Origin essentialism

PHIL UA-78 Metaphysics

Prof. Cian Dorr
22nd September 2024

1
De re modal claims
A distinction

De re modal claims are those which, intuitively speaking, concern the properties it is
necessary or possible for particular objects to have.
‘Benjamin Franklin could have been seven feet tall’ is a de re modal claim about
Franklin. ‘Bifocals could have been invented by someone seven feet tall’ isn’t.

2
A distinction

De re modal claims are those which, intuitively speaking, concern the properties it is
necessary or possible for particular objects to have.
‘Benjamin Franklin could have been seven feet tall’ is a de re modal claim about
Franklin. ‘Bifocals could have been invented by someone seven feet tall’ isn’t.
Formally, we can say that a modal sentence is de re on a certain reading if that reading
is logically equivalent to a sentence where an individual variable or pronoun occurs
nonredundantly within the scope of a modal operator like ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’.
▶ So, ‘The inventor of bifocals could have been seven feet tall’ is de re on the the >
could reading, which is equivalent to ‘For some object x, x is the inventor of
bifocals and x could have been seven feet tall’, but not on the could > the reading.
▶ Given Kripke’s view of names, ‘Franklin could have been 7 feet tall’ is
unambiguously equivalent to ‘Franklin is an object x such that x could have been
2
7 feet tall’, and thus unambiguously de re.
Some Kripkean questions about de re modality

▶ Could Queen Elizabeth II have originated from a different sperm and egg?
▶ Could Richard Nixon have been an inanimate object?
▶ Was the wooden lectern at which Kripke delivered N&N such that it could have
been made of ice from the River Thames?
▶ Could any wooden table that was originally formed from a certain hunk of wood
have, instead, been originally formed from a completely non-overlapping hunk of
wood?

3
Some Kripkean questions about de re modality

▶ Could Queen Elizabeth II have originated from a different sperm and egg?
▶ Could Richard Nixon have been an inanimate object?
▶ Was the wooden lectern at which Kripke delivered N&N such that it could have
been made of ice from the River Thames?
▶ Could any wooden table that was originally formed from a certain hunk of wood
have, instead, been originally formed from a completely non-overlapping hunk of
wood?

Kripke suggests, cautiously, that the right answer to all of these questions is no. But
it’s much more important to him that they are legitimate questions—appropriate
topics for philosophical debate.

3
Is there a special problem about de re modal claims?

Before Kripke, many philosophers (most famously, W. v. O. Quine) thought that there
was something wrong with de re modal sentences. Maybe they are meaningless. Or
maybe–more plausibly!–they are ambiguous in some distinctive way that other modal
sentences are not.

▶ ‘Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a property depends on the

way it’s described’ (N&N, p. 40)

4
Is there a special problem about de re modal claims?

Before Kripke, many philosophers (most famously, W. v. O. Quine) thought that there
was something wrong with de re modal sentences. Maybe they are meaningless. Or
maybe–more plausibly!–they are ambiguous in some distinctive way that other modal
sentences are not.

▶ ‘Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a property depends on the

way it’s described’ (N&N, p. 40)

Kripke rejects this. Once we stipulate that ‘could’ means metaphysical possibility, there
is no ambiguity in ‘a could be F’ (beyond whatever ambiguity there may be in ‘a’ and
‘F’).

4
De re attitude reports contrasted with de re modal sentences

The “special ambiguity” view has something to be said for it when it comes to
propositional attitude operators.
‘For some person x who works for the Daily Planet, Lois believes that x can fly’ does,
arguably, have both true and false readings, which it’s natural to disambiguate by
talking about ‘the way it’s described’.
▶ Maybe this is just a matter of the verb ‘believe’ having multiple interpretations:
but whatever the dimension of variability is, it is hard to detect any corresponding
variability in sentences like ‘Lois believes that there are people who can fly’.
Kripke’s rejection of the “special ambiguity” view for metaphysical modality goes hand
in hand with his rejection of the idea that modals (interpreted non-epistemically) are
sensitive to the differences between different ways of referring to the same
object/property/state of affairs in the way attitude reports seem to be.
5
Is the truth about de re modality boring?

