Complaint - Hoffman V Barton

Filing # 208884117 E-Filed 10/16/2024 11:00:05 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION
HOPE HOFFMAN, TERRI KELLOGG,

LORIEN HERSHBERGER, and
CHELSEY DAVIS,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 2024-CA-
KIM BARTON, in her official capacity as the

Alachua County Supervisor of Elections,
AMANDA SEYFANG, in her official capacity as
the Bradford County Supervisor of Elections,
DEBORAH OSBORNE, in her official capacity
as the Union County Supervisor of Elections,
CHRISTOPHER MILTON, in his official capacity as the
Baker County Supervisor of Elections,
TOMI S. BROWN, in her official capacity
as the Columbia County Supervisor of Elections,
JENNIFER KINSEY, in her official capacity as
the Suwannee County Supervisor of Elections,
LAURA HUTTO, in her official capacity as the
Hamilton County Supervisor of Elections,
TRAVIS HART, in his official capacity as the
Lafayette County Supervisor of Elections,
STARLET CANNON, in her official capacity as
the Dixie County Supervisor of Elections,
TAMMY JONES, in her official capacity as the
Levy County Supervisor of Elections,
WESLEY WILCOX, in his official capacity as the
Marion County Supervisor of Elections,
CONNIE SANCHEZ, in her official capacity as
the Gilchrist County Supervisor of Elections,
GLEN GILZEAN, in his official capacity as the
Orange County Supervisor of Elections,
MARY JANE ARRINGTON, in her official
capacity as the Osceola County Supervisor of
Elections, JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity
as the Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections,
CRAIG LATIMER, in his official capacity as the
Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections,
LORI EDWARDS, in her official capacity as the
Polk County Supervisor of Elections,
BRIAN CORLEY, in his official capacity as
the Pasco County Supervisor of Elections,
WENDY SARTORY LINK, in her official capacity as the
Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections,
JOE SCOTT, in his official capacity as the Broward
County Supervisor of Elections, TAPPIE VILLANE,
In her official capacity as the Santa Rosa County
Supervisor of Elections, CORD BYRD, in his official
capacity as Florida Secretary of State, the
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE, the
ELECTIONS CANVASING COMMISSION, and
FLORIDIANS PROTECTING FREEDOM, INC.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs HOPE HOFFMAN, TERRI KELLOGG, LORIEN HERSHBERGER, and
CHELSEY DAVIS bring this action against Defendants KIM BARTON, in her official capacity
as the Alachua County Supervisor of Elections, AMANDA SEYFANG, in her official capacity as
the Bradford County Supervisor of Elections, DEBORAH OSBORNE, in her official capacity as
the Union County Supervisor of Elections, CHRISTOPHER MILTON, in his official capacity as
the Baker County Supervisor of Elections, TOMI S. BROWN, in her official capacity as the
Columbia County Supervisor of Elections, JENNIFER KINSEY, in her official capacity as the
Suwannee County Supervisor of Elections, LAURA HUTTO, in her official capacity as the
Hamilton County Supervisor of Elections, TRAVIS HART, in his official capacity as the Lafayette
County Supervisor of Elections, STARLET CANNON, in her official capacity as the Dixie County
Supervisor of Elections, TAMMY JONES, in her official capacity as the Levy County Supervisor
of Elections, WESLEY WILCOX, in his official capacity as the Marion County Supervisor of
Elections, CONNIE SANCHEZ, in her official capacity as the Gilchrist County Supervisor of
Elections, GLEN GILZEAN, in his official capacity as the Orange County Supervisor of Elections,
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MARY JANE ARRINGTON, in her official capacity as the Osceola County Supervisor of
Elections, JULIE MARCUS, in her official capacity as the Pinellas County Supervisor of
Elections, CRAIG LATIMER, in his official capacity as the Hillsborough County Supervisor of
Elections, LORI EDWARDS, in her official capacity as the Polk County Supervisor of Elections,
BRIAN CORLEY, in his official capacity as the Pasco County Supervisor of Elections, WENDY
SARTORY LINK, in her official capacity as the Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections, JOE
SCOTT, in his official capacity as the Broward County Supervisor of Elections, TAPPIE
VILLANE, in her official capacity as the Santa Rosa County Supervisor of Elections, 1 CORD
BYRD, in his official capacity as Florida Secretary of State, the FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, the ELECTIONS CANVASING COMMISSION,2 and FLORIDIANS PROTECTING
FREEDOM, INC. (“FPF”), and allege the following:
INTRODUCTION
1. Investigators with the State of Florida recently uncovered widespread fraud and
illegality in the petition signature collection effort to place Amendment 4 on the 2024 General
Election Ballot. When all fictitious, forged, illegally obtained, or otherwise invalid signatures are
removed from consideration, Amendment 4 failed to reach the constitutionally required number
of signatures for ballot placement. The invalid petitions must be stricken and Amendment 4
removed from the 2024 General Election pursuant to binding judicial precedent in Floridians
Against Expanded Gambling v. Floridians for a Level Playing Field, 945 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA
2006).
1
Defendant Supervisors of Elections are collectively referenced as the “SOE Defendants.”
2
The SOE Defendants, the Elections Canvasing Commission, Secretary Byrd, and the
Department of State are collectively referenced as the “State Defendants.”
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NATURE OF THE ACTION
2. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, pursuant to Chapter 86, Florida
Statutes, striking the initiative to amend the Florida Constitution titled the “Amendment to Limit
Government Interference with Abortion” (“Amendment 4”) from Florida’s November 5, 2024
General Election Ballot. Or—in the event that the 2024 General Election takes place before this
matter is resolved—declaring Amendment 4 null and void and ordering that any ballots cast for it
not be counted or given effect and enjoining the Defendants from posting any resulting
Amendment 4 election results.
THE PARTIES
3. Plaintiffs Hope Hoffman and Terri Kellogg are Florida voters and residents of St.
Lucie County, Florida. They will vote in the 2024 General Election and maintain a right to
participate in and protect the constitutional initiative process. Ms. Hoffman survived an abortion
at ten and a half weeks’ gestation. After the abortion procedure, Ms. Hoffman quietly continued
to grow in her mother’s womb. When her mother felt movement and discovered Ms. Hoffman was
still alive, she chose life. Ms. Hoffman was born at 32 weeks’ gestation at North Broward General
Hospital with major injuries from the abortionist’s instruments. Ms. Hoffman’s head was cut open
by the abortionist from her forehead to her right ear, severing her scalp and skull and exposing her
brain. Ms. Kellogg adopted Ms. Hoffman as her daughter.
4. Plaintiff Lorien Hershberger is a Florida voter and resident of Taylor County. She
will vote in the 2024 General Election and maintains a right to participate in and protect the
constitutional initiative process.
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5. Plaintiff Chelsey Davis is a Florida voter and resident of Taylor County. She will
vote in the 2024 General Election and maintains a right to participate in and protect the
constitutional initiative process.
6. Defendant Kim Barton is the Alachua County Supervisor of Elections. The
supervisor of elections has duties and responsibilities in connection with the initiative amendment
process, including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot placement.
§ 100.371(11), Fla. Stat.
7. Defendant Amanda Seyfang is the Bradford County Supervisor of Elections. The
process, including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot placement. Id.
8. Defendant Deborah Osborne is the Union County Supervisor of Elections. The
9. Defendant Christopher Milton is the Baker County Supervisor of Elections. The
10. Defendant Tomi S. Brown is the Columbia County Supervisor of Elections. The
11. Defendant Jennifer Kinsey is the Suwannee County Supervisor of Elections. The
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12. Defendant Laura Hutto is the Hamilton County Supervisor of Elections. The
13. Defendant Travis Hart is the Lafayette County Supervisor of Elections. The
14. Defendant Starlet Cannon is the Dixie County Supervisor of Elections. The
process, including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.
15. Defendant Tammy Jones is the Levy County Supervisor of Elections. The
16. Defendant Wesley Wilcox is the Marion County Supervisor of Elections. The
17. Defendant Connie Sanchez is the Gilchrist County Supervisor of Elections. The
18. Defendant Glen Gilzean is the Orange County Supervisor of Elections. The
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19. Defendant Mary Jane Arrington is the Osceola County Supervisor of Elections. The
20. Defendant Julie Marcus is the Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections. The
21. Defendant Chris Latimer is the Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections. The
22. Defendant Lori Edwards is the Polk County Supervisor of Elections. The supervisor
of elections has duties and responsibilities in connection with the initiative amendment process,
including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot placement. Id.
23. Defendant Brian Corley is the Pasco County Supervisor of Elections. The
24. Defendant Wendy Sartory Link is the Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections.
The supervisor of elections has duties and responsibilities in connection with the initiative
amendment process, including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot
placement. Id.
25. Defendant Joe Scott is the Broward County Supervisor of Elections. The supervisor
of elections has duties and responsibilities in connection with the initiative amendment process,
including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.
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26. Defendant Tappie Villane is the Santa Rosa County Supervisor of Elections. The
27. Defendant Cord Byrd is the Florida Secretary of State and pursuant to
section 20.10, Florida Statutes, the “custodian of state records” as that term is used in article XI,
section 3 of the Florida Constitution. See Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Funding of Embryonic
Stem Cell Rsch., 959 So. 2d 195, 197 (Fla. 2007). He is also the chief election officer of the State
of Florida and has responsibilities in connection with the initiative process pursuant to general law.
See § 97.012, Fla. Stat.; see generally Title IX, Fla. Stat.
28. Defendant Department of State was created pursuant to section 20.10, Florida
Statutes, and has responsibilities regarding the initiative process pursuant to state law. See
generally, Title IX, Fla. Stat.; see, e.g., § 99.097, Fla. Stat. (requiring the Department of State to
adopt rules and guidelines for verifying initiative signatures).
29. Defendant Elections Canvassing Commission was created pursuant to section
102.111, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for certifying statewide election results. See
§ 102.121, Fla. Stat. It is an indispensable party defendant in multicounty elections. See § 102.168,
Fla. Stat.
30. The State Defendants are named in this suit solely based on their respective
statutory duties and to ensure the Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Nothing in
this complaint should be interpreted as a suggestion that any of the State Defendants have engaged
in wrongdoing.
31. Defendant Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. (“FPF”) is a nonprofit corporation
registered with the State of Florida and the sponsor of Amendment 4. Its partner organizations are,
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among others, nonparties: Planned Parenthood Action Fund, Planned Parenthood organizations in
Florida, the ACLU of Florida, Florida Rising, and SEIU 1199 Florida.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
32. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. See §§ 86.011,
.021, .101, Fla. Stat.
33. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction to enter permanent injunctions. See
§ 26.12(3), Fla. Stat.
34. Venue is proper in Orange County because Defendant Glen Gilzean resides in
Orange County and the Orange County Supervisor of Elections headquarters is located in Orange
County. § 47.011, Fla. Stat.
35. Plaintiffs have sued the State Defendants in each of their home venues out of an
abundance of caution due to the home venue privilege (that Plaintiffs acknowledge but do not
concede) the State Defendants arguably enjoy pursuant to Scott v. Thompson, 326 So. 3d 123, 125
(Fla. 1st DCA 2021). Plaintiffs recognize that this results in multiple complaints filed throughout
the State. These multiple suits are not an effort to harass but rather a consequence of the precedent
in Thompson.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Amending the Florida Constitution by Initiative Petition
A. Requirements for Initiative Petition Ballot Placement and Passage
36. Floridians have a constitutional right to revise the Florida Constitution by initiative
petition. Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const.
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37. Article XI, sections 3 and 5 of the Florida Constitution and the Florida Election
Code, including sections 100.371 and 101.161, Florida Statutes, set the requirements for
amendments by initiative petition.
38. Getting a proposed amendment on the general election ballot requires a sponsor to
collect petition signatures showing support for the measure and to submit those signatures to the
appropriate supervisors of elections. See id.; § 100.371(11)(a), Fla. Stat.
39. The sponsor must collect signatures from “a number of electors in each of one half
of the congressional districts of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the
votes cast in each of such districts respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding
election in which presidential electors were chosen.” Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const.
40. This election cycle, initiative petitions needed 891,523 signatures statewide to
achieve placement on the 2024 General Election Ballot. See Amendment to Limit Government
Interference with Abortion 23-07, Florida Division of Elections
available at https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=83927&seqnu
m=1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2024).
41. Each congressional district has further signature threshold requirements. Art. XI,
§ 3, Fla. Const. The sponsor must meet the thresholds in half of Florida’s congressional districts.
See id. This election cycle, placement on the 2024 General Election Ballot required signature totals
for each district as follows: District 1 (34,025); District 2 (33,010); District 3 ( 31,672); District 4
(32,183); District 5 (34,266); District 6 (34,389); District 7 (34,859); District 8 (36,943); District
9 (27,460); District 10 (27,276); District 11 (34,189); District 12 (34,136); District 13 (36,388);
District 14 (31,666); District 15 (29,986); District 16 (32,935); District 17 (36,263); District 18
(28,206); District 19 (34,934); District 20 (27,165); District 21 (35,671); District 22 (31,654);
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District 23 (32,869); District 24 (26,555); District 25 (30,974); District 26 (25,566); District 27
(28,826); District 28 (27,471). See Valid Petition Signatures, Florida Division of Elections
available at https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/initSignDetailCounty.asp?account=83
927&seqnum=1&ctype=CSV&elecyear=2024 (last visited Oct. 11, 2024).
42. Florida law requires that the sponsor “submit signed and dated forms to the
supervisor of elections for the county of residence listed by the person signing the form for
verification of the number of valid signatures obtained.” § 100.371(11)(a), Fla. Stat.
43. The supervisors of elections are responsible for verifying that the petition signatures
are valid, and can verify a signature “only if:”
1. The form contains the original signature of the purported elector.

