Arbitrary Detention and Expulsion (Arts.

124-127)
Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the State
Chapter One ARBITRARY DETENTION OR EXPULSION, VIOLATION OF DWELLING, PROHIBITION,
INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS AND CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
Nature
They are called crimes against the fundamental laws of the State,because they violate certain provisions
of the Bill of Rights (Article III) ofthe 1987 Constitution
Art. 124. Arbitrary Detention-Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor, in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;
2. The penalty prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than
fifteen days but not more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.

Elements
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory
confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for detention of any
person.
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. He detains a person
3. Detention is without legal grounds.

Private individuals liable? Conspiracy.

Read: People v Camerino, GR No 14207-R
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the accused is liable for arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code?
RULING: YES. "Private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain policemen are
guilty of arbitrary detention"(Reyes, p. 43). Moreover, it is in the law that any restraint on one’s liberty,
even for a mere short period of time, iscriminally actionable: “Even if the persons detained could move
freely in and out of their prison cell and could take theirmeals outside the prison, nevertheless, if they
were under the surveillance of the guards and they could not escape forfear of being apprehended
again, there would still be arbitrary detention.”(as cited in Lozada vs. Atienza, et al).

Detention
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in anenclosure, or in any manner detaining
and depriving him of his liberty.(People vs. Gungon, G.R. No. 119574, March 19 1998, citing People vs.
Domasian, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993; People vs. Flores, G.R. No.116488, May 31, 2001)
A person is detained when he is placed in Confinement or there is a restraint on his person. (U.S. vs.
Cabanag, 8 Phil. 64) Even if the persons detained could move freely in and out of theirprison cell and
could take their meals outside the prison, nevertheless, if they were under the surveillance of the guards
and they could not escape forfear of being apprehended again, there would still be arbitrary detention.
(People vs. Camerino, supra)
Read: People v Gungon, GR No. 119574;
People v Flores, GR No. 116488;
Astorga v People, GR No 154130

Legal Grounds for Detention

The following are legal grounds for the detention of any person:
(a) The commission of a crime;
(b) Violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the
Compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital. (Art. 124, par. 2)

“Without legal grounds”

Read: US v Gellaga, 15 Phil 120; Taruc v Carlos, 78 Phil 876; Cayao v Del Mundo, AM MTJ-93-813
The detention of a person is without legal ground:
(1) when he has not committed any crime or, at least, there is no reasonable ground for suspicion that
he has committed a crime, or
(2) when he is not suffering from violent insanity or any other ailment requiring compulsory
confinement in a hospital.
Thus, in the following cases, the detention was without legal ground:
1. A barrio lieutenant, seeing his servant quarreling with his daughter, seized the servant and an hour
later sent him to the Justice of the Peace. The servant was kept in detention from 5p.m. to 9 a.m. the
next day when he was released by the Justice of the Peace.
Held: The barrio lieutenant was guilty of arbitrary detention, because he detained the offended party
without any reason therefor, such as the commission of the crime, and without having the authority to
do so. (U.S.vs. Gellaga, 15 Phil. 120)
Note:
Merely quarreling is not a crime,2. A Manila detective sergeant arrested Aquilino Taruc becauseof the
suspicion that he might be implicated in the plot to assassinate the President and that he was related to
Luis Taruc,
A. Huh Supremo.
Held: Mere suspicion of his connection with any murderous plot isno ground recognized by law for
restraining the freedom of any individual.Lawlessness from above can only lead to chaos and anarchy.
(Taruc vs.Carlos, 78 Phil. 876)3. In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was notcommitting or
had not actually committed a crime in the presenceof respondent-judge. Such being the case, the
warrantless arrestand subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. (Cayaovs. del Mundo, A.M. No.
MTJ-93-813, September 15,1993)