A very different reason for not wanting to engage with Kripke’s questions would be
some radical view that spits out answers to all of them in one fell swoop, obviating
further debate. These come in two opposite sorts:
Hyper-Essentialism If object x has property F, then it is metaphysically necessary
that if x exists, x has F.

6
Is the truth about de re modality boring?

A very different reason for not wanting to engage with Kripke’s questions would be
some radical view that spits out answers to all of them in one fell swoop, obviating
further debate. These come in two opposite sorts:
Hyper-Essentialism If object x has property F, then it is metaphysically necessary
that if x exists, x has F.
Extreme Anti-Essentialism (first pass) If it is possible for there to be something
that has property F, then every object is such that it is possible for it to
have F.

6
Is the truth about de re modality boring?

A very different reason for not wanting to engage with Kripke’s questions would be
some radical view that spits out answers to all of them in one fell swoop, obviating
further debate. These come in two opposite sorts:
Hyper-Essentialism If object x has property F, then it is metaphysically necessary
that if x exists, x has F.
Extreme Anti-Essentialism (first pass) If it is possible for there to be something
that has property F, then every object is such that it is possible for it to
have F.
▶ The latter view is so extreme that it’s inconsistent: it’s possible (since actually
true) that there is something that is not identical to NYU, but by NI, the property
of not being identical to NYU is not one that NYU could have. Next class we will
discuss a somewhat less extreme view that avoids this problem but still has lots of
radical consequences (e.g., that Saul Kripke could have been a poached egg). 6
Is the truth about de re modality boring?

Hyper-Essentialism is so radical that it’s hard to know what to make of it: it

pervasively rejects beliefs that we all take for granted in everyday life.

▶ When we say ‘I could have missed the bus this morning’, we are not talking about
metaphysical modality: but since metaphysical modality is supposed to be broader
than these everyday interpretations of ‘could’, the truth of such remarks implies
the truth of the corresponding ascriptions of metaphysical possibility.

7
Is the truth about de re modality boring?

Hyper-Essentialism is so radical that it’s hard to know what to make of it: it

pervasively rejects beliefs that we all take for granted in everyday life.

▶ When we say ‘I could have missed the bus this morning’, we are not talking about
metaphysical modality: but since metaphysical modality is supposed to be broader
than these everyday interpretations of ‘could’, the truth of such remarks implies
the truth of the corresponding ascriptions of metaphysical possibility.

By contrast, since it’s unclear how often the topic of metaphysical possibility comes up
in everyday life, the radical claims characteristic of Extreme Anti-Essentialism (e.g.
that Kripke could have been a poached egg) are not in clear conflict with our
‘everyday’ beliefs. It’s more of a theoretical question.

7
Origin essentialism
The general challenge

Here’s Kripke explaining why he thinks Elizabeth couldn’t have been the biological
child of the Trumans:
» They might have had a child resembling her in many properties. Perhaps in some
possible world Mr. and Mrs. Truman even had a child who actually became the
Queen of England and was even passed off as the child of other parents. This still
would not be a situation in which this very woman whom we call ’Elizabeth II’
was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman, or so it seems to me.
There’s a sort of a challenge for those who think that Elizabeth could have been a
biological child of Mr and Mrs Truman: given that it’s not sufficient for Mr and Mrs
Truman to have a child that is named ‘Elizabeth’, becomes Queen (etc.), what
properties of any given child of Mr and Mrs Truman could explain that child’s being
Elizabeth?
8
The argument in footnote 56

Here’s closest Kripke gets to a honest-to-goodness argument for any essentialist claim:
» Let ‘B’ be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let ‘A’ name the piece of wood
from which it actually came. Let ‘C’ name another piece of wood. Then suppose
B were made from A, as in the actual world, but also another table D were
simultaneously made from C. (We assume that there is no relation between A and
C which makes the possibility of making a table from one dependent on the
possibility of making a table from the other.) Now in this situation B ̸= D ;
hence, even if D were made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would
not be B. (N&N p. 114)

