38.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

JAMAL RANGAIG Y
AMPUAN, SAAD MAKAIRING Y LONTO, AND MICHAEL JUGUILON Y SOLIS,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

[ G.R. No. 240447, April 28, 2021 ]

Facts

Four separate Informations were filed charging Rangaig, Makairing and Juguilon
with violations of Article II, Section 11 and 13 of Republic Act No. 9165 before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City.

At around one o'clock in the afternoon of June 10, 2011, an asset informed the
Chief Intel Officer of Dagupan City Police Station that there was an ongoing pot
session in an abandoned nipa hut in Sitio Silungan, Bonuan Binloc, Dagupan City.

During the briefing, Major Dalope, SPO1 Bactad, PO2 Cruz, SPO1 Marlon Decano
and SPO1 Ian Carvajal were tasked to conduct a buy-bust operation. The officers
proceeded to the abandoned nipa hut and PO2 Cruz, who was a few steps ahead of
the group, noticed that the door of the nipa hut was slightly ajar. PO2 Cruz peeked
through the door and saw three men inside, with two of the men holding aluminum
foil. He then signaled his companions to come closer.

Upon entering the house, PO2 Cruz and SPO1 Bactad saw Rangaig and Makairing
sitting near a table with various paraphernalia such as foil, a lighter, tooter, and
sachets on top of it. They also saw Juguilon near a small room.12 PO2 Cruz
immediately arrested Rangaig, Makairing, and Juguilon and informed them of their
constitutional rights. SPO1 Bactad searched the three men and recovered one
plastic sachet from each containing a substance suspected to be shabu.

the accused, JAMAL RANGAIG Y AMPUAN, SAAD MACAIRING Y LONTO, AND

MICHAEL JUGUILON Y SOLIS, without authority of law, confederating together,
acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally possess dangerous drug [shabu] weighing 0.18 gram, contained in two
(2) plastic sachets during a party or at a social gathering or meeting, or in proximate
company of at least two persons.

For the defense, Rangaig, Makairing and Juguilon denied the allegations against
them.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently established the
presence of all the elements required for the crimes of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and possession of dangerous drugs in a social gathering. It further
noted that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved
to prove that they were the ones recovered from Rangaig, Makairing, and Juguilon.
Aggrieved, Rangaig, Makairing, and Juguilon appealed before the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the extant appeal is hereby DISMISSED

On January 29, 2017, Rangaig, Makairing and Juguilon filed a Notice of Appeal,
which the Court of Appeals gave due course to on March 1, 2018. The records of
the case were then elevated to this Court. In their appellants' brief, accused-
appellants assert that the Regional Trial Court erred in convicting them of both
possession of illegal drugs and possession of illegal drugs in a social gathering as
this placed them in double jeopardy. They likewise claim that the prosecution's
evidence was not only inadmissible, the prosecution also failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized items. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General argues that there was no violation of accused-appellants' right against
double jeopardy, and that the items confiscated were validly seized incidental to a
lawful arrest. Moreover, it claims that the proper chain of custody of the illegal
drugs was observed.

Issue

First, whether or not the accused-appellants were placed in double jeopardy;

Second, whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest and search against
accused-appellants; and

Lastly, whether or not the chain of custody rule was complied

Ruling

1.Accused-appellants assert that the charge of the possession of illegal drugs is

absorbed in the charge of possession of illegal drugs in social gatherings. Thus,
charging and eventually convicting them of both offenses, separately, placed them
in double jeopardy. We agree.

The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is provided in Article II,

Section 21 of the Constitution:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
This constitutional right is implemented in Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

SECTION 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused

has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

2.Notably, this Court has held that an informant's tip is not sufficient as probable
cause for warrantless arrests.

The general rule is that no arrest, search, and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. This is because a person's right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is sacred in this jurisdiction.
It is enshrined in Article III, Section 2 of our Constitution which provides:

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense:

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
3.even if the seized items are deemed admissible, the prosecution's case would still
fail for violating the chain of custody rule.

