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Java How to Program, 9/e Multiple Choice Test Bank 1 of 5

Java How To Program (early objects), 9th Ed

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Chapter 1 Introduction to Computers and Java

Section 1.1 Introduction
1.1 Q1: Which of the following statements is false?
a. Object-oriented programming is today's key programming methodology.
b. Java has become the language of choice for implementing Internet-based applications and software for devices
that communicate over a network.
c. Software commands computer hardware to perform tasks.
d. In use today are more than a trillion general-purpose computers and trillions more Java-enabled cellphones,
smartphones and other handheld devices.
ANS: d. In use today are more than a trillion general-purpose computers and trillions more Java-enabled cellphones,
smartphones and other handheld devices.

1.1 Q2: Which edition of Java is geared toward developing large-scale, distributed networking applications and web-
based applications?
a. Standard Edition.
b. Industrial Edition.
c. Enterprise Edition.
d. Micro Edition.
ANS: c. Enterprise Edition.

Section 1.2 Computers: Hardware and Software

1.2 Q1: Which of the following is most closely associated with Moore's Law?
a. Every year or two, the price of computers has approximately doubled.
b. Object-oriented programming uses less memory than previous software-development methodologies.
c. Demand for communications bandwidth is decreasing dramatically each year.
d. Every year or two, the capacities of computers have approximately doubled without any increase in price.
ANS: d. Every year or two, the capacities of computers have approximately doubled without any increase in price.

1.2 Q2: Which of the following statements is false?

a. A quadrillion-instruction-per-section computer can perform in one second more than 100,000 instructions for
every person on the planet.
b. Today's key programming methodology is object-oriented programming.
c. The vast majority of the microprocessors produced each year are used in general-purpose computers.
d. Computers process data under the control of sets of instructions called computer programs..
ANS: c. The vast majority of the microprocessors produced each year are used in general-purpose computers.
Actually, they're used in embedded systems.

Section 1.3 Data Hierarchy

1.3 Q1: Which of the following statements is false?
a. The impressive functions performed by computers involve only the simplest manipulations of 1s and 2s .
b. ASCII is a popular subset of Unicode.
Java How to Program, 9/e Multiple Choice Test Bank 2 of 5

c. Fields are composed of characters or bytes.

d. On some operating systems, a file is viewed simply as a sequence of bytes.
ANS: a. The impressive functions performed by computers involve only the simplest manipulations of 1s and 2s .
It's 1s and 0s.

1.3 Q2: Which of the following data items are arranged from the smallest to the largest in the data hierarchy.
a. records, characters, fields, bits, files.
b. bits, files, fields, records, characters.
c. fields, characters, bits, files, records.
d. bits, characters, fields, records, files.
ANS: d. bits, characters, fields, records, files.

Section 1.4 Computer Organization

1.4 Q1: Which of the following is not one of the six logical units of a computer?
a. Input unit.
b. Output unit.
c. Central processing unit.
d. Printer.
ANS: d. Printer.

1.4 Q2: Which of the following statements is false?

a. Speaking to your computer is a form of input.
b. Playing a video is an example of output.
c. A multi-core processor implements several processors on a single integrated-circuit chip.
d. Information in the memory unit is persistent—it is retained when the computer's power is turned off.
ANS: Information in the memory unit is persistent—it is retained when the computer's power is turned off. Actually
the information is volatile—it's lost when power is turned off.

Section 1.5 Machine Languages, Assembly Languages and High-Level

Languages
1.5 Q1: Which of the following is not one of the three general types of computer languages?
a. Machine languages.
b. Assembly languages.
c. High-Level languages.
d. Spoken languages.
ANS: d. Spoken languages.

1.5 Q2: Which of the following statements is true?

a. Interpreted programs run faster than compiled programs.
b. Compilers translate high-level language programs into machine language programs.
c. Interpreter programs typically use machine language as input.
d. None of the above.
ANS: b. Compilers translate high-level language programs into machine language programs.

Section 1.6 Introduction to Object Technology

1. 6 Q1: ________ is a graphical language that allows people who design software systems to use an
industry standard notation to represent them.
a. The Unified Graphical Laguage
b. The Unified Design Language
c. The Unified Modeling Language
d. None of the above
ANS: c. The Unified Modeling Language.

1. 6 Q2: ________ models software in terms similar to those that people use to describe real-world objects.
Java How to Program, 9/e Multiple Choice Test Bank 3 of 5

a. Object-oriented programming
b. Object-oriented design
c. Procedural programming
d. None of the above
ANS: b. Object-oriented design.

1.6 Q3: Which statement is false?

a. Classes are reusable software components.
b. A class is to an object as a blueprint is to a house.
c. Performing a task in a program requires a method.
d. A class is an instance of its object.
ANS: A class is an instance of its object. The reverse is true.

Section 1.7 Operating Systems

1.7 Q1 Which of the following statements is false?
a. The concepts of icons, menus and windows were originally developed by Xerox PARC.
b. Windows is an open source operating system.
c. The software that contains the core components of the operating system is called the kernel.
d. Linux source code is available to the public for examination and modification.
Ans: b. Windows is an open source operating system. Actually, Windows is a proprietary operating system.

1.7 Q2: Which of the following is not a key organization in the open-source community?
a. Apache.
b. SourceForge.
c. Firefox.
d. Eclipse.
ANS: c. Firefox (it's a web browser made by the open source organization Mozilla).

Section 1.8 Programming Languages

1.8 Q1: Today, virtually all new major operating systems are written in:
a. Objective-C.
b. C or C++.
c. Visual C#.
d. Ada.
ANS: b. C or C++.

1.8 Q2: Which of the following languages is used primarily for scientific and engineering applications?
a. Fortran.
b. COBOL.
c. Pascal.
d. Basic.
ANS: a. Fortran.

1.8 Q3: Which language was developed by Microsoft in the early 1990s to simplify the development of Windows
applications?
a. Visual C#.
b. Python.
c. Objective-C.
d. Visual Basic.
ANS: d. Visual Basic.

Section 1.9 Java and a Typical Java Development Environment

1.9 Q1: Java was originally developed for:
Java How to Program, 9/e Multiple Choice Test Bank 4 of 5

a. Operating systems development.

b. Intelligent consumer devices.
c. Personal computers.
d. Distributed computing.
ANS: b. Intelligent consumer devices.

1.9 Q2: Which of the following statements about Java Class Libraries is false:
a. Java class libraries consist of classes that consist of methods that perform tasks.
b. Java class libraries are also known as Java APIs (Application Programming Interfaces).
c. An advantage of using Java class libraries is saving the effort of designing, developing and testing new classes.
d. Java class libraries are not portable
ANS: d. Java class libraries are not portable. (Java class libraries are portable.)

1.9 Q3: The .class extension on a file means that the file:
a. Contains java source code
b. Contains HTML
c. is produced by the Java compiler (javac).
d. None of the above.
ANS: c. Is produced by the Java compiler (javac).