2. The purported elector has accurately recorded on the form the date on
which he or she signed the form.
3. The form sets forth the purported elector’s name, address, city, county,
and voter registration number or date of birth.
4. The purported elector is, at the time he or she signs the form and at the
time the form is verified, a duly qualified and registered elector in the state.
5. The signature was obtained legally, including that if a paid petition
circulator3 was used, the circulator was validly registered under subsection
(3) when the signature was obtained.
§ 100.371(11)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Rule 1S-2.0091(3), F.A.C. (requiring the above information).
44. A supervisor of elections may not use random sampling as a method for verifying
signatures on constitutional amendment initiative petitions. § 99.097(1)(b), Fla. Stat.; Rule 1S-
2.0091(4), F.A.C. This prohibition is specific to the article XI, section 3 initiative amendment
process due to its strict signature requirements for ballot placement. See Let's Help Fla. v.
3
Florida law defines “petition circulator” as “an entity or individual who collects signatures
for compensation for the purpose of qualifying a proposed constitutional amendment for ballot
placement.” § 97.021(28), Fla. Stat.
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Smathers, 360 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (“Article XI, Section 3, having mandated that
there shall be no less than eight percent of the described electors who shall sign such initiative
petition before the same shall attain ballot status, we do not presume that the Legislature intended
to enact a law where, by a random or spot check, less than eight percent would become permissible.
It has no authority to so legislate. It follows, therefore, that Section 99.097(1)(b) and (2) has no
application to Article XI, Section 3, Florida Constitution, relating to proposed initiative
amendment to the Constitution.”). Thus, each petition must be checked in order to be verified. Id.
45. Once the supervisors of elections verify the signatures and petition forms, the
Secretary of State must determine the “total number of verified valid signatures and the distribution
of such signatures by congressional districts.” § 100.371(12), Fla. Stat. Upon determining that the
requisite number and distribution of valid signatures have been obtained, the Secretary must “issue
a certificate of ballot position for that proposed amendment” and assign a designating number for
the amendment. Id.
46. Before a proposed amendment can be placed on the general election ballot, the
Supreme Court must ensure the submission is valid under Florida law. See Art. IV § 10, Fla.
Const.; § 16.061, Fla. Stat. Thus, the Secretary of State is required to send an initiative petition to
the Attorney General for submission to the Florida Supreme Court once, among other things, the
Division of Elections confirms that the sponsor has submitted and the supervisors of elections have
verified forms signed and dated equal to 25 percent of the number of electors statewide in at least
one-half of the congressional districts of the state. See § 15.21, Fla. Stat.
47. An initiative petition that qualifies for submission to the Florida Supreme Court
pursuant to section 15.21, Florida Statutes, must also be submitted to the Financial Impact
Estimating Conference. See § 100.371(13)(a), Fla. Stat. The Financial Impact Estimating
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Conference is tasked with analyzing the initiative’s financial impact and preparing a “financial
impact statement to be placed on the ballot of the estimated increase or decrease in any revenues
or costs to state or local governments and the overall impact to the state budget resulting from the
proposed initiative.” Id.
48. Final ballot placement requires the Secretary of State to determine (no later than
February 1 of the year in which the general election is held) that “valid and verified petition forms
have been signed by the constitutionally required number and distribution of electors under this
code.” See § 100.371(1), Fla. Stat.
49. A proposed amendment that does not meet the threshold level of signatures may
not be placed on the ballot. See Art. XI, § 3; § 100.371(1), (12), Fla. Stat.
50. A proposed amendment is passed if it is approved by a vote of at least sixty percent
of the voters voting on the measure. Art. XI, § 5(e), Fla. Const. If passed, an amendment takes
effect “on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January following the election, or on such
other date as may be specified in the amendment or revision.” Id.
B. Requirements for Initiative Petition Signature Collection Efforts
51. Florida allows paid petition circulators to collect signatures for initiative petitions,
as long as they adhere to relevant Florida law. See § 100.371(3)-(11), Fla. Stat.
52. Paid petition circulators must be registered with the Secretary of State.
§ 100.371(3), Fla. Stat.
53. Registering with the Secretary of State requires petition circulator applicants to
disclose:
(a) The information required to be on the petition form . . . including the

ballot summary and title as approved by the Secretary of State.
(b) The applicant’s name, permanent address, temporary address, if
applicable, and date of birth.
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(c) An address in this state at which the applicant will accept service of
process related to disputes concerning the petition process, if the applicant
is not a resident of this state.
(d) A statement that the applicant consents to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state in resolving disputes concerning the petition process.
(e) Any information required by the Secretary of State to verify the
applicant’s identity or address.
§ 100.371(4), Fla. Stat.
54. All petitions collected by a petition circulator must contain a completed “Petition
Circulator’s Affidavit” including the following information:
(a) The circulator’s name and permanent address;

(b) The following statement, which must be signed by the circulator:
By my signature below, as petition circulator, I verify that the petition was

signed in my presence. Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read
the foregoing Petition Circulator’s Affidavit and the facts stated in it are
true.
§ 100.371(5), Fla. Stat.
55. A sponsor that collects petition forms or uses a petition circulator to do so is “a
fiduciary to the elector signing the petition form” and must “ensur[e] that any petition form
entrusted to the petition circulator shall be promptly delivered to the supervisor of elections within
30 days after the elector signs the form.” 100.371(7), Fla. Stat. A failure to promptly deliver
petition forms will render the sponsor liable for civil fines. See id.
56. According to regulations promulgated by the Division of Elections to ensure the
integrity of the petition form gathering process, the sponsor must account for all petition forms
used and turned in by their agents. Rule 1S-2.009(8), F.A.C.; § 100.371(9), Fla. Stat.
57. Florida law also imposes criminal penalties for violations of the Election Code,
including illicit signature-gathering activities. See generally Ch. 104, Fla. Stat.
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58. It is a first-degree misdemeanor for a person to sign an initiative petition more than
once, sign another person’s name, or sign a fictitious name to any petition. See § 104.185, Fla.
Stat.
59. It is also a third-degree felony for a person to pay a petition circulator based on the
number of petition forms gathered. § 104.186, Fla. Stat.
60. People who co-conspire or aid, abet, or advise another person to commit violations
of the Election Code—like sections 104.185 and 104.186, Florida Statutes—are punished as
principals, as if they had committed the violation. See § 104.091(1), Fla. Stat.
II. Amendment 4’s Path to the Florida General Election Ballot
A. Abortion Rights Return to the States
61. On June 24, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022). In Dobbs, the Court held that the U.S.
Constitution does not include a right to abortion and overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
and Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Id. at 231. In
so holding, the Supreme Court “return[ed] the issue of abortion to the people’s elected
representatives” and noted that the permissibility of abortion is “to be resolved like most important
questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.” Id. at
232.
62. With the abortion issue returned to the states, Florida accepted the Supreme Court’s
invitation to legislate, see, e.g., Ch. 2023-21, Laws of Fla. (2023), and abortion activists moved to
create a right to abortion in the Florida Constitution. Floridians Protecting Freedom Launch
Campaign to Ensure Constitutional Right to Abortion, Yes on 4: Floridians Protecting Freedom
(May 8, 2023) https://floridiansprotectingfreedom.com/campaign-launch/.
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B. FPF Propose Amendment 4
63. On May 8, 2023, FPF unveiled an initiative petition to amend the Florida
Constitution that, if passed by the Florida electorate, would add a constitutional right to abortion
until the point of birth. Id.
64. FPF’s Amendment 4 would create a new section in the Florida Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights. The full text states:
SECTION —. Limiting government interference with abortion.— Except

as provided in Article X, Section 22, no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay,
or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s
health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.
65. Amendment 4’s ballot title is the “Amendment to Limit Government Interference
with Abortion,” and its summary states:
No law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or

when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the
patient’s healthcare provider. This amendment does not change the
Legislature’s constitutional authority to require notification to a parent or
guardian before a minor has an abortion.
66. Achieving ballot placement for Amendment 4 required FPF to collect at least
891,523 petition signatures statewide showing support for the initiative. See Art. XI, § 3, Fla.
Const.; § 100.371(11)(a), Fla. Stat.; Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion,
Div. of Elections available at https://bit.ly/3XxhxT4 (last visited Oct. 16, 2024).
67. Unless FPF submitted at least 891,523 valid and verified petition forms statewide
and the above-referenced specific numbers of valid and verified petition forms from at least 14 of
Florida’s 28 congressional districts, Amendment 4 cannot be presented to Florida electors on the
2024 General Election Ballot.
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C. FPF’s Signature Collection Effort
68. So, FPF began its campaign to collect signatures to qualify Amendment 4 for ballot
access. As part of that effort, it hired PCI Consultants, Inc. (“PCI”) to lead the signature-collection
effort.
69. Over the past 24 months, according to campaign finance records, FPF has paid PCI
more than $27 million for petition initiative efforts.
70. PCI’s practice is to pay petition circulators per signature. See, e.g., John Ryan
Paying for signatures used to be illegal. Now it’s making this Californian rich, NPR (Aug. 13,
2016) available at https://bit.ly/3TAXF0f. On information and belief, PCI incentivized its petition
circulator’s signature-collecting efforts in Florida by hiring contractors that paid per signature or
were paid per signature. They did this even though it is a third-degree felony to pay petition
circulators based on the number of signatures he or she collects. § 104.186, Fla. Stat.
71. The signatures FPF and PCI collected were submitted to the various supervisors of
elections across the state—including the SOE Defendants—for signature verification.
D. Amendment 4 Is Approved for Ballot Placement
72. On September 7, 2023, the Secretary of State notified the Attorney General that
Amendment 4 had met the registration, submission, and signature criteria set forth in section 15.21,
Florida Statutes, including that FPF had “submitted to the appropriate supervisors for verification,
and the supervisors have verified, forms signed and dated equal to 25 percent of the number of
electors statewide required by s. 3, Art. XI of the State Constitution in one-half of the congressional
districts of the state.” § 15.21(c), Fla. Stat.
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73. The Secretary of State submitted Amendment 4 to the Financial Impact Estimating
Committee the same day. See Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. v. Passidomo, No. SC2024-
1098, 2024 WL 3882608, at *2 (Fla. Aug. 21, 2024).
74. On October 9, 2023, pursuant to article IV, section 10 of the Florida Constitution,
the Attorney General requested the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion about whether Amendment
4 complied with the single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 and whether the ballot title
and summary of the amendment complied with the requirements in section 101.161(1), Florida
Statutes.
75. On January 5, 2024, the Secretary of State determined Amendment 4 had obtained
a sufficient number of signatures for ballot placement.
76. On April 1, 2024, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Amendment 4
complied with the Constitution’s single-subject requirement and that the ballot title and summary
complied with Florida law and thus was acceptable for inclusion on the 2024 General Election
Ballot. Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Limiting Gov’t Interference with Abortion, 384 So. 3d
122, 127 (Fla. 2024).
77. On August 21, 2024, the Florida Supreme Court cleared the way for Amendment
4’s Financial Impact Statement to be included on the General Election Ballot, by rejecting a
challenge filed by FPF. See Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. v. Passidomo, No. SC2024-1098,
2024 WL 3882608, at *1 (Fla. Aug. 21, 2024). Amendment 4’s Financial Impact Statement reads
as follows:
The proposed amendment would result in significantly more abortions and

