Rule of law, justice,

and fundamental

rights in Ukraine
Shadow report

Kyiv 2024
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24

Executive
summary
On November 8, 2023, the EU Commission presented its
first Ukraine report as a candidate country and
recommended opening the negotiations. The report
included a list of suggestions for further reforms and
improvements. Our Shadow Report aims to provide an
independent civil society assessment of Ukraine's continued
progress in the judiciary and fight against corruption,
fundamental rights, and justice, as outlined in Chapters
23-24 of the EU accession process. The reporting period
covers the progress achieved between October 2023 and
September 2024. The Report considers the extraordinary
circumstances of the full-scale Russian invasion under
which Ukraine is pursuing its European integration.
Ukraine has made significant strides in its anti-corruption efforts, but the
challenges remain. Restoring asset declaration procedures, improving conflict
of interest regulations, and gaining institutional independence for the
Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office mark progress. However, issues
persist with flaws in criminal procedure legislation limiting prosecutors of the
SAPO, short statutes of limitations for corruption-related crimes, and potential
abuse of procedural rights by defendants. The High Anti-Corruption Court has
increased its efficiency but faces staffing constraints. Challenges also include
the need for independent forensic expertise and wiretapping capabilities for
the National Anti-Corruption Bureau.

At the same time, Ukraine should prioritise strengthening integrity and

combatting corruption within its criminal justice system. The focus should be
on implementing transparent and merit-based selection processes for
management positions, including rigorous integrity checks. Establishing a
robust disciplinary and anti-corruption framework carefully tailored to the
specific national context and actual corruption risks in the system is equally
crucial. 


Also, Ukraine continued successfully implementing the reforms of the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine and judicial self-governance bodies, such as the
High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges. At
the same time, there are still significant challenges due to low public trust in
the judiciary. The involvement of international experts in selection panels has
proven effective, so their participation should be extended until Ukraine joins
the EU or public trust in the judiciary significantly improves, rather than being
limited by sunset clauses.

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The EU's leverage through conditionalities has historically driven positive

changes in Ukraine's judicial system, with current priorities including new
procedure of the Supreme Court judge integrity checks and selection,
establishing the High Administrative Court, and reforming legal education and
the Bar.

Despite the full-scale war, the level of f reedom of speech in Ukraine remains
moderate. The main challenges include Russia's military aggression, the
national TV marathon United News and the concentration of TV media in the
hands of the state, the collapse in the advertising market, media closures due
to financial and security challenges, problems with blackouts, and the
mobilisation-related staff shortage in the market. All this has reduced citizens'
access to pluralistic media in Ukraine.

Ukraine has made significant progress in improving the legislation on national

minorities, primarily addressing recommendations f rom the Venice
Commission and fulfilling its international obligations. Despite a somewhat
disorganised legislative process and implementation challenges, the current
f ramework provides favourable conditions and adequate mechanisms for
protecting minority rights.

Due to Russia’s war, apart f rom millions of refugees who went abroad, around
four million Ukrainians were forced to become internally displaced persons.
This category of population is one of the most vulnerable in Ukraine. There is an
urgent need to adopt a new version of the Law ‘On Ensuring the Rights and
Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons’ to regulate better and provide their
rights.

This report was prepared by the Anti-Corruption Action Centre, DEJURE

Foundation, Automaidan, Mezha Anti-Corruption Centre, International Centre
for Ukrainian Victory, Institute of Mass Information, Media Initiative for Human
Rights, and Viktoriia Khalanchuk, an independent expert.

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CHAPTER 23: JUDICIARY

& FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
01 FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

FIGHT AGAINST

CORRUPTION

Asset declarations and conflicts of interest

Submitting asset declarations was suspended on July 8, 2022, due to the full-
scale invasion of Russia. This obligation was restored on September 20, 2023
with public officials forced to do reporting for the three last years. Though MPs
initially wanted to close access to the Register of Declarations, a strong reaction
from the public and international partners prevented it. The National Agency
on Corruption Prevention verifying hundreds of thousands of declarations
requires significant human and time resources on their side. Hence, a proper
risk-oriented approach and clear and objective criteria should be in place to
prioritise the riskiest declarations.

The difference between potential and actual conflicts of interest should be

clarified at the legislative level, as should the concept of ‘private interest’. The
grounds that prohibit decision-making, actions to prevent conflicts of interest,
and notification of the latter must also be better regulated. So far, the general
courts' practice of considering cases involving an actual conflict of interest (in
particular, where collegial body members make decisions) remains unstable
and inconsistent.

The NACP's Order of October 26, 2023, approved the procedure for lifestyle
monitoring, making it transparent and public. It was an important step
forward, yet the procedure still has some weaknesses: it lacks a clear distinction
between lifestyle monitoring and complete verification of declarations. It does
not indicate a time limit for monitoring. Also, time limits for bringing criminal
liability for false information in declarations are too short. Amending the
legislation to extend the statute of limitations in this category of crimes and
holding a single-judge hearing of such cases at the High Anti-Corruption Court
might be the solution.

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Strengthening criminal law to enhance the fight

against corruption
On June 14, 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine submitted draft law No.
113401 improving plea bargaining in criminal proceedings for corruption and
corruption-related offences (an indicator under Ukraine Facility by the end of
September). The draft law aimed to provide for significantly reduced custodial
sentences and establish more favourable grounds for release from probation
upon paying a relatively large fine (depending on the gravity of the criminal
offence). It was adopted in the first reading in July. Yet, after the public criticism
of the potential corruption loopholes, the government decided to pass a
completely different draft law, No.120392, in line with the NABU/SAPO
requirements. We expect the draft law to be considered in October.
Another problematic issue is the possibility of suspending court proceedings in
case of mobilisation of suspects and convicts to military service, including for
corruption-related criminal offences. In April 2022, the respective amendments
to Article 335 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine enabled courts,
including the HACC, to do so and are already widely used. At the same time,
this significantly delays the consideration of cases while the statute of
limitations is ending. These changes violate the principle of the inevitability of
punishment and the right to a fair trial within a reasonable timeline.
Participation in repelling the aggressor is an essential mission for society and
the state. Yet, at the same time, this should not dramatically affect the
achievement of the objective of criminal proceedings. AntAC has documented
instances where suspects and those accused of grand corruption serve in rear
military units after mobilisation but do not appear in court due to military
service.

The statute of limitations for corruption-related criminal prosecution remains

a significant challenge for the Ukrainian legal system. According to the
Criminal Code of Ukraine, the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution
depends on the gravity of the crime, and the gravity, in turn, depends on the
punishment for a particular criminal offence. For example, the statute of
limitations for declaring false information or not submitting a property
declaration is only three years. Given the high workload of the NACP and the
large number of declarants, this period may be insufficient to detect the
offence, transfer the materials for pre-trial investigation and then hold a trial.
There have already been several cases where the HACC closed3 criminal
proceedings against MPs for false declarations because the statute of
limitations had expired. The court had only a little over a month to consider the
case. Meanwhile, the HACC's workload is increasing yearly, while the number of
cases that risk not being considered on the merits because the statute of
limitations has expired is growing. According to AntAC's estimates, at least 18
cases involving 26 people currently under HACC consideration will have their
statute of limitations expire by the end of 2025 (approximately 8% of
proceedings). These cases were sent to court in 2019-2021, meaning they have
been pending for several years.

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Therefore, it is necessary to amend Article 49 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by

introducing a longer statute of limitations for corruption and corruption-
related criminal offences. It is also crucial to provide additional grounds for
suspending the statute of limitations, such as the mobilisation of suspects and
other circumstances related to martial law, and to improve the rules on
suspending the statute of limitations due to the evasion of trial and
investigation.

In 2017, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine was changed, bringing in ‘the
Lozovyi amendments’, negatively impacting the efficiency of law enforcement
agencies, prosecutors and courts. In practice, most of these amendments
significantly increased a defence's ability to abuse procedural rights, allowed for
manipulating the investigation timeframe and created conditions for the
deliberate dismissal of criminal proceedings based solely on the calculation
and coincidence of the investigation timeframe while ignoring the content of
evidence and its validity.

Eventually, most of these amendments were repealed, yet some remain in

place:

01 Right to appeal against a notice of suspicion

(even though suspicion is an assumption,

an investigative version of the prosecution

regarding a person's involvement in a criminal
offence, supported by minimal evidence)

02
Right of the defence to file a motion to close
the proceedings if the pre-trial investigation
period has expired after the person has been
notified of suspicion (except for cases when
notifying of suspicion of committing a grave or
especially grave crime against a person's life
and health)

03 Provision that grants the right to extend the

pre-trial investigation after a notice of
suspicion to a court and not to a prosecutor

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To ensure an effective and objective pre-trial investigation with respect to
rights and guarantees for suspects and those accused, and to achieve the
objectives of criminal proceedings, including ensuring the certainty of
punishment for corruption, the unconditional ground for closing criminal
proceedings due to the expiry of the pre-trial investigation after suspicion
should be abolished at the legislative level. Similarly, a prosecutor should be
allowed to extend the pre-trial investigation after suspicion. A comprehensive
review of the criminal procedure shows that it is the prosecutor who develops
the investigation strategy and is responsible for collecting sufficient pre-trial
evidence to bring cases to the court.
Counteracting procedural abuse in criminal
proceedings during the pre-trial investigation
Another challenge is the duration of court proceedings in grand corruption
cases due to procedural abuses by the defence. The parties involved often file
dozens of unreasonable motions and unjustified challenges to judges and
change lawyers solely to delay consideration of cases on the merits.

Though long overdue, the Verkhovna Rada registered draft law No. 11387 in
June 2024, yet it could only partially address some of these issues. The draft law
proposes (1) introducing administrative liability for failure to comply with a
court order to appear and (2) increasing fines if the parties fail to fulfil their
procedural duties. A systemic solution to this problem would be introducing
the institution of procedural rights abuse by the parties in criminal proceedings
and the appropriate measures to respond to such abuse.
Strategic plan for reforming law

enforcement agencies
The Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 792-p of August 23, 2024, approved4 the
Action Plan to implement the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Reforming
Law Enforcement Agencies as a Part of Ukraine's Security and Defence Sector
for 2023-2027. Both the Concept and the Action Plan cover such institutions as
the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the National
Police of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Bureau
of Investigation, the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, the Security Service
of Ukraine, and the State Customs Service of Ukraine. Although the Action Plan
should be assessed positively in terms of its content, it remains a declarative
document, with its implementation becoming either formal, delayed, or even
sabotaged.

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Functioning of the High Anti-Corruption Court

In 2023, the HACC resolved5

84 criminal

proceedings
Against
120 people

Verdicts were delivered in 65 cases, 13 were closed, and the issue of

exemption from criminal liability was decided upon the prosecutor's
motion in six proceedings.

The number of verdicts delivered in 2023

75% 202 3 is 75 % h ig er t an or t e ear e ore.

h h f h y b f

On November 23, 2023, the High Qualification Commission of Judges

announced a competition to fill 25 positions at the HACC—15 positions at the
first instance and 10 positions at the Appeals Chamber (in addition to 38 judges
sitting since 2019). The competitions are held separately.

38 15 10
judges sitting
+ positions at the + positions at the
since 2019 first instance Appeals Chamber

On June 19, 2024, the HQCJ passed a decision to hold a qualification

assessment, including anonymous testing, practical tasks, and a special
examination. This will be followed by a dossier study and interviews with the
HQCJ and the Public Council of International Experts. The latter was elected
in April 2024, which the European Commission also requires. The PCIE's term of
office will expire in November 2024. Hence, it is necessary to extend their
powers to have time to select HACC judges. The respective draft law (No. 11426)
was adopted in principle in late August 2024. Still, in the first reading version, it
envisages extending the term of office of the current PCIE members only until
the current procedure for selecting HACC judges is completed, but no longer
than November 1, 2025. This period may not be sufficient, as more than 11 HACC
first-instance judges are running for the Appeals Chamber of the HACC. If they
are successfully selected, new positions will become available in the first
instance, so additional selection would be needed. It is the first instance of the
HACC that needs additional human resources in the first place. The draft law
No. 10178 on single judge consideration of cases by the HACC has not been
adopted, even though the European Commission referred to it in its action
plan.

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The draft law No. 10178 on single judge consideration of cases by the HACC
has not been adopted, even though the European Commission referred to it in
its action plan.

Instead, another draft law was adopted6 in April 2024, which, among other
things, leaves open the possibility of considering cases by a three-judge panel if
the accused is a senior state official (members of the Cabinet of Ministers,
Prosecutor General, Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, etc.), regardless of
the type of criminal offence concerned. This step only partially reduces the
workload of the HACC judges. At the same time, we are concerned about the
list of exemptions for certain officials, as this approach violates the principle 

of equality.

Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office

The Law on the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office reform
adopted7 on December 8, 2023, amended the Law ‘On the Prosecutor's Office’
and granted a separate legal entity status to the SAPO (separate property,
accounts, and a seal), acquired in practice in March 2024. To be fully
operational, it must conduct recruitment procedures, select prosecutors and
civil servants for the relevant vacant positions, and establish the independent
units subordinated to the Head: document management, including electronic
document management, classified work, human resources management,
internal control etc.