9
The argument in footnote 56

Here’s closest Kripke gets to a honest-to-goodness argument for any essentialist claim:
» Let ‘B’ be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let ‘A’ name the piece of wood
from which it actually came. Let ‘C’ name another piece of wood. Then suppose
B were made from A, as in the actual world, but also another table D were
simultaneously made from C. (We assume that there is no relation between A and
C which makes the possibility of making a table from one dependent on the
possibility of making a table from the other.) Now in this situation B ̸= D ;
hence, even if D were made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would
not be B. (N&N p. 114)
How does Kripke argue against the following position: One thing that could have
happened is that B was made of A while a different table was made out of C. But
another thing that could have happened is that B was made of C while a different
table was made out of C? 9
Sufficiency

The consensus in the literature is that the most promising way to fix up Kripke’s
argument involves a premise along the following lines:

Sufficiency For any table t and hunk h: if it is possible for t to be a table originally
formed from h, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be
originally formed from h.

The idea: what table we get when we make a hunk into a table depends only on what
hunk we pick.

10
Filling in the argument

Sufficiency For any table t and hunk h: if it is possible for t to be a table originally
formed from h, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be
originally formed from h.
Origin Uniqueness Necessarily, no table is originally formed from two distinct hunks.
Weak Compossibility For any two non-overlapping hunks, if each is such that it is
possible for there to be a table originally formed from it, it is possible
that both of them originally form tables.
Necessity of Distinctness For any objects x and y, if x ̸= y, then it is impossible for
it to be the case that x = y.
Overlap Essentialism For any non-overlapping hunks h1 and h2 and table t, if t is
originally formed from h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed
from h2 .
11
Why is this argument valid?

1. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that t is a table and h1 and h2 are

non-overlapping hunks, such that t could have been a table originally formed from h1
and also could have been a table originally formed from h2
2. By Sufficiency, it is necessary that any table originally formed from h1 is identical to
t, and also necessary that any table originally formed from h2 is identical to t.

12
Why is this argument valid?

1. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that t is a table and h1 and h2 are

non-overlapping hunks, such that t could have been a table originally formed from h1
and also could have been a table originally formed from h2
2. By Sufficiency, it is necessary that any table originally formed from h1 is identical to
t, and also necessary that any table originally formed from h2 is identical to t.
3. But by Weak Compossibility, it is possible that both h1 and h2 are such that some
table is originally formed from them.
4. Hence it is possible that t is a table originally formed from both h1 and h2 .

12
Why is this argument valid?

1. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that t is a table and h1 and h2 are

non-overlapping hunks, such that t could have been a table originally formed from h1
and also could have been a table originally formed from h2
2. By Sufficiency, it is necessary that any table originally formed from h1 is identical to
t, and also necessary that any table originally formed from h2 is identical to t.
3. But by Weak Compossibility, it is possible that both h1 and h2 are such that some
table is originally formed from them.
4. Hence it is possible that t is a table originally formed from both h1 and h2 .
5. So by Origin Uniqueness, it’s possible that h1 = h2 .
6. But this contradicts the Necessity of Distinctness.

12
The other premises: Origin Uniqueness

Origin Uniqueness seems unproblematic given the intended interpretation of

‘originally formed from’.

▶ Of course we could combine two or more hunks of wood to form a table! But the
resulting table is ‘originally formed’ not from any of those small hunks, but from a
bigger hunk that each of them is part of.

13
The other premises: Weak Compossibility

Weak Compossibility seems pretty plausible: what, if not overlap, could explain the
impossibility of making two hunks into tables, if each alone could be made into a table?

14
The other premises: Weak Compossibility

Weak Compossibility seems pretty plausible: what, if not overlap, could explain the
impossibility of making two hunks into tables, if each alone could be made into a table?
But if we wanted to be cautious, we could avoid the need for this premise by replacing
‘non-overlapping’ throughout the argument with ‘such that it is possible that both are
made into distinct tables’. This corresponds to Kripke’s parenthetical remark ‘(We
assume that there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of
making a table from one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the
other.)’