In all cases involving dangerous drugs, great importance is put in ensuring that the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, the drug itself, remains intact. This is
due to the delicate nature of dangerous drugs and its susceptibility to being
altered or tampered.

There is great possibility of abuse in drug cases, especially those involving

miniscule amounts. This Court has recognized that buy-bust operations could be
initiated based on dubious claims of shady persons. or that small amounts of illicit
drugs could be planted as evidence on innocent individuals, in view of the secrecy
surrounding drug deals in general.

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served, or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.

Here, the prosecution miserably failed to establish that the police officers
complied with the requirements laid down in Section 21.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 15, 2018 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08489 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
Appellants Jamal Rangaig y Ampuan, Saad Makairing y Lonto, and Michael Juguilon
y Solis are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

39.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

Facts

Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello,

Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt.
Jose Domingo.

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following
day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.
Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal,
Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached
her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling
Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former. Upon
inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic
bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory
Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was
then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property
Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above
technical report, the prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence"

alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating
accused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling
on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in
evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case.

In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her

version of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she
watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked
her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt.
Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity
of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she
was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the
arresting officers.

After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a
"Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting
the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an
unreasonable search and seizure.

Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five
hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of
Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency

Issue
WON the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated
the latter’s constitutional rights.

Ruling

Yes. the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag, accused-
appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which
provides that

Sec. 5 rule 113:Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-
exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the
loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence
to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless
she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

40.LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR GASCON and CAESAR

TALIA petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
CATALINO CASTAÑEDA, JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice and Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan, respondents.

G.R. No. 133289 December 23, 1999

Facts:

Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla
were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information
dated September 18, 1997. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
comprised of the Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and
Catalino Castañeda, Jr.

On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the prosecution
represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30) days within which
to submit the amendment to the Information.

Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November 16, 1997 praying
that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of
arrest be deferred.

An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero-
Agcaoili recommending the denial of the accused's Urgent Omnibus Motion 6 was
approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on January 9,
1998.

The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New Preliminary
Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued. 8 The
same was denied in an order given in open court dated March 12, 1998 "on the
ground that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the
original Information so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard
separately in an investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court
ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard on this
matter at this time" (p. 245, Record)." 9

Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to Quash the
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
Issue

The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of this Court.

a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE

CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRE SUCH
JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF AMENDING THE INFORMATION TO
SUPPLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY AVERRED
IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION? and

b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE ALLOWED WITHOUT

CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVER OFFENSE
CHARGED THEREIN?

Ruling

The case of Arula vs. Espino 16 enumerates the requirements wherein a court
acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:

To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court
acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites
concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take
cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in
to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission
to the court.

41. ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Court, San Fernando, Pampanga and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988

Facts

Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property,
through reckless imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a cargo truck which had
collided with a Volkswagen automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the
death of one (1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other people.

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After arraignment,

respondent Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16 September 1977.

Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September 1977 a "
Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance for Trial" , alleging lack of
jurisdiction over the case on the part of the Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument
was that the amended criminal complaint alleged that the Volkswagen car involved
in the accident had suffered damages amounting to P18,000.00, and that under
paragraph 3, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime with which he was
charged would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to
three (3) times the value of the damage alleged

After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the respondent
Municipal judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977 denying the Motion to
transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance and set the trial of the case for 5
October 1977. A verbal Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.

Issue

whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has
jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner.
Ruling

No, Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and the
maximum imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through reckless
imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge involved falls outside the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and consequently within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9 September 1977 is

hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on 26 September 1977 is hereby made PERMANENT. Because the
proceedings before the respondent Municipal Court are null and void, the
Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to file a new information against petitioner
in the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga. No pronouncement as to
costs.

42. JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO,

and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO
M. TULIAO, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006

Facts

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet
dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal.
On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City. They were convicted but acquitted on appeal due to reasonable
doubt.

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda,
Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested
or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash
warrants of arrest.

