Scott D.

Sagan

Shared responsibilities
for nuclear disarmament

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Interest in nuclear disarmament has ment: all states that have joined the Nu-
grown rapidly in recent years. Starting clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt)
with the 2007 Wall Street Journal article are committed “to pursue negotiations
by four former U.S. statesmen–George in good faith on effective measures relat-
Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, ing to cessation of the nuclear arms race
and Sam Nunn–and followed by en- at an early date and to nuclear disarma-
dorsements from similar sets of former ment.” In the United States, moreover,
leaders from the United Kingdom, Ger- under Clause 2 of Article 6 of the Con-
many, Poland, Australia, and Italy, the stitution, a treaty commitment is “the
support for global nuclear disarmament supreme Law of the Land.” To af½rm
has spread.1 The Japanese and Austra- the U.S. commitment to seek a world
lian governments announced the cre- without nuclear weapons is therefore
ation of the International Commission simply promising that the U.S. govern-
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Dis- ment will follow U.S. law.
armament in June 2008. Both Senators A closer reading of these various dec-
John McCain and Barack Obama explic- larations, however, reveals both the
itly supported the vision of a world free complexity of motives and the multiplic-
of nuclear weapons during the 2008 ity of fears behind the current surge in
election campaign. In April 2009, at support of nuclear disarmament. Some
the London Summit, President Barack declarations emphasize concerns that
Obama and President Dmitri Medved- the current behavior of nuclear-weap-
ev called for pragmatic U.S. and Rus- ons states (nws) signals to non-nuclear-
sian steps toward nuclear disarmament, weapons states (nnws) that they, too,
and President Obama then dramatical- will need nuclear weapons in the future
ly reaf½rmed “clearly and with convic- to meet their national security require-
tion America’s commitment to seek ments. Other disarmament advocates
the peace and security of a world with- stress the growth of global terrorism
out nuclear weapons” in his speech in and the need to reduce the number of
Prague. weapons and the amount of ½ssile mate-
There is a simple explanation for these rial that could be stolen or sold to terror-
statements supporting nuclear disarma- ist groups. Some argue that the risk of
nuclear weapons accidents or launch-
© 2009 by Scott D. Sagan ing nuclear missiles on false warning

Dædalus Fall 2009 157

Scott D. cannot be entirely eliminated, despite Some critics of disarmament falsely
Sagan sustained efforts to do so, and thus be- complain about nonexistent proposals
on the
global lieve that nuclear deterrence will inev- for U.S. unilateral disarmament. Frank
nuclear itably fail over time, especially if large Gaffney, for example, asserts that there
future
arsenals are maintained and new nu- has been “a 17-year-long unilateral U.S.
clear states, with weak command- nuclear freeze” and claims that Presi-
and-control systems, emerge. dent Obama “stands to transform the
Perhaps the most widespread moti- ‘world’s only superpower’ into a nucle-
vation for disarmament is the belief ar impotent.”3 More serious critics fo-
that future progress by the nws to cus on those problems–the growth
disarm will strongly influence the fu- and potential breakout of latent nws,
ture willingness of the nnws to stay the future of extended deterrence, the
within the npt. If this is true, then enforcement of disarmament, and the

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the choice we face for the future is not potential instability of small numbers–
between the current nuclear order of that concern mutual nuclear disarma-
eight or nine nws and a nuclear-weap- ment. These legitimate concerns must
ons-free world. Rather, the choice we be addressed in a credible manner if
face is between moving toward a nu- signi½cant progress is to be made to-
clear-weapons-free world or, to bor- ward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-
row Henry Rowen’s phrase, “moving free world.
toward life in a nuclear armed crowd.”2 To address these problems adequate-
There are, of course, many critics of ly, the current nuclear disarmament ef-
the nuclear disarmament vision. Some fort must be transformed from a debate
critics focus on the problems of how among leaders in the nws to a coordi-
to prevent nuclear weapons “breakout” nated global effort of shared responsi-
scenarios in a future world in which bilities between nws and nnws. This
many more countries are “latent” nws essay outlines a new conceptual frame-
because of the spread of uranium en- work that is needed to encourage nws
richment and plutonium reprocessing and nnws to share responsibilities for
capabilities to meet the global demand designing a future nuclear-fuel-cycle re-
for fuel for nuclear power reactors. gime, rethinking extended deterrence,
Others have expressed fears that deep and addressing nuclear breakout dan-
nuclear arms reductions will inadver- gers while simultaneously contributing
tently lead to nuclear proliferation by to the eventual elimination of nuclear
encouraging U.S. allies currently liv- weapons.
ing under “the U.S. nuclear umbrella”
of extended deterrence to pursue their
own nuclear weapons for national se-
The npt is often described as a grand
bargain between nws and nnws. The
curity reasons. Other critics worry nnws, it is said, agreed not to acquire
about the “instability of small num- nuclear weapons in exchange for the
bers” problem, fearing that conven- “inalienable right,” under Article IV of
tional wars would break out in a nu- the Treaty, to acquire civilian nuclear
clear disarmed world, and that this power technology under international
risks a rapid nuclear rearmament race nonproliferation safeguards and the
by former nws that would lead to nu- promise by the nws, under Article VI
clear ½rst use and victory by the more of the Treaty, to work in good faith to
prepared government. eliminate eventually all of their nuclear

