious reference or innuendo; and
(6) Any ultimatums that cannot be immediately carried out.
g. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Approval Authorities.
(a) The ICASS-approved PSYOP/MISO effects are the guidelines
for all 4 MND PSYOP/MISO activities within the AO. Any
requested change to these objectives must be submitted by 4
MND through CFLCC for CJTF-OIG support and ICASS
approval;
(b) Comd CFLCC is the approving authority for PSYOPS/MISO
products and activities intended to achieve effects at tactical
level. Approval will be sought through HQ 4 MND; and
(a) Operational level PSYOP/MISO effects, intentions and
products will be forwarded through HQ 4 MND to higher
command for approval.
(3) Attribution. 4 MND PSYOP/MISO activities are to acknowledge
sources (white PSYOP), and all PSYOP/MISO products in the AO
should be ultimately attributable to CFLCC or 4 MND;
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(4) Product Submission. All products must be submitted to HQ 4 MND

together with a completed Product Action Work Sheet (PAWS) or a
Series Concept Work Sheet (SCW). Action verbs must be included on
PAWS/SCW to aid in the decision making process. All Counter
PSYOP products must be based on a detailed analysis and will be
accompanied by a completed Source, Content, Audience, Media, Effects
(SCAME) analysis. Every 30 days, all MISO elements within 4 MND AO
are to end out a consolidated file with all products approved (approved
product book) over the previous month to 4 MND HQ. This will ensure
consistent messaging throughout the AO;
(5) Non-targets. 4 MND PSYOP/MISO will not target the international
media, the UN, Atropia Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM) /
ICASS Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), or the forces and civilian
audiences of TCNs outside of the CJTF OIG Joint Operations Area
(JOA);
(6) Reach-Back. 4 MND PSYOP/MISO reach-back capability will be
coordinated with 9 MISB;
(7) Intelligence. PSYOP/MISO support will identify intelligence gaps on
Target Audience related issues for further processing and feedback;
(8) HN Assets. 4 MND and C CO 9 MISB to arrange through 9 MISB for
PSYOP/MISO access to Atropian Government media. Private
Atropian media will be contracted based on operational requirements and
HQ 4 MND approval;
(9) Influence Activities Coordination and Integration. PSYOP/MISO staff
will ensure that planning, execution and assessments are coordinated
with Influence Activities at all levels; and
(10) Requests for PSYOP/MISO support. On request and with the support
of HQ CFLCC, 9 MISB may request additional support for assets,
capabilities and products from 6 MISB (EUCOM) providing support to
HQ CJTF-OIG.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Stocking and Delivery. HQ 4 MND will stock RIABs, crank radio and other
approved PSYOP/MISO products to support ICASS-approved PSYOP effects.
Requests for approved products are to be forwarded to HQ 4 MND. Brigade
PSYOP/MISO elements will be responsible for producing and stocking
approved PSYOPS products/activities which do not fall under the ICASS-
approved PSYOP effect but are in support of Brigade effects;
b. Budgetary. TCNs are responsible for supply and maintenance of nationally
owned equipment. Budgetary support requests, including that for consumable
supplies, articles for mass consumption, costs for using public media and
forecasts for new programmes and projects, are to be forwarded to HQ 4
MND; and

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c. Controlling and maintaining indigenous assets. Brigade elements are

responsible for hiring and controlling their own assets.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. 9 MISB has allocated A CO to support 82 Abn Div, B
CO to support 1 ID and C CO to support 4 MND.

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Annex O
4 MND Op O 07 - Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)

References:
A. B-GG-005-004/AF-010 CF Information Operations, 1998
B. FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013
C. Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations, Nov 2012
D. Joint Publication 3-53 Civil-Military Operations, 08 Jul 2008
E. Joint Publication 3-13.2 Military Information Support Operations 20 Dec 2011
F. Atropia Country Study
G. Ariana Country Study
H. Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to CFLCC OPORD 07
Op IRON GUARDIAN) (insert date)
1. SITUATION
a. General. See paragraph 1 of the main body of this order.
b. Host Nation Civil Considerations. (See also reference F.)
(1) Information Environment: Public communications media is growing
in importance in ATROPIA (AP), though most major outlets are
controlled by the government or by confederates of the president. The
exception is the Internet, where relative freedom exists, but
government monitoring for anti-government messages occurs.
Internet, television and mobile phone networks are relatively
accessible to much of the population in the Area of Operations (AO),
but more so in urban areas. In addition, AP relies on third party
satellite services. While social media is blossoming, TV remains the
most widely available medium. Of note, International Organizations
(IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been
leveraging social media tools to podcast about the invasion (and
subsequent movement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)), share
best practices between their community and educate a global audience
in how they can help. In more isolated rural areas, traditional
communication print media remain the most influential communication
tools. In AP, freedom of expression through the press is essentially
respected. A variety of radio stations serve AP and include state-run,
public radio networks and private stations. Atropian government
bodies are in the lead for shaping and influencing their publics’
opinions regarding the conflict;
(2) Political Environment. The Government of AP has only recently
begun to transition away from an authoritarian type government to a
more representational democracy. AP faces significant internal issues
that must be factored into all Information Operations. While the Host
Nations (HN), GORGAS (GO) and AP, support Coalition intentions in
the region, it can be expected that their military and police forces may

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sometimes use non-democratic means to control their populations.

These may include psychological operations against their own citizens
and especially against ethnic minorities within their borders;
(3) The size of the AO and nature of the information environment and
population in AP will necessitate some reliance on the HN’s means to
broadcast and disseminate messages to identified Target Audiences
(TAs). Host Nations have agreed to cooperate with CJTF-OIG and
grant access to state controlled media as means to address Target
Audiences; and
(4) The presence of large numbers of Atropian citizens displaced from
their homes because of collateral damage, or fleeing in the face of
hostile operations, will require careful targeting and restrictive ROE to
prevent civilian casualties. Air assets may be required to conduct Non-
Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (NTISR) to
monitor displaced civilian movements and civil unrest/demonstrations.
Existing IDP camps will need to be identified in coordination with HN,
Interagency, and NGO representatives (See Appendix 2 (IDP and
Refugees in AP) to Annex W (Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)).
c. Threat Considerations. (Also see Annex D (Intelligence)).
(1) ARIANA’s (AN) activities in the cognitive domain are fully integrated
with its manipulation and management of the Information Environment
(IE) within its borders. AN’s narrative, linked to its overarching
national strategy, is focused on its right to access additional oil
resources in the CASPIAN Sea and on the abuse of the Arianian
minority in AP. With the invasion of AP, AN wants to force AP to
accept an agreement that would meet its needs and gain de facto
control and distribution of more oil resources. AN’s government is
reliant on public acquiescence, driven by misinformation. AN’s home
audiences are likely to be largely supportive of the invasion of AP.
The Arianian regime has historically used propaganda to influence or
attempt to influence the Atropian populace and the international
community and it is expected that they will continue such activities;
(2) AN’s information campaign is supported by controlled state media and
state-sponsored censorship of all forms of media. Consequently, self-
censorship at all levels has become normalized. With its monopoly on
provision of information, the Arianian Government has presented a
distorted picture to international audiences of the actual humanitarian
situation, especially in the occupied part of AP, in attempting to justify
the presence of its troops in that country. Access to the Internet is
heavily controlled. The favored means of mass communication is to
utilize government-funded radio and TV. Rural communities are
isolated and state propaganda is accepted at face value;
(3) AN’s military C4I systems are modern and sophisticated threats.
Arianian military forces use their information capabilities to promote
disinformation in order to manipulate public perception and maintain
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control. They will use asymmetric techniques to counter the

ASAM/CJTF-OIG narrative using Information Warfare (IW). AN
employs proxy forces to conduct Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
within AP, in order to incite the Arianian minority there and to provide
false information to interfere with International Organizations and
NGOs. The South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) operating in the
area appears to have the support of the Arianian government;
(4) It is expected that Arianian forces will continue to mount sophisticated
information operations in support of their overall military campaign.
During operations, Arianian forces will use messengers, and
Frequency-Modulated (FM) and Amplitude-Modulated (AM) radios
for routine communications. There are reports of recent acquisitions
throughout the region of commercial hand-held FM radios, which are
vulnerable to monitoring, jamming and exploitation. Face-to-face
communication has been influential and effective among the local
populace in crisis situations. AN and its proxies can organize a
network of human intelligence (HUMINT) operatives supported with
sufficient off-the-shelf electronic eavesdropping and jamming devices
to interfere with friendly operations throughout the AO. Conversely
AN’s counter-battery radars are vulnerable to Electronic Warfare
(EW);
(5) AN’s GPS jammers are capable of disrupting UAS guidance and GPS
guided munitions. In addition, AN has demonstrated the ability to
conduct Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks against
Atropian and Coalition unclassified networks as well as commercial
and local networks within the civilian sector. With the combination of
EW and Cyberspace Operations (CO) capabilities, AN possesses the
ability to disrupt command and control; and
(6) It is assessed that the Arianian government will continue to mount,
both regionally and world-wide, a carefully constructed, well-
orchestrated propaganda campaign in an attempt to:
(a) Justify its incursion into Atropian territory;
(b) Undermine the premise for and legitimacy of the US-led
Atropia Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM);
(c) Deny and discredit allegations leveled at AN by AP, the UN,
the UN-established International Committee for Atropia
Sovereignty and Security (ICASS) and the remainder of the
International Community;
(d) Undermine the legitimacy and credibility of CJTF-OIG and
CFLCC as a well-organized, trained, capable, determined UN-
sanctioned multinational force;
(e) Undermine government and public support in AP and GO for
CJTF-OIG, especially their support and cooperation as HNs;

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(f) Support claims of abuse and denial of rights of Arianian

minorities in AP;
(g) Undermine Atropian claims and correspondingly support
Arianian claims to petroleum assets in the CASPIAN Sea; and
(h) Undermine the impartiality of International, state actors and
media organizations reporting on AP’s actions in the region.
d. CJTF-OIG Core Themes.
(1) Intent. CJTF-OIG is committed to support the enforcement of UN
Security Council Resolutions in order to restore Atropian sovereign
territory and create conditions for regional stability. Establishment of
the security conditions envisioned by the UN will enable CJTF-OIG to
withdraw from an active military presence in the region;
(2) Legitimacy. CJTF-OIG actions are based on the UN Security Council
Resolutions and the UN Charter. Close coordination and consultation
with the UN, the regional actors and the international organizations
will occur throughout the entire campaign;
(3) Resolve. CJTF-OIG will act to enforce UN Security Council
Resolutions and support the people of AP, in order to protect their
rights and legitimate aspirations;
(4) Cooperation. CJTF-OIG is cooperating within the context of a larger
international response and coordinating its activities closely with a
broad range of stakeholders and actors. CJTF-OIG’s efforts are in
support of the wider International Community (IC) effort to achieve a
resolution to the crisis; and
(5) Responsibility / Necessity to Act. The continuing violence and illegal
actions perpetrated by the Arianian regime are the cause for the current
crisis in the region. CJTF-OIG will exercise its moral obligation to
protect and help those in need, independent of their race, gender,
religion or ethnicity.
e. CFLCC Strategic Guidance.
(1) During Op IRON GUARDIAN, IO will contribute decisively to
Domain Awareness, Situational Understanding and Domination of the
Information Environment in support of Comd CJTF-OIG’s and Comd
CFLCC’s plans;
(2) IO are to deny Arianian forces and their proxy groups, insurgents,
and/or Arianian-supported criminal elements the ability to effectively
command and control their forces by defeating their command, control,
communications, computer and Intelligence (C4I) systems;
(3) Communications for this operation will continue in support of crisis
resolution and humanitarian assistance across diplomatic, information
and economic domains; and

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(4) Key audiences must clearly understand the ASAM mission and CJTF-
OIG / CFLCC deployment, intentions and determination to succeed.
The prioritized audiences are:
(a) Arianian civil and military leadership and opinion formers;
(b) Atropian civil and military leadership, opinion formers and
populations; and
(c) Coalition members’ populations and opinion formers.
2. MISSION. Operating as part of an integrated Coalition Influence Activities
campaign, Information Operations will shape the AO to achieve Information Superiority and
dominate the Information Environment through the coordinated contribution of enablers in
support of the 4 MND mission.
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations.
(1) Intent. IO will be focused on the coordination of enablers in achieving
the 4 MND mission to deliver synchronized effects on the will,
understanding and capabilities on approved target audiences (TAs). I
intend to meet and defeat any threat to 4 MND objectives by
demonstrating commitment and resolve while maintaining the
confidence of the population. From the outset, I want to manage the
expectations of the population while countering any perceived threats
to this operation. All military information activities must mitigate
negative effects associated with combat operations. I want to exploit
every opportunity to effect decision makers and their decision making
cycles;
(2) General. IO enablers will be employed within an overall CJTF-OIG
Information Activities campaign, with a view to support information
objectives in an aggressive and pro-active manner to maintain the IO
initiative. Coordination, synchronization and de-confliction of
associated enabling functions will focus on flexible responses to
consequence management and exploitation of opportunities. IO will
support the mission by disrupting Arianian C4I, diminishing the
Arianian “will to fight,” persuading the Atropian civilian populace to
cooperate with Coalition operations, and protecting friendly
information systems;
b. IO Themes.
(1) Security and Stability. All Atropians deserve freedom from violence
and fear. The fight is not against the Arianian people, but the brutal
Arianian government. The Arianian military and people are misled by
their government’s lies and ambitions. ASAM was authorized by the
UN to protect the territorial integrity of AP and to help restore a secure
and stable environment for the Atropian people.
(2) Legitimacy. The future of AP is in the hands of the Atropian people
and the Atropian government. Humanitarian assistance is a high
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priority to the people of the AP and is supported by the Commanders

of Atropian and Coalition forces. ASAM is a UN-sanctioned mission
and CJTF-OIG/CFLCC forces are well-trained, ethical, competent,
credible, acting under a UN mandate with the welcome support and
assistance of the international community, in particular the
governments of GO and AP.
(3) Economic and Social Progress. Acting in accordance with the Rule of
Law, and with the support of the international community, Atropian
authorities will continue to promote effective democratic governance
and economic and social progress to the benefit of all its citizens
throughout the CJTF-OIG/CFLCC deployment and after it has
withdrawn.
c. IO Objectives.
(1) Promote Coalition unity, capability, and resolve;
(2) Promote the legitimacy and credibility of 4 MND to include the
broader construct of ASAM, CJTF-OIG, and CFLCC;
(3) Influence the HN civil authorities, military forces, and population, as
well as International Organizations and NGOs operating in the AO, to
trust, support and cooperate with 4 MND;
(4) Promote efforts to build the Atropian population’s trust and confidence
in the Atropian government and military forces to help set conditions
for the re-establishment of a safe and secure environment;
(5) Counter Arianian propaganda and its narrative. Refute Arianian
justifications for its incursion into AP. Disrupt AN’s C4I and degrade
its “will to fight”;
(6) Protect Coalition information systems and decision-making processes
by employing OPSEC and physical security to deny enemy access to
friendly capabilities; and
(7) Protect CJTF-OIG/CFLCC Freedom of Movement in the Information
Environment.
d. IO Target Audiences. The following UN International Committee for Atropia
Sovereignty and Security (ICASS)-approved Target Audiences are authorized
for PSYOP/MISO:
(1) General populations within the AO;
(2) Atropian political and governmental decision makers, influencers and
communicators;
(3) Atropian religious/ethnic/community/group influencers;
(4) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees;
(5) AP Armed Forces;
(6) Atropian media;

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(7) AN Armed Forces, in particular in order of priority – 25 Inf DTG,

351/353 BTGs, and 24 Mot DTG;
(8) Arianian civil Institutions and political parties; and
(9) Arianian paramilitaries, proxy forces and cyber assets operating within
the AO.
e. IO Tasks. Contribute to the overall CJTF-OIG IO campaign through
following tasks:
(1) Coordinate 4 MND Information Operations activities;
(2) Disrupt the 24 Mot DTG C4I and reduce their soldiers’ will to fight;
(3) Influence the local populace to cooperate with Coalition forces;
(4) Exploit Arianian military personnel captures/surrenders;
(5) Counter Arianian propaganda and media inaccuracies;
(6) Exploit Arianian atrocities;
(7) Protect friendly information systems;
(8) Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt, damage, and destroy
Arianian military/paramilitary ability to develop, produce, and
disseminate propaganda activity;
(9) Develop and coordinate target lists to disrupt 24 Mot DTG C4I
capabilities;
(10) Conduct PSYOP to prevent local civilian interference with operations
and to gain support for coalition forces;
(11) Coordinate with civil affairs for Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
support;
(12) Analyze captured Arianian targeting folders (particularly pertaining to
AP infrastructure and local leaders) to determine viability for use in
discrediting AN Nominate Captured HVI target packages for
exploitation;
(13) Collect and record any evidence of enemy military use of schools,
hospitals, and other prohibited sites for use in de-legitimizing the
actions of the Arianian government/military for international and local
consumption;
(14) Inform national and international audiences of friendly force progress
and efforts to reinforce the strength, legitimacy and good intentions of
ASAM, CJTF-OIG and CFLCC;
(15) Exploit any brutality by Arianian-backed insurgent forces or criminal
elements (e.g., kidnapping, torture, murder, indirect fire and IED
attacks that injure civilians, and use of residential areas or protected
sites as operational bases);
(16) Exploit Atropian participation in successful IDP/refugee returns;

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(17) Report locations of broadcast facilities (radio, TV, print facilities); and
(18) Be prepared to conduct security area leaflet drops utilizing CJTF-
OIG/CFLCC air/aviation assets.
f. Scheme of Manoeuvre. 4 MND IO plan will ensure centralized
synchronization, integration, and coordination while remaining decentralized
in execution so we remain flexible and responsive to local requirements. By
applying appropriate enablers (especially Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP),
PSYOPS, CIMIC and KLE) in time and space, 4 MND operations will be both
proactive and reactive, exploiting opportunities when they arise and
performing consequence management when required:
(1) Preliminary Moves. Completion of preparations in TAAs:
(a) IO Effects:
i. AN Armed Forces combat effectiveness is reduced;
ii. Armed factions and other belligerents do not interfere
with deployment;
iii. Establish an OPEN PPP when operating in AP (see para
3.h.(2)(d) of this Appendix);
(b) Key IO Tasks. Tasks are to be conducted with due
consideration of the ordered electronic silence:
i. Communicate to the AP population that 4 MND
objective is to preserve Atropian sovereignty;
ii. Emphasize that 4 MND intends to establish a safe and
secure environment wherein UN organizations and
NGOs can implement a comprehensive humanitarian
aid program;
iii. Condemn the Arianian Government, armed factions and
criminal elements for their unlawful actions against the
people of AP; and
iv. Degrade AN Armed Forces’ capacity to conduct combat
operations by emphasizing that 4 MND is a legitimate,
UN-sanctioned, offensive operation.
(2) Phase 1 – Advance.
(a) IO Effects:
i. Military Deception Plan is successful; and
ii. Armed factions and other belligerents do not interfere
with operations.
(b) Key IO Tasks. Tasks are to be conducted with due
consideration of the ordered electronic silence:
i. Negate adversary propaganda;

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ii. Demonstrate strength and deter interference by adopting

CLOSED PPP initially and as required based on threat;
and
iii. Diminish 4 MND operations effects on local population.
(3) Phase 2 – Cross KURA River.
(a) IO Effects.
i. AN Armed Forces combat effectiveness is reduced;
ii. Population is shielded from propaganda; and
iii. Local, Regional and Global audience understand 4
MND purpose and objectives.
(b) Key IO Tasks.
i. Disrupt and degrade Arianian C4I by supporting
Physical Destruction (PD), Electronic Warfare (EW)
and PSYOP;
ii. Degrade AN Armed Forces’ capacity to conduct combat
operations by emphasizing that 4 MND is a legitimate,
UN-sanctioned, offensive operation;
iii. Inform local, regional and global audiences of 4 MND
objectives and purpose to maintain cohesion to sustain
military ops; and
iv. Diminish 4 MND operations effects on local population.
(4) Phase 3 – Destroy 24 Mtzd DTG.
(a) IO Effects.
i. Atropian resolve and support for Coalition operations is
bolstered;
ii. AN Armed Forces combat effectiveness is reduced; and
iii. Transition to Phase IV (Stabilize) is facilitated and
communicated.
(b) Key IO Tasks.
i. Convince AN Armed Forces to surrender or desert,
reduce their will to fight;
ii. Continue to disrupt and degrade Arianian C4I;
iii. Inform populace of Coalition intentions and location of
humanitarian assistance and services;
iv. Safeguard NGO/IO freedom of movement to enable
humanitarian assistance and services;
v. Negate adversary propaganda to safeguard legitimacy of
4 MND mission;
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vi. Inform AN Armed Forces and belligerents of

consequences to Human Rights and LOAC violations;
vii. Exploit Arianian military personnel captures/surrenders;
and
viii. Exploit Arianian atrocities.
(5) Phase 4 – Stabilize.
(a) IO Effects.
i. 4 MND operational success is seen as essential for HA
and return of IDPs;
ii. Atropian local population supports 4 MND stabilization
efforts; and
iii. Future handover to follow-on forces or Atropian
security forces is communicated.
(b) IO Tasks.
i. HA activities are supported and communicated;
ii. Regional and international perceptions of the mission
are shaped to establish a positive legacy for ASAM,
CJTF-OIG and CFLCC.
iii. Lessons learned and best practices are captured;
g. Main Effort. During Preliminary Moves and Phase I Military Deception is the
main effort. During Phases II and III it is the degradation and disruption of
AN Armed Forces combat effectiveness. In Phase IV it is HA;
h. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Targeting. Uncoordinated IO activities within the targeting process
can compromise 4 MND operations and the CFLCC mission as a
whole. Whether lethal or non-lethal targeting is considered, IO will be
involved in all targeting matters in order to either exploit achieved
effects or to avoid/mitigate undesired effects. For more detail see
Annex KK (Joint Fires and Targeting);
(2) IO Enablers. IO enablers will contribute to mission success through
the following functions:
(a) Influence Activities (IA);
(b) Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Additional details in
Annex L (PSYOP);
(c) Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Close coordination
between the IO and CIMIC staff elements is required for many
CIMIC activities. Specifically in support of the Key Leader
Engagement (KLE), Liaison with Non-Military actors,
synchronizing the information activities related to
reconstruction, development and governance projects, and
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establishing operational and tactical theatre civil assessment

(TCA). CIMIC contributes to all STRATCOM, IO and
Targeting related (WG & Boards) processes in HQs on all
levels. Additional details in Annex W (Civil Military
Cooperation);
(d) Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP). The manner in which
troops interact with local populace will send an important
message to this audience, which will either undermine or
engender support. The message may change over time from
one of serious intent to one of approachable information
collector depending upon the current situation. PPP is a guide
to assist forces in determining the attitude, deportment and
level of security they should adopt in any given situation.
Brigade commanders are best able to determine the PPP that
fits their situation and local atmospherics. PPP levels will be
indicated in orders as required. PPP states for ground forces
are as follows:
i. CLOSED. Threatening posture normally aimed at
unsupportive or hostile targets;
ii. NEUTRAL. Professional/dispassionate posture
normally aimed at unknown or manipulative targets;
and
iii. OPEN. Encouraging posture normally aimed at
uncommitted and neutral targets.
(e) Military Deception (MILDEC). Additional details Appendix 2
(Military Deception) to Annex G (Land Operations);
(f) Public Affairs (PA). PA and IO are separate but related
functions. By contributing to the development of master
messages and by delivering factual, true and credible
information without endangering the OPSEC, PA demonstrates
4 MND’s legitimacy, credibility, and resolve, while informing
international TCNs, local political leadership and public
opinion through the media. 4 MND formations and support
elements must ensure that timely success stories are provided to
PA for possible delivery to the media. Additional details in
Annex X;
(g) Computer Network Operations (CNO). Emphasis will be on
Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Security
(COMPUSEC). 4 MND will support CFLCC mission with
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and/or Computer
Network Attack (CNA) capabilities when necessary and if ROE
allowed. IO will coordinate with G3/5/JEMS, who has the lead
for the protection of networks, and coordinate with
G2/Knowledge Centre for threat assessments of adversary

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CNA capabilities to determine the threat to 4 MND Mission

Secret computer networks. Based on assessments of the threat,
IO will recommend protective measures to the Commander in
coordination with Communications and Information Systems
Branch for assessment of impact on current operations and C2.
Additional details in Annex Q (CIS);
(h) Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA). CEMA will
support Information Activities including STRATCOM, IO,
PSYOPS and CIMIC by the use or employment of Electronic
Attack (EA) and Electronic Defence (ED). EA could also be
used, if applicable, to support 4 MND means of Cyber-Defence
in line with ED. Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) will be
used to support 4 MND Information Activities
(Messaging/Broadcasting) or to counter adversary Information
Activities in conjunction with adjacent Rules of Engagement.
Additional details in Annex Q (CIS).
(i) Operations Security (OPSEC);
(j) Information Security (INFOSEC);
(k) Counter Intelligence (CI). Additional details Appendix 4
(Counterintelligence) to Annex D (Intelligence);
(l) Counter Command Activities (CCA).
(m) Manoeuvre; and
(n) Physical Attack/Destruction. Whenever challenged by hostile
activities, 4 MND must be able to react proportionately,
promptly and precisely. Physical Destruction will be based on
a clear identification of those responsible for violence against 4
MND and/or local populations, to avoid negative effects.
Whenever a clear identification is made, 4 MND reaction
should be immediate, precisely targeted and flexible to
eradicate the threat and potentially deter further threats. Photos
and/or video footages of any use of kinetic assets have to be
systematically provided, as soon as possible, through the chain
of command.
(3) Video images (COMCAM, PA, EOD, Soldier Cam). 4 MND units are
to employ COMCAM and other still photo/video capabilities to
capture images in support of objectives and effects. Images are
submitted for exploitation. Images desired for use by any unit will be
declassified by the unit involved in capturing the image. During crisis
situations, special arrangements will be made to transport images,
video, or data from field locations to areas where images can be
exploited;
(4) Coordinating Bodies.

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(a) Information Operations Working Group. An IOWG will be

established at brigade HQs and higher. The IOWG will be led
by an IO Officer from the G3 / S3 staff designated as the IO
Officer and will take place as part of normal HQ battle rhythm.
The aim of the IOWG is analyze, coordinate, and provide
recommendations to achieve integrated information operational
effects. It complements and synchronizes activities from the
various information-related capabilities staffs. It ensures that
information, as an element of combat power, has an operational
advantage to mission accomplishment. Products of the IOWG
include:
i. IO effects nested with commander’s intent;
ii. IO synchronization matrix;
iii. Soldier and leader engagement plan;
iv. Refined themes, messages, and talking points;
v. Refined operational (PSYOP) products;
vi. Targeting input;
vii. Updated combined information overlay, IPOE;
viii. Plans and orders update (asset allocation, resource and
task); and
ix. Information requirements and long-term assessments.
(b) IOWGs products and activities will be coordinated with the
Joint Effects Management System (JEMS) and at the division-
level with the Information Operations Coordination Boards
(IOCB).
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Host Nations Support (HNS). Units are to identify and prioritize requirements
for HNS IO support to G3/IO HQ 4 MND for coordination.
b. Movement and Transportation. Requests for support see Annex S
(Movements).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. See Annex B (Task Organization).

Appendices:

Appendix 1 - Information Operations Synchronization Matrix

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX O OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN
Appendix 1
Annex O
4 MND Op O 07 – Op RESOLUTE GUARDIAN date

INFORMATION OPERATIONS SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

STRATEGIC AIM STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES MISSION IO EFFECTS

The aim of the international 1. Expel all Arianian military forces from Atropian sovereign Operating as part of an integrated Coalition Influence Activities 1. Local, regional and global audiences understand 4 MND
community is to end Arianian territory. campaign, Information Operations will shape the AO to achieve purpose and objectives.
aggression against Atropia, through 2. Restore a secure and stable environment throughout the Atropia Information Superiority and dominate the Information 2. Armed factions and other belligerents do not interfere
the expulsion of all Arianian Joint Operations Area (JOA). Environment through the coordinated contribution of enablers in with operations.
military forces from Atropian 3. Effect force protection for Coalition military forces deployed support of the 4 MND mission. 3. AN Armed Forces combat effectiveness is
sovereign territory, with a view to throughout the JOA. reduced/degraded.
creating the conditions under which 4. Assist the government of Atropia to strengthen the capacities of 4 MND IO OBJECTIVES 4. HA is safely delivered.
the Atropian people can govern their national security forces and institutions to enforce central 5. AP local population supports 4 MND stabilization
themselves in a free, safe, secure control. 1. Promote Coalition unity, capability and resolve; efforts.
and stable environment and permits 5. Preserve and enforce the freedom of navigation throughout the 2. Promote the legitimacy and credibility of 4 MND to include 6. Population is shielded from propaganda.
a continuation of it democratic JOA. the broader construct of ASAM, CJTF-OIG and CFLCC; 7. Conditions set for local support of follow-on mission.
national governance and 6. Establish and enforce an economic and arms embargo IAW 3. Influence the Host Nation civil authorities, military forces,
developmental programs. UNSCR 7739. and population, as well as International Organizations and
7. Support ICASS implementation partners, including UN NGOs operating in the AO, to trust, support and cooperate
Agencies, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs within with 4 MND;
capabilities and limitations in order to preserve human life and 4. Promote efforts to build the Atropian population’s trust and
alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees within the JOA. confidence in the Atropian government and military forces to
8. Gradually reduce the size, role and profile of the ICASS force help set conditions for the re-establishment of a safe and
contribution on the basis of reviews of tasks, environment, secure environment;
threat, risks, follow-on forces and Host Nation’s capacities as 5. Counter Arianian propaganda and its narrative. Refute
part of a Transition and Exit Strategy that is linked to the Arianian justifications for its incursion into AP. Disrupt
achievement of the Desired Military Strategic End State. AN’s C4I and degrade its “will to fight”;
6. Protect Coalition information systems and decision-making
processes by employing OPSEC and physical security to
deny enemy access to friendly capabilities; and
7. Protect CJTF-OIG/CFLCC Freedom of Movement in the
Information Environment.

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KEY THEMES APPROVED TA (Target Audiences)

T1. All Atropians deserve freedom from violence and fear. The fight is not against the Arianian people, but TA1. General populations within the AO.
the brutal Arianian government. The Arianian military and people are misled by their government’s TA2. Atropian political and governmental decision makers, influencers and communicators.
lies and ambitions. TA3. Atropian religious/ethnic/community/group influencers.
T2. ASAM was authorized by the UN to protect the territorial integrity of AP and to help restore a secure TA4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.
and stable environment for the Atropian people. TA5. AP Armed Forces.
T3. Acts of violence, threats and other lawlessness in AP committed by any parties will not be tolerated. TA6. Atropian media.
T4. UNSCR sanctions are internationally supported and have their basis in international law. TA7. AN Armed Forces, in particular in order of priority – 25 Inf DTG, 351/353 BTGs, and 24 Mot DTG.
T5. ASAM is a UN-sanctioned mission and 4 MND forces are well-trained, ethical, competent, credible, TA8. Arianian civil Institutions and political parties.
acting under a UN mandate with the welcome support and assistance of the international community, in TA9. Arianian paramilitaries, proxy forces and cyber assets operating within the AO.
particular the governments of GO and AP.
T6. 4 MND resolve is strong and will prevail regardless of opposition from hostile elements.
T7. The operational success of 4 MND will set the conditions for rapid and unimpeded passage of RESTRICTED TARGET AUDIENCE: Approval from COMD 4 MND is required to act on RTAs.
humanitarian assistance.
T8. Acting in accordance with the Rule of Law, and with the support of the international community, NGOs, GOs, and humanitarian organizations only to be engaged by Public Affairs or CIMIC.
Atropian authorities will continue to promote effective democratic governance and economic and social
progress to the benefit of all its citizens throughout the CJTF-OIG/CFLCC deployment and after it has Religious leaders unless by RLE.
withdrawn.

KEY THEMES TO AVOID

T1. Religious themes.

PHASE 2 PHASE 3
PRELIM PHASE 1 PHASE 4 TARGET
IO EFFECT SUPPORTED IO TASKS CROSS KURA DESTROY 24 MEANS MOE
MOVES ADVANCE STABILIZES AUDIENCE
RIVER MTZD TG
TAAs
PA Public Opinion Polls
Local, regional and Inform Local, Regional and Public Post Media Response
global audiences Global audiences of 4 MND RTAs By PA only Diplomacy Local populace reaction
understand 4 MND objectives and purpose in order to TA 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 PSYOPS
purpose and objectives. maintain. Campaign Legitimacy. Inter-agencies
KLE
Convince AP local national and PPP, PSYOPS, 4 MND deploys unhindered
Armed factions and other
other belligerents to avoid 4 MND CIMIC, Reports indicating compliance
belligerents do not TA 1, 2, 3, 9
deployment in order to enable CEMA,
interfere with operations.
FoM in AP KLE, PA
Deceive AN Armed Forces to To be issued separately
AN Armed Forces TA 7 DECEPTION
enable unhindered deployment
combat effectiveness is
Convince AN Armed Forces PPP , PSYOPS, 20% AN Armed Forces surrender
reduced/degraded TA 7
members to surrender CEMA, PA Defence positions are unmanned

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Increase rate of desertion
Use of EMS to AN Armed Forces is
Physical denied
Destruction, Reporting ability of AN Armed
PSYOPS, Forces is degraded
Degrade/disrupt AN C4I TA 7
CEMA, AN Armed Forces incapable to
CNE/CNA defend own C2 systems
AN Armed Forces wastes resources
defending eqpt not targeted
Local population leave targeted
areas
Diminish 4 MND operations CIMI, PSYOPS, Civilian population is minimal
TA 1, 2, 7
effects on local population PA, KLE Public Opinion Polls
Post Media Response
AP Government
HA is safely delivered
Public Opinion Polls
Inform populace location of HA PSYOPS, PA,
TA 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 Post Media Response
and services KLE, CIMIC
AP Government
PPP, PSYOPS, Increase HA and FOA
Safeguard NGO/IO FOM in order
TA 2, 4, 5, 7 PA, KLE
to enable HA
CIMIC, CEMA
Develop and coordinate target Increase involvement in local
lists to disrupt, damage, and PPP, PD, governance.
destroy Arianian PSYOPS, PA, Reduction of SIGACT against local
TA 6, 7, 8, 9
military/paramilitary ability to CIMIC, CEMA, nationals
Local nationals are develop, produce, and disseminate CNE/CNA
shielded from propaganda propaganda activity
Public Opinion Polls
Counter Arianian propaganda and CIMIC, Post Media Response
TA 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
media inaccuracies PSYOPS, PA AP Government
Post Media Response
Exploit Atropian participation in Increase involvement in local
CIMIC, governance
successful IDP/refugee returns TA 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
PSYOPS, PA Post Media Response
Conditions set for local
support of follow-on Regional and international Public Opinion Polls
mission. perceptions of the mission are Post Media Response
CIMIC,
shaped to establish a positive TA 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9 AP Government
PSYOPS, PA
legacy for ASAM, CJTF-OIG and Post Media Response
CFLCC

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Annex P
4 Op O 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

NOTE TO EXERCISE DESIGNERS/WRITERS: Appendix 1 (EW Tasks Matrix) to this Annex is
annotated as “To be issued”. Some of these tasks may be classified. This appendix will need to be
completed by a SME during the specific exercise writing board.
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy Forces.
(1) ARIANA (AN).
(a) Information and Electronic Warfare (INFOWAR). AN has a robust
INFOWAR capability with the brigade headquarters based in
TEHRAN;
(b) Computer Attack. AN maintains a very robust computer attack
capability through a large and capable cyber militia. AN possesses a
significant Computer Network Attack (CNA) overmatch to ATROPIA
(AP);
(c) Information Attack (IA). AN has achieved limited success with IA
when recently employed against special interest groups. It is assessed
that Arianian IA will likely only operate effectively against non-state
actors. Its IA is prone to be ineffective against Coalition nations;
(d) Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The Arianian military employs a
large force of cyber collectors, most with computer warfare and
English language skills, to both collect data and perform learned
analysis;
(e) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Arianian SIGINT programs
consistently demonstrate success in combating Western
communications systems, especially units that demonstrate poor
OPSEC. 4 MND can expect enemy SIGINT to provide useable
indications and warning, capabilities assessment and targeting
intelligence;
(f) AN Armed Forces can co-ordinate and integrate geographically
dispersed elements, especially its IADS, into a comprehensive C4ISR
network:
i. Air Forces. The AN Air Force has a moderate heliborne EW
jamming capability, employing HIP-J/K and HORIZON
platforms; and
ii. Land Forces. The AN Army employs an INFOWAR Bde to
develop electronic and computer warfare capabilities. The

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INFOWAR Bde includes both offensive and defensive EW

capabilities, including:
aa. Vehicle-mounted 1L222 ELINT (8-18 GHz) signals
intercept for pulsed airborne radars, fire control radars,
terrain following radars and ground mapping radars as
well as weapon (missile) data links. It was reported by
at least one source to have been modified to receive and
locate emissions associated with satellite telephones;
ab. Aviaconversia, Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) jamming transmitter, which jams civilian and
military frequencies for GLONASS and GPS within a
200 km range;
ac. Ground surveillance radar, RASIT, which automatically
detects, tracks, and identifies all targets and provides
polar and UTM coordinates and transmits the
information to remote weapon systems;
ad. Tigr-M REI PP LEER 2 Mobile EW System, a mobile
technical control, electronic emulation and electronic
countermeasures system that is designed for developing
radio emitters, jamming, and suppressing radio-
electronic means including cellular phone systems. The
system can also imitate various radio electronic
systems. It can operate in a static position and on the
move, and operates close to the FLOT in support of
motorized, mechanized or armoured forces moving at
high rates of speed. This capability is a likely candidate
for the high payoff target list; and
ae. Various other (tier 3) HF/VHF radio intercept and DF
systems.
(2) Asymmetric Forces. The various enemy armed groups employ civilian
telecom infrastructure as their primary means of communications, with
commercial-off-the-shelf radios for low-level tactical communications when
required; and
(3) DONOVIA. DONOVIA uses its commercial entities as vectors for collection
and recruitment activities. DONOVIA maintains a very close relationship
with both AP and AN. It is highly likely that DONOVIA has ongoing
intelligence operations and has penetrated some aspects of the Atropian
intelligence and security apparatuses given their level of economic interest in
AP.
b. Host Nation (HN). All media emanate from BAKU. Most major outlets are
controlled by the government or by confederates of the President, this includes
broadcast and print media and internet, as well as social media access:

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(1) Telecommunications.
(a) The telephone system in AP does not work very well, although it is
being upgraded. The city of BAKU has 4G LTEA connectivity and
the areas around SUMGAIT, SHEMAKA, GANJA, ASTARA,
MINGECHEVIR, and AGSTAFA have 3G HSPA. Cellular
telephones can be purchased and used locally. Two companies share
the market, Atropcel - a subsidiary of Atroptelecom - and Bakcell
(Motorola). GSM (Global System for Mobile) coverage is still basic,
but growing fast. The government, through the Ministry of
Communications and Atroptelecom controls the telephone system. An
estimated 200,000 clients are awaiting telephone installation, providing
a bonanza for mobile phone operators; and
(b) Cellular system integration and hardware are supplied by
Atroptelecom, and the networks are supported by extensive microwave
relay links. Fibre optic trunks linking major cities form the backbone
for the 4G and 3G networks. The public telephone system is based on
open wire technology with microwave radio relays. The Ministry of
Communications has licensed the Atroptelecom to provide the
following four telecom services: Public Switched Telecommunication
Service; GSM 900Mhz Mobile Telecommunication Service; Internet
Service Provision; Digital Data Communication. Fixed line telephony
and mobile telephone services are provided exclusively by
Atroptelecom. GSM service is concentrated around major routes. The
state has a monopoly on access and routinely monitors all
communications.
(2) Telephone Service.
(a) The majority of telephones are in the capital city BAKU and other
main cities. About 700 villages do not have public phone service;
(b) BAKU has approximately 280,000 telephones;
(c) The quality of local calls varies considerably depending on which
telephone exchange is used;
(d) All long distance calls must use Atroptel's lines. These allow calls to
any destination. The cards can be bought from central post, telephone
offices and at railway stations; and
(e) E-mail via several local internet service providers is available, as well
as for public access from a number of internet cafés.
(3) Internet.
(a) All new TVs and smart phones can access the internet now and
accessing the internet is no longer a discrete and independent function;
and

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(b) This is extremely significant in a modern urban city such as BAKU,

the nation’s capital, where cutting-edge technology can reasonably be
expected to be available.
2. MISSION. No change from main Op O.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Electronic Warfare.
(1) Intent. To employ EW forces capable of providing Electromagnetic Operating
Environment (EMOE) Situational Awareness across the 4 MND Area of
Operations (AO) in order to facilitate coordination of electromagnetic
operations (EMO) and support 4 MND’s freedom of movement within the
EMOE. Coordination of all EMO within the AO will be through the 4 MND
SIGINT EW Operations Centre (SEWOC). 4 MND’s tactical EW forces will
need to find, fix and exploit Arianian forces. These EW forces will also
require the ability to shape the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The 4 MND EW forces will be required to simultaneously provide all three
EW capability components as follows:
(a) Electronic Warfare Support (ES).
i. Electronic Reconnaissance (ER). This will provide Comd 4
MND an understanding of the EMOE. EW IPOE and
leveraging of operational and national EW/SIGINT capabilities
will be employed to avoid over extending tactical EW
capabilities;
ii. Indication & Warning (I&W) and Force Protection. ES
elements are required to provide force protection through
immediate threat warnings; and
iii. Support to Intelligence Collection. Given the prevalence of
modern C2 systems in the Arianian forces and the use of
civilian communication networks by asymmetric forces, EW
resources will be very effective sources of intelligence
collection. Dynamic tasking of ES assets will ensure available
sensors are employed to maximum effect. Time sensitive threat
information will be reported through operational channels, and
all ES collection will ultimately be sourced to CFLCC EWO
for coordination of follow-on analysis.
(b) Electronic Attack (EA). 4 MND use of land-based EA against AN will
be strictly controlled and not employed without the direct approval of
Comd 4 MND;
(c) Electronic Protection (EP). EP measures will be established to reflect
operating in a near-peer hostile EW environment. The following will
guide EW planning:

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i. Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). A JRFL will be

maintained for all Coalition emitters operating within the JOA.
This will include critical government, commercial and civilian
communication networks and users. The JRFL will prevent EP
fratricide and mitigate impact on electronic collection efforts;
ii. Joint Restricted Targets List (JRTL). The JRTL will identify
those communication networks and supporting infrastructure
that provide services to 4 MND elements or civilian
organizations, or those against which intelligence collection is
being considered; and
iii. Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices. The
use of C-RCIED equipment in the 4 MND AO will be
coordinated through the CFLCC and CJTF-OIG JEMS CC.
(2) Scheme of Manoeuvre.
(a) Phase I – Advance. EMCON 1. Conduct non-emitting ES and EP.
Main EW effort for this phase is I&W of AN determining friendly
main effort;
(b) Phase II – Cross River KURA. EMCON 1 initially. Conduct non-
emitting ES and EP. Main EW effort for this phase is I&W of AN
determining friendly main effort;
(c) Phase III –Destroy 24 Mot DTG. EMCON 4. ES, EW (where
approved) and EP capabilities are employed to deliver the EW effects
required to achieve Comd 4 MND’s mission. AN C2 networks and
EW capabilities are continuously re-assessed and the 4 MND EW force
capability adapted according to evolving command priorities; and
(d) Phase IV – Stabilize. EMCON 4. ES, EA (where approved) and EP
capabilities are employed to deliver the EW effects required to achieve
Comd 4 MND’s mission. AN C2 networks and EW capabilities are
continuously re-assessed and the 4 MND EW force capability adapted
according to evolving command priorities.
(3) End State. Provision of an agile and adaptable EW capability that will enable
the Comd 4 MND to achieve objectives and desired effects.
b. Tasks. See Appendix 1.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Force Protection of EW Forces. EW assets are considered Mission Essential
Property (MEP) and their capture by hostile elements has grave consequences
to the success of operations. As such, additional Force Protection (FP)
measures must be taken by supported formations to prevent the capture of EW
elements and their equipment;

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(2) Computer Network Operations (CNO). CNO and EW operations are

conducted under specific authorities and have their own approval process. 4
MND formations must be familiar with the different coordination
requirements and forward requests for execution early in the planning process
to facilitate effective and timely CNO support;
(3) Linguists. Although English is common in urban areas, Persian dialects,
Arabic, Donovian, Minarian, Atropian, Tat and TURKEYn are among the
languages that dominate the 4 MND AO, particularly in the rural areas.
Persian dialects are the dominant language in AN. 4 MND will forward
deploy special linguist support to allow tactical exploitation of information
originating from asymmetric forces. Arianian military communication will
mostly likely be encrypted. Initial deployment of EW Forces will be ELINT
focused with exploitation of message content performed in an alternate
location;
(4) Liaison. EWLOs will be dispatched from the CJTF-OIG JEMS CC to Div
formations that do not have EW forces assigned to them;
(5) Electronic Attack Restrictions.
(a) Authorizing commander will be Comd 4 MND;
(b) EA will be positively controlled. Use of EA will be consistent with
approved ROE and only used against military C4, navigation, weapon
guidance systems and communication networks. Targeting of the
Atropian telecom infrastructure has not been approved. This does not
relieve subordinate formations of the requirement to submit an
Electronic Attack Target List; and
(c) All requests for EA will be cleared against the Joint Restricted Target
List, the Joint Restricted Frequency List, applicable Rules of
Engagement and the Collateral Damage Estimate process prior to
commencement of a mission.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. TCN responsibility. The SEWOC will receive service support from
63 (US) ESB.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command and Control Roles and Responsibilities.
(1) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Coordination Centre (JEMS CC). The CJTF-
OIG JEMS CC coordinates all functions of the SEWOC and the JEWCC. The
CJTF-OIG JEMS CC will deal directly with 4 MND EMS and EW elements
in support of EMS operations and coordination.
(2) The SEWOC supports the following activities within the 4 MND HQ:
(a) EMOE Situational Awareness;
(b) EW planning and coordination with CFLCC as well as flanking
formations;

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(c) EA planning with Joint Fires, Cyber, Information Operations, ASIC

collection management, and subordinate Electronic Warfare
Coordination Centres;
(d) ES coordination between individual 4 MND formations;
(e) Providing advice on the employment of offensive EW/SIGINT
capabilities and coordinate request for support from National
authorities;
(f) Maintenance of the 4 MND Joint Restricted Frequency List with inputs
from G6, ASIC and G35 staffs; and
(g) The Theatre SIGINT Authority (TSA), resident within the SEWOC,
will exercise technical control of all EW/SIGINT capabilities assigned
to the 4 MND.
b. Signals
(1) EW Command Net. LANDWARNET.
(2) Reports and Returns.
(a) Daily EW SITREP to SEWOC;
(b) Subordinate formation’s Joint Restricted Frequency List to the
SEWOC. Initial list followed by additions or deletions as required;
(c) Prohibited, Guarded and Protected Frequency List to G6. Initial list
followed by additions or deletions as required; and
(d) Subordinate formation’s EA Target List and Jammer overlay to
SEWOC. Initial list and overlay followed by additions or deletions as
required.
c. The OPI for this annex is 4 MND G6 in coordination with CJTF-OIG JEMS CC.

