Design for safety

Margareta Lützhöft and Viet Dung Vu

Introduction
Design plays an important role in the maritime industry and is vital to the construction of ships,
maritime equipment, management systems, as well as rules and regulations.
Back in the great days of sail, vessels were designed and built on the basis of practical
experience; ship construction was predominantly a skill. The advance of science and
technology changed ship design into a complicated combination of art and science, delivering
a dramatic increase in the size, speed and technical complexity of ships.
Throughout the history of shipbuilding, naval architects have looked at ships mainly from
technical and economical points of view. Generations of ship designers have done a great job
in making seagoing vessels more seaworthy, faster, and with an increased transport capacity
and lower fuel consumption. Great effort has also been made in improving maritime safety.
Seafarers are now assisted by highly advanced automated systems and sensors, which logically
should allow for safer shipboard operations and navigation. However, the high numbers of
accidents and casualties at sea, with 3296 cases in 2016 alone (European Maritime Safety
Agency [EMSA], 2016), indicate a different picture.
Reports suggest that human errors are blamed for most maritime accidents, which raises the
question: why do humans still perform errors despite countless improvements in design and
technology to assist them?
The design of technology influences the way people work and can have a big impact on how
people perform. There are many cases where design issues actually bring negative effects to
marine operations, as seen in the grounding of the CFL Performer (2008) and the Ovit (2013)
as well as many other accidents. In the case of the CFL Performer, the complexity of the
operation of the ECDIS system with regard to the number of user settings required lead to the
mistake of the officer in not setting up a watch vector. Consequently, although the safety
contour was set at 30m, its associated alarm did not activate when the vessel crossed into
shallow water (Marine Accident Investigation Branch [MAIB], 2008). Similarly, the MAIB
also found “several of the features of the … ECDIS on board Ovit were … difficult to use”,
which rendered the system ineffective and contributed to the grounding (MAIB, 2014). These
accidents raise awareness on the issues in the interaction between individuals, technology,
systems and organisations in marine systems, which are also referred to as Human Factors (HF)
issues.
Following the hierarchy of hazard controls, HF issues can be addressed using the following
control measures, see Figure 7.1:

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Figure 7.1
Warning the operators of the issues in the systems is required under the provision of the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code but is the least effective control measure on the
scale. The issues remain in the system, and, due to the mental and physical demands of their
work, crewmembers cannot be continually aware of the existence of a problem.
Training programmes such as Bridge Resource Management (BRM), ECDIS and type specific
training courses aim to implement best practice among crewmembers. However, similar to
warning the crew of the problems, training does not completely eliminate the problems as we
are merely adding to the work load of the crew.
A more effective solution would be installing barriers to isolate the hazards. With this approach,
the crew are protected from being accidentally exposed to hazards. However, these barriers can
be bypassed, removed, or subjected to failures.
The ultimate control measure is eliminating or removing the risk. Designing systems without
HF issues is not only the most effective risk control measure but also required by maritime
rules and regulation, as seen in the SOLAS regulation V/15 regarding the design of ship bridges,
bridge equipment and procedures:
“All decisions which are made for the purpose of applying the requirements of regulations 19,
22, 24, 25, 27 and 28 and which affect bridge design, the design and arrangement of
navigational systems and equipment on the bridge and bridge procedures shall be taken with
the aim of:
1.1 facilitating the tasks to be performed by the bridge team and the pilot in making full
appraisal of the situation and in navigating the ship safely under all operational conditions;

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1.2 promoting effective and safe bridge resource management;
1.3 enabling the bridge team and the pilot to have convenient and continuous access to essential
information which is presented in a clear and unambiguous manner, using standardized
symbols and coding systems for controls and displays;
1.4 indicating the operational status of automated functions and integrated components,
systems and/or sub-systems;
1.5 allowing for expeditious, continuous and effective information processing and decision-
making by the bridge team and the pilot;
1.6 preventing or minimizing excessive or unnecessary work and any conditions or distractions
on the bridge which may cause fatigue or interfere with the vigilance of the bridge team and
the pilot; and
1.7 minimizing the risk of human error and detecting such error if it occurs, through monitoring
and alarm systems, in time for the bridge team and the pilot to take appropriate action.”
The influence of HF design on safety has been acknowledged (Earthy & Sherwood Jones,
2011), and relevant parties have started taking steps in developing a new approach to design
systems free from the HF issue, or in simpler words, to “Design the problem out”. We
acknowledge that the V/15 is difficult to quantify and design for in the traditional engineering
fashion. This book chapter will discuss the importance of design in relation to maritime safety
and explore methods that can be used to help achieve safer life and work at sea through
improved designs and design processes.

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Background
Design is everywhere.
Take a look around you: the outfit you are wearing is designed, the pen you write with every
day is designed, the computer software you use daily is designed, this book chapter was also
designed; design is everywhere. This phenomenon explains why there are countless definitions
among both the research and design communities and why it is so hard to clearly define what
“design” is.
Ralph and Wand (2009, p. 6) introduce a formal definition of design as “a specification of an
object, manifested by an agent, intended to accomplish goals, in a particular environment,
using a set of primitive components, satisfying a set of requirements, subject to constraints”.
This definition is neutral, and when applied to the ship design context, we can establish the
appropriate understanding of its particular process.
Within the maritime domain, the design objects are variable. They can be the ships, shipboard
equipment or port facilities; they can also be management systems, regulations, rules,
guidelines and procedures.
Let us take a cargo ship as an example. A modern ship is an extremely sophisticated piece of
engineering, due to both its size and functional complexity. Typically, a ship consists of several
compartments, the largest of which are the cargo holds. Holds can have different forms, built
and coated with various materials and equipped with several devices and sensors depending on
the type of cargo the ship carries. The machinery space of the ship is the location of the main
and auxiliary engines, generators, pumps, steering gears and other mechanical equipment. The
crew inhabit the accommodation area, and the navigation bridge is located on top of the
superstructure. Ships are built at the shipyards, and because of their size and technical difficulty,
they have to be carefully designed before the building starts – a work which takes months or
even years to complete.
The design of a ship is her specification, created by naval architects in the forms of technical
drawings. These drawings are the model of the ship, including her exterior as well as interior
structure together with locations and details of compartments and equipment. Using Ralph and
Wand (ibid.) as a guide, such specifications must ensure that the future ship can safely and
economically transport cargo (goals) under the specific maintenance state and the conditions
of the trading area (environment). At the same time, the naval architects must also ensure their
design can satisfy the shipowner’s requirements such as the type of cargo, cargo capacity,
desired speed or area of operation while complying with relevant rules and regulations
(constraints), e.g. for environment and safety.
The shipyard carries out the construction of the ship based on the design, and the design will
remain the guiding star throughout the process of building. Should the design be modified, so
is the future ship. This principle applies to all design objects, whether it is a ship, a radar system,
a training programme or a set of regulations. The specification should determine the
characteristics of the design object. Thus, a good design will result in a product which smoothly
helps us perform our duties while a bad design will make work harder to perform efficiently.
However, even if your equipment is designed well, the installation onboard can have an
influence. Outfitting and installation is done by subcontractors working to relatively general
requirements. They have to make on the spot “design” decisions which can depend on
something as mundane as the length of cable they brought on board. Thus, the influence on

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ergonomics of arrangements should not be underestimated. This chapter will focus mainly on
the design of the hardware in shipping – ships and maritime technologies.