The SAPO Internal Control Unit conducts secret integrity checks of SAPO
prosecutors under the procedure approved by the Head. The unit reviews a
disciplinary complaint against a SAPO prosecutor and then submits proposals
to initiate disciplinary proceedings or refuses to activate them to the
Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors.

The following problems with the SAPO's independence remain unresolved:

01 according to the CPC, the Head of the SAPO has authority neither to send
extradition requests nor to carry out mutual legal requests in criminal justice.
All these powers remain, as before, under the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor
General and their Office;

02 the PG initiates an investigation on criminal offences allegedly conducted

by an MP and approves all motions at the stage of pre-trial investigation.

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National Anti-Corruption Bureau

In the first half of 2024, the NABU initiated8

criminal
persons were sent

323 131
Against
proceedings to court, and the court

delivered

36 Against

guilty verdicts

43
persons

Following the recommendations of the 2023 independent external assessment

of the NABU, a large-scale Bureau’s reorganisation has been underway since

early 2024, with a single Main Detective Unit transformed into four separate

ones. The First Deputy Director, in charge of the MDU coordination, was

assigned to manage their work. At the same time, due to the criminal

investigation into alleged leaks f rom the Bureau and the pressure on whistle-

blowers, the latter was removed f rom coordinating the detectives and

subsequently dismissed, with the NABU Director taking over these

responsibilities. The difference with the previous structure is that f rom now on,

all newly created detective units are directly subordinated to the administrative

leadership of the Bureau (director or deputy director) without an intermediate

link of a single manager (head of the MDU), who must be a detective and,

according to the Criminal Procedure Code, the head of the pre-trial

investigation body. Under the law, neither the deputy directors nor the director

are detectives or heads of investigation and hence cannot fully coordinate the

investigative work, provide instructions, and get acquainted with the details of

the cases.

In practice, the coordination of the investigation by the administrative

leadership poses a threat to the independence of the NABU investigation.

First, the administrative leadership of the Bureau has no procedural authority

to direct investigators, which was one of the guarantees of the investigation's

independence. Also, because the director of the bureau or their deputy does

not have the aforementioned procedural powers, they have no legal

responsibility for the work results of their subordinate units. For example, when

information is leaked in a case, the bureau's management, which has been

aware of the details in an extra-procedural way, is not liable because it has no

procedural status in the case. Secondly, the positions of NABU deputy directors

are the only ones not subject to open competitive selection.

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Moreover, the law does not limit the term of office of these deputies. At the
same time, all NABU detectives are selected in open competitions. The position
of the head of the MDU (who coordinated the investigation before the
reorganisation) was also competitive. At the same time, the Bureau needs a
single person with procedural powers to coordinate the investigation.  

The solution to the problem above would be to introduce the following

amendments to the Law on NABU and the CPC:

01 the best is to include the position of deputy director of the bureau in the
list of officials heading the investigation body (amendments to Article 3 of the
CPC);

02 to establish a competitive procedure for selecting such a deputy director

according to the highest standard with the participation of international
experts. To ensure the sustainability of the work in the context of a
reorganisation, such competitive selection may be postponed for a certain
period, until the end of which the director will be able to appoint the head of
the investigation without competition;

03 the law should introduce terms of office for all deputy directors, including
the deputy responsible for coordinating the investigation.

The scandal related to alleged leaks of information about criminal proceedings

in the Bureau, which surfaced in May 20249 and unfolded in the following
months, proves that changes are highly needed. The whistle-blower detectives
informed the Bureau’s Director of possible information leaks in criminal
proceedings allegedly involving the First Deputy Director of the Bureau. A
criminal proceeding was initiated based on these facts. Subsequently, several
internal investigations were launched into the First Deputy Director's
interference in the investigation, pressure on whistle-blowers, and violations of
conflict-of-interest requirements. As a result of one of these internal
investigations and the subsequent disciplinary procedure, the NABU Director
dismissed the First Deputy Director10. These events only confirmed a need to
introduce terms of office for the deputy directors and to grant procedural
rights to the deputy director responsible for coordinating detectives, combined
with a competitive selection procedure for such a position.

Another challenge significantly hindering the NABU's effective work is the lack
of access to independent forensic expertise. According to Article 242 of the
CPC of Ukraine, the circumstances in which a forensic examination in criminal
proceedings is mandatory include determining the amount of material
damage, a component of almost all white-collar crime investigations. Currently,
the issue of forensic examinations in criminal proceedings in Ukraine is
regulated by the Law ‘On Forensic Examination’. According to it, forensic
institutions may be established at the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Health, the State Border Guard Service, the
Security Service of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (including for the

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needs of the National Police). Thus, if the NABU needs to conduct a forensic
examination in a criminal proceeding, it is forced to contact one of these
forensic institutions. For example, in 2021, NABU detectives ordered more than
400 different types of forensic examinations. For most of them, detectives
submitted documents to the Ministry of Justice's and Internal Affairs' expert
institutions.
For a long time, obtaining forensic expert opinions in NABU criminal
proceedings has been problematic for several reasons. First, unjustified delays
in conducting examinations sometimes lead to a year-long wait due to the
excessive workload of experts. Secondly, forensic experts often face undue
influence, intimidation, and obstruction when conducting examinations due to
the significant impact of suspects in NABU investigations. Thirdly, defendants
frequently get information about criminal proceedings through the influence
and leakage of information from forensic institutions. They track the potential
time of their detention or serving of suspicion notice. Forensic reports in many
investigations are the first and last point before serving a notice of suspicion.

This assessment is shared, in particular, by the OECD in its Fifth Monitoring

Report (May 30, 2022)11, which states that NABU's access to independent
forensics to assess the damage from crime is limited. Consequently, the only
adequate solution is establishing a separate forensic institution with its
independence ensured, which will do examinations for the NABU needs and,
for example, for the ESBU after its reboot.

At the same time, the NABU's right to independent

wiretapping is not implemented in practice. Even
though this right was granted in 202112, in practice,
no action has been taken to amend the bylaws or
provide the necessary technical access. The latter is,
in particular, blocked by the Security Service of
Ukraine. The lack of independent access to
wiretapping significantly limits the NABU's ability to
investigate high-level corruption.

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CHAPTER 23: JUDICIARY

& FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
02 JUDICIARY

JUDICIARY
Judicial governance bodies
During the reporting period, the judicial governance bodies, the High Council
of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine,
continued the renewal process. However, it is too early to decide whether this
chapter of the reform has been successfully completed.

The current HCJ and HQCJ represent an improvement over their previous
compositions. However, in contrast to the High Anti-Corruption Court selection
process13, which involved a commission of six international experts, the
selection commissions for the HCJ and HQCJ consisted of three Ukrainian
judges or retired judges alongside three international experts. This
arrangement led to an inconsistently effective selection process14, ultimately
resulting in the appointment of several candidates with serious integrity
reservations. The HCJ and the HQCJ have already progressed over 2023 and
2024, but significant areas of concern persist.

The High Council of Justice

The HCJ has achieved increased transparency, successfully formed the
complete composition of the HQCJ, and generalised disciplinary practices.
However, it has failed in several areas, including justifying dismissals of
disciplinary cases, prioritising complaints against judges, and promptly
handling high-profile and priority cases. Additionally, the HCJ has granted
honourable resignations to judges of low integrity, made inconsistent decisions
on disciplinary actions, and imposed lenient disciplinary sanctions. It has also
failed to hold judges accountable, denied the public’s right to criticise judges,
and did not adequately assess candidates’ compliance with judicial
requirements15.

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As of August 2024, the HCJ has 17 members, with four more members not
appointed under the quotas of the Congress of Attorneys and the President.
The notorious head of the bar, Lidia Izovitova16, deliberately delayed convening
the Congress (see details in the chapter titled ‘The Bar’). Similarly, the President
is not filling two vacancies in the HCJ under his quota17, even though the
Ethics Council recommended two candidates for the appointment. This
situation sets a dangerous precedent for not appointing the candidates for
political reasons. It poses a risk of reverting to a system where the most loyal
rather than independent and competent candidates will be selected for the
HCJ18.

Disciplining of judges. One of the most significant tasks for the reformed HCJ
was a massive backlog of disciplinary complaints (17,000) amassed while the
former was inoperative. The HCJ’s disciplinary function was reinstated in
November 2023, and since then, we have observed such trends: 19

01 02
Clearing the backlog by returning Delay of high-profile cases:
complaints and refusing to open significant cases, such as
disciplinary cases: those involving judges
approximately 6,000 complaints were caught taking bribes–
processed in this manner. However, specifically, the case of
the HCJ only resumed its functions in Judge Kniazev

January 2023; due to the legal terms (ex-President of the

and deadlines for holding judges Supreme Court)–were
accountable, hundreds of judges unjustifiably delayed.
escaped punishment.

03 04
Insufficient disciplinary actions: Appeal rights denial: 

only 61 judges have been disciplined
the HCJ denies complainants the
in the first six months, which right to appeal disciplinary decisions
accounts for less than 1% of cases. requiring legislative change. This
right is often granted only to judges,
leaving complainants disadvantaged.

Since its disciplinary function was reinstated, the HCJ has held 77 judges
accountable, with 22 dismissed as of July 2024. Almost half of the dismissed
judges collaborated with Russian authorities or received Russian passports. The
perception of impunity among the judges remains unresolved.

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Service of Disciplinary Inspectors

The HCJ reform adopted in 2021 introduced changes related to disciplinary
inspectors, but its implementation depended on the HCJ's renewal. In August
2023, the Parliament passed a law reinstating the HCJ’s authority to conduct
disciplinary proceedings against judges until the Service of Disciplinary
Inspectors is fully established. In December 2023, a competition was
announced, and a commission was formed to select the leadership and
members of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors20. This commission includes
three HCJ members and three international experts nominated by
international donors. Given the low professional capacities and integrity of the
candidates who applied to become the SDI head, a new competition with less
stringent requirements was announced21.

The selection of the SDI inspectors is proceeding in due course and is expected
to be finalised in a few months. Thus, the SDI will become operational, and new
rules of disciplinary procedures regarding judges will come into force.

The High Qualification Commission of Judges

The reboot of the HQCJ after its termination in 2019 in a transparent
competition with the participation of international experts was essential for
judicial reform and appeared in Ukraine’s EU commitments. Following the
competitive selection, the new composition of the HQCJ was appointed, and
the Commission started its activities in June 202322. Following several
unsuccessful attempts, the HQCJ elected Andriy Pasichnyk as its head in
August 2024 since the previous head, Roman Ihnatov, resigned in March
202423.

Despite some achievements, such as setting up indicators of low integrity with

the Public Integrity Council and recommending the dismissal of a few judges
of low integrity, the HQCJ has several areas of concern. Those include
inconsistent adherence to agreed indicators of judges’ low integrity and varied
practices and decision rationale among its panels. There is also a lack of public
access to judges’ dossiers, reducing oversight and limiting PIC remotely
accessing those dossiers. The HQCJ Secretariat remains unreformed, with
questionable integrity and competence, causing delays. Furthermore, the
absence of an analytical centre for gathering information on judges and
disorganisation due to the lengthy absence of the HQCJ head are significant
issues24.

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Qualification

assessment of judges
As of August 2024, almost ten months have passed since the start of the
qualification assessment. During this time, the HQCJ reviewed 172 judges25.
The Commission might need three years as it still has to conduct qualification
assessments for 1700 judges, including 200 judges who do not administer
justice due to tenure expiry26. Nevertheless, the emphasis should be on the
quality of the evaluations rather than on speed.

The HQCJ continues to keep in office judges who do not meet the established
integrity criteria–the Commission considered 43 judges with negative opinions
suitable for their positions. In comparison, only 27 judges with negative
opinions were recommended for dismissal. The trend of the HQCJ overturning
the Public Integrity Council's opinions is troubling. The HQCJ has overturned
most of the PIC’s negative opinions, agreeing with the PIC and recommending
a judge for dismissal in only 39% of the cases27. This is unacceptable, as it
indicates that the qualification assessment is not fulfilling its primary function–
cleansing the judiciary. At the same time, not all judges recommended for
dismissal by the HQCJ will ultimately be dismissed by the HCJ, which raises
serious concerns about the overall effectiveness of the qualification
assessment process.

Selection

of judges

In December 2023, the Parliament improved the selection procedure by

simplifying and expediting it28, particularly by eliminating redundant stages
and re-evaluations and reducing training time. Candidates' integrity scrutiny is
now also part of the selection of judges.

In May 2024, the HQCJ announced the competition results to fill 560 vacant
judicial positions in local courts. The HQCJ completed interviews with 434
judicial candidates and recommended 390 of them for appointment to
positions in 266 courts29. Moreover, the competition for 550 vacant positions in
appellate courts has started, with over 1700 candidates applying30.

The problem Of the Council of Judges

The law suggests that the Council of Judges “acts in the interests of all the
judges”. Yet, the former has few real functions. After the reform of the judicial
governance bodies, there is little justification for the Council’s existence as it
has no exclusive powers that could not be transferred.