fewer live births per year in Florida. The increase in abortions could be even
greater if the amendment invalidates laws requiring parental consent before
minors undergo abortions and those ensuring only licensed physicians
perform abortions. There is also uncertainty about whether the amendment
will require the state to subsidize abortions with public funds. Litigation to
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resolve those and other uncertainties will result in additional costs to the
state government and state courts that will negatively impact the state
budget. An increase in abortions may negatively affect the growth of state
and local revenues over time. Because the fiscal impact of increased
abortions on state and local revenues and costs cannot be estimated with
precision, the total impact of the proposed amendment is indeterminate.
Id. at *3.
III. The Florida Office of Election Crimes and Security Identifies Rampant
Amendment 4 Fraud
A. Fraud Allegations Cause OECS to Investigate Amendment 4
78. In late 2023 and into 2024, before Amendment 4’s approval for the 2024 General
Election Ballot, the Department of State and Office of Election Crimes and Security (“OECS”)
were inundated with complaints regarding its supporters’ petition signature-gathering efforts. See
OECS, Interim Report to Legislature on Initiative Petition Fraud Related to the Abortion Initiative
(23-07) (“Report”) at 3, attached hereto as Exhibit A. The complaints included allegations that
petitions were signed on behalf of deceased people, contained forgeries or signature
misrepresentations, used personal identifying information without elector consent, contained
perjury and false swearing, and/or were collected on an illegal pay-per-signature basis. Id. These
complaints resulted in multiple arrests, convictions, and hundreds of investigations—nearly all of
which were referred to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Id. at 2, 7-12.
79. OECS is required to submit annual reports to the Governor, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, informing elected officials about
irregularities and election law violations. § 97.022(7)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. It is also required to
undertake investigations into violations of election law and election irregularities. § 97.022(1)(b),
Fla. Stat. Amid concerns regarding the numerous Amendment 4 petition-gathering complaints,
19
including those identified in OECS’s annual report issued on January 15, 2024, OECS undertook
an investigation into the Amendment 4 irregularities. Report at 2.
80. On October 11, 2024, OECS issued a report titled “Interim Report to Legislature
on Initiative Petition Fraud Related to the Abortion Initiative (23-07)” setting forth findings and
evidence showing that thousands of Amendment 4 petitions previously verified by the SOE
Defendants contained forged or otherwise invalid signatures. See generally Report.
81. The investigation revealed that FPF and its agents, including PCI and its
subcontractors, engaged in illegal and fraudulent petition signature-gathering efforts to secure
Amendment 4’s placement on the 2024 General Election Ballot and in so doing undermined the
integrity of the initiative process and Amendment 4’s validity.
82. The Report made numerous findings including that FPF’s petition circulators were
compensated on an illegal pay-per-signature scheme, that FPF’s petition circulators engaged in
significant fraud, and that large numbers of verified petitions were in fact fraudulent.
83. To date, four petition circulators have been criminally prosecuted for illegal activity
committed on behalf of Amendment 4, two have been convicted, and many more criminal
investigations are underway.
B. OECS Report Details Illegal Pay-Per-Signature Scheme
84. According to the Report, FPF’s petition signature-gathering effort was primarily
overseen by the California-based PCI. Report at 4. FPF has paid PCI more than $27 million for
petition-related activities. See id.
85. OECS’s investigation uncovered that multiple PCI subcontractors paid individual
circulators on a pay-per-petition basis, “in gross violation of Florida law.” Id. Indeed, the scheme
was blatantly advertised on social media sites. Id.
20
86. OECS also received multiple reports of pay-per-signature arrangements by industry
witnesses and other petition circulators who were prosecuted for fraud. See id. Petition circulators
were able to receive payments as high as $10 per signature. Id.
87. FPF’s failure to comply with its statutory duty to “account for all petition forms
used by their agents,” § 100.371, Fla. Stat.; see Rule 1S-2.009(8), F.A.C., has hampered OECS’s
investigation. Report at 4. For example, FPF responded to the Department of State’s demands for
petition accountings by claiming it does not have “custody or control of any document” the
Department of State has requested. Id.
88. OECS thus discovered that in violation of Florida law, circulators submitted all
FPF’s petition forms to PCI, not FPF, and then PCI submitted the petition forms to the supervisors
of elections on behalf of FPF. See Rule 1S-2.009(8) (“All signed petition forms shall be returned
to the sponsoring political committee. Only the sponsoring political committee shall submit the
signed petition forms to the Supervisors of Elections for verification of signatures in accordance
with Rule 1S-2.0091, F.A.C.”).
89. PCI, an out-of-state corporation that has not registered in Florida (despite engaging
in at least $27 million worth of business in the state), has not cooperated with OECS, even when
presented with a subpoena. Report at 4. PCI’s subcontractors are similarly not registered to do
business in Florida. Id.
90. Florida has no state residency requirement for paid petition circulators, and OECS
has determined that many of FPF’s paid petition circulators “have few if any ties to Florida and
list addresses in other, sometimes faraway states.” Id.
91. OECS highlighted the pay-per-signature scheme as a major driver of Amendment
4 petition fraud—which OECS described as “widespread.” Id. at 5.
21
C. OECS Report Details Amendment 4 Petition Circulator Fraud
92. The Report identified multiple categories of Amendment 4 fraud.
93. First, FPF circulators submitted petition forms with the personal information of
deceased individuals. Id. at 5.
94. Second, FPF circulators submitted petition forms that contained false attestations
and perjury. Id. at 5. Much of this perjury appears to have been the result of an apparently prevalent
practice of paid petition circulators outsourcing their petition-gathering responsibilities to
unregistered petition circulators and falsely swearing that they witnessed electors signing the
outsourced petitions. Id. at 5. Florida law requires all paid petition circulators to be registered with
the state. § 100.371(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Additionally, all paid petition circulators must attest that each
petition was signed in their presence. § 100.371(5), Fla. Stat.
95. Third, investigators discovered that otherwise valid petition forms were obtained
by fraud, wherein petition circulators would misrepresent Amendment 4’s purpose and effect.
Report at 5. As investigators learned, at least one subcontractor was instructing circulators to tell
prospective signatories that the petition was “to keep the State of Florida from taking away
women’s rights; that’s exactly what [the subcontractor] told us to tell people. Not necessarily
abortion.” Id. (quoting App. N).
96. Finally, the investigation revealed that FPF petition gatherers engaged in “bulk
identity theft” with circulators using publicly available personal identifying information to
complete petition forms without electors’ knowledge or consent. See id. at 5-6. So prevalent was
this practice that election staff in the supervisor of elections offices in Martin and Osceola counties
reported that their personal information was misappropriated and signatures forged on petition
forms submitted by Amendment 4 circulators. Id. at 6. Law enforcement personnel also
22
interviewed numerous electors who confirmed that they did not complete petition forms in support
of Amendment 4.
97. FPF’s agents were aware that they were paying circulators known to engage in
fraudulent practices. Id. at 7. OECS discovered the existence of a so-called “Do Not Buy” list
circulated in the petition-gathering industry that identifies petition circulators who have engaged
in fraudulent petition-gathering activities or submitted fraudulent petitions. Id. Despite PCI’s likely
maintaining a copy of the “Do Not Buy” list, more than 50 paid circulators who submitted petitions
for FPF were included in the list. Id.
D. OECS Audits Verified Petitions and Discovers More Fraud
98. OECS’s investigation was initially focused on complaints regarding non-verified
petition forms—i.e. those that were not counted toward Amendment 4’s signature tally. See id. at
12. OECS’s investigation expanded to verified petition forms—i.e. those that did count toward
Amendment 4’s signature tally—when it discovered, inter alia, that many forms submitted by
circulators who were known to have submitted fraudulent forms were validated in multiple
counties. Id. at 12. Thus, OECS found “it was necessary to expand its investigation to validated
forms in order to (1) determine the full scope of the fraud associated with Initiative Petition 23-07,
(2) uncover the techniques used by fraudsters and recommend legislative counteraction, and
(3) identify Floridians whose identities were stolen in furtherance of election crime.” Id. at 12-13.
99. OECS engaged Department of State employees with expertise and mastery of state
signature-matching standards to conduct an audit of forms validated for Amendment 4. Id. at 14.
Auditors were instructed to assess whether forms contained all the required elector information
and matching signatures. Id. In reviewing validated petition forms, auditors made one of four
findings:
23
Id.
100. OECS conducted multiple audits in Palm Beach, Orange, and Osceola Counties—
some audits focused only on verified petitions submitted by known or suspected fraudsters and
others focused on all verified petitions not limited to known or suspected fraudsters.
101. OECS started small, beginning in Palm Beach County and focusing only on verified
petitions submitted by known or suspected fraudsters. Id. at 15. In its limited review of 41 verified
petitions, OECS discovered only 21—or just over 50%—were valid. Id. Fifteen verified
petitions—or 36.6%—were invalid and another five petitions were of questionable validity. Id. So,
in OECS’s first, albeit limited, review of verified petitions submitted by known or suspected
fraudsters, 49% of verified petitions were either invalid or of questionable validity. See id.
102. OECS expanded its investigation into Orange County, where a review of 2,216
verified petitions submitted by known or suspected fraudsters yielded an invalidity rate of 32.2%
(or 715 invalid but verified petitions). Id. Another 287 verified petitions were found to be of
questionable validity. Id. Thus, OECS’s second review found 45% of verified petitions submitted
by known or suspected fraudsters were invalid or of questionable validity. See id.
103. From there, OECS turned to auditing samples of all validated petitions—regardless
of the originating petition circulator. In Orange County, OECS requested all 11,306 petitions
validated by the Orange County Supervisor of Elections within Congressional District 9—but
24
ultimately received and reviewed 9,810 (Orange County and OECS are currently reconciling why
the remaining 1,496 petitions were not turned over). The audit revealed that 2,017 or 20.9% of all
verified petitions were invalid. Id. at 17. Another 815 verified petitions were of questionable
validity. Id. Thus, the Orange County audit revealed that nearly 29% of verified petitions were
either invalid or of questionable validity. See id.
104. OECS also audited Osceola County where fewer fraudsters were known to have
operated. See id. at 17. Osceola County is entirely within Congressional District 9. Id. Of the 1,378
verified petitions the auditors reviewed, 102 or 7.4% were invalid. Id. Another 123 were of
questionable validity. Id. Thus, the Osceola County audit revealed that 16% of verified petitions
were either invalid or of questionable validity. See id.
105. As of the date of the Report, OECS had reviewed and analyzed a total of 13,445
validated petition forms within Congressional District 9 and determined that—at the bare
minimum—2,849 should not have been validated due to statutory deficiencies or clearly
mismatched signatures. Id. at 18.
106. In Congressional District 9, the supervisors of elections validated 30,378 petition
forms, which was 2,918 petition forms over the required minimum number of 27,460 petition
forms to aid in qualifying Amendment 4 for ballot placement.
107. But when OECS concludes its audit of the validated petition forms within
Congressional District 9, the number of improperly validated petition forms will demonstrate that
Amendment 4 did not meet the constitutional minimum threshold for valid signatures in that
Congressional District, because more than 2,918 petition forms should have been invalidated and
the total number should not have reached the constitutional threshold of 27,460 petition forms.
25
108. Congressional District 9 aside, based on the preliminary audits, OECS found an
average total invalidity rate of 16.4% among verified petitions. The Report explained:
While there is a wide range of invalidity rates between the three audited counties,
on average, 25.4% of petition forms that were submitted by known or suspected
fraudsters and verified by the Supervisor of Elections should have been rejected
due to statutory deficiencies or a clear signature mismatch. Based on the only
county where data is available, the invalidity rate drops by 35.4% when all
circulators are included. Applying this “drop off rate” (35.4%) to the average
invalidity rate for known or suspected fraudsters (25.4%) yields an average total
invalidity rate of 16.4%.
109. Statewide, Amendment 4 exceeded the required constitutional threshold by only
11.8% (997,035 verified petition forms, divided by the constitutional threshold minimum of
891,523 verified petition forms, equals 1.11835).
110. Accounting for the substantial fraud and illegality in the petition gathering process
in support of Amendment 4, the actual number of valid petition forms is therefore less than 891,523
statewide.
111. Indeed, applying OECS’s average invalidity rate of 16.4% to petitions verified by
the Supervisors of Elections that should have been deemed invalid, the actual number of valid
petition forms in support of Amendment 4 drops to 833,521 statewide (16.4% of 997,035 verified
petition forms, subtracted from 997,035 verified petition forms, equals 833,521 valid petition
forms).
112. Accordingly, without the substantial fraud and illegality in the petition gathering
process in support of Amendment 4, it never would have qualified for ballot placement.
113. Similar conclusions can be drawn for some of the other congressional districts
where Amendment 4 met the minimum threshold for ballot placement.
114. For example, in Congressional District 13, the minimum threshold of verified
petitions needed was 36,388. Supervisor Marcus in Pinellas County verified 42,741 petitions.
26
Applying OECS’s average invalidity rate of 16.4% to petitions verified by the supervisors of
elections that should have been deemed invalid, the actual number of valid petition forms in
support of Amendment 4 drops to 35,731 in Congressional District 13 (16.4% of 42,741 verified
petition forms, subtracted from 42,741 verified petition forms, equals 35,731 valid petition forms).
Accordingly, without the substantial fraud and illegality in the petition gathering process in support
of Amendment 4, it never would have qualified for ballot placement based on petition forms in
Congressional District 13.
115. Again, in Congressional District 15, the minimum threshold of verified petitions
needed was 29,986. Supervisor Latimer in Hillsborough County, Supervisor Corley in Pasco
County, and Supervisor Edwards in Polk County verified a total of 35,415 petitions. Applying
OECS’s average invalidity rate of 16.4% to verified petitions that should have been deemed
invalid, the actual number of valid petition forms in support of Amendment 4 drops to 29,607 in
Congressional District 15 (16.4% of 35,415 verified petition forms, subtracted from 35,415
verified petition forms, equals 29,607 valid petition forms). Accordingly, without the substantial
fraud and illegality in the petition gathering process in support of Amendment 4, it never would
have qualified for ballot placement based on petition forms in Congressional District 15.
116. Again, in Congressional District 25, the minimum threshold of verified petitions
needed was 30,974. The Supervisor Scott in Broward County verified a total of 35,296 petitions.
Applying OECS’s average invalidity rate of 16.4% to verified petitions that should have been
deemed invalid, the actual number of valid petition forms in support of Amendment 4 drops to
29,507 in Congressional District 25 (16.4% of 35,296 verified petition forms, subtracted from
35,296 verified petition forms, equals 29,507 valid petition forms). Accordingly, without the
substantial fraud and illegality in the petition gathering process in support of Amendment 4, it
27
never would have qualified for ballot placement based on petition forms in Congressional District
25.
117. Of course, the actual invalidity rate among verified petition forms in each
congressional district may be higher or lower than 16.4%, depending on the scope of fraudulent
activity and the utilization of known or suspected fraudsters. In Orange County, for example,
OECS determined that the invalidity rate was much higher than 16.4%.
118. Congressional District 23 includes portions of both Palm Beach and Broward
Counties. If the invalidity rate in Broward County is also much higher than 16.4% (indeed the
Report speculates that it is in fact 18.5%), then the actual number of valid petition forms in
support of Amendment 4 will drop below the minimum threshold for verified petitions of 32,869
in Congressional District 23.
119. Finally, Congressional District 3 includes twelve different counties. If the
invalidity rate in those counties equals or exceeds 24%, then the actual number of valid
petition forms in support of Amendment 4 will drop below the minimum threshold for verified
petitions of 31,672 in Congressional District 3. Accordingly, without the substantial fraud and
illegality in the petition gathering process in support of Amendment 4, it never would have
qualified for ballot placement based on petition forms in Congressional District 3.
120. In sum, the evidence and preliminary audits to date demonstrate that Amendment
4 failed to lawfully obtain the threshold number of constitutionally required petition signatures.
121. Based on the rate of fraudulent and invalid petitions discovered during the
investigation, the SOE Defendants failed to conduct a sufficient review before verifying
Amendment 4’s petition forms and signatures. OECS concluded that county supervisors of
elections failed their statutory obligation to verify petition forms for Amendment 4 in accordance
with the applicable standard governing signature matching. Report at 17. For example, a
28
substantial number of forged signatures submitted by FPF were mistakenly verified as valid by
supervisors of elections in multiple counties. Id. at 12. A sufficient review of the submitted
signatures and petition forms would demonstrate that Amendment 4 did not obtain the
constitutionally required number of valid petitions in Congressional Districts 3, 9, 13, 15, 23, and
25 and in the state as a whole.
122. Because Amendment 4 failed to achieve the requisite number and distribution of
valid signatures in the minimum number of congressional districts and in the state overall, the
Secretary should not have issued a certificate of ballot position for Amendment 4.
123. Based on the rate of fraudulent and otherwise invalid petitions discovered during
OESC’s investigation, Amendment 4 should not have been placed on the 2024 General Election
Ballot and will not be a valid constitutional amendment even if approved by the electors.
124. The presence of fraud and intentional wrongdoing, the failure to substantially
comply with the signature verification laws, and the significant irregularities in the petition
gathering and submission process in support of Amendment 4 adversely affects the sanctity of the
ballot and the integrity of the election.
125. Fraud and intentional wrongdoing permeated the entire petition collection and
verification process to the extent the validity of Amendment 4’s placement on the ballot is tainted.
126. All conditions precedent to bringing this action have been performed or waived.
COUNT _I
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
(Finding FPF Engaged in Substantial Fraud to Create the Illusion of Constitutional Compliance)
127. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1-126 as if fully alleged herein.
128. This is a declaratory judgment count seeking declaratory relief under Chapter 86,
Florida Statutes.
29
129. An actual and judicable dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants over
whether FPF engaged in substantial fraud to circumvent mandatory constitutional prerequisites for
ballot placement by submitting petitions that contained forged, fictitious, and illegally obtained
signatures to create the illusion of compliance.
130. The controversy concerns a present, ascertained, or ascertainable set of facts.
131. There exists a doubt as to whether FPF substantially complied with the mandatory
constitutional prerequisites for placement on the 2024 General Election Ballot.
132. There is a bona-fide, actual, present, and immediate need for a declaration that
because FPF did not comply with the mandatory constitutional prerequisites for ballot placement,
Amendment 4 is ineligible to be included on the 2024 General Election Ballot, or—if this dispute
is not resolved before the election—declared invalid.
133. The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before the Court by proper process.
134. As Florida electors with an inherent right to a lawful initiative process, Plaintiffs
are entitled to have any doubt as to the validity of Amendment 4 removed.
135. The relief sought is not merely advisory, and the questions presented to the Court
are not for curiosity.
COUNT_II
FINAL AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
(Based on FPF’s Substantial Fraud to Create the Illusion of Constitutional Compliance)
137. FPF has engaged in substantial fraud to circumvent mandatory constitutional
prerequisites for ballot placement by submitting petitions that contained forged, fictitious, and
illegally obtained signatures to create the illusion of compliance.
30
138. FPF’s substantial fraud constitutes a basis for the Court to decertify and strike
Amendment 4 from the 2024 General Election Ballot or—if this case is not resolved before the
election—to prohibit the counting of votes or, if passed, enjoin the State Defendants from giving
effect to votes cast in favor of Amendment 4 or posting Amendment 4 election results.
139. Although the Secretary of State has issued a certificate of ballot placement, the
certificate does not cure the substantial fraud that caused Amendment 4 to appear as though it had
satisfied the constitutional requirements. Moreover, if the 2024 General Election occurs prior to
the resolution of this action, passage will similarly not cure the fraud and illegality that resulted in
Amendment 4’s passage.
COUNT III
(Finding that FPF Failed to Submit a Sufficient Number of Valid Signatures for Ballot
Placement)
Florida Statutes.
whether FPF submitted petitions validly signed by 8 percent of the voters in at least one-half of
Florida’s congressional districts and in the state as whole as of the last presidential election to the
supervisors of elections and thus whether Amendment 4 is properly included on the 2024 General
Election Ballot.
143. The controversy concerns a present, ascertained or ascertainable set of facts.
144. FPF submitted a substantial number of petitions that—whether due to fraud,
mistake, error, or any other reason—contained forged, fictitious, illegally obtained, and otherwise
invalid signatures.
31
145. Due to these multitude of reasons, the SOE Defendants and the Secretary of State
erroneously verified and certified petitions that were otherwise invalid.
146. There exists a doubt as to the validity of the SOE Defendant’s verification of
petitions and of the Secretary of State’s approval of Amendment 4 for ballot placement due to the
substantial number of invalid petition signatures FPF submitted to the SOE Defendants.
147. There is a bona-fide, actual, present, and immediate need for a declaration that FPF
failed to submit a sufficient number and distribution of valid petition signatures supporting
Amendment 4 and therefore Amendment 4 must be declared ineligible to be placed on the 2024
General Election Ballot, or—if this case is not resolved before the election—declared invalid.
150. The relief sought is not merely advisory, and the questions propounded to the Court
COUNT IV
FINAL AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
(Due to FPF’s Failure to Submit a Sufficient Number of Valid Signatures for Ballot Placement)
152. FPF has failed to satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirements to achieve
ballot placement for a constitutional amendment, specifically article XI, section 3 of the Florida
Constitution, and section 100.371, Florida Statutes, among others.
153. FPF did not obtain the required number and distribution of valid initiative petition
signatures because it submitted initiative petitions that—whether due to fraud, mistake, error, or
any other reason—contained forged, fictitious, illegally obtained, and otherwise invalid signatures.
32
154. Due to these multitude of reasons, the SOE Defendants and the Secretary of State
erroneously verified and certified petitions that were otherwise invalid.
155. FPF’s failure to obtain the required number and distribution of valid initiative
petition signatures constitutes a basis for the Court to decertify and strike Amendment 4 from the
2024 General Election Ballot or—if this case is not resolved before the election—to enjoin the
State Defendants from counting the votes or, if passed, to enjoin the State Defendants from giving
effect to votes cast in favor of Amendment 4 or posting the Amendment 4 election results.
156. Because the SOE Defendants erroneously certified as valid forged, fictitious,
illegally obtained, and otherwise invalid signatures, FPF did not obtain the required number and
distribution of valid signatures to satisfy the requirements for ballot placement.
certificate does not cure FPF’s failure to obtain the required number of petition signatures and
underlying violations of law. Moreover, if the 2024 General Election occurs prior to the resolution
of this action, passage will similarly not cure Amendment 4’s illegal placement.
COUNT V
(Finding that FPF Did Not Substantially Comply with the Mandatory Provisions of the
Constitution)
Florida Statutes.
whether FPF substantially complied with the mandatory provisions of the constitution because
(1) FPF presented initiative petitions that contained forged, fictitious, illegally obtained, and
otherwise invalid signatures; (2) FPF did not substantially comply with the essential requirements
33
of law; and/or (3) the irregularities adversely affected the sanctity of the ballot and integrity of the
initiative amendment process.
161. As a result of such substantial noncompliance, the true number of valid and verified
petitions in support of Amendment 4 cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
162. The presence of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing in the petition
gathering and/or verification processes for Amendment 4 requires the Court to invalidate the
placement of Amendment 4 on the ballot and/or Amendment 4’s election results to ensure public
credibility in the electoral process.
164. There exists a doubt as to whether FPF substantially complied with the mandatory
prerequisites for placement on the 2024 General Election Ballot.
165. There is a bona-fide, actual, present, and immediate need for a declaration that
because FPF did not substantially comply with the mandatory constitutional requirements for
ballot placement, Amendment 4 is ineligible to be placed on the 2024 General Election Ballot,
or—if this case is not resolved before the election—declared invalid.
168. The relief sought is not merely advisory, and the questions presented to the Court
COUNT VI
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
(Due to FPF’s Failure to Substantially Comply with the Mandatory Provisions of the
Constitution)
34
170. FPF did not substantially comply with the mandatory provisions of the constitution
because (1) FPF’s submitted initiative petitions that contained forged, fictitious, illegally obtained,
and otherwise invalid signatures; (2) FPF did not substantially comply with the essential
requirements of law; and/or (3) the irregularities adversely affected the sanctity of the ballot and
integrity of the initiative amendment process.
171. As a result of such substantial noncompliance, the true number of valid and verified
petitions in support of Amendment 4 cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
172. The presence of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing in the petition
gathering and verification processes for Amendment 4 requires the Court to invalidate the
placement of Amendment 4 on the ballot and/or Amendment 4’s election results to ensure
credibility in the electoral process.
173. FPF’s substantial noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of the constitution
constitutes a basis for the Court to decertify and strike Amendment 4 from the 2024 General
Election Ballot or—if this case is not resolved before the election—to enjoin the State Defendants
from counting the votes or, if passed, to enjoin the State Defendants from giving effect to votes
cast in favor of Amendment 4 or posting the Amendment 4 election results.
certificate does not cure FPF’s substantial noncompliance with the mandatory constitutional
provisions. Moreover, if the 2024 General Election occurs prior to the resolution of this action,
passage will similarly not cure Amendment 4’s illegal placement.
COUNT VII
(Finding that FPF submitted and the SOE Defendants verified illegally obtained petition
signatures)
35
Florida Statutes.
whether FPF submitted petition signatures collected on an illegal pay-per-signature basis in
violation of section 104.186, Florida Statutes, such that their verification violated
section 100.371(11)(a)5., Florida Statutes.
179. There exists a doubt as to the facts and validity of FPF’s petition signatures.
180. There is a bona-fide, actual, present, and immediate need for a declaration that FPF
submitted and the SOE Defendants verified and counted illegally obtained signatures collected on
a pay-per-signature basis such that the petition process was substantially infected by fraud and
corruption. Given the substantial fraud and corruption that permeated the election process,
Amendment 4 must be declared ineligible to be placed on the 2024 General Election ballot, or—
if this case is not resolved before the election—declared invalid.
183. The relief sought is not merely advisory, and the questions propounded to the Court
COUNT VIII
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
(Based on FPF’s submitting and the SOE Defendants’ verifying illegally obtained petition
signatures)
36
185. FPF submitted and the SOE Defendants verified petition signatures collected on a
pay-per-signature basis in violation of section 104.186, Florida Statutes.
186. Because FPF submitted signatures collected on a pay-per-signature basis, the
petition process was substantially infected by fraud and corruption. The substantial fraud and
corruption that permeated the election process constitutes a basis for the Court to decertify and
strike Amendment 4 from the 2024 General Election Ballot or—if this case is not resolved before
the election—to enjoin the State Defendants from counting the votes or, if passed, to enjoin the
State Defendants from giving effect to votes cast in favor of Amendment 4.
certificate does not cure the fraud and corruption that infected the petition process. Moreover, if
the 2024 General Election occurs prior to the resolution of this action, passage will similarly not
cure the fraud and corruption that resulted in Amendment 4’s passage.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court enter an Order:
1. Declaring that the initiative “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with
Abortion” may not appear on the 2024 General Election Ballot as a result of noncompliance with
the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the initiative petition process;
2. Setting aside the certificate of ballot placement for the initiative “Amendment to
Limit Government Interference with Abortion”;
3. Striking the initiative “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with
Abortion” from the 2024 General Election Ballot;
4. Directing State Defendants to take all appropriate action to inform voters that the
initiative “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion” has been stricken from
the ballot and that they should not cast a vote on it;
37
5. Enjoining the State Defendants from counting and/or giving effect to any votes that
might be cast for the initiative “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.”
6. If the 2024 General Election takes place prior to the adjudication of this dispute,
declaring that the initiative “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion” is null
and void;
7. If the 2024 General Election takes place prior to the adjudication of this dispute,
enjoining the State Defendants from counting and/or giving effect to votes cast for the initiative
“Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion”;
8. Enjoining the SEO Defendants from posting election results for the initiative
“Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion” on their websites or elsewhere.
9. Enjoining the Secretary of State from posting election results for the initiative
“Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion” on its website or elsewhere.
10. Awarding attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as permitted by law;
11. Granting such further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.
Dated: October 16, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ C. Alan Lawson