Design can enhance safety

This section begins with a discussion of the impact of design on safety and follows with the
introduction of factors to consider to promote safety by design and examples of their
application in the industry.

The Impact of Design on Safety

Safety should be one of the primary concerns of the maritime community, due to the hazardous
and unpredictable nature of the maritime working environment. We can assume that this is a
concern for seafarers, but it is not clear that it is so for owners – unless we also include the ship
and cargo. Through the years, non-governmental organisations and state authorities have made
efforts in improving safety in the industry. The development of science has made technology a
key instrument in making the sea a safer place. Despite the fact that all technology designs are
safety-prioritised and many designs are even created with the sole purpose of improving safety,
accidents still happen. The most common explanation for accidents and casualties at sea is
human errors. Setting aside factors beyond human control, several researchers have suggested
that human error is the most contributing factor in maritime accidents (Dhillon, 2007; Macrae,
2009; Rothblum, 2000). As a result, safety would be significantly improved if human erroneous
action could be avoided.
The maritime system is a people system. People interact with technology, the environment and
organisational factors (Grech, Horberry, & Koester, 2008; Rothblum, 2000). Safety is decided
by the way humans interact with other system components and most of the time, this has been
pre-determined in designs. The human as a living component is expected to provide necessary
adaptation and interact with other components in the requested manners. Traditionally, this has
been facilitated through training, familiarisation and following procedures. The marine Radar
is one example. It was designed to assist human vision in poor visibility and ultimately,
improve safety at sea. The seafarers are trained to operate marine Radars and must follow
proper practice when working with them. When the human fails to comply with the procedure
and carries out erroneous actions, the faulty interaction breaks the link between elements and
the cooperation breaks down. This is a common scenario of accidents in the maritime domain,
and whenever this happens, the human is blamed.
Demonstration of such deviation from standard practice can be observed in the case of the
Seastreak Wall Street allision. On January 9, 2013, while approaching berth at lower Manhattan,
New York, the high-speed ferry Seastreak Wall Street struck a pier. The investigation found
that the captain had forgotten to return the propulsion system to Combinator mode after
switching to Backup mode earlier in the voyage. Consequently, when the captain moved the
engine order levers astern to reduce speed, his action actually resulted in forward acceleration.
This allision is a typical example of human erroneous action. The captain should have been
aware of the active propulsion control mode. He should have carried out the correct action,
which would be slowing down the ship instead of accelerating. His actions resulted in injuries
to 80 people on board and damage to both the ship and the pier.
However, the investigation did not end there and the mistakes of the captain revealed much
more complicated issues in the man-machine cooperation on board the Seastreak Wall Street.
The report also points out that the propulsion system onboard the ship used poorly designed
visual and audible cues and failed to provide the captain with critical information about mode
and control transfer status. Such faulty design can lead to mistakes in operator performance,

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especially in intense traffic conditions as in this case (National Transportation Safety Board,
2014).
All human beings have capabilities and limits. For instance: humans are not very good at multi-
tasking. The ability to stay focused is largely affected by the surrounding environment, and our
physique determines reach, strength, agility and resistance to fatigue. Time and training can
help improve skills and competencies, but only to a certain level and there will always be limits
to our physical, sensory and mental abilities.
Many maritime technologies designs overlook this matter because they are designed by people
with a purely technical mindset who were trained to deal with problems from technical
perspectives. Consequently, many designs are logically functional but lack usability. The
operators are left struggling to fill the gap between their duties’ requirements and the pre-
determined interactions (Lutzhoft, 2004). Occasionally, this additional work exceeds human
abilities and the human component fails, leaving the system exposed to hazard. The underlying
cause, however, is not human error but rather the designs which are incompatible with human
capabilities, leading to a system failure.
In fact, design aspects can have a significant impact on fatalities at sea. The main contributors
are well known in shipping: slips/trips/falls, mooring and enclosed spaces. An example of 66
deaths in British shipping 2003-2012 (Roberts, Nielsen, Kotłowski, & Jaremin, 2014) was
analysed from an ergonomics perspective and found that in 64% of the cases (42 persons), it
could have been mitigated by design (Sherwood Jones, 2016).
To sum up, in order to maintain safety, minimise environmental impact and achieve expected
performance it is vital to maintain proper interaction between the human and other components
of maritime systems. A faulty design can make such interaction complicated and occasionally
impossible for the human to uphold proper interaction, resulting in human errors. Thus, it is
faulty design, not “human error”, that is the primary, or latent, reason behind accidents in the
maritime industry.
Human Factors in Design
As discussed in the previous section, bad design may increase the risk of accidents. This fact
was strongly emphasised by Miller (2000, p. 7):
“You cannot overcome human errors induced by poor Design of the workplace with more
training, more Manuals or written procedures, exhortations to work more safely, or threats of
punitive actions for job accidents.”
Hence, the best safety solution lies with the design itself, so the underlying question is: How
should the ship and shipboard equipment be designed to improve safety?
As the human is the only living, adapting component in a ship system, it is important that
human-system issues are carefully considered by designers to produce a design which can
accommodate the needs, capabilities, and limitations of humans. The “scientific discipline
concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a
system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to design in
order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance” is defined as “Human
Factors” or “Ergonomics” (International Ergonomics Association, 2012). A design taking into
account Human Factors will facilitate the interaction between humans and other system
components, significantly reduce the probability of erroneous actions and thus, improve safety
(Abeysiriwardhane, Lutzhoft, & Enshaei, 2014).

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Within the specific scope of the maritime industry, the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) adopted the term “Human element” to describe the complex multi-dimensional issue
that “involves the entire spectrum of human activities performed by ship’s crews, shore-based
management, regulatory bodies, recognized organization, shipyards, legislators, and other
relevant parties” (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 2003, p. 3).
Despite the usage of different wording, all the three terms Ergonomics, Human Factors and
Human Element mean the same approach in designing with due consideration to human needs
and abilities to improve effectiveness and efficiency and improve overall system performance.
For this reason, these three terms will be used interchangeably.
There are many methods of addressing the human element in the maritime domain. Within this
book chapter, we will use the framework of addressing the human element, which was
introduced by Earthy, Sherwood Jones, and Squire (2016) in the Human Element Alert! Project
bulletin issues 11 and 40, see figure 7.2. Following the framework, the human element can be
addressed through Human resources, Social and organisational and Human factors
considerations. The first two groups can and should be addressed at management and
operational levels while Human factors considerations can generally be addressed in
system/vessel design phase. These considerations are connected, the more effort put into the
design phase, the less should be needed in operations.
The framework divides Human Factors into nine aspects: Habitability, Maintainability,
Security, Occupational Health and Safety, Manoeuvrability, Controllability, Survivability,
System safety, and Workability. Each of these aspects will be explained below with reference
to the introduction by Myles (2015).