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Moreover, it has become an instrument for lobbying the interests of

questionable judges, covering the latter, and putting pressure on the whistle-

blower judges. The Council also actively opposed the judiciary reform in

Ukraine, sabotaging the laws aimed at its cleansing and delegating members

of low integrity to judicial selection commissions31.

In January 2023, the Parliament of Ukraine registered a draft law on liquidating

the Council of Judges32. NGOs promoting the rule-of-law reforms in Ukraine

supported this initiative. However, progress on this issue has stalled. According

to the draft law, the CoJ's powers to organise the Congress of Judges could be

transferred to the HCJ. This step aligns with the recommendations of the

Venice Commission, which has consistently advised simplifying the system of

judicial governance in Ukraine.

The Constitutional Court Reform

The Constitutional Court reform is one of the most challenging issues in

contemporary Ukrainian history. In 2020, the CCU de facto cancelled electronic

declaration and other anti-corruption reforms. Since then, the Venice

Commission has recommended depoliticising the judge selection process33.

The CCU reform was also a primary condition for opening the Ukraine-EU

negotiations.

The Constitutional Court reform introduced a competitive selection process for

CCU judges. The Advisory Group of Experts was tasked with vetting and

selecting candidates for judicial positions. The first AGE was formally

established in October 2023.

So far, the AGE has demonstrated a promising performance, as candidates with

political affiliations were not deemed to meet the high moral standards

required. As a result of the competition, one decent judge was appointed to the

CCU34. Competitions are ongoing for an additional five vacancies. It is essential

to continue closely monitoring the competition and its results.

Supreme Court

In May 2023, the Supreme Court faced a vast corruption

scandal: the court's President, Vsevolod Kniazev, allegedly

received a $2.7 million bribe35. As the latter was

suspended f rom office, the Supreme Court judges

elected a new President, with almost ¾ majority voting

in favour of Stanislav Kravchenko, a judge of questionable

integrity36 as indicated in the PIC’s negative opinion back $2.7 MLN

bribe
in 201737. Furthermore, in December 2023 and January

2024, the Supreme Court elected three judges of low

integrity to the Grand Chamber specifically to disrupt the

qualification assessment38.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

In response, non-governmental organisations and progressive judiciary

members have proposed a two-step approach to its renewal:

The first step is to thoroughly review the existing Supreme Court

01
judges’ declarations of integrity to remove those with questionable

integrity. The process may lead to disciplinary actions against a judge,

which could ultimately result in removal from their position;

Second, a new selection procedure for 40 vacant judges’ positions

02
should be implemented39, including the active involvement of civil

society and international experts, such as the Public Council of

International Experts or a similarly modelled commission. This

approach will ensure that only individuals with the highest integrity are

appointed to fill open judicial positions and that the errors made while

establishing the Supreme Court in 2017 are avoided40.

Although the European Commission endorsed this approach to renew the

Supreme Court in its 2023 Ukraine report41, progress here has stalled. Moreover,

recent developments indicate that the Supreme Court is increasingly actively

reversing significant reforms. Specifically, it has already issued two detrimental

rulings that disrupt the qualification assessment process:

ignoring the PIC’s negative opinion the Grand Chamber of the Supreme

on the judge undergoing Court ultimately overturning the

qualification assessment under the HCJ’s decision. This established a

previous HQCJ. This undermines the precedent that allows the Supreme

qualification process, affecting Court to delve into the content and

approximately 180 out of nearly 1,700 motives behind the decisions of the

judges awaiting evaluation, including HCJ and HQCJ and alter their

those of low integrity42.

rulings43.

We believe that recent Supreme Court decisions are not the last to undermine
reform efforts44. Suppose the Supreme Court and its composition are not
renewed. In that case, judicial and other crucial reforms are expected

to be obstructed by the unreformed Supreme Court,

which serves as the final instance in their consideration.

Therefore, the urgent renewal of the Supreme Court

according to the mentioned two-step approach should

be prioritised.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac
Administrative justice
Establishing a new administrative court that will hear administrative cases
against national state agencies by adequately vetted judges is written down in
Ukraine’s Memorandum with the IMF45, the Ukraine Facility Plan46, and the
2024 priorities of the G7 Ambassadors Support Group for Ukraine47. However,
no significant progress has been made so far.

Adopting the new administrative court's framework, akin to the model applied
in the HACC—currently the most successful example of judicial selection—
while avoiding the errors made while establishing the Supreme Court could
significantly improve Ukraine's judicial landscape. For this reason, it is essential
to introduce the PCIE or a similarly modelled commission entirely comprised of
international experts in the selection process.

Support Group for Ukraine

the G7 Ambassadors

International involvement in the selection of judges

In recent years, Ukraine has adopted a valuable practice involving independent
international experts in the selection processes for judicial governance bodies
and individual courts. Notably, the PCIE has proven particularly effective in
conducting a commendable selection process for the HACC. Furthermore,
despite the mixed results of hybrid commissions, which included three
Ukrainian judges or political appointees on one side and three international
experts on the other, this model is still far superior to the purely Ukrainian
commissions that previously handled the selections.

However, the participation of international experts in these selection

commissions is, unfortunately, subject to sunset clauses, which limit their
tenure. Here are some specific examples:

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

November 2024

Public Council of International Experts: its

tenure expires in November 2024. Recently, the

Verkhovna Rada adopted the draft law in the

first reading, extending the PCIE’s tenure by

one year, which is still not enough to complete

the selection process of the HACC judges48.

JUNE 2025

Selection Commission: In June 2025, members

appointed by Ukrainian bodies will replace the

international experts. After the international

experts' tenure in the Ethics Council and the

Selection Commission expires, the Council of

Prosecutors, the Council of Attorneys, and the

National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine

will nominate members instead of international

organisations.

November 2027

Ethics Council: in November 2027, members

appointed by the Ukrainian bodies will replace

the international experts. Unfortunately, the

Ethics Council’s efficiency during the HCJ

selection was noticeably lower than that of the

PCIE49.

august 2029

Advisory Group of Experts: the tenure of

international experts ends in August 2029.
Given that the involvement of international
experts has only recently started yielding
results, this practice should continue.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Risks of nominations by non-reformed Ukrainian bodies. Such a transition to

non-reformed Ukrainian bodies poses significant risks. These bodies lack
public trust and have serious integrity issues. For example, the leadership of
the Council of Attorneys has connections with Russia50. At the same time, the
Council of Judges51 delegated judges with serious integrity reservations to the
Ethics Council52 and the AGE53.

Limiting the involvement of international experts to a fixed number of years

always encourages political and judicial authorities to delay crucial reform
steps until such involvement expires. To mitigate risks, the international
experts’ participation could be in place until Ukraine reaches milestones of
sufficient development of the rule of law and cleansing of the judiciary, such as
EU accession or closing the negotiations in Chapters 23-24. An alternative
approach to involving international experts is to nominate Ukrainian experts
with extensive experience in evaluating the integrity of Ukrainian judges under
the international quota.

The Bar
The 2012 Law ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’54 is the primary document
regulating the relevant sphere. The Bar Council of Ukraine is the executive
body of the Bar, responsible for enacting mandatory regulatory acts for
attorneys, maintaining the register of attorneys, and managing the funds of
the UNBA. The head of the BCU is the ex-officio head of the Ukrainian National
Bar Association, a professional association of attorneys. Membership in the
UNBA is mandatory for all attorneys. As a result, the same individuals govern
the Bar and the UNBA, leading, in practice, to the merger of these entities and
the concentration of power within one group55.

01 The exclusive right of attorneys

in court representation
Until November 2012, anyone could be a representative in the court. Later,
amendments to the Constitution in 201656 stipulated that only an attorney
could represent others in court, with a few exceptions. This led to an increased
demand for obtaining attorney status, with the number of attorneys in Ukraine
doubling to 69,000 in 2015-202457. Many sitting judges, prosecutors, and law
enforcement officers possess an attorney's license as a contingency plan. The
legality of obtaining licences by those officials raises questions58.

02 Monopoly

of the UNBA
Currently, the Constitutional Court is deliberating the issue of the possible
unconstitutionality of mandatory membership for attorneys in the UNBA59.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

While in many countries, it's standard for attorneys to have a single exclusive
professional association, in Ukraine, the UNBA's monopoly and its practical
‘merger’ with the BCU have led to several adverse outcomes: connections with
Russia, corruption, particularly in admission to the profession, the use of
disciplinary proceedings to exert pressure on attorneys, low-quality continuing
education courses, and a lack of transparency in the management of
finances60. The solution for the Bar reform may lie in establishing multiple
attorneys' associations, which would compete for attorney membership by
providing high-quality services, including professional development
programmes, and advocating attorneys' professional rights and interests.

03 Connections of the Bar

leadership with Russia

Connections between the Bar leadership and Russia raise significant concerns.
The head of the Bar, Lidia Izovitova, is associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a
close ally of Vladimir Putin61. During the war, Izovitova maintains active
contacts with Russian attorneys who support Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The
Bar has never condemned Russia's armed aggression or collaborating
attorneys62. The latter participated in the torture of Ukrainian activists and
prisoners, thereby legitimising the actions of the occupation authorities63.

In November 2023, the UNBA appointed Oleksiy Shevchuk as a

spokesperson64, who allegedly was involved in a corruption scheme facilitating
the illegal emigration of men abroad, the disappearance of ten thousand first-
aid kits for the military and was an attorney of pro-Russian politicians65.
Although Izovitova's tenure ended in 2022, she obstructs new elections,
indicating that it is impossible to convene the Council of Attorneys due to the
war66. Those elections have to appoint two members of the HCJ67, which is
overloaded with almost ten thousand complaints68. Hence, enacting a law
mandating the reboot of the Bar leadership by convening the CAU within a
specified timef rame is vital.

04 Prevalence

of corruption

Cases where attorneys are involved in corrupt activities to influence court

decisions are widespread69. There exists a category of ‘postman-attorneys’ who
know whom and how much money to bring to ensure a case is decided in
favour of the client70. A bright example is a recent high-profile corruption case,
where the attorney was caught offering a $200,000 bribe to anti-corruption
prosecutors and detectives71. The Bar leadership is shielding such
wrongdoings since disciplinary actions are rarely initiated against attorneys
involved in corruption schemes72.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Almost half of the attorneys know about corruption schemes during the bar
exam73. Introducing a unified and transparent bar exam and vetting the Bar is
imperative to ensure the professionalism and integrity of attorneys74. Moreover,
establishing a single qualification commission responsible for organising and
conducting the bar exam is highly needed.

05 Pressure on attorneys through

disciplinary proceedings

The Bar's leadership has repeatedly used disciplinary proceedings to pressure

independent attorneys75. Public “criticism of the activities, decisions, election
process, or members” of the Bar (even in social media) is also officially defined
as a violation of attorney ethics76, which can lead to suspension or revocation of
their license. Attorneys were disbarred for their actions during public service,
not legal practice77. Also, the Bar leadership claims that disciplinary actions
have to be initiated against attorneys who mobilised for military service and
did not suspend their attorney’s license78. Yet, the former does not react to the
actions of corrupt attorneys and those who openly collaborate with Russian
authorities or transmit Russian propaganda messages79.

The High Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Attorneys fails to fulfil

its legal obligation to consolidate disciplinary practice, which remains
heterogeneous and chaotic and has multiple problematic issues. Therefore, it
needs to be rebooted with the participation of the public sector and
international experts. The European Commission also stated that “disciplinary
procedures for lawyers require significant improvements in law and practice80”.

06 Continuing

education

Ongoing professional development is one of the established international

principles of legal practice81, also enshrined in the law on the Bar. However,
contrary to the law, the BCU has restricted the choice of attorneys and
mandated that they improve their qualifications at the High School of
Attorneys, founded by the UNBA, which turned it into a profitable business
generating high revenues for its management82.

Moreover, attorneys voice grievances regarding the outdated curriculum83 and

unsatisfactory level of teaching at the HSA84. It is necessary to abolish the
monopoly of the HSA on attorneys’ professional growth and to return to the
decentralised model enshrined in this law.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

07 Finances

The European Commission, in its report on Ukraine, emphasises that “resource

management of the Bar should be improved and made more transparent and
accountable”85. The Bar bodies administer millions, with the annual
membership fees amounting to approximately UAH 140 million86. The BCU has
repeatedly introduced fees not stipulated by law, effectively functioning as
payments for services rendered87. Bar’s financial reports for 2022 and 2023
remain unpublished88, and previous reports lack details with no independent
audit confirmation. Legislative measures are necessary to establish transparent
budgetary processes and ensure proper financial reporting by the Bar, subject
to independent audit verification.

Legal Education

Ukraine has been striving to combat corruption in the judiciary for many years.
However, the low integrity of judges and attorneys remains a common
phenomenon. The root of this problem lies in legal education, which tolerates
corruption and plagiarism and has low requirements for entry into the
profession. As a result, there is a significant shortage of candidates meeting
the criteria of professionalism and integrity for more than 2,000 vacant judge
positions89 despite a large number of law school graduates. The competition
for judges’ positions in the Constitutional Court demonstrated the crisis among
lawyers90,91. The European Commission92 and G7 ambassadors93 have
emphasised the urgent need for legal education reform.

