Introducing Sociocultural Theory
Introducing Sociocultural Theory
James P. Lantolf
The Pennsylvania State University
The chapters in the present volume all explore, in various ways, the implications
for second language learning and teaching of a sociocultural theory of mind,
as originally conceived of by L. S. Vygotsky, during the years immediately
following the Russian Revolution. Such explorations lead to a view of
learning and teaching which in many respects is very different from theories
currently in favor in the mainstream SLA literature. My purpose in what
follows is to outline the core statements of sociocultural theory, and then to
preview their operationalization in the eleven chapters that comprise this
volume. The discussion here is restricted to the central tenets of the theory.
Those issues not germane to the scope of the present work, such as debates
over concept formation in childhood and which modern incarnation of the
theory is most faithful to Vygotsky’s original ideas, I leave aside in the
interest of space. Interested readers should consult the Bibliography (see, for
example, Vygotsky 1978 and 1987; Luria 1979; Wertsch 1985a; Newman
and Holzman 1993; Cole 1996).
Mediated mind
The most fundamental concept of sociocultural theory is that the human
mind is mediated. In opposition to the orthodox view of mind, Vygotsky
argued that just as humans do not act directly on the physical world but rely,
instead, on tools and labor activity, which allows us to change the world, and
with it, the circumstances under which we live in the world, we also use
symbolic tools, or signs, to mediate and regulate our relationships with others
and with ourselves and thus change the nature of these relationships. Physical
as well as symbolic (or psychological) tools are artifacts created by human
culture(s) over time and are made available to succeeding generations, which
can modify these artifacts before passing them on to future generations.
Included among symbolic tools are numbers and arithmetic systems, music,
art, and above all language. As with physical tools, humans use symbolic
artifacts to establish an indirect, or mediated, relationship between ourselves
and the world. The task of psychology, in Vygotsky’s view, is to understand
how human social and mental activity is organized through culturally
constructed artifacts.1 Vygotsky conceived of the human mind as a functional
explicit. Something similar can be said with respect to the sounds of speech.
It is interesting to note that while syntax and phonology continue to be
viewed as core areas of language and thus of linguistic analysis, pragmatics is
often relegated to the margins of linguistics, if not pushed completely into
other disciplines such as communication theory, philosophy, or sociology.
Such is the power of (the spin-off of) written words!
Genetic domains
Since we inherit cultural artifacts from our ancestors, who in turn inherit
these artifacts from their ancestors, Vygotsky reasoned that the only adequate
approach to the study of higher mental abilities was historical. As such, he
proposed four genetic domains for the proper study of higher mental functions:
phylogenetic domain, concerned with how human mentation came to be
distinguished from mental processes in other life forms through the integration
of mediational means over the course of evolution; sociocultural domain,
concerned with how the different types of symbolic tools developed by
human cultures throughout the course of their respective histories affected
the kinds of mediation favored, and with it the kinds of thinking valued, by
these cultures (for example, the impact of such artifacts as numeracy, literacy,
and computers on thinking); ontogenetic domain, where focus is on how
children appropriate and integrate mediational means, primarily language,
into their thinking activities as they mature; microgenetic domain, where
interest is in the reorganization and development of mediation over a relatively
short span of time (for example, being trained to criteria at the outset of a lab
experiment; learning a word, sound, or grammatical feature of a language).
Although sociocultural theory recognizes four genetic domains, most of
the research has been carried out in the ontogenetic domain where focus has
been on exploring the ways in which abilities such as voluntary memory are
formed in children through the integration of mediational means into the
thinking process. In one well known experiment (see Vygotsky 1987), young
children were forbidden to utter specific color terms when describing a series
of objects placed before them. They were also instructed not to repeat the
same color term more than once. In order to help the children, Vygotsky
provided them with a set of colored cards, which, if used correctly, could cue
them as to the forbidden colors as well as reminding them which terms not to
repeat. He found that young children could not integrate the cards into the
task and recourse to the cards only confused the children further. Older
children had no difficulty integrating the colored cards and in fact were only
able to avoid the forbidden colors by referring to the cards. Adolescents and
adults, on the other hand, did not require the cards at all since they were able
to rely on memory to avoid the forbidden color terms.