C. Alan Lawson, Esq. (FBN: 709591)
Paul C. Huck, Jr., Esq. (FBN: 968358)
Michael C. Kelley, Esq. (FBN: 99492)
Caroline M. Poor, Esq. (FBN: 1018391)
LAWSON HUCK GONZALEZ, PLLC
215 South Monroe St., Suite 320
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Telephone: (850) 825-4334
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
38
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for Plaintiffs
39
EXHIBIT A
Florida Department of State
Office of Election Crimes and Security
Interim Report to Legislature on Initiative Petition
Fraud Related to the Abortion Initiative (23-07)
October 11, 2024
1
Executive Summary
Legislation creating the OECS (Chapter 2022-73, Laws of Florida) requires OECS to
submit a report by January 15 of each year to the Governor, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, detailing information on investigations of alleged
election law violations or irregularity. See § 97.022(7)(a)-(e), Fla Stat. More broadly, that
legislation also makes a commitment of technology, infrastructure, and resources to OECS to help
conduct efficient and secure elections.
OECS submits this interim report consistent with its obligations. This report builds on
OECS’s last report, which noted:
During the last quarter of 2023, OECS and state election officials were inundated
with an alarming amount of fraud in the constitutional initiative petition area. In
the last quarter alone, FDLE made at least 8 arrests of paid petition circulators.
OECS expects more arrests early this year in this area.
Final Report at 9-10.
Specifically, the previous report noted that the last quarter of 2023 saw criminal allegations
against 35 paid circulators associated with the organization sponsoring Initiative Petition 23-07,
Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. (“FPF”). These allegations affected over 1,500 electors in 35
counties. Final Report at 9-10. OECS’s awareness of extraordinary levels of fraud associated with
Initiative Petition 23-07 therefore predates the Florida Supreme Court’s advisory opinion
approving the ballot initiative. Since that time, OECS has continued to be inundated with
allegations of fraud and other illegality on the part of FPF’s agents. These allegations have been
made by electors, Supervisors of Elections, and even FPF contractors, subcontractors and paid
circulators, and have been corroborated by law enforcement.
OECS therefore undertook its own investigation of the issue, as required by Florida law.
See § 97.022(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (tasking OECS with “initiating independent inquires and conducting
preliminary investigations into allegations of election law violations or election irregularities in
this state”). Based on the preliminary results of that investigation, the number of FPF paid
circulators who have committed criminal activity in connection with Initiative Petition 23-07 has
now grown to well over 100, affecting many thousands of Floridians in most of the State’s
counties. Unfortunately, the investigation also revealed that the procedures established by current
Florida law allowed thousands of fraudulent and otherwise invalid petition forms to be erroneously
validated for Initiative Petition 23-07.
OECS submits this interim report to policymakers in the legislative and executive branches
in advance of the upcoming legislative session to summarize its preliminary findings and
reemphasize the need for more effective regulation of petition circulation, verification of initiative
petition forms, and enforcement mechanisms.
2
I. OECS INVESTIGATIONS OF ILLEGAL PETITION CIRCULATION ACTIVITY
During late 2023 and throughout 2024, OECS received an unusually high volume of
complaints from Supervisors of Elections and individual Florida electors concerning Initiative
Petition 23-07, “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.” The allegations
included reports of paid FPF petition circulators signing petition forms on behalf of deceased
individuals, forging or misrepresenting elector signatures on petition forms, using electors’
personal identifying information without consent, and perjury/false swearing. In the early months
of 2024, several FPF paid circulators were arrested and charged with serious felonies. See App. E
and F. In addition to the arrests, OECS opened hundreds of preliminary investigations into
individual FPF paid circulators and several business entities involved in the collection of petitions
on behalf of FPF. In Palm Beach County alone, between June 2024 and September 2024, OECS
referred 60 individual FPF paid circulators to law enforcement for fraudulent petition gathering
activity. See App. A. OECS expects additional criminal referrals to result from the audit discussed
in section III, infra. Given the credibility of the allegations to date, nearly all of these
investigations have been referred to law enforcement and many are now active criminal
investigations with FDLE and the Office of Statewide Prosecution. Below is a summary of the
illegal petition circulation activity OECS has investigated and referred for prosecution.
A. Illegal Compensation Scheme
Petition fraud has bedeviled legislators, Supervisors of Elections, and Florida electors since
the Florida Constitution was revised to allow for constitutional amendment by initiative petition
in 1968. Article XI, section 3 provides that this power “may be invoked by filing with the
custodian of state records a petition containing a copy of the proposed revision or amendment,
signed by a number of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state, and
of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of such districts respectively
and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election in which presidential electors were
chosen.” Section 100.371, Florida Statutes, has regulated the petition circulation process since the
1970s, and the Florida Supreme Court has confirmed that “the legislature, in its legislative
capacity, and the secretary of state, in his executive capacity, have the duty and obligation to ensure
ballot integrity and a valid election process. Ballot integrity is necessary to ensure the effectiveness
of the constitutionally provided initiative process.” State ex rel. Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief
v. Firestone, 386 So. 2d 561, 566-67 (Fla. 1980).
However, bad actors in the petition circulation industry have consistently resisted Florida’s
efforts to deter, detect, and punish fraud. As recently as 2010, justices on the Florida Supreme
Court observed that there were “numerous examples of fraudulent practices on the part of initiative
proponents.” Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., PAC, 29 So. 3d 1053, 1083 (Fla.
2010) (Polston, J., dissenting with an opinion in which Canaday, J., concurred). In 2019, the
Legislature recognized that such fraud is strongly incentivized by sponsors paying circulators on
a per-signature basis. It therefore enacted section 104.186, Florida Statutes, which made it a first-
degree misdemeanor to compensate a petition circulator based on the number of petition forms
gathered. Laws of Fla., ch. 2019-64, § 4, (eff. June 7, 2019). The practice of paying per signature
3
continued, however, so the Legislature increased the offense to a third-degree felony in 2022.
Laws of Fla., ch. 2022-73, § 28 (eff. Apr. 25, 2022).
Unfortunately, it appears Florida law was still insufficient to deter FPF’s agents from
compensating petition circulators based on the number of forms gathered. The petition circulation
campaign for Initiative Petition 23-07 was primarily if not solely conducted and overseen by PCI
Consultants, Inc., a California-based corporation specializing in petition collection for ballot
initiatives. Campaign finance reports show that FPF paid PCI Consultants over $27 million in
2023 and 2024. See App. M. Criminal intelligence generated by OECS, law enforcement, and the
Office of Statewide Prosecutor strongly indicates that multiple subcontractors engaged by PCI
Consultants paid individual circulators per petition collected, in gross violation of Florida law. At
least one of these subcontractors advertised the illegal payment scheme on social media websites.
See App. J and K. Other subcontractors better concealed the illegal payment scheme but have
been accused of paying per signature by industry witnesses or petition circulators prosecuted for
fraud. See App. N at 12, 18, 24; App. E. Competing petition circulation companies also reported
credible evidence of FPF subcontractors paying per signature. See App. K. Subcontractors paid
as high as $10 per signature. See App. N at 18, 24; App. E (Harriel at 7); App. J and K.
Accordingly, earlier this year, the Department made a demand for an immediate accounting
of any and all petition forms and correspondence provided to FPF from subcontractors believed
by OECS to have compensated FPF circulators per petition. See App. J; § 100.371(9), Fla. Stat.
(requiring sponsors to “account for all petition forms used by their agents”); Rule 1S-2.009(8),
F.A.C. FPF responded to the Department’s demand by, among other things, claiming it does not
have custody or control of any documents being requested. See App. J. Ostensibly, all petition
forms collected by FPF paid circulators and volunteers were submitted to PCI Consultants, not
FPF, and then submitted by PCI Consultants to the Supervisors of Elections on behalf of FPF.
Florida law does not require sponsors’ contractors and subcontractors to comply with
demands for accounting made by the Department of State, and PCI Consultants appears to have
been less than helpful to Florida law enforcement agencies, even when faced with a subpoena.
The State’s ability to execute the subpoena has been hampered by the fact that PCI Consultants is
not a registered business entity in Florida. Many of the subcontractors PCI Consultants worked
with are not registered to do business in Florida, either. And unlike other states where
constitutional amendments can be proposed by initiative petition, Florida has no state residency
requirement for paid petition circulators. Consequently, many FPF paid circulators have few if
any ties to Florida and list addresses in other, sometimes faraway, states. Some appear to be
transient, going from state-to-state to do similar work. In fact, two paid circulators arrested for
petition fraud in furtherance of Initiative Petition 23-07 also face charges for petition fraud in
Kansas after leaving Florida. See App. F. The out-of-state residency of key suspects and witnesses
has made for significant investigative challenges.
4
B. Petition Circulator Fraud
Despite these challenges, investigations have yielded a substantial amount of criminal