In December 2023, the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Policy established a

Working Group on Legal Education Reform to prepare a draft law for legal
education reform94. Since its establishment, the Working Group has made
limited progress, having held just one meeting.

Regulation

The Law ‘On Higher Education’ and by-laws regulate the relevant sphere. There
is no separate law on higher legal education. Most higher education
institutions are subordinate to the Ministry of Education and Science. However,
some HEIs are under the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies, primarily
the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Institutional delineation of legal education

and law enforcement training

Approximately 20% of law students do not study in universities overseen by the

Ministry of Education but in specialised institutions subordinated to law
enforcement agencies, where the quality is significantly lower95.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Instead of focusing on developing critical thinking, human rights protection,

and promoting the rule of law, future lawyers are primarily trained in marching,
obedience, and criminal apprehension. Legal education in law enforcement
agencies and institutions is absent in EU countries. Thus, the EU's and G7
ambassadors' appeal for delineating legal and law enforcement education,
where lawyers educated exclusively in civil HEIs and law enforcement officers
solely trained in institutions subordinate to these agencies, is justified and
imperative. The Government of Ukraine recently confirmed that the
institutional delineation should be carried out until 202796.  

Transparent and merit-based allocation of public funds

Over the last few years, over 60% of state funding for legal education has been
received by HEIs subordinate to law enforcement agencies, which educate
about 20% of law students97. These institutions receive funding outside of
competition and not based on their merits98. Therefore, it is necessary to
introduce transparent, fair distribution of public funds.

Elimination of the legal education requirement

for certain positions

Legal education in Ukraine is mandated by the law not only for traditional legal
careers but also for various managerial roles within the state bodies99. This
lacks justification and artificially increases the demand for a legal degree.
Furthermore, the legislation provides salary supplements for judges and
employees of law enforcement agencies with doctoral degrees, creating a
market for doctoral dissertation writing services. Hence, abolishing the legal
education requirement for positions where it is not practically essential and
revoking salary supplements based on the doctorate is critical.

Optimisation of the network

and strengthening licensing standards of HEIs

~300 law

schools 40 law

schools101

100K
law students
38K
law students102

35 MLN100 38 MLN
population population

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Many of these institutions are ‘education businesses’ offering diplomas in law

for money.

Law programmes below the bachelor's degree (almost 20% of law students in
112 colleges) will be abolished in 2025. As a result, the number of law students
and law schools will be significantly reduced103. Further measures should be
the termination of distance learning (32% of law students), raising licensing
standards for law schools, reducing their number, and increasing the quality of
those that remain.

Strengthening admission requirements

The minimum admission score, which had been very low for years, was
significantly raised in 2024104. Meanwhile, institutions of the law enforcement
agencies still have a separate simplified admission procedure105. Therefore,
introducing justified high admission requirements and tests for analytical and
critical thinking is needed to attract the best and most motivated applicants to
law schools.

The Unified State Qualification Exam

After numerous delays, the USQE was introduced at the end of 2023, marking
an important step towards establishing a mechanism akin to the US Bar
Examination. However, improvements are needed to make the USQE an
effective filter, including raising the passing score, preparing high-quality test
materials, and establishing transparent evaluation criteria.

Curriculum modernisation

Many law schools employ outdated teaching

methods and curricula. 82% of law students
believe that law school educational

programmes are obsolete106.

Almost 80% of employers highlighted law

school graduates' low knowledge and skills107.

Therefore, the modernisation of curricula

should focus on acquiring practical skills,

developing analytical thinking,

providing the opportunity to choose 


subjects, studying EU law108 and legal 

ethics, and combatting plagiarism.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

CHAPTER 23: JUDICIARY

& FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
03 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS
Human rights violations by the Russian Federation
Since Russia launched its full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, the population of Ukraine has been subject to massive violations of its
rights. The Russian military constantly and systematically commits numerous
crimes against the civilian population both in the occupied and government-
controlled territories of Ukraine. On the government-controlled territories of
Ukraine, it is primarily massive shelling, destruction of civilian infrastructure,
and the killing and wounding of civilians. In the temporarily occupied
territories, the Ukrainian population is becoming a victim of numerous war
crimes. These include illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, torture,
inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual crimes, murder, and crimes against
property. It is impossible to determine the exact number of people in Ukraine
against whom the Russian military has committed crimes. To date, the
investigative authorities of Ukraine have opened more than

130 000+ criminal proceedings

regarding war crimes

According to the Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special

Circumstances, 37,000 people are officially considered missing as a result of the
war109, with a significant number being prisoners of war and civilians illegally
deprived of their liberty, held in detention facilities in Russia incommunicado,
and constantly subjected to torture110. As of August 2024, around 3,400
prisoners of war and 160 civilians were released from captivity as part of
exchanges between Ukraine and Russia, with the latter constantly
manipulating the issue and threatening to withdraw from the process.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

As of February 2024, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
estimates111 that at least 10,000 civilians have been killed in the fighting.
However, the actual number of deaths is likely much higher, as it is impossible
to establish their number in the Russia-occupied territories. Apart f rom
hundreds of thousands of residential and non-residential buildings,

Medical institutions

1500+ 214
were
were
damaged destroyed112

Educational institutions

3800+ 365
were
were
damaged destroyed112

Moreover, since October 2022, Russia has damaged up to 70% of all energy
facilities in Ukraine due to its constant missile attacks. The damage to the
energy infrastructure is estimated113 at $12.5 billion. The International Criminal
Court has issued four arrest warrants for Russian military personnel for shelling
and destroying Ukraine's energy system classifying it as a crime against
humanity114.

Current obligations
In its November 2023 Enlargement package report, the EU Commission listed
several necessary actions for Ukraine to be implemented within the next
reporting period, such as:

01 Adopt legislation to transpose and implement the provisions of the

Istanbul Convention.

To ensure the implementation of the Istanbul Convention during 2023-2024,

the Ukrainian parliament is processing and considering draft acts related to
criminal and administrative proceedings and liability for committing domestic
violence and violence against women:

on Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine regarding

Examination and Expertise, Conclusion of Reconciliation Agreements and
Criminal Proceedings in the Form of Private Prosecution in Connection with
fi
the Rati cation of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul
Convention), adopted as a whole, being prepared for the next reading;

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine and the Code of Ukraine on

Administrative Offenses in Terms of Regulation of Liability for Unlawful Acts
that may be defined as Gender-Based Violence in Connection with the
Ratification of the Istanbul Convention; and On Amendments to Certain
Legislative Acts on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and
Men and Combating Domestic Violence in terms of Harmonising Terminology
with the Provisions of the Istanbul Convention, both being processed in the
profile parliamentary committee.

The draft law ‘On Amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative

Offenses in Connection with the Ratification of the Council of Europe
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and
Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention)’ was adopted on May 22, 2024, and
will enter into force on December 19, 2024.

02
Finalise the review of existing legislation on the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities, including in education, media and the use
of state language and in the law on national minorities in line with the
recommendations of the Venice Commission Opinion of June 2023 and of its
follow-up opinion of October 6, 2023.

The substance of this recommendation is covered below in the section on

national minorities' rights.

03
Introduce annual public reporting to the Parliament on the work of
the Prosecutor General’s Office and the State Bureau of Investigation on
investigating acts of torture and protecting victims and organise a review
of the performance of the National Preventive Mechanism.

The respective obligation to introduce the reporting is present in two relevant

Action Plans115 116. However, according to the plan on reforming law
enforcement agencies, public reporting to the Parliament should occur
annually after the Ukrainian parliament adopts a law on extra-parliamentary
control over law enforcement and prosecution bodies. As of early September,
no draft laws have been registered at the Verkhovna Rada.

As for the review of the National Preventive Mechanism, numerous violations of

human rights and freedoms are taking place in the detention institutions117.
Many internal investigations and criminal proceedings have been conducted
based on the monitoring results. Therefore, the work of the National Preventive
Mechanism has been deemed satisfying and dynamically improving, but no
official news on any initiatives of its review has been publicly reported.

04
4. Ensure the application of the legislation on the rights of persons with
disabilities and that restored and reconstructed infrastructure is compliant
with barrier-free environment standards.

This is covered in the two respective Action Plans118 119. The barrier-free

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

environment has been the particular focus of attention in 2024. The Minister of
Environmental Protection reported several success stories120, yet there are still
a lot of complaints from people with disabilities regarding non-inclusive
facilities, even in big cities. As for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure
in line with the barrier-free guidelines, the former was suspended in 2024 due
to a lack of budget allocated to the Agency for Recovery.

International human rights instruments

On August 21, 2024, the Verkhovna Rada finally ratified the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, thus recognising the jurisdiction of the ICC
on pre-trial investigation and judicial consideration of the international crimes
committed in Ukraine and/or by Ukrainian citizens (also noted in the previous
report as a to-do obligation of Ukraine). The ratification was made with the
reservation under Article 124 of the Rome Statute, according to which Ukraine
does not recognise ICC jurisdiction regarding the investigation and trial of war
crimes (prescribed by Article 8 of the Rome Statute) allegedly committed by
Ukrainian citizens during the first seven years after the ratification (such a right
is provided to the newly acceding members under the mentioned article). The
Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code amendments should be adopted
and implemented to make the Rome Statute work in Ukraine.

The previous Enlargement report recommended ratifying the International

Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families. Yet, no relevant draft law has been introduced to
the parliament. The same applies to the Protocol Amending the Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data of the Council of Europe.

Applications pending before the European Court

for Human Rights
As of June 30, 2024, 7,900 applications were pending121 before the European
Court of Human Rights, constituting 12.4% of the cases. This is significantly less
than a year ago (9,656 applications). However, Ukraine ranked third in the
number of opened proceedings after Turkey and the Russian Federation
(proceedings against which are still being considered despite expulsion from
the Council of Europe).

Imposing martial law in Ukraine following the Russian full-scale onslaught

brought a lot of new challenges to the situation with human rights in Ukraine.
In 2022, Ukraine officially filed a notification on derogation of certain rights and
freedoms prescribed by the Constitution of Ukraine and corresponding to
global and European international human rights instruments122. Nevertheless,
this did not prevent filing applications by the Ukrainian citizens to the ECtHR
for the alleged violation of human rights by the Ukrainian state. Many of those
applications are related to the reported violation of freedom of movement

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

(Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention). The first case, officially

communicated to the ECtHR, was KONICHENKO v. UKRAINE. Ukraine has

formally notified of derogation from its obligations under this Article. However,

the applicant claims that Ukrainian authorities restricted this right illegally

without proper amendments to the legislation (a respective law and a

regulation by the Presidential Decree on imposing martial law) but only based

on the internal letters of the State Border Service.

In 2023, civil society organisations highlighted problems with implementing

the ECtHR decisions adopted in favour of applicants living in Ukrainian

territories temporarily occupied by Russia. Given their lack of access to

government-controlled territory, institutions, and legal representatives,

applicants cannot provide the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine with duly certified

powers of attorney.

In 2024, this situation stayed the same, with no amendments introduced to the

by-laws regulating notary activities or the respective law regulating the

application of the ECtHR decision. However, this also aims to prevent false

transactions with the property and assets of Ukrainians, which might occur

under pressure f rom the occupational ‘authorities’, notarial acts by notaries

whose workplace (office) is located in the Ukrainian territories temporarily

occupied by the Russian Federation have been prohibited. This concerns all the

notary transactions and not only those related to the transmission of rights to

apply to enforcing the ECtHR judgements. However, no public discussions and

draft amendments have been published or discussed.

Institutional set-up

The Ombudsman is Ukraine's crucial national authority on human rights

protection. Compared with 2022, the number of appeals increased more than

twice, amounting to 95,796 appeals in 2023. This rise may, among other things,

be explained by the expansion of the Ombudsman’s offices in Ukraine’s

regions. The Ombudsman’s Office actively participates in monitoring and

legislative process. In 2023, the structural units of the Commissioner's

Secretariat processed 2,731 positions to draft legal acts filed with the Verkhovna

Rada. In monitoring, the Ombudsman and his Office have elaborated and

implemented some initiatives for the first time. For instance, in 2023, the

Regulation setting out the principles of monitoring and the grounds, stages of

preparation, and conduct of this procedure was approved.

During the reported period, a significant amount of the Ombudsman’s Office

work was focused on issues related to protecting the rights of the Ukrainian

military servicepeople (acting, prisoners of war, and missing ones) and their

relatives (20.5 % of applications). The Ombudsman also actively participates in

amending the legislation on mobilisation, aiming to strike a balance between

the need to protect Ukraine’s survival and sovereignty and the necessity to

comply with all the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the

Constitution and international human rights instruments.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

For instance, in February 2024, he publicly criticised 123

the long-awaited draft
law on mobilisation measures, claiming it to be non-compliant with the
Constitution of Ukraine and containing contradictory provisions. M
oreover, in
2023, the Ombudsman’s Office monitored more than 833 military medical
commissions, with many violations of the human rights of recruited persons
L
identified. ater, the office presented proposals to reform the work of those
commissions.