Appendices:
Appendix 1 Electronic Warfare Tasks Matrix (To be issued)

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Annex Q
4 MND Op O 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN)
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

1. SITUATION. No change from Op O.

2. MISSION
a. To provide CIS support to enable effective C2 of 4 MND in order to defeat OSC 2
and set conditions to clear all remaining Arianian forces from AP.
3. EXECUTION
a. General. Effective C2 of 4 MND will rely heavily on robust, survivable and flexible
CIS to cater to the multinational nature of assigned forces. 4 MND CIS will be
characterized by:
(1) Heavy use of US Army proprietary LANDWARNET (LWN) as the bearer
network;
(2) Interoperability and integration with Coalition partners through extensive
deployment of liaison officers and related (US) DISN interfaces;
(3) Commonality and compatibility of equipment and systems in order to achieve
integration with CENTRIXS-OIG;
(4) Agility and flexibility through de-centralized execution of signal tasks;
(5) Backup and tertiary connectivity employed for all mission-critical links; and
(6) Coordination with CFLCC for technical configuration and interoperability
with assigned Coalition partners;
b. Concept of Operations. Employing LWN, tactical signal support will be provided
through node-based, digital, circuit-switched voice and data networks. To achieve
high mobility, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) will be employed to provide a
voice-centric system to provide limited on-the-move and limited data capability.
MSE also utilizes secure radiotelephone systems to extend the range for on-the-move
voice users. High capacity line-of-sight (HCLOS) and tactical high speed data
network will be utilized to provide a high data volume capability within the 4 MND
AO.
c. Tasks. 4 MND CIS will be provided by 63 (US) ESB to include:
(1) Extension of (US) DISN, including CENTRIXS-OIG services from CONUS
into theatre and throughout 4 MND;
(2) Provision of command support to HQ 4 MND;
(3) AO access to the global information grid (GIG), SIPRNET, NIPRNET and
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) for assigned 4
MND tactical forces;

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(4) Coordination of secure information exchange link between the connected

Stanardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP) and forces within the AO; and
(5) Provision of integral tactical signal support to 6 F-G Bde.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. First line service support and sustainment of all LWN resources will be a 63 (US)
ESB responsibility throughout.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Responsibility for coordination of all 4 MND CIS is 4 MND G6; and
b. The 4 MND Network Operations Centre will be located at Main HQ 4 MND.

Appendices:

Appendix 1. - CIS Groupings and Tasks (TBI)

Appendix 2. - IER-ISR Matrix and Tasks (TBI)
Appendix 3. - CIS C2 Structure (TBI)
Appendix 4. - Networks Ops Centres (TBI)
Appendix 5. - Electromagnetic Spectrum Ops (TBI)
Appendix 6. - Signals Security (TBI)

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ANNEX R OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex R
4 MND Op O 07 – OP IRON GUARDIAN

LOGISTICS

References:
A. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) dated XXXX
B. 4 MND Op O 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) dated XXXX
C. CFLCC CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) dated XXXX
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy Forces. No change from base order.
b. Friendly Forces.
(1) Boundaries. See Appendix 1 (Sustainment Overlay);
(2) Units and Installations.
(a) 310 Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). TBILISI,
GORGAS;
(b) 230 Sustainment Brigade (Sust Bde). POTI, GORGAS;
(c) 15 Sust Bde. TBILISI, GORGAS;
(d) 15 Sust Bde (Forward). AGSTAFA, ATROPIA;
(e) Division Support Area (DSA). TAA SILVER (when occupied);
(f) 1 Med Bde. TBILISI, GORGAS.
i. 31 Combat Support Hospital (CSH). MARNEULI, GORGAS;
ii. 21 CSH. TSNORI, GORGAS; and
iii. Field Hospital Regiment 41 (GE). SANGACHAL, ATROPIA
(when ordered).
(g) 18 MP Bde.
i. CJTF-OIG Theater Detention Facility. GAZAKH, ATROPIA;
and
ii. CJTF-OIG Theater Detention Facility. TBILISI, GORGAS.
(h) 16 MP Bde. CFLCC Detainee Holding Area. MINGECEVIR,
ATROPIA.
2. MISSION. To sustain 4 MND on Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Support.
(1) 310 ESC. Is responsible for the provision of overall support to CFLCC in
ATROPIA and will act as coordinating authority for all NSEs and Host Nation
(HN) support arrangements;

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(2) 15 Sust Bde. Is responsible for the provision of Area support within
ATROPIA, to include General Support (GS) to CFLCC and the provision of
water points for bulk water. 15 Sust Bde is also prepared to assist with
recovery and route clearance tasks;
(3) DSA. The DSA will be established relatively close to the Division (Div),
stepping forward as 4 MND advances. The DSA will be 4 MND’s connection
with theatre sustainment, 310 ESC/230 Sust Bde/15 Sust Bde and Troop
Contributing Nation’s (TCN) National Support Elements (NSEs). The DSA
will contain Supply Points (SPs), a Maintenance Collection Point (MCP) and a
Div PW/Detainee Holding Area;
(4) The US as Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) will provide the framework,
organizational structure and some of the common support to all Coalition
members. Agreements with LLN, Host Nation (HN) or Role Specific Nation
(RSN) providers will ease the task but not remove the responsibility of TCNs
national responsibility for sustainment. Unique national support will be
provided by NSEs. 17 Sust Bde will facilitate TCN NSEs support to Brigades
(Bdes) as required. This will include arranging 310 ESC support (through 15
and 230 Sust Bdes) as necessary;
(5) TCN combat formations will deploy with integral first and second line support
capabilities. The TCN NSEs, in cooperation with 310 ESC, will provide third
line and TCN unique sustainment support; and
(6) 17 Sust Bde will provide direct and integral LLN support to 4 MND.
b. Support Tasks. In addition to tasks identified at main body:
(1) 17 Sust Bde.
(a) Provide GS to 4 MND;
(b) Provide refuelling support to 4 MND, as coordinated by 15 Sust Bde;
(c) Coordinate with NSEs for the provision of national level support to
affiliated bdes; and
(d) Operate SPs in conjunction with NSEs for the provision of third line
supply support to non-US bdes.
(2) 577 Combat Sustainment Support Bn (CSSB). GS to:
(a) 12 (UK) Logistics Support Regiment;
(b) 4 (UK) Close Support Regiment REME;
(c) 9 (AS) Force Support Battalion;
(d) 10 (AS) Force Support Battalion;
(e) 4 (CA) Service Battalion; and
(f) 6 Franco/German (F-G) Logistics Battalion.

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(3) 1 (AS) MP Bn.

(a) Responsible for 4 MND policing, detention, force protection, and
support to tactical operations;
(b) CO 1 (AS) MP Bn is designated as 4 MND Provost Marshal; and
(c) Establish 4 MND PW/Detainee Holding Area facilities.
c. Support Dependencies Matrix. See Appendix 2 (Support Dependency Matrix); and

d. Timings. In accordance with main order.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Replenishment.
(1) Materiel. The objective is to stock for 30 DOS based on availability.
(a) Class I – Rations and Water.
i. Rations. 310 ESC will provide fresh rations across the Area of
Operations (AO). As a general rule fresh rations will be
consumed by units located to the rear of the TAAs. Fresh
ration supplements for units forward of TAAs will be ordered
through 17 Sust Bde. TCNs will provide their own unique
combat rations. Comd 4 MND will dictate feeding options
based on the operational assessment; and
ii. Water. 310 ESC will establish the necessary contracts for the
acquisition of bulk water across the AO.
(b) Class II-General and Technical Supplies. National responsibility.
(c) Class III-Fuel and Lubricants. 310 ESC will coordinate the sourcing
and procurement of common fuel requirements including aviation fuel.
Replenishment will be instituted through the normal operations of SPs.
TCNs retain responsibility for TCN-unique oils and lubricants
requirements. 310 ESC will provide the following fuel and lubricant
products:
i. Diesel – Single Fuel;
ii. AVPOL JP-8;
iii. 10 Weight Oil;
iv. 5W30 Oil;
v. Windshield Washer Fluid;
vi. Naptha /White gas 45 gallon drums or 1 litre cans;
vii. Propane – 100 pound tank;
viii. Industrial welding oxygen – 100 lb tank; and
ix. Acetylene – 100 lb tank.

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(d) Class IV-Defensive Stores. 310 ESC will hold engineering stores and
barrier material as controlled stores released on authority of CJTF-OIG
HQ. Additional common items may be available in limited quantities.
Available stores:
i. Barbed wire;
ii. 6 ft pickets;
iii. CGI;
iv. Concertina wire;
v. Timbers 6X6;
vi. ¾ inch plywood;
vii. 2 X 4;
viii. 2 X 6;
ix. 2 X 8;
x. 2 ft pickets;
xi. Bags Concrete;
xii. Hesco Bastion;
xiii. Gravel;
xiv. Soil;
xv. Concrete barriers;
xvi. Barrier baskets;
xvii. Tetrahedrons; and
xviii. Bunker A frames.
(e) Class V – Ammunition. Control and management of ammunition and
explosives is a national responsibility. TCNs will be responsible for
the delivery and replenishment of ammunition and explosives for their
respective nations while being responsive to support requests and
distribution activities of 310 ESC;
(f) Class VI – Amenities. National responsibility;
(g) Class VII – Major Equipment. National responsibility;
(h) Class VIII – Medical Supplies. National responsibility for Medical
items not common to US medical system;
(i) Class IX – Repair Parts. National responsibility; and
(j) Class X- Support to Non-Military Programs. National responsibility.
(2) Supply Points (SP). SPs will be established either for specific commodities or
for all supplies dependent on the tactical situation. The SP will be composed
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NSEs. There will be a requirement for coordination of all assets and force
protection;
(3) Salvage. National responsibility; and.
(4) Equipment Replacements. National responsibility.
b. Maintenance. First, second and third line maintenance is a national responsibility
using integral maintenance assets. 310 ESC will coordinate third line maintenance for
CJTF-OIG.
(1) Recovery. First, second and third line recovery is a TCN responsibility using
integral recovery assets. 310 ESC will coordinate the third line CJTF-OIG
recovery plan from designated MCP to the rear of the DSA. 15 Sust Bde will
assist with back loading;
(2) Repair. National responsibility; and
(3) Missile Maintenance Support. National responsibility.
c. Transportation and Movements. See also Annex S (Movements).
(1) Transportation. The national transportation requirements will leverage the
Coalition capability wherever possible to achieve efficiencies;
(2) Movements. Requirements for air, rail and road will be coordinated with
and/or provided by 49 Movement Control Battalion to move TCN personnel,
vehicles and equipment to staging and assembly areas in the AO; and
(3) Movement Support. 130 MEB will control all movement forward of TAA
SILVER until Phase IV Stabilization. At this point 17 Sust Bde will assume
responsibility for the Div rear EAST of River KURA. 16 MP Bde will
coordinate all movement rear of the Div rear boundaries.
d. Postal. Postal support will consist of a two-way postal service from TCN to the AO.
A TCN Postal Office will be established in the AO to enable shipments back to TCN.
CJTF OIG will establish a mail system within the theatre that enables TCN to
distribute personal and national mail effectively and securely;
e. Health Services Support (HSS). HSS will consist of the provision of HSS as a
national responsibility (Role 1 and 2 HSS, unique Class VIII) and that provided by the
Coalition (Role 3 CSH) and LLN (e.g. common Class VIII, blood products and
service, medical equipment repair, etc.). See also Annex K (HSS);
f. Military Police (MP). See also Annex PP (Military Police).
(1) MP Services and Authority. TCN shall provide integral national MP services
and authority;
(2) CJTF-OIG Crime Prevention/Security. Plan to be issued by PM CJTF-OIG;
(3) Discipline, Law and Order. Discipline remains a national responsibility. 4
MND PM will coordinate policing capacity with CFLCC PM to ensure
adherence to law and maintenance of order within the 4 MND AO;
(4) Handling of PW/Detainees. See Annex MM (PW/Detainee Operations) for
further details;
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(5) Displaced Persons, Refugees, Evacuees (DPRE) Control. 16 MP Bde units

will be prepared to assist in DPRE control. Priority is to keep MSRs clear;
and
(6) Stragglers. Formations are responsible for straggler control within their
respective AOs.
g. Personnel. See also Annex HH (Personnel Support).
(1) Replacements. National responsibility;
(2) Mortuary Affairs. Repatriation of human remains is a national responsibility.
Nonetheless 310 ESC will provide services as coordination lead to repatriate
human remains from TCN Bde AOs to the 310 ESC Mortuary Affairs
Collection Point (MACP) with 15 Sust Bde providing area support. Mortuary
affairs activities, scope and specific tasks are described at Annex HH
(Personnel Support) with additional details at Appendix 5 (Mortuary Affairs)
to Annex F (Sustainment) to ref A. Activities detailed includes search,
recovery, identification, preparation and movement to TCN home nation of all
Coalition personnel remains and personal effects resulting from hostile or non-
hostile causes;
(3) Labour Resources. Use of civilian labour is to be coordinated through 310
ESC;
(4) Religious Services. All TCN units will deploy with their normal complement
of chaplains. The 4 MND chaplain is responsible to coordinate chaplain
services across 4 MND;
(5) Legal Services. Legal services will be coordinated by the 4 MND LEGAD
who will provide guidance and advice on:
(a) Assistance dealing with local authorities and Government officials; and
(b) Assistance and advice in investigating claims involving injury, death or
extensive damage to civilian property.
h. Contracts. Contracting will be centrally controlled throughout by 310 ESC. All
requirements for contracting support are to be routed through 17 Sust Bde to 310 ESC
RACO who will be the contracting authority for CJTF-OIG;
i. Rear Area Security (RAS). As indicated at Annex D Intelligence the rear area should
not be considered secure. Threats exist from irregular forces/enemy Special Purpose
Forces, deep fires and potentially enemy air. There will be force protection
requirements associated with the provision of sustainment to 4 MND. Sustainment
installations and convoys will need to be protected. 17 (MN) Sust Bde is responsible
for RAS of the DSA. 16 MP Bde will coordinate RAS behind the 4 MND rear
boundary in the CFLCC rear area.

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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. A Logistics Status Report (LOGREP) will be submitted in

accordance with promulgated 4 MND Battle Rhythm. The format is at Tab T to Annex UU
(Reports).
Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Sustainment Overlay
Appendix 2 - Support Dependency Matrix

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OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

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Appendix 2
Annex R - 4 MND-OP IRON GUARDIAN

4 MND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DEPENDENCIES MATRIX

SER UNITS/FORMATIONS FIRST SECOND LINE THIRD LINE THIRD LINE

LINE DIRECT SUPPORT DIRECT SUPPORT GENERAL SUPPORT
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 4 (CA) CMBG N/A 4 (CA) Svc Bn 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
4 (CA) Fd Amb CA NSE [JTFSC (Sustain)] 310 ESC
2 6 F-G Bde N/A F-G CSS Bn 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
(Med in HQ Coy) FR NSE 310 ESC
GE NSE
3 12 (UK) AIB N/A 4 (UK) Log Sp Regt 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
4 (UK) Close Sp Regt UK NSE 310 ESC
REME
4 (UK) Armd Medical
Regt
4 X (AS) Bde N/A 10 (AS) FSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
(including Med Coy) AS NSE 310 ESC
NZ NSE
5 1 (UK) RHA Bde N/A BSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
577 CSSB UK NSE 310 ESC
180 Tpt Bn
6 4 (MN) Cbt Avn N/A 601 ASB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
405 (US) Army Fd Sp Bde 310 ESC
7 7 (GE) Recce Bn HQ Coy 17 (MN) Sust Bde 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
GE NSE 310 ESC
8 1 (CA) FP Coy Admin Pl 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
180 Tn Bn CA NSE [JTFSC (Sustain)] 310 ESC

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SER UNITS/FORMATIONS FIRST SECOND LINE THIRD LINE THIRD LINE
LINE DIRECT SUPPORT DIRECT SUPPORT GENERAL SUPPORT
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
9 130 MEB N/A BSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
10 450 (US) CA Bn HHC 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
11 1 (AS) MP Bn HHD 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
12 63 (US) Sig Bn HHC 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
13 709 (US) MI Bn HHC 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
14 C (US) Co 9 MISB HHP 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
15 17 (MN) Sust Bde NA 17 (MN) Sust Bde 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC
16 TF 4 (US) CBRNE Bn FSC 577 CSSB 17 (MN) Sust Bde 15 (US) Sust Bde
310 ESC

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Number of
Annex S
4 MND Op O 07 – OP IRON GUARDIAN

Main HQ 4 Multinational Division (MND)

SHEKI 38T PL 801 596
Date (D-12)
OPS 53

MOVEMENT ORDER 03

References:
A. CFLCC OPORD 07 (Operation IRON GUARDIAN date (D-21)
B. Joint Navigation Charts (JNC), Scale 1:2,000,000. Sheets: JNCXX022, JNCXX023.
C. Operational Navigation Charts (ONC), 1:1,000,000. Sheets: F03, F04, F05, G03, G04, G05(l).
D. Tactical Pilot Chart (TPC), Scale 1:500,000. Sheets: F03A, F03B, F03C, F03D, F04A, F04B,
F04C, F04D, F05A, F05D, G04A, G04B, G04C, G04D, G05A, G05B, G05C, G05D.
E. Map, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Series 1501A Joint Operations Graphic-
Air (JOG-A), 1:250,000 Scale. Sheets: NJ3801, NJ3802, NJ3803, NJ3804, NJ3805, NJ3806,
NJ3807, NJ3808, NJ3809, NJ3810, NJ3811, NJ3812, NJ3901, NJ3905, NJ3909, NJ3910, NK3703,
NK3706, NK3712, NK3716, NK3801, NK3802, NK3803, NK3804, NK3805, NK3806, NK3807,
NK3808, NK3809, NK3810, NK3811, NK3812, NK3904, NK3907, NK3910, NK3911, NL3711,
NL3712, NL3810, NL3811, NL3812.
F. Nautical Charts, Series 55ACO; Sheet 55001, BLACK SEA (INT 310); Sheet 55040, Marmara,
Denizi.
G. Cartography, Geodesy, and Navigation datum used throughout this OPORD is World Geodetic
System-84 (WGS84), (revised in 2004).
H. 4 MND (Ops 50) WNG O 02 OP IRON GUARDIAN issued Date (D-16)
I. 4 MND (Ops 52) Op O 07-OP IRON GUARDIAN issued Date (D-XX)

Time Zone: ZULU

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces. Threat analysis has determined that the main threat to the move along
MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI will be raids from Arianian Air Forces. This may
cause delays if movement along the MSRs is interrupted through enemy action.
b. Friendly Forces.
(1) No change to ref I, and
(2) 2-43 ADA Bn will provide Air Defence during 4 MND’s tactical move and
crossing of River KURA.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Nil
2. MISSION. 4 MND will conduct a tactical road move between TAAs SILVER and BRONZE
and Phase Line (PL) COUGAR to position the Div for offensive operations.

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3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operations.
(1) Intent. Day/night tactical road move from TAAs BRONZE and SILVER along
MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI to PL COUGAR prior to the execution of
Phase II crossing the River KURA.
(2) Scheme of Manoeuvre.
(a) Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5). Daytime tactical road move from
TAAs BRONZE and SILVER along MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI to
PL COUGAR prior to the execution of Phase II. 2 Sqn 3 CR with
7(GE) Recce Bn OPCON will clear and secure route SEATTLE and
MIAMI SOUTH toward SALYAN up to PL COUGAR. Following
immediately behind, 130 MEB will establish a system to allow the Div
to conduct tactical movement under electronic silence; this will include
Brigade (Bde) Assembly Areas (AA), Battle Group (BG)-sized
Waiting Areas (WA) and traffic control (TC). Bdes will be prepared to
move forward under Div control. 4 (CA) CMBG Mech Bn remains in
TAA BRONZE for Phase I and II of move as CFLCC reserve,
(b) Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8). Formations (Fmn) will
continue to move forward under Div control, along routes SEATTLE
and MIAMI to PL COUGAR, and on order into the crossing area,
(c) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13). TC system will remain
in place as Div crosses River KURA, and
(d) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27). TC rear of River KURA will
transition to 17 Sust BDE from 130 MEB.
(3) End State. Div has moved from current TAAs across River KURA IAW
Comd 4 MND direction prepared to conduct decisive combat operations.
b. Grouping. IAW Annex A to ref I.
c. Order of March.
(1) Phase I.
(a) 7 (GE) Recce Bn,
(b) 2 Sqn, 3 CR,
(c) 130 MEB including elements 2-43 ADA Bn , and
(d) elements 17 Sust Bde (for Div refuelling),
(2) Phase II.
(a) 4 DIV ARTY
(b) 6 F-G BDE
(c) Div Tac CP
(d) elements 4 CAB FARP

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(e) X (AS) BDE

(f) 12 (UK) AIB
(g) 4 (CA) CMBG
(h) Div Tps (-)
(i) On order, Div Main HQ
(j) On order, 17 Sust BDE
d. Tasks to Subordinate Fmns/Units. Units to move in accordance with timings specified
at Appendix 2 (Mov Table). Specific tasks as follows:
(1) 2 Sqn 3 CR.
(a) Phase I
i. Recce and secure routes MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI
SOUTH, toward SALYAN up to PL COUGAR,
ii. Clear AA and WA along both routes as identified by 130 MEB,
and
iii. Handover responsibility for routes, AAs and WAs to 130 MEB
by 0700 hrs D+4.
(b) Phase II. Sector 3 HQ.
(2) 130 MEB. For Phase I-III.
(a) Regulating HQ to include Sectors 1-3,
(b) Along MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI SOUTH:
i. Conduct engr recce,
ii. Provide engr, EOD and CBRN support,
iii. Provide TC, and
iv. Provide security (including AAs and WAs when unoccupied).
(c) In coordination with 17 Sust Bde set-up Div Refuelling Point at AA
A2 GR 39S UE 6132 2450.
(3) Formations. For Phase I-III.
(a) Move IAW Mov Table at Appendix 2,
(b) BPT occupy AAs and WAs,
(c) Provide security in AAs and WAs when occupied.
(4) 17 Sust BDE. For Phase I-III.
(a) Provide additional maint, recovery support to 130 MEB.
(b) In coordination with 130 MEB establish Div Refuelling Point at AA
A2 GR 39S UE 6132 2450.

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(5) 2-43 ADA Bn. In coordination with 130 MEB provide AD along Routes
SEATTLE and MIAMI.
e. Average Speeds.
(1) Daylight. 60 km in the hr, not to exceed 80 km in the hr, and
(2) Blackout. 40 km in the hour not to exceed 60 km/hr.
f. Density.
(1) Daylight. 50 m between vehicles
(2) Blackout. 25 m between vehicles.
g. Timings. Appendix 2 – Movement Table.
(1) Recce NMB. XXXX D+3,
(2) Route Secured. No later than (NLT) XXXX D+4,
(3) Times Between/Gaps.
i. Time between columns. – 5 minutes,
ii. Time between serials. – 5 minutes, and
(4) Estimated Times for Entire Div Move. Based on approximately 8,000
vehicles and 160 km road move.
(a) Pass Time.
i. Daylight. 5.5 hours, and
ii. Blackout. 8.25 hours
(b) Running Time.
(c) Blackout. 6 hours in blackout, and
(d) Daylight. 4 hours in daylight
(e) To complete Move. Best case 9.5 hours.
(5) Estimated Time for Bde Gp Move.
(a) Pass Time.
(b) Daylight. 1 hour, and
(c) Blackout. 1.5 hours
(d) Running Time.
i. In Blackout. 6 hours, and
ii. Daylight. 4 hours.

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(e) To complete Move. Best case 5 hours 40 minutes.

b. Halts. At Refuelling Point only;
c. Bde AAs. See Appendix 1 to this Mov O. Established by 130 MEB in following
locations:
(1) A1 – Bde AA (GARASU), GR 39T TE 9904 6043,
(2) A2 – Bde AA (ALAT), GR 39S UE 6430 2436, and
(3) A3 – Bde AA (HESENLI), GR 39S UD 3651 9105.
d. BG WA. See Appendix 1 to this Mov O. Established by 130 MEB in following
locations:
(1) Whiskey 1 - BG WA (KURDAMIR), GR 39T TE 5899 7906,
(2) Whiskey 2 - BG WA (SIGIRLI), GR 39T TE 8131 6763,
(3) Whiskey 3 - BG WA (NAVAHI), GR 39T UE 3795 3902,
(4) Whiskey 4 - BG WA (ATBULAK), GR 39T UE 4793 2179, and
(5) Whiskey 5 - BG WA (PIRSAAT), GR 39T UE 5826 1164.
e. Routes and Distances. See Appendix 1 to this Mov O.
(1) MSR SEATTLE from TAA BRONZE to TAA SILVER - 81 km
(2) MSR SEATTLE from TAA SILVER to A2 Bde AA ALAT - 98 km, and
(3) MSR MIAMI from A2 Bde AA ALAT to SALYAN - 55 km.
f. Critical Points. See Appendix 1 to this Mov O.
(1) TC Post (TCP).
(a) TCP 1. F-G Bde Start Point (SP) TAA BRONZE, GR 38T QK 4914
8087,
(b) TCP 2. Whiskey 1 - BG WA (KURDAMIR), GR 39T TE 5851 6895,
(c) TCP 3. SP TAA SILVER, GR 39T TE 7830 9249,
(d) TCP 4. Whiskey 2 - BG WA (SIGIRLI), GR 39T TE 7540 6215,
(e) TCP 5. A1 – Bde AA (GARASU), GR 39T TE 9526 5185,
(f) TCP 6. Whiskey 3 - BG WA (NAVAHI), GR 39T UE 3607 3207,
(g) TCP 7. Whiskey 4 - BG WA (ATBULAK), GR 39S UE 4678 2736,
(h) TCP 8. Div Refuelling Point (near entrance to A2), GR 39S UE 6076
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(i) TCP 9. Entrance to A2 - Bde AA (ALAT) from MSR SEATTLE, GR

39S UE 5896 2398,
(j) TCP 10. Intersection MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI SOUTH, GR 39S
UE 6486 24988,
(k) TCP 11. Exit from A2 - Bde AA (ALAT) to MSR MIAMI SOUTH,
GR 39S UE 6277 1832,
(l) TCP 12. Whiskey 5 - BG WA (PIRSAAT), GR 39S UE 5740 1447,
(m) TCP 13. Release Point (Rel P) - A3 Bde AA (HESENLI), GR 39S UE
3638 9684, and
(n) TCP 14. PL COUGAR and MSR MIAMI SOUTH, GR 39S UD 3024
8881.
(o) TCPs beyond PL COUGAR. TBC based on 2 Sqn 3 CR confirmatory
recce.
h. Routes to Div SPs. TBC
i. Routes from Div Rel P. TBC
j. Traffic Control (TC).
(1) Regulating HQ.
(a) Initially 130 MEB Altn HQ in TAA SILVER, and
(b) Then 130 MEB Main HQ in A2 – Bde AA (AYLAT) at GR 39S UE
6430 2436 and be established by XXXXXXXXX.
(2) Sector Control.
(a) Sector 1 includes TAAs BRONZE along MSR SEATTLE up to and
including A1 – Bde AA (GARASU).
(b) Sector 2 from A1 – Bde AA (GARASU) along MSR SEATTLE up to
and including A2 – Bde AA (ALAT), and
(c) Sector 3 – from A2 – Bde AA (AYLAT) along MSR MIAMI SOUTH
to the River KURA.
(3) TCPs. See list of TCPs above. 130 MEB with 91 MP Bn OPCON will
establish TC by 0700 hrs D+4.
(4) HN CIVPOL. Atropian Police will keep MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI
SOUTH free of civilian vehicle traffic and IDP.
(5) Communications. IAW communications-electronics operating instruction
(CEOI). Emission Control (EMCON) 3.
k. Lights. Blackout drive. EMCON 3.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Replenishment. 130 MEB will establish a Div refuelling point near entrance to A2 –
Bde AA (AYLAT) at GR 39S UE 2805 2536;

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b. Medical. Bde and unit trail parties to include medical assets. Priority 1 and 2
casualties are to be evacuated by air to Role 3 Medical facility. While on EMCON 3
AIRMEDEVAC requests are to be passed on Atropian land line to Sector HQ; and
c. Recovery. Vehicle casualties are to be cleared forward to ECP within A2 – BAA
ALAT at GR 39S UE 6551 2611 and A3 – Bde AA HESENLI at GR 39S UD 4296
9363. On route in-situ repair time limit will be a maximum of one hour.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Locations.
(1) Regulating HQ. 130 MEB to be established at A2 – Bde AA (ALAT) GR 39S
UE 6354 2338 by XXXXXX,
(2) Sector Control HQ.
(a) Sector 1 HQ - A1 – Bde AA (GARASU), GR 39T TE 9020 5649,
(b) Sector 2 HQ - A2 – Bde AA (AYLAT), GR 39S UE 6071 2506,
(c) Sector 3 HQ - A3 Bde AA (HESENLI), GR 39S UE 4157 9904
b. Signal.
(1) As per CEOIs, and
(2) 63 Signal Battalion to establish land line drops throughout TC system as
coordinated with 130 MEB as Regulating HQ;
c. Div Mov Conf. At HQ 130 MEB on D-9
d. EMCON. EMCON 3;
e. Liaison instructions.
(1) 130 MEB will establish liaison with HN CIVPOL;
(2) CIVPOL Regional Coordination Centres (RCC):
(a) 44 RCC in SHIRVAN GR 39S UE 2211 2303, and
(b) 8 RCC in GOYCHAY GR 38T QL 3254 0260.
f. Code Words. Issued by 130 MEB HQ
SER CODE WORDS MEANING
(a) (b) (c)
1 APPLE Crossing SP TAA BRONZE
2 BASEBALL Crossing SP TAA SILVER
3 BENCH Crossing Release Point
4 BIRD A1 GARASU
5 BOTTLE A2 ALAT
6 BOXES A3 HESENLI
7 COFFEE Whiskey 1
8 CREAM Whiskey 2
9 CUSHION Whiskey 3
10 DOLLAR Whiskey 4

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SER CODE WORDS MEANING

(a) (b) (c)
11 DOORWAY Whiskey 5
12 HOCKEY TCP 1
13 MERCEDES TCP 2
14 MUSTARD TCP 3
15 PICNIC TCP 4
16 PIGEON TCP 5
17 POTATOE TCP 6
18 SAUSAGE TCP 7
19 SOCCER TCP 8
20 STRAW TCP 9
21 SUCKER TCP 10
22 SUITCASE TCP 11
23 SWEATER TCP 12
24 TELEVISION TCP 13
25 TOYOTA TCP 14

g. Nicknames. Issued by 130 MEB HQ

SER NICKNAMES MEANING
(a) (b) (c)
1 ANSWER GIRL 2 Sqn, 3 CR
2 BAT BOY 130 MEB
3 BIRD DOG Elements 17 Sust Bde
4 BLUE JAYS 4 Div Arty
5 FISH FACE 6 F-G Bde
5 NEW MEXICO Div Tac CP
6 SMOKE SALE Elements 4 CAB FARP
7 SPANISH EYES 12 (UK) AIB
8 SPRING WATER 4 (CA) CMBG
9 TEN YEARS X (AS) Bde
10 THREE BOYS Div Tps (-)
11 TWO STATES Div Main HQ
12 UNDER 17 Sust Bde
ARMOUR

Acknowledge Instructions: ACKNOWLEDGE.

XXXXXXX
MGen
Comd
Authentication:

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XXXXXXX
Maj
G3 Ops
Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Mov Overlay
Appendix 2 - Mov Table TBI

DISTRIBUTION: Number of
copies including
Annexes
2 Sqn, 3 CR 1-2
130 MEB 3-4
17 Sust Bde 5-6
4 Div Arty 7-8
6 F-G Bde 9-10
Div Tac CP 11-12
4 CAB 13-14
12 (UK) AIB 15-16
4 (CA) CMBG 17-18
X (AS) Bde 19-20
Div Tps 20-24
Div Main HQ 25-26
CFLCC 27-28
1 ID 29-30
Spare 30-32
Archive 33

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APPENDIX 1
ANNEX S
4 MND Op O 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN

4 MND MOVEMENT OVERLAY

1. 4 MND MOVEMENT OVERLAY INSTALLATIONS BY GRID.

SER ITEM/DESCRIPTION GRID REFERENCE
1 HQ 130 MEB (Mov Regulating HQ) 39S UE 6423 2318
2 HQ Traffic Control Sector 1 39T TE 7794 9525
3 HQ Traffic Control Sector 2 39T UE 5076 4871
4 HQ Traffic Control Sector 3 39T UD 2121 9974
5 Traffic Control Sector 1 39T TE 9020 5649
6 Traffic Control Sector 2 39S UE 6071 2506
7 Traffic Control Sector 3 39S UD 4157 9904
8 Battle Group (BG) Waiting Area (WA) Whiskey1 39T TE 5907 7738
- KURDAMIR
9 BG WA Whiskey 2 - SIGIRIL 39T TE 8158 6568
10 BG WA Whiskey 3 - NAVAHI 39T UE 3817 3734
11 BG WA Whiskey 4 - ATBULAK 39T UE 4788 1974
12 BG WA Whiskey 5 - PIRSAAT 39S UE 5821 1015
13 Brigade Assembly Area (Bde AA) A1- GARASU 39T TE 9929 5872
14 Bde AA A2 - AYLAT 39S UE 6430 2436
15 Bde AA A3 - HESENLI 39T UD 4314 9181
16 Maintenance Collection Point (MCP) 39S UE 6596 2597
17 TCP 1 – F-G Bde Start Point TAA Bronze 38T QK 4914 8087
18 TCP 2 – For BG WA Whiskey 1 39T TE 5851 6895
19 TCP 3 – SP TAA SILVER 39T TE 7830 9249
20 TCP 4 – For BG WA Whiskey 2 39T TE 7540 6215
21 TCP 5 – For Bde AA A1 39T TE 9526 5185
22 TCP 6 – For BG WA Whiskey 3 39T UE 3607 3207
23 TCP 7 – For BG WA Whiskey 4 39T TE 4678 2736
24 TCP 8 - Div Refuelling Point 39T TE 5888 2169
25 TCP 9 – Entrance to Bde AA A2 (AYLAT) 39S UE 5896 2398
26 TCP 10 – Intersection MSRs SEATTLE & 39S UE 6486 2498
MIAMI SOUTH
27 TCP 11 – Exit from Bde AA A2 (AYLAT) 39S UE 6277 1832
28 TCP 12 – For BG WA Whiskey 5 39S UD 5740 1447
29 TCP 13 – Div Release Point Bde AA A3 39S UD 3638 9684
30 TCP 14 – PL COUGAR & MSR MIAMI 39S UD 3024 8881
SOUTH
31 Phase Line COUGAR 39S UD 2912 8954

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2. OVERALL DIV MOVE OVERLAY

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3. TRAFFFIC CONTROL SECTOR 1.

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4. TRAFFIC CONTROL SECTOR 2.

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5. TRAFFIC CONTROL SECTOR 3.

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Annex U
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

CBRN DEFENCE

References.
A. NATO AJP 3-8 Allied Joint Doctrine for CBRN Defence (STANAG 2451)
B. NATO ATP 45(C), Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and
Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazards Areas, December 2005 (STANAG
2103)
C. AEP-10, NATO Handbook for Sampling and Identification of Biological and Chemical Agents
D. AEP-49, NATO Handbook for Sampling and Identification of Radiological Agents (SIRA)
E. B-GJ-007-311/FP-000 NBCD Commanders Guide to Work, Rest and Water Requirements
F. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) Insert Date
G. 4 MND OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) Insert Date
1. SITUATION.
a. Area of Operations. Refer to 4 MND Op O 07.
b. Terrain. The Atropian terrain alternates between rugged mountain and relatively flat
lowlands. Mountainous terrain will channel winds through valleys and along
riverbeds resulting in reduced hazard areas, while locations to execute thorough
decontamination are limited. Larger downwind hazard areas can be expected in the
KURA-ARAS lowland areas. Further information is at Annex B (Intelligence).
c. Weather. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
d. Ariana (AN).
(1) General. AN possesses a capable and growing CBRN capability although
nuclear weapon production is still a few years away (see paragraph 1.e. (3)
below). Arianian strategic policy supports a CBRN first strike in the event it
believes its national security is in jeopardy. National policy also supports the
use of pre-emptive CBRN strikes against a neighbour either to deter
aggression or as a response to an attack. It may also use, or threaten to use,
CBRN weapons as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological
pressure. It is unlikely that AN will use CBRN weapons before CFLCC
combat forces cross into Atropia (AP). When used, the most likely reasons for
employment include: canalizing approaching ground forces, key terrain denial,
or to facilitate the withdrawal of Arianian forces in contact. Additionally, both
persistent and non-persistent agents could be employed by AN to cause
civilian casualties in order to impede the 4 MND advance, or as a terrorist act
to weaken Coalition solidarity and Atropian civilian support.
(2) Chemical/Biological. AN has a wide variety of Chemical/Biological delivery
means. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles and artillery systems capable
of delivering chemical munitions, aircraft or Special Purpose Forces (SPF) can
also be used. Arianian CBRN offensive and defensive capabilities are largely
of Donovian origin. Exact numbers of warheads and their operational status is

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unknown, and Arianian willingness to employ chemical and biological

weapons in the current strategic context is uncertain.
(3) Nuclear. With respect to nuclear capabilities, AN has carried out secretive
research supporting a uranium enrichment program over the past two decades.
It is currently assessed that AN is at least several years away from a nuclear
weapon capability.
(4) CBRN Defense. Arianian forces have a well-developed CBRN defence
capability. Operational Strategic Command 2 (OSC 2) located in AP is
believed to include a Chemical Defense Brigade, a Smoke Brigade, a
Chemical Defense Battalion in each Division Tactical Group (DTG), and
chemical defense companies or platoons within brigade-level organizations.
OSC 1, still located in AN, likely has the same CBRN Defense structure. AN
is also well-prepared to employ civilian CBRN protection measures. Refer to
Appendix 1 to this Annex.
e. Atropia (AP).
(1) CBRN Weapons. AP has the capability to produce chemical and biological
munitions from its own resources. It has long been suspected, but not proven,
that AP may already possess very limited CBRN munitions. Atropian
strategic policy does not include a CBRN first strike, and contingency plans
are primarily for the defense of AP. In the event of an impending CBRN
strike against the Atropian homeland, however, it may decide to use pre-
emptive CBRN strikes. Should any opponent conduct a CBRN attack against
AP, it may retaliate in kind. AP has a wide variety of CBRN delivery means
organic to its military forces. Atropian willingness to assemble and employ
chemical and biological weapons in the current strategic context is assessed as
LOW.
(2) Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs). AP produces a large quantity of TICs for
multiple industrial and agricultural purposes. TICs pose a risk to 4 MND
forces due to the availability of large quantities of highly toxic stored materials
which could have a lethal or debilitating effect on humans. Their availability,
proximity to urban areas, low cost, and the limited security of storage
facilities, make them an attractive option for terrorist or military targeting. In
addition to the threat from the intentional use of stored TICs, accidental
releases of TICs may result from collateral damage associated with military
operations, electrical power interruption, or improper facility procedures or
maintenance. To date AP has effectively controlled TICs and contaminated
areas. The CFLCC CBRN Center will issue a list of known TIC sites.
(3) Radiological. Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs or so-called dirty
bombs) may be fabricated from isotopic material commonly available in the
region. Americium 241 from oil well drilling equipment, Cesium 137 from
nuclear medical equipment, Cobalt 60 from food irradiation plants, and
Strontium 90 from thermoelectric generators could be packaged with high
explosives. Fabricated devices could be delivered by guerrillas or Special
Purpose Forces with unconventional delivery systems.