intelligence. Law enforcement agencies have acted on OECS referrals and developed additional
criminal targets based on interviews of witnesses and defendants and returns of documents,
subpoenas, and search warrants. These investigations have demonstrated widespread petition
fraud in connection with Initiative Petition 23-07. Fraud was incentivized by the illegal
compensation scheme described above and came in various forms.
First, FPF paid circulators submitted petition forms bearing the personal identifying
information of deceased individuals in several counties. Supervisors have provided evidence to
OECS that FPF submitted petitions on behalf of more than 20 deceased Floridians. See App. C.
Second, information received from multiple Supervisors of Elections and individual
Florida electors also shows paid petition circulators committing perjury/false swearing. Under
section 100.371(3)(a), Florida Statutes, a person may not collect signatures or initiative petitions
for compensation unless the person is registered as a petition circulator with the Secretary of State.
Section 100.371(5), Florida Statutes, requires paid petition circulators to attest that the petition
was signed in their presence. However, investigations show a widespread practice of registered
paid petition circulators distributing petition forms with pre-signed attestations to groups of
unregistered circulators, who then obtain signatures outside the paid circulator’s presence. See
App. N at 18, 49. Both the unregistered circulators who circulated petitions for compensation and
the registered petition circulators who hired them committed crimes, and petition forms collected
in this manner are invalid. See § 100.371(11)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (“The supervisor may verify that the
signature on a form is valid only if . . . [t]he signature was obtained legally, including that if a paid
petition circulator was used, the circulator was validly registered . . . when the signature was
obtained.”).
Third, investigations have revealed that petition circulators tampered with petition forms
after they were signed and submitted by electors. Statements given under oath by at least one FPF
circulator prosecuted for petition fraud reveal that, prior to submitting completed forms, the
subcontractor he worked for would use a website to verify personal identifying information. See
App. N at 40-41. If the elector could be located but the petition form was incomplete (i.e., no
address, date of birth, signature date, etc.), the subcontractor would fill in the missing information.
Id. at 31.
Fourth, investigations indicate that some otherwise valid petition forms were obtained by
fraud. According to the proffer of a circulator convicted of committing petition fraud in furtherance
of Initiative Petition 23-07, at least one subcontractor instructed circulators to tell prospective
signatories that the petition was “to keep the State of Florida from taking away women’s rights;
that’s exactly what [the subcontractor] told us to tell people. Not necessarily abortion.” See App.
N.
The fifth and perhaps most concerning discovery is evidence of bulk identity theft—
circulators using electors’ publicly available personal identifying information to complete dozens,
hundreds, or even thousands of petition forms without ever circulating the petition. Section
5
100.371(11), Florida Statutes, requires Supervisors of Elections to verify electors’ identities based
on four pieces of information: (1) name, (2) address, (3) voter registration number or date of birth,
and (4) signature match. Outside of limited exceptions for domestic violence victims and “high-
risk professionals,” name, address, date of birth, and voter registration number are available in the
voter extract file provided by the Division of Elections. This information can often be found on
the internet as well. OECS and FDLE investigations display a pattern where enterprising
circulators obtained lists of personal identifying information, copied this information onto petition
forms in bulk, then forged signatures based on the electors’ names. See App. E. The only
safeguard is the signature verification process, which is seriously flawed. See section III, infra.
The pay-per-petition compensation model incentivizes this type of fraud by encouraging paid
signature gatherers to turn in as many forms as possible.
OECS has received complaints from many Florida electors whose information was
fraudulently submitted on forms for Initiative Petition 23-07. Many complaints arose because
some Supervisors notified electors when a petition form bearing their information was rejected.
This in turn led electors to contact the Supervisor’s office or OECS to report potential fraud.
Understandably, many were angry, upset, and confused. See App. B. 1
Supervisors of Elections have also provided a large number of credible complaints. See
App. C and D. In fact, Supervisors of Elections in Martin County and Osceola County have
reported that members of their elections staff had their personal information misappropriated, and
their signatures forged, on petition forms submitted by FPF paid circulators. See App. D. These
fraudulent petitions accurately recorded aspects of the staff members’ personal identifying
information, indicating that the fraudsters may have copied this information onto the petition forms
from the state voter file or another database.
These reports are corroborated by members of the petition circulation industry, including
FPF’s own agents. In late 2023, a circulator appeared at the R.A. Gray building in Tallahassee
asking to speak with OECS. The circulator wanted to report what he believed to be petition fraud
related to Initiative Petition 23-07. The circulator explained that he was the owner of a local
petition circulator business working to collect signatures for the purpose of qualifying the abortion
amendment for ballot placement. The circulator’s employees included eight FPF paid petition
circulators, whom the circulator suspected were engaged in a scheme to forge elector signatures
on petition forms. The circulator brought over 600 petitions from eight different paid FPF petition
circulators. The circulator believed some of the petitions to be fraudulent for several reasons.
Those reasons included: at least one admission from an employee, the same handwriting for dozens
of individual electors, incorrect dates of birth, names appearing to be in alphabetical order as if
they were copied off a list, and signatures appearing to be forged, among other reasons. The
circulator did not know which of the approximately 600 petitions were in fact fraudulent but
suspected some to be so. OECS confirmed that each of the eight paid circulators in question were
registered to circulate Initiative Petition 23-07. The information and paid circulator names were
1
This represents only a sampling of complaints received from Florida electors.
6
immediately handed over to FDLE and the Office of Statewide Prosecution for criminal
investigation. See App. I.
Investigations revealed that FPF’s agents were aware of fraud perpetrated by their
circulators. For instance, PCI Consultants, Inc., the main entity hired to collect petitions on behalf
of FPF, flagged 35 petitions submitted by one of its circulators as forgeries. See App. G. Despite
appearing on the “Do Not Buy” list described in the next paragraph, this circulator was used by
FPF in nine Florida counites and had at least six other credible complaints filed against her by
electors and other election officials. PCI Consultants reported this circulator to the Supervisor of
Election for Hernando County, but petition forms submitted by the circulator were validated in
five other Florida counties, leading OECS to believe that PCI Consultants did not give the same
notice to those counties. On another occasion, the owner of one of PCI Consultant’s subcontractors
advised law enforcement that “many petitioners use Facebook, Instagram, and Yellow Pages” to
obtain personal identifying information and commit bulk identity theft. See App. E (Harriel at 9).
Through the investigative work of its law enforcement partners, OECS has also learned of,
and confirmed, the existence of a “Do Not Buy” list widely circulated in the petition gathering
community. Based on information and belief, PCI Consultants maintains a copy of the list.
Florida, unlike many other states, has not made felons ineligible for paid petition circulation. The
“Do Not Buy” list serves to give notice to entities or individuals that a particular circulator has
either actively engaged in fraudulent petition gathering activities or has in the past been implicated
in submitting fraudulent petitions. OECS was given access to a version of the list and confirmed
that more than 50 paid circulators who submitted petitions for FPF were among those listed. 2
Investigators have also uncovered the scope and methods of fraud in the course of
prosecuting FPF paid circulators who violated Florida election law. Four paid circulators who
submitted abortion petitions on behalf of FPF have been arrested for petition fraud in connection
with Initiative Petition 23-07 thus far. All four appear on the “Do Not Buy” list. Despite this,
these four, and many others who are currently under active criminal investigation, were widely
utilized by FPF in its petition gathering and submission operations. Two defendants have been
convicted—one of which was recently sentenced to a term of 25.8 months in the Florida
Department of Corrections for petition fraud related to the abortion amendment. At least two
defendants have indicated that many of the petitions they submitted were fraudulent or otherwise
illegal. See App. E (Harriel); App. N (Salazar). One of these defendants explained to prosecutors
that it was “hard to get a hundred” petitions for Initiative Petition 23-07 in a day, and that people
were generally much more willing to sign the marijuana petition circulating at the same time. See
App. N at 27, 46. Yet this defendant noticed that other circulators were “handing [in] stacks and
stacks” and “collecting a thousand a day.” Id. at 27, 42. When asked if other circulators ever
talked about using names of other people they found online, the defendant stated: “People did that
a lot. They would just fill out, people would just--fake, fake, fake, because they didn’t care.” Id.
at 45-46.
2
OECS determined that the 55 individual paid circulators on the list who submitted petition forms on behalf of FPF
accounted for over 8,800 validated petition forms across the State.
7
Additional information about these petition circulators is provided below:
George Andrews - Pasco County case 2024CF000485
OECS began investigating George Andrews in the fall of 2023. Initially, three (3)
Supervisors of Elections offices reported receiving a total of twenty-nine (29) fraudulent petition
forms signed by George Andrews, a paid circulator for the abortion amendment. 3 Law
enforcement interviewed and confirmed with 10 Florida electors that they did not complete forms
for Initiative Petition 23-07. Notably, electors confirmed that the personal identifying information
was accurate, indicating use of a database and bulk identity fraud. Based on information and belief,
the actual number of fraud victims is much higher. Andrews submitted a total of 1,906 abortion
petitions across the state; 964 were invalidated. Following the tenth elector victim interview, law
enforcement made the decision to bring charges against Andrews. He was charged with 20 felony
counts: 10 counts of Criminal Use of Personal Identification Information under section
817.568(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and 10 counts of Signing Another Person’s Name/Fictious name
under section 104.185(2), Florida Statutes. All 20 felony counts were based on invalidated
signatures on petitions related to Initiative Petition 23-07. Following Andrews’ arrest,
investigation into his fraud continued. Not long after his arrest, Andrews entered a guilty plea to
all 20 felony counts in Pasco County, Florida case 2024CF000485. The Court sentenced Andrews
to 25.8 months in the Florida Department of Corrections, where he remains as of the time of this
report.
In addition to his Florida criminal case, Andrews has also been charged with 30 counts of
felony petition fraud in the state of Kansas. See App. F. The Kansas charges remain pending.
Following Andrews’ Florida arrest and conviction, OECS was made aware that Andrews was
listed on the “Do Not Buy” list that, based upon information and belief, is maintained by PCI
Consultants, Inc. 4 See App. E (Harriel). It is highly suspect that a person like Andrews was
utilized by FPF and its contractor as a paid circulator and allowed to submit over 1,900 abortion
petitions across the State of Florida.
Following George Andrews arrest, OECS analyzed statewide data and determined that in
addition to 964 invalidated petition forms, Andrews also submitted 942 abortion petitions across
27 Florida counties that were validated. As part of its ongoing audit of validated petition, OECS
has referred an additional forty-six (46) validated petitions to law enforcement to review for
potential criminal investigation. As the OECS audit continues, OECS expects to identify
additional victims of Andrews’ petition fraud and make additional criminal referrals to FDLE in
the coming months.
3
OECS later learned that an employee of the Osceola County Supervisor of Elections Office had a fraudulent abortion
petition submitted in her name. George Andrews was the circulator listed on that petition.
4
FPF hired PCI Consultants, Inc. to collect petition forms by hiring paid petition circulators, sometimes via
subcontractors. All petitions collected by paid circulators and volunteers were submitted to PCI Consultants. It is
OECS’s understanding that PCI Consultants tracked all petition forms and submitted them to the Supervisors of
Elections on behalf of FPF. FPF paid PCI Consultants over $27 million over the past two years for their services. See
App. M.
8
Jamie Johnson - Pasco County case 2024CF000487
OECS began investigation Jamie Johnson in the fall of 2023 at same time the George
Andrews investigation. Johnson and Andrews were roommates at the time they were FPF paid
circulators. Initially, four Supervisors of Elections 5 reported receiving approximately one hundred
and two fraudulent abortion petitions 6 signed by Johnson. During the investigation, Hillsborough
County submitted another complaint against Johnson, alleging she submitted petitions in the name
of at least five deceased Floridians. See App. C.
Law enforcement interviewed and confirmed with nine Florida electors that they did not
complete forms for Initiative Petition 23-07. Notably, electors confirmed that the personal
identifying information was accurate, indicating use of a database and bulk identity fraud. During
the investigation, it was learned that Johnson submitted two fraudulent petitions using the same
victim information as her roommate, George Andrews. Johnson also submitted a fraudulent
petition using the name of the husband of one of Andrews’ victims. Following the ninth victim
interview, law enforcement decided to bring charges against Johnson for submitting fraudulent
petitions on behalf of the Florida initiative sponsored by FPF, 23-07. Based on information and
belief, the actual number of fraud victims was much higher. Defendant Johnson submitted a total
of 1,647 abortion petitions across the state; 814 were invalidated. Johnson was charged with 20
felony counts: 10 counts of Criminal Use of Personal Identification Information under section
817.568(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and 10 counts of Signing Another Person’s Name/Fictious name
under section 104.185(2), Florida Statutes. The initial investigation focused on invalidated
petitions, and all 20 felony counts were based on invalidated signatures for Initiative Petition 23-
07. Johnson was unable to be located in Florida but was eventually arrested in Nebraska. See
App. F. At that time, Florida officials learned that Johnson was also wanted in Kansas for nineteen
(19) felony petition fraud charges. The Kansas Attorney General has announced his intention to
bring Johnson to Kansas for prosecution. See App. F. Florida is similarly pursuing extradition.
Following Johnson’s arrest, OECS continued to investigate her fraud. OECS discovered
that in addition to the 814 invalidated abortion petitions, Johnson also had 833 abortion petitions
validated across 22 Florida counties. As part of its ongoing verified petition audit, OECS has
referred an additional fifty-six (56) of Johnson’s validated petitions to law enforcement to review
for potential criminal investigation. OECS expects to identify additional victims of defendant
Johnson’s petition fraud and make additional criminal referrals to FDLE in the coming months.
Following Johnson’s arrest, OECS learned that, like her co-defendant Andrews, Johnson
too was listed on the “Do Not Buy” list that, based upon information and belief, is maintained by
PCI Consultants, Inc, FPF’s main contractor. It is highly suspect that a person like Johnson was
utilized by FPF and its contractor as a paid circulator and allowed to submit over 1,600 petition
forms across the State of Florida.
5
Hernando, Pasco, Pinellas, and Sumter Counties.
6
One of these petitions from Hernando County was submitted on behalf of a deceased Floridian.
9
Andre Salazar - Sarasota County case 2024CF002716
OECS began investigation Andre Salazar in late 2023. Initially, two (2) Supervisors of
Elections 7 reported receiving a total of thirty-three (33) fraudulent abortion petitions signed by
Salazar. Law enforcement interviewed and confirmed with twelve (12) Florida electors that they
did not complete forms for Initiative Petition 23-07. Notably, electors confirmed that some of the
personal identifying information was accurate, indicating use of a database and bulk identity fraud.
Based on information and belief, the actual number of fraud victims is much higher. Salazar
submitted a total of 1,585 abortion petitions across the state; 718 were invalidated. Law
enforcement interviewed Salazar. Among other things, Salazar stated following to law
enforcement during his interview that he was employed for a period of time at a petition gathering
company tasked with gathering and submitting abortion petitions; was paid $10 per abortion
petition submitted; and circulated the petition for compensation prior to registering as a paid FPF
petition circulator. See App. E and N. Salazar also admitted that, after he became registered FPF
petition circulator, he “would have other circulators get the petitions completed for him, but he
would sign them, attesting that the petition was signed in his presence.” This calls into question
the validity of all validated petition forms submitted under Salazar’s paid petition circulator
number. See § 100.371(11)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (“The supervisor may verify that the signature on a
form is valid only if . . . [t]he signature was obtained legally, including that if a paid petition
circulator was used, the circulator was validly registered . . . when the signature was obtained.”).
Following the interviews, law enforcement brought charges against Salazar. He was
charged with 12 felony counts of Criminal Use of Personal Identification Information under
section 817.568(2)(a), Florida Statutes. All 12 felony counts were based on invalidated signatures
on petition forms related to Initiative Petition 23-07. Salazar recently entered a plea agreement
and provided a proffer to the Office of Statewide Prosecution as part of the agreement.
Following Salazar’s arrest, OECS analyzed statewide data and determined that in addition
to 718 invalidated abortion petitions, Salazar also submitted 867 abortion petitions across four
Florida counties that were validated. Cf. App. O (news reports incorrectly claiming that all petition
forms submitted by Salazar were “stopped at [the] county level and never ended up in the
initiative’s total”). As part of its ongoing audit, OECS has referred an additional validated abortion
petition to law enforcement to review for potential criminal investigation. OECS expects to
identify additional victims of Salazar’s petition fraud and make additional criminal referrals to
FDLE in the coming weeks.
Donna Harriel - Martin County case 2024CF000424
OECS began investigation Donna Harriel in late 2023. Initially, three (3) Supervisors of
Elections 8 reported receiving a total of one hundred and eighty-six (186) fraudulent abortion
7
Lee and Sarasota Counties.
8
Escambia, Martin, and Brevard Counties.
10
petitions signed by Harriel. 9 Law enforcement interviewed and confirmed with six (6) Florida
electors that they did not complete forms for Initiative Petition 23-07. Notably, electors confirmed
that the personal identifying information was accurate, indicating use of a database and bulk
identity fraud. Based on information and belief, the actual number of fraud victims is much higher.
Harriel submitted a total of 526 abortion petitions across the state; 314 were invalidated. Law
enforcement interviewed Harriel. Among other things, Harriel stated following to law
enforcement during her interview that she was employed for a period of time at a petition gathering
company tasked with gathering and submitting abortion petitions; was paid $10 per abortion
petition submitted; and was fired from the company for committing fraud. See App. E.
Following Harriel’s interview, law enforcement interviewed the owner of the FPF
subcontractor that fired her. He advised law enforcement of the following:
• A company subcontracting with PCI Consultants, Inc., engaged his company to hire paid
petition circulators to collect abortion petitions for the Amendment sponsored by FPF;
• PCI Consultants would review and validate the petition forms before submitting them to
the Supervisors of Elections;
• Harriel was at one time an employee of his company, but “Harriel was fired and placed on
Do Not Buy List that is maintained by PCI”; and
• He is aware that paid petition circulators engaged in fraud, often using Facebook,
Instagram, Yellow Pages, and other internet sources to obtain personal identifying
information of potential victims.
See App. E.
Following the interviews, law enforcement brought charges against Harriel. She was
charged with 10 felony counts: five (5) counts of Criminal Use of Personal Identification
Information under section 817.568(2)(a), Florida Statutes and five (5) counts of Signing Another
Person’s Name/Fictious name under 104.185(2), Florida Statutes. All 10 felony counts were based
on invalidated signatures on petition forms related to Initiative Petition 23-07.
Following Harriel’s arrest, OECS analyzed statewide data and determined that in addition
to 314 invalidated abortion petitions, Harriel also submitted 212 abortion petitions across 18
Florida counties that were validated. As part of its ongoing audit, OECS has referred an additional
thirty-one (31) validated abortion petitions to law enforcement to review for potential criminal
investigation. OECS expects to identify additional victims of Harriel’s petition fraud and make
additional criminal referrals to FDLE in the coming months.
C. Improper Delivery
Under Florida law, a sponsor that collects petition forms or uses a petition circulator to
collect petition forms serves as a fiduciary to the elector signing the petition form. See §
100.371(7)(a), Fla. Stat. The law requires each sponsor that collects petition forms to “promptly
9
OECS later received additional complaints from electors and Supervisors of Elections in Indian River County, St.
Lucie County, and Palm Beach County alleging that Harriel was submitting fraudulent petitions on behalf of Florida
electors.
11
deliver[]” those petitions to the Supervisor of Elections within 30 days after the elector signs the
form or be liable for a fine. Id.; Rule 1S-2.0091(2)(b), F.A.C. For each petition form that is
delivered later than 30 days from the date the elector signed the form, the fine is $50, or $250 if
the sponsor or petition circulator acted willfully. See § 100.371(7)(a)1, Fla. Stat. For each petition
form that is not submitted to the Supervisor of Elections, the fine is $500, or $1,000 if the sponsor
or petition circulator acted willfully. See § 100.371(7)(a)2, Fla. Stat.
OECS received information from Supervisors of Elections indicating that FPF violated
section 100.371(7)(a), Florida Statutes, by failing to timely deliver petition forms in some cases
and by failing to deliver the forms at all in others. In the past 12 months, OECS has issued three
letters fining FPF for these violations. See App. I. FPF has paid over $22,000 in civil fines for
violating Florida election laws, and has a pending fine in the amount of $328,000. See App. I.
It appears some of these forms were not submitted based on well-founded concerns that
some or all of the forms were fraudulent. But even where a sponsoring committee or its agent
suspects fraud, under Florida law, they must still submit the petition to the Supervisor of Elections.
Sponsors typically comply with this requirement, and those following best practice note their
concerns to the Supervisor upon submission. The Supervisor of Elections is then better able to
assess fraud at the petition verification stage of the process.
II. OECS AUDIT OF VALIDATED PETITIONS
OECS’s investigations of FPF and its agents were initially focused on complaints related
to non-verified petition forms—those that are invalid due to omissions, mismatching information,
or other noncompliance with Florida Statutes. However, as its investigations progressed, OECS
became concerned that a substantial number of forged signatures submitted by FPF were
mistakenly verified as valid by Supervisors of Elections. This concern grew as evidence and
testimony was gathered by OECS and law enforcement agencies in the first wo quarters of 2024.
Evidence in some cases indicated that the circulators did not submit any actual elector signatures,
but rather forged or procured through fraud all of the signatures submitted. Yet when data was
analyzed at the state level, OECS discovered that many forms submitted by these circulators were
validated in multiple counties.
Take the four arrested petition circulators discussed in the previous section. Collectively,
these four individuals had over 25 complaints from electors and election officials, stemming from
submissions in 15 different counties. Collectively, the complaints alleged that approximately 370
petitions were fraudulent, and included at least 7 deceased individuals. At least two of these
individuals confessed that they engaged in bulk identify theft and that most or all of the forms they
submitted were fraudulent. All four of these individuals were listed on the “Do Not Buy” list
discussed in the previous section. Yet, statewide data reveals that 2,854 petitions submitted by
these four individuals were verified as valid and counted toward the total number and distribution
of signatures required for ballot placement.
OECS is statutorily tasked with “initiating independent inquires and conducting preliminary
investigations into . . . election irregularities in this state.” 97.022(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Therefore,
OECS concluded it was necessary to expand its investigation to validated forms in order to (1)
12
determine the full scope of the fraud associated with Initiative Petition 23-07, (2) uncover the
techniques used by fraudsters and recommend legislative counteraction, and (3) identify Floridians
whose identities were stolen in furtherance of election crime. Unlike with other kinds of identity
theft, many victims of petition fraud never know that their identities have been successfully stolen
in furtherance of election crime. This is because, while a number of Supervisors notify the elector
when a deficiency in a petition form bearing his or her name causes it to be rejected, few if any
Supervisors notify the elector when a petition bearing his or her name has been validated. This
section provides an overview of the signature verification standards established by Florida law,
the methodology used by OCES to audit verified signatures for Initiative Petition 23-07, and the
preliminary results.
A. Signature Verification Standards
While the Constitution does not expressly contemplate signature verification, the Florida
Supreme Court has recognized that “verification is an element of ballot integrity and a task which
the legislature may require to be accomplished as a prerequisite to filing an initiative constitutional
proposal with the secretary of state.” Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone, 386 So. 2d
561, 566-67 (Fla. 1980). Section 100.371(11)(a), Florida Statutes, permits Supervisors of Elections
to validate a petition form only if “[t]he form contains the original signature of the purported
elector.” The Secretary of State has a statutory responsibility to “[p]rovide mandatory formal
signature matching training to supervisors of elections and county canvassing board members,”
and “[a]ny person whose duties require verification of signatures must undergo signature matching
training.” § 97.012(17), Fla. Stat. The Department of State has a corresponding duty to “adopt
rules governing signature matching procedures and training.” Id. Section 100.371(14), Florida
Statutes, further authorizes the Department of State to adopt rules to carry out the provisions of
subsection (11).
Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.056(1) fulfills these statutory mandates by creating a
two-hour online training program available at dos.fl.gov/elections/signaturetraining. The required
training course for the 2024 election cycle, entitled “Signature Verification Training for Florida
Supervisors of Elections & Canvassing Boards” (the DOS Training), is presented by Thomas W.
Vastrick, an expert in the field of forensic document examination. The DOS training instructs
signature matchers: “Don’t trust your eyes. Don’t just look at the signature and say yes or no.
Break it down into its component parts.” DOS Training, Wrap Up: Review of Concepts. For
initiative petitions, the component parts include spacing, letter height ratio, baseline habits, letter
connections, initial and terminal strokes, pen pressure, letter design, slant, pen lifts, width versus
length proportions of loops, curves at initial and terminal strokes, crossbar positions, angular
versus smooth curve, buckles, extra or missing strokes, pen control, consistent left margin, ink or
writing instrument, simplicity, and disguise or slowness. DOS Training, Wrap Up: Review of
Concepts. The DOS Training equips trainees to assess each of these component parts. DOS
Training, Red Flags & Forgery: Slowness; Red Flags & Forgery: Forgery; Red Flags & Forgery:
Simple or Illegible Signatures; Signature Examinations: Signature Examinations; Signature
Examinations: Petitions and Disguise. The training concludes by instructing signature reviewers
to adhere to these “uniform standards for evaluating signatures from the outset” and reiterates the
13
importance of “follow[ing] the standards set forth in law for validating or invalidating or accepting
or rejecting, as may be applicable a ballot, a cure affidavit, a petition, or other signed document.”
DOS Training, Wrap Up: Key Take-Aways.
B. Audit Methodology
The objectives of OECS’s audit of forms validated for Initiative Petition 23-07 are three-
fold: (1) to determine the extent and methods of the fraud, (2) to identify recommendations to
strengthen the integrity of the petition process moving forward, and (3) to identify circulators
committing election crime and seek justice on behalf of any Floridian whose identity was stolen
thereby.
To these ends, OECS compiled a list of known or suspected fraudsters who submitted
validated petition forms for Initiative Petition 23-07. This list includes individuals who:
(a) were the subjects of a complaint alleging fraudulent petition circulation submitted to
OCES by an elector or Supervisor;
(b) submitted a petition in the name of a deceased individual;
(c) were implicated by an admission from a defendant or cooperating witness; or
(d) had an invalid rate substantially higher than the state average.
OECS then analyzed county data to determine locations where known or suspected
fraudsters had a large number of petitions verified as valid. OECS issued requests to audit verified
petitions in several of those counties. Counties accommodating OECS’s requests arranged for
physical or remote review of the requested petitions.
OECS selected Department of State employees who demonstrated mastery of DOS’s
signature matching standards to conduct the limited audit of forms validated for Initiative Petition
23-07 (“DOS auditors”). Each DOS auditor has a valid and up-to-date signature match training
certificate. See Rule 1S-2.056(1), F.A.C. Auditors were instructed to assess whether forms
contained all statutorily required information about the elector and petition circulator and a
matching signature. For each petition form analyzed, the auditor made one of four findings:
Status Code Status Description