The point of the above experiment was to demonstrate the developmental
nature of mediation from a stage in which any type of assistance was useless,
Unit of analysis
Sociocultural theory clearly rejects the notion that thinking and speaking are
one and the same thing. It also rejects what some now call the communicative
view of language (see Carruthers and Boucher 1998), which holds that thinking
and speaking are completely independent phenomena, with speaking serving
only as a means of transmitting already formed thoughts. Sociocultural
theory argues that while separate, thinking and speaking are tightly inter-
related in a dialectic unity in which publicly derived speech completes
privately initiated thought.6 Thus, thought cannot be explained without
taking account of how it is made manifest through linguistic means, and
linguistic activities, in turn, cannot be understood fully without ‘seeing them
as manifestations of thought’ (Bakhurst 1991: 60). To break the dialectic
unity between speech and thought is to forego any possibility of understanding
human mental capacities, much in the same way, as Vygotsky observed, that
independent analysis of oxygen and hydrogen fails to generate an explanation
of water’s capacity to extinguish fire. What is needed, then, is a unit of
analysis that preserves the dialectic unity of the elements (thinking and
speaking).
Vygotsky proposed the word as this unit, because, in the word, meaning,
the central component of thought, and linguistic form are united. In making
his argument, Vygotsky distinguishes between the stable, or conventional,
meaning of a word and its sense, or personal, and contextualized, meaning
that emerges from particular ways people deploy words in mediating their
mental activity. It is in a word’s sense that the microcosm of consciousness is
to be uncovered.
Not all scholars working within sociocultural theory have agreed with
Vygotsky’s designation of the word as the unit of analysis for the study of
mediated mind. Wertsch (1985a: 197), for instance, suggests that it is
difficult to perceive mediated processes such as memory or attention in the
sense of a word. Vygotsky’s colleague, A. N. Leontiev (1978), early on rejected
word sense as too psychological and thus too far removed from the concrete
activity of people in their world. Zinchenko (1985), building on Leontiev’s
claim, and at the same time drawing on Vygotsky’s own writings, argues that
the appropriate unit of analysis is tool-mediated goal-directed action. This
unit, according to Wertsch (1985a: 207–8), preserves the dynamic nature of
intermental and intramental organization and functioning, while at the same
time it encompasses those precise functional systems that for Vygotsky defined
human mental ability—memory, problem solving, attention, intention,
Activity theory
Activity theory is a unified account of Vygotsky’s original proposals on the
nature and development of human behavior. Specifically, it addresses the
implications of his claim that human behavior results from the integration of
socially and culturally constructed forms of mediation into human activity.
Luria (1973, 1979) refers to the system that results from the integration of
artifacts into human activity, whether that activity be psychological or social,
as a functional system. Mind, according to Luria, is not properly speaking the
activity of the biologically given brain, but is a functional system formed
when the brain’s electro-chemical processes come under control of our
cultural artifacts: foremost among these is language. Vygotsky argued that if
psychology was to understand these functional systems it had to study their
formation (i.e. their history) and activity and not their structure. Vygotsky’s
ideas were eventually crystallized by A. N. Leontiev in his theory of activity,
and while researchers since the time of Leontiev’s original formulations have
modified aspects of the theory, his fundamental claims continue to reside at
its core. Activity in Leontiev’s (1978) theory is not merely doing something, it
is doing something that is motivated either by a biological need, such as
hunger, or a culturally constructed need, such as the need to be literate in
certain cultures. Needs become motives once they become directed at a
specific object. Thus, hunger does not become a motive until people decide to
seek food; similarly, literacy does not become a motive for activity until
people decide to learn to read and write. Motives are only realized in specific
actions that are goal directed (hence, intentional and meaningful) and carried
out under particular spatial and temporal conditions (or what are also
referred to as operations) and through appropriate mediational means. Thus,
an activity comprises three levels: the level of motivation, the level of action,
and the level of conditions. Activities then can only be directly observed, by
others, at the level of conditions. However, the motives and goals of particular
activities cannot be determined solely from the level of concrete doing, since
the same observable activity can be linked to different goals and motives and
different concrete activities can be linked to the same motives and goals. The
illustrations given below should make these important points clear.