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(4) CBRN Defense. AP is also well-prepared to employ CBRN protection

measures, both civilian and military, and has company-sized chemical defence
units organic to all maneuver Brigades. The Atropian Southern Command
(ASC) contains 3702 Chemical Defense Battalion which is organized with a
Battalion HQ, Decon Company, NBC Recon Company and Support Platoon.
It is equipped with mostly Donovian Tier 2 equipment and is generally
considered combat ready but will be easily overwhelmed by significant CBRN
attacks.
f. Friendly Forces. CFLCC - 415 CBRNE BDE.
g. Attachments and Detachments. CBRNE TF4 attached OPCON to 130 MEB.
2. MISSION. 4 MND will conduct CBRN Defence operations in order to protect the force
during the execution of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
3. EXECUTION.
a. 4 MND Concept of Operations. 4 MND will conduct a tactical road move, a
deliberate crossing of the KURA River, and then breakout to destroy 24 Mot DTG,
followed by the re-establishment of the International Border (IB) and defensive
operations. The four phases are: Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5), Phase II - Cross
River KURA (D+6- D+8), Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13), and Phase
IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27).
b. Commander’s Intent. The overall intent is to ensure that 4 MND elements will have
the capability to defend and protect themselves to the maximum extent possible
against a CBRN threat. 4 MND will adopt a pro-active CBRN defence posture to
lessen the incentive for AN to use CBRN weapons or TICs. Emphasis will be on
operating outside, and extracting from the hazard as soon as reasonably achievable,
rather than being capable of operating inside it. If operations within a contaminated
environment are critical to achieve mission success, every effort will be made to
ensure that appropriate CBRN defence measures are implemented.
c. Scheme of CBRN Support. 4 MND will conduct CBRN operations IAW the
principles of contamination avoidance, protection and decontamination in order to
maintain freedom of maneuver and the ability to apply combat power. The CBRN
concept of support will entail attaching a decon capability to each Bde, and assigning
CBRN command and control with CBRN recce elements to the main effort of each
phase. Additional CBRN decon elements will be centrally controlled to establish Div
Decon sites and for specific CBRN tasks.
d. Priority of CBRN Support.
(1) Phase I.
(a) TAA GOLD.
(b) MSR SEATTLE and MIAMI route opening.
(2) Phase II.
(a) Assembly Area (AA) A3.
(b) KURA River crossing area.

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(3) Phase III.

(a) KURA River crossing area.
(b) Breakout force – X (AS) Bde and 12 (UK) AIB.
(4) Phase IV.
(a) 4 MND defensive positions on the international border.
(b) Division Support Area in the vicinity of SALYAN and the KURA
River.
e. CBRN Threat Status. 4 MND will utilize CFLCC CBRN Defense THREAT CON
levels as per Appendix 2 to this Annex. Current THREAT CON GREEN. The
NATO equivalent CBRN THREAT LEVEL is LOW.
f. Grouping. 130 MEB will detach OPCON the following CBRN elements.
(1) 63 Chem Co (-) (1xRecon Pl, 1x BIDS Pl and 1xDecon Pl) to 2 Sqn 3 CR for
Phase I, and for Phase II up until 2 Sqn 3 CR crosses the KURA River.
(2) 51 Chem Co (-) (1xRecon Pl and 1xDecon Pl) to 6 F-G for Phases I-II, and
1xDecon Pl, 51 Chem Co for Phase III.
(3) 1x Decon Pl, 51 Chem Co to 12 (UK) AIB for Phases I-II.
(4) 51 Chem Co (-) (1xRecon Pl and 1xDecon Pl) to 12 (UK) AIB for Phase III.
(5) 92 Chem Co (-) (1xRecon Pl and 1xDecon Pl) to X (AS) Bde for Phases I-III.
(6) 1xDecon Pl, 63 Chem Co to 4 (CA) CMBG.
(7) 1xDecon Pl, 63 Chem Co to 17 Sust Bde.
(8) Direction on regrouping during Phase IV will be issued at a later date. It is
anticipated that Bdes will retain 1xDecon Pl.
g. Common Tasks for Formations.
(1) Establish CBRN warning and reporting networks.
(2) Conduct CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance and decontamination operations
as required.
(3) BPT conduct operations in a contaminated environment.
(4) BPT to support counter-WMD proliferation operations.
(5) Report potential TIC facilities within boundaries.
h. Specific Tasks.
(1) 130 MEB.
(a) Detachments as per paragraph 3.f above.
(b) Assist with the operation of the 4 MND CBRN warning and reporting
network.
(c) Conduct CBRN route reconnaissance in the 4 MND rear area and
along MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI up to Bde rear boundaries.
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(d) Conduct CBRN area reconnaissance of Assembly Areas (AAs) and

Waiting Areas (WAs), and the KURA River crossing area.
(e) Conduct area, personnel and equipment thorough decontamination as
necessary.
(f) BPT to establish Collective Protection at medical installations, and Div
and Bde Command Posts.
(g) BPT provide CBRN support to Atropian Southern Command.
(h) BPT to conduct counter-WMD proliferation operations.
(i) Conduct a threat assessment of TIC facilities in the 4 MND AO and
maintain a master list with vulnerabilities and hazard prediction
templates. Over time develop contingency plans for intentional or
accidental releases.
(j) Provide engineer support to CBRN operations including: thorough
decontamination site preparation and TIC containment.
(k) BPT provide MP security and traffic control in response to a CBRN
incident.
(l) Coordinate CBRN Defence and TIC response with the HN and 415
CBRNE Bde.
(m) BPT to assist the Host Nation (HN) civilian authorities.
i. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Priority Intelligence Requirements.
(a) Status, capabilities and location of Arianian CBRN offensive weapons.
(b) Status, capabilities, and location of Arianian CBRN Defense forces.
(c) Guerilla and Arianian SPF intentions of capturing or releasing
Atropian CBRN weapons, TICs and radiological materials.
(d) Locations and types of chemical weapons precursors, radiological
materials and bomb making materials.
(e) CBRN, TIC and environmental hazards in AP.
(f) Extent of damage to Atropian critical infrastructure containing TICs,
and biological or radiological materials.
(2) Friendly Force Information Requirements.
(a) Restrictions on the employment of national CBRN resources.
(b) Status, locations and activities of Atropian CBRN weapons and CBRN
Defence forces.
(c) Which Atropian chemical and biological warfare sites (if any) are
vulnerable to seizure by Arianian forces or associated groups?
(d) Locations and status of Bde and Div decon sites.

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(3) Obscuration. Battlefield obscuration will be provided by 4 (MN) DIV ARTY.

(4) Riot Control Agents (RCA). IAW with CJTF-OIG ROE, the use of pepper
spray in self-defence and for force protection is authorized.
(5) Chemical and Radiological Reconnaissance. Bdes are responsible for
Chemical and Radiological recce in their AO. Non-chemical units will
employ unit recce teams to detect and mark contaminated areas. Chemical
recce systems will be employed along 4 MND MSRs to identify hazard areas
that may significantly affect manoeuver and rapidly identify bypass routes
around contamination that may delay 4 MND forces. Refer to Appendix 4 for
chemical and radiological recce and surveillance tasks.
(6) Biological Detection. CBRNE TF4 will conduct biological detection in
accordance with the priorities set forth in paragraph 3.d above with focus on
the KURA River crossing sites. Refer to Appendix 4 to this annex.
(7) Sampling Identification of Biological, Chemical, Radiological Agents
(SIBCRA). SIBCRA will be conducted on order by Comd 4 MND.
(8) Decontamination. All non-chemical units must BPT conduct operational
decontamination to minimize residual contamination casualties and reduce
masking time. 415 CBRNE BDE will operate a thorough decontamination site
at TAA GOLD (CITRUS FOUR) and at KEPPAP south of W2 at GR 39T TE
751 624. Bdes with attached Decon Pls will plan for decon sites and establish
them as necessary. CBRNE TF4 will establish Div decon sites that move
forward in pace with 4 MND as listed in Appendix 5. Weathering as a
decontamination method will not be employed in Phases I-III, and during
Phase IV only with the concurrence of both COM CFLCC and the TCN.
(9) TICs and CBRN Weapon Exploitation/Elimination. 4 MND supported by 415
CBRNE BDE will take action to prevent the proliferation of CBRN weapons
including their component materials. Advancing 4 MND forces may
encounter abandoned or discarded CBRN materials as Arianian Armed Forces
(AN Armed Forces) are defeated or forced to withdraw back to AN. 415th
CBRN BDE has one Tech Escort company available to conduct exploitation
and limited elimination operations. When units encounter abandoned or
discarded CBRN materials the following actions shall be taken:
(a) Evacuate and secure the immediate area;
(b) Report the discovery of these sites to the HQ 4 MND and CBRNE
TF4;
(c) Secure the materials under the guidance of assigned CBRN units;
(d) Hand over the site to the 415 CBRNE BDE response team; and
(e) Provide site security while the 415 CBRNE BDE response team is
working.
(10) Radiation Exposure Guidance.
(a) Commanders at all levels are required to reduce the risks from ionizing
radiation by avoiding unnecessary exposure and keeping the dose
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received by personnel “As Low As Reasonably Practical” (ALARP).

Whenever exposure is unavoidable, appropriate dose control measures
shall be implemented to balance the duty of care to personnel against
the achievement of the military task.
(b) Maximum Permissible Dose. Commanders will ensure personnel are
equipped with appropriate dosimetry.
i. Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In the event of a radiological
threat, Canadian National Commander Joint Task Force AP (
JTF-A) will designate in writing those CAF personnel that will
be appointed as radiation emergency workers with a maximum
exposure of up to 100mSv. Only Canadian authorities above
Comd JTF-A can authorize higher exposure limits. In the case
of a life-saving situation no dose limit is applicable.
ii. US Forces. OEG is 50cGy.
iii. Other TCNs will set appropriate limits.
(11) Individual Protective Equipment. All personnel will deploy with sufficient
IPE to allow for exposure in a CBRN environment for 48 hours. Ensure all
personnel have immediate access to one set of protective coveralls (or TCN
equivalent) with a replacement available within two hours.
(12) Dress State. Commanders are authorized to upgrade Dress States as deemed
appropriate to the tactical situation. Dress states are:
(a) Phase I – Dress State xxxx.
(b) Phase II-III – Dress State xxxx.
(c) Phase IV – Dress State xxxx.
DRESS ITEMS OF DRESS US MOPP
STATE Respirator/Mask Suit Boots Gloves Equivalent
ZERO Issued and 1st IPE Ready MOPP 0
carried 2nd IPE Deployed
ONE Carried Issued and Issued and Issued and
Carried Carried Carried
TWO Carried Worn Carried Carried
MOPP 1
THREE Carried Worn Worn Carried
MOPP 2
THREE Worn Worn Worn Carried
MOPP 3
MASK
FOUR Carried Worn Worn Worn -
FOUR Worn Worn Worn Worn MOPP 4
MASK
Notes.
1. Dependant on the situation and the tasks being undertaken, commanders may authorize “Suit
Open” for Dress States 2-4.
2. The additional description “Mask” may be added to Dress States 1-4.
3. US MOPP 3 is the equivalent of Dress State 3 Mask.

(13) Collective Protection. At threat level RED, CBRNE TF4 will establish
Collective Protection at medical facilities, and Div and Bde Command Posts.

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(14) Environmental Protection. 4 MND personnel employed in CBRN Defense

operations must protect the environment as much as possible. Commanders
will employ environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse
impacts on human health to the greatest extent practicable.
(15) Support to Host Nation. Requests for NBC defence support to the HN will be
forwarded the HQ 4 MND G3 Ops CBRN.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Shortages. Mission critical shortages of NBC defence equipment/supplies should be
reported through national reporting chains immediately.
b. IPE Resupply.
(1) AS. Personnel are to deploy with one set of chemical defence (CD) coveralls
while a second set will be held at formation second line, as well as an extra
10% spares. Three additional sets of IPE will be held at JTFSC (Sustain).
Resupply of IPE is based on usage.
(2) US Forces. Commencing on D-Day, the US forces will push at least one ICE
pack per soldier every 30 days. US units are authorized to requisition CBRN
ICE between pushes as required. 15 Sustainment BDE in AP will hold an
additional set per person.
(3) Other TCNs. Units and formations from other TCNs will ensure their units
hold sufficient CBRN protective equipment and may place additional
equipment with 15 Sustainment BDE.
c. Biological Casualty Reporting. The Div medical staff will institute special
monitoring and reporting arrangements, and careful attention will be paid to any
changes in the rate of sickness or infectious diseases.
d. Records. Formations and units will maintain records of individual exposure to CBRN
hazards.
e. Contaminated Casualties. CBRN contaminated casualties will be segregated and
decontaminated as far forward as possible at casualty collection points (CCPs).
Medical units will develop detailed procedures for the evacuation and treatment of
chemically-contaminated casualties.
f. CBRN contaminated remains will be segregated. Further direction will be issued.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) 4 MND G3 Ops CBRN – MAJ XXXXXX (AS).
(2) Comd 130 MEB - COLONEL XXXXXX (US).
(3) CO CBRNE TF4 - LTC XXXXXX (US)(CM).
b. Location. HQ CBRNE TF4 will co-locate with the HQ 130 MEB with a CBRN
Centre det with the 4 MND Main Command Post upon arrival in TAA SILVER.
c. Coordination. HQ 130 MEB will host a CBRN Defence conference commencing
1000 hrs, D-12 to coordinate CBRN defence.
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d. CBRN Hazard Warning and Reporting.

(1) The 4 MND CBRN Centre located in the Div Main Command Post will
operate the Div CBRN Warning network diagram as described in Appendix 3.
(2) CBRN reporting and hazard prediction will be done in accordance with Ref B.
(3) The primary means of communication between the 4 MND CBRN Centre and
subordinate CBRN Centres is secure E-mail, followed by secure voice.
Classified information will not be discussed over unsecure means.
e. Reachback. CBRNE TF4 will coordinate CBRN reachback support through HQ 415
CBRNE BDE.

Appendices.
Appendix 1 - Arianian CBRN Defense Organization
Appendix 2 - CFLCC CBRN THREATCON
Appendix 3 - 4 MND CBRN Warning and Report Network Diagram
Appendix 4 - Reconnaissance and Surveillance Tasks
Appendix 5 - Planned Decontamination Sites

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Appendix 1
Annex U
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
ARIANIAN CBRN DEFENCE ORGANIZATION
1. OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC COMMAND 2 (OSC 2). (located in Atropia).
a. 23 Mechanised Infantry Division (IFV) - 23 Chemical Defense Battalion.
b. 24 Motorised Infantry Division (MOT) - 24 Chemical Defense Battalion.
c. 25 Mechanised Infantry Division (APC) - 25 Chemical Defense Battalion.
d. 361 Chemical Defense Brigade.
(1) 361 Chemical Defense Brigade Headquarters.
(2) 1-361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
(3) 2-361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
(4) 3-361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
(5) 4-361 Chemical Defense Battalion.
(6) 361 NBC Reconnaissance Battalion.
(7) 361 Decontamination Battalion.
(8) 361 Smoke Battalion.
(9) 361 Materiel Support Battalion.
e. 363 Smoke Brigade.
(1) 363 Smoke Brigade Headquarters.
(2) 1-363 Smoke Battalion..
(3) 2-363 Smoke Battalion.
(4) 3-363 Smoke Battalion.
(5) 363 Materiel Support Company.
2. OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC COMMAND 1 (OSC 1). (located in Ariana).
a. 11 Mechanised Infantry Division (IFV) - 11 Chemical Defense Battalion.
b. 12 Motorised Infantry Division - 12 Chemical Defense Battalion.
c. 13 Mechanised Infantry Division - 13 Chemical Defense Battalion.
d. 14 Motorised Infantry Division - 14 Chemical Defense Battalion.
e. 317 Chemical Defense Brigade.
(1) 317 Chemical Defense Brigade Headquarters.
(2) 1-317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
(3) 2-317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
(4) 3-317 Chemical Defense Battalion.
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(5) 4-317 Chemical Defense Battalion.

(6) 317 NBC Reconnaissance Battalion.
(7) 317 Decontamination Battalion.
(8) 317 Smoke Battalion.
(9) 317 Materiel Support Battalion.
f. 319 Smoke Brigade.
(1) 319 Smoke Brigade Headquarters.
(2) 1-319 Smoke Battalion.
(3) 2-319 Smoke Battalion.
(4) 3-319 Smoke Battalion.
(5) 319 Materiel Support Company.

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Appendix 2
Annex U
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

CFLCC CBRN THREATCON / THREAT LEVELS

CFLCC CBRN THREATCON / THREAT LEVELS

CBRN
CFLCC ENEMY
ATTACK THREAT MINIMUM PROTECTIVE
THREAT
PROBABILITY STATUS INDICATORS ACTIONS
CONDITION
(STANAG 2984)
- No offensive CBRN capability - Verify CBRN defense
WHITE Negligible NONE - TICs in AO, no interest of equipment holdings
(Serial O) employment - Routine maintenance
- CBRN offensive capability Above Plus
- No indicators of use in next 12 - CBRN training and
hrs rehearsals
GREEN Possible LOW - TICs in AO, some interest of - Prepare eqpt and vehicles
(Serial 1) use by enemy - Activate CBRN Warning
and Reporting Network
- Dress State 0 / MOPP 0
- Wearing protective gear Above Plus
- Preparing to employ - Emplace alarms
- CBRN munitions moving - Dress State 2 / MOPP 1 -
forward to delivery units verify mask seals
AMBER Probable MEDIUM - Cover equipment/supplies
(Serial 2) - CBRN munitions or TICS
already employed in JOA - Verify alarms/warnings
- Brief CBRN teams
- Decon site preparation

- CBRN munitions/TICs ready Above Plus

for employment - Dress State 3 / MOPP 2
- Intelligence indicates certain - Continuous monitoring
(HIGH use - Use vehicle overpressure
RED Imminent - CBRN weapons used in JOA
(Serial 3) - CBRN RV NAI Overwatch
- SSM launch
- Air attack in progress
- No contamination present
- CBRN/TIC contamination is Above Plus
present in AO - Unit CBRN surveys
- Mark contaminated areas
- Find uncontaminated routes
BLACK Attack Occurred - Decontamination as
necessary
- CBRN defense equipment
resupply

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Appendix 3
Annex U
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

4 MND CBRN WARNING AND REPORTING

NETWORK

X (AS) FORCE 2 SQN 3 CR

PROTECTION BN (OPCON)
CBRN CENTRE
1 (AS) MP BN

X (AS) Bde 4 (CA) CMBG

CBRN CENTRE CBRN CENTRE

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Appendix 4
Annex U
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
4 MND CBRN RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE TASKS

Chemical-Radiological Biological
Routes and Areas
Initial Ongoing Initial Ongoing
TAA SILVER Bde areas Bdes 17 Sust Bde until CBRNE TF4 CBRNE TF4 until
departure DSA moves fwd
MSR SEATTLE to Phase I - 2 Sqn 3 CBRNE TF4 until Phase I - 2 Sqn CBRNE TF4 until
ALYAT CR 415 CBRNE BDE 3 CR 415 CBRNE BDE
MSR MIAMI ALYAT to Phase I - 2 Sqn 3 assumes Phase I - 2 Sqn assumes
Phase Line COUGAR CR responsibility 3 CR responsibility
MSR SEATTLE Phase I - 2 Sqn 3 Phase II CBRNE Phase I - 2 Sqn Phase II CBRNE
Assembly Area (AA) A1 CR TF4 3 CR TF4
MSR MIAMI AAs A2 Phase I - 2 Sqn 3 Phase II-III Phase I - 2 Sqn Phase II-III
and A3 CR CBRNE TF4 3 CR CBRNE TF4
MSR SEATTLE and Phase I - 2 Sqn 3 Phase II-III Phase I - 2 Sqn Phase II-III
MIAMI Waiting Areas CR CBRNE TF4 3 CR CBRNE TF4
(WA)
Objs OPAL and Phase II - 2 Sqn 3 CBRNE TF4 Phase II - 2 Sqn CBRNE TF4
GARNET CR 3 CR
Bridgehead (less Phase II – 6 F-G CBRNE TF4 CBRNE TF4 CBRNE TF4
SALYAN) Bde
SALYAN Phase III - X 17 Sust Bde CBRNE TF4 CBRNE TF4
(AS) Bde
Phase III Advance - Bde Bdes Bdes CBRNE TF4 if CBRNE TF4 if
AOs necessary necessary
Phase III – KURA River Conducted by CBRNE TF4 CBRNE TF4 if CBRNE TF4 if
fwd to Bde Rear Bdes during necessary necessary
boundaries advance
Phase IV Bde Defensive Bdes Bdes CBRNE TF4 if CBRNE TF4 if
Areas necessary necessary

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Appendix 5
Annex U
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date

PLANNED DECONTAMINATION SITES

SER NAME LOCATION OPENS CLOSES

(a) ABBY FOUR KEPPAP south of W2 at GR 39T Prior to arrival of 4 MND in Unknown
(415 CBRNE TE 751 624 TAA SILVER
BDE)
(b) MILLIE ONE TAA SILVER at GR 39T TE 804 Opens upon 4 MND arrival in Departure of 12 (UK) AIB from TAA
790 TAA SILVER SILVER
(c) MILLIE TWO KARAGARLY, south of TAA Opens for Phase I and II if Departure of 12 (UK) AIB from TAA
(Alternate) SILVER at GR 39T TE 861 715 necessary SILVER
(d) MILLIE Just south of AA A3 at GR 39S Opens for Phase II Closes when Obj PEARL is secure
THREE UD 304 936
(e) MILLIE FOUR AA A2 at ALYAT GR 39S UE Opens for Phase II if necessary Closes when Obj PEARL is secure
(Alternate) 642 216
(f) MILLIE FIVE YENIKEND just east of AA A3 Opens for Phase II if necessary Closes when Obj PEARL is secure
(Alternate) at GR 39S UD 366 981
(g) MILLIE SIX SALYAN in the bridgehead at Opens for Phase III
GR 39S UD 273 811
(h) MILLIE ARBATAN southwest of Opens for Phase III if
SEVEN SALYAN in the bridgehead at necessary
GR 39S UD 235 834
(i) MILLIE EIGHT SHORSULA north of Obj Opens when Obj PEARL is
PEARL at GR 39S UD 143 673 secure

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Annex W
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)
CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)
References:
A. MC 411/2 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Military
Interaction (CMI), 28 March 2014
B. ADDP 3.11 Civil Military Operations, 01 Apr 09
C. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, October 2011
D. FM 3-07. Stability Operations, July 2008
E. FM 6.0, Commander and Staff Organization, May 2014
F. Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to CFLCC OPORD 07 for Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert
date)
G. Atropia Country Study
H. Ariana Country Study
I. Government of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment: The Ministry of Emergency
Situations, Feb 2016
J. Red Crescent Society of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment, Feb 2016
K. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs – Baku: Preliminary
Assessment Report South-Central Atropia (insert date – when Atropian advance halted but before
CFLCC OPORD)
1. SITUATION
a. Background. See paragraph 1 of the main body of the 4 MND Op O 07, Annex D
(Intelligence).
b. General
(1) The purpose of this Annex is to provide guidance for civil military cooperation
(CIMIC) which will be referred to as Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and
Civil-Military Operations (CMO) for the remainder of this order. It refers to
the relationships between military forces, civil authorities, agencies of the
Host Nation (HN), agencies of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), UN
agencies, international organizations and civilians in the 4 MND AO.
(2) CAO are activities of a commander that focus on relations between military,
international government and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs),
and civilian authorities and populace. These activities may be performed by
designated Civil Affairs (CA) forces, by other military forces, or by a
combination of the two. Activities performed or supported by CA forces
include but are not limited to: Populace and Resource Control; Humanitarian
Assistance (HA); and Support to Civil Administration.
(3) CAO require a collaborative relationship between military and civilian actors
in a conflict environment. CAO in this complex Op IRON GUARDIAN
situation plays a crucial role integrating and synchronizing military activities
with those of the wider international community (IC), HN and other key
stakeholders. CAO supports the de-confliction of military and civil activities
as competing demands on limited HN infrastructure and resources may arise,

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especially when the resources are already constrained by geographical,

environmental and conflict challenges. CAO also provides commanders with
assessments of the civil situation.
c. Policy. CA activities shall be executed consistent with applicable international laws,
conventions, agreements, and pertinent laws and policies of TCNs and in conjunction
with the CFLCC CA plan. The scope of CAO in 4 MND will be to provide the
minimum Populace and Resource Control and only emergency HA. CAO will look to
minimize civilian impact on operations, but also alleviate suffering and set conditions
for handover to Atropian Government control.
d. Threat Considerations. See Annex D (Intelligence). It may be expected that some
civilians will attempt to interfere with friendly operations either with or without
malicious intent. Civilian actions that hamper friendly forces could possibly be aided
or encouraged by the enemy. Arianian Special Purpose Force (SPF) units operating
within the AO will conduct terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure/high value
targets in order to destabilize AP and hinder 4 MND operations. The Arianian
invasion has already seen considerable internally displaced person (IDP) movement
that has and will continue to also effect military operations.
e. Friendly Forces. The CFLCC 360th CA Brigade (Bde) has four CA battalions (bn).
450th CA Bn is OPCON to 4 MND. The remaining CA bns are allocated as follows:
431th CA Bn to 1 ID; 489th CA Bn to 82 Abn Div and 412th CA Bn is retained by
360th CA Bde for CFLCC tasks.
f. Government of AP. AP is a functioning secular country that is still not truly
democratic in all respects. It has a developed, albeit limited, civil infrastructure and
bureaucracy. The IDP problem has stretched the government’s capacity. Even
though IO/NGOs are operating in AP, the government retains authority and
responsibility for the welfare and care of all its people. AP has recently established
camps to house civilians affected and at the request of the UN, the Atropian Red
Crescent Society will also establish refugee and IDP camps.
g. Assumptions
(1) In areas of heavy combat, there will be displaced civilians and significant
damage to civil infrastructure.
(2) Atropian government organizations and citizens will be generally supportive
towards Coalition forces and operations.
(3) Atropian authorities and humanitarian actors (international and national) will
be able to handle the humanitarian situation where and when a safe and secure
environment is established.
h. CAO Objectives
(1) Effective military liaison and coordination with Atropian, IC and other
relevant actors established.
(2) Freedom of movement supported.
(3) Situational awareness and understanding of the civil environment in AP is
maintained.

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(4) Contribution to a permissive environment is provided.

i. Lines of CAO Activity
(1) Facilitating Civil-Military Interaction. CAO provides the Comd 4 MND with
a capability to reach out and interact with the relevant civil stakeholders in
order to exchange information, synchronize, coordinate, and de-conflict
activities on all levels.
(2) Support to the Force. CAO contributes to the situational awareness on all
relevant aspects of the civil domain and contributes to the planning and
assessment cycles at all levels. Additionally CAO coordinates and de-
conflicts the use of the HN infrastructure and Lines of Communication.
(3) Protection of the Population and Environment. CAO contributes to reducing
the environmental impact and minimizing collateral damage to critical
infrastructure, key life support facilities, as well as religious and historical
sites. Additionally, CAO supports consequence management efforts in order
to mitigate negative impacts of the conducted military operations.
2. MISSION. 450th CA Bn conducts CA operations to establish cooperation with civilian
authorities, local population and IC actors, in order to create an environment conducive to 4 MND
operations.
3. EXECUTION
a. General. 450th CA Bn will plan and coordinate CA for 4 MND through an integral
Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT). The Bn includes four companies which will be
allocated TACON to each of the Division's (Div) manoeuvre bdes. It will establish a
Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC). The CMOC will manage, coordinate and
synchronize key CA operations and be the focal point for civil military cooperation in
the Div AO. The CMOC will consult and coordinate with other 4 MND enablers such
as, but not limited to, Information Operations (Annex O (Information Operations))
and Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) (Annex X (Public Affairs)) to achieve
complementary and synergistic effects. The CMOC will include an Operations and
Intelligence Section composed of a civil liaison team (CLT) and collation and analysis
of civil information (CIM) cell. In addition, a Functional Specialty Cell will provide
the ability to plan, coordinate, enable and manage CA projects.
b. CAO Support to 4 MND Scheme of Manoeuver. CAO support will be provided as
follows:
(1) Preliminary Moves (D-D+3). CAO staff and 450th CA Bn will continue to
contribute to the development of an understanding of the Div AO.
(2) Phase I Advance (D+3-D+5). Priority will be to coordinate with Atropian
civil authorities and IC to ensure 4 MND freedom of movement along Route
SEATTLE and MIAMI to include local police liaison, assembly areas and
waiting areas.
(3) Phase II (Cross River KURA) (D+6- D+8). Continue and consolidate CA
activities from Phase I. Once the bridgehead has been established (Phase Line
LION) focus will be placed on the town of SALYAN between Objectives
(Objs) OPAL and GARNET.
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(4) Phase III (Destroy) (D+9-D+13). As 4 MND advances into territory

previously occupied by AN there will be a requirement to quickly assess the
civil environment, especially to determine the potential effect on operations,
and to establish initial linkage with IO/NGOs and local authorities. It will
then be important to ensure immediate needs are met through a combination of
Div resources (within capacity), the Atropian government and IC actors.
(5) Phase IV (Stabilize) (D+14-D+27). Activities from Phase III will continue.
CAO will support Atropian Government and IC efforts at HA, re-
establishment of civil authority and eventually reconstruction. CAO may
support 4 MND input to COM CFLCC participation in a Joint Military
Commission (JMC), if established.
c. Assigned Tasks
(1) Establish the required liaison and coordination mechanisms with the local
Atropian authorities and civil organizations, and IOs/NGOs.
(2) Set up a 4 MND CMOC to support civil-military interaction.
(3) Establish situational awareness of the humanitarian situation in the AO in
order to identify any potential gaps in the provision of HA and basic civil
services.
(4) Integrate all aspects of the civil dimension of the 4 MND AO in the CFLCC
Theatre Civil Assessment.
(5) Identify Atropian resources/infrastructure that may be useful and ensure
coordination/de-confliction with Atropian authorities and IC in its potential
use.
(6) Identify culturally relevant property and critical infrastructure in the AO.
(7) Support assessment efforts as required by AP as relates to the consequences of
conducted operations.
(8) Provide CA expertise, information and coordination that support Comd 4
MND’s contributions to COM CFLCC participation in any JMC.
d. Implied Tasks
(1) Coordinate security needs for the effective provision of HA with relevant
actors.
(2) Support 4 MND freedom of movement by minimizing negative influences of
the civil environment on military operations in the AO, and vice versa.
(3) Ensure that CAO are conducted in a way that is both consistent and
coordinated with an integrated 4 MND Influence Activities plan.
(4) Support the 4 MND information campaign to strengthen STRATCOM
messaging and reduce impact of Arianian and proxy propaganda.
(5) Support minimizing 4 MND/CFLCC negative impacts on the local economy
and the coordination with other relevant stakeholders about the competitive
use of Atropian resources in the AO.

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(6) Increase situational awareness concerning the civil environment to reduce

environmental impact and minimize collateral damage on critical
infrastructure, key life support factors, as well as religious, historical and
cultural sites.
(7) Support the implementation of existing bilateral TCN/AP Security Assistance
Missions by liaison and cooperation.
(8) In consultation with CFLCC CAO, establish a mapping and tracking system
reflecting the IDP and refugee situation in the 4 MND AO.
(9) Provide regular CAO assessments and reports to facilitate Comd 4 MND input
to CJTF-OIG campaign plan progress.
(10) Contribute to monitoring and assessing the situation related to human rights
violations, inter-ethnic and gender-based violence, children affected in armed
conflicts and any other vulnerable groups in the AO.
e. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Synchronization and Integration. The coordination and de-confliction of
CIMIC operations and other influence activities will occur through the
division-level Information Activity Working Group (IAWG) (see Annex O
(Information Operations). The IAWG will set priorities and liaise with the
Targeting Effects Board for overall synchronization and integration with both
kinetic and non-kinetic activities.
(2) HA may be provided but without detriment to military operations, to the
extent that supports the Comd 4 MND's desired effects, and to meet the
requirements of international law. Essential HA needs are defined as food,
water, shelter, medical needs and security.
(3) All units will be prepared to supervise or assist relief, rehabilitation, or other
assistance provided by non-military organizations that are authorized to
function within the AO.
(4) CAO assessments will focus on identification of serviceable Atropian civilian
and military infrastructure that can support 4 MND military operations and
civil-military operations. Priority in locating infrastructure will be given to
medical, power generation, secure warehousing, fuel storage, and
transportation facilities and assets. Military resource priority will be to POL
transportation, distribution and storage capabilities for use by 4 MND/CFLCC
units.
(5) Report locations of IDPs, actions, conditions or movements that can interfere
with military operations through normal operation reporting channels.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. 450th CA Bn HHC will provide 1st line support to the bn. Second
line support will be drawn from 577th CSSB.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. CMOC will co-locate with HQ 4 MND Main. The CMOC is
C2 systems capable (TACLAN/ISOCA) and able to communicate and exchange information with
other CMOCs/CA elements and leverage reachback capability.

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Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Humanitarian Organizations Operating in AP
Appendix 2 - IDP and Refugee Camps in AP

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Appendix 1
Annex W
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN ATROPIA
References:
A. Government of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment: The Ministry of Emerging
Situations, (insert date)
Red Crescent Society of Atropia Micro Operational Environment Assessment, (insert date)
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Baku: Preliminary
Assessment Report South-Central Atropia (insert date – when Atropian advance halted but before
CFLCC OPORD)
UN Backgrounder – South Caucasus Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee /IDP Situation (insert
date)
1. UN ORGANIZATIONS
Organization Name Acronym Main Office Location in Atropia
United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF BAKU
World Health Organization WHO BAKU
United Nations High Commissioner for UNHCR BAKU
Refugees
Office of the High Commissioner for Human OHCHR BAKU
Rights
United Nations Development Program UNDP BAKU
World Food Program WFP BAKU

2. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Organization Name Acronym Main Office Location in Atropia
International Federation of Red Cross and IFRC BAKU, in locations with Atropian Red
Red Crescent Societies Crescent Society
International Organization for Migration IOM BAKU
US Agency For International Development US AID BAKU
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid ECHO BAKU
and Civil Protection department
World Bank BAKU

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3. INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)

Organization Name Acronym Main Office Location in Atropia
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief CARE BAKU,
Everywhere International
Relief International RI BAKU, BILASUVAR
International Rescue Committee IRC BAKU, SHIRVAN
Medecins sans Frontiers MSF BAKU, BEYLAGAN
Norwegian Refugee Council NRC SHIRVAN
Action Contre la Faim ACF BAKU, IMISHLI
International Islamic Relief Organization IIRO BAKU
Danish Relief Council DRC FIZULI, JALILABAD
Save the Children BAKU
Georgia A. Smith Human Development Trust SHIRVAN

4. ATROPIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOS

Organization Name Acronym Main Office Location in Atropia
Atropian Committee for Refugees and IDPs CRI BAKU
Atropian Red Crescent Society BAKU (Regional Centres in BAKU, GANJA,
SUMGAYIT, MINGECHEVIR, SABIRABAD,
LENKARAN, GARABAKH)
Ministry of Emergency Situations MES BAKU

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Appendix 2
Annex W
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
IDP AND REFUGEES IN ATROPIA (AP)
References:
A. Government of Atropia (AP) Micro Operational Environment Assessment: The Ministry of
Emergency Situations, Feb 2016
B. Red Crescent Society of AP Micro Operational Environment Assessment, Feb 2016
C. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Baku: Preliminary
Assessment Report South-Central AP (insert date – when AP advance halted but before CFLCC
OPORD)
D. UN Backgrounder – South Caucasus Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee /IDP Situation (insert
date)
1. AP CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS. Atropian Government sources, as well as the most
recent report (reference C) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UN OCHA) in BAKU indicate that the Atropian areas most directly affected by the conflict
so far are as follows:
a. UJAR Province - BEYLAGAN, FIZULI and JABRAYLI Rayons;
b. HAJIGABUL Province - IMISHLI, BILASUVAR and SAATLY Rayons;
c. AGJABADI Province - AGJABADI Rayon;
d. KURDAMIR Province - JALILABAB Rayon; and
e. GOYCHAY province - KURDAMIR and ZARDAB Rayons.
2. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. The humanitarian situation in the most-affected Atropian
Rayons is dire. Following the invasion by ARIANA (AN), significant numbers of Atropian citizens
were literally “on the move” driven from their homes by the conflict. The fighting greatly affected
communities, households and individuals in the conflict area and created a significant humanitarian
crisis with the following characteristics:
a. Widespread civilian casualties (fatalities and wounded);
b. Significant damage to/destruction of all types of Atropian facilities (hospitals,
schools, public and private buildings) and infrastructure (communication, transport
routes, water, power and sanitation);
c. Complete disruption of normal commercial and economic activity in the conflict
affected area (harvests and markets);
d. Minefields and unexploded ordnance; and
e. Significant movement of local population from combat zones into safer areas (real or
perceived), creating an IDP crisis.
3. ACCESS TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS. There is no or very limited non-combatant
access into the conflict-affected areas at this time. OCHA staff members on the ground have been
interviewing IDPs who are crossing into Atropian-controlled territory. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that significant numbers of IDPs are seeking to exit the combat-affected areas south of the River
KURA moving north in numbers that could range from 40-80,000 (estimate only).
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4. MOVEMENT OF IDPS.
a. General. As outlined in reference C, since the Arianian invasion there has been a
significant movement of displaced Atropian citizens northward from the Arianian-
occupied zone towards the three IDP camps established in the vicinity of the cities of
UJAR, KURDAMIR and HAJIGABUL.
b. Main Routes. Based on the following movement of IDPs as the conflict unfolded,
there appear to be three main corridors:
(1) Routes R18/R32. See Tab A. Primary route to HAJAR IDP Camp from the
BEYLAGAN/FUZULI/JABRAYLI areas and surrounding countryside. To
date approximately 15-20,000 IDPs have used this route;
(2) Route R11. See Tab B. Main corridor towards the SABIRA IDP Camp from
IMISHLI/BILASUVAR/SAATLY areas and surrounding countryside. IDPs
numbered in the 20-25,000 range (estimate only); and
(3) Routes M6/E119/R45. See Tab C. IDPs from the BILASUVAR / SALYAN /
SABIRABAD areas and surrounding countryside numbered headed toward the
KHALISA IDP Camp proceeding northeast on route M6, east on E119, and
north on route R45. IDPs numbered in the 20-30,000 range (estimate only).
c. Factors.
(1) IDP movements along the outlined routes are minimal at this time; the
heaviest flow occurred in the months just following the Arianian invasion. A
resumption of hostilities will certainly generate renewed IDP movements with
groups likely to use the same movement routes to the IDP camps;
(2) There are currently no facilities for IDP support of any kind along the IDP
movement corridors and no humanitarian NGO/INGO presence south of the
IDP camps identified at Ref C; and
(3) The IDP movement corridors previously used, and likely to be followed in the
future overlap with MSRs in two instances:
(a) Route to IDP CAMP HAJAR (UJAR) overlaps MSR HOUSTON from
SHARG to AGJABEDI; and,
(b) Route to IDP CAMP KHALISA (HAJIGABUL) overlaps MSR
MIAMI from BILASUVAR to SALYAN.

d. Deduction. The movement corridor along Route 45 towards the KHALISA Camp in
HAJIGABUL has the potential to significantly affect 4 MND operations. A high
number of IDPs moving north along Route R45 could hamper movement of 3 CR and
subsequent advance of 4 MND main elements during the latter stages of Op IRON
GUARDIAN Phase I (Advance to KURA River). Any large concentration of IDPs in
vicinity of Arianian 25 DTG south of SHIRVAN will complicate combat operations.
In Phase IV (Stabilization) the location of this movement corridor in 4 MND AO will
be a major planning consideration.

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5. ATROPIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE. Rayon Councils are struggling to cope with the
humanitarian situation. They are the main local government points of contact and coordination on
the ground for the humanitarian agencies. The Atropian Ministry of Emergency Situations and the
state sponsored Committee for Refugees and IDPs (CRI) are spearheading the government response
in cooperation with the Atropian Red Crescent Society.
6. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE. The UN-OCHA offices in BAKU are acting as the central
coordination point for international donors and major NGOs and IOs involved in humanitarian
activities, as well as with the Atropian central government. The BAKU-UN offices are also the
primary point for humanitarian civil-military coordination. The initial focus of the OCHA-
coordinated humanitarian effort is as follows:
a. Establishment of “safe havens” (IDP camps) where services and aid can be delivered
to affected/displaced populations;
b. The provision of “basic human needs” such as water, sanitation, medical, food and
nutrition to affected populations, directly into established IDP camps; and
c. A UN-coordinated “cluster” system has been established to coordinate sectoral inputs
as follows:
(1) Nutrition (UNICEF);
(2) Health (WHO);
(3) Water/Sanitation (UNICEF);
(4) Emergency Shelter (UNHCR/IFRC);
(5) Camp Coordination/Management (UNHCR/IOM);
(6) Protection (UNHCR/OHCHR/UNICEF);
(7) Early Recovery (UNDP);
(8) Logistics (WFP); and
(9) Emergency Telecommunications (OCHA/UNICEF/WFP).
7. CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION. Significant coordination with international and
national IOs/NGOs will be necessary in this early humanitarian response period. The primary points
for initial coordination are the offices of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Atropia (AP) in
BAKU and the Atropian Ministry of Emergency Situations. Humanitarian assistance operations will
be carried out within the context of the UN Humanitarian Principles with an aim to provide the
immediate and essential humanitarian response and to reduce the restrictions that the humanitarian
situation may impose on military operations.
a. Tasks.
(1) CIMIC Teams. Provide information to Atropian security forces and
IOs/NGOs on;
(a) The security situation, areas of particular risk (including criminal
activity, land mines and security incidents);
(b) Condition and needs (humanitarian and security) of the population,
major population movements within 4 MND AO;

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(c) Conditions in “shared space” such as roads and airports;

(d) Coordinates and planned movements of humanitarian operations;
(e) Military plans/capacity to provide assistance to the population;
(f) General post-strike information on strike locations and explosive
munitions used in order to assist the planning of humanitarian relief
and mine-action/UXO activities;
(g) Changes in control of territory; and
(h) Effects of fighting on civilian population, including degradation of
infrastructure.
(2) EOD Teams. With appropriate authorization be prepared to conduct de-
mining/UXO clearing operations.
8. PRELIMINARY IDP ASSISTANCE CENTRES. Initial IDP reception and assistance centres
have been established (table below). Other centres may be established as necessary and if warranted
by changing humanitarian factors and conditions.