No minimum period of detention

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities
Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee;
2. That he has detained a person for some legal ground; and
3. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authority within:
 a. 12 hours, detained for crimes punishable by light penalties, or equivalent;
b. 18 hours, for crimes punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; or
c. 36 hours, for crimes/offenses punishable by capital punishment or afflictive penalties, or their
equivalent
If by private person, illegal detention. Read: People v Sali, 50 OG 5676
A private individual who makes a lawful arrest must also comply with the requirements prescribed in
Art. 125. If he fails to do so, he shall be guilty of illegal detention (Art. 267 or Art. 268), not arbitrary
detention.
The periods of time in Art. 125 were applied to the arrests made by a private person. (People vs. Sali, et
al., C.A., 50 O.G. 5676)
"Shall detain any person for some legal ground."
No warrant of arrest issued.
Art. 125 does not apply when the arrest is by virtue of a warrant of arrest.
Art. 125 applies only when the arrest is made without warrant of arrest. But the arrest must be lawful.
If the arrest is made with a warrant of arrest, the person arrested can be detained indefinitely until his
case is decided by the court or he posts a bail for his temporary release.
The reason for this is that there is already a complaint or information filed against him with the court
which issued the order or warrant of arrest and it is not necessary to deliver the person thus arrested to
that court.
Deliver? Judicial delivery.
It will be noted that what constitutes a violation of Article 125 is the failure to deliver the person
arrested to the proper judicial authority within the period specified therein.
The delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace officer, does not
consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an information against
the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to
issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer can not
transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. (Sayo
vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859)
Read: Sayo v Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil 859;
People v Acosta, CA, 54 OG 4742;
Agbay vs Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, 309 SCRA 726
Proper judicial authorities?
The term "judicial authorities", as used in Art. 125, means the courts of justice or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with
having committed a public offense, that is, the "Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law." (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution)
The judicial authorities mentioned in Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be considered to
include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or
of commitment for temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of the
person arrested without warrant. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra)

Read: Sayo v Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil 859;

Agbay vs Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, 309 SCRA 726;
Agbay v Natividad, GR No 134503
Waiver. Preliminary/Custodial investigation.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation
in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for
bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. (Sec. 7, par. 2,
Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel:
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
Custodial Investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person
is taken custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any manner.
It shall include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting” officer
for any violation of law.
Computation. An election day or special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the
period, it being a ‘no-office day’.
Read: Soria v Desierto, GR No. 153524
FACTS
Respondent police officers arrested petitioners Soria and Bista without a warrant for alleged illegal
possession of firearms at 8:30PM of May 13, 2001, a Sunday that immediately precedes the May 14,
2001 Elections. Petitioners were brought to Prosecutor Viloria a day after at 4:30PM was released at
6:30PM of the same day or after 22 hours of detention, while Bista was released after 26 days as he has
a standing warrant of arrest for another offense.
Petitioners, invoking Article 125, filed a complaint before the Ombudsman. The latter dismissed the
same for lack of merit, ruling that Sundays, holidays, and election days are excluded in the computation
periods as contemplated in Article 125.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sundays, holidays, and election days are excluded in the computation of periods under
Article 125.
RULING
No, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period
prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it
being a “no-office day.”
The Court, citing Medina v. Orozco, Jr., reasoned that –
…In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk
of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And
then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and employees could very well
compound the fiscal’s difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring
that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained.

Non-availability of judge.
Detained person shall be released when a judge is not available. Where a judge is not available, the
arresting officer duty bound to release a detained person, if the maximum hours for detention provided
under Article 125 of the RPC has already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an offense
under Article 125.
Arresting officer is duty bound to release the person detained, if the maximum hours for detention
provided under Art. 125 of the RPC have already expired.
Subsequent detention by virtue of warrant, not affected. Read: Gunabe v Director of Prisons, 77 Phil
993, People v Mabong, 100 Phil 1069; People v Liu, GR No. 189272
Read period of detention under RA No. 11479 (Terrorism)
Art. 126. Delaying release - The penalties provided for in article 124 shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who delays for the period of time specified
therein the performance of any judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or
detention prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the notice of such order to said
prisoner or the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.
Three acts punishable
1. By delaying performance of judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner.
2. By unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner.
3. By unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. There is a judicial executive order for the release of the prisoner or detention prisoner, or that there is
a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person
3. Offender without good reason delays:
a. Service of notice of such order to the prisoner, or
b. Performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner, or
c. Proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person.
Note: The prisoners could be prisoners by final judgment or detention prisoners. Wardens and jailers
are the officers most likely to violate this provision.
Art. 127. Expulsion - The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who, not being thereunto authorized by law, shall expel any person from the Philippine
Islands or shall compel such person to change his residence.
Two acts punishable
1. By expelling a person from the Philippines
2. By compelling a person to change his residence
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. He expels any person from the Philippines, or compels a person to change his residence.
3. Offender is not authorized to do so by law.
Authorized by law?
Only the court by a final judgement can order a person to change his residence. This is illustrated in
ejectment proceedings, expropriation proceedings and in the penalty of destierro.
Courts with jurisdiction, by final judgment. Ejectment proceedings, Expropriation proceedings, destierro.
Read: Villavicencio v Lukban, 39 Phil 778
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and
thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that
those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao
instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could
have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao
Held:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to punish official transgressors.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus are to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the
chief of police could deport the women, they must have the means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not
be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ
of habeas corpus.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If
the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from
Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in
the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great
writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Violation of Domicile
Art. 128. Violation of Domicile. – The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter
any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without
the previous consent of such owner, or, having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required
to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so. If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any
papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search
made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Acts punishable
1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof or;
2. By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner;
or
3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after
having been required to leave the same.
Common elements
1. The offender is a public officer or employee;
2. He is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a search for papers and for
other effects.
Public officer
If the offender who enters the dwelling against the will of the owner thereof is a private individual, the
crime committed is trespass to dwelling.

