Sayre CriminalConspiracy 1922
Sayre CriminalConspiracy 1922
Sayre CriminalConspiracy 1922
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Harvard Law Review Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Harvard Law Review
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY'
1 A most admirable book dealing with the subject of Criminal Conspiracy is that
of R. S. WRIGHT, Tm; LAW OF CRIMNAL CONSPIRACIES (London, I873). This has
been much relied on in the preparation of this article.
A scholarly account of the early historical development of Conspiracy has just
been published as one of the Cambridge Studies in English Legal History, by P. H.
WINFIELD, Tm HiSTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE, (I92I),
reviewed in 35 HARV. L. REV. 353.
2 "The offence of conspiracy," says Mr. Sergeant Talfourd, "is more difficult to
be ascertained precisely than any other for which indictment lies; and is, indeed,
rather to be considered as governed by positive decisions than by any consistent and
intelligible principles of law." Talfourd's edition of DICKINSON'S QUARTER SESSIONS,
p. 200 (quoted by Wharton in 3 CRIMINAL LAW, 6 ed., p.. 47, note (d). "The law of
conspiracy is certainly in a very unsettled state. The decisions have gone on no dis-
tinctive principle; nor are they always consistent." C. J. Gibson in Mifflin v. Com-
monwealth, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 46I (I843).
The origin of the crime of conspiracy goes back to the very early
pages of the history of our common law. Apparently it grew out
of the effort of reformers to correct the abuses of ancient criminal
procedure. During the thirteenth century, according to Bracton,3
there were two modes of commencing prosecution for felonies
the one, by way of private appeal, generally involving trial by
battle, and the other by way of public inquest before what later
developed into the grand jury. False appeal was in a measure
guarded against by the personal liabilities of the appellor; if the
appellor were vanquished in the battle by which the truth of the
accusation was tried, he was, in the words of Bracton, "committed
to gaol, to be punished as a calumniator, but he shall not lose his
life nor a limb, although according to the law he is liable to re-
taliation." 14 Furthermore, the vanquished was liable to a pecu-
niary penalty. "But upon the duel being finished a penalty of
sixty shillings shall be imposed upon the vanquished party as a
recreant, and besides he shall lose the law of the land (legem terrae
amittet). " 5
Nevert-heless, abuses sprang up; children under twelve, who
could not be outlawed and against whom no damages could be
recovered, were sometimes incited to bring the appeal. The newer
procedure of "indictment upon common report" by a grand jury
lent itself to still greater abuse; one could bring to the jury false
reports, and thus perhaps accomplish the downfall of his enemy,
have remained the well-settled law for some three centuries; it was
not until the close of the sixteenth century that the courts began
to relax the strictness with which they had always limited the
crime of conspiracy. During the reign of James I, Chief Justice
Popham recalled a case, decided in I574, wherein the justices had
suggested that a common-law indictment for conspiracy might
be allowed against false accusers even though no indictment upon
the false charge had been found by the grand jury."3 Such a doc-
trine was authoritatively established by the Court of Star Chamber
in the famous Poulterers' Case,14 decided in i6ii. Thus was taken
the first step in the long process by which the early rigidly defined
crime of -conspiracy was, through judicial, analogical extension,
gradually expanded into the vague and uncertain doctrine which
we know to-day.
In the Poulterers' Case, the defendant poulterers had confed-
erated to bring against one, Stone, a false accusation of robbery;
but Stone was so manifestly innocent of the crime charged that the
grand jury refused to indict him. As a defense to the action for
damages subsequently brought by Stone against his false accusers,
it was argued that since he had never been indicted or acquitted,
no recovery could be had; "because no writ of conspiracy for the
party grieved, or indictment or other suit for the King lies, but
where the party grieved is indicted, and legitimo modo acquietatus,
as the books are F. N. B. II4b; 6 E. 3, 4ia; 24 E. 3, 34b;
43 E. 3. Conspiracy II; 27 Ass., p. 59; I9 H. 6, 28; 2I H. 6, 26;
g.E. 4, I2, &c." But the Court of Star Chamber squarely decided
to the contrary, citing certain early notes, and definitely held that,
as in conspiracies for maintenance, the confederating together con-
stituted the gist of the offense rather than the false indictment
and subsequent acquittal. From the doctrine announced by this
indicted is acquitted; now he shall have this Writ of Conspiracy against them who so
indicted him." FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREvIm, II4D. Coke defines conspiracy as
" a consultation and agreement between two or more to appeale or indict an innocent
falsely and maliciously of felony, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted and
appealed; and afterward the party is lawfully acquitted by the verdict of twelve men."