Camp (Nearest town) Capacity Involved “Cluster” Agencies

HAJAR (UJAR) 40,000 ICRC, AZRC (Red Crescent Society of AP)
SABIRA 20,000 CARE International, IIRO (International Islamic Relief Org),
(KURDAMIR) ICRC
KHALISA 27,000 UN cluster agencies, IFRC (International Federation of Red
(HAJIGABUL) Cross and Red Crescent Societies), ICRC

Tabs:

Tab A - HAJAR Camp Corridor

Tab B - SABIRA Camp Corridor
Tab C - KHALISA Camp Corridor

W2-4/4
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Tab A
Appendix 2
Annex W
4 MND Op O 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN insert date
IDP MOVEMENT CORRIDOR TO HAJAR CAMP

W2-A-1/1
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Tab B
Appendix 2
Annex W
4 MND Op O 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN insert date

IDP MOVEMENT CORRIDOR TO SABIRA CAMP

W2-B-1/1
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Tab C
Appendix 2
Annex W
4 MND Op O 07 OP IRON GUARDIAN insert date

IDP MOVEMENT CORRIDOR TO KHALISA CAMP

W2-C-1/1
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Annex X
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

References:
A. ADDP 3.13.2 Military Public Affairs (TBI)
B. US Army FM 3-13 Inform and Influence Activities 25 January 2013
C. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Nov. 2003
D. FM 3-61.1 Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Oct. 2003
E. FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, Jan. 2006.
F. Annex F (Public Affairs) to CFLCC OPORD O7 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) date
1. SITUATION
a. Background. Refer to main body of this OPORD specifically paragraph 1, Annex D
(Intelligence), Annex W (Civil Military Cooperation), Annex L (PSYOPS) and Annex
O (Information Operations);
b. Information Environment.
(1) Host Nation (HN) ATROPIA (AP). AP’s state-run and public media compete
with private and opposition publications and broadcasters. Internet, television
and mobile phone networks are relatively accessible to much of the population
in the AO, but more so in urban areas. TV is the most-popular medium. In
more isolated rural areas, traditional communication print media remain the
most influential communication tools. In AP, freedom of expression through
the press is essentially respected. Atropian government bodies are in the lead
for shaping and influencing their publics’ opinions regarding the conflict. 4
MND / CFLCC will deliver support and assistance in this area to local
authorities;
(2) International Media. All personnel must understand the power of the
international media and the importance it plays in helping the public
understand and maintain support for ongoing operations. The international
media, to include traditional journalists, documentarians and reputable
bloggers, will significantly influence western public and political opinion; and
(3) ARIANA (AN). Transparency in political and social debate is subject to
extremely tight governmental control in AN, resulting in this being perceived
by the population as propaganda. The Arianian government continues to use a
wide range of media as an integral part of its activities to influence the
populace and international actors. AN and its affiliated partners and proxies
will attempt to shape the information environment based on their interests;
c. Core Message. CJTF-OIG, in response to illegal Arianian aggression, is committed to
the restoration of the territorial integrity of AP as mandated by UN Security Council
Resolutions;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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d. Core Themes.
(1) Intent. CJTF-OIG is committed to support the enforcement of UN Security
Council Resolutions in order to restore Atropian sovereign territory and create
conditions for regional stability. Establishment of the security conditions
envisioned by the UN will enable CJTF-OIG to withdraw from an active
military presence in the region;
(2) Legitimacy. CJTF-OIG actions are based on the UN Security Council
Resolutions and the UN Charter. Close coordination and consultation with the
UN, the regional actors and the international organizations will ensure a
common effort;
(3) Resolve. CJTF-OIG will act to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions and
support the people of AP, in order to protect their rights and legitimate
aspirations;
(4) Cooperation. CJTF-OIG is cooperating within the context of a larger
international response and coordinating its activities closely with a broad
range of stakeholders and actors. CJTF-OIG’s efforts are in support of the
wider IC effort to achieve a resolution to the crisis; and
(5) Responsibility / Necessity to Act. The continuing violence and illegal actions
perpetrated by the Arianian regime are the cause for the current crisis in the
region. CJTF-OIG will exercise its moral obligation to protect and help those
in need, independent of their race, gender, religion or ethnicity.
e. Core Audiences. These include:
(1) Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) members, countries and regional
policymakers, opinion leaders, publics, service members and families;
(2) Regional, national and international News Media Representatives (NMRs);
(3) Atropian and Arianian publics;
(4) 4 MND service members;
(5) Atropian Armed Forces; and
(6) International Organizations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organizations
(NGOs).
f. Assumptions.
(1) The Arianian government and the Arianian Armed Forces (AN Armed
Forces) can be expected to mount a massive, carefully constructed, well-
orchestrated, world-wide propaganda campaign as part of its military
operations;
(2) AN will use political, economic, cultural, and military issues and events as
opportunities to discredit Coalition resolve, military capability and intentions
in the free press. AN will use the media to further its propaganda goal to
weaken public support and confidence in Coalition military resolve and/or
intentions;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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(3) Non-state organizations and proxies associated with AN can be expected to

use the media to further their goals;
(4) Commanders will feel pressure from their national HQs and government
agencies to conform to national communication strategies as a priority. These
strategies may or may not be consistent with 4 MND’s; and
(5) National PA approaches to casualty-related communications will drive the
overall mission narrative if not effectively coordinated.
2. MISSION. 4 MND will execute active public affairs in order to provide responsive, timely
and accurate information to both domestic and foreign audiences and to counter enemy
misinformation.
3. EXECUTION
a. Commander’s Intent. I view that a key element in the overall success of 4 MND
operations, and within CJTF-OIG as a whole, is the provision of timely and accurate
PA information. To that end I will implement a proactive PA posture. I intend a
robust and effective PA operation to communicate 4 MND and Coalition activities to
audiences in an accurate, transparent and timely manner. I cannot stress enough that 4
MND PA must be “first with the truth”. It must lean forward in providing the facts
regarding ongoing events and military and humanitarian activities. It must assist the
media in reporting accurately by providing context. 4 MND PA must also support
and make meaningful contributions to the overall CJTF-OIG / CFLCC PA effort.
This is to help attain and maintain popular support for the mission by explaining the
goals and legitimacy of the UN-mandated Atropia Security Assistance Mission
(ASAM);
b. Concept of Operations. PA will assist operations by:
(1) Providing timely information and news products that demonstrate the core and
key messages, provide timely information about operations to public and news
media representatives, and facilitate news media operations;
(2) Providing internal command information programs and products to keep units
and family members informed;
(3) Countering effects of Arianian propaganda attempts through an active PA
posture by informing and educating external and internal publics of the actual
situation and facts;
(4) Conducting a media embed program consistent with CJTF-OIG and/or TCN
media embed directives;
(5) Facilitating outreach engagement initiatives to inform and educate local,
national and international opinion leaders, academics and defense-issues
analysts; and
(6) Maintaining and managing 4 MND / CFLCC social media (See Appendix 2
for guidance).
c. Key Messages.

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(1) The United Nations, by adopting United Nations Security Council Resolutions
7739 and 7752, has decisively authorized international intervention in the
CAUCASUS. The International Committee for ATROPIA Sovereignty and
Security (ICASS) and its ATROPIA Security and Assistance Mission
(ASAM) is the international community’s response to those UNSCRs. 4
MND is operating under the authority of ICASS and ASAM to assist in ending
the current crisis in AP and restoring its national sovereignty;
(2) The restoration of Atropian sovereignty will free Atropian civilians currently
in Arianian-occupied AP and allow displaced persons to return to their homes;
(3) The resolution of the crisis will greatly enhance the ability of the international
community to provide assistance to all citizens of AP;
(4) Military operations are focused on expelling AN Armed Forces from Atropian
sovereign territory. Atropian civilians, homes and infrastructure will be
preserved as much as possible; and
(5) 4 MND is a robust, well-trained and well-equipped military force that is
highly capable of engaging and defeating armed threats to accomplish its
mission.
d. PA Effects. PA activities within 4 MND will focus on achieving the following key
effects:
(1) 4 MND / CFLCC is recognized as a regional stabilizing force by national and
international audiences;
(2) TCNs and public audiences receive timely updates of 4 MND mission
progress and significant events to include enemy and friendly casualty status
without compromising operational security;
(3) International recognition and support for the ASAM is strong and unwavering;
(4) Arianian propaganda is effectively countered by increased accurate and
independent reporting from international, national and local news agencies;
(5) ICASS, TCNs and CFLCC forces are informed of mission progress and
critical issues of force protection, safety, health, welfare and morale;
(6) Increased reporting of defeats suffered by Arianian military forces by
international, national and local media; and
(7) Key audiences recognize 4 MND / CFLCC will transition authority to follow-
on forces or the HN for stability or peace support operations once security
conditions permit.
e. PA Focus by Phase of Op IRON GUARDIAN. Although emphasis will shift as the
operation unfolds, underlying and overarching PA key messages are to continue
throughout. In addition, PA must remain agile and responsive to events that arise:
(1) Preliminary Moves (D-D+3). PA will focus on key messages concerning the
legitimacy of 4 MND presence, its aim to free occupied peoples and areas of
AP, its goal of defeating AN Armed Forces while preserving AP life,
infrastructure and economies, the preparedness of 4 MND personnel and

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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material to accomplish its goals and missions, and the combat prowess of its
personnel and equipment. PA activities must take into account the intention
during this stage to conduct operations under electronic silence;
(2) Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5). The PA effort during this phase will build
upon the focus of the previous stage. PA will not cover the tactical movement
of the Div forward to assist OPSEC and observe electronic silence when in
effect;
(3) Phase II - Cross KURA River (D+6- D+8). PA activities will continue to
build upon current ongoing themes, being re-active as necessary but
continuing to ensure OPSEC. Only after the breakout has occurred will PA go
active;
(4) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13). With the commencement of
combat operations PA focus will shift to the liberation of AP peoples,
successes in the field, casualties and prisoners of war and the defeat of
Arianian forces; and
(5) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27). The key PA activity in this phase will
focus on Coalition/Atropian victory, deterrence of further Arianian aggression,
humanitarian operations, and stabilization and reconstruction efforts.
f. 4 MND PA Tasks. The PA office is assigned as a Special Staff section to HQ 4
MND. CFLCC PA remains as the overall lead organization for PA throughout the
AO and during all operations. In support of CFLCC PA, 4 MND PA tasks are:
(1) Liaise, coordinate and consult with CFLCC PA to ensure 4 MND PA activities
are consistent and complementary to the overall PA effort;
(2) Lead, plan, coordinate and conduct tactical PA activities within 4 MND AO;
(3) Coordinate across the 4 MND staff sections and subordinate formations as
well as relevant AP Armed Forces to synchronize communications efforts;
(4) Prepare for media coverage throughout all phases of the operation, including
social media coverage and support to outreach engagement initiatives;
(5) Coordinate with national representatives of TCNs as appropriate;
(6) Identify gaps and disconnects with national PA goals and objectives as
compared to 4 MND’s and reconcile or mitigate as much as possible;
(7) In consultation and coordination with CFLCC PA, plan and oversee AP
Armed Forces PA mentoring programme;
(8) Create and maintain list of key spokespersons and subject matter experts;
(9) Ensure pre-emptive Media Response Lines (MRL), Questions and Answers
(Q&As) and News Release/Statement templates are prepared and approved for
use;
(10) Consolidate daily 4 MND PA SITREP to be sent to HQ CFLCC;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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(11) Illustrate 4 MND units’ capabilities and resolve, as well as their

professionalism through external and internal media coverage, social media
outlets and visual imagery;
(12) Support communications efforts to reach and inform internal audiences and
protect them from enemy misinformation and propaganda;
(13) Obtain/consolidate Div still and video imagery of events/activities and
forward them to CFLCC PAO for approval and release;
(14) Develop for execution a comprehensive and effects-aimed Key Leadership
Engagement (KLE) programme;
(15) Provide PA support to CFLCC to highlight the successes of Op IRON
GUARDIAN to Target Audiences through internal and external media
coverage, KLE and visual imagery;
(16) In consultation with CFLCC PA, coordinate 4 MND efforts to keep military
personnel and family members informed;
(17) Support higher level PA plans to help gain, and maintain the support of the
local and international communities, counter rumors and misinformation and
deter further Arianian aggression;
(18) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the
operation;
(19) Provide/coordinate the provision of Talking Points to all appropriate military
personnel prior to media engagements to help facilitate communication
synchronization and ensure they understand the overarching intent of the
mission;
(20) Ensure that subordinate commanders and PA personnel are familiar with
approved Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and ground rules concerning
operations, including communications, transportation and other media support
requirements;
(21) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do
not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC;
(22) Ensure all entitled media have approved credentials before joining any unit;
(23) Collect, consolidate and provide CFLCC PAO with a press kit for 4 MND
formations and units, to include a formation/unit fact sheet and Commander’s
biography with photo;
(24) Carry out a periodic overall PA assessment and produce a thorough after-
action report including successes, failures and lessons learned; and
(25) Utilize best practices in media interviews when talking to reporters (see
Appendix 1).
g. Brigade PA. Brigade-level formations within 4 MND are to establish a PA
organization. Tasks include:

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(1) Liaise, coordinate and consult with 4 MND PA to ensure PA activities are
consistent and complementary to the overall PA effort;
(2) In coordination with 4 MND PAO, lead, plan, coordinate and conduct tactical
PA activities within brigade AOs;
(3) Engage media outlets in their AO as soon as possible once a phase/stage of
operations is complete, even as follow-on phases/stages proceed;
(4) Obtain still and video imagery of events/activities and send to 4 MND PAO
for approval and release;
(5) Develop for approval by 4 MND PAO and then execute a KLE programme;
(6) Develop for approval by 4 MND PAO and then execute a programme to keep
brigade family members informed;
(7) Be prepared to receive media embeds and provide support to media during the
operation;
(8) Review national embedded policy with visiting media in their areas of
operation;
(9) Designate Unit Public Affairs Representatives (UPAR) for each battalion
sized element. UPARs are responsible for briefing commanders and
disseminating current PAG, and ensuring that all units are prepared to
facilitate media engagements;
(10) Do not interfere with News Media Representatives (NMR) as long as they do
not interfere with the execution of the mission or threaten to violate OPSEC;
and
(11) Provide 4 MND PAO with a press kit for formations and units, to include a
formation/unit fact sheet and Commander’s biography with photo.
h. PA Support to Inform and Influence Activities.
(1) Coordinate daily messages and Talking Points consistent with PA objectives;
(2) Coordinate efforts to counter Arianian propaganda by having international
news media presence at critical locations to accurately report events;
(3) Coordinate to ensure PA activities do not compromise or conflict with CFLCC
Strategic Communications, and 4 MND Civil Military Cooperation (Annex
W), Information Operations (Annex O), and PSYOP (Annex L); and
(4) Coordinate and focus media attention on operational and strategic isolation of
Arianian regime, the defeat of Arianian military capability that has attacked
and threatens AP, and 4 MND humanitarian assistance efforts.
i. Spokespersons. Commander 4 MND is the official Div spokesperson and will
delegate this responsibility as and when appropriate. All members of 4 MND are free
to engage with the media at any time, but only in accordance with national policies.
Individuals shall confine their comments to their own area of expertise and respect
operational security. See again Appendix 1 for guidelines;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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j. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Daily Public Affairs Situation Reports (PA SITREP) are to be submitted to 4
MND PA (see Tab FF (PA SITREP) to Annex UU (Reports)). Div will
consolidate all reports;
(2) A “technical net” will be established to effect communications between
brigade/battalion PAOs and 4 MND PA;
(3) Release authority for material and imagery will be held by 4 MND PAO;
(4) 4 MND PAO to be informed of any critical information requirements such as
media requests, military and civilian casualties, large-scale or significant
incidents, injuries to PAO personnel;
(5) 4 MND PAO to be advised immediately of news media exposure to classified
information or any possible media ground rules violations;
(6) 4 MND personnel are not authorized to confiscate media cameras, film,
audio/videotape, or reporter’s notebooks. Any questions regarding the
specific application of this policy should be referred to the 4 MND PAO;
(7) Sensitive Issues.
(a) Casualties/Accidents/Incidents. Casualties/accidents/incidents will be
acknowledged at the brigade level and within the established national
casualty management policies of each TCN’s command element.
Brigade-level PA will acknowledge deaths or serious injuries in
accordance with PA principles of OPSEC and privacy. Where
casualties have occurred, 4 MND PAOs will only comment on the fact
that Coalition forces were involved, the regional area in which the
casualties occurred, and, when the details are confirmed, the number
and type of casualties. It remains the responsibility of respective NCE
PAOs to coordinate/approve further release of details. In all cases
photography of friendly force casualties is prohibited. In the event of a
large scale incident, critical information leak, capture/kill of a key
leader, or mass casualty situation which may require communications
consequence management, all key information (5Ws) must be
forwarded immediately to both 4 MND PAO and CFLCC PAO;
(b) Atrocities/War Crimes. Any instances of atrocities and/or war crimes
will attract media attention. Any brigade discovering evidence of such
activity shall inform 4 MND G3 and Public Affairs without delay.
Brigade PA staff are strongly encouraged to send their imagery and
combat camera assets and invite embedded media to the site as soon as
possible to record and bring world attention to the findings, but, in
coordination with the Military Police in location, without
contaminating the evidence;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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(c) Cultural / Ethnic / Religious / Gender Issues. Understanding the varied

and myriad cultural makeup of 4 MND’s AO in AP will be vital when
communicating with local audiences. In consultation with HQ 4
MND, Brigades are to develop a “Code of Conduct” and continue
highlighting cultural awareness via internal communications
mechanisms; and
(d) Imagery and Detainees. All imagery of detainees will be reviewed by
the 4 MND PAO to ensure they respect the detainee’s rights, and
protect the detainee from public curiosity in accordance with Article 13
of the Third Geneva Convention. Imagery will not show a detained
person’s recognizable face, nametag or other identifying feature.
k. Requests for Public Affairs Information (RFIs). Submit all RFIs to HQ 4 MND.
l. Support for News Media Representatives (NMRs).
(1) Media Escort. NMRs embedded or transiting between units and formations
are normally to be escorted and afforded protection as appropriate;
(2) Accreditation. Requirements for accreditation will be established by the
Coalition/national-level defence agencies and supported by CFLCC PAO. As
a minimum, the CFLCC Information Bureau (CIB) will institute procedures to
determine the legitimacy of individuals as bona fide media representatives
entitled to receive support afforded by TCN and CFLCC forces. News media
representatives must have a valid passport, an accreditation letter from their
news agency and a working visa identifying them as journalists to fulfill
CFLCC accreditation requirements;
(3) Assignment. CIB, in consultation with subordinate formation PAOs, will
determine the assignment of NMR to specific subordinate units within the AO
to preclude overloading any single unit. Where possible, media
representatives will be assigned to their preferred location;
(4) Facilities. 4 MND units will provide media embeds with adequate
accommodation (it might be austere), meals and transportation;
(5) Inoculations. NMRs accompanying CFLCC in the field are required to have
the same inoculations that have been administered to military personnel;
(6) Communications. 4 MND will provide communications services free of
charge to civilian media representatives when commercial facilities are not
available. Transmission by military communication facilities will be on a non-
interference basis. News media will be advised of the status of their traffic;
(7) Courier Flights. Courier flights may carry news material to appropriate
processing or distribution points on a non-interference basis without charge.
News media will be informed of the status of their material;
(8) Transportation. As directed by CFLCC, 4 MND will provide accredited
media representatives with military transportation into and within the 4 MND
AO when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation
and when commercial transportation is restricted into the area or unavailable;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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(9) Security. The presence of news media representatives in operational areas will
require the following considerations concerning security:
(a) Procedures will be implemented to preclude the unauthorized release
of classified or sensitive information. Embedded media will be
expected to abide by established ground rules on releasable and non-
releasable information. NMRs violating embargo agreements will be
immediately repatriated. Non-releasable information includes:
i. Force composition and movements;
ii. Operations or other orders;
iii. Plans and intentions;
iv. Casualties (until national command elements authorize the
release of details);
v. Organizations;
vi. Tactics;
vii. Details of defensive positions;
viii. Camouflage methods;
ix. Weapon capabilities; and
x. Names of individual serviceperson (unless authorized by
serviceperson);
(b) Media representatives can access operations, intelligence and other
classified areas only in case of a strong need and under strict escort and
control; and
(c) Individuals are not authorized to release information to media nor are
they permitted to agree to a personal interview without prior
coordination with the PAO supporting that unit or formation. When
the PAO has coordinated the media visit, personnel may grant media
requests for interviews and provide only unclassified information in
interviews, briefings and written materials. All personnel are to be
aware that “off the record” statements to media representatives do not
exist.
(10) Audio-Visual. 4 MND unit PAOs will assist the media as necessary in
obtaining audio-visual coverage.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Administration.
(1) Media are required to carry their own equipment; and
(2) 4 MND PAO will maintain a Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System
(DVIDS) and other media equipment. PAOs requiring use of the system are to
coordinate with 4 MND PAO.
b. Logistics.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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(1) Media embeds will be provided logistical support to include military

transportation (ground or air) into and within the AO while covering the
operation. Media embeds will have their own protective equipment; and
(2) Non-embedded accredited media covering operations should be “self-
sustaining”.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Media will use commercial means of communications if available. If commercial
lines are not available, official military means will be authorized. Military satellite
transmission facilities can be provided when operationally feasible;
b. Media may use independent satellite uplinks for transmission of products from field
locations when the on-scene commander determines transmission will not violate
OPSEC or compromise an ongoing operation;
c. 4 MND PAO located at HQ 4 MND; and
d. 4 MND PAO in coordination and consultation with CLFCC PAO will facilitate use of
Logistic Packages (LOGPACs) in the absence of electronic means in order to
facilitate dissemination of media and information products to higher-level PAO
channels.

Appendices:

Appendix 1 - Media Interview Guidelines

Appendix 2 - Social Media Policy
Appendix 3 - Visits

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX X OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 1
Annex X
4 MND Op O 07 – OP IRON GUARDIAN date

BEST PRACTICES IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS

1. This appendix provides general guidelines of “do’s and don’ts” when being interviewed by
the media. These guidelines are not designed to be overly restrictive but rather to offer parameters to
assist the interviewee in ensuring that unauthorized operational or personnel private information is
not inadvertently released to the media. Although TCN units may have their own national guidance
with respect to media interviews, these guidelines are to apply as much as possible when operating as
part of 4 MND. Questions, queries or requests for clarification are to be forwarded to 4 MND PAO
through formation/unit PAOs.
2. The following are “best practices” when dealing with the media:
a. Units may discuss general capabilities and training they have recently conducted.
b. Soldiers should “stay in their lanes” when discussing daily operations, duties, and
responsibilities and should not discuss specific aspects of the units, including number
of personnel, shortages, and/or equipment.
c. Soldiers should not discuss or speculate on how the unit might be employed.
d. No discussion of operational details, plans, or possible future operations.
e. No discussion of exact unit deployment destination to include arrival/departure
locations.
f. Do talk about the training we do.
g. Do not discuss specifics of Rules of Engagement.
h. Do talk about your job and what you do.
i. Leaders - Do talk about your Soldier’s and unit/formation.
j. Everything is on the record.
k. Deal in the facts – do not speculate or address hypothetical questions.
l. Avoid speculating or commenting on things “outside your lane”, such as other
governments or government officials.
m. Do not discuss classified information. The media is not the enemy, but remember
OPSEC. If not sure, say “Due to Operational Security, I cannot discuss that subject.”

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX X OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 2
Annex X
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY

1. SITUATION
a. General. Social media (SM) is a powerful, interactive, fast-paced, far-reaching,
influential and economical communications tool. SM includes social networks which
allow participants to create, share and interact with user-generated content (e.g.
FACEPAGE, CHATTER - TBC based on potential ION implementation) as well as
online technologies that allow multiple users to collaboratively create content (e.g.
wikis). From an operational standpoint, SM allows commanders to carry out two-way
communication directly with audiences and without the filters associated with
traditional media. Therefore, SM must be closely considered as part of any carefully
planned and deliberate communications strategy subject to clear objectives, goals and
guidelines; and
b. Information Environment. The internet in both ATROPIA (AP) and ARIANA (AN)
are discussed in Annex X (Public Affairs) and Annex O (Information Operations).
However SM is not restricted to the Area of Operations (AO). SM is a global
phenomenon and given the significant amount of international attention to the
situation in the CAUCASUS it has the potential to influence local and national
targets. Within 4 MND, SM can impact operations both positively and negatively.
2. MISSION. 4 MND will use Social Media to assist in influencing the information
environment to contribute to mission success.
3. EXECUTION
a. Commander’s Intent. Inappropriate, unregulated and unauthorized use of SM can
pose a serious threat to operations and personnel safety. I intend to implement a
restrictive SM policy but acknowledge that the pervasiveness of SM and its
widespread use and availability can be leveraged. 4 MND cannot avoid the need to
provide a clear, factual and contextual voice to the SM landscape regarding its role in
the AP but it must be regulated and enforced. To that end 4 MND PA, in consultation
and coordination with CFLCC PA, will plan, establish and manage a professional and
targeted SM presence. To mitigate the risk, all SM activity is to be coordinated
through the G3 Force Protection and the Force Protection Working Group (FPWG);
b. SM and Op IRON GUARDIAN Phases. The lead up phases to Op IRON
GUARDIAN rely heavily upon military deception and surprise. Both the initial stage,
Preliminary Moves, and Phase 1 (Advance) will be conducted under electronic
silence. In addition, during Phase 2 (Cross KURA River) and Phase 3 (Destroy)
information activities will be carefully monitored and controlled to ensure that key
effects are achieved. As such individual use of SM activity will be prohibited during
Op IRON GUARDIAN. Relaxation of SM restrictions will be considered during
Phase IV (Stabilization) as directed by Comd 4 MND.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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c. Risks. All 4 MND personnel are to be made aware of the risks and considerations
involved in the use of SM. Risks related to SM include, but are not limited to:
(1) IT Security. Arianian forces have the potential to hack, deface or infect 4
MND SM sites;
(2) Operations Security (OPSEC). The OPSEC standards that exist for all internal
and external communications apply equally to SM. If ever in doubt over
whether imagery or text is in violation of OPSEC, it is every 4 MND
member’s responsibility to consult their chain of command and/or OPSEC
subject-matter expert prior to publishing. The proposal may be advanced
further to the PA or Intelligence offices for further consideration. As a
minimum, no 4 MND member shall publish any material that reveals the
following:
(a) 4 MND arrival or departure flights;
(b) Specific geographic locations of 4 MND units;
(c) Rules of Engagement;
(d) Force protection measures;
(e) Intelligence activities;
(f) Damage sustained by 4 MND or Coalition equipment;
(g) Information about any critical incident until that information has been
officially released publicly;
(h) Information about V/VIP visits until Comd 4 MND authorizes public
release;
(i) Imagery of interiors of military vehicles/aircraft, classified systems,
restricted military areas, facilities, installations and demonstrations of
their capabilities;
(j) Specific information on 4 MND or Coalition Special Operations
personnel; and
(k) Identities of detainees, close protection personnel, snipers, aircrew,
members of the intelligence community, counter-IED operators,
language and cultural advisors and dog handlers.
(3) Critical Incidents. The use of SM for crisis communications and during critical
incidents must be carefully coordinated by 4 MND in order to avoid the
inadvertent release of incorrect information. Of note, CJTF-OIG will be the
releasing authority on all information relating to critical incidents during all
phases of Op IRON GUARDIAN;
(4) Geotagging. Many cameras and cell phones with photo capability incorporate
GPS locator technology. GPS coordinates are embedded in any photo that is
taken and can be extracted from the photo once posted online. This
information can be potentially damaging to the mission and its members.
Only photographs taken from official 4 MND PA sources will be posted; and

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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(5) Outdated Information. Stale and dated content resulting from lack of SM
platform maintenance can put the credibility of the host organization at risk.
d. SM Planning. To mitigate inherent risks, thorough planning must be conducted prior
to 4 MND establishing a SM presence. Also, as a result of its popularity, low cost and
simplicity, there exists a risk of overusing SM, not using it effectively or expending a
disproportionate amount of effort towards its use. 4 MND’s official use of any SM
platform must be made in the context of its overall information influence and
communications objectivism, and a well-defined plan that will ensure its effectiveness
and sustainability. The Information Operations Working Group (see Annex O
(Information Operations)) will draft an SM plan to include:
(1) Clearly defined objectives and rationale for SM engagement;
(2) Considerations of target audiences and whether they have sufficient access to
the internet;
(3) SM platforms to be used;
(4) How SM use is aligned with the overall 4 MND communications plan;
(5) Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of those managing SM initiatives;
(6) Expected nature of interactions and expected frequency of posts;
(7) Risk assessment and management;
(8) Confirmation of consultation with Cyber and resultant recommendations; and
(9) An approach for evaluation to include metrics and measures of success.
e. Positive Control. Due to the potential for abusive behaviors by visitors, including
hostile forces, (e.g. profanity, information attacks, solicitation, ideological attacks,
special interest groups, spam), it is imperative that, once initiated, 4 MND SM
platforms be continuously and carefully monitored. Additionally, content should be
submitted on a regular basis in order to “drive the conversation”. SM account
usernames and passwords must be shared and held in a secure location by a 4 MND
SM manager to ensure that accounts do not fall out of 4 MND control. 4 MND PA
will always have a backup SM manager in order to maintain a consistent presence on
their SM platforms should the first manager not be available.
f. Guidance and Restrictions.
(1) Limitation of SM Accounts. The popularity and simplicity of SM leads to the
risk of too broad a SM footprint. Too many SM sites will inevitably lead to a
dilution of communications efforts. Therefore, 4 MND will limit itself to one
site/account for each major SM platform. This means that brigades, sub-units
and specialty trades will not be permitted to create their own SM accounts
dedicated to 4 MND/Op IRON GUARDIAN. This also means that no member
or unit within 4 MND is permitted to create a SM site that represents or
appears to represent 4 MND/Op IRON GUARDIAN. Of note, National
Command Elements (NCEs) will be able to establish their own national SM
presence related to their participation in the Op, ensuring all the time that
formation names and locations of 4 MND subordinate formations and units are
not named;

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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(2) Approval of Official 4 MND SM Content. 4 MND PAOs are responsible for
SM content management and the appearance of the sites/platforms being
utilized. The process for posting text or imagery is the same as the release of
information through any other communications mechanism. Therefore, the
same established approval procedures must be exercised prior to any SM post;
(3) Personal SM Content.
(a) All SM-related guidance regarding personal use of SM within this
annex is subject to Comd CFLCC direction issued prior to force
deployment into theatre;
(b) OPSEC is paramount and it is incumbent upon all 4 MND personnel to
consider the potential for creating risk to themselves, their families,
their peers and the mission by publishing information on personal SM
accounts. All personnel must follow strict security protocol with
personal SM accounts while deployed, and must inform and encourage
their friends and family to do the same. Personal pages should be
restricted to friends and family only;
(c) 4 MND personnel SM behaviour must be in line with the ethics and
values defined by their respective code of conduct policies;
(d) In order to minimize OPSEC violations and other risks, there will no
permission given to the publishing of op related information and
imagery. All approved imagery subject again to review by FPWG 4
MND;
(e) In order to prevent geotagging, 4 MND personnel are required to
ensure that the GPS locator on their personal phones is disabled and
they should never use location-based applications; and
(f) 4 MND personnel will at no time use SM during a critical incident
unless directly authorized by Comd 4 MND.
g. Coordinating Instructions. As with all PA activities, the SM effort should be well
coordinated and aligned with higher headquarters direction, the broader STRATCOM
approach and other in-theatre PA enablers. Furthermore, 4 MND PA will actively
seek opportunities to build their SM presence and momentum by linking into and
cooperating with other established SM actors (UN, CJTF-OIG, CFLCC, NCEs,
NGOs, and Atropian Armed Forces PA).
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. No change.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Annex EE
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
ENGINEER SUPPORT
References:
A. FM 3-34.22 (February 2009), Engineer Operations - BCT and Below
B. TM 5-330, Planning and Design of Roads, Airbases, and Heliports in the Theater of Operations
C. ATP 52(B) (2008), Land Force Combat Engineer Doctrine (NATO)
D. STANAG 2295 Ed. 3(2008) Allied Joint Doctrine For Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-
IED)
E. STANAG 2430 Land Force Engineer Messages Reports and Returns (AENGRP-2)
F. STANAG 2528 Ed. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine For Force Protection (AJP-3.14)
G. STANAG 2395 Ed. 3 (2007) Deliberate Water Crossing Procedures
H. CFLCC OPORD 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN) dated
I. 4 MND Op O 07 dated
1. SITUATION
a. General. Refer to 4 MND Op O 07.
b. Terrain. ATROPIA (AP) possesses two geographic regions: the mountain ranges and
the vast flatlands (sometimes referred to as the KURA-ARAS lowland).
(1) There are two major river systems which cut through AP, the KURA River
and the ARAS River. The MINGACHEVIR Reservoir, a manmade lake
located in the central portion of the operational area, is a major obstacle and
the dam on its southeast corner is a key facility.
(2) KURA River. The average width of the KURA River from the
MINGACHEVIR Reservoir to the delta is around 150 meters, with some
sections of the river, particularly east of YEVLAKH prior to the confluence
with the ARAS, can be as little as 90 meters in width. The river is navigable
for the last 300 km to just below the town of MINGACHEVIR. The mean
velocity of the KURA River is about 1.65 m/s and it discharges over 100,000
cubic meters of silt annually. Flooding typically occurs in June and July.
There were 12 existing bridges on the KURA River that were assumed to be
MLC 100. ISR reports that the existing bridges over the KURA River are not
intact. See Appendix 7 for the Road and Bridge Overlay in the 4 MND AO.
(3) ARAS River. The un-navigable ARAS River flows eastward, and joins the
KURA River in AP 121 km from its mouth on the CASPIAN SEA. The swift-
flowing ARAS has a discharge of approximately twice that of the KURA
River and provides most of the sediment forming the KURA-ARAS delta. It is
approximately 60 meters at its narrowest points through the Area of Operation
(AO). The river also contains several areas where the river is braided. The
banks of the ARAS are susceptible to erosion. Recce of potential crossing sites
is required to determine bank suitability. The soil along the ARAS is gravel
and sand or loam and humus. There are two existing bridges crossing the
ARAS River at BARHAMTEPE and IMISHLI both assumed MLC 100.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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(4) Lowland. The KURA-ARAS lowland is composed primarily of agricultural

fields divided by berms and irrigation ditches which will seriously affect
movement. Much of the farmland is soggy and unusable due to excess
irrigation and salinization. The fields are trafficable only during the late
summer months or when frozen during the winter. Lateral movement will be
difficult.
(5) Road Network. The major roads in the 4 MND AO are the M2 (MSR
SEATTLE) and M3 (MSR MIAMI) which are paved two-way two lane MLC
100. There are limited lateral routes. While the AP road networks are mainly
paved there are numerous unimproved dirt and gravel roads throughout the
area. In the lowland, many of the unimproved roads are located on berms.
Disrupting mobility would be easily affected by damaging paved roads
through the use of IEDs or cratering charges. Rural roads are not properly
maintained and are susceptible to damage from the weather and overuse. The
Road and Bridge overlay is at Appx 6.
(6) Obstacles. The AN forces have consolidated their gains in Atropia and have
adopted a deliberate defense with fortified positions. Obstacles, including
minefields, road craters and barriers, and bridge demolitions have been
incorporated into the defense. Imagary confirms that the major bridges over
the Kura River have been destroyed, and it appears that other bridges in the 23
and 25 DTG sectors have been prepared for demoliton. It has also been
determined that there are minefields and road blocks reinforcing the destroyed
bridges in Objs OPAL and GARNET.
(7) IED/UXO. IEDs have been used by various anti-government guerrilla groups
for several years against AP authorities, military forces and other guerrilla
groups. The two primary groups of concern are Salasyl which operates in
southeastern AP and advocates the violent overthrow of the AP government,
and the South Atropian People’s Army (SAPA) who have ties with AN and
aims to create a separate country out of southern AP and northern AN.
(a) Sporadic IED strikes have been conducted against CJTF-OIG convoys
over the past three months by AN Special Forces (SPF) and anti-
government guerrillas. AN SPF have been using sophisticated TTPs
and devices involving military components. IEDs employed by SAPA
and Salasyl are less sophisticated, use homemade materials, and have
been largely employed ineffectively.
(b) 82 ABN DIV was targeted upon arrival in AP, and in the past month
attacks have increased with the move of CFLCC forces into AP.
Technical exploitation of recovered IEDs and materials has been
incorporated into revised render safe procedures. Lessons learned
from 82 ABN Div counter-explosive hazard operations will be shared
with CFLCC forces.
(c) It is likely that AN SPF will continue to operate in Gorgas and AP and
target CJTF-OIG soft and high value targets to disrupt the CFLCC
deployment and coalition cohesion. Once CFLCC combat forces cross
into AP, IED attacks will become more aggressive and complex.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Sayasyl and SAPA will likely expand their targets to include industrial
facilities and civilian soft targets to create mass casualties and weaken
support for the AP government.
(8) UXO. There are explosive remnants of war (ERW) in AP from previous
conflicts. The Atropia National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has been
actively conducting clearance operations in the northwest parts of AP. ERW
remain in the Rayons along the Lower Janga border.
c. Enemy Forces. See Annex D (Intelligence). See Appendix 1 to this Annex for the
suspected AN engr ORBAT. It is estimated that the engr units in the front line AN
Division Tactical Groups(DTG) (23 and 25) were at 75% strength and the depth DTG
(24) was at 85% strength at D-45 days.
d. Friendly Forces. See paragraph 1 of the main body of 4 MND Op O 07.
(1) Higher Engrs. CFLCC 36 Engr Bde.
(2) See Appendix 2 for the 130 MEB organization and Appendix 3 for 4 MND
national engr capabilities.
(3) AP Engrs. See Reference H.
e. Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A of 4 MND Op O 07. OPCON 130
MEB throughout:
(a) 47 (CA) Sp Sqn;
(b) 20 (US) Engr Bn;
(c) CBRNE TF4 (US); and
(d) 91 (US) MP Bn.
2. MISSION. Division Engineers will support 4 MND operations during all phases of
Operation IRON GUARDIAN.
3. EXECUTION.
a. 4 MND Concept of Operations. 4 MND will conduct a tactical road move, a
deliberate crossing of the KURA River, and then breakout to destroy 24 Mot DTG,
followed by the re-establishment of the International Border (IB) and defensive
operations. Four phases:
(1) Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5). 2 Sqn 3 CR with 7(GE) Recce Bn OPCON
will secure route SEATTLE and MIAMI SOUTH toward SALYAN to Phase
Line (PL) COUGAR.
(2) Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8). 3 Bde(-), 82 Abn Div will secure
initial bridgeheads at Objectives (Obj) OPAL and GARNET by air assault. 2
Sqn 3 CR will link up and become the Force in Place. Concurrently, 3 Bde (-)
82 Abn Div will push forward to the Intermediate Bridgehead Line (PL
TIGER) to allow bridging operations to commence. Once bridges are
established, F-G Bde will cross and advance to the Final Bridgehead Line (PL
LION).

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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(3) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mtzd DTG (D+9-D+13). X (AS) Bde RIGHT and 12
(UK) AIB LEFT will break out of the bridgehead. 2 Sqn 3 CR will cross and
provide LEFT flank security, while 7 (GE) Recce Bn screens NORTHWEST.
X (AS) Bde will move forward to defend the bridgehead and clear SALYAN
to allow LOC bridging to be emplaced at the main M3 highway crossing.
(4) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27). On order, and once Obj PEARL is secure
7 (GE) Recce Bn will advance WEST and NORTH to screen the IB within
boundaries. 6 F-G Bde will conduct clearance operations in the Div rear. The
Div will orient WEST in hasty defence and commence planning for transition
to stability operations, X (AS) Bde LEFT forward, 12 (UK) AIB RIGHT
forward and 4 (CA) CMBG (-) in depth.
b. Engr Concept by Phase.
(1) Phase I - Advance (D+3-D+5). 541 Engr Company and engr bridging and
horizontal construction recce dets will support 2 Sqn 3 CR and conduct route
recce on MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI. 130 MEB will open and maintain
MSR SEATTLE from TAA SILVER to ALYAT and MSR MIAMI from
AYLAT to PL COUGAR.
(2) Phase II - Cross River KURA (D+6- D+8). Engr support for 2 Sqn 3 CR
continues forward (fwd) to Objs OPAL and GARNET. 130 MEB supported by
MP, EOD and CBRN elements will control and support the move of 4 MND
fwd. 20 Engr Bn will maintain MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI while 19 Engr
Bn with 47 (CA) Sp Sqn establishes crossing sites over the KURA River. The
6 F-G Bde will be supported by 4 Engr Bn (-) in the bridgehead.
(3) Phase III - Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13). X (AS) Bde and 12 (UK) AIB
will break out of the bridgehead supported by their integral engr units and
additional engr Companies (59 Mobility and 62 Sapper). The 6 F-G Bde will
continue to be supported by 4 Engr Bn (-). 20 Engr Bn, including a bridging
company, will move forward behind the Breakout force to provide additional
engr support to the advance, while 19 Engr Bn assumes responsibility for the
Div MSR and maintains the crossing sites.
(4) Phase IV - Stabilize (D+14-D+27). Engr efforts will be focused on defensive
operations along the IB, survivability tasks, obstacle reduction, infrastructure
damage assessment, and transition to stabilization operations.
c. Priority of Engineer Effort by Phase.
(1) Phase I – Advance (D+3 – D+5).
(a) Support the move of 2 Sqn 3 CR.
(b) Open MSR SEATTLE to ALYAT and MSR MIAMI to PL COUGAR.
(2) Phase II – Cross the KURA River (D+6 – D+8).
(a) Crossings over the KURA River in Objs GARNET and OPAL.
(b) Support the bridgehead force.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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(c) Support the move of Bdes fwd along MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI
and across the KURA River.
(3) Phase III – Destroy 24 Mot DTG (D+9-D+13).
(a) Support the breakout force.
(b) Maintain MSR SEATTLE to ALYAT and MSR MIAMI to the KURA
River.
(4) Phase IV – Stabilize (D+14 – D+27).
(a) Defensive operations along the IB.
(b) Survivability tasks during transition to stability operations.
(c) Maintain 4 MND MSR MIAMI from ALYAT fwd.
d. Grouping and Tasks.
(1) All Formations.
(a) Submit Bde Crossing Tables down to combat team (company team US
terminology) level by D-6.
(b) Report information on routes, enemy obstacles and damaged
infrastructure.
(c) Secure breach lanes and bridging sites until relieved by follow on
forces.
(d) Support counter-explosive hazard operations.
(2) 2 SQN 3 CR.
(a) Engr recce dets attached TACON for Phase I.
(b) Engr Company attached OPCON for Phases I and II.
(c) Conduct engr route recce of MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI from
ALYAT to Objs GARNET and OPAL.
(d) Conduct confirmatory recce of float bridge sites over KURA River in
Objs GARNET and OPAL.
(e) Identify damage to existing bridges over KURA River in Objs
GARNET and OPAL, and work required to repair them.
(3) 6 F-G Bde. Engr Bn (-) attached OPCON for Phases I-III for mobility,
counter-mobility and survivability support tasks.
(4) 12 (UK) AIB. Engr Mobility/Sapper Company attached OPCON for Phases
III.
(5) X (AS) Bde. Engr Mobility/Sapper Company attached OPCON for Phases II
and III.
(6) 130 MEB.
(a) Grouping.
i. 20 Engr Bn from 36 Engr Bde attached OPCON throughout.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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ii. Bridging and Horizontal Construction Engr Recce dets

detached TACON 3 Sqn 3 CR for Phase I.
iii. 541 Sapper Company detached OPCON to 3 Sqn 3 CR for
Phases I and II (up KURA River crossing).
iv. 4 Engr Bn (-) detached OPCON to the F-G Bde for Phases I, II
and III for mobility, counter-mobility and survivability tasks.
v. 59 Engr Mobility/Sapper Company detached OPCON 12 AIB
(UK) for mobility, counter-mobility and survivability tasks
during Phases II and III.
vi. 62 Engr Mobility/Sapper Company detached OPCON X (AS)
Bde for mobility, counter-mobility and survivability tasks
during Phases II and III.
(b) Tasks.
i. Open MSR SEATTLE from TAA SILVER to ALYAT, and
MSR MIAMI from ALYAT to Objs OPAL and GARNET, and
maintain them until relieved by 36 Engr Bde.
ii. Establish Bde-sized Assembly Areas (AA) and BG-sized
Waiting Areas (WA) along MSRs SEATTLE and MIAMI.
iii. Clear and maintain Div MSRs within AO up to Bde rear
boundaries.
iv. Conduct bridge assessments and route recce to identify 4 MND
MSR alternate routes and bypasses.
v. Establish three crossings over the KURA River for the crossing
of the 4 MND Bdes, and then maintain two until replaced by
LOC bridging.
vi. Coordinate the replacement of tactical bridging with LOC
bridging on 4 MND MSRs.
vii. Coordinate Explosive Hazard information collection and
counter-explosive hazard operations in the 4 MND AO.
viii. Provide survivability support for critical assets, including FA
firing units, counter battery radar systems, Patriot air defense
systems, command nodes, hospitals, crossing sites and critical
logistics nodes.
ix. BPT conduct environmental mitigation tasks.
x. Manage 4 MND facilities, real estate and construction
activities.
xi. Coordinate the employment of any HN military and civilian
engrs to support 4 MND.
xii. Be prepared to assist Atropian authorities with the repair of
critical infrastructure that impacts CFLCC operations.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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xiii. Be prepared to coordinate engr support for humanitarian

assistance and to create a safe environment in AP.
e. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Timings.
(a) 2 Sqn 3 CR commences move xxxxxxxx.
(b) 130 MEB commences move xxxxxxxx.
(c) MSR SEATTLE to ALYAT and MSR MIAMI to PL COUGAR open
and ready for Div tactical move no later than xxxxxxxx.
(d) KURA River crossings established by xxxxxxxx.
(e) Final Bridgehead Line established xxxxxxxx.
(f) Breakout commences xxxxxxxx.
(g) KURA River tactical bridges replaced by LOC bridging xxxxxxxx.
(2) Information Requirements.
(a) Engr Priority Intelligence Requirements.
i. Capacity, limitations and damage of bridges over major
waterways on the 4 MND lines of advance.
ii. Potential gap crossing sites.
iii. Disruption to the 4 MND MSRs in AP.
iv. IEDs, booby-traps and mine use within the CFLCC AO.
v. Type, location, status and composition of enemy obstacles
within the 4 MND AO.
vi. Location and disposition of enemy breaching and bridging
assets within 4 MND AO.
vii. Extent of damage to Atropian critical infrastructure within the 4
MND AO, including airfields and oil facilities.
viii. Environmental hazards in 4 MND AO.
(b) Engr Friendly Force Information Requirements.
i. Restrictions on the employment of national engrs and engr
resources.
ii. Loss of friendly breaching and bridging assets
iii. Status of crossing sites and breached lanes.
iv. Status, locations, and activities of Atropian Engrs.
v. Location and extent of construction materials in AP.
(3) KURA River Crossing.
(a) Organization.

