Book Reviews   917

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Stephan W. Schill (ed.). International Investment Law and Comparative
Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 836, £145. ISBN:
9780199589104.

1 International Investment Law as Public Law?

The science of international law can no longer be content with the analogous application of
private law categories. It must search the entire body of the ‘general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations’ for proper analogies. With the growing importance of international
legal relations between public authorities and private legal subjects, public law will be an
increasingly fertile source of international law.1
Wolfgang Friedmann’s famous assessment of the role of public law as a source of (general) public
international law in 1963 holds even truer vis-à-vis international investment law in 2011. The
kind of disputes investment arbitration tribunals have to deal with and the substantive issues
they have to decide are widely perceived as matters of public concern, and thus by far transgress
the rather isolated bilateral relationship that is the typical characteristic of a private dispute.2
Whether a state may adopt a general regulatory scheme banning toxic waste3 or whether it
may, in order to prevent an economic collapse, amend laws formerly guaranteeing a fixed
exchange rate and unlimited convertibility into a foreign currency4 genuinely touches upon its

1
Friedmann, ‘The Use of “General Principles” in the Development of International Law’, 57 AJIL (1963)
279, at 295.
2
Albeit, naturally, this is a rather ideal-type categorization, since many disputes that are indisputably
private in nature inhere direct and indirect consequences that may affect third parties, if not to say entire
communities.
3
Cf. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Partial Award, 13 Nov 2000.
4
As in the disputes regarding the Argentine crisis. For an overview of the facts and the unfolding of the
crisis also consult BG Group PLC v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 24 Dec 2007, at paras
16–82. Also see Alvarez and Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors – A Glimpse into the
Heart of the Investment Regime’, in K.P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy
2008–2009 (2009), at 379.
918 EJIL 22 (2011), 909–927

sovereignty and indirectly affects a myriad of stakeholders. Gus van Harten deserves credit for
pointing the international investment community to the public nature of investment disputes.5
The recently published volume, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law edited
by Stephan W. Schill, seeks to profit from such view by assessing various issues of international
investment law through the public law lens.
As this large collection of essays premises,6 international investment law may be considered a
form of public law because it involves the adjudicatory control of the exercise of public authority,
providing non-state entities with direct rights of action against the host state. Moreover, this
public law system operates on the global level by drawing on both domestic and international

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law and creating a legal regime granting primacy to the former. Since most international invest-
ment agreements, despite their usual bilateral nature, set similar standards for the protection of
investors,7 these standards harmonize the way investors must be treated on a global level. Hence
one might consider terming the public law system that international investment law creates
‘global’.
However, some critical voices do not agree with the conceptualization of international
investment law as public law.8 Indeed, its procedural frame borrows from international
commercial arbitration, i.e., a regime created to decide private disputes. Additionally, investment
claims are targeted at monetary compensation, and arbitral awards as such cannot amend national
law or overhaul a policy. Moreover, in many investment disputes the investor had previously con-
cluded an investment contract with the host government laying down the basic framework and
terms of the rights and obligations the investor enjoys regarding its investment in the host state.
Usually, those contracts are of a private law nature, comparable with a private law contract
between private entities or between a domestic economic actor and the government acting
de iure gestionis. Thus, one might argue, investment disputes being based partially or in some
instances even exclusively on investment contracts do not substantially differ from ordinary
contract law claims under domestic law, for they root in a relative, i.e., private relationship.9 So,
too much fuss about the public law character?
To tackle the last argument first, such view neglects the fact that the role of investment con-
tracts is shrinking radically. While, nowadays, instances are very rare in which there is an
investment contract but no international investment agreement, the reverse situation occurs
rather frequently. Moreover, if both investment contract and international investment agree
ment exist – given that international law trumps domestic law in case of conflict – the tribunal
will apply the former only to those issues that are not addressed in the international investment
agreement. What is more, to derive international investment law’s alleged private law char-
acter from the existence of (private law) investment contracts conflates the factors determining
the public or private law character of a legal system. Assume the equation in a purely domestic
system: the government concludes a private law contract with a domestic private entity. Indis-
putably, the contract itself is of a private law nature, and if either side defaults on its obligations
the dispute arising is equally of a private law character. However, what if the state does not act