1.9 Q4 : The command ________ executes a Java application.

a. run
b. javac
c. java
d. None of the above
ANS: c. java.

Section 1.10 Test-Driving a Java Application

(none)

Section 1.11 Web 2.0: Going Social

1.11 Q1: ________ helps Internet-based applications perform like desktop applications.
a. Ajax
b. Blogging
c. RSS
d. Mashups
ANS: a. Ajax.

1.11 Q2: Which of the following companies is widely regarded at the "signature" company of Web 2.0 ?
a. Foursquare.
b. Facebook.
c. Google.
d. Groupon.
ANS: c. Google.

Section 1.12 Software Technologies

1.12 Q1: ________ involves reworking programs to make them clearer and easier to maintain while preserving their
correctness and functionality.
a. Object-oriented programming
b. Refactoring
c. Agile software development
d. LAMP
ANS: b. Refactoring.
Java How to Program, 9/e Multiple Choice Test Bank 5 of 5

1.12 Q2: Which software product release category is "generally feature complete and supposedly bug free, and ready
for use by the community?"
a. Alpha.
b. Beta.
c. Release candidate.
d. Continuous beta.
ANS: c. Release candidate.

Section 1.13 Keeping Up-to-Date with Information Technologies

(none).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 It does not appear as if there were any formed intention of
resuming the offensive in the Western Ægean in order to give
support to Mardonius whenever he should re-open the campaign,
H. viii. 130, though, if Herodotus is to be believed, plans of attack
ad fin. of some kind were discussed. Whatever they may
have been, they were not put into immediate
operation; and the appearance of the Greek fleet on the Asian coast
later in the year completely altered the situation.
The approach of spring warned the Greeks that they must make
preparations to meet the impending attack of Mardonius. With
incomprehensible but characteristic dilatoriness, no immediate effort
was made to collect the army, though a fleet of a hundred and ten
ships gathered at Ægina under a new commander, the Spartan
Leutychides. Moreover, Themistocles no longer commanded the
Athenian contingent, his place being taken by Xanthippos. Possible
reasons for this remarkable and important change have been already
suggested. Of the actual reasons nothing is known.
There was, moreover, in this year, a change not merely in the
personnel, but also in the system of command which prevailed
during the previous year in the Athenian contingent. The Athenian
army had played no part at Thermopylæ, and at Salamis it had
acted, in so far as it did act, in immediate conjunction with the fleet.
It had been, therefore, possible to place both arms of the service
under the control of one supreme commander,—Themistocles. In
479, however, it was evident that the altered circumstances of the
war would necessitate the employment by Athens of a considerable
force on land, acting quite independently of the fleet. It would be
impossible, therefore, for one man to command both; and a
separate command on land was given to Aristides, another member
of the College of Ten Strategi. He may or may not have been placed
under the general control of Xanthippos. As events turned out, he
must have exercised a practically independent command. An
arrangement of this kind would, had the circumstances arisen but a
few years earlier, have raised considerable constitutional difficulty;
but between 490 and 480 the whole system of military and naval
control had been completely remodelled.
At the time of Marathon, the supreme command was in the hands
of one of the archons, with the title of Polemarch, and the ten
strategi were subordinate to him, being merely the commanders of
the contingents furnished by the ten Kleisthenic tribes, and also
forming a council of war. In the course of the official year 487–486,
the method of lot was introduced into the election of the nine
archons, of whom the polemarch was one. The most thoroughgoing
democrat at Athens, being, as a citizen, liable to service in war,
would hardly fail to see the undesirability of entrusting his life to a
general chosen by this method. That special form of fatalism would
have few attractions for him. Thus the constitutional change with
regard to the archonship necessitated some change in the
arrangements of the military and naval commands. The polemarch
was no longer commander-in-chief. That office was vested in the
members of the board of strategi, which henceforth had absolute
control of military and naval affairs. As strategi, all of the ten were in
a position of equality; and it is probable that each was allotted his
own special department of administration, either on election, or by
mutual arrangement between the members of the elected board. A
board so constituted might work well in times of peace, but in time
of war such a divided command could only lead to confusion and
inefficiency. The people therefore reserved to
APPEAL FOR AND
FROM IONIAN
itself the power of allotting special commands
GREEKS. to strategi of its own choice, or even of
appointing one member of the board a
generalissimo (στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ).
It was under this constitutional arrangement that the mode of
command adopted in 479 was possible.
It was while the fleet was at Ægina that the Greeks received the
first direct appeal for aid from the Ionian Greeks. Doubtless the
populations of the cities along the Asian coast were much stirred at
this time by the disaster which had befallen the great expedition.
That the Ionian contingent had shared in those disasters was a
consideration which would affect but slightly the sentiments of the
mass of the Ionian population; since, as has been already pointed
out, that contingent represented merely the dominant philomedic
minorities in the various Ionian towns. With the unbroken power of
Persia to back them, those minorities could not be assailed with any
hope of success; but now that that power was shaken, it might seem
that the time had arrived for action. In Chios, at any rate, a plot was
formed to murder the local tyrant Strattis. It miscarried, and six of
the chief conspirators fled for their lives across the Ægean, where
they made an appeal, first to Sparta, and then to the fleet at Ægina,
to strike a blow for the liberty of their countrymen beyond the sea.
Herodotus’ silence as to their reception at Sparta is eloquent; but his
description of the effect of their appeal on the fleet is one of the
most remarkable, and probably one of the most misinterpreted
H. viii. 132. passages in his history, “The refugees, with difficulty,
induced the fleet to go as far as Delos; all beyond was
to the Greeks a land of danger, for they knew not even how it lay,
and fancied it all to be full of the enemy’s troops. As for Samos, it
seemed to them as far off as the Pillars of Hercules. So it befell that
the Persians were afraid to sail westward of Samos, and the Greeks
dare not go eastward of Delos, though the Chians entreated them so
to do. So fear stood between them and protected them.”
This passage, even in its manifest rhetorical exaggeration, is
interesting. The evident intention of the historian is to mark the fact
that the mutual feelings of the two adversaries had entered upon a
second stage.
He has spared no pains to draw a striking contrast between the
exaggerated confidence prevailing on the Persian side up to the time
of Salamis, and the corresponding lack of it among the Greeks. The
balance of fear had been heavy against his countrymen. But now, at
the opening of the campaign of 479, he is equally anxious to show
that the scale had altered, and was now in equilibrium. With the
dramatic instinct of the Greek, he wishes to indicate in one striking
sentence that the turning-point in the tragedy has been reached. He
was telling, as he well knew, the most exciting story in the history of
the world up to his own time, and he may be pardoned, perhaps, if
in his anxiety to emphasize its climax he has employed the language
of exaggeration.
But when it becomes a question of determining the extent of the
exaggeration, it may be suggested that there is perhaps less
exaggeration in his statement than in the criticisms which have been
passed upon it. May it not be that the eastern shore of the Ægean
was to the European Greek of 480 a far less known region than
might, without reflection, be assumed? Twenty years had passed
since the outbreak of the Ionian revolt. Was not the attitude of
Athens and Eretria in the first year of it peculiarly calculated to
render communications between the two shores difficult and rare?
The trade of the Ionian cities must have practically ceased during
the seven years of the struggle; and, in any case, Persia, in her
bitter resentment at the interference of the two states of European
Greece, was not likely to encourage the visits of traders from the
other side of the sea. Every avenue of trade in the Asian waters
must have been unsafe to the Greek, not merely on account of the
possible presence of the Persian fleet, but by reason of the swarm of
privateers which the south coast of West Asia was ever ready to
produce. And when the revolt was over, was it
THE SILENT
ÆGEAN.
probable that the Persians would allow the
Greek trader free access to information with
regard to the plans of the expeditions of 492 and 490, or, amid the
access of bitterness which arose from the failure of the latter year,
with regard to the preparations made for a great revenge? If
intercourse did continue, how does it arise that the Greeks were
ignorant of the magnitude and real intent of the expedition of 480,
up to within a few months of its arrival in Greece? The Ionian must
have known long before. Why did he not tell the Greek trader, if that
trader was a frequent visitor to his ports? After-ages do not realize
the nature of the blow dealt to trade by a prolonged period of war,
even if the active warlike operations be not continuous. To take
examples from the history of England. Those who read the story of
the Seven Years’ War mark with pride the absolute predominance
which Great Britain had gained upon the seas by the year 1761. And
yet, in that very year, eight hundred and twelve English trading ships
were captured by the enemy,—no small fraction of the British trading
fleet of those days. During the wars of the Napoleonic period when,
after Trafalgar, Britain for many years commanded the sea, the
English Channel, the greatest trade highway in the world, was
almost as deserted as that Northern Ocean which Tacitus describes.
Is it not possible, at least, that Herodotus has in his mind a state
of things lasting for many years in the Ægean similar to that which
prevailed in the Channel in the first years of the nineteenth century?
He may have exaggerated the feelings of the Greek sailors at this
time; but who at the present day can say to what length of
exaggeration he has gone?
 CHAPTER XI.
THE CAMPAIGN OF PLATÆA.