158 Dædalus Fall 2009

weapons. Wolfgang Panofsky, for exam- of all the Parties to the Treaty to devel- Shared
ple, argued: op research, production and use of nu- responsi-
bilities for
clear energy for peaceful purposes with- nuclear
Non-nuclear Weapons States were en-
out discrimination and in conformity disarma-
joined from acquiring nuclear weapons ment
with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”
and Nuclear Weapons States were forbid-
The expected global expansion of nu-
den to transfer nuclear weapons and the
clear power, however, will lead to in-
wherewithal to make them to an nnws.
creasing demand for enriched uranium
To compensate for this obvious discrim-
and reprocessed plutonium around the
inatory division of the world’s nations,
globe; a crucial question for future se-
nnws were assured that they had an
curity therefore is whether the spread
“inalienable right” to the peaceful appli-
of nuclear power will lead to the spread
cation of nuclear energy, and the nws
of enrichment and plutonium fuel-pro-

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obligated themselves in Article VI of
duction facilities. Mohamed ElBaradei
the treaty to work in good faith toward
has been particularly forceful in warn-
nuclear disarmament.4
ing of the security risks inherent in
In his 2009 Prague speech, President such a world of multiple “virtual nucle-
Obama similarly maintained that “the ar weapons states,” arguing for “a new
basic bargain is sound: Countries with international or multinational approach
nuclear weapons will move towards dis- to the fuel cycle so as to avoid ending up
armament, countries without nuclear with not just nine nuclear weapon States
weapons will not acquire them, and all but another 20 or 30 States which have
countries can access peaceful nuclear the capacity to develop nuclear weapons
energy.” in a very short span of time.”5 George
These statements correctly highlight Perkovich and James Acton agree, not-
the important linkage between nuclear ing that the nws are unlikely to take
disarmament and nuclear nonprolifera- the ½nal steps toward complete disar-
tion. But framing the linkage in this way mament if there are many states that
–with nws seen as responsible for dis- could quickly get nuclear weapons ma-
armament and nnws responsible for terial from their own national urani-
accepting nonproliferation safeguards um or plutonium production facilities.
on their nuclear power programs–is “If no acceptable form of regulation
historically inaccurate and politically can be established for the proliferation-
unfortunate. It is historically inaccurate sensitive activities that many states
because both Article IV and Article VI which today promote disarmament
were written to apply to both the nws are seeking to conduct,” they argue,
and the nnws. This common descrip- “the abolition of nuclear weapons
tion of the Treaty is unfortunate because may not prove possible.”6
it limits the prospects for crafting a more Many proposals exist for different
comprehensive and more equitable im- forms of multinational fuel-cycle facil-
plementation of the basic npt bargains, ities (plants owned and operated by
based on shared responsibilities be- multiple states) or international facili-
tween nws and nnws, in the future. ties (plants owned and operated by an
international organization). Govern-
A rticle IV of the npt simply states, ments of many nnws, however, as well
as some nuclear technology exporters,
“Nothing in this Treaty shall be inter-
preted as affecting the inalienable right argue that creating any constraints

Dædalus Fall 2009 159

Scott D. on the national production of nuclear facilities. Indeed, such an agreement in
Sagan fuels would violate the “inalienable principle, with an exception for facilities
on the
global right” mentioned in Article IV. As Al- with “direct national security signi½-
nuclear bert Wohlstetter once noted, it is as if cance,” was in fact made by President
future
some diplomats believe that all states Lyndon Johnson in 1967, as a major com-
have “a new natural right to Life, Lib- promise during the npt negotiations.9
erty, and the Pursuit of Plutonium.”7 Reaf½rming this commitment, as a re-
Three important points about Arti- sponsibility under Article IV, should be
cle IV become clearer if one probes a lit- easy to accept in principle; after all, if
tle more deeply. First, this “inalienable nws are committed to working in good
right” is in reality a conditional right, faith toward nuclear disarmament, at
dependent upon the state in question some point they would become, to coin
being “in conformity” with Articles I an acronym, fnws (former nuclear-