5
G. van Harten, International Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007); also see van Harten and
Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’, 17 EJIL (2006) 121.
6
Only cf. Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law – An Introduction’, in the
vol. under review, at 3, 10 ff.
7
See on this S.W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009).
8
See, e.g., Hirsch, ‘Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: Divergent Paths’, in P.M. Dupuy, F. Fran-
cioni, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (2009), at
97, 107 ff.
9
Ibid., at 108 f.
 Book Reviews   919

as a private entity, but in its capacity as a public entity bestowed with public authority, i.e.,
seizing the other side’s assets, arresting its employees, or adopting legislation effectively eradi-
cating the rights enshrined in the contract? In this case we no longer observe a coordinative
relationship of legal peers. Rather, the relationship is hierarchical and thus vertical rather than
horizontal, for the state does not act in a private capacity but employs instruments of puissance
publique. Such disputes, whether predominantly administrative or constitutional in character,
involve individual rights the private entity can raise against the exercise of public authority by
the government and are thus undoubtedly of a public law character. This situation parallels the
usual situation at issue in an investment dispute.

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Moreover, claimants in investment disputes often aim eventually to achieve a certain policy
change that could not be attained otherwise. While monetary compensation is the usual
remedy, it is often rather a tool than the ultimate goal. The larger the amount of potential com-
pensation, the more likely that the state amends its laws or changes its policies and that other
states with similar laws or policies follow suit or abstain from adopting them in the first place – in
order to avoid further claims by similarly-situated foreign investors. Simply put, a country the
annual GDP of which stands at US$ 54 billion can hardly afford to pay about US$ 500 million
in compensation.10
Finally, despite all parallels with commercial arbitration (procedural) investment arbitration
is intertwined with and hence unthinkable without (substantive) investment law. Therefore,
procedural mechanisms, such as particularly the enforcement of arbitral awards, while also
existing within the clearly private law realm of international commercial arbitration, attain a
completely different character for, combined with the public law features of substantive invest-
ment law, they turn into public law sanctions for illicit exercises of public authority.

2 International Investment Law and Comparative Public

Law
A Public Law and Public Interest
So, if international investment law is understood as public law, what conclusions are to be
drawn and what is the suitable methodology to interpret international investment law through
the public law lens? International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law engages in, as the
title suggests, a comparative analysis comparing certain features of international investment
law with other (domestic and international) public law regimes to answer the above question.
This book, to say as much from the outset, is without doubt an intriguing and to date the most
comprehensive11 study adopting a public law approach to international investment law. Hence,
it provides a major contribution to the investment law debate. Not without flaws – which will be
mentioned below – but with a myriad of inspiring perspectives on all controversially discussed
issues in the field, this collection of essays certainly is seminal and a rich source for those in
academia and practice willing to make use of the public law argument.

10
Cf. CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, Separate Opin-
ion by Ian Brownlie, 14 Mar 2003, at paras 72 and 79; also see S. Ripinsky and K. Williams, Damages in
International Investment Law (2008), at 375.
11
There are other collections of essays revolving around similar issues. To give but one example, Dupuy,
Francioni, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), supra note 8, deals with human rights aspects of international
investment law, and in some parts and contributions touches upon public law analysis; only see Ch III
‘Judicial “Balancing” of Economic Law and Human Rights in Regional Courts’, at 195.
920 EJIL 22 (2011), 909–927

The doctrinal avenue for comparative public law analysis, as the reference to Friedmann12
foreshadowed and as Stephan Schill argues in his introductory contribution, is ‘general princi-
ples of law’ as referred to in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
They provide a source of law to be taken into account when interpreting investment treaties
according to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.13 The relevance
of comparative public law will, so Schill contends, depend on the interpretative leeway inter-
national investment agreements permit. ‘To the extent that investment obligations leave no
room for doubt, the ambit of comparative public law will be limited to a de lege ferenda perspec-
tive. To the extent, however, that there is interpretative leeway, comparative public law can be