Figure 7.2

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Habitability
Habitability represents the quality of a vessel that allows people to live and work in a safe and
productive manner.
Onboard ships, habitability is expressed by the acceptability in terms of whole-body vibration,
noise, indoor climate, lighting, and physical and spatial characteristics, according to prevailing
research and standards (American Bureau of Shipping [ABS], 2016), the most notable of which
is the Maritime Labour Convention (International Labour Organization, 2006, pp. 46-49).
The design of the vessel must be able to provide comfortable, clean (cleanable) and convivial
accommodation, washing and toilet facilities, mess rooms, group meeting and exercise areas
and recreational spaces with due consideration to the crew’s variation in anthropometric
characteristics, genders and culture diversity (Alert! Project, 2006, p. 5).
Poor lighting, whether too bright or too dim, can have an adverse effect on human performance
and physiological as well as psychological well-being. Similarly, whole-body vibration can
lead to discomfort, degraded performance and in some cases can even lead to chronic health
problem such as back pain, musculoskeletal disorders and temporary physiological changes
(Grech et al., 2008).
Inappropriate levels of noise can decrease vigilance during watchkeeping duties, affect sleep
and rest quality and consequently lead to fatigue and degraded performance. Noise and
vibration require special attention since routine shipboard operations involve working around
noisy machinery and therefore, it is essential that measures are taken to minimise the effects of
noise, such as insulation, noise absorbent flooring, large diameter propeller, shock absorbers
engine and rubber suspension exhaust system (Alert! Project, 2014, p. 7).
Furthermore, the design of working and accommodation areas must also consider the impact
of climatic condition on human performance and health, particularly the temperature, humidity
and the quality and circulation of air. The purpose is to provide an environment which is
suitable to promote optimal task performance and crew physiological well-being.

Maintainability
From the engineering point of view, maintainability is defined to be the probability that a failed
component or system will be restored to the condition of operational effectiveness within a
period of time when maintenance is performed following prescribed procedures (Ebeling, 2004;
Smith, 2011). Thus, maintenance is essential for the safe and efficient operation of all systems.
From the operators’ perspective, however, maintenance is a complex task often involving the
removal and replacement of several components, which requires high vigilance and skills and
is commonly performed in difficult working conditions under time pressure. As a result,
maintenance work is especially vulnerable to error (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).
Design plays an important role in deciding the outcome of maintenance tasks. Bad ergonomic
features such as lack of access, restricted space to manoeuvre, or components that can be
incorrectly fitted will hinder the ability to perform effective maintenance duties and under
certain conditions can even trigger critical events, as seen in the accident that led to the death
of a crew member while carrying out routine lifeboat maintenance onboard the passenger ship
Volendam in Lyttelton, New Zealand (Transport Accident Investigation Commission, 2011).
To promote the conduct of maintenance duties in safe and effective manners, it is essential that
the design of the ship and shipboard equipment provide design solution to allow for operational
maintenance tasks to be rapid, safe and effective. Such consideration should include

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habitability factors as well as the nature of the tasks, equipment access and the requirements
and capabilities of the crew members performing the tasks.

Manoeuvrability
Statistics of accident data suggests that most collision and grounding accidents originate from
actions performed on the navigation bridge (ABS, 2006). The success of collision avoidance
and safe navigation of ships largely depends on the safe handling of ships, which requires the
effective interaction between the human operators – the seafarers and the manoeuvring
characteristics of the ship. While every ship regardless of her manoeuvrability can be handled,
some ships with poor manoeuvrability can be very difficult to handle under certain
circumstances such as high traffic density or restricted area to manoeuvre and can pose a threat
to navigation safety.
Therefore, for the safety of ships, people onboard and the marine environment, vessels must be
designed and constructed in a way to have the most appropriate manoeuvring capabilities
consistent with the intended role, manning and operating pattern of the ship, taking into account
propulsion and manoeuvring configuration, communication, critical system redundancy,
weather conditions and harbour services, with the aims of cost efficiency, fuel economy and
environmental protection (Alert! Project, 2016).

Controllability
A consideration of the integration of a working system which takes into account human
capabilities and limitations as well as technologies can help achieve efficient control of systems
and ship. This includes knowledge of human physiology and psychology but also design
spanning from layout to dialogue design levels. The following points are included in
controllability:
• Control room, workstation, display screen layout
• Computer dialogue design
• Controls and switches
• System integration
• Communications
• Alarm philosophy and management
• Direct and peripheral vision, daytime/night-time vision, dazzle, reflection and glare
The issue of design for controllability has become more important because of increased
complexity of marine equipment, particularly with the application of automation and computer-
based systems. Resources for achieving this are mainly found in the ISO 9241-series of
standards on the ergonomics of human-system interaction and in guidelines from classification
societies, for example the ABS 86 Guidance Notes on the applications of ergonomics to marine
systems.

Workability
Workability represents the capacity of the vessel and her equipment suitable for the intended
work situation. Due consideration should be given to the users, tasks, equipment, materials and
procedures and the physical and social aspects of the working environment (Lloyd's Register,
2008), including:
• The users, their tasks and their fitness for task
• Equipment and accessibility
• Communications and signage
• Protective equipment

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 • Size, shape and gender, strength and stamina, and posture
In order to make something for someone, you need to know who they are and what they are
trying to do. In one Japanese management theory, this is addressed by “going to the gemba”.
This means finding out what is going on by going “to the floor”. Consult users about their jobs,
find out about their capabilities, and let them show you how they work. Do not ask them what
they want to have; users are not designers – it is their professional skills we want to support,
not their ship design skills.

Security
This consideration has evolved from mainly physical security as addressed by the ISM and
ISPS codes to the cyber landscape. Areas include the following (Alert! Project, 2016).
• Company/ship physical, documentary and cyber security policies
• Human threat landscape (error, misuse and abuse)
• Relationship between security and safety
• Updating of security knowledge
• Seafarer role in protective measures
• Training for confidence and knowledge
• Awareness of, and response to, threat
• Team cohesion
• Management of security risks
A number of resources are available, mainly in the form of training, awareness and policy. The
central aim is naturally to protect the seafarer and the ship, but also the business and the
environment. Not many of these issues are addressed in design, but we would suggest that
seafarers can be protected to some degree by physical design and, not least, by having a plan
for addressing cyber security in the design phase.

Survivability
Survivability is not just about the adequacy of firefighting, damage control, lifesaving and
security facilities; it is also about having the correct resources, training and procedures in place
to ensure the safety of the ship and to protect the health, safety and wellbeing of its seafarers
(Alert! Project, 2015a). Survivability includes:
• Availability of manpower
• Emergency response systems & procedures
• Ship layout & equipment fit
• Firefighting & damage control systems & equipment
• Lifesaving appliances
• Personal survival & medical kits
• Search & rescue communications
• Escape & evacuation routes
• Crisis management plans
This area is critical, and one where many unfortunate accidents happen to crew trying to
manage an emergency. An unacceptable number of fatalities result from drills, especially with
lifeboats and rescue boats. Between 1989 and 1999 lifeboats and their launching systems have
cost the lives of 12 professional seafarers or 16% of the total lives lost on merchant ships.
Additionally, eighty-seven seafarers were injured (MAIB, 2001). A notable accident occurred
in 2014 onboard the Maltese flagged bulk carrier Aquarosa while the ship was in the Indian

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Ocean on her voyage from Singapore to Fremantle, Western Australia. The ship’s freefall
lifeboat was inadvertently released during a routine inspection, causing serious injuries to the
second engineer, who was the only person in the lifeboat at the time. Subsequent investigation
by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found the design of the lifeboat’s on-load
release system to be a contributing factors to the accident (Australian Transport Safety Bureau,
2015). In addition, statistics show life-saving appliances to be one of the ten most focused-on
areas of safety recommendation issued by maritime investigative bodies of EU States between
2011 – 2015 (EMSA, 2016), making survivability a crucial factor to consider in addressing the
human element in the maritime industry.

