Lectura 3 - Libro STRATEGIC LEARNING Capitulo 9
Lectura 3 - Libro STRATEGIC LEARNING Capitulo 9
Lectura 3 - Libro STRATEGIC LEARNING Capitulo 9
9
Execute
Implementing and
Experimenting in the
Strategic Learning Cycle
One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think
you know it, you have no certainty unless you try.
—Aristotle
H ow many times have you heard the following claim: ‘‘The hard
part of a strategy is getting it done; the rest is easy.’’? No one
will disagree that it’s actions that make the cash register ring. Effec-
tive implementation is vitally important. But just beating a drum
about implementation misses the larger point: Strategy creation and
strategy implementation are mutually interdependent. The one can-
not work without the other.
Implementation, like the bottom line, is not a thing apart. After
all, the entire Strategic Learning process—Learn, Focus, Align, and
Execute—is a challenge of implementation. Each stage of the pro-
cess has its own set of hurdles and rewards, and when done effec-
tively, each stage builds on the previous one to generate a powerful
171
172 APPLYING STRATEGIC LEARNING TO CREATE ADAPTIVENESS
momentum behind your strategy. Every step helps to bridge the gap
between doing and excelling.
If all of the components of the Strategic Learning process are in
place, then this cohesion will help you to execute your plan rapidly
and successfully. But the implementation of your strategy will only
be as effective as your insight, focus, and alignment, and the quality
of those outputs will depend on the rigor of your discipline as you go
through each of these steps. If an organization constructs its strat-
egy in a piecemeal fashion, fails to build it on solid insights, or ne-
glects to consider how it will align the levers of its business system
behind its strategy, then its chances of success are slender.
That’s why implementation should be seen as part of the contin-
uum of the Strategic Learning cycle (Figure 9.1). It represents both
its successful culmination and a source of learning for the continua-
tion of the cycle.
2006), ‘‘It was clear to us that our invent-it-ourselves model was not
capable of sustaining high levels of top-line growth.’’4
They came up with a revolutionary idea: create an open innova-
tion system by harnessing talent and ideas from outside the
company. The basic premise: What if P&G took its 7,500 R&D people
and added to that the 1.6 million R&D people outside of the
company in its areas of interest? That would create a talent pool
of 1,607,500 R&D people at P&G’s disposal. Huston wrote, ‘‘We
knew that external connections could produce highly profitable in-
novations. Betting on these connections was the key to future
growth.’’
Within five years, the resulting Connect þ Develop model had
furnished innovations from the outside to more than 35 percent of
P&G’s new products being sold in the marketplace, up from 15 per-
cent in 2000. And some 45 percent of the initiatives in the product
development pipeline had key elements that were discovered exter-
nally. P&G estimates that its R&D productivity has increased by
nearly 60 percent. As Huston wrote, ‘‘The model works.’’
they can and cover them up where they can’t. Of course, concealing
a failure ensures that no one will learn from it.
Learning from experimentation requires a culture that is both
open to risk-taking and capable of learning from mistakes. Risk-
taking and mistake-making are, after all, opposite sides of the same
coin. The key is to make smart mistakes, rather than stupid ones.
Smart mistakes are those where the value of the learning is bigger
than the cost of the mistake. This is crucially dependent on an orga-
nization’s ability to analyze and distill the lessons from its experi-
ments and rapidly share and apply them.
Smart mistakes are a hallmark of cultures that are open and
adaptive, like the high-performance cultures described in Chapter 6
that are characterized by collaboration, teamwork, and rapid
responsiveness to the needs of customers. Rather than waiting to
react to changes in the competitive environment, these organiza-
tions aren’t afraid to experiment and learn from the results of those
experiments so that they can respond swiftly and successfully. Like
firefighters who train to deal with a variety of different emergencies,
organizations that have ‘‘trained’’ through experimentation will be
better able to manage volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambi-
guity, and lay the foundations for long-term success.
One organization that has built experimentation into its DNA is
Ideo, the award-winning design firm. ‘‘Fail early and often to suc-
ceed sooner,’’ is its motto. As Tim Brown, Ideo’s CEO, writes in his
recent book, Change by Design, ‘‘Leaders should encourage experi-
mentation and accept that there is nothing wrong with failure as
long as it happens early and becomes a source of learning. A vibrant
. . . culture will encourage prototyping—quick, cheap, and dirty—
as part of the creative process and not just as a way of validating
finished ideas.’’5
! What was the intent? What was the intended strategy at the
time the action started? What role was supposed to be played
178 APPLYING STRATEGIC LEARNING TO CREATE ADAPTIVENESS
by each unit? What was the desired outcome and how was it
supposed to be achieved?
! What actually happened? In Army parlance, what was the
‘‘ground truth,’’ the actual events as they played out in the
heat of battle, with all the misunderstanding, disruption, and
confusion that inevitably occur when two armies clash?
! Why did it happen? This is the root-cause analysis. How did
the commanders’ intent, the adversaries’ actions, changes in
the environment, and the decisions of individuals combine to
produce a specific set of outcomes?
! How can we do better? What lessons can be learned from the
events of this action that will enable Army units in similar fu-
ture actions to carry out their missions in such a way as to
more closely achieve the commanders’ intent?