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Chapter 3
1. What is the difference between games with perfect and imperfect
information? Provide examples. 2. Explain Bayesian games with example. 3. What is a Nash equilibrium in the context of imperfect information? 4. Explain how beliefs are updated in games with imperfect information. 5. What are repeated games? 6. How do strategies change in repeated games compared to one- shot games? 7. Explain how the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be modified in the context of imperfect information. 8. Extensive form games and perfect subgame nash equilibrium.
9. Explain the difference between normal form and extensive form
representations of a game.
10.
Solve the Extensive form game to find Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Player 1
/ \
L R
/ \
(2,1) Player 2
/ \
U D
/ \ (0,2) (1,1)
Chapter 4
1. Define self-interested agents in the context of non-cooperative
game theory. How does their behavior differ from cooperative agents?
2. Provide examples of real-world non-cooperative games involving
self-interested agents.
3. What is a normal form game? Describe how to represent a game in
normal form.
4. How do we move from optimality concepts to equilibrium in game
theory? Discuss the transition with examples.
5. What is the significance of equilibrium in non-cooperative games?
6. Describe the concept of a Nash equilibrium in normal form games.
7. What are some other solution concepts for normal form games besides Nash equilibrium?
8. What is a zero-sum game? Provide an example and explain the key
properties.
9. How do you compute Nash equilibria for two-player zero-sum
games?
10. Explain the difference between zero-sum and general-sum
games.
11. Discuss the concept of optimality and concept of Pareto
efficiency in the context of game theory.
Chapter 5
1. What is social choice theory? How is it applied in aggregating
individual preferences into collective decisions? 2. Discuss the importance of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in social choice theory. 3. What are social welfare functions? How do they relate to the existence of fair and efficient social choice mechanisms? 4. Explain how ranking systems are used in mechanism design to aggregate preferences. What are the key challenges in creating a fair ranking system? 5. What are protocols for strategic agents? How do they ensure that agents reveal their true preferences in a mechanism? 6. Explain the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. How does it ensure efficiency and truthfulness in allocation problems, such as shortest path problems? 7. What are combinatorial auctions? Explain the challenges and strategies involved in designing mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. 8. Discuss the role of mechanism design in profit maximization for auctioneers. What strategies can be used to ensure revenue maximization in auctions? 9. What are some computational applications of mechanism design in real-world scenarios?