I will begin with Leontiev’s informative example of the hunting practices
of some tribal cultures and then consider some more recent examples taken
from the education and L2 learning literature. Hunting, according to Leontiev,
has its basic motive in the biological need to satisfy hunger. The actual form
the hunt takes is culturally specified. In some cultures, it is a collective activity
in which some members of the community are assigned the responsibility of
beating the bush mediated by such artifacts as sticks, hands (clapping), voices
(shouting), and drums, in order to scare and drive the prey (the immediate
goal of the hunt) toward other members of the community given the task of
slaying it with the use of other artifacts, such as spears, and bows and arrows.
Yet other members are given the responsibility of butchering and distributing
the carcass to the general community, often according to a hierarchically
specified code. The hunt then is an activity that can only be realized in the
concrete actions of the hunters under specific conditions. For those participating
in the hunt, their actions have meaning because they are linked to the activity’s
motive, satisfying hunger, and its immediate goal, slaying an animal. The
beaters make sense of their actions, making noise to frighten the animal, by
connecting this behavior to the motives and goals of the hunt. This is
important because the beaters’ actions are only indirectly linked to the primary
goal, which is the slaying of an animal.
As I have stated earlier, activities are differentiated from each other by their
objects and motives and not necessarily by their concrete realization as
actions. Thus, the same activity can be realized through different actions and
with different forms of mediation. For example, not all cultures engage in
collaborative hunting. In some cultures, all aspects of the hunt are carried out
by the same individuals, say through stealthfully stalking and killing the prey
with a bow and arrow, spear, or rifle. In yet other cultures, the need to consume
food is realized in the action of purchasing groceries at a supermarket. At the
level of motive, these actions are all part of the same activity, even though
they appear different in their overt manifestation. On the other hand, what
appear to be the same actions can be linked to a different motive and thus
constitute different activities. In the case of the beaters, it might turn out that
they discover beating the bush rhythmically is fun and so they continue to
engage in this action even when the community has no need for food. Thus,
what was originally part of the activity of hunting now becomes an activity in
its own right, because it is linked to a different motive—the motive of fun.
Beating the bush now has new meaning. One might suspect that sport
hunting arose under similar circumstances.
Wertsch, Minick, and Arns (1984), in a cross-cultural study, provide
another example of how activity theory can inform our understanding of
human mental and social behavior. In this study, the researchers compared
the interactional activity that arose between rural Brazilian mothers and their
children and urban school teachers and their students in a puzzle-copying
task. The object of the task was for the adult-child dyads to copy a barnyard
scene depicted in a model. The researchers hypothesized that given the
contrasts between rural and urban cultures in Brazil there would be
differences in the way the dyads carried out the copying activity. Briefly, the
researchers found that indeed clear differences emerged between the rural
and urban dyads with regard to how the children were mediated by their
respective caregivers. In the case of the urban dyads, the adults preferred to
offer the children strategic clues by first orienting them to the model and
telling the child to construct a similar scene. Along the way, the teachers
suggested that the children look at the model before selecting the appropriate
animal, fence, or what have you, to place in their own scene. In no case did
the teachers pick up any pieces for the child, nor did they offer direct
commands such as ‘Pick up the duck and put it in this spot.’ Instead they
created a linguistic scaffold which allowed the child to figure out for him- or
herself what to do at each point along the way. Thus, they would produce
utterances such as ‘Now look at the model.’ ‘Are you sure this is the correct
place?’ ‘What comes next?’ According to the researchers, there are three
important features of this activity that need to be highlighted: the children
made mistakes along the way, because they were offered strategic rather than
directive help; the children carried out all of the actions themselves; by
directing the children’s attention to the model, the teachers were not just
helping the children to copy the specific scene but they were instructing them
in how to work with models.
The rural dyads behaved in a markedly different way. The mothers
maintained responsibility for most of the moves throughout the task. They
only rarely directed the children’s attention to the model, opting instead to
look at the model themselves. They used much more directive rather than
strategic language. Thus, they tended to say things like ‘Now pick up the
duck and put it here.’ In a sense, the rural mothers used their children as tools
to construct an accurate copy of the model, without imparting to their
children an understanding of what the task was about. Under such direct
adult regulation, however, the rural children made significantly fewer errors
in copying the model than their urban counterparts. Nevertheless, because
most of the task remained under adult control, the children failed to learn
much about how to orient themselves toward and copy models.