Occupational health and safety

Designers must take into account the effect of work, the working environment and living
conditions on the health, safety and wellbeing of the person. The MLC emphasises the rights
of every seafarer to a safe and secure workplace that complies with safety standards; to fair
terms of employment; to decent working and living conditions on board ship; and to health
protection, medical care, welfare measures and other forms of social protection. The
considerations include:
• Company/ship occupational health and safety policies
• Health and wellbeing
• Personal health
• Health awareness – mental and physical
• Short/long term hazards to health
• Safe working practices
• Tripping/falling/bumping/crushing hazards
• Provision, maintenance, access, and use of PPE
• Accident recording, reporting, investigation, and feedback
Further support is available in the ILO Guidelines for implementing the occupational safety
and health provisions of MLC 2006 (Alert! Project, 2015b). Additionally, there are a number
of ILO codes on worker protection and health and an IMO guideline on an OHS programme.

System safety
This consideration is about the effect of people and their behaviour on the safety of systems. It
is the interface between risk management and human factors and concerns the effect human
behaviour may have on the safety of systems. It is important to include a judgment of risk when
planning the design and taking into account hazards in underlying task descriptions and
analyses. In this consideration, it is prudent to perform human reliability analyses and to
consider resilience of the system. Resilience is briefly described as supporting safe operation
as opposed to minimising risk, by ensuring that an organisation can continue operating in the
face of threats. An organisation’s resilience can be operationalised by auditing and
strengthening the ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate – which can all be supported
by good user centred design.
• Hazards to/from crew
• Human element in analysis of risks
• Human element in treatment of risks
• Ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate
• Business imperative

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 • Potential for human & organisational error
• Potential for environmental damage & pollution
• Training and familiarisation

Although not all the Human Factors aspects in the framework are equally applicable to design
and sometimes overlap, their implementation will nevertheless help create better workplaces
with enhanced usability. The following section will discuss notable success stories of ship
design cases to explain further the positive influence Human Factors inclusion may have.

Notable ship design cases

The framework of addressing the human element can be applied to all design projects. The
actual application, however, varies among different cases. This section considers the
implementation of Human Factors dimensions in three design projects, namely the
development of the Tamar-class lifeboat, operated by the Royal National Lifeboat Institution
(RNLI); the Service Operations Vessel 9020, designed by Damen Shipyards Group; and the
Pure Car/Truck Carrier (PCTC) Harvest Leader, designed by Andreas Shipping Ltd.

The Tamar lifeboat class

The Tamar lifeboat design (see figure 7.3) is an early initiative to involve users and design a
vessel to their needs. The main motivations were championing and organisational support and
a higher duty of care than the merchant sector. The crew members are volunteers and therefore
have greater protection under law, and a safe and comfortable work environment is also needed
in order to retain manpower supply. Lifeboats are often called out in adverse weather conditions
and under time-critical circumstances. Furthermore, their size and shape make them subject to
severe effects of heavy pitching and rolling which can significantly hinder the crew’s
performance and bring risks and potential health issues. Additionally, the crew consists of up
to 90% volunteers with little or no maritime professional background. Therefore, to promote
the success of search and rescue operations as well as to protect the well-being of people on
board, it is required of the designers to provide a solution to ensure the technology onboard is
safe, effective and intuitive for these “ordinary people” to use (Chaplin & Nurser, 2007).

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Figure 7.3
The decision was to bring the boats to the crew members by applying ergonomics, and the
process started with a risk assessment based on operational feedback and a task hazard analysis
(Chaplin & Nurser, 2007). It was found that the primary concern in the lifeboat’s design was
the potential of lumbar spinal injury caused to the operator by the lifeboat’s motion under heavy
sea conditions – so the seat became a major focus. The design team employed computer-
modelling techniques to model boat and wave motion and the motion of the human lumbar
spine to identify different types of injury sustained on different sea states and seat design. The
results of this research lead to new seat design for comfort, shock absorption and to improve
the ability to control the vessel.
Given the stationary position of the operators, the Tamar lifeboat is fitted with an integrated
electronic Systems and Information Management System (SIMS), appropriately described as
‘Safety In My Seat’ by lifeboat crew. The functions include: the navigation of the lifeboat,
including direction finding, radar and charting; radio communications and CCTV; and the
mechanics of the lifeboat including the engines, bilge and electrics (Royal National Lifeboat
Institution, 2014). The integration of functions and data greatly reduce the need for the operator
to move around the boat at sea. In addition, this system allows for flexibility in task sharing
which makes it possible to have a crew of mixed experience and expertise.
RNLI staff and crews are involved in all stages during the development of the Tamar class.
During the operation of the vessel, crew feedback is continuously collected to generate data for
future improvements. A number of examples of how Human Factors dimensions were
implemented are shown in table 7.1.
Table 7.1. Results of implementing Human Factors dimensions in the design of the Tamar lifeboat class

Aspect Comment
Design process User and stakeholder involvement through iteration, from concept to operation. With
station trials across the country to take any ideas in for the next Tamar (continual
improvement).
Seakeeping ability The Tamar class is self-righting, returning to an upright position in the event of capsize.
Workability SIMS supports task sharing among the crew and saves space by replacing separate systems
and equipment. Space layout includes PPE, grab rails, slip-resistant coatings, signage, etc.
Guard rails, two gate sections on each side to allow different boat/ pontoon height. Tamar
carries a daughter boat for accessing difficult areas. To deploy the daughter boat there is
a floodable recess which also allows casualties to be easily handled on board.
Controllability The seats incorporate controls such as throttles, joystick and a trackball to operate SIMS.
Communication through headsets. If all back-ups fail, the lifeboat can still be operated
using conventional methods. Two control stations are used for different phases of mission.
At the upper station there are two throttle controls to allow the helm to gain the best view
of the side in use.
Manoeuvrability The Tamar lifeboat is very agile and has a top speed of 25 knots. She has twin engines
and a bow thruster. Out of sea manoeuvrability improved by multiple launch and recovery
options. Mast section on hydraulics to allow easy and quick movement between stored
and active states.
Maintainability The Tamar’s propellers and rudders are protected by tunnels and the keels are steel lined.
Engine room floor layout allows complete access to the whole engine for easy
maintenance. Labelling and easy access to all serviceable components and sampling
points.
Habitability The lifeboat can carry 118 survivors standing. Special crew seats for comfort, shock
absorption and control. Layout optimised for safe and efficient teamwork during rescue
missions.
System safety Interface designed for situation awareness, shared task load, safety through remote
monitoring and control, redundancy and simplified training. The coxswain has control
thus allowing to give control to who needs it so no mixed messages.

13
 Occupational The shock-absorbing seats enhance crew comfort and safety. There is belted seating for
health and safety 10 survivors. Grab rails, layout, best possible protective and survival equipment are
provided in combination with very high levels of training and drilling.
Security SIMS uses an Ethernet local area network architecture for fast and reliable communication
between workstations. If a single point failure occurs, system data integrity is not affected.
Survivability Design loads are set to higher than expected use, and a safety factor is used, meaning that
even if the lifeboat is taken out beyond expected performance it will withstand the loads.
Secondary buoyance is built into hull. Additionally, she carries a salvage pump. The
control system is made with rugged and salt water-resistant hardware and has no moving
parts, which makes it robust and shock-resistant. The architecture is resilient as back-up
systems reduce the risk of complete system failure.

As said by Neil Chaplin – the RNLI’s principal naval architect: “Seven years is indeed a long
time to develop one boat; however, with the seats and SIMS we now have components that can
be applied to future lifeboat designs and perhaps retrofitted to current ones to enhance the safety
of our volunteer crews” (Alert! Project, 2006, p. 7). The RNLI Tamar boats are an example of
augmenting human capability with usable technology that combines with their values and
training to achieve the very best solution for people in danger.