(3 INST. I42-I43.) So, Hudson, in his treatise on the Star Chamber (2 COLL. JURID.
I04, IO5) says in regard to conspiracy: "But when the party is indicted, and not
legitimo modo acquietatus, then can no conspiracy lie, as it was adjudged in Daniel
Wright's case." See also Sherington v. Ward, Cro. Eliz. 724.
13 Sydenham v. Keilaway, Cro. Jac. 7.
4 9 Coke 55 b.
decision, it- was an easy step to the very general doctrine that since
the gist of the crime is the conspiracy, no other overt act is neces-
sary; 15 and this came to be the well-acknowledged law of criminal
conspiracy.'6 In the ancient phraseology, it was not necessary to
show that anything had been "put in ure"; 17 the mere conspiracy
alone was held to constitute the gist of the offense and to be there-
fore indictable. There seems to be no doubt but that the courts
in adopting this doctrine followed a sound instinct; and the prin-
ciple, thus early decided, has come to be a universal and well-settled
doctrine of the modern law of conspiracy. There is nothing in the
doctrine out of accord with the well-recognized principle of crimi-
nal law that without some overt act no one can be convicted of a
common-law crime, no matter how black his intent may have been.
For the conspiring together itself constitutes an overt act which may
well furnish the basis of crnminal liability. Once given some overt
act, the criminal law does not necessarily require the fulfillment of
the defendant's designs or the completion of his intended actions
before liability attaches. The entire law of attempts bears witness
to the contrary.
Some writers, indeed, have viewed the law of criminal conspiracy
as an outgrowth of the larger law of criminal attempts.'8 That the
two have many features in common and are based very largely
on the same general underlying principles, cannot be gainsaid.
Nevertheless, the two are not to-day the same; every criminal
conspiracy is not an attempt. One may become guilty of con-
spiracy long before his act has come so dangerously near to com-
pletion as to make him criminally liable for the attempted crime.
15 The growth of this doctrine may be traced in the following cases: Rex v. Kim-
berty, i Lev. 62 (I663); Rex v. Armstrong, i Ventr. 304 (I678); Rex v. Best, 2 Ld.
Raym. II67, 6 Mod. i85 (I705); Rex v. Kinnersley & Moore, i Stra. I93 (I7I9).
18 See, for example, i HAWKiNS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, C. 72, ? 2. As Hawkins
points out, a distinction was drawn between a formal action based upon the writ of
conspiracy and "an action on the case in the nature of such writ."
17 Anon., 27 Ass., f. I38 b, pl. 44 (I354).
18 See, for example, WRiGHT, LAW OF CONSPIRACY, 36, 62. Stephen also comments
on the analogy between the law of conspiracy and that of attempts. 2 STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMNAL LAW, 227. Bishop goes so far as to say: "The act of con-
spiring, and the specific intent to accomplish what constitutes a substantive crime,
are in combination a criminal attempt, and it is the professional usage to term it con-
spiracy. It follows the same rules, and is subject to the same limitations, as other
attempts." 2 BISHOP, NEW CRim. LAW, 8 ed., ? I9I(2), P. I07. "It is not called in
the books 'attempt,' but it is such in nature and effect." (i Ibid., ? 592.)
32 7 GEO. I, C. I3, P. 403 (I720). This statute fixed the daily hours of work f
journeymen tailors as running from six o'clock in the morning to eight o'clock at
night; the wages were fixed from March 25 to June 24 at "any sum not exceeding
Two Shillings per Diem, and for the Rest of the Year One Shilling and Eight Pence
per Diem."
33 I3 East, 228 (i8ii).
44 The Judge's only reference to the Act of I825 was the last sentence of the opinion
in which he said that, "the statute never meant to empower workmen to meet and
combine for the purpose of dictating to the master whom he should employ, and that
this compulsion was clearly illegal." But this summary reference leaves entirely un-
decided whether the criminality lay in the combination, or in some "molesting" of
employees, or in some "obstructing" of the employer.
45 32 N. J. L. I5I (I867).
46 The court quite disregarded or overlooked the fact that Rex v. Bykerdyke was
decided under the English Act of I825 which made criminal the "molesting or in any
way obstructing another" in a trade dispute, - a statute which of course was not in
force in New Jersey.