H. viii. 131.
While these events were occurring in Middle Greece,
Mardonius, in the far North, was preparing to move. It
is said that before starting he despatched an envoy to make inquiries
of the oracles of Northern Greece, at Lebadeia, Abæ, and Mount
Ptoon, on what subject Herodotus is unable to say with certainty—
on the circumstances of the time, he is inclined to think.

H. viii. 136. A much more important envoy was despatched to

Athens in the person of Alexander, the son of
Amyntas, a member of the royal house of Macedonia, who was
connected with the Persians by family ties, and with the Athenians
by his having held for them the position of Proxenos, or consular
agent, in his own country.
It may fairly be doubted whether Herodotus got the tale of
Alexander’s mission from an Athenian or from a Macedonian source,
or whether he combined information derived from both. The
H. viii. 136. reference to the character of the Athenian people has,
on the one hand, a strong Attic flavour about it, H. viii.
137 et seqq. while the knowledge of the Macedonian royal family
displayed here and elsewhere in his work suggests that Herodotus
acquired his information on the spot in the course of a visit to that
177
country.
 From Sketch by E. Lear.]
PLAIN OF THEBES AND MOUNT KITHAERON.
1. Kithæron (about 15 miles).
2. Ridge between Parasopia and Plain of Thebes.
3. Thebes.
[To face page 436.

This tale might, consequently, be derived from Macedonia. This

supposition is, however, rendered unlikely,
MARDONIUS AND
ATHENS.
owing to the excessively mistaken forecast
which Alexander is described to have made of
forthcoming events; and its Attic origin is the more probable. It is
needless to say that that does not make for the veracity of a story
whose evident intention is, like that of so many of the stories of this
time, to bring into relief the self-denying patriotism of Athens. Yet, in
spite of this, the story in itself is credible enough.

H. viii. 136. Mardonius, so the tale runs, had made up his mind
that if he could win over the Athenians to the Persian
side he would thereby deprive the forces opposed to him of a people
both numerous and brave, who were, moreover, mainly responsible
for the disaster of the previous year. By this means he hoped to gain
once more command of the sea, and expected to be infinitely
superior to the enemy on land. This design, Herodotus thinks, was
probably suggested to him by the oracles he had recently consulted.
 The most remarkable reference, so far, is to the recovery of the
command of the sea. No one could better estimate than Mardonius
the full significance of the loss of that command. He must have
known well that, unless it were recovered, he could at best obtain
but a partial measure of success. Anything of the nature of a
prolonged campaign to the southward of Bœotia would be, on the
mere question of commissariat, impossible; and a brief campaign
was not to be looked for. A foe which had been formidable with the
courage of despair was likely to be more formidable when animated
with the courage of a hope following despair. He had, no doubt,
accumulated during the winter in Thessaly as large a commissariat
as possible; but it is beyond conception that he could have greatly
increased the necessarily limited supplies obtainable locally by
transport along that route of four hundred miles whose use had only
been contemplated a month or two before, and whose organization
must necessarily have been of the most hurried description. He must
win Athens over, or modify his plans.
To her accordingly was offered a free pardon for the past on the
part of the Great King, the enjoyment of her existing lands, and any
accession of territory she liked. Nor did Alexander the envoy fail to
point out to the Athenians the contrast between such a prospect and
their actual state as the people who had suffered most from the war.