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and II of the npt. It is too often forgot- weapons states), and the safeguard ex-
ten in the debate over the Iranian nu- ceptions they currently maintain would
clear program, for example, that a state no longer apply.
that is not behaving “in conformity” In practice, it would be helpful for
with its Article II commitment “not nws to go beyond reaf½rmations and
to seek or receive any assistance in the expressions of principle and pick one
manufacture of nuclear weapons” has or more model facilities to place under
at least temporarily sacri½ced its rights advanced safeguards, to demonstrate
to acquire civilian nuclear technology future intentions and help create best
under Article IV. The Board of Gover- practices. Strict safeguards on existing
nors of the International Atomic Energy nuclear-fuel production facilities in
Agency (iaea) decides whether or not the nws are not really necessary today
a state is in compliance with its speci½c to ensure that the materials from the
safeguards commitments. But the iaea plants are not diverted for nuclear
does not determine the appropriate re- weapons, since nws already have suf-
sponse to a safeguards violation that is ½cient ½ssile materials from their mili-
not remedied in a timely fashion; in- tary nuclear production programs. But
stead, it reports any such case of non- placing new facilities under iaea safe-
compliance to the un Security Council guards would signal equitable treat-
and the General Assembly–as it did in ment and a long-term commitment to
2004 with respect to Libya and in 2006 disarmament. Similar safeguards will
with respect to Iran–and then the Se- also be needed if a Fissile Material Cut-
curity Council must decide on appro- off Treaty (fmct), ending the produc-
priate responses.8 tion of materials for weapons, is suc-
Second, Article IV refers to “all the cessfully negotiated, though in this case
Parties to the Treaty,” not just the nnws. the veri½cation and safeguarding func-
This should lead to increased opportu- tions would be best handled (at least ini-
nities to share responsibility for nonpro- tially) by a new organization of inspec-
liferation and disarmament, for it sug- tors from nws, rather than the iaea, so
gests that as part of their Article IV com- as to limit access into sensitive former
mitment, the nws should reaf½rm that weapons-material production facilities.
international safeguards can eventually Third, responsibilities for sharing the
be placed on all of their nuclear power ½nancial support of iaea international
plants and enrichment and reprocessing safeguards can be improved. Today, each

160 Dædalus Fall 2009

iaea member state pays into a regular their disarmament commitments, and Shared
budget of the Agency, from which the the May 2009 npt Preparatory Com- responsi-
bilities for
Safeguards Division draws funds for its mittee meeting was not unusual in that nuclear
inspection programs; but the Agency regard. The nnws complaints are not disarma-
without some merit, for the recent Bush ment
is strapped for funds to deal with the
current level of inspections, and will administration did not follow through
be much more so if nuclear power con- on some of the disarmament-related
tinues to expand as expected and if the commitments (most speci½cally, seek-
more intrusive regime required by the ing rati½cation of the Comprehensive
Agreed Protocol, which calls for ad- Test Ban Treaty) that previous admin-
vanced inspections, comes into force. istrations had made at npt review con-
One approach that has been advocated ferences.11 In addition, some former
is to have states pay more into the iaea U.S. government of½cials have unhelp-

