THE RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS

There are certain general principles of interpretation which has been applied by the
courts from time to time. And one of them viz. Construction Ejusdem Generis has
been explained herein below. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the
same kind," it is used to interpret loosely written statutes. Where a law lists specific
classes of persons or things and then refers to them in general, the general
statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.
Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other
motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of
land-based transportation. The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of
a similar class

CONSTRUCTION EJUSDEM GENERIS

According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem
Generis is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. It is a canon
of statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of
the same general class as those enumerated.

The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words
should be given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires
otherwise. But when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the
general word may be given a restricted meaning of the same category. The general
expression takes it's meaning from the preceding particular expressions because the
legislature by using the particular words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to
that effect. This principle is limited in its application to general word following less
general word only. If the specific words do not belong to a distinct genus, this rule is
inapplicable. Consequently, if a general word follows only one particular word, that
single particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and, therefore, Ejusdem
Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case. Exceptional stray instances are,
however, available where one word genus has been created by the courts and the
general word following such a genus given a restricted meaning. If the particular
words exhaust the whole genus, the general word following these particular words is
construed as embracing a larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a
universal application. If the context of legislation rules out the applicability of this
rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be
used in unrestricted sense, it would not have bothered to use particular words at all.

It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Rule, dating back to

Archbishop of Canterbury's Case in 1596, it provides that when general words follow
specific words in a statute, the general words are read to embrace only objects
similar to those objects of the specific words. The rule recognizes and gives effect to
both the specific and general words by using the class indicated by the specific words
to extend the scope of the statute with the general words to include additional terms
or objects within the class. In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is
important to keep in mind that it is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be
resolved by merely tying the issue to the procrustean bed of Ejusdem Generis. In
fact, there are several conditions that have been identified for the doctrine to apply,
but none more important than the identification of the class. There are five
conditions that have been identified:

 The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;

 The members of the enumeration suggest a class;
 The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
 A general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually following it; and
 There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a
broader meaning than the doctrine requires.

Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key to unlocking the true
value of the doctrine is to ensure that the identified class has some objective
relationship to the aim of the statute. In other words, the basis for determining,
which among various semantically correct definitions of the class should be given
effect is found in the purpose and subject of the statute as revealed in the legislative
intent.

In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, 1955 SCR (2) 303, the validity of the
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 was impugned. One of
the tenures was known as Bhomichar tenure and it was contended that its holders
were not jagirdars. It was held: We agree with the petitioners that a jagir can be
created only by a grant, and that if it is established that Bhomichara tenure is not
held under a grant, it cannot be classed as a jagir. We do not base this conclusion on
the ground put forward that the word 'Jagir' in Article 31-A of the Constitution
should be read Ejusdem Generis with 'other similar grants', because, the true scope
of the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' is that words of a general nature following specific
and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same
nature as those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede are
controlled by the general words which follow.

In Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State, 1957 AIR 521 , the petitioner was the widow of a
tenant of certain premises and she had vacated from such premises. Finding the
premises vacant, the respondent requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4)(a) of
the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, for the public purpose of housing a
government servant. One of the contentions of the petitioner was that under the
Explanation to the sub-section there would be deemed to be a vacancy when the
tenant 'ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction or
assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or
otherwise', and that the words 'or otherwise' should be construed as Ejusdem
Generis with the words immediately preceding them. It was held that the rule
Ejusdem Generis sought to be expressed in aid of the petitioner can possibly have no
application. The legislature, when it used the words 'or otherwise', apparently
intended to cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of the
preceding clauses, for example, a case where the tenant's occupation has ceased as a
result of trespass by a third party. The legislature intended to cover all possible cases
of vacancy occurring due to any reasons whatsoever. Hence, far from using those
words Ejusdem Generis with the preceding clauses of the explanation, the legislature
used those words in an all-inclusive sense. The rule of Ejusdem Generis is intended to
be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific
words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature
presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense that is to say, as belonging
to the same genus as the particular and specific words.

In Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona, AIR 1959 SC 586, the
respondent levied a tax of Rs. 2 per day as license fee on the appellants, who were
lessees of a cinema house. The levy was under Section 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay
District Municipal Act, 1901, which provides that the municipality could levy 'any
other tax to the nature and object of which the approval of the Governor shall have
been obtained'. It was contended that Section 59(1)(xi) is unconstitutional in that the
legislature had completely abdicated its-functions and delegated the power to the
municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed. The contention was
rejected by the Supreme Court and one of the reasons given for the decision is:
Although the rule of construction based on the principle of Ejusdem Generis cannot
be invoked in this case, for items (i) to (x) do not, strictly speaking, belong to the
same genus, they do indicate, to our mind, the kind and nature of tax which the
municipalities are authorized to impose.