H. viii. 141. The news of Alexander’s visit to Athens, and of its

object, created considerable alarm at Sparta. An
embassy was despatched with all speed to counteract the possible
ill-effects of his proposals. This embassy was actually present when
Alexander spoke; for the latter had been kept waiting for several
days before he had been allowed to bring his business before the
assembly. The astute Athenians had made up their minds to use
Alexander as a lever wherewith to move the sluggish Sparta to
action. They do not seem to have had any intention whatever of
taking Mardonius’ message into consideration. When Alexander had
done speaking, the Spartan ambassadors addressed the assembly.
They urged that it would be gross desertion on the part of the
Athenians to renounce their share in a war which had been provoked
by them, and by them alone. Turning to more material matters, they
promised to alleviate the sufferings of the Athenians by undertaking
the support of the non-effective part of the population.
The Athenian answer to Mardonius’ message was as firm as their
determination: “So long as the sun runs his course in the heavens,
we will never make terms with Xerxes.”
The answer to the Lacedæmonians as reported by Herodotus is,
in sentiment and language alike, one of the finest passages in Greek
prose.
“The fear of the Lacedæmonians lest we should make terms with
the barbarians is, humanly speaking, very natural. And yet, knowing
well, as you do, the spirit of Athens—that there is not in the wide
world gold sufficient nor land so exceeding fair and good that we
would accept it as the price of our own defection and of the
enslavement of Hellas,—your fear, we think, does you but small
credit. There are many powerful considerations which would forbid
our so acting, even had we the will to do so.
ATHENS AND
SPARTA.
First and foremost is the burning and
destruction of the images and temples of the
gods, which we, so far from making terms with the doers of these
deeds, must of necessity avenge to the full. Secondly, there is that
tie of blood and language which binds the Greek world together, our
common share in our religious foundations and sacrifices, our
community of manners—things which it would disgrace the
Athenians to betray. Know this, if you did not before know it, that so
long as a single Athenian survives, we will never make terms with
Xerxes. We admire your kindly thought for us, in that, homeless as
we are, you are willing to support our families. That kindness on
your part is complete, but we will endure as we are, without
burdening you.
“But now, these things being so, send forth your army with all
speed, for we imagine that the invasion of our land by the barbarian
will not be long deferred, so soon as he hears our message refusing
compliance with his demands. Ere, then, he enters Attica, there is
time for us to meet him in Bœotia.”
And so the Spartan ambassadors went home.
The Athenians evidently hoped that they would be able to save
their land from the devastation of the previous year by persuading
the allies to meet the enemy in Bœotia.
Their hopes were natural, but they were not destined to be
fulfilled; and, if by Bœotia the Bœotian plain was meant, it was
fortunate they remained unfulfilled.
On receipt of the answer from Athens Mardonius started on his
march from Thessaly without delay. The feudal families of that
region had thoroughly espoused the Persian cause, and their
attitude, as well as that of the Bœotians, shows that the dominant
section in the two great territories of the North had definitely made
up their minds that, whatever the fate of the South might be, those
H. ix. 2. regions were to become part of the Persian Empire.
The Theban advice to Mardonius to remain in Bœotian
territory and seek to conquer Greece by corrupting the leading men
of its various states, shows that the medization of the ruling powers
in Bœotia was not merely a passive attitude. One thing, however,
Mardonius had made up his mind to do—to capture Athens a second
time. Herodotus attributes the intention to mere vanity, but any one
or all of three practical reasons made its acquisition of importance to
him. Its recapture might induce Xerxes from his base on the Asian
coast to attempt to regain the command of the sea. Its possession
might bring pressure to bear on the Athenian authorities, and aid his
design of detaching that people from the forces of resistance. Finally,
in case he intended to advance on the Isthmus, the possession of
the Acropolis would protect his left flank. He occupied Athens
without striking a blow, the population having been removed, as in
the previous year, to Salamis. Having occupied it, he reopened the
negotiations which Alexander had attempted but a short time before.
The result was the same. The spirit of the people was shown by
their stoning to death Lykides, a member of the council, for merely
proposing that the message should be communicated to the
Assembly. Even his wife and children were murdered in a similar way
by the Athenian women at Salamis.

H. ix. 6. This second withdrawal to Salamis comes

somewhat as a surprise in Herodotus’ narrative, for his
account of the visit of the Spartan embassy to Athens at the time of
Alexander’s presence there makes it appear that an understanding
had been arrived at by which Athens might be spared a second
invasion. The explanation comes later. “So long as the Athenians
expected that an army would come from Peloponnese to help them,
they remained in Attica.” But when the presence of the enemy in
Bœotia was announced, and it became impossible to hope that help
from the South could arrive in time, they retired to Salamis, as they
had done the year before. They also despatched an embassy to
Sparta to protest against the delay.
The strong appeal to patriotism made in their last communication
to the Lacedæmonian embassy had failed to impress a people whose
very institutions and training rendered them incapable of forming a
real conception of the true spirit of a pan-Hellenic policy. Their stern
discipline, moreover, was only too well calculated to render them
mere tools of those set over them; and the delay in the present
instance was probably due to the policy of an inner ring of the
government at Sparta. The records of the time afford no certain clue
to the motives lying behind that policy. It is
ATHENIAN
EMBASSY AT
possible that it aimed at forcing the hand of
SPARTA. the Athenians, and compelling them to take
part in the defence of the Isthmus.

H. ix. 7. Sparta having failed to listen to persuasion, Athens

had recourse, as on previous occasions, to threats.
The Spartans were told that if Athens found herself deserted, she
would seek her salvation in her own way; it was more than hinted
that Mardonius’ offer might become a question of practical politics.
The Spartan excuse for delay was similar to that urged for the
desertion of Thermopylæ, the celebration of a festival. The story of
the reception of the ambassadors is one of the strangest in the
strange history of this time. They bitterly reproached the
Lacedæmonians with their conduct. They put the very worst
construction on the Spartan policy, which had, they said, inflicted on
patriotism an amount of suffering which it dare not have inflicted on
uncertain fidelity. It is probable that the reproach was, in so far as
the Spartan authorities were concerned, well deserved. From the
language used by the Athenians it is evident that they believed that
the Spartans had agreed to join in operations in Bœotia merely in
order to keep Athens from medizing before the wall at the Isthmus
178
was absolutely completed.
That was the construction Athens put upon their conduct at this
time; but it is probable that the more correct interpretation of their
extraordinary policy is that by delaying they would be able to
transfer the defence to the wall, and could, under any
circumstances, rely on the devotion of Athens to the common cause.
Turning to the question of the future war policy, the Athenian
ambassadors proposed that, as Bœotia had been lost, the enemy
should be met in Attica; and they mentioned the Thriasian plain
between Eleusis and Mount Ægaleos as admirably designed for a
field of battle. [It must be remembered that this recommendation
was made at a time when the Greeks were without experience of the
effectiveness of the Persian cavalry on ground suited to its
operations.]
The Ephors deferred their answer to the following day; from that
to the next, and so on, until ten days had been wasted. They were
waiting, says Herodotus, for the completion of the wall. They were,
too, waiting, no doubt, until events in the North developed
sufficiently to make it impossible for Athens to propose any other
line of defence. This unsatisfactory state of things was brought to an
end, so Herodotus says, by a warning addressed to the Ephors by
Chileos, a Tegean, who had great influence in Sparta. He pointed out
that if Athens joined the Persian, wall or no wall, the doors of the
Peloponnese would be opened wide. Herodotus evidently supposed
that until this moment such an idea had never occurred to the
Spartan authorities, despite the experiences of Artemisium and
Salamis in the previous year. In all probability, what really influenced
these authorities was the fact that an able man, whose opinion they
valued, was not so sure as they themselves were, that Athenian
loyalty would endure much longer the severe test to which it was
being put.
Their next act was a very strange one. Without saying a word to
the ambassadors, they despatched under cover of night a force of
five thousand Spartans, each of whom was accompanied by seven
helots. There were, therefore, forty thousand in all. The number of
light-armed helots is remarkable, certainly above the usual quota
179
allotted to a force of five thousand heavy-armed.
In constituting this force, the unusual
SECRET DESPATCH
OF SPARTAN ARMY.
number of light-armed in the army which it
would have to meet would naturally be taken
into consideration. The circumstances of population in the Spartan
territories, moreover, were such that any unusual increase in the
numbers employed on any expedition would be supplied by the
increase in this branch of the service. The commander of this large
force was Pausanias. Kleombrotos had been in command at the
Isthmus in the previous year, but had died shortly after bringing
180
back his army thence. It must have been prepared for departure
181
for some time past No such force could start on short notice.
The ambassadors, knowing nothing of this sudden march, and
weary of the continual procrastination, were prepared to leave
Sparta on the following morning. Before the deception was
discovered the Athenian delegates actually stated that, in
consequence of Sparta’s attitude, Athens would make terms with
Persia, and, more than that, would accompany the Persians in their
invasion. Truly the Spartan government policy had very nearly
brought Greece to ruin.
 The surprise of the indignant envoys may then be imagined when
they were told in answer by the Ephors that they had every reason
to believe that their army was, by that time, at Orestheion on its
march against “the strangers,” as they called the barbarians.
Orestheion was in the small plain of Asea, S.S.E. of the Arcadian
plain, where one of the great roads from Sparta northward met the
main road coming from Messenia to the Arcadian plain. The fact that
they took this route is interesting, because it almost certainly
indicates that they wished to avoid Argos, from which, as will be
seen, a certain amount of trouble was to be expected.
Thus the truth came out; and the envoys started without delay in
pursuit of this phantom army, accompanied by five thousand picked
hoplites of the Periœki.
The truth about the attitude of Argos at this time is rendered
uncertain by the fact that, after the war was over, the patriot Greeks
regarded not merely those races which had medized, but also those
who had not taken part with them, as having been enemies of their
fatherland. That of itself would give rise to a number of traditions of
doubtful credibility with respect to the attitude of such neutrals.
Nevertheless, the attitude of Argos was highly suspicious, and there
is no doubt that it was firmly believed in after-time that she had had
traitorous relations with Persia.