As for the prisoners of war, the Ukrainian Ombudsman fulfils his mandate
regarding both Ukrainian PoWs detained in Russia and Russian PoWs in
Ukraine. Ukraine’s Ombudsman Office constantly submits letters and requests
for information about the Ukrainian PoWs, their health condition, allowances,
etc. As for the Russian PoWs, the Ombudsman’s Office constantly monitors
compliance of the detention facilities, food, and medical treatment in line with
the Geneva Convention III and other international instruments, allowing the
PoWs to communicate with their families.

Special attention is dedicated to protecting child rights, preventing/

persecuting international crimes committed against Ukrainian children and
returning the forcefully deported/displaced Ukrainian children to Russia and
temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The Ombudsman’s Office has a
lead in actively elaborating the international mechanism of repatriating such
kids back to Ukraine. Thus, as of August 2024, 388 Ukrainian children have been
reported124 officially returned to Ukraine. The Ombudsman’s Office is also one
of the leading institutions within the BringKidsBackUA125 international expert
group. In 2023126 and 2024127, the Ombudsman collected and optimised
information and analysis of the violations of rights and international rights
committed against Ukrainian children and their present and future possible
consequences for the Ukrainian children and Ukraine in general.

Media freedom

Media survival remains fragile due to both economic and security challenges.
At the same time, good progress has been achieved in bringing the Law on
Media into force and amending Order No. 73 of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine, facilitating media and journalists access to the war
zone. Citizens of Ukraine exercise freedom of expression, and there is criticism
and investigative journalism in the media. Ukraine must consider ways to
support independent media, including the Public Broadcaster, in the long
term.

In 2024, Ukraine moved up 18 positions in the Press Freedom Index of the

international human rights organisation Reporters Without Borders, ranking
61st128 (in 2023, Ukraine was ranked 79th). At the same time, Reporters state that
the full-scale war launched by Russia threatens the survival of Ukrainian media
by the expansion of Russian propaganda and weakening the Ukrainian
economy.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

2024
2023

61
/180
the Press
Freedom Index
2024

From 2013 to 2023, Ukraine rose f rom 126th to 79th in the World Press Freedom
Index. Over the decade, Ukraine has significantly improved the working
conditions of journalists and the media landscape despite the war waged by
Russia on the territory of Ukraine.129

Russia's crimes against media and journalists. From October 2023 to

August 2024, the Institute of Mass Information recorded 75 crimes against
media and journalists in Ukraine committed by Russia. These include
kidnapping of journalists, shootings and injuries, threats against media
professionals, damage to media offices, cybercrime, shutting down Ukrainian
broadcasting, legal pressure, and blocking of Internet access. In addition,
Ukrainian media continues to be closed as a result of the financial crisis caused
by Russia's full-scale aggression, suffering from problems with energy supply,
shelling, evacuation, and mobilisation.

At least 13 journalists from both foreign and Ukrainian media got injured as a
result of Russian shelling between October 2023 and August 2024130,131. During
this period, Russian shelling destroyed or damaged at least ten media offices.
Not a month went by without Russian hackers attacking Ukrainian media. In
particular, online media websites and satellite channels are subject to massive
attacks. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 87 media
professionals have been killed, 11 of them while on duty, 76 as civilian victims of
shelling and torture, or during their service at the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Kidnapping of journalists. In the reporting period, the media informed

about at least nine kidnappings of journalists by Russians. These occurred
mainly in the occupied territory of Ukraine–parts of the Kherson, Luhansk, and
Zaporizhzhia regions. As of the end of summer 2024, Russia is illegally
detaining132 31 Ukrainian media workers, all of them being civilian hostages
despite Russia declaring them combatants.133

Crimean journalists illegally detained by Russia are imprisoned on false

charges, primarily for long periods, from 14 to 20 years. Russia uses torture and
abuse against captured journalists and refuses to provide medical care134.
Among the articles that Russia incriminates journalists are public calls for:

terrorist attacks135
illegal acquisition

state treason and espionage

transfer, sale, storage, transportation
illegal manufacture of explosives
/ carrying of weapons

alteration / repair of explosive devices their main parts, and ammunition.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Shelling of TV towers. In 2024, the Russians resumed shelling Ukrainian

television and radio infrastructure. Previously, IMI recorded 16 cases like this at
the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. In particular, in March
2024, the Russians deliberately attacked television infrastructure facilities in the
Kharkiv region with drones and launched missile and air strikes on radio
facilities in the Sumy region. As a result, some settlements in the Sumy region
were left without TV and radio signals.

During this period, Russia committed

crimes against media and journalists in
11 regions of Ukraine, including both

11
frontline and rear regions

(Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Odesa,

Donetsk, Dnipro, Ternopil, Sumy,
Poltava, Luhansk, and Kherson regions). regions

Operational challenges for media in times of war. One of the main

challenges for Ukrainian editorial offices has been the prolonged power
blackouts throughout Ukraine caused by the Russian shelling of energy
infrastructure. These blackouts significantly complicate collecting, processing,
and transmitting information. They also impaired contact with the audience,
which is also affected by blackouts and lack of access to the Internet. The
media have to quickly adjust their work to the blackouts and look for funds for
power equipment (generators, batteries, power banks, fuel).

Ukrainian editorial offices, especially regional ones, are in a critical financial

situation due to the falling advertising market. According to a survey of
regional media conducted by IMI in June 2024, 41% of all requests from editorial
offices concerned financial support. Many editorial offices need help covering
basic operating costs. Another challenge was the staffing problems in the
media related to the mobilisation of male media professionals into the Armed
Forces and the evacuation and relocation of journalists to safer places.

Crimes against media and journalists committed by the Ukrainian side.

The main categories of violations for which Ukrainian entities are responsible in
the period from October 2023 to August 2024 were: restriction of access to
public information - 17 cases; cybercrime - 15 cases; obstruction of legitimate
journalistic activities - 14 cases; indirect pressure - 12 cases (mostly spying on
journalists); threats - 11 cases. In total, 87 crimes were recorded in 2023, for
which the Ukrainian side is responsible. Before the pre-full-scale invasion in
2021, IMI recorded 197 violations.

Monopoly in the information space and signs of censorship. The case of

the introduction of censorship and black-lists in the state news agency

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Ukrinform has gained wide publicity in Ukraine. The information about the

‘blacklists’ was published by Ukrayinska Pravda and later confirmed by former

Ukrinform employees. At the same time, the police found no grounds to open

the criminal proceeding. As of September 2024, the case is under consideration

by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech, which plans to set

up a commission to study the situation in detail.

The TV marathon United News threatens media pluralism, as the television

space has come mainly under state control. Detector Media's monitoring of the

marathon shows an unbalanced representation of political forces favouring the

Servant of the People on all channels involved in creating the marathon. The

marathon has low viewer ratings and trust, is criticised by civil society, and

threatens pluralism in information coverage. Ukrainians’ trust in the telethon

has dropped to 36%.136

Public broadcasting. Since May 21, 2024, the Public Broadcaster has de

facto withdrawn from the TV marathon and started its round-the-clock

broadcasting on Channel One. De jure, Suspilne remained a part of the

marathon, as evidenced by a memorandum signed by all project participants.

The withdrawal from the marathon came after Svitlana Ostapa, the head of the

Supervisory Board of Suspilne, said Suspilne was about to be thrown out of the

evening slots of the telethon. This came after MP Mariana Bezuhla, affiliated

with the Office of the President, launched an information campaign against

Suspilne. In connection with the pressure on Suspilne, the European

Broadcasting Union, the Parliamentary Committee on Ukraine's EU Integration,

Mediarukh, and the Public Council under the Committee on Freedom of

Speech spoke out in Suspilne’s defence. This helped to protect the broadcaster

from attacks while leaving the state marathon to produce its content.

Public broadcasting in Ukraine systematically adheres to journalistic standards

and maintains editorial independence. However, the public broadcaster's

funding level is insufficient for proper functioning. According to the Law ‘On

Public Media’, the state must provide funding for Public Broadcasting at the

level of at least 0.2% of the general expenditures of the State Budget of Ukraine

for the previous year. Thus, in 2024, the broadcaster:

should have received yet RECEIVED three times less

5.5 BLN₴ 1.8 BLN₴

At the same time, the

government has allocated UAH 1.5

billion for government media to

finance the so-called United TV

Marathon.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Pressure on investigative journalists. In 2023-2024,

well-known investigative journalists, including Yuriy Nikolov of Nashi Hroshi,
and journalists from Bihus.Info and Slidstvo.Info, were subjected to pressure.
Anonymous Telegram channels affiliated with the authorities published
provocative videos calling journalists ‘enemies of the people’, agents, and
evaders, accused them of drug use, and used summons as a repressive tool.
Bihus.Info and Slidstvo.Info found out that the Security Service of Ukraine was
surveilling journalists because of their investigations. In particular, Yevhen
Shulhat from Slidstvo.info was approached by the military enlistment officers
with a draft summons right after he published a story about the assets of the
family of one of the Service chiefs, Ilya Vityuk. The media community
Mediarukh demanded the opening of a criminal proceeding against the
Special Security Service and the Territorial Centre for Recruitment and Social
Support. Eventually, on May 1, 2024, the President Zelenskyi fired Vityuk.

In general, Ukrainians rely heavily on Telegram channels to receive news during

the war. The annual USAID/Internews Media Consumption Survey137,
conducted from July to September 2023, confirmed that Telegram remains the
key social network for news consumption (72%). In 2021, only 20% of Ukrainians
used Telegram as a news source.
At the same time, according to IMI research138, many of Ukraine's most popular
Telegram channels spread fake news, particularly related to mobilisation. The
Ukrainian authorities have also stated the number of threats to Ukraine's
security posed by this messenger. Some media offices are gradually closing
their Telegram channels.

Changes to Ukrainian media legislation

over the past year:
01 New rules for journalists in combat zones and adjacent areas were
developed. On February 26, 2024, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine published an updated ‘Recommendations for Journalists on the
Organisation of Work at Military Facilities and in Combat Areas under Martial
Law’. Amending Order No. 73 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine ‘On the organisation of interaction between the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, other components of the defence forces and representatives of the
media for the duration of the legal regime of martial law’139 simplified media
access by providing a detailed description of the zones (green, yellow, and red)
and removing the requirement to stop the work of journalists in case of a life
threat. The amendments were made based on IMI's recommendations after
war correspondents reported about censorship and selectivity in red-zone
access for journalists140.

02 The independence of the media regulator should be ensured by adequate

funding. The budgetary financing of the National Council of Television and
Radio Broadcasting for 2024 is insufficient.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

According to the Law ‘On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2024’141, UAH 229
million is allocated for the Regulator—development costs amount to only UAH
10.25 million. Moreover, the legislative guarantees of financing the National
Council were suspended for 2024 by the law on the State Budget.

03 The Roadmap to support restoring a pluralistic, transparent and

142
independent post-war media space has been approved . Three objectives
include: I. ‘Promoting the stable resumption of the activities of media entities in
Ukraine’, II. ‘Ensuring access to information’, and III. ‘Increasing the resilience of
Ukraine’s population to disinformation and manipulative information’.

04 Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Media’. Some amendments were

introduced to this law: some technical (to clarify the wording of a relatively
recent law), some concerned clarifications regarding the language of the
aggressor state in the media143 and restrictions for public authorities on
entering the ownership structure of print and online media144,145.

Rights of national minorities

During the reporting period, Ukraine adopted a law amending the legal
f ramework on national minorities and several by-laws. The legal f ramework for
Indigenous people did not change.

In December 2023, Ukraine’s parliament adopted Law No. 3504-IX146,

amending several legal acts regarding the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities, including the f ramework one147. Drafted by the
Government after consultations with various minority organisations148, this Law
also aimed to incorporate the latest Venice Commission recommendations149
on the eve of the European Council meeting on Ukraine’s EU candidacy status.

One of the key amendments concerned education. The Law cancelled the
quota system for the EU languages150. It allowed 100% of secondary education
in the mother tongue with four subjects only being taught in the state
language: Ukrainian language, literature, history, and protection of Ukraine151.
The amendment applies to the EU languages and those languages protected
by Ukraine under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages152,
except for the official languages of states recognised as aggressors or
occupying powers by Ukraine’s parliament. Other changes concern the use of
minorities’ languages in various areas, including but not limited to media,
election campaigns, books in minority languages, and advertising. The revised
legal f ramework on national minorities considers the Venice Commission
recommendations.

The 2022 Framework Law153 envisaged the by-laws adopted during the
reporting period.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

February 2024

the Government adopted the Methodology for using the languages of

national minorities (communities) of Ukraine in settlements traditionally
resided by persons belonging to these communities or in which such
persons make up a significant part of the population 154. Later in March, the
Government approved the Procedure for determining the list of the
settlements mentioned above 155.

June 2024

the Government approved the List of languages of national minorities

(communities) and indigenous peoples of Ukraine in danger of
extinction156.

October 2023

the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience
approved the Regulation on the Council of Public Associations of National
Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine157. This allowed for an open
competition to elect 18 persons from 18 different minorities to the Council,
which held its first inaugural meeting on May 31, 2024158. The current
composition of the Council will be operative for four years.