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used broadly.’14 Generally, two ways are imaginable in which public law might impact on the
interpretation of investors’ rights. First, it may extend those rights and sharpen their contours.
Investment tribunals may deduce institutional and procedural requirements from domestic and
international (public law) standards.15 Secondly, comparative public law analysis may also be
used to limit an investor right. It may demonstrate that certain state conduct is permitted in
domestic legal systems, and thereby support the argument that the state measure at issue in an
investment dispute is justified.16
Unfortunately, both Schill’s and subsequent contributions17 stop here. They flesh out the
potentials of comparative public law analysis to extend and to limit investor rights in specific
subject areas, but they do not tackle the more general question regarding the theoretical foun-
dations of the ‘public’ character of international investment law. If international investment
law has strong public law traits – if not, a comparative study would be obsolete – there must be
a public interest involved that serves as the yardstick of legal argument.18 Public law without
public interest is hardly thinkable, so what is (or what are) the public interest(s) to be consid-
ered in the realm of international investment law? If we deny that public interests are at stake
in international investment law, again, employing a comparative public law analysis becomes
dubious. If, however, we accept that there is something out there, an effort must be undertaken
to grasp what it is and what role it asserts in the investment realm. Otherwise, analysis may lose
focus and orientation.
To be sure, the focus of Schill’s book is on developing a methodology for interpreting inter-
national investment law rather than elaborating on its theoretical foundations. However, part
I entitled ‘Concept and Foundations’ contains only three contributions,19 and none deals with the
reasons for the conceptualization of international investment law as public law. In particular,
delineating thoughts on a general approach vis-à-vis defining the limits of investors’ rights in
light of the state’s aim to further the public interest would have been worthwhile.20 Even
more interesting, and partly transgressing the scope of comparative public law analysis, is

12
See supra note 1.
13
Schill, supra note 6, at 26 ff.
14
Ibid., at 31.
15
Ibid. at 32.
16
Also see della Cananea, ‘Minimum Standards of Procedural Justice in Administrative Adjudication’, in
the vol. under review, at 39, 42 f, and 47 f, who, however, presents a brilliant tour de force through 300
years of legal thought in order to flesh out commonly shared due process standards appropriate to guide
international investment law: cf. at 69 ff.
17
See Stephan Schill’s contribution on umbrella clauses, where he acknowledges such a premise, at 317,
336 ff.
18
Compared with 6 to 8 contributions in the three other parts. Also see infra sect 3C.
19
However, see Schill, supra note 18, 341 and infra sect 2B.
20
Such as the title of Jürgen Kurtz’s essay: see Kurtz, ‘The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National
Treatment in International Investment Law and the WTO’, in the vol. under review, at 243.
 Book Reviews   921

a further question: is the public interest in a global investment law regime that enmeshes
domestic and international law and sets harmonious international standards that strongly
impact on the domestic legal regime a domestic or rather a global or transnational issue?
And if the latter was assumed how did this affect a general ‘public law’ theory of inter-
national investment law?