H. ix. 12. Herodotus asserts that the Argives sent a

messenger about this time to Mardonius, who was in
Athens, saying that they were unable to carry out the promise that
they had made to him to stop the Spartan army on its march
northwards. This tale is to a certain extent supported by the fact
that the Spartans, instead of adopting the shorter route north by the
Thyreatic plain and Argos, adopted the longer one indicated by the
mention of Orestheion. Argos was, by its strategical position, ever a
serious obstacle to Sparta’s communication with the north.
Mardonius had, up to this time, refrained
KITHÆRON AND
PARNES. from damaging Athens and Attica, in the hope
that the Athenians would change their minds,
and accept his proposals; but, failing to persuade them to do so, and
hearing of the advance of this army to the Isthmus, he set fire to
Athens, and began to withdraw to Bœotia; “because,” says
Herodotus, “Attica was not a country for cavalry, and if he were
defeated in an engagement his only line of retreat was through strait
places, so that a few men could stop him.” He determined,
therefore, to retreat, and make Thebes his base of operations, as
lying in a region eminently adapted to the use of cavalry. His evident
fear was lest the Greek forces should work up through the Megarid
and seize the difficult passes of the Kithæron-Parnes range in his
rear.
As this range is of great importance in the campaign which was at
this time about to open, it may be well to describe its nature, and to
enumerate the passes by which it is pierced. It was regarded by the
Greeks as an effective and important line of defence; and the
difficulties which it presented to various armies which had occasion
to traverse or to attempt to traverse it in the warfare of the fifth and
fourth centuries before Christ, show that their estimate of its
defensive possibilities was not a mistaken one. As its name implies,
it is in reality composed of two short ranges, Kithæron on the west,
and Parnes on the east. These are connected by an upland country
known to the ancients by the name of Panakton, whose approaches
on either side are, from a military point of view, of a very difficult
character. The chain as a whole may be said to form a continuous
barrier stretching from the head of the gulf of Corinth to the
southern part of the Euripus. Both Kithæron and Parnes are sharply-
edged, steep-sided ridges, whose highest points rise to a height of
four thousand five hundred feet above sea-level, while the general
elevation of each chain is about three thousand feet. Though not, as
will be seen, of any great height, they offer comparatively few
passages. There are six points at which the range may be traversed.
Of these the western series, four in number, are of importance in
reference to the battle of Platæa itself, while the two eastern passes
afford alternative routes for an army retreating, like that of
Mardonius, from Athens to Thebes.
 At the extreme west of the range, where it sinks with sudden
abruptness into the gulf of Corinth, it is turned rather than traversed
by what is little better than a mountain track, which led from the
Bœotian port of Kreusis to the Megarean town of Ægosthena. From
Ægosthena a road led southwards to Pagæ, and so round the
western bastions of Mount Geraneia to the Isthmus. It was also
quite possible to reach Megara by a branch of this route.

Cf. Xen. Hell. The difficulties of this pass are such that it was
v. 4; vi. 4. rarely used for military purposes, and it seems to have
played no part whatever in the operations of 479.
The second pass is that which the road from Platæa to Megara
formerly traversed. It crosses Kithæron a little more than a mile
eastward of Platæa, entering a deep valley which runs into the chain
from the north, and ascending steeply from the head of the valley to
the summit of a col in the ridge. Its character forbids the supposition
that it can ever have been used for wheeled vehicles, and its
importance must have been mainly due to the fact that it is the only
one of this series of passes, with the exception of the track by
Ægosthena, by which land communication between Northern Greece
and the Peloponnese could be maintained without entering Attic
territory. The road south of it, towards Megara, traverses the
182
troublesome hill region of the Northern Megarid. The fact that
Platæa practically commanded the northern end of this pass
rendered the town one of the most important strategic positions in
Greece, both in the fifth and in the fourth centuries. It will be
hereafter seen that this pass must have played an important part in
the operations of the Greek army at Platæa.
The third pass is one by which the road from Platæa to Athens
crossed the range. It is little more than a mile to the east of that last
mentioned. Remains of the road are visible on the north side,
entering a somewhat broad valley running into the hills. It must
have always been an easy pass, and the ancient wheel-ruts worn in
183
the rock show that it was used by wheeled vehicles. The road,
 after traversing it, turned east, and joined,
PASSES BETWEEN
ATTICA AND
near Eleutheræ, the road from Thebes to
BŒOTIA. Eleusis by way of the pass of Dryoskephalæ.
This pass also played an important part in the
operations at Platæa.
The fourth pass was well known under its Attic name of
Dryoskephalæ, and though not traversed by the direct road between
Thebes and Athens, must have been largely used by those going
from one place to the other, owing to the route by way of it being
more easy than the direct road by Phyle. From the Bœotian side,
near the site of the ancient Erythræ, the ascent is steep; it must
have always been necessary to make it by a series of zigzags. The
summit once reached, the descent is gradual, down a long stream-
valley which abuts on a small plain of Attica beneath the fortress of
Eleutheræ. As a pass, it was probably always more difficult than that
on the Platæa-Athens road, but as the route from Thebes through it
was more direct, it became the most used of the passes of
Kithæron, and seems to have been the only one which had a special
name in ancient times. The road through it was continued southward
through a not very difficult country, as country goes in Greece, to
the Thriasian plain and Eleusis, passing by or very near the fortress
of Œne, whose importance must have been due to its position with
reference to this road. Near Eleusis it joined the Sacred Way to
Athens. Of the importance of this pass at the time of the battle of
Platæa it is hardly necessary to speak.
The fifth of the series of passes is that on the direct road between
Thebes and Athens. After ascending from the Bœotian plain to the
plateau of Panakton, it traverses the upland pastures of that region,
and enters a difficult country, where it was commanded by the
important Attic fortress of Phyle. Thence it reaches the head of the
Athenian plain. Mardonius might certainly have made use of this
route for his retreat. He preferred, however, the more roundabout
way through the sixth pass. It may have been, on the whole, an
easier route. Furthermore, Mardonius, who seems to have been
more apprehensive than he need at this moment have been that his
retreat might be cut off, evidently thought that the route furthest
from the Greek lines of advance would be safest.
The sixth pass leads from the plain of Athens into the lower basin
of the Asopos. It was commanded near its summit by that fortress of
Dekeleia which was destined to become so famous in the latter part
of the Peloponnesian war. After passing Dekeleia, it was possible,
instead of continuing along the road due north, to diverge to the left
and follow a stream-valley to Tanagra. From Tanagra there must
always have been a good, though not absolutely direct, road to
Thebes, and also an easy passage up the Asopos valley.