Damen Service Operations Vessel 9020

The Damen Service Operations Vessel 9020 (see Figure 7.4) is an example of how human
element issues can be addressed in operational design. The ship was built for the deployment
and retention of offshore support and maintenance engineers. This design used a new
operational concept which needed iterative involvement of stakeholders. The development of
this vessel has been driven by functional equipment, based on feedback from potential end-
users. Human element issues have been included in all levels of design, from hull form through
the general arrangement and the selection and design of systems, to detailed ergonomics. How
this operational design addresses human element issues is shown in table 7.2.

14
Figure 7.4

Table 7.2. Results of implementing Human Factors dimensions in the design of the Walk2Work windfarm support vessel

Aspect Comment
Design process User and stakeholder involvement, iteration
Seakeeping ability The hull form is longer (at 90 metres) and shallower (4.6m) than a comparable
conventional PSV. The bow section has been lowered by 1.5 meters compared to
conventional platform supply vessels, which significantly reduce slamming in heavy
seas
Workability New context of use for operation further offshore where crew transfer within a day
becomes impractical; voyages may last a month. 80% weather operability in wave
heights of up to 3m. Power savings compared with conventional PSV. Interior zoned to
assist workflow and storage. Walking distances minimised. Facility locations match
activity sequences. User tasks considered for logistical flows. Air-conditioned workshop
facilities to store sensitive parts and tools
Controllability Single deckhouse for bridge and site management
Manoeuvrability DP available, but designed to be largely used non-DP
Maintainability Separation of clean and dirty areas
Habitability Longer hull, shallower draught for more comfortable motion. Worker accommodation
midships to reduce pitch motion effects. Single-occupancy cabins, fitness centre and
internet/movie services. Maximum use of natural light. Comfortable décor scheme
Connectability Offices, conference room, recreation dayrooms, reception room, hospital, drying room,
all cabins provided with internet telephone and satellite TV
System safety For a high level of redundancy, alternative transfer methods are included such as
helicopter, crane or a Damen-designed rigid hull inflatable boat (RIB)
Occupational safety Crew transfer hazards reduced by motion-compensated gangway from a stable DP2
and health platform

The PCTC Harvest Leader

Cargo ships account for the majority of the world fleet (Equasis, 2015). Therefore, an attempt
to implement HF&E in the design of merchant ships can have a powerful effect on the maritime
industry. The PCTC (Pure Car Truck Carrier) vessel Harvest Leader (see figure 7.5) designed
by Andreas Shipping Ltd. for NYK Line is an example of such effort (Bialystocki, 2016).

15
Figure 7.5
The process of designing the ship followed an unusual practice in the industry, where crew
feedback was gathered and subsequently analysed by the design team alongside the owner’s
designers, the managers and the shipyard, in order to find a solution to apply on the design.
Such practice resulted in various design improvements on the ergonomic aspects of the vessel,
see table 7.3. Personal communication with the project leader revealed that although some of
the changes were made at the later stage, thus leading to some increase of cost, this was
absorbed by savings in other parts of the build and subsequent expense, especially maintenance
cost. During the ship’s life cycle, crew feedback will continuously be collected and taken into
account when considering changes in arrangements of equipment or implementation of new
technologies.
Table 7.3. Results of implementing Human Factors dimensions in the design of the PCTC Harvest Leader

Aspect Comment
Design process User and stakeholder involvement through iteration. The involvement of users was
deemed unsuitable and insignificant at the early design stages but was much more
fruitful at the subsequent detailed design stage.
Seakeeping ability Due to the commercial purpose of a merchant ship, the Harvest Leader was design and
built to satisfy the seakeeping ability requirements of the regulations.
Workability Vast improvements were implemented and eventually achieved positive outcomes
regarding workability. Alternation of cargo hold fans location help preventing
obstruction to visibility. The bridge control console was separated into wing control
console and instruments console. Both were planned to facilitate ease of use and intuitive
operation. The systems were installed with the principle of being as uncomplicated as
possible, notably the removal of unused equipment usually provided by the shipyard,
the design of modules of “plug and play” type allows for easy and efficient maintenance.
Controllability Cameras were installed at critical locations. Additional telephones and PA speakers were
provided in working and accommodation areas to improve internal communication. The
integration of all alarms from bridge systems into one Bridge Alarm Monitoring Systems
and the use of a user-friendly Integrated Monitoring, Alarm, and Control Systems allows

16
 for easy monitoring and control of bridge, engine, and machinery systems. The
equipment is standardised within the owner’s fleet to support familiarisation and
adaptation.
Manoeuvrability The Harvest Leader was designed to achieve service speed of about 20.0 knots and
equipped with bow and stern thrusters to improve manoeuvrability.
Maintainability All machinery in the engine room was arranged with 360° access and less-frequently
attended spaces such as cargo hold ventilation trunks were also provided with safe and
comfortable means of access to allow for easy maintenance. Workshops in the engine
room were designed and equipped with additional equipment such as ultrasonic cleaner
and lifting devices to further support maintenance.
Habitability Five extra cabins were provided to accommodate irregular workers. The illumination
level was raised high above the flag requirements for crew comfort and in working areas
it increases safety through easier task performance. Moreover, several spaces without
any illumination level requirements was also specified by the owner’s request such as
300 lux in the wheelhouse and engine control room, 200 lux in the engine room
workshop. Additional noise reduction measures were taken to maintain comfortable
noise level on board. A 5-blade propeller was installed to reduce the effect of propeller
on the vibration level. Crew’s living and common spaces were enlarged to allow more
comfortable habitation.
System safety Bridge and Engine control systems are designed to improve situation awareness,
increase ease of use, and many preventative measures were applied to prevent the crew
mistakes.
Occupational safety Working and exposed decks are painted with anti-slip coating to avoid slipping. Kick
and health plates are installed on each side of fixed ramps to prevent fittings from rolling and
falling. Illumination, noise, and vibration levels were controlled to maintain at high
safety level as required by latest IMO standards. The increase of manning level helps
maintain sufficient resting hours.
Survivability Several improvements were implemented which exceed the minimum safety standards.
Fire detectors were installed in all cabins and fire hydrants with hoses were provided in
the accommodation area. The crew was provided with additional life jackets at the
muster stations to allow for immediate access in cases of emergency. Oversize and child
size life-saving appliances were added.

How shall we design?