Valid Agree with Supervisor’s decision to validate
Invalid Do not agree with Supervisor’s decision to
validate; highly confident the petition is invalid
First review Validity is questionable; requested second
indeterminate reviewer
Missing Missing or defective scan; OECS unable to
make a determination
14
C. Preliminary Results
To date, OECS has audited verified petitions in three counties: Palm Beach, Orange, and
Osceola Counties.
Palm Beach County
The audit began with a visit to Palm Beach County to obtain information about the county’s
storage of petitions and the signature comparison process. OECS began in Palm Beach County
because (1) it is among the most organized Supervisor of Elections office in terms of cataloging
and sharing evidence of petition-related fraud with OECS and county electors; and (2) there was
evidence of substantial fraud on the part of circulators submitting petition forms there. See App.
A (referring 60 individual FPF paid circulators for criminal investigation, all due to elector
declarations or forms containing the personal identifying information of electors who were
deceased at the time of the alleged signature).
While there, OECS reviewed a sample of 41 validated petition forms submitted by known
or suspected fraudsters. OECS compared the information on the forms with the statutory
requirements set forth in section 100.371(11)(a), Florida Statutes. Although the sample size was
small, this initial review produced concerning findings. Perhaps most surprising was the number
of signatures that did not match any signature on file. Fifteen signatures were not remotely close,
while an additional five warranted secondary review. 10
Total Verified Petitions Reviewed 41