47 See Ibid., i56, I57. 48 Ibid., p. I54-
49 See, for instance, Cohn & Roth Electric C
ioi Atl. 659 (I9I7); Jetton-DekleLumber Co. v
"An act may be immoral without being indictable, where the isolated
acts of an individual are not so injurious to society as to require the in-
tervention of the law. But when immoral acts are committed by num-
bers, in furtherance of a common object, and with the advantages and
strength which determination and union impart to them, they assume
the grave importance of a conspiracy, and the peace and order of society
require their repression. . . . When it is said in the books that the means
must be unlawful, it is not to be understood that those means must
amount to indictable offences, in order to make the offence of conspiracy
Kemp v. Division, No. 24I, 255 Ill. 2I3, 99 N. E. 389 (I9I2); Clemmitt v. Watson,
I4 Ind. App. 38, 42 N. E. 367 (I895); Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 9I Minn. I7I,
I85, 97 N. W. 663 (I903); State v. Employers of Labor, I02 Neb. 768, 774, i69 N. W.
768 (I9I8); National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 3I5, 63 N. E. 369
(I902); Kissam v. United States Printing Co. i99 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910);
Bossert v. Dhuy, 22I N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917); State v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C.
633, 49 S. E. I77 (1904); Roddy v. United Mine Workers, 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126
(1914); Sheehan v. Levy, 215 S. W. 229 (Tex. Civ. App., I9I9). Contra: Plant v.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. ioII (I899), and numerous other Massachusetts cases;
Ruddy v. Plumbers, 79 N. J. L. 467, 75 Atl. 742 (I9IO); Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa.
559, 9I Atl. 224 (1914); State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814 (I894).
50 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [I892] A. C. 25; Macauley Bros. v. Tierney,
I9 R. I. 255, 33 Atl. i (I895); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. III9
(I893).
51 In the later New Jersey case of Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq.
759, 762, 53 Atl. 230 (I902), the Court said: "The doctrine of the old cases, of which
we have in New Jersey an interesting example in State v. Donaldson . . . which
placed the employee, when acting in combination with his fellow-workmen, at a tre-
mendous disadvantage as compared with his employer, I think may be regarded as
entirely exploded."
52 i5 N. H. 396, 402, 403 (I844).
II
S 42 N. H. 393, 396 (5) (i86i). The court in this case squarely held that a com-
bination to commit a civil trespass did not constitute a criminal conspiracy.
54 See, for example, 8 Cyc. 624, note i9; I2 C. J. 548, note 48; 2 BISHOP, NEW
CRim. LAW, 8 ed., ? i8i, note 2 (p. 103); 3 WHARTON, CRIM. LAW, 6 ed., 8i, note (1),
? 2326.
58 Acts being defined, in the words of Mr. Holmes, as voluntary "muscular con-
tractions." - HoLmEs, THE COMON LAW, P. 54.
69 See, for example, United States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 482 (i837); State v.
Hall, II4 N. C. gog, ig S. E. 602 (I894).
60 Of course it is necessary also to show that the anti-social effect is such as con-
stitutes, under the law of the prosecuting state, a criminal offense.
61 If, for example, after the defendant had fired at his victim with full intent to
kill him, the bullet had been deflected perhaps by another bullet, and the victim not
hit, there would have been no crime of murder, although every single act and motive
of the defendant would have been precisely the same.
62 Adherents of the Hawkins doctrine sometimes seek to defend the logic of the
doctrine by its analogy to the offenses of routs and riots. Routs and riots are crimes
which by common law require the concurrence of three or more persons. No matter
how great a tumult a single person may make, he cannot be indicted for a rout or a
III
But the law, which after all exists primarily to achieve justice
and thus to promote social peace and equilibrium, must not be
bound down too arbitrarily by logical or purely analytical considera-
tions any more than by the iron grip of historical precedents and
correctly traced legal genealogies. If the purpose of legal doctrines
is to promote the social security and well-being, they must be ex-
amined functionally and tested by the degree of protection which
they afford to social and to individual interests or rights.