In the previous two sections, we discussed the influence of design on the safety level of the
whole system, the necessity of addressing the human element in design, as well as certain cases
of optimal design with due regard to Human Factors. This section will summarise the most
important aspects of a good design process, which require serious consideration from ship
designers and equipment manufacturers, including Human-Centred Design (HCD), regulations
standards, and guidelines, as well as challenges in the design process.
Human-Centred Design
As seen in the cases of the Tamar lifeboat, the Walk2work wind farm support vessel, and the
PCTC Harvest Leader, the designers applied input from users to implement Human Factors
aspects in the designs, which resulted in the improvement of effectiveness, efficiency,
satisfaction, and overall safety. In such cases, the designers follow a process of “applying
Human Factors and ergonomics knowledge and techniques to minimise human error, enhance
effectiveness and efficiency, improve human working conditions, and counteract the possible
adverse effects of use on the health, safety, and performance of the mariner”, which is known
as Human-Centred Design.
The standard ISO 9241-210:2010 sets out the principles of HCD, which can be briefly
summarised as follows: The future or potential users are involved through the design and
development; the designers cooperate with the users to understand user needs, the nature of the
tasks and the product’s intended working environment. Such data is combined with human
factors and usability knowledge and technique to create highly usable systems, which can
17
improve productivity, enhance user well-being and reduce risk of harm (International
Organization for Standardization, 2010).
As described in ISO 9241-210:2010, an HCD process consists of four activities:
• Understand and specify the context of use
o Identify the users of the ship or system under development and determine their
characteristic, goals, and tasks. Define the technical, organisational and physical
environments in which the ship or system in question will operate.
• Specify the user requirements
o Identify user needs and specify resulting functional and other requirements for
the ship or system within the intended context of use.
• Produce design solutions to meet user requirements
o Apply user requirements data and Human Factors considerations to produce
design solutions and implement in the design.
• Evaluate the design against the requirements
o Appraise the design solutions in order to select the most appropriate, identify
defects and alter accordingly to produce the most optimal design.
Since the standards are not prescriptive rules but rather principles to follow, the actual activities
and tasks, and the order of performance of these activities, as chosen by designers adopting
HCD approaches, may vary greatly due to users’ characteristics, intended operating
environments, economic aspects, and many other factors. HCD activities should be done
whenever applicable and changed whenever necessary, e.g. one may evaluate a previous ship
for better requirements or re-visit the context of use for more detail on a design solution that is
not working as well as it used to.
Standards, Regulations and Guidelines
The design and construction of ships and ship systems follow specific requirements, criteria,
standards, rules, regulations, codes, and guidelines. In the maritime industry, there are three
primary sources from which those criteria can be obtained and applied: classification society
rules, regulatory requirements, and ship-owner requirements.
The first criterion to consider when starting a design project is the regulations and standards
applied to the project outcomes. Standards and Regulations set out the baseline for the
minimum properties a designed object must possess to be able to enter into use in the industry.
Failing to comply with such standards will render the project outcomes inadequate and
jeopardise the whole design process.
Human Factors consideration in the design of ships is officially required under the provisions
of standards, rules and conventions issued by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO),
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation for Standardisation
(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The IMO regulates human
factors consideration in ship design through several assembly resolutions, resolutions and
circulars from the maritime safety committee and the sub-committee on navigation,
communications, search and rescue (NCSR), and the SOLAS Convention. The ILO Maritime
Labour Convention contains regulations addressing habitability and occupational health and
safety. The IEC and ISO are two international organisations that produce international
standards. IEC covers electrotechnology and related conformity assessment and ISO covers
almost all other fields and conformity assessment with regard to vessel designs. Human factors
dimensions are addressed in ISO/IEC standards of two fields of activity under the International
Classification for Standards (ICS), namely ICS.13 – Environment, Health protection, Safety

18
and ICS.47 – Shipbuilding and marine structures. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 provide the lists of major
publications from the IMO and ISO.
Table 7.4. IMO publications relevant to HF in ship design

Assembly Resolutions (RES)

A.468(XII) Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships
A.601(15) Provision and Display of Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships
A.708(17) Navigation Bridge Visibility and Functions

A.861(20) Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs)

A.947(23) Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for the Organization
A.1021 (26) Code on Alerts and Indicators
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Resolutions
64(67) Adoption of new and amended performance standards
128(75) Performance Standards for a Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)
137(76) Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability
Performance Standards for the Presentation of Navigation-Related Information on
190(79)
Shipborne Navigational Displays
Adoption of amendments to the performance standards for shipborne voyage data recorders
214(81) (VDRs) (Resolution A.861(20)) and performance standards for shipborne simplified voyage
data recorders (S-VDRs) (Resolution MSC.163(78))
Adoption of the revised performance standards for electronic chart display and information
232(82)
systems (ECDIS)
MSC Circulars
834 Guidelines for Engine-Room Layout, Design and Arrangement
982 Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge Equipment and Layout
1002 Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for Fire Safety
1091 Issues to be considered when introducing new technology on board ship
1512 Guideline on Software Quality Assurance and Human-Centred Design for e-Navigation
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV) Circulars
SN.1/Circ.265 Guidelines on the Application of SOLAS Regulation V/15 to INS, IBS and Bridge Design

Table 7.5. ISO documents relevant to HF in ship design

ISO Title of document

Mechanical vibration and shock - Evaluation of human exposure to wholebody vibration --
2631-1:1997
Part 1: General requirements
2923:1996 Acoustics - Measurement of noise on board vessels
3797:1976 Shipbuilding - Vertical steel ladders
5488:2015 Ships and marine technology - Accommodation ladders
5489:2008 Ships and marine technology - Embarkation ladders
Mechanical vibration -- Measurement of vibration on ships -- Part 5: Guidelines for
20283-5:2016 measurement, evaluation and reporting of vibration with regard to habitability on passenger
and merchant ships
Ships and marine technology – Shipboard plans for fire protection, life-saving appliances
17631:2002
and means of escape
Ships and marine technology – Computer applications – General principles for the
17894:2005
development and use of programmable electronic systems in marine applications
Mechanical vibration - Measurement of vibration on ships - Part 2: Measurement of
20283-2:2008
structural vibration
Mechanical vibration - Measurement of vibration on ships - Part 4: Measurement and
20283-4:2012
evaluation of vibration of the ship propulsion machinery
Ships and marine technology - Design, location and use of shipboard safety signs, safety-
24409-1:2010
related signs, safety notices and safety markings - Part 1: Design principles
27991:2008 Ships and marine technology - Marine evacuation systems - Means of communication
Ships and marine technology - Ship's bridge layout and associated equipment -
8468:2007
Requirements and guidelines

19
 2412:1982 Shipbuilding -- Colours of indicator lights
Ergonomics of human-system interaction – Part 210: Human-centred design for interactive
9241-210:2010
systems

Alongside the above-mentioned organisations, classification societies provide guidelines to

assist ship designers with the ergonomic design of ships and marine systems. American Bureau
of Shipping (ABS), Lloyd’s Register (LR), Det Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd (DNV
GL), Bureau Veritas (BV) and the ClassNK (NK) are classification societies which represent
the majority of the ship classification market. Each society develops their own guidelines
addressing human factors in ship design. Their main guidelines are listed in Fig. 7.6 together
with the illustration of the involvement of different regulatory bodies in this issue.

Figure 7.6
The role of classification societies is expecting significant changes with the revolution in rule-
making in the maritime industry by transforming from prescriptive regulations toward Goal-
based standards (GBS). With the introduction of GBS, the focus is shifted from the process to
the achieved outcomes where the designers have settled goals but are free to elect whatever
measures they deem fit to achieve compliance. The structure for goal-based new ship
construction standards have explicit consideration of the human element, as seen in the
following extraction from the resolution MSC.287(87) (IMO, 2010, p. 6):
“Ship’s structures and fittings shall be designed and arranged using ergonomic principles to
ensure safety during operation, inspection and maintenance. These considerations shall
include, but not be limited to, stairs, vertical ladders, ramps, walkways and standing platforms
used for means of access, the work environment, inspection and maintenance and the
facilitation of operation”.
The move toward goal-based standards has the advantage of being highly flexible to
accommodate not only human variability and adaptability but also the dynamics of the marine