Read: US v Macaspac, GR No. 3878;

US v Ponte, GR No. L-5952
“Judicial order” - Search warrant
A public officer or employee is authorized by judicial order when he is armed with a search warrant duly
issued by the court. Hence, he is not being authorized by judicial order, when the public officer has no
search warrant.
“Against the will of the owner” - express or implied opposition or prohibition.
To constitute a violation of domicile, the entrance by the public officer or employee must be against the
will of the owner of the dwelling express or implied. If the entrance by the public officer or employee is
only without the consent of the owner of the dwelling, the crime is not committed. Neither is the crime
committed if the owner of the dwelling consented to such entrance.

Read: People v Sane, CA 40 OG Supp 5, 113;

US v Vallejo, 11 Phil 193;

People v Malasugui, 63 Phil 221;

Facts: Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, was found lying on the ground, with several wounds in the head.
He died as a result of this wound shortly afterward in the Cotabato Hospital where he had been brought
by a policeman. Kagui Malasuqui became a suspect because when the victim was still alive when found
and upon being asked who had attacked him, laconically answered, "Kagui." On the same day, the
accused Kagui Malasugui was arrested without a warrant. He voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim and when asked if he had anything
else to surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police thereupon conducted a
body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted in the production of
additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim. Was the search valid?
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted on the accused legal?
Held: There was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. When one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. The
right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.

Rojas v Sps Matillano, GR No. 141176

FACTS:
Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, Paulina
Matillano. Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, owned by
Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao. Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime and after store
hours. Ben himself opened the store in the mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was
another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Ben’s nephew.
On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house
of spouses Matillano, where he rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work
the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa
was not paid his salary for the month of October.
Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported the
matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that
after Lariosa’s employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost
P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee,
had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.
An incident occurred wherein Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen
Ben’s money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and
pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still
refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao
City.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88 dated November
6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas “to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to
5:00 p.m.” Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was
authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on board a police car and
proceeded to the location of the store.
In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of a
relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into
the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part
of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that
the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search.
An information was filed in the RTC of Davao City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things.
Lariosa was acquitted of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured
Lariosa’s confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.
Lariosa’s parents on the other hand, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for robbery, violation
of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al.
The RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their claims. The trial court
also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies
of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that
the latter voluntarily turned over the subject items to them.
The CA reveresed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house, as well
as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family.
HELD:
The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and with the
handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the respondents. They
proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her vehement protests, and
because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she might be harmed, respondent Matillano was forced to
accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their house.
The petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts inside the
house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of respondent
Paulina Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.
Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto Genise
is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to “follow up a
theft case within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City.” The petitioner was not
authorized, under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as violation of
domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent Paulina
Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either
expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her
wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to object or resist did
not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners
were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio
Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search
and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.