14
The other premises: Weak Compossibility

Weak Compossibility seems pretty plausible: what, if not overlap, could explain the
impossibility of making two hunks into tables, if each alone could be made into a table?
But if we wanted to be cautious, we could avoid the need for this premise by replacing
‘non-overlapping’ throughout the argument with ‘such that it is possible that both are
made into distinct tables’. This corresponds to Kripke’s parenthetical remark ‘(We
assume that there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of
making a table from one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the
other.)’
The conclusion will then be:
Weaker Origin Essentialism For any hunks h1 and h2 such that it’s possible that h1
and h2 are both made into two distinct tables, and any table t that is
originally formed from h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed
14
from h2 .
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

The Necessity of Distinctness (ND) is interesting and controversial.

The SEP article by Robertson Ishii tries to make it seem unproblematic by talking
about ‘the necessity of identity/distinctness’, suggesting that somehow these are a
package deal. But this is very misleading! The Leibniz’s Law argument for NI does not
establish ND.

15
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Immediately after the passage quoted above, Kripke suggests two arguments for ND!
Here is the first:
» However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X ̸= Y; if X and Y were both
identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence
X = Y.)

16
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Immediately after the passage quoted above, Kripke suggests two arguments for ND!
Here is the first:
» However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X ̸= Y; if X and Y were both
identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence
X = Y.)
There must be some blunder here. It looks like the only properties of identity being
appealed to are transitivity and symmetry. But there are many transitive and
symmetric relations R for which it can be false that x bears R to y without it being
necessarily false—e.g. being the same height as.

16
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Immediately after the passage quoted above, Kripke suggests two arguments for ND!
Here is the first:
» However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X ̸= Y; if X and Y were both
identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence
X = Y.)
There must be some blunder here. It looks like the only properties of identity being
appealed to are transitivity and symmetry. But there are many transitive and
symmetric relations R for which it can be false that x bears R to y without it being
necessarily false—e.g. being the same height as.
Kripke seems to be simply assuming that if X = Z at some possible world w, then
X = Z. But that’s just equivalent to ND, which he’s supposed to be arguing for!
16
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Here’s Kripke’s second argument:

» Alternatively, the principle follows from the necessity of identity plus the
’Brouwersche’ axiom, or, equivalently, symmetry of the accessibility relation
between possible worlds.

Here, Kripke is referring to the following principle, named for L.E.J. Brouwer:

B If something is the case, then it is necessarily possible for it to be the

case.

17
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

FYI: ‘The accessibility relation between possible worlds’ can be defined as follows:

World w is accessible from world v := At v, w is a possible world.

The symmetry of accessibility entails that the actual world A is a possible world at
every possible world, hence that A is necessarily a possible world, hence that everything
that is the case is necessarily possibly the case.
(We can also use the necessity of B to go the other way, but that’s a bit more
complicated.)

18
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

B and (the necessity of) NI jointly entail ND:

▶ Suppose x ̸= y. Then by B, it is necessarily possible that x ̸= y—i.e. it is

necessarily not necessary that x = y. But by the necessity of NI, it is necessary
that if x = y then it is necessary that x = y, and hence necessary that if it’s not
necessary that x = y, then x ̸= y. So, it is necessary that x ̸= y.

19
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

B and (the necessity of) NI jointly entail ND:

▶ Suppose x ̸= y. Then by B, it is necessarily possible that x ̸= y—i.e. it is

necessarily not necessary that x = y. But by the necessity of NI, it is necessary
that if x = y then it is necessary that x = y, and hence necessary that if it’s not
necessary that x = y, then x ̸= y. So, it is necessary that x ̸= y.

But why believe B??? I don’t know any good snappy arguments.

19
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Fortunately, we can drop ND as a premise if we just slightly weaken the conclusion, as

follows:

For any non-overlapping hunks h1 and h2 , if t is originally formed from

h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed from h2 and not from h1 .