20
system due to changing technology, operations and manning. However, this novel approach
also requires changes in the practice of many stakeholders in the industry. Explicit activities
are expected from classification societies throughout the design, construction, survey and
approval to demonstrate compliance (Earthy & Sherwood Jones, 2006). Within the framework
set at the IMO, it is the role of classification societies to develop specific criteria to support the
goals.
Challenges with Human-Centred Design
It is undeniable that human-centred design helps create good products, but just like any other
design approach, there are advantages and disadvantages. The important thing is that the
designers understand this and adapts in order to find the most appropriate design practice.
Applying knowledge of Human Factors and ergonomics will improve usability, reduce the
likelihood of human errors, and enhance system effectiveness and efficiency. However, there
are aspects of Human-centred design, which designers must take into consideration. One
drawback of HCD is the re-allocation of time and expense. The process of user data collection,
subsequent analysis, and producing design solutions requires both specialist human and
financial resources. It incurs some short-term risk to project time and cost. However, this is
more than repaid in reduced long-term risks to safety, efficiency and training costs. This issue
will be further discussed in the section on the economic aspects of design.
An important aspect of HCD is the involvement of users in the design process. Users may not
be aware of their needs or make false assumptions of their actual needs. Furthermore, acceding
to users’ requests instead of finding out what they need may result in overly complex designs.
Users are not designers and therefore, their involvement should reflect this distinction. A
common mistake made by designers, when they do involve end users, is to utilise users as co-
designers. It is important to bear in mind that “HCD does not necessarily imply that users
perform research or design roles ... but that they contribute to research or design processes, as
experts on their own daily lives and on their own experiences with products and services”
(Steen, 2008, p. 27).
The economic aspects of design
Another issue when it comes to the implementation of Human Factors considerations is the
monetary challenge. Since such design practice may require additional expense in the early
phases, it should be considered an investment, and just like any investment, the managers
always pay keen attention to economic justification. However, it seems there is still a lack of
awareness in the industry regarding the economic benefits that optimal design may bring in the
long run. This may be due to a lack of routines and methods for performing cost and effect
estimations of ergonomics investments (Österman, 2009, 2012; Österman & Rose, 2015).
Costa and Lützhöft (2014) analysed and categorised the benefits of addressing Human Factors
in ship design and operation. Their study found that implementing HF in the design stages can
result in not only direct benefits for the seafarers but also several benefits for the ship-owners.
Among them, the following economic benefits can serve as a strong justification for the ship-
owners to invest in HF:
• Reduction of accidents lead to reduction of operational costs;
• Less additional cost for adjustment or redesign since everything was done correctly at
the beginning;
• Prevention of layday cost due to crew mistakes;
• Less stressful working environment results in less sick leave;
• Lower training cost if systems are more intuitive; and

21
 • Lower costs for relocation of hardware if the system is built properly from the start.
• Better public image and reputation for the company, which can also lead to economic
benefits.
There is also an emphasis on the importance of early application of good design practices. Yet,
making such investing decisions can be problematic due to the fragmented structure of the
maritime industry, where one department pays for the design and another reaps the benefits of
less maintenance, less attrition, safer and more efficient operations. Unfortunately, there are
few examples of cost-effectiveness calculations available for the shipping domain. However,
we can assume that if we wait until we are at operational and management levels to address
Human Factors issues we tend to increase redesign costs, training costs and paperwork (e.g.
ISM). An example from BMT regarding an oil production company’s benefits from integrating
HFE early into design of offshore facilities identifies the following reductions (BMT, 2007):
• Capital expenditure 0.25-5%
• Engineering hours 1-10%
• Design rework 1-5%
• Project duration up to 40% less due to reduced rework and fewer approval cycles
• Operation and maintenance 3-6% per year
Despite the current lack of a formal method for evaluating economic benefits of design
investment in the industry, it is suggested that optimal design can improve user performance
and well-being (Petersen, 2010) and ultimately lead to improved safety.
If people consider the potential cost-reduction and cost-effectiveness behind the safe operation
of ships and shipboard equipment, safety can be perceived as profit, as added value and as a
corporate social responsibility which must be considered when making investment decisions.
Human Factors and Design Engineering
Through their active engagement in the design process, naval architects have a direct influence
on every aspect of ships’ designs. While their work is influenced by rules and guidelines from
regulatory bodies, it is the professional knowledge and maritime HF skills of the designers that
are essential for the design of ships and marine systems with high usability. Unfortunately,
designers are usually biased towards the technical aspects and focus exclusively on the ship as
a physical artefact while ignoring work design and human-system integration. It is necessary
that maritime designers become more aware of this issue and employ design approaches that
can employ HF concepts to their full extent (Lützhöft, Petersen, & Abeysiriwardhane, 2017).
To achieve this, we first need to uncover the reasons behind this phenomenon.

The engineering mindset

Efforts have been made to intervene early in the process, at ship design level
(Abeysiriwardhane et al., 2014; Abeysiriwardhane, Lützhöft, Petersen, & Enshaei, 2015), and
at software/ equipment level (Petersen, 2010, 2012). The former is a summary of a project on
increasing HF awareness among the community of naval architects, and the latter is an account
of an in-house project using HCD to design and test a new generation of maritime electronics.
Both used the ISO standard as their starting point. One of the issues found in both studies is
the differing underlying philosophy, culture and mindset in Human Factors and Engineering.
The lack of equality in the value assigned to human factors in the professional viewpoint held
by naval architects and maritime designers traces its root into the natural inclinations of design

22
engineering, the training and education systems, and the design engineering thinking (Lützhöft
et al., 2017).
In his theory of multiple intelligences, instead of seeing intelligence as dominated by a single
general ability, Gardner (1998) differentiates intelligence into eight different abilities. The
archetypical design engineer is gifted with four of these, namely: naturalistic intelligence,
spatial intelligence, bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence and logical-mathematical intelligence.
Naturistic intelligence represents the abilities to recognise and categorise natural objects;
spatial intelligence allows people to form and operate on mental images; bodily-kinaesthetic
intelligence provides the capability to control body motion to handle objects; and logical-
mathematical intelligence allows the ability to confront and assess objects and abstractions and
understand their relations and underlying principles (Gardner, 2006a, 2006b). In combination,
these traits provide a person with the necessary skills to design and construct objects, but also
lead to the design thinking that is based on numbers and logic. Thus, engineering is based on
applied mathematics and physics and their associated principles, which explains why typical
engineering education programmes often focus on technological subjects rather than the issues
of human-machine interaction (Lützhöft et al., 2017). In the first study mentioned above,
Abeysiriwardhane et al. (2014) study undergraduate naval architecture students at the
Australian Maritime College and find the students lack awareness in maritime Human Factors
issues. None of the participating students was aware of HF rules and guidelines even though
most of them were familiar with marine regulations and classification societies.
Furthermore, the nature of design engineering thinking urges designers to approach complex
affairs by dividing them into semi-independent components (Bucciarelli, 1994). The success
of this strategy depends upon the robustness of the interfaces between components, which is
naturally achieved by supressing potential refractory issues through the avoidance of
qualitative requirements and relying solely on measurable physical criteria. Also, uncertainty
is unavoidable during the process of creating a new product, and designers have always faced
the risk of uncertain knowledge. Through the years, design engineers have developed strategies
to tackle uncertainty; they often rely on immediate data and employ heuristics rather than
comprehensive analysis to even out the lack of precise information (Lützhöft et al., 2017).
Together, these strategies make it problematic for designers to consider and apply knowledge
on the context of use and user characteristics in their designs.
To address the differing cultures of Human Factors and technical factors, it is necessary to
recalibrate the engineering mindset, which ought to maintain relatively equal views between
the requirement of technical functions and the needs and satisfaction of the end users. This re-
calibration has to be done as early as in the training steps of future designers, by integrating
knowledge of Human Factors in the curriculum. However, it is clear that one-sided change
does not work. Thus, the human factors professional must adapt the content and dissemination
techniques to practice, not preaching. For undergraduate education, it is recommended that the
following key areas are addressed in the syllabus (Abeysiriwardhane et al., 2014):
• Fundamental principles of HF and HCD;
• Development of an understanding of the nature and application of these principles;
• Guidance on HF rules and regulations followed by the industry;
• Designers’ responsibility to integrate HF and HCD into designs to avoid hazards;
• Appreciation of the HF and HCD in complex work systems;
• Demonstration of the importance for safety and comfort for the life of the end users;
• How to become a usability expert in a working environment where other employees are
not aware or interested on HF/HCD.