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i. Force in Place. 2 Sqn 3 CR, followed by 4 (CA) CMBG.

ii. Assault Force. 3 Bde(-) 82 Abn Div.
iii. Bridgehead Force. 6 F-G Bde, followed by 4 (CA) CMBG.
iv. Breakout Force. 12 (UK) AIB and X (AS) Bde.
v. Crossing (Assured Mobility in US Doctrine) Force. 130 MEB.
vi. Regulating HQ. HQ 130 MEB.
(b) Projected Crossing sites. Establish two sites in Obj OPAL and one in
Obj Garnet.
i. Obj OPAL - 39S UD 256 903 (CITRUS ONE).
ii. Obj OPAL - 39S UD 250 899 (CITRUS TWO).
iii. Obj GARNET - 39S UD 273 816 (CITRUS FIVE).
iv. Obj GARNET - 39S UD 282 808 (CITRUS SIX).
(c) See Appendix 7 to this Annex for planned routes, waiting areas and
traffic control points.
(d) Float Bridge Crossing Restrictions.
i. Speed/spacing. 200 vehicles/hour, 10 km/hr and 30m spacing.
ii. MLC. Max MLC 70.
iii. Mine Rollers. Not attached.
iv. Mine Ploughs. Up position.
v. Maintenance. Float bridges will close for one hour of
maintenance after four hours of operation.
(e) Div Order of March for Phases I-II. See 4 MND Op O 07.
(f) 4 MND Bdes and units will submit Crossing Tables down to combat
team level to HQ 4 MND by D-6.
(4) Mobility Support. Maneuverability and the crossings over the KURA River
will be crucial to the success of Op IRON GUARDIAN.
(a) Div Engrs with 2 Sqn 3 CR will conduct bridge assessments and route
recce to identify alternate routes and bypasses up to the KURA River.
(b) 130 MEB will clear and maintain Div MSRs within AO.
(c) Bde Engrs will conduct bridge assessments and route recce to identify
routes and bypasses beyond the KURA River.
(d) Bde Engrs supported by 130 MEB may have to construct lateral routes
to support their advance.
(e) Bdes will conduct hasty combined arms breaching and gap crossing
operations to facilitate movement throughout all phases of the
operation.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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(f) Bdes will use existing bridges that retain structural integrity or the
ability to be over-bridged. If existing bridges are not available, assault
or tactical bridging will be utilized to cross dry/wet gaps. 130 MEB
will replace these bridges with tactical bridging along major routes. 36
Engr Bde will follow up and install LOC bridging along the MSRs.
(5) Counter-Mobility Support. Engr units will emplace obstacles as necessary to
canalize the enemy and disrupt any counterattacks.
(a) See the ROE for restrictions on mines and cluster munitions. ROE
takes precedent over other information in this OPLAN. 4 MND will
not employ booby-traps or IEDs. Anti-tank mines will be surface laid.
(b) Scatterable Mines. Scatterable mine requests are to be submitted
during the CFLCC Target Synchronization Board (TSB).
i. COM CFLCC is emplacement authority for scatterable mines
in the CFLCC AO. Ground or artillery delivered mines with
48-hour and less self-destruct times has been delegated to
Comd 4 MND. Bde Comd may authorize scatterable mines
with four hour and less fuse settings. Greater than 48 hours
remains with COM CFLCC.
ii. The emplacement authority for USAF delivered GATOR mines
regardless of self-destruct time is retained by COM CJTF-OIG.
Emplacement authority for Air VOLCANO delivered mines is
retained by COM CFLCC.
iii. MOPMS use as a protective minefield is delegated to the
emplacing commander. When utilized as part of an obstacle
plan, MOPMS must be reported as a scatterable minefield.
(c) Barrier Restricted Areas.
i. Div and Bde MSRs.
ii. In or around critical infrastructure and protected sites.
iii. Artillery Position Areas.
iv. Designated refugee routes and holding areas.
v. Within three km of the IB.
(d) Obstacle Numbering.
i. 130 MEB 1000-1999
ii. 4 (CA) CMBG 2000-2999
iii. 6 F-G Bde 3000-3999
iv. 12 (UK) AIB 4000-4999
v. X (AS) Bde 5000-5999
vi. 4 MND – other 6000-6999
vii. Attached forces 7000-7999

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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viii. Attached AP forces 8000-8999

(6) Survivability. During combat operations, Bdes will undertake survivability
tasks to safeguard critical assets. Once the IB is re-established and major
combat operations cease, survivability tasks will be refocused to safeguard 4
MND units and infrastructure from insurgent activity.
(7) Explosive Hazards. Paramilitary, insurgent and guerilla forces operate in AP
and AN. This could involve the use of IEDs, particularly on unimproved dirt
and gravel roads and berms.
(a) HQ 415 CBRNE Bde will establish the CFLCC Explosive Hazards
Coordination Cell (EHCC) to gather information, and coordinate
CFLCC EOD and Counter-IED operations. HQ 130 MEB will perform
this function within the 4 MND AO. Refer to Appendix 2 to Annex J.
(b) US Army EOD units and Engineer Clearance units have been assigned
to 4 MND for the conduct of counter-explosive hazard operations in
the 4 MND AO. Only properly qualified EOD personnel and EOD
units shall conduct EOD procedures against explosive ordnance, UXO
or IEDs. Attempts will be made to render safe explosive devices for
intelligence gathering efforts if the situation does not affect the local
population and 4 MND’s ability to accomplish the mission being
undertaken.
(c) Counter-explosive hazard operations will be coordinated with HN
leaders to ensure civilian safety.
(8) Geomatic Support. The 4 MND Div Engr will coordinate geomatic support.
Map requests IAW Annex UU.
(9) Infrastructure Support. Refer to CFLCC OPORD 07.
(10) Environment Protection. See Appendix 5 to this Annex.
(11) Support to Host Nation.
(a) Enemy operations in the heavily populated areas of AP could result in
the HN asking for engrs to provide survivability and general
engineering assistance. Military, LOGCAP and HN general
engineering capacity will be limited during all phases of the operation.
During Phase IV, engrs must be prepared to assist in the restoration of
key LOCs, bridges and priority infrastructure to enable restoration of
basic services. Commanders at every level must continually assess
essential services in their AO and the local governments’ ability to
provide these services. Commanders must prioritize requests to ensure
critical projects are undertaken to meet the immediate needs.
(b) Humanitarian Demining (HDM). HMD is a HN responsibility;
however, 4 MND units may be asked to assist AP through mine
awareness education and training of HN personnel during the transition
to stability operations. HMD will not be undertaken without the
authority of COM CFLCC.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See 4 MND Op O paragragh 4 and Annex R (Logistics).

a. General. Engr units will deploy with their own organic logistic and medical support,
and will receive additional support from their supported formations or the 130 MEB
BSB.
b. Combat Supplies. Engr units will deploy with their basic and maintenance loads on
wheels.
c. Mines and Explosives. Engr units will carry their basic load. Refer to Appendix 4 to
this Annex.
d. Refueling. 17 Sustainment Bde will establish a Division refueling point in Assembly
Area (AA) A2.
e. Move Order. Div Main HQ will issue the Move Order to support the tactical
movement in Phase II in coordination with 130 MEB.
f. Host Nation Support. 4 MND engrs will maximize the use of HN engr support for
MSR maintenance, construction materials and survivability tasks.
g. Construction Materiel. Construction materiel is available for local purchase and will
be coordinated by 36 Engr Bde. 36 Engr Bde will establish gravel pits as necessary.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) 4 MND Div Engr. Colonel XXXXXX (AS).
(2) Comd 130 MEB. Colonel XXXXXX (US).
b. Location. HQ 130 MEB will be established SOUTH of ALYAT in AA A2 by
XXXXXX. 130 MEB Alternate CP remains TAA SILVER until D+8 when it
relocates to AA A3 east of the KURA River.
c. Reachback. 4 MND Div Engr will facilitate reach back support through HQ 36 Engr
Bde.
d. Engr Liaison. HQ 130 MEB will deploy Engr LO to Atropian Engr units in the AO.
e. Codewords. See paragraph five of 4 MND Op O 07.
f. Reporting. Engr reports and returns IAW Appendix 1 of Annex UU.
g. Crossing Site Nicknames.
(1) Obj OPAL Primary - 39S UD 256 903 (CITRUS ONE).
(2) Obj OPAL Secondary - 39S UD 250 899 (CITRUS TWO).
(3) Obj GARNET Primary - 39S UD 273 816 (CITRUS SIX).
(4) Obj GARNET Secondary - 39S UD 282 808 (CITRUS SEVEN).

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Enemy (Arianian) Engrs
Appendix 2 - 4 MND Engr Capabilities
Appendix 3 - 130 MEB Organization
Appendix 4 - Mines and Explosives
Appendix 5 - Environment (Omitted)
Appendix 6 - Road and Bridge Overlay (Falconview)
Appendix 7 - KURA River Crossing Overlay (Falconview)

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Appendix 1
Annex EE
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

ARIANA FIELD ARMY - ENGINEERS

1. OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC COMMAND 2 (OSC 2). (located in Atropia).
a. 23rd Mechanised Infantry DTG (IFV) - 23rd Engineer Battalion
Brigade Engineers - 231st, 232nd, 233rd and 234th Engineer Company
b. 24th Motorised Infantry DTG - 24th Engineer Battalion (Mot)
Brigade Engineers - 241st, 242nd and 244th Engineer Company
c. 25th Mechanised Infantry DTG (APC) - 25th Engineer Battalion
Brigade Engineers - 251st, 252nd, 253rd and 254th Engineer Company
d. 26th Motorised Infantry DTG (located in AN) – 26th Engineer Battalion (Mot)
Brigade Engineers – 261st, 262nd, and 263rd Engineer Company
e. 347th Separate Mech Infantry BTG (IFV) - 347th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
f. 349th Separate Tank BTG - 349th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
g. 351st Reconnaissance Brigade - 351st Engineer Battalion (Sep)
h. 3rd Engineer Command
i. 3rd Engineer Command Headquarters
(1) 31st Combat Engineer Brigade
(a) 31st Combat Engineer Brigade Headquarters
(b) 1/31st and 2/31st Combat Engineer Battalions
(c) 31st Obstacle Battalion
(d) 31st Obstacle Clearing Battalion
(e) 31st Camouflage Cover Concealment and Deception (C3D) Battalion
(f) 31st Fabrication Battalion
(g) 31st Pontoon Bridge Battalion
(h) 31st Road and Bridge Battalion
(i) 31st Engineer Reconnaissance Company
(j) 31st Heavy Transport Battalion
(k) 31st Materiel Support Battalion
(l) 31st Signal Company

(2) (U) 33rd Assault Crossing Brigade

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(a) 33rd Assault Crossing Brigade Headquarters

(b) 1/33rd, 2/33rd and 3/33rd Assault Crossing Battalions
(c) 33rd Engineer Reconnaissance Company
(d) 33rd Heavy Transport Battalion
(e) 33rd Materiel Support Battalion
(f) 33rd Signal Company
(3) 36th Pontoon Brigade
(a) 36th Pontoon Brigade Headquarters
(b) 1/36th, 2/36th and 3/36th Pontoon Battalions
(c) 36th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
(d) 36th Heavy Transport Battalion
(e) 36th Materiel Support Battalion
(f) 36th Signal Company

2. OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC COMMAND 1 (OSC 1). (located in Ariana).

a. 11th Mechanised Infantry Division (IFV) -11th Engineer Battalion
Brigade Engineers - 111th, 112th and 113th Engineer Company
b. 12th Motorised Infantry Division - 12th Engineer Battalion (Mtzd)
Brigade Engineers - 121st, and 122nd and 124th Engineer Company
c. 13th Mechanised Infantry Division - 13th Engineer Battalion (APC/Mtzd)
Brigade Engineers - 131st, 132nd, 133th and 134th Engineer Company
d. 303rd Separate Mech Infantry Bde (APC) - 303rd Engineer Battalion (Sep)
e. 305th Separate Tank Brigade - 305th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
f. 307th Reconnaissance Brigade - 307th Engineer Battalion (Sep)
g. 1st Engineer Command
(1) 1st Engineer Command Headquarters
(2) 11th Combat Engineer Brigade
(a) 11th Combat Engineer Brigade Headquarters
(b) 1/11th and 2/11th Combat Engineer Battalions
(c) 11th Obstacle Battalion
(d) 11th Obstacle Clearing Battalion
(e) 11th C3D Battalion
(f) 11th Fabrication Battalion

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(g) 11th Pontoon Bridge Battalion

(h) 11th Road and Bridge Battalion
(i) 11th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
(j) 11th Heavy Transport Battalion
(k) 11th Materiel Support Battalion
(l) 11th Signal Company
(3) 13th Assault Crossing Brigade
(a) 13th Assault Crossing Headquarters
(b) 1/13th, 2/13th and 3/13th Assault Crossing Battalions
(c) 13th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
(d) 13th Heavy Transport Battalion
(e) 13th Materiel Support Battalion
(f) 13th Signal Company
(g) 16th Pontoon Brigade
(4) 16th Pontoon Brigade Headquarters
(a) 1/16th, 2/16th and 3/16th Pontoon Battalions
(b) 16th Engineer Reconnaissance Company
(c) 16th Heavy Transport Battalion
(d) 16th Materiel Support Battalion
(e) 16th Signal Company

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Appendix 2
Annex EE
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
4 MND ENGINEER CAPABILITIES

UNIT SUB-UNIT ORGANIZATION TASKS MAJOR ENGR EQPT

6 F-G BDE
550 (GE) HQ Engr mobility, counter-mobility 4xLeopard Bieber AVLBs(20m), 4xSpare
ENGR CO Bridgelayer Gp and survivability tasks. Bridges, 3xKeiler Mine Clearing Vehs, 3xLeo
Breaching Gp Dachs AEVs, and plus additional equipment
Mine Clearing Gp

4 (CA) CMBG
4 CER 41 FD SQN HQ Engr mobility, counter-mobility, 9xLAV Engr, 2x AEV, 2xAVLB (20m), 2xSpare
2xFd Tp (LAV) EOD, and survivability tasks. bridge, 1xCougar MPV, 1xD9 Armoured Dozer,
(41-116-713) (7-23-161) Armd Engr Tp 3xTracked Excavator, 1xHMAD, 1xWheeled
Loader, 2xMPEV, 4x10T Dump Truck,
2xMICLIC, 2xVolcano, 1200x FFV AT Mines
42 FD SQN As above As above As above
43 FD SQN HQ Light engr mobility, counter- 8xMSVS SEV, 2xWh Excavator, 4xMPEV, 2x5T
2xFd Tp (MLVW) mobility, EOD, and survivability Dump Truck, 3xDEUCE High Speed Light
(7-20-125) Support Tp tasks. Tracked Dozer, 720xFFV AT Mines

45 SPT SQN HQ Horizontal and vertical 3xLAV Engr, 5xMSVS SEV, 3xHESV/Trailer,
Const Tp construction, diving, tactical 2xROWPU, 2x31.1M MGB Set, 1xDive Tm Set,

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(8-29-168) Hy Eqpt Tp bridging, water supply, EOD, 1xLink Reinforcement Set, 1xBr Boat Erection,
Engr Resources Tp route clearance, and High Risk 30Aslt Boats w/motors, 2x25M Trackway, 600
EOD Tp Search. FFV AT Mines, 2xMICLIC Reloads, 2xGrader,
2xWheeled Loader, 8xVolcano Reloads, 1xCrane,
1xHigh Mob Armd Dozer, 1xMPEV, 1xD9
Armoured Dozer, 2xD8 Dozer, 4xTracked
Excavator, 4x10T Dump Trucks, 6xHESV
Dumps, 1xRough Terrain Forklift, 1xRoller
Compactor, 2xHusky, 3xCougar MPV, 1xBuffalo

12 (UK) AIB
26 ENGR 8 ARMD ENGR HQ Engr mobility, counter-mobility, 8xSPARTAN Recce, 4xTROJAN AVRE,
REGT SQN Armd Engr Tp EOD and survivability tasks. 4xTITAN AVLB (25m), 4xSpare Bridges,
Mech Tp 2xRIDGEBACK MPV, 4xSPARTAN Engr,
1xBarmine Layer, 4xFascines
30 ARMD ENGR As Above As Above As Above
SQN

33 ARMD ENGR As Above As Above As Above

SQN
38 HQ & SP HQ Horizontal construction, tactical 2xBR90 Sets (36m each), 15T crane,
SQN Bridge Tp bridging, diving, engr resources, 2xExcavators, 4xDozers, 4xWheeled Loaders,
Resources Tp and water supply. 1xGrader, 6xDump Truck, 1xCrane, 30 Aslt Boats
Plant Tp w/motors,1xDive Set, 2xROWPU, 2xARV

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X (AS) BDE
X CER X SPT SQN Sqn HQ Horizontal and vertical 1xHy Dozer, 3xMedium Dozers, 1xLt Dozer,
Emergency construction, firefighting and 4xLoader-Backhoe, 2xExcavators, 1xCrane,
Response TP explosive detection 3xRoller Compactors, 1xGrader, 1x4T Dump
Plant TP Truck, 8x8T Dump Truck, 2xExpl Dog Teams,
Const TP 3xFire Trucks
Specialist TP
X FD SQN Sqn HQ Combat Engr mobility, counter- Wheeled Sect Vehs
2x Wheeled Fd TPs mobility and survivability tasks.
X FD SQN Sqn HQ As above. Mechanised Sect Vehs
2x Mechanised Fd
TPs
1x Mob Spt TP

130 (US) MEB

4 EN BN 59 MOBILITY HQ Assault bridging, breaching and M113 APC CP, 13xM113 APC, 6xAVLB MLC
CO 2xAssault Pl earthmoving, obst emplacement 70, 6xspare bridges, 4xMICLIC, 2xMine Roller,
Obstacle Pl explosive minefd breaching, and 2xMine Plough, 2xVolcano, 2xSkidsteer, 4xM9
(5-0-113-118) in support of BCTs. ACE, 3xHEMETT crane, 2xAPers Breaching
System, 1xM88A2 Rec Veh

62 SAPPER CO HQ Mobility, counter mobility, 1xStryker CV, 8xM113 APC, 2xMICLIC,

2xSapper Pl survivability tasks, and supports 1xM88A2 Rec Veh
(5-0-98-103) of general engr tasks in support
of BCTs and Support Brigades.

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87 SAPPER CO As per 62 Sapper As per 62 Sapper CO As per 62 Sapper CO

CO
569 MOBILITY As per 59 Mobility As per 59 Mobility CO As per 59 Mobility Co
CO CO

19 EN BN 72 SURVEY Provides project requirements,

AND DESIGN estimating, planning, survey, and
TEAM management.
(0-1-13-14)

541 SAPPER CO As per 62 Sapper As per 62 Sapper CO

CO
68 HQ Horizontal construction, 2xHYEX Excavator, 1xForklift, 2xSEE Loader
HORIZONTAL 2xHoriz Const Pl earthmoving, land clearance and Backhoe, 11xD7 Dozer, 4xGrader, 8xScraper,
CONST CO Eqpt Support Pl survivability tasks. 2xScoop Loader, 2xCrane 25T, 6xRoller
Compaction, 8xDump Truck 20T, 10xTruck
(5-0-156-161) Dump MTV, 6xSkidsteer, 27xTruck LET 66000,
24xSemi-Trailer 40T, 1xM984E1 Wrecker
76 VERTICAL HQ Vertical construction, repair and 8xTruck Dump MTV, 2xTrailer Tools, 2xSEE
CONST CO 2xVert Const Pl maintenance of camps, utilities Loader Backhoe, 6xSkidsteer, 1xM984E1 Truck
(5-3-153-161) and infrastructure. Wrecker, 1xForklift
502 MULTI- HQ Float bridging (210m) or rafting, 12xFloat Br Ramp Bay, 30xInterior Bay,
ROLE BRIDGE 2xBridge Pl and dry gap bridging. 4xHEMTT DSB Launcher, 4xDry Sp Br (40m),
CO (MRBC) Support Pl 30xAslt Boat w/motors, 14xBBE, 1xHYEX
Excavator, 1xCrane 25T, 1xTruck Wrecker 8x8,
(5-1-179-185) 1xD7 Dozer, 42xBr Adaptor Pallet, 4xHMEE
Loader 44xTrailer Pallet 8x20, 56xHEMTT CBT

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20 EN BN 937 HQ Route and area clearance of 16xMMPV, 8xIVMMD with Trailers, 8xMPCV,
CLEARANCE 2xRoute Clearance explosive hazards. 2xD7 Dozer, 2xMedium Flail, 2xM113 Panther
CO Pl Lite, 2xHEMTT Crane, 1xM88A2 Rec Veh,
Area Clearance Pl 1xWrecker 8x8
(6-0-185-191)
91 As per 68 Hor As per 68 Hor Const Co As per 68 Hor Const Co
HORIZONTAL Const Co
CONST CO
74 MULTI- As per 502 MRBC As per 502 MRBC As per 502 MRBC
ROLE BRIDGE
CO
47 SP SQN (CA) HQ Float bridging (160M) and 5xCougar MPV, 4xHusky, 2xBuffalo, 1xE LAV,
2xBridge Tp rafting, 3xEOD Teams, and 24xMFB Interior Bays, 10xMFB Ramp Bays,
(7-23-162) Hy Eqpt Sect 2xroute clearance sections. 26xBAPS, 1xHMAD, 10xBridge Boat Erection,
Resource Sect 1xCrane 25T, MFB Anchorage System,
EOD Tp 1xExcavator, 10 Assault Boats/motors,
2xDump Trucks, 4x25M Trackway, 1xWh
Loader

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Appendix 3
Annex EE
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

130 MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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Appendix 4
Annex EE
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

MINES AND EXPLOSIVES

Note to Exercise Designers: This Appendix 4 to Annex EE to 4 MND Operation Order 07 is

intended to be populated
as a summary of the indicated Division holdings of the various types/natures of mines and
explosives.

1. MINES.

Items 6 F-G BDE 4 CMBG 12 (UK) X (AS) 130 MEB OTHER Total
AIB BDE

2. EXPLOSIVES.

Items 6 F-G BDE 4 CMBG 12 (UK) X (AS) 130 MEB OTHER Total
AIB BDE

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX EE OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN
APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – AGDASH DISTRICT

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APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – KYURDAMIR AIRPORT REGION

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APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – PARS ABAD

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APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – SHIRVAN DISTRICT

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APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – SABIRABAD DISTRICT

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APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – JABRAYIL DISTRICT

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APPENDIX 6 – BRIDGE OVERLAY – SALYAN

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Appendix 7
Annex EE
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

KURA RIVER CROSSING AREA

3. OBJECTIVE GARNET OVERLAY.

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4. OBJECTIVE OPAL OVERLAY.

5. GRID REFERENCES –GENERAL.

SER ITEM/DESCRIPTION GRID REFERENCE

1 HQ 130 MEB (Mov Regulating HQ) 39S UE 642 232
2 HQ Traffic Control Sector 3 (23 MP Co) 39T UD 212 997
3 Traffic Control Sector 3 (center) 39S UD 416 990
4 BAA A2 - AYLAT – center 39S UE 643 244
5 BAA A3 - HESENLI – center 39T UD 431 918
6 Phase Line COUGAR 39S UD 291 895

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6. GRID REFERENCES –OBJ OPAL.

SER ITEM/DESCRIPTION GRID REFERENCE
1 Float Bridge Site CITRUS ONE 39S UD 252 911
2 Float Bridge Site CITRUS TWO 39S UD 250 899
3 Waiting Area (AA) O1 39S UD 310 944
4 Waiting Area (AA) O2 39S UD 309 933
5 Waiting Area (AA) O3 39S UD 295 891
6 Waiting Area (AA) O4 39S UD 283 890
7 Waiting Area (AA) O5 39S UD 268 915
8 Waiting Area (AA) O6 39S UD 234 905
9 Waiting Area (AA) O7 39S UD 237 894
10 TCP F1 39S UD 306 939
11 TCP F2 39S UD 289 893
12 TCP F3 39S UD 266 927
13 TCP F4 39S UD 260 906
14 TCP F5 39S UD 261 901
15 TCP F6 39S UD 255 906
16 TCP F7 39S UD 249 901

7. GRID REFERENCES –OBJECTIVE GARNET.

SER ITEM/DESCRIPTION GRID REFERENCE
1 Float Bridge Site CITRUS FIVE 39S UD 273 816
2 Float Bridge Site CITRUS SIX 39S UD 282 808
3 Waiting Area (WA) G1 39S UD 283 875
4 WA G2 39S UD 290 856
5 WA G3 39S UD 276 830
6 WA G4 39S UD 296 826
7 WA G5 39S UD 260 825
8 WA G6 39S UD 271 795
9 TCP G1 39S UD 2808 8826
10 TCP G2 39S UD 2845 8500
11 TCP G3 39S UD 2737 8190
12 TCP G4 39S UD 2907 8187
13 TCP G5 39S UD 2852 8095
14 TCP G6 39S UD 2821 8067
15 TCP G7 39S UD 2696 8188

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX EE OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

TAB A (KURA RIVER CROSSING OVERLAY) TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX EE

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ANNEX KK OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex KK
4 MND Op O 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN)

FIRE SUPPORT, JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING (date is D-12)

References:
A. CFLCC OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN)

Time Zone: ZULU

1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy. No change from main order.
b. Friendly Forces.
(1) 4 MND Field Artillery Order of Battle:
(a) 4 RCHA - DS 4 (CA) CMBG
(b) 19 Regt RA - DS 12 (UK) AIB
(c) X Regt RAA - DS X (AS) Bde
(d) 295 PAB - DS F-G Bde
(2) Divisional Artillery Units:
(a) 26 (UK) Regt, RA (2x155mm Btys, 1x 105mm Bty) R 4 MND
(b) 1-12th (US) MLRS Bn (2 Btys x 9 MLRS) GSR 4 MND
(c) 2-43rd (US) ADA Bn, DS 4 MND
(d) 4(MN) GSR – (1 x CM/CG Rdr Bty, 3 x UAV Tps) R 4 MND
(e) 2/1-14 HIMARS Bty
(3) Corps Field Artillery Units (75 FA Bde):
(a) 2-4 (US) MLRS (3 x Btys x 6 MLRS)
(b) 3-13 (US) MLRS (3 x Btys x 6 MLRS)
(c) 2-18 (US) MLRS Bn (3 x Btys x 6 MLRS)
(d) 1-14 (US) HIMARS Bn (3 x Btys x 6 HIMARS)
(4) Corps ADA Units:
2-43 ADA Bn (3 x Patriot Btys, 2 x Avenger Btys)
2. MISSION. To provide coordinated divisional fires and targeting solutions in support of 4
MND Op IRON GUARDIAN.

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3. EXECUTION
a. General. There remains a distinction between targeting and joint fires during the close
battle and the distinction is often blurred. Joint fires primarily include the combined
employment of air, aviation, artillery, cyber and electronic warfare. As such, the
majority of Joint fires at Division (Div) level and below supports ground troops and is
designed to influence the close battle. This support is generally classified as either
combat engagement or self-defence and should not be confused with deliberate or
dynamic targeting. Within 4 MND, targeting will primarily be employed in the
planning and execution of the div deep battle or in direct support of the CFLCC joint
fires program only. The aim is to shape 24 Mot DTG and possibly 349 Tk BTG
course(s) of action (COA) and degrade their combat power and/or decision making
ability in such a way that it enables the success of the commander’s chosen scheme of
manoeuvre before the close battle. However, it is important to note that the deep
battle may not be linear or geographical. The 4 MND staff officer primarily
responsible for the integration of fires (lethal and non-lethal) is Chief Joint Fires.
b. 4 MND Concept of Fire Support
(1) Due to the LCC phasing of this operation, 4 MND will not commence its
advance until 1 ID has secured Obj DIAMOND (LCC Phase II); thus setting
favorable conditions for 4 MND to move in a less-impeded fashion towards
the designated river crossings. 4 MND long-range units can be expected to
support LCC Phase I operations in the degradation of OSC 2 lead DTGs. Gun
positions within the ASC sector are currently being coordinated to allow 4
MND to support the attack of specified targets in the area of the 25 Mech
DTG and 353 AT BTG during the period D Day-D+3. It is anticipated that 4
MND field and AD Artillery units will move early in the order of march to be
positioned to support the establishment and expansion of the bridgehead.
During this period most of the Corps Artillery fire support will be weighted
towards supporting 1 ID in their advance. During 4 MND Phase II DS units
will need to be prepared to conduct quick action missions during the move. 4
MND Div Arty will coordinate the river crossing of field and AD arty units in
order to provide maximum support to the Bridgehead and Break-out Forces.
During Phase III, priority of fire support will be weighted to X (AS) Bde and
deep strikes against elements of the 244 Tk BTG in depth.
c. Field Artillery Groupings and Tasks
(1) D-D+3 (LCC Ph I)
(a) X (AS) Regt RAA - GSR-75 FA Bde
(b) 295 (GE) PAB- GSR 75 FA Bde
(c) 26 (UK) Regt RA- GSR 75 FA Bde
(d) 1-12 (US) MLRS Bn – GSR 75 FA Bde
(e) 4 (CA) GSR-GS 75 FA Bde
(f) Remaining units retain normal affiliations

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(2) 4 MND Ph II
(a) 19 (UK) Regt RA - R 295(GE) PAB
(b) 26 (UK) Regt RA - GSR 295 (GE) PAB
(c) X (AS) Regt RAA – R 295 (GE) PAB
(d) Remainder - R Div Arty deep fire plan (TBI)
(3) 4 MND Ph III
(a) DS units retain normal affiliations
(b) 26 (UK) Regt RA - GSR 19 (UK) Regt RA
(c) 1-12 (US) MLRS Bn - GSR 4 (CA) RCHA
(d) 3-13 MLRS Bn – GSR 2 Sqn 3 CR, then 1 Div Arty.
(4) 4 MND Ph IV
(a) DS units retain normal affiliations
(b) 26 (UK) Regt RA - R 19 (UK) Regt RA
(c) 295 (GE) PAB - R X (AS) Regt RAA
d. 2-43 ADA Bn
(1) Ph I
(a) Area defence of TAA SILVER.
(b) Point defence of 4 MND Main HQ, CFLCC reserve and Div ASP.
(2) Ph II
(a) Route defence of MSR SEATTLE and MIAMI as coordinated by 130
MEB
(b) Point defence of crossing sites at Obj OPAL and GARNET.
(c) Point defence of 4 MND Main HQ
(3) Ph III Same as Ph II, plus:
(a) Area defence of breakout forces
(4) Phase IV
(a) Area defence of forward bdes
(b) Point defence of crossing sites/LOC bridging sites
(c) Point defence of Div Main HQ
(d) Area defence of DSA
e. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Fire Support Coordination Measures. See Appx 2.
(2) Joint Fires

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(a) To be coordinated by 4 MND Chief Joint Fires.

(b) Joint fires program will apply to 4 MND principally in CFLCC Phase I
and Div Phases II-III. Separate instructions to follow. Bdes may
nominate targets to support this program until 1200 hrs D-3.
(c) 4 MND field artillery units will support the CFLCC joint fires program
during CFLCC Phase I operations. See ref C for further details.
(3) Ammunition Planning. The following table provides the current ammo
planning estimate to support CFLCC and 4 MND operations during Phases 1-
III of Op IRON GUARDIAN. All howitzer numbers are expressed as Rounds
per Gun (RPG). For 203 mm rocket ammo and Avenger AD systems,
numbers are expressed as pods/launcher(PL):
PHASE HE SMK IR ILL M982 M30 M31 GLMRS FIM-92 Blk 1 PATRIOT
STINGER
Prelim/LCC 100 10 12 6 6 2 4 6
Ph 1
Div Ph II 100 40 12 10 8 4 6 6
Div Ph III 360 40 72 24 16 10 6 8
Div Ph IV 200 24 48 12 8 8 4 6
(est)

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Arty Ammunition
(1) 4 MND Arty Units will complete their upload of basic ammunition loads at
the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) established within TAA SILVER. SP
105 will be located at 39T TE 7926 9303.
(2) Basic loads are to remain on wheels throughout Phases1-III inclusive.
(3) Priority of upload will be to those units supporting 75 FA Bde in LCC Phase I.
Timings and unit priorities will be sent in separate message.
(4) Maintenance loads will be transported as much as possible by 96 Tpt Co, 180
(US) Tpt Bn within 17 Sust Bde. 17 Sust Bde will recce a future Div ASP in
the area of Obj OPAL to open not later than (NLT) D+11. Div Arty G4 will
coordinate transportation requirements of 4 MND artillery units with 17 Sust
Bde/180 (US) Tpt Bn.
b. Movement
(1) Units designated to support LCC Phase I operations will move independently
of the Div under CFLCC control direct from FAAs to Position Areas
established by 75 FA Bde HQ.
(2) Movement of Div artillery units will be controlled as per normal but
coordinated by 130 MEB/ Div Arty G4 as part of the Div tactical road
movement to and across the River KURA. Movement will ensure the Div is
well supported throughout. Units will need to plan on incorporating additional
ammo vehicles as part of their convoy packets.

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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command
(1) Comd Div Arty will exercise command of all 4 MND Arty units and OPCON
of all attached field, AD and STA Arty units.
(2) Alternate Comd.
(a) CO 26 Regt RA is nominated alternate Comd Div Arty.
(b) X (AS) Regt RAA is nominated as Alternate Div Arty HQ.
(3) Locations. 4 MND Arty Main will remain in TAA SILVER during Div
Phases I-II. Div Arty Tac will co-locate with Div Tac CP during Phase III.
Phase IV TBA.
(4) Coordination.
(a) Appx 2 portrays the established FSCM to initially support this opo.
(b) Arty LO/LNO will be dispatched as required by the associated
tasks/arrangements.
b. Signal
(1) The following Artillery communications networks will be employed:
(a) XXXXXXX
(b) XXXXXXX
(c) XXXXXXXX
(d) XXXXXXX

Appendices:
Appendix 1 - Joint Targeting
Appendix 2 - Fire Support Coordination Measures

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The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX KK OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appx1
Annex KK
4MND Op O 07 -OP IRON GUARDIAN
JOINT TARGETING
References.
A. CFLCC OPORD 07(OP IRON GUARDIAN)
B. US EUCOM CONOP IRON GUARDIAN for the CAUCASUS (TBI)
C. NATO AJP 3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Targeting
1. SITUATION.
a. General. The targeting process and the conduct of joint fires will be conducted by 4
MND in support of Operation IRON GUARDIAN. Due to the diverse nature of the
Division’s construct and the inherent doctrinal differences that may be at play, this
order sets out the agreed approach to joint targeting.
2. MISSION. 4 MND will conduct joint fires through a synchronized targeting process
3. EXECUTION.
a. The Targeting Process. The targeting process does not apply to the exercise of self-
defence or where the need to act or react is immediate and does not leave time for the
formal targeting process. These situations are governed by the principles of self-
defence and implemented ROE. However, the need to act or react or the right of self-
defence does not allow tactical and operational planners to purposely avoid the
targeting process when situations requiring the use of offensive action can be
foreseen. All attacks, whether carried out pursuant to this directive or in self-defence
or otherwise, shall be conducted in compliance with the ROE implemented and the
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
b. 4 MND Divisional Targeting Board (DTB). The DTB shall be composed of the
following members:
(1) Div Comd (or the COS as his designate) (Target Engagement/Approving
Authority-(TEA))
(2) G2
(3) G3
(4) 4 MND LEGAD
(5) Atropian Southern Command LO
(6) POLAD (if established)
(7) CO 13 ASOS/ OIC JAGIC
(8) G3 Info Ops
(9) Comd Div Arty
(10) Senior National HQ reps for CA, FR, GE, NZ, UK and US (if not otherwise
covered above)
(11) G3 Targeting as Secretary

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c. Legitimate Targets. The legal rule of distinction will be applied by commanders at all
levels at all times to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
civilian objects and military objectives. Legitimate targets are divided into two
categories:
(1) Persons as military objectives; and
(2) Objects as military objectives.
d. The Doubt Rule. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian or not, that person
shall be considered a civilian. In the case of doubt as to whether an object that is
normally dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action or not, it shall be presumed not to be so.
e. Dynamic Targeting. The Dynamic Targeting process will be employed under the
following conditions:
(1) targets of opportunity, which are targets identified too late, or not selected for
action in time to be included in deliberate targeting;
(2) planned targets whose status has recently changed necessitating more
expedient prosecution. To facilitate their timely execution, COM CFLCC has
pre-approved the following target sets for prosecution within the CFLCC AO:
(a) theatre ballistic missiles;
(b) high-threat surface-to-air missiles;.
(c) mobile tank and anti-tank units of Bn size or larger
(d) groups of mobile command and control vehicles;
(e) in place military bridging; and
(f) mobile or stationary bridging units and equipment.
f. Time Sensitive Targets(TST). A TST is a CFLCC-designated target which warrants
immediate action response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of
opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a significant danger to friendly forces.
TSTs will be generally prioritized, categorized, coordinated, de-conflicted and
directed for engagement at the CFLCC level using the dynamic targeting process. 4
MND may be periodically assigned to conduct target engagements and BDA in
support of a CFLCC or adjacent formation target set.

Tabs:
Tab A - Targeting Priorities (omitted)
Tab B - Time Sensitive Targets
Tab C - Target Checklist
Tab D - Attack Guidance Matrix

KK1-2/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX KK OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Tab B
Appendix 1
Annex KK
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN insert date

SAMPLE TARGET EFFECTS SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

DECIDE DETECT DELIVER ASSESS DESIRED MEASURE OF

PRI Category HPT/ Agency Asset Agency Asset Agency Asset EFFECT EFFECTIVENESS
HVT (2)
(1)
1 Fire
Support
2 AD
KINETIC

3 ISTAR

4 Manoeuvre

5 IO
(includes
KINETIC
NON-

CIMIC,
PA and
EW)

LEGEND:
Note (1): P= Payoff, V= Value
Note (2): 1-Neutralize, 2- Suppress, 3- Destroy, 4- Influence, 5- Offensive EW, 6- KLE, 7- Inform, 8- Deceive

KK1-B-1/1 The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities only.

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX KK OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Tab C
Appendix 1
Annex KK
4MND OP O 07 (OP IRON GUARDIAN)

TARGET SUMMARY SHEET AND TARGET ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITY CHECKLIST

TARGETING CHECK LIST:

DTG: Target Name: Lat/Long Basic Encyclopedia (BE) #:

Mission Description: OSFIX Number:

TARGETING VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Geographical Criteria Substantiation/Remarks

Is the target within the authorized geographical area? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

In prosecuting the target, will kinetic effects cross an
international border □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Persons as Military Objectives

Is the person part of the belligerent forces?

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the person carrying out a command function in the
belligerent forces in respect to the conduct of
hostilities? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the person participating directly in the conduct of
hostilities? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the person carrying or wearing a fixed distinctive sign
(such as uniforms, badges, headdress, etc.) associated
with the belligerent forces? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the person carrying arms as a combatant or a person
who directly participates in hostilities (e.g. manning
weapons systems, patrolling, taking up defensive
positions, gathering or conveying intelligence? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the person performing staff functions for the
belligerent forces integral to the conduct of hostilities
(e.g. intelligence, planning, military logistics)? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the person performing military logistical support
functions directly related to the conduct of hostilities?
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX KK OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Objects as Military Objectives Substantiation/Remarks

Description of the object
Does the object, by its nature, location, purpose or use

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
make an effective contribution to the military action of
the belligerent forces?
Description of the effective contribution to the military
action of the belligerent forces?

