G.R. No. 191176. October 14, 2015.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT (DILG), petitioner, vs. RAUL V. GATUZ,
respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief;

Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of
declaratory relief.—Court orders or decisions cannot be the
subject matter of declaratory relief. They are not included within
the purview of the words “other written instrument.” The same
principle applies to

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. The

fundamental rationale for this is the principle of res judicata.
Parties are not permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once. Judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is
conclusive on the parties subject only to appellate authority. The
losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment
under the guise of an action for declaratory relief.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Non-Interference; Courts and
tribunals with the same or equal authority — even those exercising
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction — ­are not permitted to
interfere with each other’s respective cases, much less their orders
or judgments.—Another reason why judicial or quasi-judicial
orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory
relief is the doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference.
Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority — even
those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction — ­are not
permitted to interfere with each other’s respective cases, much
less their orders or judgments. This is an elementary principle of
higher importance essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Its observance is not required on the grounds of judicial
comity and courtesy alone; it is enforced to prevent unseemly,
expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of
processes.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 19.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Dela Cruz Law Office for respondent.

BRION,** J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari

challenging the 18 January 2010 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 808-M-

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** Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2222 dated

September 29, 2015.

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2009.1 The RTC permanently prohibited the Department of

the Interior and Local Government (DILG/the Department)
from implementing the Ombudsman’s decision in
Domingo v. Gatuz, OMB-L-A-08-0126-C2 and declared
void the October 22, 2009 DILG memorandum
implementing this decision.
In 2008, the respondent, Raul Gatuz, was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan.
On February 21, 2008, Felicitas L. Domingo filed an
administrative complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against the respondent for Abuse of Authority
and Dishonesty. The complaint was docketed as
Administrative Case No. OMB-L-A-08-0126-C.
In a decision dated November 17, 2008, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found the respondent guilty
of Dishonesty and imposed the penalty of three months
suspension without pay.3
On May 20, 2009, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
indorsed its decision to the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government for immediate implementation.
The Department received the indorsement on May 29,
2009.
On June 30, 2009, the respondent received a copy of the
Deputy Ombudsman’s decision. The respondent moved for
reconsideration on July 7, 2009.
The Department deferred the implementation of the
decision in view of the respondent’s pending motion for
reconsideration. The Department also inquired with the
Ombudsman

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1 Penned by the Presiding Judge Renato C. Francisco, Rollo, pp. 47-52.

2 Approved by the Hon. Deputy Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez on
December 8, 2008, id., at pp. 53­-63.
3 Pursuant to Section 10, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07 as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17 in relation to Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 6770.

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386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
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about the effect of this Court’s ruling in the then recent

case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.4 Samaniego
held that in administrative cases where the Ombudsman
imposes a penalty other than public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
equivalent to one-month salary, the filing of an appeal
stays the execution of the decision.
On July 10, 2009, the Ombudsman denied the
reconsideration prayed for.
On September 22, 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman
answered the Department’s inquiry and pointed out its
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 1, Series of 2006. The MC
states that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for review of the decisions, orders, or resolutions of
the Ombudsman does not stay its implementation unless a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of injunction is
in force.
On October 22, 2009, the Department issued a
memorandum5 addressed to the DILG Regional Director for
Region III, directing him to implement the respondent’s
suspension.
On November 17, 2009, the respondent filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief and Injunction with a Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC. The respondent asked the RTC
to explain his rights pending the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration and to restrain the Department from
implementing his suspension. The respondent argued that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
automatically stays the execution of the Ombudsman’s
decisions in administrative cases

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4 586 Phil. 497; 564 SCRA 567 (2008).

5 RE: Implementation of the Decision of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-08-0126-C, entitled: “Felicitas L.
Domingo v. Raul V. Gatuz, et al. (Barangay Officials of Barangay Tabang,
Plaridel, Bulacan).”

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pursuant to Samaniego and Lapid v. Court of Appeals.6

The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 808-M-2009.
On November 20, 2009, the RTC issued a TRO.
On December 15, 2009, the Department filed its answer
arguing that: (1) the Samaniego ruling only applies to
appeals, not motions for reconsideration; (2) Samaniego
had not yet attained finality because there was a pending
motion for reconsideration; (3) MC No. 1, Series of 2006 is
applicable in the case; and (4) the RTC had no jurisdiction
because the action was effectively against the decision of
the Ombudsman.
On January 18, 2010, the RTC issued the assailed
decision declaring the October 22, 2009 DILG
memorandum void; the court prohibited the respondent
from implementing the memorandum. The RTC relied on
Samaniego, and held that a motion for reconsideration is a
precursor to an appeal. It also brushed aside the objections
to the finality of Samaniego, but did not touch on the
objections to its jurisdiction.
On March 26, 2010, the Department filed the present
petition for review on certiorari of the RTC decision in
Civil Case No. 808-M-2009.
Meanwhile on June 15, 2010, the respondent filed a
Petition for Review of OMB-L-A-08-0126-C before the
Court of Appeals (CA).