Issue

Whether or not the filing of the urgent motion for complete preliminary
investigation and motion to recall/quash the warrants of arrest allowed the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused;

Ruling

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law
and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court
can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other relief sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof,
constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when
he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke
the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
43. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman;
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

Facts

1. In 1991, a criminal case was filed against Santiago with the Sandiganbayan for
alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Subsequently, an order of arrest was issued
against her by Presiding Justice Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for
the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00

2. An "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf
of Dr. Miriam Defensor- Santiago," was filed by petitioner and she prayed for
dispensing of her personal appearance in the Court for now until such time she will
have recovered due to the result of the vehicular collision in which she suffered
extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. Such motion was
granted and the Court authorized petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional
liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance
before said court.

3. In 1991, respondent Ombudsman Vasquez filed a manifestation "that accused

Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in Ermita, Manila in the afternoon
of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be
Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left
unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes
4. The Sandiganbayan acted on the manifestation and setting the arraignment
Miriam. The petitioners filed a motion for her provisional liberty under a
recognizance and averred that her continuance to remain under a bail bond may
imply that she had intent to flee.

5. She also filed a petition for cetiorari with the SC for the suspension of the RTC
proceedings against her. The SC issued a TRO. It subsequently lifted the TRO and
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

6. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order as regards her announcement

to leave for the U.S. to pursue a fellowship in Harvard.

Issue

1. WON The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with

grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it
had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

2. WON The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial

comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
with this Honorable Court.

Ruling

NO. The hold-departure order is but an exercise of the court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused.

Under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.

The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not act without jurisdiction
when it issued the hold departure order against Miriam Defensor Santiago. The
court stated that it had acquired jurisdiction over Santiago when she filed a motion
seeking

acceptance of a cash bail bond on her behalf. The court also rejected Santiago's
argument that the hold departure order violated her rights to due process,
freedom of speech, and freedom of travel. The court asserted that the hold
departure order did not contravene the temporary restraining order previously
issued by the Supreme Court.

44. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU
CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES
AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 157163 June 25, 2014

Facts

On May 22, 2001, respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses
Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad,and XM Facultad and Development Corporation
commenced Civil Case No. CEB-26468 to seek the declaration of the nullity of the
promissory notes,real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety
agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner. They further sought
damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
orwrit of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on the
mortgages against their properties. It appears that the respondents’obligation to
the petitioner had reached ₱17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to pay ₱13
Million because they had been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia
in 1997. The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan
under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint sought a TRO or
a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the threatened foreclosure.
On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, as well as its oppositionto the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, contending that the foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal
right to do. the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion to dismissfor being
unmeritorious, but granted the respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner assailed the orders of the RTC by petition for
certiorariin the CA.

Issue

1. Whether or not Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed for (a) non-
payment of the correct amount of docket fee; and (b) improper venue;14

2. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioner, its agents and representatives, was in order.

Rulings

1. The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.provides
the proper precedent in this case. In Hernandez, appellants contended that the
action of the Hernandez spouses for the cancellation of the mortgage on their lots
was a real action affecting title to real property, which should have been filed in the
place where the mortgaged lots were situated. Rule 4, Section 2 (a), of the then
Rules of Court, was applied, the petitioner’s contention that the filing and docket
fees for the complaintshould be based on the assessed values of the mortgaged
real properties due to Civil Case No. CEB-26468 being a real action cannot be
upheld for lack of factual and legal bases.

2. Respondents were not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction. As

mentioned, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction on July 16, 2001
based on the foregoing allegations of the respondents’ application,22 and the CA
upheld the issuance in its assailed July 9, 2002 decision.

However, the RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
petitioner from proceeding withthe foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly
erroneous and unwarranted.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts.27 It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary
peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution, affecting as it does
the respective rights of the parties.28 The requirements for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or TRO are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction

may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, eitherfor a limited
period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to

do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling and setting aside
the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City for being devoid of factual and legal
bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City to proceed with
dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and DIRECTS the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.