Comparing the relative performance of the rural and urban dyads from the
perspective of activity theory, we note that the teachers made every effort to
ensure that the goal of the activity (copying a model) became shared by their
students. This did not happen in the rural dyads, where the mothers preferred
not to share the goal. With regard to the actual conditions under which the
children selected and placed pieces in their scene, the teachers consistently
tried to shift responsibility for the decisions underlying this behavior to their
students, while the mothers by and large determined which pieces to select
and where to place them, directing their child’s behavior through linguistic
means.
In attempting to explain these differences, the researchers suggest that the
rural and urban dyads operated from different underlying motives, which
gave rise to very different objects of activity. They reasoned that in the
mediational control of the child’s parent. Gradually, control passed from the
parent to the children as they appropriated the language used by the parent as
a means of mediating their own mental and indeed physical activity. At this
point, the children’s speech also shifted from an exclusively social to a shared
psychological function, but as in the case of the novice pool player, the
psychological function was still linked to the specific external circumstances in
which the puzzle solving occurred. The children’s speaking activity, therefore,
was in some respects social in that it occurred in the presence of the other
person, but it was importantly psychological to the extent that it was not
directed at the other person; rather it was oriented to the children themselves
as they instructed themselves in selecting the appropriate piece from the
pieces pile, placing the piece in the puzzle, and in evaluating the correctness of
their moves.
Importantly, the self-directed language attested in Wertsch’s research and
numerous other studies (see Diaz and Berk 1992), takes on an elliptical quality.
That is, it most often consists of utterances that are not fully syntactic. In fact,
it looks like one half of a dialogue between individuals with a close personal
relationship. For instance, utterances such as the following are frequently
attested in self-directed speech in English: What? Next, an orange one, Wait,
No, I can’t … Done, etc. This speech, in which we ask ourselves questions,
answer these questions, tell ourselves to interrupt a particular activity, tell
ourselves we are wrong or that we cannot do something, and that we have
completed a task, is generally referred to as private speech; that is, speech that
has social origins in the speech of others but that takes on a private or
cognitive function. As cognitive development proceeds, private speech
becomes subvocal and ultimately evolves into inner speech, or language that at
the deepest level loses its formal properties as it condenses into pure meaning.
According to Vygotsky, it is in the process of privatizing speech that higher
forms of consciousness arise on the inner plane and in this way our biological
capacities are organized into a culturally mediated mind.
Once mental processes grow inward and private speech evolves into inner
speech, mental activities need not remain, and for most people, they do not
remain, as exclusively internal mental operations. In the face of difficult
tasks, and here difficulty is ultimately determined by the individual, these
processes can be reexternalized as the person attempts to regain control over
them in performing the task. Frawley and Lantolf (1985) refer to this process
as reaccessing earlier stages of development.9 If a task is especially difficult,
and if the person decides that it is important enough to persist in the task, the
person has the option of seeking help from other people. In this way,
psychological processes once again become social as the person seeks out
other mediation. Alternatively, the person may seek assistance not in some
other person, but in particular artifacts made available by the culture. Hence,
the person may decide to consult a book, use a calculator or computer, or even
a horoscope as a means of obtaining needed mediation.10
ZPD, ‘is the source of all the specifically human characteristics’ of development
(Vygotsky 1987: 210). Imitation in the ZPD, unlike copying (the verbatim
mimicking of what the expert appears to do), is a complex activity in which
the novice is treated not as a repeater but as a communicative being (Newman
and Holzman 1993: 151–2). As an example of imitation, consider the following
interaction between an adult and a child taken from a study by Bloom,
Hood, and Lightbown as presented in Newman and Holzman:
Child: (opening cover of tape recorder) open, open, open
Adult: Did you open it?
Child: (watching tape recorder) open it
Adult: Did you open the tape recorder?
Child: (watching tape recorder) tape recorder
(Newman and Holzman 1993: 151)
The child creates something new (open > open it; tape recorder) as a result of
imitating portions of the adult’s utterances. Notice that the child does not
produce an exact copy of the adult’s speech and importantly the exchange is
both communicative and instructional.
As often happens in traditional school settings, however, the expert (for
example, language teacher) may well insist that the novice (for example,
student) produce an exact copy of what is offered. In such circumstances,
little if any account is taken of the student’s ZPD, and while the novice with
sufficient effort may succeed in accurately reproducing the expert’s model,
imitation, in Vygotsky’s sense, is not operative. Moreover, the expert/novice
interface in such a situation is rarely if ever communicative.11 The reader will
encounter several examples of genuine imitative interactions in the chapters
that follow; importantly, many of these occur between and among learners
with only marginal intervention from the teacher.
isolated segments of life in vitro, and it can never be, even at its best,
brought to a final conclusion beyond the shadow of human doubt.