The Petition

The Department argues: (1) that the RTC cannot issue

injunctive reliefs in an action for declaratory relief; (2) that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue what was effectively
an injunction against a decision of the Ombudsman; (3)
that Samaniego had not yet attained finality because of the
pending motion for reconsideration before this Court; and
(4) that

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6 390 Phil. 236; 334 SCRA 738 (2000).

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388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
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under MC No. 1, S. 2006, a motion for reconsideration does

not stay the execution of the Ombudsman’s decision.
In its comment, the respondent counters: (1) that the
RTC had jurisdiction over the case for declaratory relief
and injunction; (2) that the filing of an appeal or a motion
for reconsideration stays the execution of the
Ombudsman’s suspension Order pursuant to Lapid and
Samaniego; and (3) that the case has been rendered moot
because he has already appealed the Ombudsman case to
the Court of Appeals.

Our Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

The respondent cites the cases of Office of the
Ombudsman v. Hon. Ibay7 and Marquez v. Ombudsman
Desierto8 to support his argument that the RTC has
jurisdiction over actions for declaratory relief with
injunction against the Office of the Ombudsman.9 The
respondent maintains that the controversy concerns the
extent of the Department’s power to implement the
decision of the Ombudsman pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration in the light of this Court’s
rulings in Lapid and Samaniego. He posits that the
controversy was a proper subject of declaratory relief.
We disagree with the respondent as the facts of Marquez
and Ibay are considerably different from the present case.
Marquez and Ibay both involved Lourdes Marquez, a
bank manager, who was ordered by the Ombudsman to
produce bank documents in relation with certain bank
accounts under investigation. Faced with the dilemma of
violating the Bank Secrecy Law, on one hand, and the
threat of being cited in direct contempt by the Ombudsman
on the other, Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the RTC. In both

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7 416 Phil. 659; 364 SCRA 281 (2001).

8 412 Phil. 387; 359 SCRA 772 (2001).
9 Rollo, p. 176.

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cases, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action

for declaratory relief and injunction. However, our
rulings in Marquez and Ibay only related to the
investigatory power of the Ombudsman.
 As the respondent himself admits, the DILG
Memorandum subject of his petition for declaratory relief
was an implementation of the Ombudsman’s decision in
OMB-L-A-08-0126-C: the memorandum was in the nature
of a writ of execution. Therefore, the declaratory relief
action was essentially against a quasi-judicial action of the
Ombudsman — a subject matter beyond the RTC’s
declaratory relief jurisdiction.
Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of
declaratory relief.10 They are not included within the
purview of the words “other written instrument.”11 The
same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of
quasi-judicial bodies. The fundamental rationale for this is
the principle of res judicata.12 Parties are not permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once. Judgment rendered
by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the
parties subject only to appellate authority. The losing party
cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the
guise of an action for declaratory relief.
Another reason why judicial or quasi-judicial orders or
decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief
is the doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference.
Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority —
even those exercising concurrent and coordinate
jurisdiction — ­are not permitted to interfere with each
other’s respective cases,

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10 Reyes v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 137794, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 1, 15;
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 19; 391 SCRA 370,
384 (2002); Tanda v. Aldaya, 98 Phil. 244, 247 (1956).
11 Tanda v. Aldaya, id.
12 Id.

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390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
vs. Gatuz

much less their orders or judgments.13 This is an

elementary principle of higher importance essential to the
orderly administration of justice.14 Its observance is not
required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy
alone; it is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of processes.15
Where the decisions of certain administrative bodies are
appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative
bodies are coequal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms
of rank and stature; their actions are logically beyond the
control of the RTC, a coequal body.16 Notably, the decisions
of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are appealable to
the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.17 As a coequal body, the RTC has no jurisdiction
to interfere with or to restrain the execution of the
Ombudsman’s decisions in disciplinary cases.
Finally, we already reconsidered the 2008
Samaniego decision in our resolution dated October 5,
2010.18 We unani­mously held En Banc that the decisions of
the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are immediately
executory and cannot be

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13 Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. v. Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11,
2012, 669 SCRA 270, 281.
14 Republic v. Reyes, 239 Phil. 304, 316-317; 155 SCRA 313, 324
(1987); Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC of Legazpi City, Br. I, 229 Phil. 405,
414; 145 SCRA 408, 416 (1986).
15 Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC of Legazpi City, Br. I, id.
16 Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. v. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Misamis Oriental, Br. 40, Cagayan de Oro City, 543 Phil. 298, 311; 514
SCRA 326, 332 (2007); Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 274 Phil.
1156, 1191; 197 SCRA 853, 873 (1991); Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 344, 355; 171 SCRA 348, 360
(1989).
17 Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
September 15, 2003.
18 Ombudsman v. Samaniego, 646 Phil. 445; 632 SCRA 140 (2010).

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stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an

injunctive writ.19 This legal question has been settled
 with finality.
All things considered, the RTC clearly erred in taking
cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in
restraining the execution of the Ombudsman’s decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. We hereby
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19 in Civil Case
No. 808-M-2009.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta,*** Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ.,

concur.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are

raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not
among those within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 676
SCRA 579 [2012])

——o0o——

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19 Id., at p. 451; p. 145.

*** Designated as acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio
T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 2223 dated September 29, 2015.

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