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safeguards budget in proportion to the fully claimed that the United States
number and kinds of facilities they have never really intended to keep its Article
on their soil that are subject to inspec- VI commitments. Former cia Director
tion. This approach, however, places the John Deutch, for example, asserted in
½nancial burden only on the state that Foreign Affairs in 2005 that Washington
bene½ts from the nuclear power plant or was “unwise” “to commit under Article
fuel facility in question and ignores that 6 of the Nonproliferation Treaty [npt]
the nonproliferation bene½ts of the safe- ‘to pursue good-faith negotiations’ to-
guards are shared by all states. A better ward complete disarmament, a goal it
approach would be to have all govern- has no intention of pursuing.”12 The
ments–both nws and nnws, and both Bush administration’s 2001 U.S. Nu-
states with nuclear power programs and clear Posture Review was also widely
those without nuclear power–substan- interpreted to signal movement away
tially increase their funding support from the npt commitment to nuclear
for the iaea, to enhance its future safe- disarmament because the document
guards capabilities. Indeed, it would be declared that U.S. nuclear weapons
possible to have private industry and “possess unique capabilities . . . to hold
even philanthropic organizations inter- at risk targets [that are] important to
ested in promoting more safe and secure achieve strategic and political objec-
use of nuclear power also contribute to tives”; it called for the development of
the iaea safeguards budget.10 new nuclear warheads; and it outlined
a strategy of “dissuasion,” the policy of
A rticle VI of the npt states in full, maintaining such a large advantage in
military forces, including nuclear, that
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty un-
dertakes to pursue negotiations in good other states would be dissuaded from
faith on effective measures relating to even considering entering into a mili-
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an tary arms competition with the United
early date and to nuclear disarmament, States.
and on a treaty on general and complete Many diplomats and scholars have
disarmament under strict and effective spoken about the speci½c arms-con-
international control.” Many diplomats trol and disarmament steps the Unit-
from nnws have complained at virtual- ed States and other nws could take
ly every npt review conference that the to demonstrate that they are pursuing
nws have not done enough to meet their Article VI commitments more se-

Dædalus Fall 2009 161

Scott D. riously. Missing from this debate is a and a collective responsibility to make
Sagan discussion of what the nnws can do to sure that constraints are placed on sen-
on the
global help in the disarmament process. Look- sitive fuel-cycle facilities. In short, the
nuclear ing at shared responsibilities points to nnws should recognize that entering
future
two speci½c ways in which the nnws into negotiations about international
can better honor their Article VI com- control of the nuclear fuel cycle is an
mitments. essential part of their Article VI commit-
First, just as nws and nnws should ment “to pursue negotiations in good
share responsibilities for funding the in- faith on effective measures relating to
creasingly advanced international safe- cessation of the nuclear arms race.”
guards necessary for nuclear power facil-
ities, the nws and nnws should both
contribute signi½cantly to funding the
A third common criticism of the dis-
armament goal is that nuclear force re-

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necessary major research and develop- ductions might back½re, inadvertently
ment effort for improved monitoring encouraging nuclear proliferation, by
and veri½cation technologies that will undercutting U.S. extended deterrent
be needed if nuclear disarmament is to commitments. In September 2008, for
progress to very low numbers of weap- example, Secretary of Energy Samuel
ons. In October 2008, the British gov- Bodman and Secretary of Defense Rob-
ernment invited the governments of the ert Gates declared that “the United
other npt-recognized nuclear states– States will need to maintain a nuclear
the United States, Russia, France, and force . . . for the foreseeable future,” bas-
China–to participate in a major tech- ing this position in part on the need to
nical conference examining future veri- protect U.S. non-nuclear allies:
½cation challenges and opportunities.
The role nuclear forces play in the deter-
Even more importantly, the British gov-
rence of attack against allies remains an
ernment recognized that R&D for dis-
essential instrument of U.S. nonprolifera-
armament veri½cation must not occur
tion policy by signi½cantly reducing the
in “splendid isolation,” and so jointly
incentives for a number of allied countries
sponsored test programs with the Nor-
to acquire nuclear weapons for their own.
wegian government laboratories to iden-
. . . In the absence of this “nuclear umbrel-
tify promising technologies that would
la,” some non-nuclear allies might per-
permit Norway and other nnws to be
ceive a need to develop and deploy their
more directly involved in implement-
own nuclear capability.14
ing and monitoring future global nucle-
ar disarmament.13 The term “nuclear umbrella,” how-
Second, focusing on shared respon- ever, should be deleted from the strate-
sibilities helps identify a more direct gic lexicon used by government of½cials
and stronger linkage between Article VI and scholars alike. It connotes a defen-
and Article IV of the npt. Because nws sive, passive strategy–as if Japan, South
will be less likely to accept deep reduc- Korea, and nato countries were pro-
tions to zero (or close to zero) if there tected by some kind of missile defense
are more and more states with latent shield–rather than the threat of retal-
nuclear-weapons capability because of iation with nuclear weapons against a
the spread of uranium enrichment and state that attacks a U.S. ally. Even more
plutonium reprocessing technologies, importantly, the nuclear umbrella term
nnws have both an individual interest does not differentiate between two very