Would the total or partial destruction, capture or

neutralization of the target, in the circumstances ruling

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
at the time, offer a definite military advantage to own
forces?
Description of the definite military advantage:

Is the object a valid military object? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

Specially Protected Persons under the LOAC Substantiation/Remarks

Is the intended target person, at the time of the planned

operation, known to be the object of a special
protection? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Acting exclusively in a religious role? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Acting exclusively in a medical role? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Wounded or otherwise hors de combat (rendered
unconscious or otherwise incapacitated by wound or
sickness)? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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Specially Protected Objects under the LOAC Substantiation/Remarks

Is the target a:

Medical facility or medical vehicle?

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Religious site of special significance
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Cultural or historical site of special
significance
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Dam, dyke or other work and installations
containing dangerous forces.
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Object indispensable to survival of the
civilian population e.g. foodstuffs,
agriculture, crops, water supplies or
irrigation works □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Are the environmental effects acceptable?
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Weapons List and comments

Proposed Major weapons with blast effect planned for attack, offensively or defensively:

Direct Fire

Indirect Fire

Aerial

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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Estimation of expected civilian casualties Substantiation/Remarks

Civilians present in within the weapons effects range?

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
If yes, consult CFLCC Targeting Board.
(May require National Command Approval)

If yes, how many? ____ Number □ Unknown

Is there a likelihood of collateral damage to targets on □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
the NSL/RTL?
□ Requires National Command Approval
Is it expected that the attack will cause the loss of life □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
or injury to civilian not taking a direct part in hostilities?
□ Requires National Command Approval
Estimation of expected collateral damage Substantiation/Remarks

Are there civilian objects in the weapons effects range?

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Description of the objects (general and structural
descriptions)

Are the means and methods used anticipated to cause

collateral damage to civilian objects?
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Are there specially protected objects in the weapons
effects range?
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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Proportionality Test Substantiation/Remarks

Can expected collateral damage be avoided e.g. by the
tactics, methods or means used including platforms,
weapons and munitions employed? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Can expected collateral damage be minimized e.g. by
the tactics, methods or means used including
platforms, weapons and munitions employed? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Is the attack expected to cause collateral damage,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Link to CJTF-OIG Strategic Objectives Substantiation/Remarks

Does the partial or total destruction, capture or

neutralization of the target support the achievement of
CJTF-OIG Military and Strategic Objectives?
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Political Impact Substantiation/Remarks

Is the target a politician or does its attack have

significant political implications?
□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Restricted Target List Substantiation/Remarks

Is the target on the RTL?

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
No Strike List Substantiation/Remarks

Is the target on the NSL?

□ Yes □ No □ Unknown
Coalition approval Substantiation/Remarks

Have the appropriate Coalition/National authorities

approved the target? □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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TARGET ENGAGEMENT AUTHORIZATION:

Classification:
DTG: Target Name: Lat/Long Basic Encyclopedia (BE) #:
Osfix:
Mission Description:

Target Recommended by □ 4 MND G2

□ National J2 □ Yes □ No
Comments:

Name and Rank Date and Time

Target Recommended by: □ 4MND LEGAD

□ National LEGAD □ Yes □ No
Comments:

Name and Rank Date and Time

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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Target Authorized by □ COM CJTF-OIG □ COM CFLCC

□ Comd 4 MND □ National Command □ Yes □ No
Comments

Name and Rank Date and Time

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX KK OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Tab D
Appendix 1
Annex KK

XXX ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX

PRIORITY HPT ISTAR ISTAR TSS ATTACK STRIKE EFFECT BDA ROE REMARKS
DETECT TRACK (NOTE 1) WHEN ASSET REQUIRED ASSET/ (NOTE 4)
ASSET ASSET (NOTE 2) (NOTE 3) CRITERIA
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)

1. TSS: 1 = Required TLE. 2 = Minimum Size of Unit. 3 = Static or Moving. 4 = Time of Acquisition. Completed in conjunction with the delivery
standard matrix appropriate to the target category.
2. Attack: I = Immediate. P = Planned. A = As Available. TOT = Time on Target.
3. Examples of possible effects: D = Destroy. N = Neutralize. E = Exploit. S = Suppress. H = Harass. Di = Disrupt. De = Delay (hours).
4. ROE column indicates that the attack meets the ROE. It may be indicated by either an individual’s (e.g. Legal Advisor’s) initials or applicable
paragraph number from the extent ROE.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities only.

KK1-D-1/1 OFFICIAL
Appx 2 UNCLASSIFIED
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Anx KK
4 MND Op O 07 Op IRON GUARDIAN
NFA
CFLCC OPORD 07

4 MND Fire Support

Coord Measures

NFA
CFLCC OPORD
07
FSCL STEEL
D-3 0001Z

FSCL 1
TUNGSTEN
UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL O/O from D+8
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ANNEX HH OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex HH
4 MND Op O 07 – OP IRON GUARDIAN

PERSONNEL SUPPORT

References:
A. CJTF-OIG OPORD 01 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) dated XXXX
B. 4 MND Op O 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN) dated XXXX
C. Appx 1, Annex UU, 4 MND Op O 07, Reports and Returns
D. TCN Graves Registration Service Instructions
E. NATO STANAG 2070, Emergency War Burial Procedures
F. QSTAG 655, Handling of Deceased Personnel in an Area of Operations
G. CFLCC OPORD 07 dated XXXX
1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. To provide Personnel Support to 4 MND.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Personnel Support.
(1) CFLCC G1 will provide higher level advice, support and coordination on
personnel support to 4 MND as the technical authority for all CFLCC
personnel. 4 MND G1 will coordinate personnel support for 4 MND efforts to
meet operational requirements;
(2) For the most part personnel support remains a national responsibility. 4 MND
G1 will, however, provide the overall coordination function for the Division;
and
(3) Personnel support includes: replacements, strength management, personnel
accounting, casualty management, personnel database and information
management, postal services, personnel evaluations, promotions, transfers and
discharges, morale, welfare and recreation, and awards.
b. Personnel Management.
(1) Personal Records and Accounting. National responsibility;
(2) TO&E. TO&Es are extant as agreed between CJTF-OIG and TCNs. TO&E
will remain at this level,
(3) Repatriation. 4 MND Div Surg in consultation with the relevant TCN will
authorize repatriations. In conjunction with the relevant TCN, 4 MND G1 will
coordinate the repatriation of personnel from the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
All repatriation and replacement communications are to include 4 MND G1
for tracking purposes. Requests for national replacements for repatriated
personnel are to be identified in the repatriation message for sourcing;
(4) Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting will be in accordance with Tabs GG
(Notice of Casualty Report (NOTICAS)) and Z (Personnel Report
(PERSREP)) to ref C to facilitate the management of casualty operations
requirements. Note that NOTICAS is a Division tool to keep the Comd
informed of casualty incidents; it does not replace TCN own national

HH-1/3
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only.
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procedures, processes and notifications. Comd 4 MND will not release the
names of TCN casualties until that nation has indicated that it is permissible to
do so;
(5) Replacements. National responsibility; and
(6) Personnel Report. The Personnel Report (PERSREP) shall be provided IAW
with ref B and C.
c. Personnel Administration.
(1) Travel Documents. National responsibility and in accordance with applicable
SOFAs;
(2) Coalition Rotation Plan. National responsibility, to be coordinated with 4
MND G1 and CFLCC G1;
(3) Personnel Performance Evaluations. National responsibility; and
(4) Restriction of Leave.
(a) Leave is a National responsibility, to be coordinated with 4 MND G1
and CFLCC G1 IAW Coalition policy; and
(b) In rare circumstances and for operational reasons the Comd 4 MND
may have to restrict specific personnel by position or capability from
taking leave during the deployment. When this situation arises the
restriction on leave shall be coordinated with the TCN and the 4 MND
G1. Again no leave is expected other than on compassionate grounds
prior to Phase 4 Stabilization.
d. Personnel Services.
(1) Financial Services. National responsibility;
(2) Compensation and Benefits. National responsibility;
(3) Postal Services. Personal mail and official national mail is a national
responsibility. However, CJTF OIG will establish a mail system within the
theatre that enables TCN to distribute personal and national mail effectively
and securely. Official Op IRON GUARDIAN mail will be a Signal function;
and
(4) Morale and Welfare (MW). Morale and Welfare is a command responsibility
and should be a consideration whenever possible. The provision of MW
material is affected by a number of factors, including operational tempo,
location, deployment duration and the size of the task force. MW planning is
a national responsibility and will include coordination between Coalition
forces, 4 MND G1 and CFLCC G1.
e. Mortuary Affairs. Repatriation of human remains is a national responsibility.
Nonetheless 310 ESC will act as lead to repatriate human remains from TCN Bde
AOs to the 310 ESC Mortuary Affairs Collection Point (MACP) with 15 Sust Bde
providing area support. Specific tasks for 4 MND and TCN Bdes include:
(1) 4 MND.
(a) Establish and staff Divisional mortuary affairs office.

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(b) Establish and operate within boundaries MEP.

(c) Coordinate the rearward movement of human remains with the CFLCC
Mortuary Affairs Office.
(d) Coordinate the rearward movement of personal effects to the CFLCC
personal effects depot.
(2) TCN Components.
(a) Coordinate national requirements for mortuary affairs.
(b) Provide a point of contact for the CFLCC Mortuary Affairs Office.
(c) Provide Mortuary Affairs Collection Teams (MACT) within TCN Bde
AOs.
(d) TCN Bdes responsible to transport remains to 4 MND Mortuary
Evacuation Point (MEP). Note: 15 Sust Bde will evac from MEP to
MACP.
(3) Further details at Appendix 2 to Annex I to CFLCC OPORD 07 describes
mortuary affairs activities and scope for search, recovery, identification,
preparation and movement to CONUS or TCN home nation of all CFLCC
military and civilian personnel remains and personal effects resulting from
hostile or non-hostile causes.
f. Administrative Investigations. Commanders at all levels have the authority to
conduct national administrative investigations which can involve military
investigations into injuries and deaths, property loss and destruction, safety violations
and concerns and any other matter or incident. 4 MND will conduct administrative
investigations as ordered or required to address Division-wide incidents.
Investigations will be conducted in accordance with guidelines issued by CFLCC. All
matters that require an administrative investigation will be reported to the 4 MND G1
and the CFLCC G1 for situational awareness;
g. Operations Record. An appropriate level staff appointment within HQ 4 MND will be
assigned as the Officer responsible for maintaining the Operations Record for 4
MND. The Operations Record Officer will create and maintain the Operations
Record for submission upon completion of the operation. TCN Bdes will receive a
copy; and
h. Honours and Awards. National responsibility. Comd 4 MND would be willing to
endorse, if appropriate citations are provided by TCNs.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change from Main Order.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Points of Contact.
(1) 4 MND G1; and
(2) 4 MND Superintendent Clerk.
b. The OPI for this annex is 4 MND G1.

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ANNEX II TO OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex II
4 MND Op O 07 - Op IRON GUARDIAN

Reference: 4 MND Op O 07

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE

(ISTAR)
1. SITUATION
a. As part of the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) – Operation
IRON GUARDIAN mission, 4 MND intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets will be employed in the Division Area of Operations
(AO) to ensure continuous coverage. The planning and tasking of multinational
ISTAR assets within the brigades (Bde) of the division (Div) will be coordinated
through the G2 staff in order to support the mission and maximize the capabilities of
each nation’s assets.
2. MISSION
a. 4 MND will design an aggressive ISTAR plan that assists in the destruction of 24 Mot
DTG and sets the conditions to clear all Arianian forces from the sovereign territory
of Atropia.
3. EXECUTION
a. 4 MND ISTAR CC will coordinate a variety of sensors within the AO in order to
support full spectrum operations.
(1) ISTAR Operations General. Will be conducted in three different manners:
(2) Collection Reporting. In support of intelligence via G2 Information
Collection Plan.
(3) Deliberate Ops. As part of the Operational Planning Process (OPP) cycle.
(4) Hasty Ops. As part of a response to ongoing operations.
b. Scheme of Manoeuvre. 4 MND will utilize both Corps and Div ISTAR assets to
provide a robust sense and strike capability with a focus on supporting the
Commander’s main effort through all phases. Maneuver Bdes will use their integral
assets within their assigned areas. Once the border is restored, 4 MND ISTAR
elements will provide a multi-spectral guard on the ATROPIA (AP)/ARIANA (AN)
border focused on the two main avenues of approach from the SOUTH into the 4
MND AO: the first along MSR MIAMI (Route 3) coming NORTH out of ASTARA
(39S UC 144577) along the CASPIAN SEA Coast; and the second route from the
Arianian border at BILEH-SUVAR (39S UC 144 577) towards BILASUVAR in AP.
All 4 MND ISTAR actions will be integrated with Coalition air and any available
Atropian forces operating in our area. Once established, an ISTAR screen will be
maintained throughout the AO and along the international border (IB) reinforced with
air effects. Cross border deep collection will leverage CFLCC assets providing
GMTI/MASINT/SIGINT capability. Rear Area Security (RAS) and Lines of

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Communication (LOC) support will be conducted using both integral div/bde

capabilities and requested CFLCC assets for indications and warnings support.
c. ISTAR Assets.
(1) External to 4 MND in the CFACC, but potentially available while 4 MND is
the designated Main Effort: 3 x RIVET JOINT a/c, 14 x EA 18 GROWLERS
a/c, 6 x GLOBAL HAWK, 4 x MQ9 Reaper and 4 x WATCHKEEPERS.
(2) External to 4 MND at LCC level: 2 x GREY EAGLE, 30 x OH-58D, and 8 x
HUNTER UAVs.
(3) Internal to 4 MND:
(a) (6 F-G Bde) - (GE) Panzer Artillerie Bataillon (PAB) 295 - 10 x KZO
UAVs (higher altitude, KZO system includes Radar system), (GE) 291
Jagerbataillon – 4 x ALADIN and 4 x MIKADO;
(b) 4 MN Arty Bde – 4 x GREY EAGLE, 3 x RQ21a BLACKJACKS, 4 x
WATCHKEEPER UAVs and 3 x Medium Range Radar;
(c) 4 CMBG – (CA) Arty GS Bty - 3 x RQ21A Blackjacks and 3 x
Medium Range Radar; Recce Sqn - 18 x LAV mounted LRSS radar
and 6 x small UAV; Armd Regt - 6 x LAV mounted LRSS radar. Arty
Regt - 8 x Locating Systems; and AA Coy - 24 x high powered thermal
sights;
(d) 2-43 ADA Bn - 4 x Sentinel GBS and 3 x Patriot Radar systems;
(e) 709 MI Bn – 4 x HUNTER IAVs plus long range surveillance
capability;
(f) 7 (GE) Recce Bn – 1 x LUNA UAV, 2 x KZO and 4 x ground
surveillance radar; and
(g) 1x UAS (AS) Bty, 5x Shadow 200 TUAS.
d. Groupings and Tasks.
(1) 7 (GE) Recce Bn.
(a) Grouping - 1 x Luna UAV, 2 x KZO and 4 x ground surveillance radar.
(b) Tasks - Screen advance during Phases 2 and 3. During Phase 4, screen
within boundaries along the IB and provide Div RAS/LOC security.
(2) 4 (MN) CAB.
(a) Grouping – 2 x GREY EAGLE and Avn assets.
(b) Tasks - Screen advance and destroy enemy assets attempting to
interfere with our operations.
(3) 4 (MN) Arty Bde.
(a) Grouping – (CA) CS Regt - 6 x small UAV; and (CA) GS Regt – 3 x
RQ21A BLACKJACK, 4 x GREY EAGLES and 4 x
WATCHKEEPER.

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(b) Tasks - UAV troops will be used to observe major enemy

concentrations, counter-attack routes, border crossing sites and
irregular force strongholds once they are identified. Coordinate
counter-battery radars to provide optimum coverage of the Div area of
influence.
(4) 63 Sigs Bn.
(a) Grouping - EW Platoon TACON to 7 (GE) Recce Bn.
(b) Tasks - EWCC will coordinate the monitoring of communications
within the AO. The focus will be on 24 DTG’s div and bde command
posts and any communications from irregular forces (SAPA or Salaysl)
that may be operating in our area.
e. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Naming Conventions for Request and Planning Matrix. YY/MM/DD-UNIT-
DISTRICT-NAMED OP (if applicable)-NAI/TAI/DP ####.
(2) Request Procedures. The 4 MND ISTAR Request form and details are noted
in Annex D to 4 MND G3 ISTAR FSOP XXXX ISTAR PROCESS. Requests
for effects requiring external assets to 4 MND must be submitted NLT 96 hrs
in advance by 1000hrs daily. Requests for integral assets must be in Special
Instructions (SPINS) format submitted NLT 48 hrs in advance to the 4 MND
ISTAR-CC.
(3) Task for Aerial ISTAR platforms. Integral Unmanned Airborne Vehicles
(UAV) and Small Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (SUAV) will be in
accordance with the ISTAR Planning Matrix. All forms and templates are
located on the ISTAR-CC site on ORION. Requests for CAF national effects
are submitted through the All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) with
integration of additional LCC/Coalition capabilities identified at the daily
ISTAR coordination conference. Effects requested within the 72hr window
will be processed dynamically through the ISTAR staff within the 4 MND
Operations Centre. Tasked mission elements are to report any unsupportable
tasks due to a change in the tactical situation to the ISTAR Coordination
Centre (CC) Duty Officer as soon as possible.
(4) Daily ISTAR Coordination. Will be held at 1300 hrs (local) in the ISTAR CC.
Formations planning a deliberate operation beyond that currently planned are
to provide CONOP slides if available.
(5) Commander 4 MND ISTAR Priorities. ISTAR priorities are IAW CFLCC
Operational Priorities. These priorities are:
(a) LCC Prioritized Target List (PTL);
(b) Ongoing operations;
(c) 24 DTG;
(d) Deliberate operations;
(e) AP/AN border surveillance;
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(f) General Force Protection/Over watch; and

(g) Humanitarian Assistance (Priority will change on commencement of
Phase 4)
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. No Change from Op O 07.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS
a. Initially, ISTAR coordination meetings will be conducted daily but the frequency may
change depending on the operational situation.

Appendices:

Appendix 1 - ISTAR Synchronisation Matrix

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Annex II
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ISTAR Synchronisation Matrix

All PIRs are numbered as per paragraph f of Annex D (Intelligence) to 4 MND Op O 07 - Operation IRON GUARDIAN
Phase 3 - Dominate
6 F-G 12 (UK) 4 (CA) X (AS) 1 MN 130 (US) Flanks
NAI # PIR.IR.EEI NAME EFFECT INDICATOR
7(Ge) Recce Bde AIB CMBG Bde 1 MN Arty CAB MEB 709 MI Bn 450 CA Higher COMMENT

32001 Assy Area Garasu HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, Recce Obstacles or reports of irregular forces
3 (a)i x x x x x
operating in the area
32002 Choke Point Hajigabul FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Obstacles or reports of irregular forces
3 (a)i x x x x x
operating in the area
32003 Assy Area Alyat FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Obstacles or reports of irregular forces
3 (a)i x x x x x
operating in the area
32004 Assy Area Hesenli FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Obstacles or reports of irregular forces
3 (a)i x x x x x
operating in the area
32005 Crossing site OPAL FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, minor obstacles, defensive
3 (a) ii x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32006 Crossing Site GARNET FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, minor obstacles, defensive
3 (a) ii x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32007 Bridgehead Area FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, minor obstacles, defensive
3 (a) ii x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32008 Crossing on Kura River FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, minor obstacles, defensive
3 (a) ii x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32009 C-Atk Route 25 DTG FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Major concentration of armd vehicles in a
3 (a) ii x x x x x x x
hide within 20 kms of crossing sites
32010 C-Atk Route 24 DTG FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Major concentration of armd vehicles in a
3 (a) ii x x x x x x x
hide within 20 kms of crossing sites
32011 241 BTG Defence FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, bridge demolitions, defensive
3 (a)i x x x x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32012 242 BTG Defence FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, bridge demolitions, defensive
3 (a)i x x x x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32013 244 BTG Defence FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, bridge demolitions, defensive
3 (a)i x x x x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32014 253 BTG Defence FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Minefields, bridge demolitions, defensive
3 (a)i x x x x x x x
works and major engineer obstacles
32015 3 (b) i, 3 (c) i and En Resupply Rte – DPRE Rte FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Large convoys or large number of people
x x x x
ii moving along the route
32016 3 (b) ii, 3 (c) i and En Resupply Rte – DPRE Rte FMV, HUMINT,SIGINT Large convoys or large number of people
x x x x
ii moving along the route
32017 24 DTG Resupply Base HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, Large number of support vehicles (supply,
3 (a)i x x x
EW maint, transport) in the same location.
32017 Irregular Forces Staging Area HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, Large number of SYL or SAPA forces
3 (b) I to v x x x x
EW concentrated in towns in this area
32018 24 DTG ResupplyBase HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, Large number of support vehicles (supply,
3 (a)i x x x
EW maint, transport) in the same location.
32018 Irregular Forces Staging Area HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, Large number of SYL or SAPA forces
3 (b) I to v x x x x
EW concentrated in towns in this area
32019 24 DTG ResupplyBase HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, Large number of support vehicles (supply,
3 (a)i x x x
EW maint, transport) in the same location.
32019 Irregular Forces Staging Area HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT Large number of SYL or SAPA forces
3 (b) I to v x x x x
EW concentrated in towns in this area
32020 241 Anti-tk Bn (Suspected) HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, Twenty or more MT12S in a hide area
3 (a) ii x x x
TECHINT,EW, GMTI
32021 Arty Firing Area (suspected) SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT,EW, Gun Line of 2A65 Guns
3 (a) ii x x x x
MASINT, GMTI
32022 Arty Firing Area (suspected) SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, EW, Gun Line of 2A65 Guns
3 (a) ii x x x x
MASINT, GMTI
32023 Location of 349 Tank BTG (sep) SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, EW, This bde is expected to counterattack any
3 (a)iii MASINT, GMTI 4MND breakthrough in 24/25 DTG MDA x x x x x x x x x

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ANNEX MM TO OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex MM
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date
PW/DETAINEE OPERATIONS
Reference:
A. STANAG 2195 (AJP 2.5) Allied Joint Doctrine for Captured Persons, Materiel, and Documents
B. FM 3-39.40 Internment, February 2010
C. Appendix 16 (EPW/Detainee) to Annex C to CFLCC OP Order 07 date
1. GENERAL.
a. Command and National Responsibilities. PW/Detainee operations are a command
responsibility at all levels, supported by the Military Police (MP). The PW/Detainee
process is structured to provide the requisite care, custody and control of all persons
detained under Coalition/multi-national forces’ authority. Given the expected fluidity
of operations, this process must have the inherent flexibility that will permit us to
minimize the impact of PW/Detainee operations on operations. The US has agreed to
be Lead Nation (LN) for the handling and disposition of PWs. The handling of
Detainees is a national responsibility.
b. Categorization. In accordance with references A and B, all detainees (Captured
Persons (CPERs) IAW reference A) will be categorized as soon as possible and
treated as either Enemy Prisoners-of-War (EPW), other detainees/CPERS (criminals,
non-EPW entitled belligerents, etc.), Civilian Internees or Retained Personnel
(medical or religious). Retained Personnel are considered as EPWs, but with
additional considerations/provisions as indicated under Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention. EPWs will be treated in accordance with accepted international
agreements and references. EPWs will be processed according to the agreed US-led
process within accepted agreements, and other detainees/CPERS will be processed
and evacuated under the nationally-controlled processes of the holding power. PWs
will be treated in accordance with accepted international agreements and references.
c. Capture/Release. Although tactical situations may oblige commanders to detain
persons during the conduct of operations, it is the responsibility of National
Commanders at all levels to determine individual categorization as either a PW or
Detainee, and immediately field release all others IAW their national directives. Once
a determination has been made to further retain the detained person and a Detainee
number has been assigned, only the National Commander of the capturing nation has
the authority to release or transfer to other nations those categorized as Detainees.
Likewise, those categorized as PW are captured enemy combatants, and are to be held
as PWs IAW references until cessation of hostilities.

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2. REPORTING
a. PW/Detainee Reporting. In accordance with national directives, all PW or Detainees
in Coalition custody shall be reported via official means by using a Common Capture
Report (COMCAPREP).
b. Facility Reporting. All temporary PW/Detainee Holding Areas and Collecting Points
established for use by 4 MND elements or in the 4 MND AO shall be identified and
reported to the 4 MND PM.
3. FACILITIES.
a. Due to differing legal, custodial and handling requirements, PW and Detainees are not
to be held together (i.e., if in the same facility they must be segregated), unless
exceptional circumstances warrant. 4 MND will initially establish a Div PW/Detainee
Holding Area in TAA SILVER at AGSU (39T TE 806 938) by D+2. On order and no
earlier than D+ 8 the Div PW/Detainee Holding Area will be prepared to move to
Division Support Area (DSA) QOBUSTAN (39T UE 633 384). 4 MND will
coordinate the onward movement of PWs (not Detainees) to a CFLCC Holding Area
in MINGECEVIR, ATROPIA. Movement of Detainees will be done consistent with
national policies, under the control of the holding nation and in accordance with their
national agreements for transfer of custody.
b. As required, Bdes and below will establish temporary Collecting Points located near
main supply routes and appropriate medical and support facilities. Bde Collecting
Points shall be identified and reported to the 4 MND PM.
c. CJTF-OIG will establish CJTF-OIG PW/Detainee Theatre Detention Facilities at
GAZAKH, ATROPIA and MARNEULI, GORGAS.
4. TRANSFER/EVACUATION
a. Transfer/Movement. Given all nations of 4 MND are Article 3 countries the transfer
of PW to the US as Lead nation within CJTF-OIG is authorized. The US, will accept
transfer of PWs at the 4 MND Holding Area collocated in the DSA. Nations should
expect to move their Detainees back to their own Detainee facilities using national
resources. Dependent on Host Nation Transfer Agreements and National Bilateral
Agreements transfer of Detainees may then occur to Atropian authorities.
b. Transportation. In accordance with the references, all modes of transportation
available to 4 MND shall be prepared to transport PW/Detainees. Maximum use will
be made of empty vehicles conducting replenishment to the DSA. If integral transport
is not available, a request for transport of PW/Detainees must be made to HQ 4 MND.
The formation requesting transport support shall provide own escort and security.

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5. TASKS.
a. Common to All
(1) Provide MP, guard force and, as required, engineer support to the
establishment, collapse, movement and re-establishment of bde-level
PW/Detainee Collecting Points.
(2) Provide security escort of PW/Detainee moving rearward to the Div-level
Holding Area, or other national Detainee facilities.
6. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Div PM. Oversee, with the support of a PWHO, 4 MND PW/Detainee Holding Area.
b. Div Surgeon. Coord health specialist support to the 4 MND PW/Detainee process.
c. Div Engr. Coord construct/collapse as required Div-level PW/Detainee Holding
Areas.
d. G1. Coord PW/Detainee administration and welfare.
e. G2. Coord interrogation process in accordance with Appendix to Annex D.
f. G3. Coord terrain management of PW/Detainee Holding Area(s), tasking of Div-
level guards/escorts and execution of the PW/Detainee reporting process.

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Annex PP
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN date

MILITARY POLICE

References:
A. Status of Forces Agreement between the International Committee for ATROPIA Sovereignty and
Security (ICASS) ATROPIAN Security and Assistance Mission (ASAM) and the Governments of
ATROPIA, GORGAS and TURKEY dated
B. STANAG 2085 NATO Combined Military Police
C. STANAG 2296 (AJP 3.2.3.3) Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police
D. STANAG 2226 (ATP 3.7.2) NATO Military Police Guidance and Procedures
E. STANAG 2195 (AJP 2.5) Allied Joint Doctrine for Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents
1. SITUATION
a. General. No change.
b. MP Forces Available
(1) 4 MND
(a) 1 (AS) MP Bn OPCON 4 MND
(b) 174 Provo Pl remain OPCOM 12 (UK) AIB
(c) 91 MP Bn OPCON 130 MEB
(d) 4 MP Pl remain OPCOM 4 CMBG
(e) 1 MP Pl 92 MP Coy allocated OPCON (less national policing) to 6 F-
G Bde for Phases 1 to IV
(f) 3 MP Coy, 1 (AS) MP Bn allocated OPCON (less national policing) to
X (AS) Bde for Phases 1 to IV
(2) Flanking Formations
(a) 16 MP Bde OPCOM CFLCC
(b) 744th MP Bn OPCOM 82 Abn Div
(c) 293rd MP Coy OPCOM 3 CR
(3) NCEs and NSEs. National MP assets may be deployed in support of NCEs or
NSEs.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of MP Support. Guidance and direction on the conduct of MP operations,
their limitations and employment will be in accordance with references B to E. MPs
have two broad roles: police the force and provide MP support to the mission.
Specifically, MPs will provide the following functions: policing, security/force
protection, detention/custody, PW/Detainee collection, support to stability operations,
support to mobility and support to tactical operations.

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b. Jurisdiction. MPs maintain jurisdiction over all persons within the JOA, and over
attached multinational (MN) forces IAW the SOFA at reference A. Police
investigations are a national responsibility and the 4 MND Provost Marshal (PM) will
de-conflict any investigations that involve more than one nation.
c. Grouping. MP platoons grouped OPCON/OPCOM to subordinate Bdes as per
paragraph 1.b. (1) above. 91 MP Bn OPCON 130 MEB for Div tactical movement
forward from TAA SILVER to River KURA during Phases I-III. Elements of 91 MP
Bn will be regrouped in Phase IV to 4 Sust Bde as they assume Traffic Control (TC)
in Div rear area.
d. Tasks
(1) Security Operations. MP shall provide security advice to commanders and to
subordinate elements, and will augment the Comd’s security program. The
following support will be provided but not limited to:
(a) Physical Security Surveys (PSS).
(b) Threat Risk Assessments (TRA).
(c) Assist in the coordination of IT system Certification and Accreditation
process.
(d) Security Investigations.
(2) Custody Operations. 4 MND PM and supporting MPs are subject matter
experts and will assist commanders at all levels in the planning and execution
of custodial operations where PW/Detainee and service custody are required.
On behalf of the Comd 4 MND, MPs will contribute to the oversight and
governance of all permanent and temporary detention throughout the AO.
MPs at all levels will assist commanders with the following tasks:
(a) Provide staff advice to commanders and staffs at all levels and assist in
the development of theatre-specific SOPs or TTPs.
(b) Leveraging engr and other assets, establish and oversee temporary
holding facilities. Although MP will be assigned specific
responsibilities to oversee custodial facilities, commanders at all levels
shall support and directly augment this task as necessary to ensure the
safeguard and proper handling of PW/Detainee takes place.
(c) Assist in the evacuation of PW/Detainee to the 4 MND custodial
facility.
(d) Maintain detailed records and backup records on all persons detained
by 4 MND personnel and all PWs/Detainees transferred from custody
to other forces/authorities.
(e) Conduct liaison with all Coalition/Atropian forces on mutual
PW/Detainee issues.
(f) For service custody of 4 MND personnel, the TCN is responsible.
(3) Force Protection. Tasks assigned for force protection will normally be
assigned by commanders through to their respective supporting elms. It is
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ANNEX PP OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

important to understand that these tasks are not driven by MP technical

obligation and are driven by operational requirements. Although not limited
to, the following MP-specific support will be provided if required:
(a) Close Protection Services.
(b) Tactical Aircraft Security Officers.
(c) Assist in the provision of Force Protection advice/planning.
(d) Installation or site protection.
(e) Designated route security.
(4) Tactical Support to Operations. The following tactical MP support to
operations will be provided when required and troops to task ratios permit:
(a) Staff support to OPP or unit battle procedure.
(b) Provision of criminal intelligence.
(c) Support to mortuary affairs process.
(d) Liaison, coordination or support to HN Law Enforcement.
(e) Assist with detainee processing, escorting and evacuation.
(f) Mobility support to combat operations.
(g) Sensitive Site Exploitation.
(h) BPT conduct Security Sector Reform activities.
(i) BPT assist with Police Capacity Building (Train and mentor security or
police forces).
(j) Area or site protection/defence.
e. Coordinating Instructions
(1) PW/Detainee Reporting. In accordance with refs, all PW/Detainees in custody
shall be reported via official means by means of a PW/Detainee Capture
Report.
(2) Holding Facilities. Due to differing legal, custodial and handling
requirements, PW and Detainees are not to be held together in the same
facility, unless exceptional circumstances warrant. 4 MND will initially
establish Division Holding Area (DHA) in TAA SILVER by D+5. On order
and no earlier than D+ 8 the DHA shall be prepared to move to ALYAT (UE
6221). Bde Collection Points shall be identified and reported to the 4 MND
PM.
(3) Handling of PW/Detainees. Although 4 MND will establish a multinational
DHA, bdes are to be prepared to have both an established PW process and an
independent national detainee handling process as necessary.
(4) Movement
(a) Movement forward into AP through to the CFLCC Forward Assembly
Area (FAA) will be directed by CFLCC HQ and controlled by 16 MP
PP-3/4
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only.
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ANNEX PP OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Bde. This is expected to be administrative road movement. Movement

from the FAA to TAAs BRONZE and SILVER will again be LCC
directed and 16 MP Bde controlled; dependent on the tactical situation
this could be either administrative road moves or tactical movement.
(b) Movement forward of TAA SILVER will be tactical movement
directed by HQ 4 MND and controlled by 130 MEB as the Div
Regulating HQ. 91 MP Bn will be OPCON 130 MEB and likely given
a Sector for TC.
(5) Stability Policing - Phase IV. To be issued.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Refer to 4 MN Div Op O 07
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. 4 MND PM. LTCOL XXXX
b. While conducting non-policing functions, 4 MND MPs are OPCON (less policing
functions) to the Comd 4 MND.
c. While conducting policing duties, MPs are OPCOM to respective NCE. As such all
MPs conducting police duties will fall under the authority of the respective NCE PM.

PP-4/4
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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ANNEX TT OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex TT
4 MND Op O – Op IRON GUARDIAN Insert date
HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)
References:
A. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Atropia/CJTF-OIG
B. Technical Arrangements to the Status of Forces Agreement Atropia/CJTF-OIG
C. Annex F (Sustainment) to CFLCC OPORD 07 (Op IRON GUARDIAN)
1. SITUATION. The country of ATROPIA (AP) has limited resources available for ongoing
support to the significant military force deployed into the country in response to the current situation.
To that end AP’s main effort will be on supporting Atropian national forces to the extent possible,
resulting in limitations to the availability of Host Nation Support (HNS) for the 4 MND.
2. MISSION. Coordinate the provision of HNS to 4 MND elements located in AP to contribute
to mission success.
3. EXECUTION
a. Scheme of HNS. Resources are severely constrained within AP. To that end it is the
intent of Comd 4 MND that forces operating within the 4 MND Area of Operations
(AO) shall be self-sufficient and will not impose a significant support bill on the host
nation (HN). In order to reduce demands on HN, all HNS requests shall be made
through 17 Sustainment Brigade to 310th ESC.
b. HNS Considerations.
(1) Accommodations. HN has agreed that 4 MND will have access to military
accommodations where they are available. Requests are to be made through 4
Sust Bde and ultimately back through 306 Real Estate Team/18 Engineer
Brigade. Support is available in the following areas:
(a) Personnel accommodation/billeting;
(b) Offices;
(c) Warehousing;
(d) Workshops;
(e) Vehicle parks;
(f) Firing ranges;
(g) Training areas;
(h) Airfields; and
(i) Ammunition storage facilities.
(2) Ammunition and Weapons. There is no excess capacity of weapons and
ammunition within AP;
(3) Communications. Atropian telephone (cell and land-line) networks are
relatively advanced and provide a high degree of functionality for military
communications as does the national data network. 4 MND will have access to

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ANNEX TT OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Atropian telephone and data networks subject to the continuing availability of

bandwidth. Requirements are to be addressed through 63 (US) ESB;
(4) Finance. The government of AP has agreed that there will be no charge for
the use of government and military facilities for CJTF-OIG / CFLCC. For
those services which AP contracts out, charges levied to 4 MND shall be at the
same rate as paid by the Atropian government for those services;
(5) Fuel. Fuel shall be drawn from Atropian sources only in emergency
circumstances. Where it is necessary to draw from Atropian sources, fuel will
be replaced in kind as soon as practicable;
(6) Local Labour. Local labour is available to support 4 MND operations.
Payment for labour shall be at agreed rates identified in the technical
arrangement to the SOFA. All requests for local labour are to be made
through 17 Sust Bde;
(7) Maintenance. 4 MND units shall have access to maintenance facilities and
equipment not in use by Atropian units. Access will be strictly controlled
through advance requests to 17 Sust Bde;
(8) Medical. 4 MND units and personnel shall only use Atropian medical
facilities in an emergency to save life and limb. Injured 4 MND members
shall subsequently be transferred to a CJTF-OIG hospital as soon as
practicable. Any emergency treatment by Atropian medical services shall
immediately be reported to HQ 4 MND G1(Med) ;
(9) Movement/Transport Support. Available transportation equipment is limited
to railway rolling stock and motive power as identified in sub-para 3.b.(9) of
reference C. and hire of local commercial trucks. Hired transportation service
providers are specifically excluded from transporting 4 MND ammunition and
explosives. Requests for transportation support from the HN are to be made
through 17 Sust Bde (and subsequently 152 Mvt Ctrl Bn);
(10) Rations. No rations are available within AP. 4 MND units are to be self-
sufficient for rations through a combination of combat rations and fresh
rations provided through 17 Sust Bde/310th ESC;
(11) Supplies and Equipment. Not available;
(12) Translation. Translation and interpreter services are available within AP.
Payment for translation and interpreter services shall be at agreed rates
identified in the technical arrangement to TCN SOFAs. Requests for
translation and interpreter services are to be made through 17 Sust Bde;
(13) Water. 4 MND units and personnel are to draw water exclusively from
military sources. Units responsible for acquiring and treating bulk water may
draw water from Atropian military and government facilities although
potability will still need to be confirmed.
c. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
17
(1) Sustainment Brigade.
(a) Coordinate requests for local labour services;
TT-2/3
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ANNEX TT OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

(b) Coordinate requests for translation and interpreter services;

(c) Coordinate contracting for commercial transport services; and
(d) Coordinate requests for the use of transportation infrastructure.
(e) Coordinate requests for use of Atropian military facilities and
locations.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change to base order.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. No change to base order.

TT-3/3
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only.
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ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN

REPORTS

Reference:
A. Annex R (Reports) to OPORD 07 (OPERATION IRON GUARDIAN) CFLCC (U).
B. DJFHQ Reports and Returns Templates
(http://collab/army/1div/HQ1DIV/Collaboration/SitePages/SOP_Endorsed_Page.aspx)

1. GENERAL
a. The table below identifies the reports most commonly used by 4 MND and
subordinate formations. The reports may be amended by Comd 4 MND at any point
during the operation. Unless otherwise indicated all reports are applicable to
formations or units OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM or TACON to 4 MND.
b. The reports below are for internal use only within 4 MND. Reports submitted by 4
MND to CFLCC are identified Ref A. All other report templates not listed will be
drawn from Ref B.

Reports Acronym Appendix

Air Defence Report ADREP 1
Air Request AIRREQ 2
Air Task AIRTASK 3
Barrier Report BARREP 4
Casualty Evacuation Request CASEVACREQ 5
Civil-Military Cooperation Report CIMICREP 6
Commander’s Assessment ASSESSREP 7
Control/Co-ordination Line Report CCLREP 8
Downed Aircraft Report DOWNAIRREP 9
Engineer Data Report ENGRDATAREP 10
Engineer Report ENGRREP 11
Gun And Armoured Fighting Vehicle GUNAFVS 12
(AFV) State
Helicopter Acknowledgement HELACK 13
Helicopter Request Form HELQUEST 14
Helicopter Tasking Form HELTASK 15
Host Nation Support Request HNSREQ 16
Intelligence Report INTREP 17

UU-1/2
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only.
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ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Intelligence Summary INTSUM 18

Location Status LOCSTAT 19
Logistics Status Report LOGREP 20
Medical Evacuation Request / Dustoff MEDEVAC 21
Medical Evacuation Request - MIST MIST 22
Meteorological Report METREP 23
NBC Chemical Downwind Report NBCCDR 24
Obstacle Report OBSREP 25
Personnel Report PERSREP 26
Rules of Engagement Request ROEREQ 27
Restricted Operating Zone Request ROZREQ 28
Scatterable Minefield Request SCATMINREQ 29
Situation Report SITREP 30
Transport Request TRANSREQ 31
Public Affairs Situation Report PA SITREP 32
Notice of Casualty Report NOTICAS 33
Medical Situation Report MEDSITREP 34

UU-2/2
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 1
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

AIR DEFENCE REPORT

Purpose: Used to provide a summary of AD engagement results since the last ADREP, and to report
the status and availability of AD equipment and ammunition.

A ADREP Ref No.

B Engagements since last report:
1 Total fixed wing aircraft destroyed
2 Total helicopters destroyed
3 Total missiles destroyed
4 Total fixed wing aircraft damaged
5 Total helicopters damaged
6 Total missiles damaged
7 Remarks
C AD equipment status/availability - by
complete fire unit:
1 Equipment type:
- Deployed in action
- Unserviceable (U/S)
- Available in 24 hours
- Available in 48 hours
- Destroyed since last ADREP
- Remarks
2 Equipment type:
etc
3 Equipment type:
etc
D Ammunition stocks:
1 Ammunition type:
- Quantity held on weapons
- Quantity held at....... (give location)
- Remarks
2 Ammunition type:
etc
3 Ammunition type:
etc
E Amplification (as necessary)

UU1-1/1
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 2
Annex UU
4 MND OpO 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

AIR REQUEST

Purpose

1. An Air Req/Task Msg (AIR REQ/TASK MSG) is the msg whereby units, fmn and tasking
agencies respectively req or task air spt in the form of OCA, CAIRS, air interdiction and armed
recon. The AIR RECON REQ/TASK MSG is to be used for all air recon missions (see HQ 1 DIV
SOP chap 3, annex N, appendix 70).

Method of transmission

2. Req for OAS are passed over the Tac Air Req Net to the tasking agency. The tasking
agency normally passes the AIR TASK MSG to the airfield or carrier over the appropriate Tac Air
Comd Net of equivalent line ckt. Prec for the msg is dependent on the tac urgency to the adrs in
relation to other msg tfc.

Format

3. The msg is called an Air Req Msg. When acft are tasked by the ASOC, it becomes an Air
Task Msg. Originators are only required to complete that info which is known. For example, con
arrangements at Para D may only be known at the DJFHQ JOSCC level. If not required, para are
omitted, except in the case of para 'C', which always requires loc ref(s) or specific NIL. The air req
will normally not incl F, G or H.