(Luria 1987: xii)
While the eleven chapters included in the present volume are squarely
situated within the research tradition discussed by Luria and Bruner—
theory-guided observation and interpretation of people engaged in the
activity of teaching, learning (in educational or other settings), and using
second and foreign languages—each chapter foregrounds specific features of
sociocultural theory and backgrounds others. The nine empirically grounded
chapters mesh nicely with previous work carried out by sociocultural scholars
in such ordinary venues as an after-school cooking club in New York (Cole
and Traupmann 1981), a milk processing plant in New York (Scribner 1985),
village shops in rural Nepal (Beach 1995), Russian immigrant communities in
Israel (Kozulin and Venger 1994), tailor shops in Liberia and butcher depart-
ments in American supermarkets (Lave and Wenger 1991), a gas turbine
manufacturing company in Japan (Engestrom 1999), airliner cockpits (Hutchins
and Klausen 1996), and of course, classrooms.
All of the chapters in the present volume deal in some way with the
fundamental concepts of mediation and activity theory. Moreover, several of
the chapters work with the constructs of inner speech and private speech
(Donato, Pavlenko and Lantolf, Verity, and McCafferty and Ahmed), the
zone of proximal development and scaffolding (Donato, Swain, Ohta, Verity,
and van Lier), and regulation and control (Verity, Ohta, Thorne, van Lier).
Nine of the chapters present empirically-based studies and two are theoretical
discussions of the potential benefits derived from relating socio-cultural theory
to other theoretical perspectives. Seven of the empirically-based chapters
(Donato, Kramsch, Ohta, Roebuck, Sullivan, Swain, and Verity) focus on
language learning and teaching in classroom settings, and two (Pavlenko and
Lantolf, McCafferty and Ahmed) investigate the processes and consequences
of learning other languages in domains beyond the classroom.
The first chapter, by Donato, deals with four major themes: private speech,
mediation, scaffolded learning in the zone of proximal development, and
activity theory. As part of an introductory graduate course on sociocultural
theory, Donato apprenticed his students into the theory by asking them to
carry out a series of small-scale classroom research projects. Several of these
projects are discussed and commented on in the chapter. The first is on the
appearance of private speech during grammar instruction in an ESL class.
According to Donato, it is important for teachers to recognize that students
frequently need the opportunity to mediate their own learning privately;
additionally, students often make their appeals for assistance through private
speech, which, because it is not fully social, may not be fully appreciated for
what it is by the teacher.
research. She extends the earlier work of Coughlan and Duff (1994) on the
fluid nature of cognitive activity among university-level classroom L2
learners of Spanish as they undertake to complete a classroom task. Roebuck
argues that it is important for teachers and researchers to distinguish between
tasks and activities (explained above). Specifically, she discusses the processes
through which learners position themselves as individuals in carrying out a
written recall of a newspaper article in the second language, and contends
that neither teachers nor researchers can assume that their particular
orientation to a task is the one that learners (or participants) will adopt.
Moreover, learners’ orientation, that is, what they think the task is about,
and what counts as its successful completion, can change as the activity of
carrying out the task unfolds. This is because learners, and in fact, non-
learners as well, often reinterpret the meaning and intent of a task and,
importantly, their abilities relative to the task on-line rather than prior to
engaging with it. For instance Roebuck reports that some learners oriented
themselves to the goal of writing a recall of the newspaper article, while
others used the writing activity as a means not of telling someone about the
contents of the article, but of comprehending what the article was about.
Roebuck further shows how shifts in orientation, as well as the externalization
of cognitive strategies for completing the task (for example, lexical search)
often unfold on the page in a form of private speech known as private writing.
In her chapter, Swain examines mediation from the perspective of
collaborative dialogue in a French immersion and an adult ESL classroom.
She argues that collaborative dialogue is a key form of mediated learning.