February 2024

the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience
approved the Procedure for establishing and functioning the Centre for
National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine159. The framework Law No.
2827-IX envisages such Centres, and the Procedure clarifies practical
mechanisms of their operation, such as management.

All the secondary legislation mentioned above, except for the List of languages
in danger of extinction, was drafted before the December 2023 legislative
changes occurred. As the Venice Commission recommended enshrining some
of the guarantees directly in Framework Law to ensure legal certainty, some
legal provisions are currently duplicated in the Law and the by-laws.

Roma minority. In December 2023, the government adopted the Action Plan
for 2024-2025 to implement the Roma Strategy up to 2030160. The Strategy was
adopted in July 2021, but the development of the Action Plan was postponed
due to the Russian full-scale invasion and the need to adapt its provisions to
the full-out war context. In addition to the national action plan, regional
military administrations developed their regional action plans to implement
the strategy at the local level. The Intragovernmental Coordinating Working
Group on the Strategy’s implementation, established in 2022

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

and headed by the Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine161, held its
first meeting in June 2024162. Representatives of Roma minority organisations
are also members of this Group.

Institutional changes. The key central governmental authority responsible for

developing and implementing state policy on national minorities is the State
Service for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience. During the reporting
period, Ukraine’s Ombudsman started exercising parliamentary control over
the right of national minorities to use their languages163. This strengthened
oversight of minority language use and balanced promoting the state
language with protecting minority languages.

Media landscape. In December 2023, leaders of the Hungarian community in

Ukraine sent a letter to the Hungarian Government asking for Ukraine’s
support during the EU accession164. According to the media, the Hungarian
response was not encouraging,165 although Hungary did not block the opening
of accession negotiations.

In January 2024, Hungary sent 11 paragraphs of demands regarding the

Hungarian minority in Ukraine, conditioning Ukraine’s EU accession to
implement such demands. Ukraine publicly committed to fulfilling the latter.
Ukrainian media revealed the content of Hungarian requests in late June
2024166. The demands include some provisions based on the Hungarian
position on minorities, which cannot be considered as Ukraine’s obligations or
international standards. This situation overall raises doubts about the
legitimacy and aims of Hungarian pressure.

International obligations. In July 2024, Ukraine submitted its national report

under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages167. Ukraine’s
government is also drafting its report under the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities. Reporting on the latter is delayed, given that
the Advisory Committee has not visited Ukraine yet and has not delivered an
opinion on Ukraine’s previous national report (submitted in January 2022).

Religious minorities. A long-lasting public discussion on the activities of

religious organisations affiliated with the Russian Federation in Ukraine
resulted in the respective Law, passed by the Parliament on August 20, 2024168.
This Law prohibits Russian Orthodox Church activities in Ukraine and stipulates
criteria and procedures for establishing affiliation and banning and cancelling a
ban on foreign religious organisations in Ukraine. The Law affects the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church (affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate) since its affiliation
with the Russian Orthodox Church has already been established169. While there
is caution regarding the Law’s provisions, in particular, because the state
experts are authorised to examine if a religious organisation has a link with
ROC, the court should consider a case and deliver a judgment on a concrete
legal entity. Remarkably, the Law was supported by the Ukrainian Council of
Churches and Religious Organisations170.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

Internally displaced persons

The International Organisation for Migration estimates the number of IDPs in

Ukraine as of April 2024 at around 3.5 million. Slightly more than 4.7 million
have returned to their usual place of residence. The number of Ukrainians living
abroad is more than four million. The vast movement of people forced to flee
their homes created an acute shortage in the labour market and an additional
burden on the state budget of Ukraine to provide needed social support to
internally displaced persons.

This category of population is one of the most vulnerable in Ukraine. Many IDP
households have incomes per person below the subsistence level. The problem
of housing is also very acute. Only a tiny part of IDPs live in specially equipped
temporary accommodation. The rest are forced to rent housing and pay rent or
live with relatives171. In 2024, the severity of these problems remained
unchanged, and no significant steps were taken to address them.

Today, Ukraine's state policy on solving the problems of IDPs is partially

ineffective. In 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Strategy of
State Policy on Internal Displacement until 2025 and the operational plan for its
implementation in 2023-2025 to effectively address all issues related to IDPs at
all stages, f rom displacement to return or integration into a new community. In
January 2024, the Temporary Special Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine on the protection of property and non-property rights of IDPs and
other persons affected by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine recognised the implementation of the Strategy to be
insufficient172. In particular, due to a lack of consistency in legislation, many
internally displaced persons lost the right to receive housing allowances in
2024.

There is an urgent need to adopt a new version of the Law ‘On Ensuring the
Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons’. The current law dates
back to 2014, and despite the legal changes over the past ten years, new
approaches to state policy towards internally displaced persons need to be
enshrined. In particular, the state should regulate a timef rame during which a
person retains IDP status. In the years since the first displacement in 2014,
many IDPs have adapted to their new place of residence and are no longer
displaced but retain this status. Approaches to social security also need to be
updated, as well as the development of relevant programmes of housing
assistance, employment assistance, etc. Despite this, a new draft law has not
been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and its text has not been
agreed upon.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

CHAPTER 24: Justice,

freedom, and security

chapter

24
National Police of Ukraine

The National Police of Ukraine is the largest173 law enforcement agency in the
country, investigating 84% of all crimes and 77% of corruption crimes174. In
addition, since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the NPU
has initiated more than 120,000 criminal proceedings related to crimes by
Russian armed forces and their accomplices175.

In its 2023 Enlargement Package report, the European Commission noted that
the NPU “continues to suffer from corruption, outdated equipment and limited
capacity in general, including the ability to conduct financial investigations”176.
In February 2024, the NACP audited the NPU's corruption prevention work.
According to the audit, the NPU does not have internal and regular channels
for reporting corruption, lacks a proper procedure for identifying corruption
risks in public procurement, does not have adequate accounting and
distribution of charitable assistance, etc177. Thus, the NPU continues to have
significant shortcomings in its activities, which later contribute to corruption
loopholes.

The NPU remains politically dependent on the Ministry of Internal Affairs of

Ukraine, which prevents it from being an impartial body and effectively
investigating offences. Transforming the MIA, moving away from the concept
of a post-Soviet ministry of militia, and creating an independent and
professional law enforcement agency were among the reasons for the
liquidation of the militia and the creation of the NPU in 2015178.

Given that the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine directs and coordinates
NPU’s activities, the Chief of the Police is appointed and dismissed by the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine following the former’s proposals. The First
Deputy and Deputy Chiefs of the Police are appointed and dismissed by the
Minister upon the Chief of the Police's proposal. The First Deputy and Deputy
Chiefs of the Police are appointed and dismissed by the Minister upon

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

the Chief of the Police's proposal. Considering the absence of transparent,

competitive procedures for appointing senior positions at the NPU, such
appointments are political.

The State Anti-Corruption Programme179 for 2023-2025 obliged180 the MIA and
the NPU to develop a draft law allowing for a competitive selection of the NPU’s
senior leadership, with integrity as one of the key criteria. Civil society has
repeatedly appealed to the MIA and the NPU to introduce transparent
competition and appoint the NPU leadership with a commission that includes
representatives of international partners181. The draft law on competitions for
NPU senior positions should be developed based on the standards of the
recent NACP182 and NABU183 heads selections.

However, the MIA and the NPU developed a draft law that did not involve
consultation with civil society184. The draft law empowers the MIA to arbitrarily
set a list of managerial positions for competitive selection while lacking a
procedure and criteria for determining such positions. Thus, there is a risk of
manipulating the list and avoiding introducing competition for the Police Chief
and deputies.

Ineffective disciplinary procedures at the NPU

The NPU has faced criticism over corruption scandals and other abuses by the
NPU leadership. The situation worsened due to inadequate internal
investigation procedures and the lack of disciplinary sanctions against
compromised officials. For example, the head of the NPU, Ivan Vyhivskyi, has
been allegedly using the property of relatives who do not have sufficient official
income185. Despite public concern, the Minister of Internal Affairs refused to
launch an internal investigation, claiming that the NABU should investigate
it186. Given that the pre-trial investigation and prosecution of a law
enforcement agency head may last several years, the Minister’s reaction shows
a lack of will to bring the Police Chief to responsibility.

Since the system of bringing police officers to disciplinary responsibility is

ineffective, MIA and the NPU had to finalise a draft law in line with the State
Anti-Corruption Programme by July 31, 2024,187 allowing for the establishment
and functioning of two types of disciplinary commissions:

for internal investigations into violations (at least half of the members should

of constitutional rights and freedoms of be representatives of the public and

a person and citizen by police officers human rights organisations)

for internal investigations into other

disciplinary offences of police officers

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

However, the developed draft law does not guarantee the mandatory inclusion

of at least half of the civil society representatives in disciplinary commissions to

ensure compliance with the SACP requirements188 and to introduce an

independent and objective procedure.

The police officer certification procedure needs improvement

out of

100 000 In 2015, almost 100,000 militia officers were

transferred to the National Police. After
certification, which included two tests and a
short interview with the ministry-dominated
commission, only 6% of officers were found to
be incompatible with their positions.
Therefore, the new institution was staffed
entirely by representatives of the old system189.

The State Anti-Corruption Programme obliged the Ministry of Internal Affairs

and the National Police to reform the police performance appraisal system by
introducing efficiency, integrity, managerial competencies (for managers), and
performance assessments190. At the same time, the developed draft law does
not include performance among the evaluation criteria191.

Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine

Law No. 3840-IX, adopted on June 20, 2024,192 on the reboot of the Economic
Security Bureau of Ukraine, was quite challenging to pass, as it initially did not
meet the requirements of international partners. However, due to the threat of
not receiving the next tranche from the International Monetary Fund, the draft
law was finally adopted in a more or less acceptable version to all stakeholders.

According to the Law, the commission to elect the ESBU head consists of three
persons appointed directly by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and three
others appointed based on proposals from international and foreign
organisations. The decision is made by four votes, of which at least two are from
representatives of international organisations. The law also introduces a new
method of staff appointment at the ESBU, which is exclusively based on
competitive selection conducted by personnel commissions. Those
commissions are formed by the ESBU Director with five members each,
including at least two members nominated by the assembly of representatives
of civil society organisations and at least one member nominated by the Public
Control Council of the ESBU.

In the case of personnel commissions, the law provides too lenient and abstract
requirements for civil society organisations that may delegate their
representatives. Therefore, there is a risk that candidates from unauthorised
and/or artificial organisations or organisations controlled by politicians or
industrial and financial groups will be included in the commissions.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

This can negatively affect the objectivity and quality of the integrity assessment
of candidates and the voting of public representatives during the selection for
positions at the ESBU.  

In addition, the Law provides for mandatory re-certification of the current ESBU
employees, which must be conducted during 18 months. The decision of the
re-certification commission shall be deemed adopted if at least seven
members vote for it, including at least three members delegated by the ESBU
head and three by the international partners (in total, there are six
representatives on each side). The re-certification involves testing general skills
and knowledge of Ukrainian legislation and an interview to assess compliance
with integrity and professional competence criteria. The main challenge to the
re-certification will be the integrity and professionalism of the respective
commissions’ members, who must ensure a proper reboot of the ESBU,
especially given the former’s size (twelve members). In addition, the law does
not prioritise the votes of commission members representing international
partners in the decision-making process.

Asset Recovery and Management Agency

Revenues to the State Budget of Ukraine from managing ARMA assets in 2023
amounted to UAH 101.3 million, an increase of almost 300% compared to
2022. ARMA is gradually trying to restore trust in the institution by opening the
register of seized assets and selling them through Prozorro.Sale.193 The sale
and selection of asset managers on Prozorro are positive changes in the
agency's activities.

Nevertheless, serious challenges in ARMA's activities need to be addressed,

such as:

01 02

Additional procedure regulation to Amendments to the ARMA Law

select interim asset management are necessary to abolish the need

is needed

to coordinate with the legal

owner of the property if this
(approved by the ARMA Order of owner is associated with the
September 29, 2023). aggressor country.

03

It is crucial to increase ARMA’s institutional capacity, update the competitive

selection procedure for selecting the top management based on the N ACP,
N ABU, SAPO, and ESBU best examples, and conduct ARMA’s external audit by
an independent commission, not an audit company that is currently selected
annually in a non-transparent manner.