FORMAT EXAMPLE
AIR REQ TASK. AIR REQ AIR TASK 3/A/501
TASK/MSN NO (1) (2)
A. DETAILS OF TASK (DESTROY, A. DESTROY 12 TKS IN WOOD
NEUTRALISE OR SEARCH) (3) JA 356465/9
B. TOT (4) B. 171600Z TO 171630ZAUG9X
C. POSN OF FRIENDLY C. NIL
FORCES (5)
D. CON ARRANGEMENTS (PROV D.
DETAILS OF FOL IF
APPLICABLE)

D-1 RDR CON AGENCIES. C/S AND D-1 DISH PAN ON TATC
FREQ OF INITAL CON RDR
D-2 RDR CON AGENCIES. C/S AND D-2 HAND-OFF TO PLATTER ON
FREQ OF FWD CON RDR (IF TADC, FAT MAN ON TADC
APPLICABLE - NOTE MAY BE
THE SAME C/S AS THE ACE)
D-3 TACP-ALO. C/S AND FREQ D-3 RED BARON ON TADC
D-4 TACP/FAC. C/S AND FREQ (IF D-4 DEEP SIX ON TAD 1
KNOWN)
D-5 CONTACT PT (CP) D-5 CP ALPHA
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

D-6 MARKERS (INDICATOR

SMOKE, PANEL, ETC -
NORMALLY WHEN FAC NOT
USED)
E. INFLIGHTREP (GIVE C/S AND E. RED BARON ON TADC
THE FREQ TO WHOM THE
INFLIGHTREP IS TO BE MADE
IF ONE IS NEC)
F. SQN F. 805.00
G. NO AND TYPE OF ACFT G. FOUR F18
H. ARMAMENT H. 2.75 IN RKT
I. OTHER INFO/INSTR I. 8/8 AT 2 000 FT VIX 7 KM,
W/V 210/15
ACK (6) ACK

Notes

1. The no and ltr used in the Req/Task No are determined and used in the fol manner:

a. Req/Task No are prefaced by '1' for air interdiction req, by '2' for tac air recon req,
'3' for CAIRS, '4' for counter air, and '5' for any other req.

b. The subsequent ltr and no gp ident the req unit fmn and the ser no of its req; indent
ltr and blocks of no are allotted to fmn/units by the appropriate coord HQ in the
region, eg 3/A/501.

2. The Air Task Msn No is used as fol:

a. Normally the Air Task Msn No is the same as the Air Req No and is used to ident the
msn throughout these procedures. When used in the air 3/A/501 may be abbreviated
to MSN 501. Msn No are not to be confused with sqn C/S, which are still used. The
Req/Task No is used to ident the msn throughout these procedures, and the msn is
tasked, flown, con, recov and rept on as 3/A/501.
b. If, for any reason, the tasking agency decides that, Air Req 3/A/501 is to be flown as
Air Task 3/A/550, they send the Accept Refuse Msg as 'AR3/1/501 accepted as
3/A/550'. Thereafter the msn is tasked, flown, con, recov and rept on as 3/A/550.

Note that to asst the tasking agency, the senior unit fmn may estb a sys of pri to be
allotted to req by initiating units fmn.

3. Describe tgt to atk/look for (eg. pers, veh, equip in open, pers dug in, qty of
tgt, dir of mov if any). GR of tgt or of loc/s to search or line search no. If required
state pri. If photo confirmation is required after visual recon msn add 'CFM'.

4. Specific time, or ASAP and a NLT time/latest time info of value. Use for
DTG if required for clarity.

5. If friendly forces are within 1000m of tgt their posn is to be given,

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

preferably in relation to an easily recognised topographical feature. Failing this, their

posn in relation to the tgt by bearing and distance or a GR. If no friendly forces are
within 1000m of tgt 'NIL' is to be specified. This para must always be completed.

6. Insert CS and freq of appropriate con agencies. Freq are never to be Xmit
in plain language unless emergency conditions render it essential. Previously aloc
ckt designators are to be used instead. For example, TADC means 'TAD Common'
freq on which con agencies or ALO will keep listening watch. It is aloc along with
other TAD Freq for FAC known as TAD1, TAD2, etc.

7. To cfm that the tasked airfield or carrier has rec the Air Task Msg, the msg
is always ack immediately upon rec, eg 'Air Task 3/A/501 ACK'.

AIRSUPREQ

AIR SUPPORT REQUEST

Used to req preplanned and immediate CAIRS, interdiction, recon, survl, helo airlift, and
other acft msn.

Usage Set Name Set Title Form

C EXER EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION

O OPER OPERATION IDENT DATA
M MSGID MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
O R REF REFERENCE
O R CANX MSG CANCEL WITH NEW INFO
M PERID EFFECTIVE DAY-TIME PERIOD
M 8REQUEST AIR MISSION REQUEST INFO C
O 8MSNLOC AIR MISSION LOCATION INFO C
O 8CONTROL AIR MSN CONTL AGENCY INFO C
O 8GNDFRND FRIENDLY GROUND TROOPS LOCN C
O 8TGTDESC TARGET DESCRIPTON INFO C
O 8GUIDED LASER GUIDED WEAPONS INFO C
O 8BEACON BEACON DESCRIPTION C
O 8SHIP SHIP TARGET INFORMATION C
O 9SHIP SHIP POSITN & MOVET DATA C
O 8MOVAA MOVEMENT & AAW AXIS INFO C
O 8FACSCD FAC AIRCRAFT SCHEDULE C
O 8EWDATA ELECTRONIC WARFARE INFO C
O 8CHAFF CHAFF MISSION INFORMATION C
O 8RECDATA RECON MISSION INFORMATION C
O 8DELADDR DELIVERY ADDRESS C
O 8REPORT REPORT REQUIREMENTS C
O 8AIRDRIP DROP ZONE DATA C
O 8ROUTE AIRCRAFT ROUTE DATA C
O 8REFUEL AIR-AIR REFUELLING DATA C

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

O 9REFUEL AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING C

O 8ESCDATA ESCORT MISSION DATA C
O 8RDZDATA A/C RENDEZVOUS MSN INFO C
O 8RDZLOC RENDEZVOUS LOCATION INFO C
O 8CARGO AIRLIFT CARGO INFORMATION C
O 8SPECHND SPECIAL CARGO HANDLING C
O 8LOADATA AIRLIFT LOADING DATA C
O 8CONTACT LANDING SITE CONTACT ID C
O 8LANDSTS LANDING SITE DATA C
O 8PROTFRQ AIR MISN PROTECTED FREQ C
O FYFCE FRIENDLY FORCES
OR FYPOS FRIENDLY FORCES POSITION
OR ISR IDENT SAFETY RANGE
OR IFF IFF & SIFSETTING
O EMCON EMISSION CONTROL PLAN
CODES CODES, CRYPTO AND AUTHENT
OR PREF PRINCIPAL SET REFERENCE
O AKNLDG ACKNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
O RMKS REMARKS
O DECL MSG DECLASS DATA F

Example:

EXER/BRAVE SHIELD 95//

MSGID/AIRSUPREQ/TOC/1221001//
PERID/210600Z/TO:220600Z/ASOF:210300Z//
8REQUEST
/REQNO /PR/MSNTYP/MSTART /MSTOP /R/WPNTYP/SR /ACTYP /ALR/CMNT
/ABC003/lB/CAS /211500Z/ /D/- / -/- /- /-
/MAR423/lC/ESC /211315Z/ /-/ATOA / -/F15A /- /-
/RAK002/4 /REC /211000Z/ /-/- / -/- /- /Sl//
8MSNLOC
/MSNNO /LOCTYP/LOCN /ALT/CMNT
/ABC003/ /32UQV21307600 / -/-
/MAR423/ /321500N1052000W / -/-
/Sl /AREA /18SRT14001600 //
8CONTROL
/MSNNO /CONT/CALLSIGN /PRIFRQ /SECFRQ /REPIN
/ABC003/INTL/SUNDOG 25 / 322.5/ 347.0 /3220N10500W
/MAR423/CORD/BLACKHAWK 01 / 321.0/ 387.2 /-
/Sl /OPCN/OCTOPUS / 321.5/ 350.8/ /
8GNDFRND
/REF /TIMPOS /FRCORD /MRKING/COLOR /CMNT
/ABC003/210600Z/QV21007400 /PANEL /RED//
8TGTDESC
/REF /NOT/TGTTYP/STAT/HDG/SPD /TLGHT /TWDRAD /DOP
/TGTAD
/ABC002 / 1/TBUNKR/ - /- / -/ -/

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

100M/BLSTWL/HVYAAA//
AMPN/TGT AREA IS HEAVILY PROTECTED IN ALL QUADRANTS BY MULTIPLE AAA
OF ALL SIZES. COULD POSSIBLY BE SAM DEFENDED. ENTIRE FORTIFICATION
ALONG WITH AAA GUN POSITIONS MUST BE DESTROYED IN ORDER TO ALLOW
ADVANCE OF FRIENDLY FORCES THROUGH AREA//
8GUIDED
/REF /LASR/GUIDFRQ /CMNT
/ABC003/3290//
8BEACON
/REF /BCN /CD/BCNLOC /ON-
TIME/OFFTIME/BCNEL
/ABC003/ALPHA /B
/324000N1052310W/211400Z/211530Z/ 2200
//
8EWDATA
/REF /EMITTYP /ELNOT/FC/LOWFRQ /UPFRQ /ECM-TECQ /CMNT
/MAR423/ - /- /- / 145.00MHZ/ 160.00MHZ/JAMBAR//
AMPN/BEGIN JAMBAR 211530Z, STOP JAMBAR 211650Z//
8RECDATA
/REF /TYPCOV /IMGTYP /IMQ/CM/TGTCOD /CMNT
/Sl /AREACOV/OP /B /A /2ABCDEF//
8DELADDR
/REF /DELADDR /CMNT
/Sl /2DBN8THMAR /Al//
AMPN/Al REQUEST AIRDROP AT 18SRT1000900. CONTACT RANGER ON FRQ 316.0
OR 321.1 WHEN ON RUNIN HEADING 320//
8REPORT
/REF /RPTREQ/QTY /RECPD/LTIOV /SCALE /DP/CMNT
/Sl /IIR / 2/DUPOS/220600Z/ 10000/ 5//
8ROUTE
/REF /PN/ROUTEPT /TYP/ATIME /SPD /ALT/CMNT
/MAR423/ 1/3215N10520W /TKF/- / / 120KTS/ 30/-
/MAR423/ 2/3245N10524W /NVP/211330Z/- / -/-
/MAR423/ 3/3305N10600W /NVP/211335Z/- / -/-
/MAR423/ 4/3310N10615W /TGT/211415Z/ / 5/-
/MAR423/ 5/3200N10600W /LND/211455Z//
8ESCDATA
/REF /ESCORTED /ESCCS /PRIFRQ /SECFRQ
/MAR423/6CH47 /ADDER 01 / 297.0/ 304.1
/MAR423/lOAHl /JINGO 02 / 297.0/ 304.1
//
AMPN/VITAL RESUPPLY MISSION TO A UNIT HOLDING A KEY BRIDGE. 3 HELOS
HAVE BEEN DOWNED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA. HELOS WILL HOLD AT
FIELD UNTIL CAP AIRCRAFT ARRIVE//
8CARGO
/REF /CC/QTY /LOADTYP/CARGOWT/CARGOSZ/LGTH /WDTH /HEIGHT/CMNT
/S3 /- / 3/CBT / -/ -/ -/ -/ -
/S10

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

/S3 /- / 2/BLADDER/ 1000LB/ 48CUF/ 4FT/ 4FT/ 3FT/Sll//

8SPECHND
/REF /EXIN/H /SPTEQ /HZD /SD/NEW /CMNT
/Sll /EXT /NO /- /- /- /
/KBSB//
8LOADATA
/REF /ONLOC /ONTIME/OFFLOC /OFFTIME
/S10 /KBSA /210900Z/KBSB /210915Z
/Sll /KBSB /210915Z/FB A /210940Z//
AMPN/DO NOT ARRIVE AT KBSA EARLIER THAN 210800Z. DO NOT ARRIVE FB A
LATER THAN 211200Z FOR TERMINATION//

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 3
Annex UU
4 MND OpO 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

AIR TASK

Purpose

1. To order a subordinate command to execute one or more acft sorties.

Format - ADFORMS

Usage Set Name Set Title

Form
C EXER EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION
O OPER OPERATION lDENT DATA
M MSGID MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
O MSGCLASS MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION
O R REF REFERENCE
M MISSN MISSION
O MISLOC AIR MISSION LOCATION INFO
M R FORCE FORCE TASKED
M R EVTASK EVENT TASKING
O HRSCD FLIGHT TIME HOURS CODE
O ORDNLD ORDNANCE LOAD
O R TRACK ASSIGNED SEARCH TRACK
O AREA AREA
O AREATYP DESIGNATED AREA
O CIRC CIRCULAR AREA
O ELLIPSE ELLIPSE
O SECTOR SECTOR DETAILS
C TARGET TARGET DETAILS
O TARWI TARGET WEATHER INFO
O TOT TIME ON TARGET
O ORDNLD ORDNANCE LOAD
O GUIDED LASER GUIDED WEAPONS INFO
O BEACON BEACON DESCRIPTION
O TIRSRP REPORT STANDARD REF POINT
O FACSCHD FWD AIR CONTROL SCHEDULE
O ROUTE ROUTE DETAILS

O ALT ALTlTUDE
C FYFCE FRIENDLY FORCES
O FYPOS FRlENDLY FORCES POSlTION
O FYGND FRIENDLY GROUND TROOPS
O ISR IDENT SAFETY RANGE
O R PIMAS POSIT & INTD MOVMNT - AS
O ESCRT ESCORT MISSION DATA
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
UU3-1/3 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

C ARTANK AIR REFUELL'G TANKER DATA

O R ARDATA AIR REFUEL RECEIVER REQ
C RNDZVOUS RENDEZVOUS INSTRUCTIONS
O ALT ALTITUDE
O COMMS COMMUNICATIONS
O 8NAVAID NAVIGATIONAL AID INFO
C
C RECDATA RECON MISSION INFORMATION
O DELADDR DELIVERY ADDRESS
O REPREQ REPORT REQUIREMENTS
C ROUTE ROUTE DETAILS
O ALT ALTITUDE
C CARGO AIRLIFT CARGO INFORMATION
C DROPZONE DROP ZONE DATA
O TARWI TARGET WEATHER INFO
O SPECHAND SPECIAL CARGO HANDLING
O LOADATA AIRLIFT LOADING DATA
O R CONTACTAS CONTACT NAME OR CALLSIGN
O R LANDSTS LANDINGS SITE DATA
O R IFF IFF & SIFSETTING
O EMCON EMISSION CONTROL PLAN
O CONTROL AIR MSN CONTROL AGENCY
O R COMMS COMMUNICATIONS
O CODES CODES, CRYPTO AND AUTHENT
O VOICECODE LOW GRADE VOICE CODES
O PROTFRQ AIR MSN PROTECTED FREQ
O R EWDATA ELECTRONIC WARFARE DATA
O R CHAFF CHAFF MISSION INFORMATION
O R AKNLDG ACKNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
O RMKS REMARKS
F
O DECL MSG DECLASS DATA
M ENDAT END OF DATA

Example:

EXER/HIGH SIERRA//
MSGID/AIRTASKOR/81WG/22/MAR/REQ//
MISSN/TRNG/FUEL/ONAE/AAR 20CU STUDS//
FORCE/33SQN/l/B707/WINDSOR TBA//
EVTASK/ASWM/020040Z6/-/-/-/ABTL/l//
AMPN/9 X F18A DEPART ASWM IN COMPANY WITH B707 FOR ABTL//
EVTASK/ABTL/-/030130Z7/030300Z6/-/ABTL/2//
EVTASK/ABTL/-/-/-/230630Z4/ASWM/4//
AMPN/14 X F18A DEPART ABTL IN COMPANY WITH B707 FOR ASWM//
ARTANK/WINDSOR TBA/-/-//
ARDATA/MAPLE/9/F18A/PRB/JP5/60/600/-//

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
UU3-2/3 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

ARDATA/MAPLE/4/F18A/PRB/JP5/25/100/030130Z7//
ARDATA/MAPLE/14/F18A/PRB/JP5/45/630/-//
RNDZVOUS/-/ROM/WINDSOR TBA/MAPLE 1-9/-//
ALT/ONSTA/FL200-FL300//
RNDZVOUS/030130Z7/270M-ABTL-60NM/USS TEXAS/MAPLE 14/FL200//
RNDZVOUS/030500Z8/270M-ABTL-60NM/WINDSOR TBA/MAPLE 1-4/FL200//
AMPN/EVTASK 2 AND 3 RDVU WITH 2 X 4 F18A FORMATIONS SPLIT BY 30MINS//
CONTACTAS/l/FLTLT K SMITH/20CU/049289022//
AMPN/CONTACT SAME FOR TASKS 2, 3 AND 4//
FORCE/20CU/9/F18A/MAPLE 1-9//
EVTASK/ASWM/020400Z6/-/-/-/ABTL/l//
EVTASK/ABTL/-/030500Z8/030600Z2/-/ABTL/3//
FORCE/20CU/14/F18A/MAPLE 1-14//
EVTASK/ABTL/-/-/-/230630Z4/ASWM/4//
HRSCD/UNK//
RMKS/EXAMPLE OF MULTIPLE FORCE TASKING. DOES NOT NECESSARILY
REPRESENT HOW TO TASK A HIGH SIERRA DEPLOYMENT//
ENDAT/28/OCT94//

Notes

1. Sets and Fields are indicted M (mandatory) or O (optional).

2. Repeatable Sets are indicated by the symbol R.

3. Grouped fields are indicated by the symbol G.

4. The symbol ( ) indicates the first set of a segment, related sets shown by the symbol ( )
with the symbol ( ) indicating the final set of that segment.

5. Conditional (C) sets appear in segments and become mandatory whenever any other set
of that segment is used.
6. Sets within a segment indicated as R are repeatable within that segment, and each time
the segment is repeated.

7. Begin each field with a Field Marker (/) and do not break a field over a line. If
insufficient space exists, commence the field on a new line.

8. End each set with an end of set Marker (//).

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
UU3-3/3 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 4
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

BARRIER REPORT
Purpose: Used to pass info on friendly obstacles, current and planned.

BARRIER REPORT (BARREP)

A Amendment
1 YES/NO
2 Designator (Note 1)
B Operation Order (OPORD) reference (if applicable)
C Map details
1 Map/chart series
2 Map/chart suffix no
3 Map/chart sheet no (Note 2)
4 Map/chart edition no (Note 2)
5 Geodetic datum (Note 2)
D Barrier data: (Note 2)
1 Obstacle no
2 Obstacle nickname
3 Obstacle zone/belt name/no
4 Task serial no
5 Grid ref (GR) (Note 2)
6 Obstacle type (Notes 2 and 3)
7 Generic mine type (Note 2 and 4)
8 Obstacle status (Note 2 and 5)
9 Barrier data:
E Obstacle effective times: (Note 2)
1 START date-time group (DTG)
2 END DTG
F Special remarks Acknowledge—
G 1 YES/NO Instructions for
2 acknowledging Force/unit to
3 acknowledge (Note 2)

NOTES:
1. If the answer at A is YES, a unique amendment designator must be
included here.
2. Repeat as necessary.
3. Specific obstacle type selected from:

UU4-1/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

Crater
AB Abatis CR LS Landslide
(Road)
Antitank
TD DM Demolition MF Minefield
Ditch
WO Barbed DT Dragon OT Other (4)
Wire Teeth
Obstacle
BP Beam Post DG Dry Gap UX UXO
Obstacle
BE Berm FB Falling WW Waterway
Block
Obstacle
Booby
BT FL Flooding
traps

4. Generic Mine type selected from:

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

A Area T Anti-Tank U Unknown
Anti-
H O Off-Route
Helicopter
Anti-
P N No Mines
Personnel
5. Obstacle status selected from:

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

BRE Breached PAS Passable PRO Proposed
Planned
CAN Cancelled PLP MRK Marked
Preliminary
CLR Cleared PLR Planned Reserve
Prepared for
EXE Executed IMP
Execution

UU4-2/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 5
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

CASUALTY EVACUATION REQUEST

General

1. A CASEVAC – 9 LINER is used to request casualty evacuation in all instances and should
not be confused with the JFHQ/MNF G37 CASEVAC – DUSTOFF maintained for tactical
evacuation (Cbt Bde HQ to Higher).

2. A CASEVAC – 9 LINER is to conform to the format outlined below.

Format - Plain Text

SUBJ: CASEVAC REQUEST (9-LINER)

FROM: UNIT TO: HQ X Bde

SERIAL CONTENT EXAMPLE

1. GRID LOCATION OF PICK UP SITE: GR 123 456

2. RADIO FREQUENCY AND CALL PRI: 34:543/ALT: 44:500 - CS IO

SIGN:

3. NUMBER OF PATIENTS BY
PRECEDENCE:

A. URGENT; to be at hospital facility (R2 1

or R3) within ASAP to 60 minutes of
first notification (P1).

B. PRIORITY; to be at hospital facility 1

(R2 or R3) within 4 hours of
notification by ’9-line’ (P2).

C. ROUTINE; to be at hospital facility

R2/R3 within 24 hours of notification
by ‘9-line’ (P3).

4. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

FOR EVAC:

A NONE A

B HOIST

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

C EXTRACTION EQUIP

D VENTILATOR

5. NUMBER OF PATIENTS BY TYPE:

L. LITTER

A AMBULATORY 2

E. ESCORTS

6. SECURITY OF PICKUP SITE:

N. NO ENEMY N

E. ENEMY IN AREA

P. POSSIBLE ENEMY

X. ENEMY (ESCORT REQ)

7. METHOD OF MARKING LZ

A. PANELS

B. PYROTECHNICS

C. SMOKE C

D. NONE

E. OTHER

8. PATIENT NATIONALITY AND

STATUS:

A. JTF MILITARY 2

B. JTF CIVILLIAN

C. NON-JTF MILITARY

D. NON-JTF CIVILLIAN

E. OPPOSING FORCES/PW/DETAINEE

F. CHILD

9. PICKUP ZONE (PZ) PZ NO TREE/POWERLINES

TERRAIN/OBSTACLE DESCIPTION 100 M TO EAST OF PZ

DO NOT DELAY LAUNCH OF MEDEVAC – SUPPLY FURTHER INFORMATION

ONCE AVAILABLE:
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Additional Information. Depending on the tactical situation, time and/or precedence of the
casualties, MIST should be sent following the 9 Liner:
M: Mechanism of injury (example: gunshot wound (GSW), in-direct fire (IDF), rocket
propelled grenade (RPG), explosion, road traffic accident (RTA)).
I: Injury or Illness Type (found or suspected).
S: Symptoms and Vital Signs (A – airway B – breathing rate C – pulse rate D –
conscious/unconscious E – other signs).
T: Treatment given (example: combat application tourniquet (CAT) applied, Morphine).
A/C: Adult/child, age if known.
T: Time of injury.
1. Specify if critical medical supplies are needed to be brought in with MEDEVAC.
2. ‘9-liner is not used for requests to move casualties who are killed in action at the scene.
3. A single MIST report can be utilised to detail multiple casualties in the event of a
MASCAS incident.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
UU5-3/3 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 6
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION REPORT

Purpose. Used to keep commanders continuously informed of matters associated with the
coordination of civil-military cooperation that affect, or could affect, the capabilities and/or the
operations of forces under their command.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION REPORT

(CIMICREP)
Host Nation Support (HNS) / Intra Country
A
Resources (ICR) coordination:
1 HNS/ICR acquisitions
2 Current negotiations
3 Areas of concern
4 Remarks
B Civil Emergency Planning:
1 Freedom of action
2 Civil support
3 Civil government actions
4 Emergency legislation
5 Population control / protection / safe areas
6 Evacuation measures
7 Reception areas / evacuation routes
8 Cooperating partners/organizations
9 Refugee movements/control/problems
10 Areas of concern
11 Assessment/proposals
C Civil-Military Cooperation:
1 Hearts and minds operations
2 Humanitarian aid programmes
3 Reforming civil infrastructure
4 Areas of concern
5 Assessment/proposals

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
UU6-1/1 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 7
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT
Purpose: Used to provide the commander's assessment of the overall strategic/local situation and his
intended or recommended actions based on such assessment.

COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT (ASSESSREP)

A Political Overview
B Assessment—opposing forces (OPFOR):
1 Strategic overview
2 OPFOR summary
3 OPFOR options
C Assessment—blue forces:
1 Posture
2 Military situation
3 Logistics
4 Command and information system (CIS) assessment
5 Precautions
D Comd's overall assessment:
1 Blue forces
2 OPFOR situation
3 Concerns
E Intentions

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 8
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

CONTROL/COORDINATION LINE REPORT

Purpose

1. The SITREP is submitted at the tac level.

Method of transmission

2. SITREPs are normally passed in msg format with IMMEDIATE prec. If passed by rad
they are to be concise.

3. SITREPs should be passed to higher HQ and all flanking units / fms.

Format - Plain Text

SITREP NO (1)

PD COVERED (DTG TO DTG)

REF (IF REQUIRED)

1. EN (2)

A. INDENT

B. EN RES WHICH CAN AFFECT LOC SIT

C. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EN ACTY DURING REPT PD

D. BRIEF EST OF EN STR, MATERIAL MEANS, MORAL AND

THEIR PROBABLE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SIT

E. CONCLUSIONS COVERING COA OPEN TO EN

2. OWN SIT

A. LOC OF FWD ELM (3)

B. LOC OF FMNS, UNITS AND SPT UNITS (IF APPLICABLE) (3)

C. LOC OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SPT UNITS (IF APPLICABLE)

D. BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS OF OPS DURING REPT

PD

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

E. CURRENT FMN/UNIT OP CAPABILITY

3. ADMIN. (GEN STATEMENTS OF ADMIN SIT OF OTHER THAN NORMAL AS

IT DIRECTLY AFFECTS TAC SIT)

4. GEN. (MUST INCL FUTURE INTENTIONS) (4)

5. COMD EVAL (5)

6. ACK INSTR (IF REQUIRED)

Notes

1. Numbered sequentially from 001.

2. En sit can be ref to previous intrep/intsum.

3. LOCSTATs can be ref to previous LOCSTATs.

4. Future Intentions must be incl to cfm or state the intentions for both
Ops and Admin for at least the next 24 hr.

5. COMD eval should be written by the COMD or their principal ops staff
offr.

Example - Sig Format

SITREP NO 15
PD 211800K TO 221800KDEC9X
1. EN. IAW INTREP 27 AND INTSUM34.
2. OWN SIT.
A. NO CHANGE FROM LOCSTAT 024.
B. AS FOR 2A.
C. N/A.
D. TF CONTINUES TO ADV ALONG AXIS CENTURIAN WITH TWO MOT BN
FWD.
E. NO CHANGE.
3. DUE TO MSR REOPENING RESUP BY RD WILL RECOMMENCE NI 23/24 DEC 9X.
4. TF WILL CLOSE UP TO OBJ MERCURY AND ATTEMPT QUICK ATK
WITH 6 RAR AND 2/14 QMI.
5. ADV CONTINUES AS PLANNED. AFTER PREVIOUS ATK 25/49 RQR IS
EFFECTIVELY ONE COY SHORT. IF QUICK ATK AT OBJ MERCURY IS NOT
SUCCESSFUL I INTEND TO CONDUCT DELIBERATE TF (-) ATK PROBABLY NI
25/26 DEC. IF THIS IS THE CASE I WILL REQUEST JF FS PRI FOR THIS PD.
6. N/A

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

ADFORMS guidance

3. IAW Ref A:

Usage Set Name Set Title Form

O EXER EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION

O OPER OPERATION IDENT DATA
M MSGID MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
O R REF REFERENCE
M PERID EFFECTIVE DAY-TIME PERIOD
O R MAP MAP IDENTIFICATION
O HEADING HEADING SET H
/ENEMY
O 5EUNIT ENEMY UNIT INFORMATION C
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/NONHOSTILE INFORMATION
O HEADING HEADING SET H
/OWN SITUATION
O R BNDLINE BOUNDARY LINE
O 5UNIT MIL UNIT ID AND LOC INFO C
O 5NREADY UNIT STATUS BELOW C3 READ C
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/ADMIN AND LOG
O CBCASLTY COMBAT CASUALTY DATA
O 5EQSTRPT EQUIPMENT STATUS
REPORT C
O 5ASCTRPT AIRCRAFT STATUS REPORT C
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/GENERAL
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/SITUATION
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/OPERATIONS
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/LOGISTICS
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT
/PERSONNEL
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
/SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MILITARY DIPLOMATIC
EVENTS
O GENTEXT GENERAL TEXT H
COMMANDERS EVALUATION
O DECL MSG DECALSS DATA

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
UU8-3/3 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 9
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

DOWNED AIRCRAFT REPORT

DTG:_______________

Line 1 A/C type & tail #

Line 2 Location grid or ref point

(distance/direction from major
landmark)

Line 3 Threat level Low Med High Unknown Secure

Line 4 Number of injuries/casualties Litter/Urgent Critical Ambulatory Fatalities

Line 5 Person on board (include any codes

listed in the aviation procedures
guide)

Line 6 Reason Enemy Action Mechanical Failure Other

Line 7 Landing type Precautionary Emergency Hard Crash

Line 8 Fire/fuel spillage Fire Fuel Spill

Line 9 A/C systems affected Airframe Engine Trans Hydraulics Fuel Syst Electrical

Line 10 Problem Leak Fire Crack Dent Hole Bent

Msn Comps Over Speed Over Temp Over Trq

Line 11 Accessibility & Hazards Open Confined (Two or less A/C) Very Confined (One A/C)

Ordnance Trees Wires Slope Dust Snow

Smoke Fog Rain Water Ice Fire

Remarks:

Reported by (Name):

A/C tail #/radio frequency/phone number:

Sensitive items/ammunition on board:

Location of individual who can guide rescue party:

Rcvd By (Name/Rank):

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise activities
only.
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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 10
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

ENGINEER DATA REPORT

General

1. Armed forces of NATO and ABCA countries use std forms given in this annex as a
simple and concise method of rept engr info collected in the fd. The forms are intended for use
by units of all arms and svcs.

Security classification

2. The originator is resp for the clas of the rept. Since most info is obtained from
terrain analysis aval to the en also, info should not be clas higher than nec.

Method of transmission

3. The forms are designed for xmit by rad using std msg format and should begin
with the prefix ENGREP. Where ENGREPs are spt by drawings, maps and overlays, they are to
be sent by rad and fol by the written repts.

Method of compiling

4. Only complete those parts of the format which are applicable to the rept. Use
serial ltrs and no, exactly as shown, in order to properly ident info. Nil entries for incomplete
parts are not required. It is emphasised that incomplete repts are often of great value, eg that
mines have been found in a certain area although no details are known.

5. Info on such items as originator, adrs, security clas, prec, and DTG as prov on the
std msg form must also be prov in written repts. Map ref (Ser A) are mandatory. Note that
ENGREPs do not take the place of detailed records of minefields, dmls etc.

6. Tables to assist in the compilation of ENGREPs are detailed at para 8.

7. Std format repts on engr info are grouped under the fol headings:

ENGREP 102 (ENGR TASK STATUS REPT)

ENGREP 103A (ENGR MATERIAL REQ)
ENGREP 103B (ENGR MATERIAL RELEASE ORDER)
ENGREP 104 (ENGR UNIT STATUS)
ENGREP 110A (ROUTE RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 110B (ROUTE RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 111A (ROAD BRG AND TUNNEL RECCE ORDER)

UU10-1/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

ENGREP 111B (ROAD BRG AND TUNNEL RECCE REPT)

ENGREP 111C (ROAD BRG AND TUNNEL REPAIR AND MAINT
EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 111D (ROAD BRIDGE AND TUNNEL REPAIR AND MAINT
COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 112A (CROSSING SITE RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 112B (CROSSING SITE RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 112C (CROSSING SITE EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 112D (CROSSING SITE COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 113A (MINEFD BREACHING / CLEARING RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 113B (MINEFD BREACHING / CLEARING RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 113C (MINEFD BREACHING / CLEARING EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 113D (MINEFD BREACHING / CLEARING COMPLETION REPT)

ENGREP 120A (OBSTACLE RECCE ORDER)

ENGREP 120B (OBSTACLE RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 120C (OBSTACLE EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 120D (OBSTACLE COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 121A (BRG DEMOLITION RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 121B (BRG DEMOLITION RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 121C (BRG DEMOLITION RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 121D (BRG DEMOLITION COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 122A (MINEFD LAYING RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 122B (MINEFD LAYING RECCE REPORT)
ENGREP 122C (MINEFD LAYING EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 122D (MINEFD LAYING COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 130A (SURVIVABLITY RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 130B (SURVIVABLITY RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 130C (SURVIVABLITY EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 130D (SURVIVABLITY COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 140A (RECCE ORDER)
ENGREP 140B (RECCE REPT)
ENGREP 140C (EXECUTION ORDER)
ENGREP 140D (COMPLETION REPT)
ENGREP 203 (ENGREP)
ENGREP 204 (ENGDATAREP)
ENGREP 301A (SCATTERABLE MINEFD REQ)
ENGREP 301B (SCATTERABLE MINEFD ORDER)
ENGREP 301C (SCATTERABLE MINEFD WNG)
ENGREP 301D (SCATTERABLE MINEFD REPT)
ENGREP 301E (SCATTERABLE MINEFD RECORD)
ENGREP 302 (RESERVED DEMOLITION ORDER ) (STANAG 2017)
ENGREP 303 (OBSTACLE REPT)
ENGREP 305 (BARRIER REPT)
UU10-2/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

8. The list of tables is as fol:

TABLE A TASK STATUS

TABLE B LIMITING REQUIREMENTS / RESTRICTIONS FOUND
TABLE C OBSTRUCTION TYPE
TABLE D SURFACE CONDITIONS
TABLE E ROAD SURFACE TYPE
TABLE F TYPE OF TASK
TABLE G ROAD USAGE TYPE
TABLE H OBSTACLE TYPE
TABLE I DEGREE OF PERMANENCY
TABLE J BRG PIER TYPE
TABLE K BRG STRUCTURE
TABLE L TUNNEL DESCRIPTION
TABLE M CROSSING SITE TASK
TABLE N CROSSING SITE MEANS / SITE CAPABILITY
TABLE 0 NATURE OF SOIL
TABLE P APPROACH VEGETATION
TABLE Q ENGR RESOURCES STATUS
TABLE R OBSTACLE CAT
TABLE S GENERIC MINE TYPE
TABLE T MINEFD DENSITY
TABLE U LAYING METHOD
TABLE V METHOD OF BREACHING
TABLE W TYPE OF TGT
TABLE X OBSTACLE STATUS
TABLE Y TAC OBJECTIVE
TABLE Z BRG DEMOLITION STATUS
TABLE AA INITIATION METHOD
TABLE AB MINEFD TYPE
TABLE AC SURVIVABILITY MSN
TABLE AD SURVIVABILITY TASK
TABLE AE UNIT LEVEL
TABLE AF UNIT TYPE
TABLE AG GEN ENGR SPT MISSION
TABLE AH GEN ENGR SPT TASK
TABLE AI ENGR TASK / RECCE TYPE
TABLE AJ LIMITATIONS
TABLE AK ORDERS TO THE DEMOLITION GUARD
TABLE AL ORDERS OTHER THAN FIRING
TABLE AM OBSTACLE CHARACTERISTICS
TABLE AN RESOURCE NATURE

UU10-3/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

TABLE A - TASK STATUS

CODE DESCRIPTION
0 TASK NOT STARTED
1 TASK STARTED
2 WORK 25% COMPLETE
3 WORK 50 % COMPLETE
4 WORK 75% COMPLETE
5 WORK 100% COMPLETE
6 STATE 1 NOW (DEMOLITION)
7 STATE 2 NOW (DEMOLITION)
8 TASK COMPLETE
9 ABANDONED INCOMPLETE
10 TASK HANDED OVER

TABLE B - LIMITING REQUIREMENTS/RESTRICTIONS FOUND

Both the code and a measurement should be given, eg, WI-9.0/GR-35/HI-12.0

CODE DESCRIPTION
GR GRADIENT in %
HC HORIZONTAL CURVE in metres
HI HEIGHT in metres
WI WIDTH in metre

TABLE C - OBSTRUCTION TYPE

Type of construction will be RD- road, BR- bridge or TU- tunnel.

CODE DESCRIPTION
AO ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE
OR OVERHEAD RESTRICTION
OT OTHER
SC SHARP CURVE
SG STEEP GRADIENT
WR WIDTH RESTRICTION
SF SURFACE CONDITION
ML MLC
HB HUMP BACK OR RAMP

UU10-4/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE D - SURFACE CONDITIONS

CODE DESCRIPTION
1 SAND
2 POTHOLE/RUTTING
3 LANDSLIDE
4 SNOW/ICE
5 FLOODING
6 NO OR SOFT SHOULDERS
7 WASH OUT

TABLE E - ROAD SURFACE TYPE

ODE DESCRIPTION
AS ASPHALT
BS WOOD /TIMBER
BN CONCRETE
BA REINFORCED CONCRETE
BP PRESTRESSED CONCRETE
CX PEBBLE
GS GRAVEL
ML METAL
MN BRICK/MASONARY
PE COBBLESTONE
RE ROCK
SN SNOW/ICE
TE EARTH
VE SILT
SD SAND
DS MISCELLANEOUS

TABLE F - TYPE OF TASK

CODE DESCRIPTION
RR ROAD REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE
RO ROAD CONSTRUCTION
BR BRIDGE REPAIR, MAINT AND REINFORCEMENT
TR TUNNEL REPAIR

UU10-5/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE G - ROAD USAGE TYPE

CODE DESCRIPTION
A MOTORWAY/EXPRESSWAY
B MAIN ROAD/HWY/FEDERAL ROAD
C REGIONAL ROAD
D LOCAL ROAD/STREET
E TRACK LANE
P PEDESTRIAN
R RAILWAY
O OTHER

TABLE H - OBSTACLE TYPE

CODE DESCRIPTION
BE BERM
MF MINEFIELD
WO BARBED WIRE OBSTACLE
TD ANTITANK DITCH
AB ABATIS
BP BEAM POST OBSTACLE
FB FALL BLOCK OBSTACLE
BT BOOBY TRAP
DT DRAGON TEETH
CR ROAD CRATER
DM DEMOLITION
RI RIVER
LS LANDSLIDE
UX UXO
OT OTHER

TABLE I - DEGREE OF PERMANENCY

CODE DESCRIPTION
1 EMERGENCY
2 TEMPORARY
3 PERMANENT

UU10-6/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE J - BRIDGE PIER TYPE

CODE DESCRIPTION
PS PILES
SB SLAB
CB CRIB
GR GIRDER
FL FLOATING
OT OTHER

TABLE K - BRIDGE STRUCTURE

CODE DESCRIPTION
AR ARCH BRIDGE
CR CANTILEVER BRIDGE
FL FLOATING BRIDGE
GR BOX GIRDER BRIDGE
LT LIFT BRIDGE
SL SLAB BRIDGE
ST STRINGER BRIDGE
SU SUSPENSION BRIDGE
SW SWING BRIDGE
TR TRUSS BRIDGE
MI MILITARY BRIDGE
OT OTHER

TABLE L - TUNNEL DESCRIPTION

CODE DESCRIPTION
EL ELLIPTICAL
HS HORSESHOE
SQ SQUARE
SC SEMI-CIRCULAR

TABLE M - CROSSING SITE TASK

CODE DESCRIPTION
A ACTIVATE CROSSING SITE
B DEACTIVATE CROSSING SITE
C ACTIVATE ALTERNATIVE CROSSING SITE
D DISMANTLE CROSSING SITE

UU10-7/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE N - CROSSING SITE MEANS/SITE CAPABILITY

CODE DESCRIPTION
1 CROSSING MEANS:
EG EXISTING CROSSING
FA FORD/WADING
AB AMPHIBIOUS-BRIDGING
AF AMPHIBIOUS-FERRYING
AP SWIMMING
SU SNORKEL SUBVERSION
GE ARMD/ ASLT BRIDGING
BR DRY BRIDGING
OT OTHER
2 CROSSING CAPABILITY:
XX IMPOSSIBLE
PP POSSIBLE WITH PREPARATION
OK POSSIBLE WITHOUT PREPARATION
GD POSSIBLE LEFT TO RIGHT BANK
DG POSSIBLE RIGHT TO LEFT BANK

TABLE O - NATURE OF SOIL

CODE DESCRIPTION
BN CONCRETE
GS GRAVEL
CX PEBBLE
PE COBBLESTONE
TE EARTH
VE SILT
SD SAND
RE ROCK
MN BRICK/MASONARY
DS MISCELLANEOUS

TABLE P - APPROACH VEGETATION

CODE DESCRIPTION
I GRASSLAND
V ISOLATED BUSHES, SHRUBS
W SINGLE LINE OF TREES
X THICKET OF TREES FORMING OBSTACLE

UU10-8/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE Q - ENGINEER RESOURCE STATUS

CODE DESCRIPTION
E ESTIMATED
A ALLOCATED
U USED

TABLE R - OBSTACLE CATEGORY

CODE DESCRIPTION
EN ENEMY
FR FRIEND
UN UNKNOWN

TABLE S - GENERIC MINE TYPE

CODE DESCRIPTION
A AREA
H ANTI-HELICOPTER
N NO MINES
O OFF ROUTE
P ANTI PERS
T ANTI TANK
U UNKNOWN

TABLE T - MINEFIELD DENSITY

CODE DESCRIPTION
A MINES PER METRE FRONT
B MINES PER METRE FRONT

TABLE U - LAYING METHOD

DESCRIPTION
CODE
AS ARTILLERY SCATTERED
GS GROUND SCATTERED
FS FAST AIR SCATTERED
HB HAND BURIED
HS HAND SURFACE LAID
LS HELICOPTER SCATTERED
MB MECHANICAL BURIED
MS MECHANICAL SURFACE LAID
UU10-9/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE V - METHOD OF BREACHING

DESCRIPTION
CODE
C COMBINATION
E EXPLOSIVE
H HAND
M MECHANICAL

TABLE W - TYPE OF TARGET

CODE DESCRIPTION
AR AREA
BL BUILDING
BR BRIDGE
DA DAM
FA FERRY
RD ROAD
RR RAILROAD
SR CROSS COUNTRY ROAD/TRACK
TL TUNNEL
OT OTHER

TABLE X - OBSTACLE STATUS

CODE DESCRIPTION
PRO PROPOSED
PLR PLANNED RESERVE
PLP PLANNED PRELIMINARY
IMP PREPARED FOR EXECUTION
EXE EXECUTED
PAS PASSABLE
BRE BREACHED
CLR CLEARED
CAN CANCELLED
MRK MARKED

UU10-10/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE Y - TACTICAL OBJECTIVE

CODE DESCRIPTION
BK BLOCK
CD CANALISE/ DEFLECT
DT DISRUPT
PT PROTECT
RT DELAY

TABLE Z - BRIDGE DEMOLITION STATUS

CODE DESCRIPTION
PRO PROPOSED
PLR PLANNED RESERVE
PLP PLANNED PRELIMINARY
IMP PREPARED FOR EXECUTION
EXE EXECUTED
CAN CANCELLED

TABLE AA - INITIATION METHOD

CODE DESCRIPTION
B BOTH
E ELECTRICAL
M NON ELECTRICAL

TABLE AB - MINEFIELD TYPE

CODE DESCRIPTION
TA TACTICAL
NU NUISANCE
PR PROTECTIVE
PH PHONEY

TABLE AC - SURVIVABILITY MISSION

CODE DESCRIPTION
A PROTECTIVE WORKS
B HARDENING
C PROTECTIVE WORKS WITH CAM/CONCEALMENT
D CAM/CONCEALMENT
E DECEPTION
UU10-11/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE AD - SURVIVABILITY TASK

CODE DESCRIPTION
1 HQ
2 CP
3 OP
4 DEFENSIVE POSITION
5 FIRING POSITION
6 INSTALLATION
7 OTHER

TABLE AE - UNIT LEVEL

CODE DESCRIPTION
1 DIV
2 BDE
3 BN/REGT
4 COY/SQN
5 PL/TP
6 OTHER

TABLE AF - UNIT TYPE

DESCRIPTION
CODE
1 DISMOUNTED TROOPS
2 MECHANISED TROOPS
3 ARMOURED
4 ARTILLERY
5 LOGISTICS
6 ENGINEERS
7 OTHER

TABLE AG - GENERAL ENGINEER SUPPORT MISSION

DESCRIPTION
CODE
A CONSTRUCT
B MAINTAIN
C REPAIR
D PROVIDE
E IMPROVE
UU10-12/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE AH - GENERAL ENGINEER SUPPORT TASK

DESCRIPTION
CODE
1 WATER SUPPLY
2 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
3 HELICOPTER LANDING GROUND/PAD
4 FUEL STORAGE
5 ACCOMMODATION
6 AIRSTRIP
7 AREA CLEARANCE
8 RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION
9 PORT/HARBOUR
10 PIPELINE
11 SEWERAGE
12 BASE CAMP
13 EARTHWORKS
14 OTHER

TABLE AI - ENGINEER TASK/RECONISANCE TYPE

CODE DESCRIPTION
MO MOBILITY
CM COUNTER MOBILITY
SU SURVIVABILITY
GE GEN ENGR SUPPORT

TABLE AJ - LIMITATIONS

CODE DESCRIPTION
PER PERSONNEL
EQP EQUIPMENT
TIM TIME
LOG LOGISTICS
MAT MATERIEL

UU10-13/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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TABLE AK - ORDERS TO DEMOLITION GUARD COMMANDER

CODE DESCRIPTION
IA IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING PREPARED
IB UPON RECEIPT OF CODE BY RADIO
IC UPON RECEIPT OF ORDER IN PERSON
ID OTHER ORDERS

TABLE AL - ORDERS OTHER THAN FIRING

CODE DESCRIPTION
BA BY THE AUTH COMD PERSONALLY
BB BY THE AUTH COMD LO PERSONALLY
BC BY RADIO
BD BY OTHER MEANS

TABLE AM - OBSTACLE CHARACTERISTICS

CODE DESCRIPTION
IMP PREPARED
PAS PASSABLE
BRE BREACHED
MSL MINES SURFACE LAID
MRK MARKED
COV COVERED BY ENEMY FIRE

TABLE AN - RESOURCE NATURE

CODE DESCRIPTION
1 RATIONS/WATER
2 PERS EQUIP
3 POL
4 CONSTRUCTION STORES
5 AMMUNITION
6 MORALE SUPPORT
7 MAJOR EQUIP
8 MEDICAL
9 REPAIR PARTS
10 OTHER

UU10-14/14
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 11
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

ENGINEER REPORT
Purpose: Used to report combat engineer task progress and unit combat effectiveness from
brigade group level up to corps level.
ENGINEER REPORT (ENGRREP)
A Amendment:
1 YES/NO
2 Designator (Note 1)
B Map details:
1 Map/chart series
2 Map/chart suffix no
3 Map/chart sheet no (Note 2)
4 Map/chart edition no (Note 2)
5 Geodetic datum (Note 2)

C Reporting unit combat effectiveness summary:

1 Personnel unit combat effectiveness (Note 3)
2 Equipment unit combat effectiveness (Note 3)
D HQ location:
1 Actual location (grid ref)
2 Planned location (grid ref)
3 Date-time group (DTG) planned to become effective
E Organization designator of subordinate unit(s)
1 Unit designation name (Note 4)
Size indicator
Nationality
Role indicator—Code “A”
Role indicator—Code “B”
Role indicator—Code “C”
Role indicator—Code “D”
Higher formation name
Armed service or civilian agency code
Unit ident code
2 Unit designation name, etc.
F Subordinate unit combat effectiveness: (Notes 2 and 4)
1 Personnel
2 Equipment
G Grid location (Note 4) (grid ref)

UU11-1/3
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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H Task identification (Note 4):

1 Task no (Note 2) engineer task nickname
2 Task no, etc.
I Task status (Note 4):
1 Engineer task type (Notes 2 and 5):
Status (Note 6)
Estimated DTG of completion
Complete task capability indicator—YES/NO
Task limitations (Note 7)
2 Engineer task type, etc.
J Unit combat effectiveness assessment:
1 Next 24 hours: Personnel (Note 3)
Equipment (Note 3)
2 Next 48 hours: Personnel (Note 3)
Equipment (Note 3)
3 Next 72 hours: Personnel (Note 3)
Equipment (Note 3)
K Special remarks
L Acknowledge—YES/NO
1 Instructions for acknowledging
2 Force/unit to acknowledge (Note 2)

NOTES:
1. If the answer at A is YES, a unique amendment designator must be included here.