162 Dædalus Fall 2009

different kinds of extended deterrence a commitment to isolate and overthrow Shared
policies: a U.S. commitment to use nu- any leader who uses outlawed chemical responsi-
bilities for
clear weapons ½rst, if necessary, to de- or biological weapons. Finally, limiting nuclear
fend an ally if it is attacked by an ene- the role of U.S. nuclear weapons to de- disarma-
my who uses conventional forces, bio- terrence of other states’ use of nuclear ment
logical or chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons would signal strong support
weapons; and a more tailored U.S. com- for the eventual elimination of all nu-
mitment to use U.S. nuclear weapons in clear weapons, for if such a no-½rst-use
retaliation against only a nuclear attack nuclear doctrine became universally ac-
on an ally. The ½rst form of extended de- cepted, the existing nws could more
terrence was the U.S. Cold War policy easily coordinate moving in tandem to
in nato and in East Asia and remains lower and equal levels of nuclear weap-
largely intact today despite the end of ons on the road to zero.

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the Cold War. Such a change in U.S. and other pow-
Adopting the second form of extend- ers’ nuclear doctrine will not be easily
ed deterrence–maintaining commit- accepted by all allies, nor will it be easy
ments to joint defense but limiting the to implement within military establish-
threat of nuclear weapons use to retal- ments. nato of½cial doctrine, for ex-
iation against nuclear attacks on allies– ample, which has not been revised since
would not necessarily lead to the nucle- 1999, continues to assert (though it does
ar proliferation cascade that Gates and not prove) that nuclear weapons remain
Bodman seem to fear. Indeed, a more critical for a variety of threat scenarios:
targeted U.S. nuclear guarantee, if im- “[T]he Alliance’s conventional forces
plemented properly after alliance con- alone cannot ensure credible deterrence.
sultation, could have a number of pos- Nuclear weapons make a unique contri-
itive strategic effects. First, such a bution in rendering the risks of aggres-
change might be welcomed by those sion against the Alliance incalculable
allies who continue to value allied con- and unacceptable. Thus, they remain
ventional military commitments, but essential to preserve peace.”15 Interest
feel that ½rst-use nuclear threats en- in maintaining an expansive form of
courage nuclear proliferation elsewhere extended deterrence remains strong in
in the world. A more targeted nuclear East Asia as well. Ambassador Yukio
guarantee would also make U.S. nucle- Satoh, for example, correctly notes
ar weapons doctrine consistent with that the Japanese government’s of½cial
Negative Security Assurances (nsas)– “Defense Program Outline” states only
commitments not to use nuclear weap- that “to protect its territory and people
ons against nnws–which all ½ve npt- against the threat of nuclear weapons,
recognized nws have made at past npt Japan will continue to rely on the U.S.
review conferences and at the un Secu- nuclear deterrent”; but Satoh has also
rity Council in 1995. In addition, aban- recommended that the United States
doning U.S. threats to use nuclear weap- should now threaten to retaliate with
ons in response to another state using nuclear weapons if North Korea uses
chemical or biological weapons against chemical or biological weapons in any
the United States or our allies could future conflict.16
be followed by more credible deterrent The major responsibility for reduc-
threats to respond with devastating con- ing the roles and missions that nuclear
ventional military retaliation, and with weapons play in the doctrines of the

Dædalus Fall 2009 163

Scott D. nuclear powers clearly falls on the gov- global strategic context is different,
Sagan ernments of those nations. President Henry Kissinger alluded to a similar
on the
global Obama called for precisely such doctri- dynamic when he admonished the
nuclear nal change in his 2009 Prague speech, nato alliance back in 1979:
future
promising that “to put an end to Cold
We must face the fact that it is absurd
War thinking, we will reduce the role
to base the strategy of the West on the
of nuclear weapons in our national se-
credibility of the threat of mutual sui-
curity strategy.” This will require that
cide. . . . Don’t you Europeans keep ask-
U.S. politicians and military of½cers
ing us to multiply assurances that we
stop leaning on the crutch of nuclear
cannot possibly mean; and that if we
weapons to shore up deterrence, even
mean them, we should not want to ex-
in situations in which the credibility
ecute; and that if we execute, we’ll de-
of such threats is vanishingly thin. Dur-