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

In addition, in August 2023, the government approved the Asset Recovery

Strategy for 2023-2025 to implement the State Anti-Corruption Programme. In
November 2023, a relevant interagency working group was formed, and in
August 2024, the Action Plan for implementing this Strategy was finally
approved. The plan envisages the development of several dozen draft laws
designed to improve the regulation of tracing and managing seized assets in
Ukraine. Thus, the first deadlines for submitting seven draft laws to the
Government are already at the end of 2024, including a draft law to expand
access to additional sources of information and to strengthen the operational
capabilities of law enforcement agencies in investigating money laundering
and a draft law to expand the powers of the ARMA, in particular, to prepare a
reasoned conclusion in case of independent detection of signs of an offence
f rom any source. As of today, none of these draft laws have been registered in
Parliament. Therefore, in the fourth quarter of this year, we should expect an
intensification of legislative initiatives related to the ARMA's activities.
JUSTICE

FREEDOM

SECURITY

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Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
1. Draft On mending t e Crimin l Code o
Law ‘ a r ine nd t e Crimin l h a f Uk a a h a

P roced re Code o
u r ine to impro e t e e cienc o ple
f Uk a rg ining v h ffi y f a ba a ’

2. r t L w ‘On mending t e Crimin l Code o

D af a a r ine nd t e Crimin l h a f Uk a a h a

P roced re Code o
u r ine to impro e t e reg l tion o ple
f Uk a greement in v h u a f a a s

crimin l proceeding on corr ption nd corr ption-rel ted crimin l o ence

a s u a u a a ff s’

3. CC clo ed
HA crimin l proceeding g in t
s a or m ing l e decl r tion

a a a s MP f ak a fa s a a

4 . e Order o t e C inet o ini ter o

Th f h r ine ‘On dopting t e ction
ab f M s s f Uk a a h A

l n to implement t e Compre en i e tr tegic l n or e orming L w

P a h h s v S a P a f R f a

En orcement gencie
f rt o t e ec rit
A nd e ence ector o
s as a Pa r ine f h S u y a D f S f Uk a

for 2023-2027’

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R by h H a f h HA

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a a A r ine 3 f h a P u f Uk a

to impro e t e proced re or cond cting crimin l proceeding

v h u f u a s’

.
7 Th e L w ‘On mendment to t e Crimin l roced re Code o
a A sr ine nd h a P u f Uk a a

Ot er Legi l ti e ct o
h s a r ine to trengt en t e Independence o t e
v A s f Uk a S h h f h

S peci li ed nti-Corr ption ro ec tor O ce

a s A u P s u 's ffi ’

8 . eport on t e per orm nce o t e

R h tion l nti-Corr ption
f a re o f h Na a A u Bu au f

Uk a r ine or t e r tf l o 202
h fi s ha f f 4

9 . "Le ing in orm tion in

ak f re t Con tr ction c
a e" emplo ee w
G a s u as : NABU y as

se rc ed p oto

a h – h

10. NABU D irector emen r ono di mi ed i

S r t dep t
K yv i o gl
s s ss h s fi s u y G z U ava

11. ilot t
P o nd of
5 h R onitoring
u nder t e I t n l nti-Corr ption ction
M U h s a bu A u A

P al n

12. Th e L w ‘On mending cert in l w of r ine to ring t e t t of t e

a a a a s Uk a b h s a us h

Na tion l nti-Corr ption

a A re of r ine in line wit t e Con tit tion of
u Bu au Uk a h h s u

Uk a r ine ’

1 . orm tion of t e
3 F a ig nti-Corr ption Co rt ow
h H h A dge were elected u u : h 38 ju s s

a mong c ndid te
343 a a s

1 .
4 r ine
Uk a dici l re orm
’s ju mi ed re iew
a it ne r
f e point

has x v s as a s k y

1 .
5 Th e e ooted ig Co ncil o
“R b tice
” H in nd il

h u f Jus : W s a Fa s

1 . Election in t e
6 sdow o hr o re mo ili ed ttorne
Sha indering

f Wa : Wh a b s a ys h ?

1 .
7 Th e re ident
P s till not ppointed n one to t e r t po ition o
has s a a y h fi s s f a

mem er o t e
b ig Co ncil o
f h H tice nder i
h otu w ile t e Et ic f Jus u h s qu a, h h h s

Co ncil i
u eginning inter iew or t e econd po ition

s b v s f h s s

1 .
8 Th e commi ion did O recommend ppointing new mem er to t e
ss N T a a b h

H C wJ: t ne t

ha ’s x ?

1 . riorit
9 P et rny R i mont u o compl int re iew in t e
: S x ig Co ncil o
hs f a s v h H h u f

Justice

46
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
20. T he C r e a c H i i
J fo m r the e ecti
d i ci i ary i
omm ss on fo ect r s l on of d s pl n nsp o s

21. Ukrai ia ciety e erve ficia with a hi h eve

n n so d r e i ai a
s s of ls g l l of p of ss on l sm nd

a i n mp eccab e re utati l p on

22. 4 year , aw , 6 e ber : h w the ew c

s 2 l s 1 iti
m the i h
m s o n ompos on of H g

Qua ificati
l C i i onu e Ukrai e wa e ecte
omm ss on of J dg s of n s s l d

23 he i h Qua ificati
. T H g C i i ul e e ect a ew hea – A riy
on omm ss on of J dg s l s n d nd

P a ich yk, but ai t e ect a e uty hea

s n f ls o l d p d

24 QC : Acc
. H i h e t a
J r b e , htt ://vkk - yah e ya-i-
ompl s m n s nd P o l ms ps s dos n nn

r b e y webfl w i /e
p o l m . o . o n 

25 e. T th the qua ificati

n mon a es of e t: 43 ju e w i te rity
l on ss ssm n dg s of lo n g

retai e their iti , a

n d 7 were rec pos e e r i i a , htt ://
ons nd 2 omm nd d fo d sm ss l ps

d ejure u ati / - i yacziv- czi yuva ya- u iv-43- e br che yh-

.fo nd on 10 m s o n nn s dd n do o sn

za y hy y- a-
l s a ah- 7-rek
l n e uva y-zvi yty/
pos d 2 om nd l ln  

26 he CQ ’ re
. T H e t the reque t r ub ic i r ati , htt ://
Js spons o s fo p l nfo m on ps

d rive e c /fi e/ / utMzwNy_4YSS a_8qZr N-G r iX/view?

.googl . om l d 1Td fo T0 J n

u = hari
sp s ng 

7 e
2 . T th the qua ificati
n mon a es of e t: 43 ju e w i te rity
l on ss ssm n dg s of lo n g

retai e their iti , a

n d 7 were rec pos e e r i i a
ons nd 2 omm nd d fo d sm ss l 

28 he erkh v a Ra a ha a
. T V r ve a e
o n e t t ju icia career
d s pp o d m ndm n s o d l

r ce e , i i yi a ex e iti e ecti , a th u h c cer exi t ab ut

p o ss s s mpl f ng nd p d ng s l on l o g on ns s o

the qua ificati a e l e t

on ss ssm n

29 r ati
. Info m the re u t i terview c
on on ucte by the Q s withl s of n s ond d H CJ

ca i ate r the iti

nd d ju
s fo e a art the c pos etiti r 56 vaca t
on of dg s p of omp on fo 0 n

ju dge iti i ca c urt , a u ce

pos ons n lo Se te ber 4, l 3
o s nno n d on p m 1 202 .

3 Re ult
0. as i i t the c
s of etiti r a ellate c urt a March 8,
dm ss on o omp on fo pp o s s of

2024

31. Failu re s of t he Coun cil of Judg e s

32. R e sults of admission to t he c omp etiti on fo r a ellate c urt

pp o s as of Ma rch 8,
2024

33. he e ice
T V i i O i i
n N /
Comm ss on. p n on o. 1012 2020

34 U . er the ew rule : the erkh v a Ra a a i te Serhiy Riz yk a a

nd n s V o n d ppo n d n s

ju e the
dg oftituti al urt Ukrai e

Cons on Co of n

35 Ukrai e Su re e
. urt ea Accu e
n p aki
m $ 7 Milli
Co Bribe
H d s d of T ng 2. on

36 he Su re e
. T urt Kravche k — re ervi
p m Co the Ol Way of n o P s ng d s

37 “Black ay i the hi t ry
. the c urt” c
d n ti ue : Sta i lav Kravche k wa
s o of o on n s n s n o s

electe a the re i e t the Su re e urt

d s P s d n of p m Co

38 he Su re e
. T urt electe tw ju
p m e l w i te rity t the Gra
Co d o dg s of o n g o nd

C ha ber: ju e Stu ak, wh lie i her eclarati , a ju e hrib yi, wh

m dg p o d n d on nd dg Po n o

a te
dop litically d potivate eci i mo d d s ons

47
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES

3 R o of ju g s' positions

9. ec rd d e

40 Establishm nt of th n w Sup m Cou t: k y l ssons

. e e e re e r e e

41 Th Eu op an Commission Uk ain 2023 R po t

. e r e r e e r

42 Th Sup m Cou t st u k own th ass ssm nts of 180 ju g s of low

. e re e r r c d e e e d e

int g ity, j opa ising th l ansing of th ju i ia y

e r e rd e c e e d c r

43 Th Sup m Cou t of K av h nko—P s ving th Ol Ways

. e re e r r c e re er e d

44 Ju i ial mat ix: ontinu ass ssing th ju g s of low int g ity o b gin
. d c r c e e e d e e r r e

ass ssing th Sup m Cou t

e e re e r

45 Int national Mon ta y Fun Uk ain

. er po t No 23/3
e r d. r e re r . 99

46 Uk ain Fa ility Plan

. r e c

47 G7 Ambassa o s’ suppo t g oup fo Uk ain p io iti s fo 2024

. d r r r r r e r r e r

48 Continu , but not nough: Th V khovna Ra a a opt a aft law that

. ed e e er d d ed dr

ext n s th t m of th Publi Coun il of Int national Exp ts

e d e er e c c er er

4 Ju i ial fo m on th b ink of isast : th Ethi s Coun il a mits

9. d c re r e r d er e c c d

can i at s of low int g ity to th High Coun il of Justi , blo ks

d d e e nt on s
r e c ce c dece e

an o s not xplain its

d d e isions
e dec

50 Th fish stinks fi st f om th h a : What is w ong with th Uk ainian Ba

. e r r e e d r e r r

an how to fix it, https:// ju foun ation/ n/th -fish-stinks-fi st-f om-th -
d de re. d e e r r e

h a -what-is-w ong-with-th -uk ainian-ba -an -how-to-fix-it/

e d r e r r d

51 Failu s of th Coun il of Ju g s. 

. re e c d e

52 Th Ethi s Coun il, whi h will l ans th High Coun il of Justi , was
. e c c c c e e e c ce

fo m automati ally

r ed c

53 Yanukovy h’s h n hman an Vovk’s a ompli : th Coun il of Ju g s

. c e c d cc ce e c d e

l t Ya oslav Romanyuk an Volo ymy Kuzm nko to th s l tion

e ec ed r d d r e e e ec

commission fo th Constitutional Cou t

r e r

54 Th Law ‘On th Ba an P a ti of Law’

. e e r d r c ce

55 Th fish stinks fi st f om th h a : What is w ong with th Uk ainian Ba

. e r r e e d r e r r

an how to fix it

56 Th Constitution of Uk ain
. e r e


57. Th p of ssion of atto n y is mo popula among m n - Val ntyn Hvoz iy

e r e r e re r e e d

58 Ba o sh lt ? A ss to th p of ssion qui s att ntion!

. r r e er cce e r e re re e

5 Will th Constitutional Cou t B ak Down th M v huk-Po tnov Syst m

9. e r re e ed edc r e

in th L gal P a ti ?

e e r c ce

60 Th fish stinks fi st f om th h a : What is w ong with th Uk ainian Ba

. e r r e e d r e r r

an how to fix it.

61 Ibi . M v huk's p opl STILL ont ol Uk ainian Ba : 'Russian wo l ' vs

. d ed edc e e c r r r r d

ju i ial fo m
d c re r

48
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
62. T raitor lawyers in Crimea still operate w ith Ukrainian licenses, and the
N ational B ar Association d oes not respond to this

63. Th e fish s tinks r t f rom the

fi s h ead: Wh at is w rong w ith the Ukrainian B ar
and h ow to fix it

64 . Th e UNBA appointed a sp okesperson

65. To reboot the B ar: Th e Sh evchuk case as an indicator of the sys tem's
malfunction

66. Elections in the Sh adow of W ar: Wh o are mobilised attorneys h indering? 

67. L aw on the H igh Council of Jus tice

68 . H y r goriy Usyk: Th orough analytical w ork on existing i ciplinary complaints

d s

in the H CJ lies ahead

69. 2023 the IL AC Ru le of L aw report. Su v v r i ing the Assault: Th e Ukrainian L egal

Sys tem After a Y ear of W ar (Th e IL AC Ru le of L aw report, 53)

7 0. Th e fish s tinks r t f rom the

fi s h ead: Wh at is w rong w ith the Ukrainian B ar
and h ow to fix it

71 .A $ 200,000 b ribe as a signal for overhauling the legal p rofession

7 2. Th e IL AC Ru le of L aw report, 53

73 . Th e B ar of Ukraine. Sh adow report, 34

74 . D ecree of th e P resident of Ukraine on th e St rategy for th e D evelopment of

th e Jud icial Syst em and Constitutional Just ice for 2021-2023

75 . St atement of th e Ukrainian B ar Association regarding th e us e of i ciplinary

d s

p roceedings as a means of p ressure on attorneys

7 6. Ru les of attorney ethics

77 Th . e fish s tinks r t f rom the

fi s h ead: Wh at is w rong w ith the Ukrainian B ar
and h ow to fix it

78 . Elections in th e Sh adow of W ar: Wh o are mobilised attorneys hindering? 