23
Interestingly, when attempting to involve engineers in designing ships and ship systems for
seafarers, both authors of the two studies mentioned in the beginning of this section come to
the same conclusion - that practice bests theory. Instead of the traditional teaching methods, it
is better to expose students to the real environment of the end-users, and to provide them with
first-hand experience on the life and work onboard ships. This new approach has been shown
to develop the awareness on maritime HF among students and improve the connection between
the future designers and the end-users (Abeysiriwardhane, Lutzhoft, Petersen, & Enshaei,
2016).
Basically, if Human Factors knowledge and skills are to be accepted in technical domains, they
may have to be reframed to fit the “end-user” – couched in a language that makes sense to
technical users and presented in a manner which fits the engineering mindset.

Ergonomics mindset at the organisational level

Achieving Human Factors awareness at an individual level is only the first step of the “Design
for safety” approach. To achieve safety through design at the industry level, best practice is to
rebalance the engineering mindset in every organisation, and especially for the design of ships
and shipboard equipment, i.e. in ship design firms, shipyards, and equipment manufacturers.
The goal of this transition is to make system usability and human factors a focus in each
organisation’s operational policies.
One useful instrument for this process is the Organisational Human-Centeredness Scale,
introduced by Lloyd’s Register, which describes levels of usability maturity (Table 7.6) – the
extent to which an organisation addresses human-centred issues.
Table 7.6. Usability Maturity Levels and Process Attributes (Earthy, 1998)

Level Description of Levels Process Attributes

Level X Unrecognised No indicators.
The need for a human-centred process There is no concern with mixed level of user
is not recognised. satisfaction. There is no positive attributes at
this level.
Level A Recognised A1 - Problem recognition attribute.
The organisation recognises the need to Members of the organisation are aware of the
improve the quality of use of its problem with the quality of use of the systems
systems. produced.
A2 – Performed processes attribute
Process are performed to provide input to make
the system human-centred.
Level B Considered B1 – Quality in use awareness attribute
The organisation engages in training The staff involved in the development process
and awareness raising to make its staff are aware of quality of use as an attribute of the
aware that quality of use is important system.
and can be improved by taking account B2 – User focus attribute
of end-user requirements during the The staff involved in the process relating to the
development process. user-facing element of the system take account
of the fact that a human being will need to use
it.
Level C Implemented C1 – User involvement attribute
Human-centred processes are fully Information is collected from representative
implemented and produce good results. users using appropriate techniques throughout
the system lifecycle.
C2 – HF technology attribute
Human factors methods and techniques are used
in or by human-centred processes.
C3 – HF skills attribute

24
 Human factors skills are used in human-centred
processes.
Level D Integrated D1 – Integration attribute
Human-centred processes are integrated Human-centred process are integrated with
into the quality process and systems other processes
lifecycle of the organisation. D2 - Improvement attribute
Human-centred processes are used in the
improvement of work products from other
processes.
D3 - Iteration attribute
The development lifecycle is iterative.
Level E Institutionalised E1 – Human-centred leadership attribute
The quality in use of whole ranges of Human factors/people-centred approach
systems is coordinated and managed for influences the management of all systems
business benefit. The culture of the lifecycle processes.
organisation become benefits from E2 - Organisational human-centeredness
being user and human centred. Human- attribute
centred skills are regarded on a par with Human factors/people-centred approach
engineering skills. influences the attitude of the whole
organisation.

The descriptions of attributes at each maturity level explain why human-centred methods
developed for high level organisations are not applicable for lower level organisations; also,
low level organisations cannot immediately produce solutions to achieve the highest level of
maturity but rather must undertake a steady process of transition through all levels.
The main usage of the scale is to evaluate and improve an organisation’s capability in
addressing Human Factors and, in due course, improve the quality of use of that organisation’s
products. However, besides the primary use in assessment, the scale can also be used as a model
for designing an organisation’s operations or to improve existing operational agendas. For the
marine sector the scale has been developed into the referenced LR Guides (Lloyd's Register,
2007, 2014a, 2014b) which provide marine-specific capability levels for HCD process
improvement for Operators, Designers and Manufacturers.
This scale is just one of several methods to expand Human Factors considerations in an
organisational level; other methods such as the Corporate UX Maturity Scale (Nielsen, 2006),
where the level of commitments to user experience (UX) of an organisation is sorted in eight
stages ranging from objecting to fully committed, can also be considered. In practice, each
organisation should follow the most appropriate approach, whilst bearing in mind the goal of
usability and user needs.

Conclusions and recommendations

The properties of a product are defined by its design. The design of ships and equipment will
directly affect the outcomes of shipboard operations and thus determine maritime safety.
Within the scope of maritime shipping, the characteristics of ships and shipboard equipment
are determined by naval architects and equipment manufacturers during the design process.
Investigation reports of maritime accidents indicate that the main reasons behind the majority
of accidents are inappropriate design factors resulting in poor usability, impeding proper
interactions between the human and other elements of the maritime system as well as increasing
the probability of human errors. Such faulty designs were the result of a lack of proper
understanding about the capabilities and behaviours of the actual users among the naval
architects and equipment designers’ communities.

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To improve safety, it is necessary to design ships and ship equipment with due regard to Human
Factors in order to match with users’ abilities and requirements. This practice is, however, often
neglected in the maritime industry. There is a need for a systematic approach for dissemination
of this issue to all stakeholders in the industry as well as a request, and ideally a requirement,
for all relevant parties to take action to follow Human Factors design practice. In establishing
such an approach, the following factors have to be considered:
• Design solutions that consider the human element are developed by following human-
centred design approach to provide design solutions based on users’ needs in the
intended context of use.
• Project managers, naval architects and equipment designers should take account of the
changes to resource and management requirements associated with the introduction of
human-centred design activities to a project.
• Equipment designers and naval architects need to follow required practices prescribed
in regulations and standards as well as refer to guidelines from classification societies
for recommended applications.
• Beside safety, human-centred design also provides economic benefit. An optimal
design will increase effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, and reduce maintenance
cost. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that higher safety can also be
perceived as monetary profit.
• Design principles need to be rebalanced between Human and Engineering factors, with
stronger consideration placed on the human element. This issue needs to be addressed
at the individual level through the incorporation of HF knowledge in the training
syllabus for future industry designers, and at the organisation level by enhancing the
level of user-centeredness among the industry’s organisations.
With proper understanding of the importance of the design process to safety and productivity,
particularly as seen in recent design projects, we can expect a transformation in the practice of
ship and marine equipment design in the near future, which will strengthen the contribution of
design to safe and effective operations in the maritime industry.

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