H. ix. 14. Herodotus, after describing Mardonius’ preparations

for leaving Athens, says that when already on his way
it was reported to him that a body of a thousand Lacedæmonians
had been pushed forward to Megara. On hearing this, he wheeled
about, and led his army as far as Megara, while his cavalry overran
the whole of the Megarid. Herodotus’ intention in mentioning the
incident is made sufficiently clear by the words which follow: “This is
H. ix. 14, ad
the furthest point west in Europe which the Persian
fin. army reached.” It is to this expedition that a tradition
mentioned by Pausanias must be referred—a tradition
Paus. i. 44, 4. which preserved the record of the advance of the
Medes to Pagæ.
There is no reason to doubt that the Persian raid into the Megarid
is an historical fact, recorded by Herodotus and preserved in this
chance tradition. It is not, however, at all likely that it was made by
the whole Persian army, or that it was made at the time Herodotus
mentions. His object in relating the story is plainly indicated, and in
his desire to make his main point, he has probably not been over
careful as to exactness in date.
If Mardonius wished, as is represented by the historian, to secure
his safe passage to Bœotia, he would hardly have turned back with
all his force. Had he done so, his natural line of withdrawal would
have been by Dryoskephalæ. The raid into Megara seems to have
been a cavalry reconnaissance, whose object was to discover what
 the Greeks were doing at the Isthmus, and,
MARDONIS
RETREATS TO
moreover, it was probably made several days
BŒOTIA. at least before the time indicated by
Herodotus.

H. viii. 15. The actual line of retreat Herodotus describes with

some detail. He first went to Dekeleia, whence guides
despatched by the Bœotarchs conducted him to Sphendale, and so
to Tanagra. From thence he made his way up the Asopos valley to
184
Skolos, where he formed a stockaded camp.
It is impossible to arrive at any real comprehension of the history
of this stage of the war without deducing from the action of
Mardonius the nature of the designs, both political and strategical,
which led him to adopt the course of action which he did.
It is evident, in the first place, that he had given up all idea of an
attack on the fortifications of the Isthmus. It is also evident that he
had recognized from the first that the only possibility offered him of
an attack on that position was in the event of his winning over
Athens to his side. If he could not do so, he would be liable to have
his communications cut at any moment in the very difficult region of
the Megarid. The negotiations with Athens had conspicuously failed.
It would be absurd to suppose that he was not prepared for such an
eventuality even before he started for Thessaly; he may be
conceived even to have recognized that, after the events of the
previous year, the probability of success in the negotiation was
185
remote. If this be the case, it is to be concluded that he had
some alternative design in his mind, which he intended to carry out
in case the first miscarried. The very circumstances under which the
history of the time was written forbade the possibility of the nature
of that design becoming known to after-ages, and the only surviving
indications of what he planned are afforded by what he did.
It is amply proved in the Greek historians that the disaster of the
previous year had left the ruling powers of the north just as loyal to
Persian interests as they had been before Salamis. If anything, their
loyalty had increased. Their contingents were with Mardonius. They
had practically staked their all on his success; and only his presence
could save them from the severe retaliation which the patriotic
Greeks might be expected to inflict on those who had joined the
enemies of their country. If Mardonius’ strategy at this time be any
indication of his policy, that policy aimed at the establishment of a
new Persian frontier at the Kithæron-Parnes line, with Thessaly,
Phocis, and Bœotia in a similar position to the vassal states of
Thrace and Macedonia.
His strategical plan was well based. The Kithæron-Parnes line
offered a much easier defence against an assailant from the south
than against one from the north, because the continuous valleys of
the Œroë and Asopos formed a natural highway running lengthwise
along the chain, such a highway as was conspicuous by its absence
on the southern side. By this highway an army could be moved
rapidly from one point to the other, according to the locality of the
pass through which the attack might be delivered. On the south no
such facilities existed, and an army on the
CHANGE IN GREEK
PLAN OF
north which made a feint at one of the eastern
CAMPAIGN. passes, and so attracted an enemy to its
defence, could move to one of the western
passes, and get through it long before the defender could move
186
from his original defensive position.
Thus Mardonius was well placed. He had a fortified base at
Thebes, in a rich country, and a country well adapted to his strength
in cavalry; and he had a fortified camp on the strategic line of
highway which the Asopos valley afforded.
It is little short of a calamity for the history of this time that
Herodotus has omitted to account for the absolute change in the
Greek plan of campaign which is indicated by the advance of the
army from the Isthmus into Bœotia. It had manifestly been the
intention of the Spartans up to the very last moment to await attack
at the Isthmus; it may be certain that the other Peloponnesian
States entertained this design still more emphatically. And yet, in
spite of this, they follow the enemy to Bœotia, and shortly after their
arrival there develop an offensive movement of a most unmistakable
character. Athens must have been mainly responsible for this
remarkable change; but what were the motives of Athens? It was
too late to save Attica. The mischief there had been done. And yet
these Greeks were persuaded to develop a policy whose boldness is
in conspicuous contrast to the purely defensive attitude they had
hitherto adopted in all their land operations, and to inaugurate the
new policy in a region peculiarly favourable to that arm of the
enemy’s force from which they had most to fear and against which
they had nothing to match. It can only have been carried out under
the impetus of some great and well-grounded alarm; and in view of
the silence of the ancient historian, the only conclusion that it is
possible to draw from the acts of either side is that the Greeks,
through the Athenians, suspected the existence of a design to
establish a new Persian frontier at Kithæron.
It was consequently necessary to take the offensive and the risk it
involved, unless they were ready to submit to the existence of the
Persian terror at their very doors. Whether its continued existence
would have been possible without the regaining of the command of
the sea is another question; but, considering the attitude of Bœotia
and Thessaly, it would be unsafe to assert the impossibility. In any
case, the Greeks regarded those possibilities from so near a
perspective, that their field of vision must have been contracted to
the one dangerous alternative.