79 . Attorney Ilya Kostin claimed th at h e faced pressure as a result of i

h s

criticism of th e B ar leadership members;

naction Towards Collaborators and

I th e Hu nt for Independent Attorneys: In
Wh ose Interests D o th e B ar B odies Act?

8 0. Th e European Commission Ukraine 2023 R eport, 27

81 . Th e United N ations B asic P rinciples on th e R ole of L awyers, art. 24; th e CCBE

Charter of Core P rinciples of th e European L egal Profession, P rinciple (g), art.
.
5 8; R ecommendation N o. R ( 2000) 21 of th e Committee of M inisters of th e
Council of Europe on th e f reedom of exercise of th e profession of lawyer,
p rinciple nternational
II; I B ar Association P olicy Gu d i elines for Training and
Education of th e L egal P rofession.

8 2. P rofessional D evelopment W orth M illions: H ow Iz ovitova and Gv ozdiy P rofit

f rom th e Attorneys’ S chool

49
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
83. Attorneys vs. the High School of Attorneys

84. Artem Donets vs the monolithic Bar – 2:0

85. The European Commission Ukraine 2023 Report, 27

86. The fish stinks first from the head: What is wrong with the Ukrainian Bar
and how to fix it

87. The Bar of Ukraine. Shadow report, 59

88. Annual reports of the UNBA

89. The European Commission Ukraine 2023 Report, 19 

90. Has the competition stalled? How are judges selected for the Constitutional
Court in the first open competition?

91. The interview of Lyubomyr Andreychuk for the Constitutional Court

92. The European Commission Ukraine 2023 Report, 19

93. G7 Ambassadors’ support group for Ukraine priorities for 2024

94. The concept of legal education reform is promised by the end of June: how
did the first meeting of the Working group go?

95. Training of lawyers in higher education institutions with specific conditions:

current status and Euro-integration requirements

96. The government approved an action plan that, among other things,
includes the delineation of legal and law enforcement education

97. State funding for legal education 2024: bachelors for the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, PhD students for the ministry of Education and Science,

98. Legal education reform map

99. Ibid. 

100. Ibid.

101. Law faculties ranking: Krakow once again the best

102. Law Faculties Ranking 2022. Where to go for legal studies? 

103. Towards European standards: the government abolished legal education in

colleges

104. A small step forward – the Ministry of Education and Science adopted
admission rules to law schools in 2024

105. Legal education reform map

106. Legal education reform. Results of students’ survey on quality of legal

education

107. Report on the results of analytical research “Knowledge and skills of law
school graduates and higher education institutions through the lens of
alignment with labour market demands

50
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
108. Study of European Union Law

109. Missing in action during the war. What to do: an interview with a
government commissioner

110. 95% of Ukrainian prisoners of war were tortured – UN reports on russia’s war
crimes

111. Two-year update. Protection of civilians: impact of hostilities on civilians

since 24 February 2022

112. During the full-scale war in Ukraine, 1642 medical facilities have been
damaged and 214 more have been completely destroyed

113. The Parliament estimates the damage to energy inf rastructure f rom
attacks at $12.5bn

114. Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants

115. Resolution on approval of the action plan for the implementation of the
recommendations of the European Commission presented in the Progress
Report of Ukraine under the EU Enlargement Package 2023

116. Order on approval of the action plan aimed at implementing the

Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Reforming Law Enforcement Agencies as
Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023-2027

117. Special Report ‘On the State of Affairs Regarding the Prevention in Ukraine
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Measures in
2023’

118. Order on approval of the National Action Plan for the implementation of
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the period up to
2025

119. Order on approval of the Action Plan for 2023-2024 for the implementation
of the National Strategy for creating a barrier-f ree space in Ukraine for the
period up to 2030

120. Implementing barrier-f ree environment: important measures to create a

barrier-f ree environment are being implemented in the environment sector

121. Pending applications allocated to a judicial formation

122. Articles 12, 17, 19, 21, 25 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Articles 8, 10, 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Articles 1, 2, 3 of the Additional Protocol to
the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. In April 2024, the
scope of derogation was amended and reduced, Ukraine officially filed the
notice informing that it derogates f rom Articles 4.3 (related to forced or
compulsory labour), 9 (f reedom of thought, conscience and religion), 13 (right
to an effective remedy), 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and 16 (restrictions on
political activity of aliens) of the Convention as well as articles 3, 8(3), 9, 13, 20, 22,
24, 26, 27 of the ICCPR.

51
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
123. The re marks took up nine pages: Lubinets criticizes new draft law on
mobilization

124. Children of war

125. Bring Kids Back UA

126. Special Report, ‘UNBLOOMED: Violation of the Rights of Ukrainian Children

in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine and in Russia: Deportation,
Militarization, Indoctrination’

127. Special Report, ‘Russia’s Systemic Policy of Destroying Children’s Ukrainian

Identity’

128. RSF moves Ukraine up 18 points in the press f reedom index

129. RSF: Ten years after the Euromaidan’s uprising, a more diverse and
transparent media landscape

130. Freedom of Speech Barometer for December 2023

131. Freedom of Speech Barometer for January 2024 (corrected)

132. Russia is detaining at least 30 Ukrainian journalists - IMI list to PACE

133. Journalist Dmytro Khyliuk was taken to Russia during the occupation of the
Kyiv region in 2022: ‘A soldier released f rom captivity tells about the UNIAN
correspondent Khyliuk’

134. Crimean journalist Iryna Danylovych completely lost hearing in her left ear

135. Occupiers hold the admins of two Ukrainian Telegram channels captive,
accuse them of terrorism

136. Trust in the telethon “Yedyni Novyny”

137. Ukrainian media, attitudes and trust in 2023

138. Anonymous Ukrainian Telegram channels reported on mobilisation in a

manipulative way – IMI study

139. Order no.73 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

140. Ukrainian military changes regulations on reporting f rom the f rontline

following IMI recommendations

141. Law ‘On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2024’

142. Order of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy No. 451 as of June
28, 2024

143. Law ‘On A mendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Consideration of

c
the Expert Opinion of the Coun il of Europe an d its Bodies on the Rights of
National Minorities (Communities) in Certain Areas’

144 . Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10

March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision
of audio-visual media services

52
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
14 5. Law ‘ n On
n hAme n On
dme ng’ n h
ts to t e Law of Ukrai e ‘ Advertisi a d ot er

laws of Ukrai n n h p n e o n Eu p n g
t e im nn h leme tatio of ro ea le islatio i to t e

n n g
atio n
al le n ’

islatio of Ukrai e…

1 46 On
. Law ‘ n ng S Ame n Inc p
di h Exp ome Laws of Ukrai e to or orate t e ert

Assessme n h C unc Eu p n I B
t of t e o R g ng h R gh il of ro e a d ts odies e ardi t e i ts of

N n atio n (C
al Mi un ) In C
orities n ’
omm ities ertai Areas

14 On N n
7. Law ‘ n (Catio un ) al Mi n ’
orities omm ities of Ukrai e

14 8 n c n nu
. Ukrai e n b ng ng
o ti g nc
es to work o h E n ri i its le islatio loser to t e U o e

o n p c ng n n rote tin , - D ny Sh yh
atio al mi orities e s m al

149 Th F . -up p n n h p n n n h
e ollow o nn n
i io n to t e o i io o t e law o atio al mi orities

(c ommun ) ( 9610),
ities p by h V n c C
draft law # n 136 h ado ted t e e i e ommissio at its t

Ple n yS n n V n c , n 6- Oc b 2023

ar essio i e i e o 7 to er

1 0 Th y
5 . is sn uc by h 201
stem was i On E uc n’ № 214 -VIII,
trod ed t e 7 Law ‘ d atio 5

a n c fi by h 2020
d was lari edOn G n S c n y E uc n’ № 463-IX,
t e Law ‘ e eral e o dar d atio

a n n g d e g u nc
visa ed a uc n ugh n h
rad al i ngu g rease of ed atio ta t i t e state la a e

f rom 20% n h g i 40% n 9 h g

5t n 60% n h gh ch ( h E
rade to i t rade a d i i er s ool for t e U

la ngu g )
a es

1 1 Th
5 . p c cp n
is is a atrioti c n bu ng c c n y
dis i li e aimed at o tri ti to ivi ide tit of

Ukrai n ’ c z n e s iti e s.

1 2 Th
5 . uch ngu g
e list of s fin by h la On R fic n h a es is de ed t e Law ‘ ati atio of t e

Eu p n Ch
ro ea R g n n y ngu g ’ № 802-IV

arter for e io al or Mi orit La a es

1 3
5 On N n
. Law ‘ n (Catio un ) al Mi n ’ № 282 -IX orities omm ities of Ukrai e 7

1 4 pp
5 . A by h R u n h C b n
roved t e n esol n № 181 tio of t e a i et of Mi isters of Ukrai e of

09 02 2024

. .

1
55. A pp by h R u n h C b n
roved t e n esol n №2 tio of t e a i et of Mi isters of Ukrai e 57 of

04.03.2024

1 6 pp
5 . A by h R u n h C b n
roved t e n esol n №6 0 tio of t e a i et of Mi isters of Ukrai e 7 of

0 .06.202
7 4

1
57. A pp by h O roved h S S c
t e n E hn c
rder of t n e tate ervi e of Ukrai e for t i Affairs a d

F reedom of C n c nc № H-86/12, 02 10 2023

o s ie e . .

1 8 C unc N n
5 . o n y
il of c
atio n: n c
al Mi n n orit Asso iatio s a ew voi e for Ukrai ia

diversity

1 9 pp
5 . A by h O roved h S S c
t e n E hn c
rder of t n e tate ervi e of Ukrai e for t i Affairs a d

F reedom of C n c nc № H-18/12, 02 02 2024

o s ie e . . .

160 S gy
. trate ng h R Promotin h R gh n Opp un t e ealisatio of t e i ts a d ort ities of

Perso n B ng ng h R s elo N n i n ynto t n nS c y

e h
oma atio al Mi orit i Ukrai ia o iet for t e

Period U p T 2030, p by h D c
o h C bn
ado n ted t e e ree of t e a i et of Mi isters of

Ukrai n № 866-р
e

161 D c . eh C bn
ree of t n e n № 68 19.0 .2022
a i et of Mi isters of Ukrai e 4 of 4

53
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES

162. The first meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of the
Roma Strategy Implementation

163. Law ‘On Amending Some Laws of Ukraine to Incorporate the Expert
Assessment of the Council of Europe and Its Bodies Regarding the Rights of

National Minorities (Communities) In Certain Areas’ № 3504-IX

164. A copy of the letter was published by the Ukrainian media European
Pravda

165. Ukrainian media European Pravda reported this referencing to the

Hungarian news agency MTI

166. Orban's 11 demands: How Hungary crossed red lines again in blackmailing
Ukraine on its path to the EU

167. Ukraine’s Fifth periodical report

168. Law ‘On Protecting the Constitutional Order Concerning the Activities of
Religious Organizations’ № 3894-IX

169. See the Conclusion of the Religious Expert Examination of the Statute on
Governance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the presence of ecclesiastical
and canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate

170. Statement of members of Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious

Organisations on the UCCRO’s website

171. For more information on the problems faced by IDPs, see the report of the
National Institute for Strategic Studies

172. Government fails to implement the plan of the State Policy Strategy on
Internal Displacement until 2025

173. Law ‘On National Police of Ukraine’

174. Unified Report on Criminal Offenses for January-December 2023 of the

Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine

175. Crimes committed by the Russian military during the full-scale invasion of
Ukraine

176. Ukraine 2023 Report

177. Act of scheduled audit of the organisation of work on prevention and

detection of corruption in the National Police of Ukraine

178. Arsen Avakov: Ministry of Internal Affairs is being transformed into the civil
Ministry of European model

179. The State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023-2025

180. Measure 2.1.6.1.3 of the State Anti-Corruption Programme

54
Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 Antac

REFERENCES
181. Statement of Ukrainian CSOs on the reform of the National Police of
Ukraine

182. Competition for the position of the Head of NACP

183. Competition for the position of Director of the NABU

184. Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the
National Police’ to Improve Police Service’

185. A journalistic investigation by the Bihus.info

186. Interview with the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Ihor Klymenko,

187. Measure 2.1.6.2.3 of the State Anti-Corruption Programme

188. Draft Law ‘On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Police’
and the Disciplinary Statute of the National Police of Ukraine on Improving the
Procedure for Conducting Internal Investigations and Ensuring the
Independence of Disciplinary Commissions’

189. Statement of the NGO “Automaidan” on the results of certification in the

NPU

190. Measure 2.1.6.3.1 of the State Anti-Corruption Programme

191. Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the
National Police’ to Improve Police Service’

192. Law ‘On amending certain legal acts of Ukraine to improve the work of the
Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine’

193. Resolution No. 719 of September 27, 2017, as amended on November 14,
2023

55
This report was made possible with the support of the American and British
people, particularly through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the UK government’s International Development
program, as part of the Promoting Integrity in the Public Sector Activity (Pro-
Integrity). The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the contractor
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government, USAID, the UK
government, or UK International Development.


Shadow Report on Chapters 23-24 antac.org.ua