2. These information elements are repeatable for each separate item/subitem/subordinate

unit as appropriate.

3. Selected from the following codes:

1 Fully operational
2 Substantially operational
3 Marginally operational
4 Non-operational

4. Serials E through I are repeatable as a message block (segment) for each subordinate
unit reported.

UU11-2/3
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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5. Task type selected from the following codes:

MO Mobility
CM Counter-mobility
SU Survivability
GE General engineer support

6. Task status selected from the following

codes:

00 Task not started

01 Task started
02 Work 25% complete
03 Work 50% complete
04 Work 75% complete
05 Work 100% complete
06 State 1 now (demolition)
07 State 2 now (demolition)
08 Task complete
09 Abandoned incomplete
10 Task handed over

7. Task limitations selected from the following codes:

PER Personnel
EQP Equipment
TIM Time
LOG Logistics
MAT Materiel

UU11-3/3
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 12
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

GUN AND ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE (AFV) STATE

Purpose. To provide information on availability of critical combat platforms.

GUN AND AFV STATE

A Artillery:
1 Type/ no. serviceable/ no. require integral repair
support/ no. requiring CS/GS repair support / no.
beyond economical repair
2 Repeatable as necessary
B Mortars:
1 Type/ no. serviceable/ no. require integral repair
support/ no. requiring CS/GS repair support / no.
beyond economical repair
2 Repeatable as necessary
C Anti-armour weapons (Hy):
1 Type/ no. serviceable/ no. require integral repair
support/ no. requiring CS/GS repair support / no.
beyond economical repair
2 Repeatable as necessary
D Armoured vehicles (trk/wh): (Note 1)
1 Type/ no. serviceable/ no. require integral repair
support/ no. requiring CS/GS repair support / no.
beyond economical repair
2 Repeatable as necessary
NOTES:
1. Soft skinned vehicles will not be reported unless losses
have a critical impact on operations.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU12-1/1 OFFICAL
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Appendix 13
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

HELICOPTER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Purpose. To inform a unit or formation of the acceptance, delay or refusal of a request for
transport helicopter or utility helicopter support.

HELICOPTER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
(HELACK)
HELQUEST identifier (unit ident ((i.e., SIC)) and
unique request ident (date plus 3-digit serial no)
A Decision—ACCEPTED/REFUSED/DELAYED
until date-time group (DTG) (Note 1)
B Quantity and type of aircraft (ac) tasked
C Aircraft callsign (C/S) or mission number
D Estimated DTG at pickup point(s) (PUPs) (Note 2)
E Reason for REFUSED/DELAYED
F Additional information—clearance, e.g., corridors
or timeframe, and any instructions not covered at A
to D above.
NOTES:
1. The reason for REFUSED/DELAYED must be given at E.
2. Repeated as necessary – D1, D2, D3, etc. – for multiple
PUPs.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU13-1/1 OFFICIAL
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Appendix 14
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

HELICOPTER REQUEST FORM

DATE TIME GROUP FILE NUMBER MESSAGE NUMBER

SUBJ: HELQUEST

REFS:

1. 1. REQUESTING UNIT
2. 2. MSN NO

A. A. NO. AND TYPE OF HELS (CH146/CH147 ETC)

B. B. NATURE OF TASK (DETAILS)

C. C. PICK UP POINT(S)/RV LOC

D. D. DEST(S) OR RECCE TGT(S)

E. E. DTG AT PICK UP POINT(S) (NOTE 1)

F. F. NOT AFTER TIME AT PICK UP POINT OR ON

TASK (NOTE 1)
G. G. EST DURATION (IN HOURS)

H. H. TOTAL PAX (MIL/CIV/VIP)

I. CARGO (NOTE 2)
I.
J. J. C/S & FREQ AT PICK UP POINT(S)

K. K. C/S & FREQ AT DEST

L. L. BRIEFING (C/S & FREQ/LOC)

M. M. DEBRIEFING (C/S & FREQ /LOC)

N. N. CBT INT UPDATE WITH PREFERRED ROUTES

O. O. RMKS/OTHER (NOTE 3)

(NOTE 1) ALL TIMES LOCAL

UU14-1/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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(NOTE 2) STATE WHAT PAX WILL BE CARRYING, i.e., TAC VEST, WPNS,
RUCKSACKS PLUS ANY ADDITIONAL CARGO SUCH AS TOBOGGANS OR
SLUNG LOAD WEIGHTS INCLUDING DESCRIPTION OF DANGEROUS CARGO
(BLANK/PYRO) TO BE CARRIED INTERNALLY (IF NONE, STATE “NO
DANGEROUS CARGO”)

(NOTE 3) OPI NAME AND PHONE NUMBER, DANGEROUS CARGO OP NEC DEC
REF, CIV PAX AUTH REQ OR APPROVAL REF, FIN CODE FOR CREW TD
EXPENSES IF OVERNIGHT OR OVER A MEAL HOUR, ETC

UU14-2/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
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Appendix 15
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

HELICOPTER TASKING FORM

DATE TIME GROUP FILE NUMBER MESSAGE NUMBER

NOTE 1

SUBJ: HELTASK

REFS: (HELQUEST NO)

1. 1. TASKED UNIT
2. 2. MSN NO

A. A. NO. AND TYPE OF HELOS

B. B. NATURE OF TASK (DETAILS)

C. C. PICK UP POINT(S)/RV LOC

D. D. DEST(S) OR RECCE TGT(S)

E. NOTE 1 E. DTG AT PICK UP POINT(S) (NOTE 1)

F. NOTE 1 F. NOT AFTER TIME AT PICK UP POINT OR ON

TASK (NOTE 1)
G. G. EST DURATION (IN HOURS)

H. H. TOTAL PAX (MIL/CIV/VIP)

I. CARGO (NOTE 2)
I.
J. J. C/S & FREQ AT PICK UP POINT(S)

K. K. C/S & FREQ AT DEST

L. L. BRIEFING (C/S & FREQ/LOC)

M. M. DEBRIEFING (C/S & FREQ /LOC)

N. N. CBT INT UPDATE WITH PREFERRED ROUTES

O. O. RMKS/OTHER (NOTE 3)

UU15-1/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Notes:
1. All times LOCAL.
2. State what PAX will be carrying, ie tac vest, wpns, rucksacks plus any additional cargo
such as toboggans or slung load weights including description of dangerous cargo
(ammo/blank/pyro) to be carried internally (if none, state “NO DANGEROUS
CARGO”).

3. OPI name and phone number, dangerous cargo OP NEC DEC ref, civ pax auth req or
approval ref, fin code for crew TD expenses if overnight or over a meal hour, etc

UU15-2/2
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 16
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

HOST NATION SUPPORT REQUEST

HOST NATION SUPPORT REQUEST (HNSREQ)

A HNSREQ reference no
Designator(s) of formation(s)/unit(s) needing
B
support
C Support needed—a summary of the type(s) and
quantity of support needed, e.g.;
1 Security for reception of reinforcements
Security of command/logistic facilities and high risk
2
assets
3 Decontamination
4 Chemical smoke
Transport, transshipment, storage of
5
materiel/stores/munitions
6 Transport/accommodation of personnel
7 Casualty evacuation
8 Military bridging
9 Communications bearers
10 Repairs of weapons/equipment
11 General CSS
12 Damage limitation/repair
13 Reinforcement/stockpiling facilities
14 Food supplies
D Legal authorization (Note 1)
E Time by when the HNS is required
F Duration:
1 FROM date-time group (DTG)
2 TO DTG
G Location at which support is required
Point of contact (POC) details at the support
H
location
I Remarks
NOTES: 1. Reference the relevant bilateral/multilateral
agreements on which the HNSREQ is based.

UU16-1/1
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 17 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 17
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT (INTREP)

A What? (The event/incident/activity being reported)
B When?
C Where?
D How?
E Assessment/comment (to include):
1 Reliability
2 Deductions
3 Conclusions

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU17-1/1 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 18
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Purpose

1. The Intsum is a periodical summary of en acty and assessment of likely en intentions.

Method

2. The Intsum is to be transmitted in message format with an IMMEDIATE prec.

INTSUM TEMPLATE

1. ENEMY SITUATION. [J2WK & CC2 STAFF]

A. OVERALL. A BROAD DESCRIPTION (<5 LINES) DESCRIBING THE NATURE
OF EN ACTY NOTED IN AREA OF OPERATIONS.
B. HIGHER (STRAT – OP LEVEL). NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF EN HIGHER
LEVEL ACTY RELEVANT TO JTF AND COMPONENT OPS.
C. JOINT/COMBINED HIGHER TAC LEVEL. A BROAD DESCRIPTION (<10
LINES) DESCRIBING THE NATURE OF EN ACTY NOTED IN AOR, CONC ON LEVEL
OF EN CTF/JTF/FORCE (IE: OUR OPP NUMBERS).
D. TACTICAL LEVEL. (COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF PREP SUMMARY
OF EN ACTY WITHIN AOR, RECEIVED VIA THEIR INTSUM)
(1) MARITIME. [N2]
(2) LAND. [G2]
(3) AIR. [A2]
2. THIRD PARTY SITUATION. [R&A Cell]
A. DCS. [CMO]
B. CRIMINAL. [CMO-JMP ADVICE AS REQ]
C. PARA-MILITARY.
D. SECURITY SERVICES AND POLICE.
E. MILITARY FORCES.
3. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE THREAT SITUATION IN AOR. [J2X]
A. ENEMY.
B. THIRD PARTY/UI.
4. ANALYSIS OF EN ACTY IN AIR. (ANALYSIS OF EN ACTY SPECIFICALLY
LOOKING AT THEIR COMD INTENT, C2, CAPABILITY & COA)
5. ANALYSIS OF THIRD PARTY ACTY IN AOR. (TO ADVISE HOW 3RD PARTIES
CAN AND WILL LIKELY INFLUENCE JTF OPS, SPECIFICALLY LOOKING AT THEIR
INTENT AND CAPABILITY AND LIKELY COA)
6. FORECAST. (DEEP, CLOSE AND REAR)
7. POC.
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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EXAMPLE.

SUBJ: CJTF 631 INTSUM 08/04, PD 110800K TO 112100K MAY 04

ENEMY SITUATION.
1. OVERALL. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF AR ELMS FROM ATROPIA, THE
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AR AND AP HAS UNDERGONE A
SIGNIFICANT SHIFT. THE UNCONVENTIONAL THREAT TO CTF FORCES INCREASES

AS M3/RD SF CONTINUES TO ACTIVELY TARGET CTF REAR AND LOGISTIC ELMS.

THE RODEMACHT CONTINUE TO UTILISE AIR COVER TO PATROL THE DISPUTED

ZONE, HOWEVER THEY WILL AVOID DIRECT CONTACT WITH CTF AIR UNITS.

2. POLITICAL. THE ARIANIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN HAS DENOUNCED

THE INTERFERENCE OF THE US IN ATROPIA. THE ARIANIAN UN REPRESENTATIVE
STATED THAT THE ACTION OF THE US WAS CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW. NO FURTHER INDICATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED
REGARDING THE POLITICAL WILL OF ATROPIA TO MAINTAIN MILITARY FORCES
WITH THE DISPUTED ZONE. J2 COMMENT. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE POLITICAL
WILL OF THE ATROPIAN GOVERNMENT MAY NOT BE SHARED BY THAT OF THE
POPULATION. END COMMENT.
3. TACTICAL.
A. MARITIME. ONE FOXTROT SS DEPARTED ST LAWRENCE HEADING EAST
POSSIBLY ARMED WITH MINES. ONE KILO CLASS SSG REMAINS ON PATROL IN
VICINITY OF CURTIS CHANNEL. THE REMAINDER OF RD MARITIME UNITS ARE
DISPERSED WITH SOME IN HARBOUR AND SOME AT SEA. THE UNITS AT SEA
REMAIN IN A NON-AGGRESSIVE POSTURE. J2 COMMENT. CURRENTLY THE TWO
SUBMARINES PRESENT THE GREATEST THREAT TO CTF MARITIME ELMS. THE
FOXTROT IF ARMED, AND CAN GET CLOSE ENOUGH, HAS THE ABILITY TO SEED A
MINEFIELD THAT COULD SEVERELY AFFECT SEA APPROACHES TO BUNDABERG
HARBOUR EFFECTIVELY CLOSING THE HARBOUR UNTIL CLEARED OF MINES. IN
THE EVENT THAT A MINEFIELD IS LAID, IT WILL AFFECT LOGISITIC SUPPORT
THROUGH THE HARBOUR FOR PERIOD OF TIME. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT RD
MARITIME ELMS CURRENTLY AT SEA WILL BECOME DIRECTLY ENGAGED WITH
CTF
MARITIME UNITS. END COMMENT.
B. LAND. REPORTING HAS CONFIRMED THE LOCS OF GND AND AD FORCES IVO
GLADSTONE. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED THAT ELMS OF THE HOME GUARD
HAVE BEEN RAISED AND ARE PREPARING A POSN IVO GLADSTONE. REPORTING
INDICATES THAT THE HOME GUARD IS MADE UP OF WELL TRAINED AND
MOTIVATED SOLDIER BATTLE HARDENED BY MORE THAN THREE YEARS OF

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU18-2/4 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

CONFLICT. REPORTING HAS ALSO INDICATED A COY (-) OF 84 UNK PERS WAS LOC
IVO BILOELA. G2 COMMENT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED
REGARDING THIS SIGHTING. IT IS POSSIBLE THIS COY OF PERS IS FORCE
PROTECTION FOR THE 1 MIB GP HQ. END COMMENT. A 2 RAR MTD PL (+) WAS
ATK IVO GLENGARRY BY 2 X MI-24 HIND. 1 MIB RECON COY AND SCREEN OF 11
MRB CONTACTED ADF RECON ELMS NTH OF GREEN LINE. J2 COMMENT: RD
ACTIONS DURING THE PERIOD ARE CONSISTENT WITH A COUNTER RECON
BATTLE. THE METHOD OF CONTACT AND WITHDRAWAL INDICATES THE
DOCTRINAL INTENT OF MUSORIA TO INFLICT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES AND
WITHDRAW PRIOR TO DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT. IT IS LIKELY THAT MUSORIA IS
ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT THE CTF FROM GAINING AS MUCH TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE ON THEIR DEF POSN IVO MDP AND GLADSTONE. END COMMENT.
C. AIR. A NUMBER OF F-5 AND A-4 ACFT WERE REACTED FROM
ROCKHAMPTON TO PROV CAP AND CAS IN RESPONSE TO RD CONTACTS WITH
ADF. A NUMBER OF F-5 CAP WAS ALSO FLOWN IN WHAT IS ASSESSED AS A
RESPONSE TO RD TP MOVEMENT. J2 COMMENT: IT IS LIKELY THAT ALL FUTURE
CONTACTS WITH RD GROUND FORCES WILL TRIGGER LAUNCH OF F-5 FOR CAP
OPS. END
COMMENT.
4. THIRD PARTY SITUATION.
A. CRIMINAL. NSTR
B. REFUGEES. NSTR
C. PARAMILITARY. CIMIC REPORTED A 100M LENGTH OF RAIL TRACK THAT
WAS BLOWN UP AT GRLU211226. A TRACK REPAIR CREW ARRIVING 4 HOURS
LATER DETONATED A LAND MINE, AND THE GROUP WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
ENGAGED BY A SNIPER. AT 102000K MAY 04 A C130 TAKING OFF FROM
BUNDABERG APOD WAS ENGAGED BY A SA-7. AT 102007K MAY 04 AN MP
CHECKPOINT AT HQ FSG ENTRANCE WAS ENGAGED BY AUTOMATIC FIRE
BELIEVED TO BE 5.56MM. AT 102230K MAY 04 A 3 BDE CSS CONVOY WAS
AMBUSHED ON ROUTE SPADE. AT 101605Z MAY04 A C130 WAS ENGAGED BY AN
SA-7 IVO BUNDABERG APOD. AT 110100K, AN S-70 ACFT WAS ENGAGED BY
MANPAD AT 500' AGL AT BUNDABERG APOD. EACH OF THESE INCIDENTS IS
ASSESSED TO BE A WELL PLANNED CO-ORDINATED RESPONSE TO THE CTF
FORCE BUILD-UP IN THE NORTH OF AZURIA.J2 COMMENT. IT IS ASSESSED THE M3
AND RD SF ARE CONDUCTING THESE ATTACKS IOT DISRUPT THE LOC AND
SUPPLY TO THE CTF FORCE AND ALSO IN AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW CTF FORCES
SOUTH. END COMMENT.
4. J2 ASSESSMENT. IN THE DEEP IT IS ASSESSED THAT RODELAND MARITIME
ASSETS WILL CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON RD SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY.
RODEMARINE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ASSERT SEA CONTROL OF THE
CAPRICORNIA CHANNEL, BUT HAS THE CAPACITY TO CONDUCT SHAPING
OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY THROUGH SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AND
POSSIBLE MINELAYING. IN THE CLOSE IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE RODEMACHT
HAS HARDENED THE LAND FORCES IN GLADSTONE IN AN ATTEMPT TO SHAPE
THE CTF WEST AWAY FROM THIS HARDENED SHOULDER. THIS WESTERN AA IS
The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU18-3/4 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

WHERE THE USE OF HIS COUNTER ATK FORCE IS BEST SUITED. IT IS ASSESSED
THROUGH PREVIOUS USE OF CAP AND CAS THAT RD ATTEMPTS TO GENERATE
AIR CONTROL OVER THE DISPUTED ZONE FOR PERIODS UP TO TWO HOURS. RD
ALSO HAS THE CAPACITY TO SCRAMBLE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT IN AN
ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THE PRESENCE OF CTF AIR ASSETS OVER THE DISPUTED
ZONE. IN THE REAR IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE UNCONVENTIONAL THREAT WILL
CONTINUE TO ESCALATE. ATKS HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE IN
SOPHISTICATION AND THEIR LEVEL OF SUCCESS.

5. POC INT W'KPR 3301200.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU18-4/4 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 19
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

LOCATION STATUS

1. Static Unit.
LOCATION STATUS (LOCSTAT)
A Location of reporting HQ
B Reporting HQ contact point
C Reporting HQ helicopter LZ
Location of subordinate HQs for whom reporting HQ is
D
responsible
E Location of observation posts
F Location of standing patrols
G Location of other friendly, neutral, unknown
organizations in assigned area of operations

2. Unit on the Move.

LOCATION STATUS (LOCSTAT)
A Location of lead FLOT
B Location of reporting HQ
C Location of tail for F echelon
D Location of administrative echelon
E ETA at release point/harbour/objective

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU19-1/1 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 20 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 20
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

LOGISTICS STATUS REPORT

Purpose: To report a unit’s logistic status of first line holdings and shortfalls.

LOGISTIC STATUS REPORT (LOGREP)

A Critical vehicle / major equipment status: (Note 1)
1 Type / qty authorized / qty on hand / outstanding demands
2 Etc.
B Critical minor equipment / spare parts status: (Note 2)
1 Code/outstanding demands
2 Etc.
C Maintenance State: (Note 3)
1 Type / no. serviceable / no. at CS unit / no. at GS unit / no. beyond repair (BR)

2 Etc.
D Combat supply system:
1 Class V - critical shortfalls (type/qty)
2 Class III - critical shortfalls (type/qty)
3 Class I - critical shortfalls (type/qty)
E Summary to include impact of shortfalls on unit operations
NOTES:
1. Only vehicles and equipment designated in Reportable Item List (RIL)
contained in higher formation Op O and those vehicles and equipment
considered by units as critical are to be reported.
2. Only minor equipment and spare parts that are having a significant effect on
equipment availability are to be reported.
3. Report only tracked/wheeled vehicles, heavy/medium weapons and CIS equipment.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU20-1/1 OFFICIAL
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APPENDIX 21 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 21
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

Purpose

1. The purpose of this form is to standardise the info requirements for the evac of a cas.
The form may be used for evac by rd (CASEVAC) or air (DUSTOFF). The requesting unit or
HQ prov this info to its next superior HQ. Note complete serials only as required.

Format - Plain Text

FORMAT EXAMPLE ONE EXAMPLE TWO

SECURITY CLAS (1) RESTRICTED UNCLAS

FROM 3 RAR 3 BDE

TO DJFHQ DJFHQ DJFHQ

CASEVAC/DUSTOFF X/XX (2) CASEVAC 6/9X DUSTOFF 6/9X

A. MAP REF A. MAP TOOLAN, A. MAP TOOLAN, SHEET
SHEET 3682, ED 1, SER 3682, ED 1, SER R514,
R514, 1:50000 1:50000

1. TYPE OF SPT 1. RD EVAC 1. DUSTOFF

2. UNIT/SUB-UNIT TO BE SPT 2. D COY 3 RAR 2. D COY 2 RAR

3. PICK-UP PT GIVING GR, 3. GR 703503 RED 6 3. LZ APACHE

IDENT, NICKNAME (3) GR 705514

4. TIMINGS AND LOCS:

A. BRIEFING (4)

B. COMMENCE TASK (5) 4B. ASAP 4B. ASAP

C. FINISH TASK (6)

D. DEBRIEFING (7)

5. CONTACT AT UNIT/SUB-
UNIT TO BE SPT (8)

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU21-1/3 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 21 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

6. RAD C/S AND FREQ (9) 6. 5GLC ON 36 PT 40 6. 5GLC ON 36 PT 40 ALT

ALT 4TWZ ON 55 PT 90 4TWZ ON 55 PT 90

7. CAS DETAILS (10) 7A. 1 X PRI 2, LITTER. 7A. 1 X PRI 1, LITTER.

GUNSHOT WOUNDS GUNSHOT WOUNDS TO
TO ARM CHEST AND LIMBS

7B. 2 X PRI 3, 7B. 1 X PRI 2, LITTER.

WALKING. NBCAS - GUNSHOT WOUND TO
VIRAL ILLNESS LEG

7C. 1 X ASST MED 7C. 2 X ASST MED REQ

REQ
8. LOAD DETAILS (11) 8. 2 X PERS EQUIP TOTAL
WT 100LBS

9. OTHER INFO 9. BEST APP TO LZ FROM

SW DUE TO EN ACTY
NORTH AND NW. SMOKE
AVAL. NIL HOIST

Notes

1. Clas should be relevant to the acty and content. However, can broadcast in plain
lang on insecure circuits in emergency conditions, in which case C/S and freq should be sent
using freq designations.

2. CASEVAC or DUSTOFF X/XX as appropriate. The req no used with the msg
heading is the Req Ident No. It consists of a sequence no and a year, eg 2/97. Each fmn/DCU is
to keep a register of their CASEVACs/DUSTOFFs.

3. For DUSTOFF, ident of the type of LZ and its loc are required.

4. Briefings initiated by the req unit will rarely be required for DUSTOFF tasks. In
some cases specific briefings might be required for med and/or op reasons. Such briefings would
be in addition to any conducted as part of normal flying procedures.

5. DUSTOFF tasks will normally commence ASAP. There may, however, be

occasions, usually for op reasons, when DUSTOFF acft should enter or leave an area within a
particular timeframe.

6. This ser will rarely be completed by the originating unit.

7. If req by originating unit.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU21-2/3 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 21 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

8. Not normally required unless the originator is remote from the cas.

9. Originator's C/S and alt freq. Freq are never to be transmitted in plain lang on
insecure circuits unless emergency conditions render it essential. Aloc freq designations are to
be used.

10. Must incl the number of cas to be collected, their pri, nationality (if other than AS),
the nature and site of wounds and whether they are on litters or are sitting. Incl details of
accompanying med staff (or requested).

11. Load detail must incl the type and weight (in kg for CASEVAC, in lbs for
DUSTOFF) of the load, incl pers equip.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU21-3/3 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 22 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 22
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

9 LINER MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST – MIST

M MECHANISM OF INJURY (M) (Time: …………….)

(and at what time if known)
I INJURY OR ILLNESS SUSTAINED (I)

S SYMPTOMS AND VITAL SIGNS (S) ……………………………………………..……..

A – airway B – breathing rate C – A ………... B …….….. C ………..…..
pulse rate D – conscious/unconscious D ……….................... E .. …………...…..
E – other signs
T TREATMENT GIVEN (T)
(e.g. Tourniquet and time applied,
Morphine)
NOTES:
Specify if critical medical supplies are needed to be brought in with MEDEVAC
‘9-liner” is not used for requests to move casualties who are killed in action at the scene

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU22-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 23 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 23
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT

Purpose. The dissemination of meteorological information is a responsibility of the intelligence

staff working in conjunction with the meteorological staff. The meteorological report must be
passed at twenty-four hour intervals to all formations and units.

METEOROLOGICAL REPORT (METREP)

FORMAT EXAMPLE
Subject: Meteorological Report—All Subject: Meteorological Report—All
Times Local Times Local
1. Area of validity 1. Suffield range
2. Valid period (0-24 hours) 2. Forecast 290630 to 300630
A. General forecast conditions, A.Cloudy periods with a few showers
including precipitation amounts. towards evening / no precipitation
B. Surface wind direction to 8 points amount.
and speed in km/h. B. South-west 30
C. Forecast maximum/minimum temps C. 20/15
(C).

3. Outlook valid period (24-48 hours) 3. Outlook 300630 to 010630.

A. As for paragraph 2.A. above. A. Mainly sunny. Clear overnight.
B. As for paragraph 2.B. above. B. South-west 20.
C. As for paragraph 2.C. above. C. 17/2.
4. Further outlook (48-72 hours) 4. Further outlook 010630 to 020630.
A. General weather outlook. A. Little change.
5. Natural light conditions. 5. Natural light conditions.
A. Next last light (Civil). A. 292201
B. Next first light (Civil). B. 300439
C. Moon phase. C. First quarter
D. Next moon rise D. 291350
E. Next moon set. E. 300442

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU23-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 24 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 24
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

NBC CHEMICAL DOWNWIND REPORT

Purpose: Used to disseminate a forecast of all meteorological data required for the chemical
hazard area prediction procedure. It is sent every six hours and covers three consecutive two hour
periods.

NBC NBC CHEMICAL DOWNWIND REPORT

Event (NBCCDR)
A NBCCDR Serial No. (if applicable)
AREAM Name of Area of Validity
ZULUM Period of Validity:
1 Date-Time Group (DTG) of observation
2 Effective DTG valid FROM
3 Effective DTG valid TO
UNITM Units of measurement:
1 Length
2 Height
3 Direction
4 Speed
5 Temperature
WHISKEYM Surface weather - 1st two hour period
1 Downwind direction in degrees True
2 Wind speed in km/h or knots
3 Detailed or simplified air stability category
4 Surface air temp in C
5 Relative humidity range
6 Significant weather phenomena
7 Degree of cloud cover
XRAYM As for WHISKEYM but for the 2nd two hour period
YANKEEM As for WHISKEYM but for the 3rd two hour period

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU24-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 25 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 25
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

OBSTACLE REPORT

Purpose: To report (enemy) obstacles, booby traps and other similar devices.

OBSTACLE REPORT (OBSREP)

A 1 Amendment YES/NO
2 Designator (Note 1)
B 1 Map details:
2 Map/chart series
3 Map/chart suffix no Map/chart sheet no (Note 2) Map/chart
4 edition no (Note 2)
5 Geodetic datum (Note 2)
C 1 Location and nearest feature Geographic place name Grid
2 Ref (Note 2)
D Obstacle data:
1 Mines present indicator (YES/NO/UNKNOWN)
2 Generic mine type (Notes 2 and 3)
3 Obstacle type (Notes 2 and 4)
4 Obstacle characteristics (Notes 2 and 5)
E 1 Dimensions: Length (m) Width (m) Depth (m) Height (m)
2
3
4
F 1 Lane/gap data Entry point: (GR) Exit point: (GR)
2
G Special remarks
H 1 Acknowledge—YES/NO
2 Instructions for acknowledging (Yes/No) Force/unit to
3 acknowledge (Note 2)

NOTES:
1. If the answer at A is YES, a unique amendment designator
must be included here.
2. Repeat as necessary.
3. Selected from:
CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING
A Area O Off-Route U Unknown

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU25-1/2 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 25 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Anti- Anti-
H P
Helicopter Personnel
N No Mines T Anti-Tank
4. Specific obstacle type selected from:
CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING
Other
AB Abatis DG Dry Gap OT
(specified)
Dragon
BE Berm DT TD Antitank Ditch
Teeth
BP Beam Post FB Falling UX UXO
Obstacle Block
Obstacle
Barbed Wire
BT Booby-Traps FL Flooding WO
Obstacle
CR Road Crater LS Landslide WW Waterway
DM Demolition MF Minefield
5. Selected from:
CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING
BRE Breached IMP Prepared MSL Mines Surface
Laid
COV Covered by MRK Marked PAS Passable
Enemy

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU25-2/2 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 26 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 26
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

PERSONNEL REPORT

Purpose: To provide commanders and staffs with a summary of personnel information.

PERSONNEL REPORT (PERSREP)

A Formation/unit ident (of the formation(s)/unit(s) reporting or being reported)
(Notes 1 and 2)
B Personnel data (Notes 1 and 3)
1 Total war establishment (WE)
2 Total attachments (OPCOM only)
3 Total strength
4 Total incapacitated
5 Total dead
6 Total PW held
C Time (Notes 1 and 4)
D Personnel assessment (Notes 1 and 5)
E Commander's overall personnel assessment for the formation/unit preparing the
message (i.e., the master PERSREP)
NOTES:
1. To be repeated as necessary for each formation/unit being reported.
2. All formations/units under full or operational command are to be included. Data of
formations/units under operational control, tactical control or tactical command are to be
reported by the parent unit.
3. Gives personnel data by category - officers, warrant officers (Senior NCOs –
sergeants and above) and other noncommissioned members (NCMs, Junior NCOs and
other ranks) - and numbers for each data element.
4. Gives the time qualifier and date-time group (DTG) of the information for each
formation/unit being reported.
5. Provides an assessment of battleworthiness, shortage of critical pers, etc. of each
formation/unit being reported.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU26-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 27 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 27
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REQUEST

General

1. An ROEREQ seeks new ROE or amendment to existing ROE.

2. An ROEREQ is prefixed by the proword ROEREQ and is reported in message format

with a precedence allocation commensurate with the urgency of request.

Purpose

3. The ROEREQ is used to request new ROE or amendments to existing ROE based on
the operational requirements.

Format - Plain Text

From:

To: (1)

Info:

ROEREQ

1 Operation Codeword

2 Reference for current ROE

3 Area in which ROE applies

4 New ROE requested (include draft wording of ROE)

5 ROE amendment requested (include reference to extant ROE and provide draft
wording of amended ROE)

6 ROE proposed for cancellation

7 Justification for new/amended ROE

8 Point of contact for ROEREQ

1. When reporting to:

a. Cbt Bde HQ: for S3 and S06
b. Div HQ: for J3 and J06

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU27-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 28 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 28
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

RESTRICTED OPERATING ZONE REQUEST

A C/S / FREQ
B CENTRED ON GRID
C RADIUS (1 NM = 1800 M)
D ALT
E DTG REQUESTING FOR
F PURPOSE

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU28-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 29
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

SCATTERABLE MINEFIELD REQUEST

Purpose: To request a scatterable minefield.

SCATTERABLE MINE REQUEST (SCATMINREQ)

A Amendment
1 YES/NO
2 Designator (Note 1)
B Map details:
1 Map/chart series
2 Map/chart suffix no
3 Map/chart sheet no (Note 2)
4 Map/chart edition no (Note 2)
5 Geodetic datum (Note 2)
C Task obstacle identifier:
1 Task serial no
2 Obstacle no
3 Obstacle nickname
4 Obstacle zone / belt name / no
D Location and nearest feature:
1 Geographic place name
2 Grid ref (Note 2)
E Safety zone:
1 Zone identifier
Zone size in metres

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU29-1/2 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

F 1 Target type
2 Target sub-type
3 Degree of protection
G Request data:
1 Tactical objective (Note 3)
2 Laying method (Note 4)
3 Approving authority
4 General stopping power (LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH)
5 Minefield density
H Mine emplacement:
1 No earlier than date-time group (DTG)
2 No later than DTG
Obstacle effective times
I 1 START DTG
2 END DTG
J Special remarks
1 Acknowledge—YES/NO
K 2 Instructions for acknowledging
3 Force/unit to acknowledge (Note 2)
NOTES:
1. If the answer at A is YES, a unique amendment designator must be included here.
2. Repeat as necessary.
3. Selected from:
CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING
BK Block DT Disrupt PT Protect
Canalise /
CD RT Delay
deflect
4. Selected from:
CODE MEANING CODE MEANING
Artillery
AS FS Fast air scattered
scattered
GS Ground scattered LS Helicopter scattered

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU29-2/2 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 30 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 30
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

SITUATION REPORT

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

FORMAT REMARKS
Pro word
1
"SITREP"
2 Enemy Units in contact, en shelling, estimation of
str, morale, possible en action.
3 Friendly Loc of tps, by grid encoded, or by rl, your
activity, your intentions.
Any immed adm reqr at the time (fuel, ammo,
4 Admin
etc.).
5 General Info not covered elsewhere, e.g., “I suggest C/S
24 clear the wood at grid. . ..”

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU30-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 31 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 31
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

TRANSPORT REQUEST

TRANSPORT REQUEST
A Unit requesting transport
B Load
C DTG transport required
D RV location
E Contact at RV
F Destination
G Estimated time of completion
H Purpose
I Remarks—(details of cargo must be sufficient to
ensure that the appropriate vehicles and
loading/unloading facilities are provided)

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU31-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 32 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 32
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION REPORT (PA SITREP)

Purpose: Used to keep commanders continually informed about the Public Affairs (PA)
situation during periods of crisis, peace support operations and war.

A Situation
1 Overall media trends
2 Extraordinary media events
3 Assessment of PA situation
4 Requests and/or proposals

B Media coverage - a summary of important media reports

C Public attitudes
1 Summary of observed attitudes/reactions
2 Assessment of public opinion trends
3 Proposals for reactions/measures (1)

D Actions taken/planned:
1 Summary of PI actions
2 Projection of initiatives
3 Management of APAMC/PAMC operations to cover: (2)
a. Journalists accommodated by APAMCs/PAMCs
b. Journalists accredited as War Correspondents by
national officials at PAMCs
c. Cases requiring withdrawal of accreditation

E Miscellaneous information

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
UU32-1/1 OFFICIAL
 OFFICIAL
APPENDIX 33 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 33
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – OP IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

NOTICE OF CASUALTY REPORT (NOTICAS)

Purpose: To inform the chain of command of a casualty.
NOTICE OF CASUALTY REPORT (NOTICAS)
PRIORITY—SECRET
TO: FROM:
FAX NO: FAX:
ATTN: G1, G3, G4 FILE REF NO:
DRAFTER:
TITLE:
OUTGOING FAX NO: DATE/TIME:
SUBJECT: NOTICAS
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
A NOTICAS NO:
B MISSION:
C SERVICE NO:
D Ident (ZAP) NUMBER: CDN:
E RANK:
F FULL NAME (FIRST
AND LAST NAME):
G SEX:
H NATIONALITY:
I NEXT OF KIN:
J CATEGORY:
K ON DUTY (Y OR N):
L DATE
M LOCAL TIME:
(DATE/MONTH/YEA
N PLACE:
R):
O CASUALTY TYPE
(DEATH OR
SPECIFIED
INJURIES):
P CASUALTY CAUSE:
NOTE:
TCNs are responsible for their own national reporting procedures.

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 34 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

Appendix 34
Annex UU
4 MND Op O 07 – Op IRON GUARDIAN (insert date)

MEDICAL SITUATION REPORT (MEDSITREP)

1. Purpose. To inform higher formations of the medical and health services situation.

MEDICAL SITUATION REPORT (MEDSITREP)

A Map data:
1 Map/chart series
2 Map/chart suffix no
3 Map/chart sheet no (Note 1)
4 Map/chart edition no (Note 1)
5 Geodetic datum (Note 1)
B Medical facility/status: (Note 2)
1 Nationality
2 Grid ref / location coordinate
3 Status (Note 3)
C Beds established/occupied:

1 Beds established
2 Beds occupied (by status) (Note 4)
D Medical personnel:

1 Surgical teams
2 Unposted physicians—numbers by speciality not posted to surgical
teams (Note 5)

E Surgical casualties—numbers awaiting surgery

F Casualties admitted:
1 Total numbers admitted since last MEDSITREP
2 Numbers by category of casualty (Note 6)
G Casualties evacuated:
1 Total casualties evacuated since last MEDSITREP
2 Numbers evacuated by category (Note 7)
H Casualties awaiting evacuation:
1 Sitting
2 Stretchers
I Surgical operations:
1 Total surgical operations since last MEDSITREP
2 Number of operated patients by category (Note 8)

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 34 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

J Deaths:
1 Total deaths since last MEDSITREP
2 Number of deaths by category (Note 8)
K Medical logistics—availability/number of days held/serious shortages
L Special diseases/injuries—narrative description of any special
diseases
or injuries experienced

M Mission assessment—a narrative summary assessment of the facility's

ability to carry out its assigned mission using the following headlines:

1 KA—mission can be fulfilled

2 KB—mission can be fulfilled with restrictions (to be detailed)
3 KC—mission cannot be fulfilled (reasons and expected duration to be
detailed)

NOTES:
1. Repeatable as necessary.
2. Serials B through K are repeatable as a message block (segment) for each medical facility
being reported.
3. Selected from OPEN, CLOSED or RESERVED.
4. Selected from:

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

A Fr Forces, Mil and C Local Civ (including

Sp Civ evac/refugees)
B Opposing Forces, D Total Bed
Military Occupancy
5. Speciality selected from:

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

A Primary Care E Radiology I Dentistry

B Surgical F Pathology J Gynaecology

C Anaesthetics G Orthopaedics K Psychology

D Internal H Head/Neck L Other (to be

Medicine detailed)

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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APPENDIX 34 TO ANNEX UU OF OPORD 07 IRON GUARDIAN

6. Category of casualties selected from:

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

A Non-Battle C Wounded in Action

Casualties
B Diseased D Battle Stress /
Psychiatric

7. Evacuation categories selected from:

ANNEX MEANING CODE MEANING

A Returned to Duty C Evacuated to Home

or Holding Country

B Evac to Other
Medical
Facility
8. Selected from:

CODE MEANING CODE MEANING

A Fri Forces, Mil and C Local Civ (incl

Sp evacuees/refugees)
Civilians
B Opposing Forces,
Military

The situation represented in this document is fictitious and is designed and intended for simulation, training and exercise
activities only.
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