H. ix. 19. The Lacedæmonian army, which was last heard of

at Orestheion in Arcadia, arrived at the Isthmus and
encamped there. The patriotic States of Peloponnese, seeing the
Spartans on the move, despatched their contingents thither also, or,
rather, the complements of their contingents, since it must be
concluded that the wall had not been without any defenders up to
this time. From the Isthmus the whole army moved forward to
Eleusis, where the Athenian land-army from Salamis joined it. The
whole combined force then moved north along the road to
187
Dryoskephalæ.

From Sketch by E. Lear.]

PLAIN OF KAPAIS, FROM THEBES.
[To face page 452.

Shortly after passing the summit of the pass the Greek army
would arrive in full view of the Bœotian plain, which from that
elevated place appears more flat than it really is. The comparative
monotony of the scenery of the plain itself is disguised by distance;
and that which strikes the eye most forcibly is the contrast between
this huge extent of comparatively low level ground, and the
magnificent frame of mountains which forms the horizon on every
side. To the north-west, Helicon descends in a long and highly
serrated slope, behind which the hump of Parnassus in the far
distance towers to a great height. The
LIMITS OF THE
FIELD OF
northern horizon is bounded by that southern
OPERATIONS. extension of the Œta range which lies between
Kopais and the North Euripus, though Kopais,
or what was once Kopais, is out of sight behind a comparatively low
ridge in the neighbourhood of Thebes. To the north-east, Mount
Ptoon is visible; and over its lower ridge the great cliffs of Mount
Mekistos, on the Eubœan side of the Euripus, are just discernible.
Away to the east, though hidden from sight at the top of the pass by
a high bastion of Kithæron, the truncated cone of Mount Dirphys in
Mid-Eubœa is the most prominent object.
There are but few extensive views in Greece comparable with it,
and perhaps only one which excels it, that from Thaumaki on the
road from Lamia northward, when the great plain of Thessaly, with
its fringing ranges, is spread out like a sea before the spectator.
From the pass the Greeks descended to a position which
extended across the road by which they had come, at the point at
which it debouched fully on the plain. Before describing this position
in detail it may be well to give a brief general description of the
ground on which the prolonged struggle took place.
Its limits may be clearly defined. To the south its boundary is the
limit of cultivation, where the rocky foot of Kithæron begins to rise
from the rounded ridges of the plain. Outside this line the ground
was impracticable for cavalry operations, and, though both armies at
different times traversed this ground, no fighting took place beyond
the line, or even in its neighbourhood. On the north, the limits are
equally well defined by the river Asopos, although again in this case
the major part of the Persian army was, during nearly the whole of
the operations, to the north of the stream. The only fighting,
however, which can possibly have taken place beyond it occurred
during the assault on the Persian camp after the battle. To the east
the limit may be taken as the line of the Thebes-Athens road; while
to the west an imaginary line running due north from the town of
Platæa to the Asopos will well define its utmost extent in that
direction. The area of this field is about fifteen square miles, the
dimensions from north to south and from east to west being about
three and a half and four miles respectively.
In respect to the lie of its surface it may be divided into two parts.
The southern portion of it along the foot of Kithæron consists of
ridges running south and north, divided from one another by
stream-valleys,—spurs, in fact, of the great mountain, but of no
 188
great height. Of these the easternmost is much loftier than the
others. On the westernmost is the site of the town of Platæa.
North of these ridges a distinctly marked line of depression
extends across the field from east to west. It runs up the course of a
189
brook, in a south-westerly direction, to the site of the modern
Kriekouki. After reaching the bottom of that village it turns at right
angles and goes north-west in a line parallel to, and immediately
north of, the watershed between the basins of the Asopos and
Œroë, reaching the flat alluvial plain north of Platæa, just west of
the springs of Apotripi, the traditional Gargaphia.
This depression is of considerable importance in relation to the
general scheme of the operations of the Greek army on the field:⁠—
(a) Because it forms the dividing line between the first and
intended third positions and the second position, that is to say,
between the positions which were chiefly remarkable for their
defensive character, and that position which was assumed with the
manifest intention of taking a vigorous offensive.
(b) Because in it the Greek army, after marching from the first
position, took up its order before occupying the second position.
(c) Because in it the two combats which ultimately decided the
battle were fought.
The plain which has been mentioned in reference to the western
extremity of this depression extends without any break from the
north end of the site of the town of Platæa to the Asopos river. The
plain is the only flat land in the whole battle-field.
 From Sketch by E. Lear.]
PLAIN OF PLATÆA AND KITHÆRON.
[To face page 454.