B Specific Subject Areas of International Investment Law Viewed

through the Public Law Lens

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It is a strength of this book that it vigorously, albeit not blindly, embraces the notion of inter-
national investment law as public law. While most contributions demonstrate the value of the
comparative public law approach, the book also includes voices that flesh out the ‘limits of
comparativism’21 in specific subject areas.
Irmgard Marboe, for example, after an astute comparative study of state responsibility on
the one hand and state liability under different jurisdictions on the other hand, stresses that
the privileged position the state assumes for itself vis-à-vis state liability in the domestic and
European realms is increasingly criticized as ill-founded and lacking legitimacy. ‘Consequently’,
she concludes, ‘caution should be taken not to introduce new criteria allegedly based on “general
principles of law” into international investment law, which could then be confronted with the
same criticism’.22
Jürgen Kurtz establishes a methodological critique of the comparative analysis conducted by
investment tribunals vis-à-vis the national treatment standard.23 Indeed, as he rightly points
out, awards such as Occidental24 or Methanex,25 drawing on WTO (case) law while neglecting
the textual, contextual, systemic, and remedial differences26 between the world trade and the
investment law regimes, lead to unsound conclusions regarding the role of competition when
interpreting ‘likeness’.27 Kurtz is less sceptical than Marboe, however. He does see some poten-
tial in drawing on WTO law regarding, e.g., the interpretation of what constitutes ‘less favour-
able treatment’, provided such comparative analysis is sensitive to the differences between inter-
national investment law and world trade law.28
It was the editor who wrote one of the most inspiring essays of this volume. Dealing with
so-called ‘umbrella clauses’29 in international investment agreements, Schill draws on the general
principles of pacta sunt servanda and clausula rebus sic stantibus in order to determine in which
cases the host state’s interferences with investor–state contracts amount to a breach of the
umbrella clause and in which cases the host state is in fact entitled to interfere.30 Exploring the
scope and limits of government action (allegedly) in the public interest, Schill argues that the

21
Marboe, ‘State Responsibility and Comparative State Liability for Administrative and Legislative Harm to
Economic Interests’, in the vol. under review, at 377, 411.
22
Kurtz, supra note 21.
23
Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
1 July 2004, at paras 174 ff.
24
Methanex Corp. v. US, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 Aug
2005, Part IV, Ch B, at paras 28 ff.
25
Kurtz, supra note 21, at 250 ff.
26
Ibid., at 255 ff., 278.
27
Ibid., at 262 ff., 278.
28
I.e., a provision guaranteeing the observation of obligations assumed by the host state vis-à-vis the
investor.
29
Supra note 18, at 330 ff.
30
Ibid., at 337 ff.
922 EJIL 22 (2011), 909–927

host state cannot contract away its power to interfere with investor–state contracts and
bases this claim on customary international law as well as domestic public law.31 Hence he
asserts an ‘implicit police power exception to the operation of the umbrella clause for the
regulation of contracts in the public interest’32 and delineates the standard – proportionality
analysis33 – which he deems most appropriate to decide when the host state should be required
to compensate the investor.34
His argument is convincing and the ‘implicit police power exception’, along with the propor-
tionality test, might even accrue to a kind of litmus test for public interest exceptions to investor
rights. One thought, however, may be added which Schill seems to neglect. In the domestic

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context as well as in inter-state arbitration to which Schill refers when proving the ‘implicit
police power exception’, the state is very much concerned to avoid its conduct being found to
be unlawful. The most perilous remedy in these contexts is the stigma of unlawfulness, not
so much the obligation to pay compensation. By contrast, in international investment law it
does not matter so much to the host state whether its conduct is considered lawful or not. What
matters to it most is how much compensation it has to pay. High amounts of compensation
entail serious consequences on the host state’s incentive or even ability to pursue the public
interest, regardless of whether the host state’s conduct was lawful or unlawful.35 Considering
that paying money is by far the most important remedy in international investment arbitra-
tion, it becomes doubtful whether public law standards vis-à-vis compensation derived from the
domestic and inter-state context may be transferred to the international investment realm
without modification.
Aware that in international investment law states fear compensation more than findings
of illegality, Anne van Aaken’s essay on primary and secondary remedies in a comparative
perspective36 equates primary remedies – i.e., the focus on illegality and thus on prevention or
restitution – with domestic law and secondary remedies – i.e., damages and compensation – in
international investment law.37 Arguing that primary remedies protect property rights more
effectively and that secondary remedies, if they amount to very high sums, are as intrusive on
a host state’s sovereignty as primary remedies, van Aaken argues for ‘reintroduc[ing] primary
remedies in investment law’.38
This is an intriguing and thought-provoking suggestion, which calls on law and economics
considerations to corroborate the notion of a high effectiveness of primary remedies. However,
I am rather sceptical whether it is really wise to introduce primary remedies in international
investment law. Despite its (global) ‘public law’ or even an allegedly ‘global administrative
law’39 character one should not forget that the international investment regime differs consider-
ably from a domestic legal order, at least as regards both the possibilities of enforcement and the