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stroy civilization. That is our strate-
ing the 2008 U.S. election primary cam-
gic dilemma, into which we have built
paign, for example, Senators Hillary
ourselves by our own theory and by
Clinton and Christopher Dodd both
the encouragement of our allies.19
criticized then Senator Obama for say-
ing that he would not consider using Second, it would be helpful if the
U.S. nuclear weapons to attack al Qae- nnws that are not members of U.S.
da targets inside Pakistan (a U.S. ally), alliances would spend as much time
arguing, in Clinton’s words, “I don’t condemning states that are caught vio-
believe that any president should make lating their commitments not to devel-
any blanket statements with respect op chemical or biological weapons as
to the use or non use of nuclear weap- they do complaining that the nsas of-
ons.”17 In May 2009, General Kevin fered at the npt review conferences
Chilton, the commander of the U.S. should be legally binding. Finally, those
Strategic Command, took the “all op- U.S. allies that remain concerned about
tions are on the table” argument to a conventional or chemical and biological
new level, threatening U.S. nuclear re- threats to their national security should,
taliation in response to cyber attacks: as part of their Article VI disarmament
“I think you don’t take any response commitment, help to develop the con-
options off the table from an attack on ventional forces and defensive systems
the United States of America. . . . And I that could wean themselves away from
don’t see any reason to treat cyber any excessive reliance on U.S. nuclear weap-
differently. I mean, why would we tie ons for extended deterrence.20
the president’s hands?”18
While the United States and other
nws should take the ½rst steps to reduce
The ½nal argument against nuclear dis-
armament concerns breakout scenarios
their reliance on nuclear weapons, there and the challenge of enforcement. Har-
is much that nnws can do to encourage old Brown and John Deutch, for exam-
and enable new nuclear doctrines to be ple, have argued that “[p]roliferating
adopted, in the spirit of shared responsi- states, even if they abandoned these de-
bilities for nuclear disarmament. First, vices under resolute international pres-
nnws that are members of U.S. allian- sure, would still be able to clandestinely
ces can stop asking to be reassured about retain a few of their existing weapons–
noncredible military options. This is not or maintain a standby, break-out capa-
a new problem. Indeed, although the bility to acquire a few weapons quick-

164 Dædalus Fall 2009

ly, if needed.”21 The breakout problem, the iaea and in the un Security Council Shared
however, applies to both new potential to create stronger resolutions condemn- responsi-
bilities for
proliferators and former nws that have ing these violations and imposing sanc- nuclear
disarmed in a nuclear-free world. Thom- tions on the violators. Such a display of disarma-
as Schelling and Charles Glaser have shared responsibilities would both help ment
made similar arguments about “the in- resolve these proliferation crises and set
stability of small numbers,” fearing nu- better precedents for future challenges.
clear use would be more likely at the ½- Second, the nnws and nws need to
nal stages of disarmament or after nucle- work together more effectively to reduce
ar disarmament occurs, because states the risks of nuclear weapons breakout
would engage in arms races to get nucle- in the future. To help deter withdrawal
ar weapons in any subsequent crisis and from the npt, the un Security Council
the winner in any such arms race would could adopt a binding resolution stating

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use its nuclear weapons with less fear of that it would consider any case in which
nuclear retaliation.22 a state withdraws from the npt, after
These are legitimate concerns, and being found to be in noncompliance
addressing the challenges of veri½ca- with its safeguards agreements, to con-
tion and enforcement of disarmament stitute a threat to international peace
should be a high priority for future dis- and security under the un charter. The
armament efforts. How can a vision of Nuclear Suppliers Group and the iaea
shared responsibility between the nws could also discourage future withdraw-
and nnws help address these vexing als from the npt by making all future
problems? First, nws and nnws sales of sensitive nuclear facilities sub-
should work together to punish the vio- ject to safeguards agreements that do
lators of currently existing nonprolifer- not lapse if a state withdraws from the
ation agreements. North Korea violated npt and including a “return to sender”
its npt commitments by secretly tak- clause in which the recipient state would
ing nuclear material out of the Yongby- be required to close down the facilities
on reactor complex in the 1990s and by and return the sensitive technology and
covertly starting a uranium enrichment nuclear materials to the country of ori-
program with the assistance of Pakistan. gin as soon as possible.23
Iran similarly was caught in violation of It is often forgotten, however, that
its npt safeguards agreement in 2002, there is a logical link between Article
when the covert Natanz enrichment fa- VI and Article X of the npt. It will be
cility was discovered and evidence of dif½cult for the existing nws to take
nuclear weapons-related research was the ½nal steps of nuclear disarmament
later released by the U.S. intelligence without more con½dence that nnws
community. Finally, Syria was caught will not withdraw from the Treaty in
violating its npt commitments in 2007, the future. It will also be dif½cult for
when Israeli intelligence discovered a the nnws to accept constraints on their
covert nuclear reactor under construc- Article X rights without more con½-
tion. More consistent pressure by all dence that the existing nuclear powers
½ve permanent members of the un Se- will actually implement disarmament
curity Council (the P5 are the United in ways that are dif½cult for them to re-
States, Russia, China, France, and the verse. At future npt review conferences,
United Kingdom) should be matched by the nws and nnws should therefore
more uniform support by the nnws at address how best to promote increased