20
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Fortunately, we can drop ND as a premise if we just slightly weaken the conclusion, as

follows:

For any non-overlapping hunks h1 and h2 , if t is originally formed from

h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed from h2 and not from h1 .

If we combine this move with the previous weakening, we get

Weakest Overlap Essentialism For any hunks h1 and h2 that could be made into
two distinct tables and any table t originally formed from h1 , it is
impossible for t to be originally formed from h2 and not from h1 .

This follows from Sufficiency and Origin Uniqueness.

20
Problems with Sufficiency: plans

Consider a table t made in 1760 by Thomas Chippendale from a certain hunk h.

Sufficiency implies that if h had, instead, been stored until 1970 and then made into an
austerely cubical modernist table by designer Milo Baughman, then t would have been
a modernist table. That may seem dubious!

21
Problems with Sufficiency: plans

Response (Salmon 1979): weaken Sufficiency to:

Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for t to be a
table originally formed from h according to P, then it is impossible for a
table distinct from t to be originally formed from h according to P.

22
Problems with Sufficiency: plans

Response (Salmon 1979): weaken Sufficiency to:

Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for t to be a
table originally formed from h according to P, then it is impossible for a
table distinct from t to be originally formed from h according to P.
The original argument for Overlap Essentialism still goes through if we strengthen
Weak Compossibility to:
Weak Plan Compossibility If h1 and h2 are non-overlapping hunks, h1 could be
made into a table according to P1 , and h2 could be made into a table
according to P2 , then it could be that: h1 is made into a table according
to P1 and h2 is made into a table according to P2 .
(We also need to add the premise that necessarily every table is made according to
some plan—this seems unproblematic.) 22
Problems with Sufficiency: recycling

A single hunk of wood can be shaped into a table; disassembled; and later made into a
table again, according to the same or a different plan.
Sufficiency implies that whenever this happens, we get the same table both times.
Plan Sufficiency has the same implication in situations where the same plan is used
both times. That may seem dubious!

23
Salmon’s argument against Plan Sufficiency

Maybe it’s not so bad to think that these are cases where we get the same table
again—after all, things do seem to routinely survive disassembly and reassembly.
Salmon (1979) gives an argument against Sufficiency and Plan Sufficiency based on
the following cases.
Table Of Theseus With Reassembly A table is made in 1900 out of hunk h
according to plan P. Over the next fifty years, bits of h are gradually replaced,
until finally at t + 50 none of the original bits of h are part of a table. Then, all
the bits of h are gathered and reassembled into a table, again according to P.
Salmon’s judgment: The original table survives the part-replacements and is in 1950
composed of matter not overlapping h. So, it is not the table made of h in 1950.

24
Salmon’s argument against Plan Sufficiency

Maybe it’s not so bad to think that these are cases where we get the same table
again—after all, things do seem to routinely survive disassembly and reassembly.
Salmon (1979) gives an argument against Sufficiency and Plan Sufficiency based on
the following cases.
Table Of Theseus With Reassembly A table is made in 1900 out of hunk h
according to plan P. Over the next fifty years, bits of h are gradually replaced,
until finally at t + 50 none of the original bits of h are part of a table. Then, all
the bits of h are gathered and reassembled into a table, again according to P.
Salmon’s judgment: The original table survives the part-replacements and is in 1950
composed of matter not overlapping h. So, it is not the table made of h in 1950.
(This is non-obvious: Hobbes 1655 gives essentially the same case, using ships, and
uses it to argue that even in the case without reassembly, the original ship does not 24
survive.)
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon further weakened Sufficency:

Only-table Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever originally formed from h, and formed
according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be the
only table originally formed from h and formed according to P.

25
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon further weakened Sufficency:

Only-table Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever originally formed from h, and formed
according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be the
only table originally formed from h and formed according to P.

This of course requires weakening the conclusion:

Only-table Overlap Essentialism If h1 and h2 are non-overlapping hunks and t is the

only table ever originally formed from h1 , then it is impossible for t to be
the only table ever originally formed from h2 .

25