Valid 21
Invalid 15
First review indeterminate 5
Missing 0
Invalidity Rate 36.6% or more
Several forms contained additional indicia of fraud, such as suspect handwriting, the
inclusion of both a voter registration number and date of birth (only one is required and many
electors do not have ready access to their voter registration numbers when approached in public),
and circulator affidavits signed days after the signature was obtained. OECS referred these forms
to law enforcement for criminal investigation. OECS also determined that, of the 41 petitions
reviewed, multiple petitions were submitted on behalf of five electors. It is a crime for a person
to knowingly sign a petition for an issue more than one time under section 104.185(1), Florida
Statutes. OECS referred these five forms to law enforcement to investigate whether the electors
submitted multiple forms, or submitted one petition only and were the victim of fraud with respect
to the second form.
10
Secondary reviews have not yet been performed.
15
Orange County 1
Based on the initial findings in Palm Beach County, OECS decided it should review
additional populous counties that, according to OECS analysis, had high levels of validated
submissions from known or suspected fraudsters. OECS assembled a larger team and sought
targeted petitions from Orange County, a populous county relatively near Tallahassee. Like in
Palm Beach County, OECS reviewed validated petitions submitted by known or suspected
fraudsters. However, rather than requesting a sample, OECS requested all petitions meeting that
criteria.
The initial Orange County review consisted of 2,216 validated petitions, 11 and the findings
were similar to Palm Beach County. Many of the petitions contained a signature that clearly did
not match any signature on file. The results of the review were:
Total Verified Petitions Reviewed 2,216