In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, reported on 28 January, 2015, the respondent

issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the
acquisition of the appellant's land. The notification directed that action under Section
17(2)(c) of the Act shall be taken on the ground of urgency and that the provisions of
Section 5-A shall not apply in regard to the acquisition. The appellant contended that
though Section 17(2)(c) read by itself covers a very large field, that provision should
be given a narrower meaning because of the provisions of Section 17(2)(a) and (b). It
was held: The Ejusdem Generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a rule of
construction to aid the courts to find out the true intention of the legislature. If a
given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is
no occasion to call in aid that rule. Ejusdem Generis rule is explained in HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND thus: 'As a rule, where in a statute there are general words
following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things
of the same kind as those specified, although this, as a rule of construction, must be
applied with caution, and subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be
construed in accordance with the intention of Parliament. For the Ejusdem Generis
rule to apply, the specific words must constitute a category, class or genus, then only
things which belong to that category, class or genus fall within the general words'.

The Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker, 1980 AIR
65, has laid down the following five essential elements of this rule:

(1) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words;

(2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;

(3) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;

(4) the general terms follow the enumeration; and

(5) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. If the legislative purpose of a

statute is such that a statutory series should be read Ejusdem Generis, so be it, the
rule is helpful. But if not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfill the purpose
of the statute. The rule like many other rules of statutory interpretation is a useful
servant but a bad master.

In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, 1967 AIR 1857, the respondent
raised a question of his seniority in service and filed a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution praying that suitable directions may be given to the appellant Board.
The appellant contended that it was not 'State' as defined in Article 12 and that
therefore no direction could be given to it. The High Court rejected the appellant's
contention. In the Supreme Court the appellant relied on certain decisions46 in
which 'other authorities' in the Article were read Ejusdem Generis with 'State'.

However, dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held:

“In our opinion the High Court [in these cases] fell into an error in applying the
principle of Ejusdem Generis when interpreting the expression 'other authorities' in
Article 12 of the Constitution, as they overlooked the basic principle of interpretation
that, to invoke the application of Ejusdem Generis rule, there must be a distinct
genus or category running through the bodies already named. Craies summarizes the
principle as follows: 'The Ejusdem Generis rule is one to be applied with caution and
not pushed too far.. .. To invoke the application of the Ejusdem Generis rule there
must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different
objects of a widely differing character but to something, which can be called a class
or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the mention of a
single species does not constitute a genus'. Maxwell explained the principles by
saying, 'But the general word which follows particular and specific words of the same
nature as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to be restricted to the
same genus as those words . . .. Unless there is a genus or category, there is no room
for the application of the Ejusdem Generis doctrine.” Where the preceding words do
not belong to a distinct genus, the rule of Ejusdem Generis does not apply.
In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1965 AIR 1167, through the Fruit
Products Order, 1955, issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955,
it was made obligatory that the peonage of fruit juice in fruit syrup should be twenty-
five. The appellant argued that the order did not apply to its product Rooh Afza even
though it contained fruit juices because clause 2 (d) (v) of the Order includes
squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barrelled juice and ready-to-serve
beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp and that the
expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp should be
construed Ejusdem Generis. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and held
that the rule had no application here because the things mentioned before the
general expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did not
fall under a determinable genus. Further, the context makes it clear that all
beverages containing fruit juice are intended to be included.

In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India, 1989 AIR 1019,
the Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing,
printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing, which
precede the expression 'or any other process' in Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate processes which import a change of a lasting
character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or
otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must share one or the other of these
incidents. The expression is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in
its extended meaning and the expression 'unprocessed' in the exempting notification
draws its meaning from that context.

In Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1882,
interpretation of the words 'or other proceeding' in the phrase 'a claim of set off or
other proceeding to enforce a right arising from contract' appearing in . Section 69 of
the Partnership Act, 1932 was involved. The Supreme Court did not apply the
principle of Ejusdem Generis because the preceding words /a claim of set off did not
constitute a genus. The court also observed that interpretation Ejusdem Generis or
Noscitur a Sociis need not always be made when words showing particular classes
are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so interpreted there
must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the
general words can and are intended to be restricted.
In M. Kumar v/s Bharat Earth Movers Limited, ILR 1999 KAR 1715, the Supreme
court observed that to invoke the application of the Ejusdem Generis rule there must
be' a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different
objects of the widely different character but to something which can be called a class
or kind of object; where this is lacking, the rule will not apply and mention of single
specie will not constitute a genus.

Thus, EJUSDEM GENERIS is:-

(a) In an enumeration of different subjects in an Act, general words following specific

words may be construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and the
construction may be narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the
same kind as those previously mentioned, unless of course, there is something to
show that a wider sense was intended.

(b) If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the general- words are
construed as embracing a larger genus.

General words in a statute should be taken ordinarily in their usual sense. General
words, even when they follow specific words, should ordinarily be taken in their
general sense, unless a more reasonable interpretation requires them to be used in a
sense limited to things Ejusdem Generis with those specifically mentioned. If,
however, the particular words exhaust the whole genus, the general words must be
understood to refer to some larger genus.

The doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is only part of a wider principle of construction,

namely, that, where reasonably possible, some significance and meaning should be
attributed to each and every word and phrase in a written document. That being the
object of the doctrine, it is difficult to see what difference it can make whether the
word 'other' is or is not used, provided-and this is essential-that the examples which
have been given are referable to a clearly ascertainable genus

The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution, because, it implies a
departure from the natural meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a
supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be controlled by the
fundamental rule that statutes must be construed so as to carry out the object
sought to be accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all of one
genus, in which case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that
genus.