31
Ibid., at 340.
32
Also cf. Kingsbury and Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory
Actions in the Public Interest – the Concept of Proportionality’, in the vol. under review, at 75.
33
Schill, supra note 18, at 341 f.
34
Cf. CME v. Czech Republic, Separate Opinion by Ian Brownlie, supra note 10, at paras 72 and 79.
35
Van Aaken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State
Liability: A Functional and Comparative View’, in the vol. under review, at 721.
36
Ibid., at 723.
37
Ibid., at 749.
38
Cf. Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 5; van Aaken, supra note 36, at 721.
39
See R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2008), at 19 ff. For a critical
account of the investment arbitration regime as it stands nowadays see van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty
Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law’, in the vol. under review, at 627; see also van
Harten, supra note 5, at 152 ff.
 Book Reviews   923

state’s willingness and ability to abide by the rule of law. Van Aaken’s suggestion presupposes
a well-functioning administration that considers itself bound by an international tribunal’s de-
cision ordering primary remedies. While this may be true for some, national administrations
and governments are usually less willing to comply with the orders and judgments of inter-
national tribunals than they are to follow domestic courts. Moreover, while the enforcement
regime for secondary remedies is rather elaborate and efficient, building on the principles of the
New York Convention and thus on a proven and tested mechanism of international commercial
arbitration, it is difficult to imagine how enforcement of primary remedies should proceed. It is
indeed the general scepticism regarding a host state’s willingness to abide by international rules

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and principles of investment protection that induced the international community to create
the investment arbitration regime, and that is the major justification for its existence to date.40
Finally, a short note on a further interesting piece in the book under review. Catherine
Donnelly’s contribution on comparative public procurement constitutes a more than overdue
inquiry into an area of law of utmost importance in international investment law.41 Albeit
occasionally operating a little bit too generously regarding terminology,42 Donnelly provides an
astute study of four principles – transparency, legitimate expectations, due process, and propor-
tionality – relevant both in domestic and European public procurement law and in international
investment law.

C A Few Words on Structure

Unfortunately, structure is one of the weaker aspects of this volume. Schill’s book consists of
four parts. Part I, as was already mentioned above, seeks to lay out ‘Concept and Foundations’.
Part II, ‘Investor Rights in Comparative Perspective’, pertains to substantive issues such as
fair and equitable treatment or denial of justice. Kurtz’ contribution and Schill’s piece on um-
brella clauses belong here. Part III also deals with substantive issues; unlike Part II, however,
it does not tackle investor rights, but focuses on ‘Comparative Administrative and Comparative
Constitutional Law on Selected Issues’ and includes the text by Donnelly on public procurement.
Eventually, Part IV purports to comprise essays on ‘Dispute Settlement, Arbitral Procedure, and
Remedies’. Inter alia, Anne van Aaken’s contribution is found here.
Regrettably, it remains opaque how, for example, Kingsbury’s and Schill’s – excellent – piece43
on proportionality is a matter of the ‘Concept and Foundations’ of comparative public law ana-
lysis. Proportionality may well serve as a concept to view international investment law issues
through the ‘public law’ lens. It is thus a specific question and not really an aspect responding
to the general question of the concept of comparative public law analysis. Placing it in Part IV