Dædalus Fall 2009 165

Scott D. veri½cation and transparency and to re- ing from any disarmament agreement.
Sagan duce incentives for npt withdrawal and The possibility of rearmament, however,
on the
global disarmament reversal as part of their is both a potential problem for stability,
nuclear joint responsibilities to work in good if a conventional war or deep crisis oc-
future
faith toward a nuclear-free world. curs between two latent nuclear states,
Efforts to prevent cheating on npt and a potential source of stability, for
commitments or future disarmament each latent nuclear state will know that
agreements may fail, of course, and if it rushes to rearm, others may do so
stronger enforcement mechanisms as well. “Irreversibility” is often cited
therefore need to be considered. There as a key objective in any nuclear disar-
are, fortunately, strong logical reasons mament agreement (for example, this
to be optimistic about the prospects for goal was cited in the 13 Practical Steps
enforcement in a nuclear-free world: in agreed to at the 2000 npt Review Con-

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such a world, the major powers, which ference). Yet in a world without nucle-
would include both traditional nnws ar weapons, the former nws would be
and new former nws, would take viola- “more latent” than others who did not
tions more seriously because small-scale have their technological expertise or op-
cheating would pose an even greater risk erational experience, and an objective
to their security than is the case now. in the ½nal negotiations in the global
Today, the existence of large arsenals in disarmament process must be to create
the United States and Russia, and argu- stronger veri½cation and monitoring
ably in other nws as well, encourages capabilities to provide con½dence that
some leaders to be complacent about one state could not start the rearma-
the spread of nuclear weapons to new ment process without others observ-
nations. Faith in the strength of nuclear ing such actions. Nuclear deterrence
deterrence leads some policy-makers would still exist in a nuclear-weapons-
to believe that North Korea or Iran, for free world, but it would be of a much
example, will be deterred from ever more recessed and latent form than
using their nuclear weapons if the cur- exists today.
rent negotiations fail. In a nuclear-free Some are pessimistic about the pros-
world, however, such deterrence opti- pects for latent nuclear deterrence, be-
mism would be far less likely, and all lieving that it is inherently less stable
major powers would share deeper than the current form of active nuclear
fears of the emergence of new nuclear deterrence. Sir Michael Quinlan, for
states.24 The temptation for buck-pass- example, argued that “it is sometimes
ing would remain, but the faith that nu- suggested that the very fact of this re-
clear deterrence would constrain a vio- constitution risk would serve as a deter-
lator would not, and new institutional rent to war–weaponless deterrence, it
arrangements for coordinating decision- has been called, a sort of deterrence at
making on sanctions and conventional one remove. But that implies a world-
military operations, perhaps through wide and long-sighted wisdom on
the un Security Council, could help which it would surely be imprudent
produce more effective enforcement to count.”25 Quinlan was certainly cor-
of nonproliferation and disarmament. rect to remain skeptical about the de-
Finally, it should be noted that in a gree we can ensure that “worldwide
nuclear-weapons-free world, former and long-sighted wisdom” will exist
nws will retain the option of withdraw- in the future world without nuclear

166 Dædalus Fall 2009

weapons. But surely the same argu- is therefore by no means clear that the Shared
ment holds true, and in spades, for nws will be able to overcome these responsi-
bilities for
a future world with many states hold- challenges to achieve the goal of com- nuclear
ing nuclear arsenals. We cannot design plete nuclear disarmament. What is disarma-
an international system in which wis- clear, though, is that the existing nws ment
dom and prudence are guaranteed. cannot reach the summit of a nuclear-
A nuclear-free world would, however, free world without the active partner-
reduce the consequences of individu- ship of the current nnws. The nws
al failures of wisdom and prudence. and nnws have a shared responsibil-
ity for nuclear disarmament in the fu-
The technical and political challenges ture, and will share a common fate if
they fail to cooperate more effectively.
that confront proponents of nuclear dis-
armament are complex and serious. It