North of the depression rise three ridges or

DESCRIPTION OF 190
THE FIELD. hills. These ridges are separated from one
191
another by two deep stream-valleys. The
slope of these ridges northward toward the Asopos is longer and
more gradual than on the south.
In general appearance the plain of Bœotia at this part resembles
the Wantage downs in such parts as the ploughland predominates
over the pasture. The great grey wall of Kithæron to the south rises
into the air, and dwarfs into insignificance the inequalities of the
plain, rendering, moreover, all horizontal distances most deceptive to
the eye.
It may be assumed with absolute confidence that the accidents of
the terrain in this region of Greece are for all practical purposes
identical with those which existed more than two thousand years
ago. There is no evidence of great surface-changes such as are
brought about in other parts of Greece by the torrents which sweep
down in violence from the mountains. In Upper Parasopia such
torrents do not exist. Their non-existence can hardly be ascribed to
inferior rainfall, for the Bœotian climate is not more dry than that of
other parts of Greece. The probable cause is the peculiarly porous
nature of the soil, and, presumably, of the underlying rock, which
absorbs a large amount of water which would in other parts of
192
Greece escape along the surface.
In the flat plain between Platæa and the Asopos river, the courses
of the various streams which traverse it are without doubt liable to
alterations, but the characteristics of the stream-beds as to width,
depth, and so forth, are undoubtedly the same as they were in the
past.
The passes which actually debouch upon the field are, as has
been already mentioned, three in number. It is remarkable that in
Herodotus’ account of the battle that of Dryoskephalæ is the only
one mentioned. It is, however, quite clear from Herodotus that,
while the Greeks were in the second position on the battle-field, the
Dryoskephalæ pass, and also that on the Platæa-Athens road, were
both held by the Persian cavalry, and the supplies of the army during
the time must have come through the pass on the Platæa-Megara
193
road.
Before entering upon the actual description
HERODOTUS’
ACCOUNT OF
of the battle itself, it may be well to say one
PLATÆA. word about the general character of the
account of it which Herodotus has given to the
world. Its length and elaboration are greater than that devoted by
the author to the description of any other single act or scene in the
history of his time. The historian had evidently expended
extraordinary trouble in its preparation, and had done his utmost to
arrive at all the facts and to relate them with accuracy. Any failure in
the latter respect is owing either to the nature of his source or
sources of information, or to a misapprehension of military details
due to his want of special knowledge and experience. But whatever
these defects may be, his narrative is by far the best of the accounts
which have survived until the present day, a fact which is capable of
proof by reason of the extraordinary manner in which, in spite of
certain obscurities, it harmonizes with the present state of the region
wherein the incidents occurred. There can be no reasonable doubt
that he visited the field, and that, where he gives topographical
details, they are the result of autopsy. Some of the difficulties which
arise with reference to his description are more probably due to
want of knowledge on the part of the modern than on the part of
the ancient historian. Some, again, are attributable to that natural
difficulty, which must ever arise, when any one attempts to follow
exactly the description, however clear, of a complicated piece of
ground as seen by the eyes of another man; and this difficulty is not
decreased when the language employed does not possess that
wealth of technical vocabulary which is at the service of the writer of
the present day. It is so easy to fail to realize these difficulties under
which Herodotus wrote. Official records were probably non-existent:
written records of any kind, if existent, were probably of the most
meagre kind; and the historian must have been obliged to have
recourse to the narratives of those who were actually present at the
operations. It must have cost an infinite amount of trouble to collect
the information, and to piece together the different narratives; and
yet, despite the immense difficulty of dealing with evidence of this
kind, Herodotus has left an account of the battle which is not merely
of interest and value from the point of view of general history, but
also in the narrower field of exclusively military history.
Platæa was no ordinary engagement. It was really a campaign of
several weeks, conducted within an extraordinarily limited field of
operations. During that brief time, and within that small area, the
strength and weakness of East and West matched in battle against
one another were exemplified in a most striking way. The lesson it
taught was so tremendous, so wide in application, that men could
not grasp it. Perhaps it was as well for the world that they did not.
H. ix. 19. The Greeks having descended from the summit of
the pass of Dryoskephalæ towards the Bœotian plain,
discovered that the Persians were encamped upon the Asopos, and
194
took up their position “on the foothills of Kithæron.” Herodotus
H. ix. 22. refers later to this position as having been at Erythræ.
The site of that small town has been somewhat in
dispute; it appears to have been in the hollow on the north side of
195
the mountain into which the road from Dryoskephalæ descends.
The position taken up by the Greeks is
FIRST POSITION
OF THE GREEKS.
recognizable without difficulty at the present
day. Their right was on the high bastion of
Kithæron, east of Erythræ, stationed for the most part, in all
probability, in the neighbourhood of the old fort which here
overhangs the road. Their centre was on the low ground, à cheval of
the Thebes road. Their left was probably on the slopes of the high
ridge (ridge 1 in the map) to the east of the site of Kriekouki. The
numbers present at this time are not known. All that is known is
that, after considerable reinforcements had come in, from a hundred
thousand to a hundred and ten thousand Greeks were in the field. It
is not therefore possible to say what would be likely to be the length
of the Greek front in this first position.
The strength of the position would be great. Their right and left
wings would be unassailable by cavalry, and only assailable by
infantry at a great disadvantage. Only on the flat ground in front of
Erythræ would it be possible for the Persian cavalry to attack them,
and this only along the right or east portion of the low ground, since
the left or west portion of their centre would be protected by deep
and precipitous stream-gullies which are there at this day, and must
have existed in a similar form at the time of the battle. The
comparatively advanced position of their
ATTACK BY
PERSIAN CAVALRY.
centre in front of Erythræ, instead of on the
difficult ground south of its site, was probably
due to their being largely dependent on the wells of the little town
for their supply of water.
 THE FIRST POSITION AT PLATÆA.
1. Greek right.
2. Greek centre.
3. Greek left.
4. Site of Erythræ.
5. Pass of Dryoskephalæ.
[To face page 460.

H. ix. 20. Mardonius, seeing that the Greeks had taken up

this position, and that they showed no disposition to
come down into the plain, sent against them the whole of his
cavalry, under the command of Masistios, a Persian of high
reputation. On getting near the Greeks it did not attack in a body,—
the deep stream courses opposite the Greek left centre would make
that difficult,—but, owing evidently to the narrowness of the front
assailable, attacked in squadrons, and did a great deal of damage.
The Megareans were drawn up at the most assailable point, and
were hard pressed by an assault which evidently aimed at cutting
the Greek army in two, and seizing their direct line of retreat by way
of the pass. The narrowness of the assailable front appears
emphatically in Herodotus’ account of the message the Megareans
despatched for assistance. They speak of themselves as being
single-handed in the fight, and beg to be relieved from their
position. They threaten even that, unless help be sent, they will be
obliged to leave their post. Pausanias, who led the great Spartan
contingent and commanded the whole army, had some difficulty in
finding volunteers for the post of danger. Finally the Athenian picked
troops, under the command of Olympiodoros, accompanied by a
body of bowmen, undertook to occupy the critical position. Aristides,
who commanded the Athenian contingent, would see clearly the
H. ix. 22. pressing nature of the danger. The Persians continued
their attack by squadrons until their leader, Masistios,
had his horse wounded by an arrow. It reared and threw him, close,
apparently, to the Greek line of battle; for the Athenians immediately
rushed towards him. He was killed, and his horse was captured. The
Persians had not noticed the fall of their commander, and it was not
until they had retired and had come to a stand-still that the loss was
discovered. With shouts of encouragement to one another, the
horsemen turned upon the Greeks, eager to gain possession of their
leader’s body. They came no longer in squadrons, but in what must
have been one column of horse, many ranks in depth. The Athenians
called on the rest of the army to aid them, but before the latter
came up the attack fell. The Athenians, only three hundred in
number, were pressed back from the place where Masistios lay; the
fight was too unequal. But when the other Greeks came up the
Persian horsemen retired and were obliged to leave the body in the
hands of the enemy. After retreating a distance of two stades, they
held a consultation, and decided that, having lost their general, the
best thing they could do was to retire to the camp.
In this combat the Persian cavalry was evidently taught a severe
lesson. They found out the mistake of attacking unshaken heavy
infantry at close quarters, a fundamental error in tactics which they
did not repeat again in the course of the battle. From this time
forward the Persians used their cavalry to inflict damage on the
immobile Greek force by assailing it with missiles from a distance,
and by cutting its lines of communication. They had learnt their
lesson: the Greeks had not.
It is evident that the latter drew a wholly mistaken conclusion
H. ix. 25.
from the results of the fight, and that their previous
fear of the enemy’s cavalry gave place to an
unwarranted confidence in their ability to face it on any ground.