The French immersion study demonstrates how young learners, through
collaborative dialogue, are able to organize and mediate their own learning
without the intervention of the expert teacher. Thus, she argues that through
their dialogic interaction, the students do not negotiate meaning; rather they
negotiate learning (see also the chapter by Sullivan). The ESL study extends
to language learning the work that Talyzina (1981) and her colleagues carried
out in the former Soviet Union which focused on the positive effects of
learners verbalizing strategies for doing geometry problems. Specifically, the
study Swain reports on shows that overt collaborative verbalization of meta-
cognitive strategies such as predicting, planning, and monitoring can be a
more effective means of mediating learning than just instruction in learning
strategies alone.
Sullivan’s chapter considers the way in which communicative language
teaching (CLT) is implemented in a non-Western setting. In particular, she
focuses on the role of playful behavior in mediating the interaction that
unfolds in an adult English as a foreign language classroom setting in Vietnam.
This is especially important from a sociocultural perspective, since as we have
seen, Vygotsky argued that play fulfills an important role in mental development.
Sullivan also challenges some common Western assumptions about effective
language teaching: decenter the teacher in favor of individual learners;
who enter into and must find ways of engaging with unfamiliar cultural
surrounds. Both chapters also examine the ways in which individuals in such
circumstances undertake to reconstruct their identities. In Verity’s case it is an
identity as an expert language teacher, while in Pavlenko and Lantolf’s study,
it is an identity as a member of a new culture.
Pavlenko and Lantolf consider the powerful role that personal narratives
play as mediating artifacts as people undertake to reform an identity. The
documentation for their study is provided by the written narratives of
individuals, largely academics, who have abandoned their original cultural
surround and have struggled to take on a new surround along with its new
mediational artifacts. They show how the process, at least for the people
considered in their study, moves through stages of loss to stages of recovery.
The former is marked by such phenomena as the weakening of one’s linguistic
system as a tool not only for social interaction, but as a tool for mediating
one’s own thinking processes, including above all one’s inner voice. The latter
is characterized by the appropriation of a new voice, and along with it, a new
sense of identity, from the voices of those encountered in the new cultural
circumstances. As the authors discuss, one of the major problems confronted
by those passing through such a reformation process in a second culture
relates to the need to construct a new history, or a new narrative, which can
be relied upon as a mediational means to make sense of the events in the new
circumstance.
Verity’s study is based on a series of self-reflections contained in a daily
journal in which the author documents her sense of loss and recovery of self-
regulation as an expert language teacher upon entering Japanese educational
culture. The journal evidences the author’s struggle to construct a zone of
proximal development which would allow her to scaffold herself, rather than
seek external other-regulation, into a new identity as an expert teacher in
accordance with a new set of cultural norms. For Verity, it was crucial for her
to hear her own voice rather than the voice of others, because the problem she
was confronting was not so much one of taking in new information as it was
of restructuring her current knowledge. Much of the writing contained in
Verity’s journal can be considered private writing, and while similar in
function to the strategic writing of writers, scholars, composers, etc. explored
by John-Steiner (1985), it also served as self-acknowledgment, in a concrete
form, of the author’s sense of lost expertise. It also enabled her to overcome
this sense of loss and ultimately to restructure her professional identity as an
expert language teacher.
The chapter by McCafferty and Ahmed is also about private speech, not in
its verbal but in its gestural manifestation. Speakers not only use gestures to
repeat meanings that they externalize verbally, but they also use gestures to
manifest meaning that is not verbally expressed. The authors report on one
aspect of a larger and on-going cross-linguistic study of Japanese and English
L2 learners. Informed by the research of David McNeill and his colleagues,
Notes
1 Some sociocultural theorists have posited that changing tools, either
physical or symbolic, will lead to a change in an activity. As will become
clear in the discussion of activity theory below, an activity has a complex
structure and merely changing the means (without altering its motive and
goal) through which it is realized will not in itself give rise to a change in the
activity. To be sure, changing tools may change the appearance of an activity,
but this does not mean that its fundamental structure is altered.
2 Somewhat earlier, the dominant metaphor for the mind had been the
telephone switchboard and going still further back to the time of Descartes,
the mind was frequently thought of as the inner workings of a clock.
3 See Scinto (1987) for a study of the role of schooled literacy on cognitive
development during onotogenesis.
4 Originally Vygotsky viewed the gestures of deaf children as arising from
the natural, or biological mind and thus considered them to be a detriment to
the development of higher, culturally mediated, mental systems. Later,
however, he realized that deaf individuals did not merely gesture but relied