40
C. Donnelly, ‘Public–Private Partnerships: Award, Performance, and Remedies’, in the vol. under review,
at 475.
41
Fair and equitable treatment in the investment context is rather a right than a principle, cf. ibid., 475 – at
least this is debatable and hence terminology must be treated with care. Cf. on rights and principles in
legal theory R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (1986). More-
over, Donnelly appears sometimes to use fair and equitable treatment and transparency interchange-
ably, cf. Donnelly, supra note 41, 480. This somewhat neglects the fact that the other ‘principles’ she
scrutinizes – such as legitimate expectations, due process and even to some extent proportionality – form
aspects of the fair and equitable treatment standard in international investment law: see Dolzer and
Schreuer, supra note 40, at 133 ff. Correctly, however, at the end of her scrutiny, see Donnelly, supra note
41, at 498: ‘the more overarching principle of fair and equitable treatment’.
42
Kingsbury and Schill, supra note 33.
43
Burke-White and von Staden, ‘The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitra-
tions’, in the vol. under review, at 689.
924 EJIL 22 (2011), 909–927

next to William Burke-White’s and Andreas von Staden’s contribution on public law stand-
ards of review44 in my opinion would have been more suitable, since both essays target public
law standards of review but promote different answers – proportionality on the one hand45 and
margin of appreciation46 on the other. Moreover, Part III referring to ‘Selected Issues’ appears as
a rather random assemblage of various matters. There is no doubt that they are important and
most contributions are excellent. However, one suspects that a clear-cut editorial concept did
not exist when the individual contributions were drafted.

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3 Conclusion
It is the thankless task of a reviewer to select from the wealth of articles in this rich volume,
and I advise everybody interested in the topic to rummage through the book. It includes many
contributions that would more than deserve to be mentioned, but did not find their way into
this review merely due to lack of space for further discussion. The book has some flaws, which I
have pointed out – e.g., that it stops short of laying a general ‘public law’ theory of international
investment law or that the way it is structured does not always convince. Nonetheless, I am con-
fident it will spark debate in many areas of international investment law and provide somewhat of
a blueprint for subsequent comparative analyses that aim at informing public international law.

Individual Contributions
Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law. An
Introduction;
Giacinto della Cananea, Minimum Standards of Procedural Justice in Administrative
Adjudication;
Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights
with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest. The Concept of Proportionality;
Markus Perkams, The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law.
Searching for Light in the Dark;
Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public
Law;
Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, Full Protection and Security;
Ali Ehsassi, Cain & Abel. Congruence and Conflict in the Application of the Denial of Justice
Principle;
Jürgen Kurtz, The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International
Investment Law and the WTO;
Freya Baetens, Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality. Determining Likeness in Human
Rights and Investment Law;
Stephan W. Schill, Umbrella Clauses as Public Law Concepts in Comparative Perspective;
Abba Kolo, Transfer of Funds. The Interaction between the IMF Articles of Agreement and
Modern Investment Treaties. A Comparative Law Perspective;
Irmgard Marboe, State Responsibility and Comparative State Liability for Administrative and
Legislative Harm to Economic Interests;
Hector A. Mairal, Legitimate Expectations and Informal Administrative Representations;
Kim Talus, Revocation and Cancellation of Concessions, Operating Licenses and Other
Beneficial Administrative Acts;

44
Kingsbury and Schill, supra note 33, at 102.
45
Burke-White and von Staden, supra note 44, at 715 ff.
 Book Reviews   925

Catherine Donnelly, Public-Private Partnerships. Award, Performance and Remedies;

Christina Binder and August Reinisch, Economic Emergency Powers. A Comparative Law
Perspective;
Federico Lenzerini, Property Protection and Protection of Cultural Heritage;
Christian Tietje and Karoline Kampermann, Taxation and Investment. Constitutional Law
Limitations on Tax Legislation in Context;
Paul B. Stephan, Comparative Taxation Procedure and Tax Enforcement;
Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law;
Chester Brown, Procedure in Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Relevance of

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Comparative Public Law;
William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, The Need for Public Law Standards of Review
in Investor-State Arbitrations;
Anne van Aaken, Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and
National State Liability. A Functional and Comparative View;
Borzu Sabahi and Nicholas J. Birch, Comparative Compensation for Expropriation;
Alessandra Asteriti and Christian J. Tams, Transparency and Representation of the Public
Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration
Dr Andreas Kulick, LL.M. (NYU)
Research Fellow, University of Potsdam, Germany
Email: [email protected]
doi: 10.1093/ejil/chr063