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ENDNOTES
1 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, and “Toward a Nuclear-Free
World,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008; Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David
Owen, and George Robinson, “Stop Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb,” The Times
(London), June 30, 2008; Alexander Kwasnewski, Tadeusz Mazowieki, and Lech Walesa,
“The Vanishing Bomb,” The Moscow Times, April 7, 2009; Helmut Schmidt, Richard von
Weizsacher, Egon Bahr, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World:
A German View,” International Herald Tribune, January 9, 2009; Massimo D’Alema, Gian-
franco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi, and Francesco Calogero, “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons,” Corriere Della Sera, July 24, 2008; Malcolm Fraser, Gustav Nossal,
Barry Jones, Peter Gration, John Sanderson, and Tilman Ruff, “Imagine There’s No
Bomb,” The Age, April 8, 2009.
2 See Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas A. Brown, Gregory Jones, David McGarvey, Henry
Rowen, Vincent Taylor, and Roberta Wohlstetter, “Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear
Armed Crowd?” Report for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 22, 1976;
http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=19751204-AW
-EtAl-MovingTowardsLifeNuclearArmedCrowd&PDFFolder=Essays.
3 Frank Gaffney, Jr., “Peace Through Weakness,” February 16, 2009; http://www.center
forsecuritypolicy.org/p17891.xml?cat_id=120.
4 Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, “The Nonproliferation Regime under Siege,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (August 5, 2007); http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/
the-nonproliferation-regime-under-siege.
5 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Addressing Veri½cation Challenges,” Statements of the Director
General: Symposium on International Safeguards, October 16, 2006; http://www.iaea
.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n018.html.
6 George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Adelphi Paper
396 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 93.
7 Albert Wohlstetter, “Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules,” Foreign
Policy (Winter 1976/1977).
8 Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance,” Survival 51 (1) (2009):
143–164.

Dædalus Fall 2009 167

Scott D. 9 See George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
Sagan 1992), 101.
on the 10 For creative ideas on increasing the size and diversity of iaea contributions, see Thomas
global
nuclear Shea, “Financing iaea Veri½cation of the npt,” November 2006; http://www.npec-web
future .org/Essays/20061113-Shea-FinancingIAEAVeri½cation.pdf.
11 For differing views on this, see Christopher A. Ford, “Debating Disarmament: Interpret-
ing Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonprolif-
eration Review 14 (3) (2007): 402–428, and Scott D. Sagan, “Good Faith and Nuclear Disar-
mament Negotiations,” in Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. George Perkovich and
James M. Acton (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009),
203–212.
12 John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” Foreign Affairs (January–February 2005): 51.
13 Des Brown, “Laying the Foundation for Multilateral Disarmament,” February 5, 2008;

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http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/1session/Feb5UKDefSec
DesBrown.pdf.
14 Samuel W. Bodman and Robert M. Gates, “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in
the 21st Century,” September 2008; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/nuclearweapons
policy.pdf.
15 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (nato, April 1999); http://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
16 See “Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?” Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace Conference, April 6, 2009; transcript available at http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1299.
17 Reuters, “Obama, Clinton in New Flap over Nuclear Weapons,” August 2, 2007; http://
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N02381100.htm.
18 Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. General Reserves Right to Use Force, Even Nuclear, in
Response to Cyber Attack,” Global Security Newswire, May 12, 2009; http://gsn
.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090512_4977.php.
19 “Kissinger on nato,” Time, September 17, 1979; http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,920653,00.html.
20 George Perkovich, “Extended Deterrence,” Draft Paper Prepared for the Evans-
Kawaguchi Commission, May 2009.
21 Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” The Wall Street
Journal, November 19, 2007.
22 See Thomas C. Schelling’s essay in this issue of Dædalus, as well as Schelling, “The Role
of Deterrence in Total Disarmament,” Foreign Affairs (April 1962). See also, Charles Glaser,
“The Instability of Small Numbers Revisited,” in Rebuilding the npt Consensus, ed. Michael
May (Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2008); http://
iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22218/RebuildNPTConsensus.pdf.
23 See Pierre Goldschmidt, “Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime,” Non-
proliferation Program Paper 100 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, April 2009).
24 This argument was ½rst made by Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disar-
mament,” Survival 40 (1) (Spring 1998).
25 Michael Quinlan, “Abolishing Nuclear Armouries: Policy or Pipedream?” Survival 49 (2)
(Winter 2007–2008): 12.

168 Dædalus Fall 2009