A law which protects must be a predicable law; indeed one of
the most essential attributes of all law is predicability. It is per-
haps this more than any other factor which makes justice accord-
ing to law preferable to justice without law, as found for example
in legislative or executive justice.63 The excellence of justice ac-
cording to law, or judicial justice, rests upon the fact that judges
are not free to render decisions based purely upon their personal
predilections and peculiar dispositions, no matter how good or
how wise they may be; they are bound by principles embodying
the accumulated wisdom and experience of past ages, and those
principles furnish a fixed standard by which citizens of the state
may measure or shape their conduct and by which the course of
justice can be reasonably foreseen and predicted. Once rob the law
of this predicability, and the state reverts to a government by men
rather than by law. No one will be secure in his or her interests
riot. But the analogy after all is rather superficial. Criminality, here as elsewhere,
is measured by the anti-social effects of the defendants' acts; and in the inherent
nature of things it is impossible for a single individual to produce the effect of a riot.
In other words, a single person is not indictable for a riot, because it is inherently
impossible for him to produce the anti-social effect or criminal consequence known as
a riot; but as to cases of conspiracy it is in fact very frequently possible for a single
individual to procure or cause identically the same criminal consequence as a com-
bination may procure.
63 Interesting examples of legislative justice will be found in the judicial powers
exercised by American colonial legislatures and state legislatures immediately after
the Revolution, such as the issue of bills of attainder, bills of pains and penalties,
legislative granting of new trials, legislative divorce proceedings, insolvency proceed-
ings, etc. See PoUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 3 ed., p. 75. Legis-
lative justice has generally been recognized as capricious, uncertain, and therefore often
unjust and tyrannical, and highly susceptible to prejudice and extra-legal considera-
tions.
64 This, it is believed, was the first trial in America of wage-earners as such for trad
union conspiracy. The report of the case was printed as a pamphlet in i8o6; it may
be found reprinted in 3 COMMONS AND GILm1oRE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, pp. 59-248.
65 During this time the sentiment of the upper classes in England was so hostile
to trade unions that there remained in force from i8oo to I824 the drastic Combina-
tions Act (40 GEO. III, c. io6), which made every journeyman workman who "enters
into any combination to obtain an advance of wages or to lessen or alter the hours of
work" liable to imprisonment.
In America, also, during the entire first third of the nineteenth century the crimi-
"A combination of workmen," said the court, "to raise their wages
may be considered in a two fold point of view; one is to benefit them-
selves . . . the other is to injure those who do not join their society.
The rule of law condemns both. . . Hawkins, the greatest authority
on the criminal law, has laid it down, that a combination to66 main-
taining one another, carrying a particular object, whether true or false,
is criminal." 67
nal law was the accepted method for dealing with trade unions. See early cases in
3 & 4 COMMONS & GILMORE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY.
66 The evident omission appears in COMMONS & GILM1ORE.
67 Quoted from 3 COMMONS & GILm1oRE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AmERICA
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, P. 233.
Compare the language used in the New York Hatters' Case of I823. "Journey-
men confederating and refusing to work, unless for certain wages, may be indicted for
a conspiracy, . . . for this offence consists in the conspiracy and not in the refusal;
and all conspiracies are illegal though the subject-matter of them may be lawful. . .
Journeymen may each singly refuse to work, unless they receive an advance in wages,
but if they refuse by preconcert or association they may be indicted and convicted
of conspiracy. . . The gist of a conspiracy is the unlawful confederation, and the
offence is complete when the confederacy is made, and any act done in pursuit of it
is no constituent part of the offence." Quoted from GROAT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICA, P. 38.
68 Brightly's N. P. Rep. (Pa.) 36 (I82I).
artificially to raise their wages; his conclusion was that "a com-
bination to resist oppression, not merely supposed but real, would
be perfectly innocent; for where the act to be done and the means
of accomplishing it are lawful, and the object to be attained is
meritorious, combination is not conspiracy." 69 The court finally
decided that the defendants were not guilty unless they should be
proved "to have been actuated by an improper motive."
It may be that these two decisions were right or it may be they
were wrong; the point is that the application of the Hawkins
doctrine of criminal conspiracy rendered the law applicable to
labor combinations either very unpredicable or highly unjust.
Since that day some of the prejudice and much of the bitterness
against labor unions has passed away. The courts have in a meas-
ure corrected their mistakes; they universally to-day declare the
legality and even the social necessity under modern industrial
organization of trade-union associations and organized effort on
the part of employees.70 But in spite of all, there still lurks in many
minds considerable of the ancient feeling; and even to-day de-
cisions are to be found where the courts have resorted to the same
vague conspiracy doctrine in order to hold criminal the members
of trade unions whose concerted conduct tended in the judge's
eyes to injure the social welfare, but in whose individual conduct
71 See, for example, State v. Dalton, I34 Mo. App. 5I7, II4 S. W. II32 (I908).
72 There would seem to be little room for doubt that no court or legislature, squarely
facing and comprehending the situation, would be willing to turn every tort planned
by more than one, into a crime.