Valid 1,214
Invalid 715
Missing 0
A number of the petitions contained additional indicia of fraud, such as suspect handwriting,
indecipherable or misspelled names, incorrect date of birth, and circulator affidavits signed days
after the signature was obtained.
Orange County 2 (U.S. Congressional District 9)

Based on the overarching fraud concerns outlined in the earlier sections of this report and
the Palm Beach County and Orange County reviews, OECS decided to undertake a larger, more
comprehensive review of all verified petition forms—i.e., not limited to those submitted by known
and suspected fraudsters. OECS returned to Orlando to conduct a second Orange County review.
In this review, OECS requested all 11,306 petitions validated by the Orange County Supervisor of
Elections within the Ninth United States Congressional District. (OECS ultimately received and
reviewed 9,810 of these petitions. OECS and Orange County are reconciling why the additional
1,496 petitions were not provided to OECS.) OECS intends to complete its review of those
remaining petitions as soon as they are provided. As would be expected, the audit revealed a lower
rate of invalidity than when known and suspected fraudsters were viewed in isolation. However,
at 20.9% or more, this rate is still concerningly high.
11
OECS reviewed petitions from Districts 8, 9, 10, and 11 as part of Orange County 1.
16
Valid 6,840
Invalid 2,017
Missing 341
Osceola County
After completing the second Orange County audit, a team of DOS auditors was sent to
neighboring Osceola County. OECS believed it would be helpful to compare the results from
Palm Beach County (1.5 million residents in 2022) and Orange County (3.2 million residents in
2022) with a smaller county where petitions submitted by known and suspected fraudsters
accounted for a smaller percentage of validated forms. Osceola County (423,000 residents in 2022)
fit this description and is located entirely within the Ninth U.S. Congressional District. Of the
16,700 forms validated in Osceola County, only 1,378 (8.3%) were submitted by known or
suspected fraudsters. By comparison, of the 11,306 forms validated in the portion of Orange
County within the Ninth District, 2,216 (19.6%) were submitted by known or suspected fraudsters.
The audit revealed a significantly lower rate of invalidity.

Valid 1,153
Invalid 102
Missing 0
These widely disparate invalidity rates indicate that some Supervisors of Elections offices
may be utilizing far more effective internal controls over signature verification than others.
Preliminary results indicate that more populous counties may have faced more difficulty in
accurately verifying signatures submitted for Initiative Petition 23-07 than smaller counties. OECS
plans to conduct a thorough analysis of the methods used by Supervisors to hire signature verifiers,
confirm that they have completed the mandatory training, and ensure that they are accurately
applying the standards established by DOS. OECS will report its findings in future reports.
Analysis
Current Florida law places immense weight on signature verification. Because all other
required personal identifying information is publicly available, a robust signature match procedure
is the only real line of defense for ballot integrity. Unfortunately, the preliminary results of
OECS’s audit indicate that some counties failed their statutory obligation to verify petition forms
for Initiative Petition 23-07 in accordance with the standards “governing signature matching”
promulgated by Department of State. See §§ 97.012(17), 100.371(14), Fla. Stat.
17
Thus far, OECS has reviewed and analyzed a total of 13,445 validated petition forms.
OECS has determined that, at a minimum, 2,849 should not have been validated due to statutory
deficiencies or a clear mismatch between the signature on the petition and any signature on file.
While there is a wide range of invalidity rates between the three audited counties, on average,
25.4% of petition forms that were submitted by known or suspected fraudsters and verified by the
Supervisor of Elections should have been rejected due to statutory deficiencies or a clear signature
mismatch. 12 Based on the only county where data is available, the invalidity rate drops by 35.4%
when all circulators are included. 13 Applying this “drop off rate” (35.4%) to the average invalidity
rate for known or suspected fraudsters (25.4%) yields an average total invalidity rate of 16.4%. 14
These county figures, while based on a small sample size and subject to change with
additional data, allow for extrapolation of invalidity rates by United States congressional district
(CD). Consider the Ninth Congressional District, which is comprised of Osceola County and
portions of Orange and Polk Counties. Applying the total invalidity rate in Orange County (Orange
2 audit), applying the invalidity rate for known and suspected fraudsters in Osceola County
(Osceola audit) adjusted by the drop off rate (Orange 1 audit ∆ Orange 2 audit), and applying the
average total invalidity rate (see n.14) for Polk County results in a projected CD invalidity rate of
11.7%.
CD9
# Validated Invalidity # Improperly
Forms Rate Validated Forms
Orange 11,306 20.9% 2,358
Osceola 16,700 4.8%^ 799
Polk 2,372 16.4%✝ 390
TOTAL 30,378 11.7% 3,546
^
(1 - 35.4%) * 7.4%
(1 - drop off rate) * Osceola KSF inval. rate
✝
average total inval. rate, see n.14
Five other congressional districts both (a) contain portions of audited counties and (b)
received validated signatures equal to eight percent of the votes cast in the last preceding
presidential election: CD10, CD20, CD21, CD22, and CD23.
CD10, which contains another portion of Orange County, would be expected to have an
invalidity rate around 20.9% (Orange 2 audit).
12
(36.6% + 32.3% + 7.4%) / 3 = 25.4%
(Palm Beach KSF inval. rate + Orange KSF inval. rate + Osceola KSF inval. rate) / # audited counties = average
KSF inval. rate
13
(32.3% - 20.9%) / 32.3% = 35.4%
(Orange KSF inval. rate - Orange total inval. rate) / Orange KSF inval. rate = drop off rate
14
(1 - 35.4%) * 25.4% = 16.4%
(1 - drop off rate) * average KSF inval. rate = average total inval. rate
18
CD20 contains portions of Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Applying the invalidity
rate for known and suspected fraudsters in Palm Beach County (Palm Beach audit) adjusted by
the drop off rate (Orange 1 audit ∆ Orange 2 audit) 15 and applying the average total invalidity rate
(see n.14) for Broward County results in a projected CD invalidity rate of 18.2%.
CD21 contains Martin and St. Lucie Counties and a portion of Palm Beach County.
Applying the invalidity rate for known and suspected fraudsters in Palm Beach County (Palm
Beach audit) adjusted by the drop off rate (Orange 1 audit ∆ Orange 2 audit) and applying the
average total invalidity rate (see n.14) for Martin and St. Lucie Counties results in a projected CD
invalidity rate of 18.4%.
CD22, which contains another portion of Palm Beach County, would be projected to have
the invalidity rate for known and suspected fraudsters in Palm Beach County (Palm Beach audit)
adjusted by the drop off rate (Orange 1 audit ∆ Orange 2 audit), which is 23.6%.
CD23 contains portions of Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Applying the invalidity
rate for known and suspected fraudsters in Palm Beach County (Palm Beach audit) adjusted by
the drop off rate (Orange 1 audit ∆ Orange 2 audit) and applying the average total invalidity rate
(see n.14) for Broward County results in a projected CD invalidity rate of 18.5%.
Pending additional audits, the projected invalidity rate of CDs composed of unaudited
counties is 16.4% (the average total invalidity rate, see n.14).
In addition to shedding light on the true number of valid petition forms submitted for
Initiative Petition 23-07, the audit has generated a great deal of information that OECS plans to
deploy in the form of legislative proposals and additional criminal referrals. OECS has made or
anticipates making hundreds of more criminal referrals based on the audited petition forms.
OECS’s audit therefore remains ongoing. OECS has outstanding requests to Hillsborough and
Alachua Counties for access to validated petition forms submitted by known or suspected
fraudsters. OECS has also requested a larger sample of validated forms from Palm Beach County.
OECS plans to make additional requests, focusing on populous counties with high levels of
validated forms submitted by known or suspected fraudsters. OECS further plans to request an
audit of all 2,372 verified forms in the portion of Polk County within CD9. OECS intends to report
the results of these planned audits in a subsequent interim report to the Legislature.
Conclusion
OECS continues to be active and vigilant in its efforts to combat election fraud. The fraud
outlined in this report is unacceptable, and it is imperative that the state consider major reforms to
the initiative petition process to prevent groups from doing this ever again in Florida.
15
(1 - 35.4%) * 36.6% = 23.6%
(1 - drop off rate) * Palm Beach KSF inval. rate = Palm Beach total inval. rate
19
Appendix A: Palm Beach County Referrals
Appendix B: Sampling of Voter Complaints
Appendix C: Deceased Voter Submissions
Appendix D: Sampling of Supervisors of Elections Complaints
Appendix E: Arrest Reports
Appendix F: News Reports of Arrests
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D
NEWS/ CRIME
Dade City man accused of

election fraud in No Labels
party petition in Kansas
George Andrews, 30, also submitted invalid petitions for
an abortion rights ballot initiative in Florida, authorities say.
A Dade City man has been charged with two counts of election perjury and 28 counts of election forgery for allegedly forging signatures on petitions to make No Labels
an officially recognized political party in Kansas, according to a news release.
"
• • • • -·' • • -·-· • -· iez The Kansas City Star (TNS)
> Donate
:T
A Florida man accused of forging signatures on petitions to get a new political
party officially recognized in Kansas has been arrested.
George Andrews, 30, of Dade City was arrested on Feb. 10 and has been charged
with two counts of election perjury and 28 counts of election forgery for allegedly
Appendix G: Contractor Referrals
Appendix H: Law Enforcement Referrals
Appendix I: Improper Delivery
Appendix J: Demands for Accounting & FPF Response
Appendix K: Illegal Payment Investigations
Appendix L: PCI Corporate Filing
Appendix M: FPF Payments to PCI
Appendix N: Proffer
Appendix O: Tweet

Complaint - Hoffman V Barton

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Filing # 208884117 E-Filed 10/16/2024 11:00:05 AM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

HOPE HOFFMAN, TERRI KELLOGG,

v. Case No. 2024-CA-

KIM BARTON, in her official capacity as the

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs HOPE HOFFMAN, TERRI KELLOGG, LORIEN HERSHBERGER, and

STATE, the ELECTIONS CANVASING COMMISSION,2 and FLORIDIANS PROTECTING

FREEDOM, INC. (“FPF”), and allege the following:

Amendment 4 election results.

brain. Ms. Kellogg adopted Ms. Hoffman as her daughter.

constitutional initiative process.

constitutional initiative process.

6. Defendant Kim Barton is the Alachua County Supervisor of Elections. The

process, including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot placement.

§ 100.371(11), Fla. Stat.

7. Defendant Amanda Seyfang is the Bradford County Supervisor of Elections. The

8. Defendant Deborah Osborne is the Union County Supervisor of Elections. The

9. Defendant Christopher Milton is the Baker County Supervisor of Elections. The

process, including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.

process, including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.

process, including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.

including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot placement. Id.

amendment process, including verification of signatures for initiative amendment ballot

including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.

process, including verification of signatures for initiative ballot placement. Id.

adopt rules and guidelines for verifying initiative signatures).

29. Defendant Elections Canvassing Commission was created pursuant to section

31. Defendant Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. (“FPF”) is a nonprofit corporation

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

.021, .101, Fla. Stat.

§ 26.12(3), Fla. Stat.

County. § 47.011, Fla. Stat.

I. Amending the Florida Constitution by Initiative Petition

A. Requirements for Initiative Petition Ballot Placement and Passage

petition. Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const.

amendments by initiative petition.

appropriate supervisors of elections. See id.; § 100.371(11)(a), Fla. Stat.

Interference with Abortion 23-07, Florida Division of Elections

m=1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2024).

9 (27,460); District 10 (27,276); District 11 (34,189); District 12 (34,136); District 13 (36,388);

District 14 (31,666); District 15 (29,986); District 16 (32,935); District 17 (36,263); District 18

(28,206); District 19 (34,934); District 20 (27,165); District 21 (35,671); District 22 (31,654);

927&seqnum=1&ctype=CSV&elecyear=2024 (last visited Oct. 11, 2024).

verification of the number of valid signatures obtained.” § 100.371(11)(a), Fla. Stat.

are valid, and can verify a signature “only if:”

1. The form contains the original signature of the purported elector.

application to Article XI, Section 3, Florida Constitution, relating to proposed initiative

the amendment. Id.

proposed initiative.” Id.

code.” See § 100.371(1), Fla. Stat.

50. A proposed amendment is passed if it is approved by a vote of at least sixty percent

other date as may be specified in the amendment or revision.” Id.

B. Requirements for Initiative Petition Signature Collection Efforts

§ 100.371(3), Fla. Stat.

(a) The information required to be on the petition form . . . including the

§ 100.371(4), Fla. Stat.

Circulator’s Affidavit” including the following information:

(a) The circulator’s name and permanent address;