73 I77 Mass. I55, I58, 58 N. E. 686 (I900).
a deeper insight into the present wants of society. But the improvements
made by the courts are made, almost invariably, by very slow degrees
and by very short steps. Their general duty is not to change but to
work out the principles already sanctioned by the practice of the past.
No one supposes that a judge is at liberty to decide with sole reference
even to his strongest convictions of policy and right. His duty in general
is to develop the principles which he finds, with such consistency as he
may be able to attain."
Thus it would seem clear that even were it wise to take such a
step as to turn into crimes when planned by more than one person
all those acts 75 which through long-established usage have come
to be held tortious but not criminal, no judge by the method of
judicial legislation has the right to do so. A step of so very ques-
tionable a nature and so revolutionary and sweeping in its char-
acter must be taken, if at all, by the legislature. During the
seventeenth century, when the law was undergoing a period of
exceptional and vigorous growth, when morals were being largely
infused into the law and many new doctrines introduced, the courts
went much further in judicial legislation than to-day. Yet even
the seventeenth-century judges never went so far as to lay down
the doctrine that all combinations to commit torts are criminal.
Those who preach the doctrine that a conspiracy may be criminal
although neither the means used nor the end pursued is criminal,
resort for the most part to an argument founded upon the danger
of combinations to the community. If it is the function of the
75 As is readily apparent from the context, the word "acts" here is used in its
common sense of including not simply "voluntary muscular contractions," but the
immediate and direct effects of such voluntary muscular contractions as well.
Such forms of statement are very persuasive. One does not wonder
that the idea has gained many adherents. Yet the danger argu-
ment is open to serious objection. The short answer to it is that
if every combination to commit a tortious act does in fact so in-
crease the danger to the state that the criminal law should under-
take to prevent it, it is for the legislature, and not for the courts, to
make the first move in the matter. It is always open to the legis-
lature to declare what is so dangerous to the state that it should
be branded as criminal. It is not open to the courts by sweeping
judicial legislation to turn into common-law crimes every combina-
tion to commit a tortious act.
But there is another objection to the danger argument which
76 2 BIsHoP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW, ? i8o, quoting from Seventh Rep. Crim. Law
Com., I843, p. 90.
77 A number of judges have expressed the same idea. See, for instance, State v.
Dalton, I34 Mo. App. 5I7, 535, II4 S. W. II32 (I908), where Justice Nortoni, ren-
dering the decision in a lower Missouri court, says: "It may be stated as a general
proposition that where an additional power or enhanced ability to accomplish an
injurious purpose arises by virtue of the confederation and concert of action, an ele-
ment of criminal coxispiracy is thereby introduced which will render sufficiently
criminal either the means or the purpose otherwise merely unlawful, to sustain a con-
viction, although the means or the end were not such as are indictable if performed by
a single individual." See also Comm. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, 337 (I807), per Parsons,
C. J.; United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 896 (I89I) (per Spear, J.).
IV
78 33 HEN. VIII, C. I.
79 See, for instance, Rex v. Wilders, cited in 2 Burr. at II28 (I720); Rex v. Bryan,
2 Stra. 866 (I730); Rex v. Wheatley, 2 Burr. II25 (I76I).
able fraud cases is sufficient to reveal the legal morass into which
the law has strayed as a result of following in these cases the
Hawkins doctrine.
Quite apart from the fraud cases, the notion gleaned from the
Hawkins statement and from the leading text-writers who have
been following in Hawkins' footsteps ever since, has gained the
widest currency. If one were to consider all the dicta and unsup-
ported statements of judges and text-writers, he would unques-
tionably find the very great majority in support of the doctrine
that to constitute a conspiracy neither the end pursued nor the
means used need necessarily be criminal. Such is the common
statement, which in the words of Hobbes passes "like gaping from
mouth to mouth." Yet the actual decisions, apart from the fraud
cases, lend small support to the prevalent conceptions. State-
ments are copied from one text-book into another, and then into
the encyclopeedias of law; and long and formidable lists of cases
are cited to support the statements. But when these lists of cases
are carefully analyzed, it will be found that frequently the majority
of them are cited for mere dicta or loose general remarks; and that
of the actual decisions, not since overruled, almost all are fraud
cases.
Two illustrations will suffice. Bishop in his Criminal Law,
speaking of the crime of conspiracy, says: 80 "The unlawful thing
proposed, whether as a means or an end, need not, to constitute a
punishable conspiracy, be such as would be indictable if proposed
or even done by a single individual." In support of thiis statement
he cites three American and two English cases. Of the three Ameri-
can cases, State v. Rowley,8' is a conspiracy to cheat and defraud
and apparently fell directly within the terms of a state statute
against cheating by false pretenses; State v. Burnham,82 has been
in effect apparently overruled by State v. Straw;83 and People v.
Richards 4 seems to have been also overruled by Alderman v.
People.85 The American cases cited, therefore, furnish very doubt-
ful support for Bishop's statement. Of the two English cases cited
both are conspiracies to cheat and defraud.
80 2 BISHOP, NEW Clum. LAW, 8 ed., ? i8i (i). 81 I2 Conn. IOI (I837).
82 I5 N. H. 396 (I844). 83 42 N. H. 393 (i86i).
84 I Mich. 2I6 (I849). 85 4 Mich. 414, 432 (I857).
86 I2 C. J. 547
87 Such cases seem to rest largely upon the authority of the English eighteen
century case of Rex v. Delaval, 3 Burr. I434 (I763). But, as Wright remarks (CRIMI-
NAL CONSPIRACY, P. 32): "It can hardly be doubted that . . . the acts proposed
were indictable at the date" of that case, "independently of combination, on the
principle . . . that conduct grossly contrary to public morals or public decency was
punishable irrespectively of combination."
88 32 N. J. L. I5I (I867). 89 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 762, 53 Atl. 230 (I902).
90 See quotation in note 5I, supra. 91 78 N. J. L. 256, 73 Atl. 530 (I90
therefore," said the court in reaching its decision 92 "that the ob-
ject of the conspiracy was unlawful, . . . and that this unlawful
object was designed to be accomplished by deceit and fraud, was
a cheat reaching large numbers of persons and tended to their
oppression." 93
On the following page of Corpus Juris the further statement is
made 94 that "it will be enough if the acts contemplated are cor-
rupt, dishonest, fraudulent, or immoral, and in that sense illegal."
But five American cases and one English case are cited in support
of this. Of the five American cases, the first is one where the de-
fendants were held not guilty; the second is the decision of merely
a lower state court; the third case seems to have been later over-
ruled; the fourth was the case of a conspiracy to commit an act
which was illegal; 95 and the fifth was a conspiracy to commit a
criminal offense. The English case of Rex v. Delaval was a con-
spiracy to commit what was probably a criminal offense.96
These examples will suffice to show how plentiful and common
are loose dicta scattered through the cases following the Hawkins
doctrine, but how few actual decisions, apart from the fraud cases,
can be actually mustered out in its support. On the other hand,
decisions are not lacking which squarely decide against the Hawkins
doctrine. In Rex v. Turner,97 already discussed, Lord Ellen-
borough clearly rejects the doctrine; and although the decision
has been criticized by some,98 it has been followed by later cases,
such as Rex v. Pywell.99 Similar decisions are to be found among
the American cases. In the case of Commonwealth v. Prius,100 for
instance, Justice Bigelow refused to convict for a conspiracy to
overinsure certain goods, saying: "It was not a crime in the de-
" If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be
fined not more than ten thousand dollars, imprisoned not more than
five years, or both."
"There can be found running through our legal literature many re-
markable statements that an act perfectly lawful when done by one per-
son becomes by some sort of legerdemain criminal when done by two or
more persons acting in concert, and this upon the theory that the con-
certed action amounts to a conspiracy. But with this doctrine we do
not agree. If an individual is clothed with a right when acting alone,
he does not lose such right merely by acting with others, each of whom
is clothed with the same right. If the act done is lawful, the combination
of several persons to commit it does not render it unlawful. In other
words, the mere combination of action is not an element which gives
character to the act."
the gist of the action is the damage, and not the conspiracy. In Savile v. Roberts,
i Ld. Raym. 374, 378, it was said: "An action will not lie for the greatest conspiracy
imaginable, if nothing be put in execution; but if the party be damaged, the action
will lie." See also Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. (U. S.) 407 (i86o).
105 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. I27 (I908). 106 Ibid., 273.
107 I67 Mass. 92, I07, io8, 44 N. E. I077 (I896).