Refusal to leave
Having surreptitiously entered said dwelling. When a public officer or employee may commit violation of
domicile even if the entrance is only without the consent of the owner; that is, the offender
surreptitiously entered the dwelling. But in this case, what constitute the crime is the refusal of the
offender to leave the premises when required to do so and the entrance into the dwelling.
“Papers or effects found therein”
Article 128 is not applicable when a public officer searched a person outside his dwelling without
search warrant such person is not legally arrested for an offense, because the papers or other effects
mentioned in Article 128 must be found in the dwelling.
Qualifying circumstances
1. If the offense is committed at night time; or
2. If any person or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not returned immediately after
the search made by the offender.
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained, and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. – In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search
warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use
unnecessary severity in executing the same.

Acts punishable
1. By procuring a search warrant without just cause
2. By exceeding his authority or by using unnecessary severity in executing a search warrant legally
procured.
Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he procures a search warrant
3. That there is no just cause
Procuring without just cause
A search warrant is said to have been procured without just cause when it appears on the face of the
affidavits filed in support of the application thereof, or through other evidence, that the applicant had
every reason to believe that the search warrant sought for was unjustified.

Search Warrant (Rules of Criminal Procedure)

A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for a personal property described
therein and bring it before the court.

Probable Cause.
Defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the object sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.

Read: Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541;

FACTS:
Petitioner (Rommel Corro) was a publisher and editor of the Philippine Times. Upon application filed
by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service, respondent
(RTC Judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City) issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure
of: (a) printed copies of Philippine Times, (b) manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the
Philippine Times, (c) newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times, (d) subversive documents,
articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and (e) typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines,
video machines and tapes. Said items/articles were used and being used as instrument or means of
committing the crime of inciting to sedition
under (Article 142) of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondents also padlocked and sealed the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which petitioner
was the publisher-editor. Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging, among others that said seized properties were not in any way
connected with the offense of inciting to sedition. Said motion was denied by respondent judge in a
resolution, pertinent portions which state that “the proper forum
from which the petition to withdraw articles should be addressed in the office of City Fiscal of Quezon
City and that it is not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is
pending.”
Hence, petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and restraining
order to enjoin respondent RTC from proceeding with the trial praying that search warrant issued by
respondent judge be declared null and void; that a mandatory injunction be issued to return
immediately the documents/properties illegally seized; that final injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from the utilizing said document/properties as evidence; and that respondent be directed
to re-open the padlocked business office of the Philippine Times.

ISSUE:
Was there sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search warrant?
RULING:
No, there was no sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search warrant. SEC. 3, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court provides the requisites for issuing search warrant.
(1) A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense;
(2) to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination;
(3) under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
(4) and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the present case, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies,
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and
tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable
records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally
objectionable. Therefore, an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged
subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine
Times, Rommel Corro. In addition, the statements made by Col. Castillo and Lt. Ignacio in the affidavits
are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge is declared null and void and, accordingly,
SET ASIDE.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner.
Further, respondents Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to
RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times

Burgos v Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:
The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-
editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants
issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles, instruments,
etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance
of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause.
Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the search
warrant six months later.

ISSUE: WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

HELD: NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case
at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.

True test of lack of just cause.

It is whether the affidavit filed in support of the application for search warrant has been drawn in such
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The oath
require must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search
warrant or his witness, not of the facts “reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable.”

Read: People v Alvarez, GR No. 45358;

Facts:

the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to
Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner
kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by
him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of
the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to
the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a
reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and
residence at seven o’clock on the night and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal
revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books,
four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs,
forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of
credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt
book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and
loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks
of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.
As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the
petitioner filed a motion praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be
declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. Motion granted. Attorney
Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order be set aside
and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days
for the necessary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the affidavit is valid for purposes in issuing a search warrant
Ruling:
No The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath
of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused

it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held
that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

People v Sy Juco, GR No. 41957

Facts:
Narciso Mendiola, agent of BIR, filed for a search warrant based on the information from a reliable
source alleging that certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being kept in the building
No. 482 in Binondo, Manila occupied by Santiago Sy Juco.
CFI Manila through Judge Albert issued a search warrant directing peace officers to seize the above-
stated articles to deliver them to the court, for the proper action to be taken in due time. After making
the required search the officers concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by
Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to his
clients.
Remo filed a petition in CFI Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents be
prohibited from opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of the City of Manila likewise be
ordered to take charge of said property in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of
which the search was made is null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. A similar petition
was later filed in the same case by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., the same agents of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue having also seized some books belonging to it by virtue of the above-mentioned search
warrant. CFI Manila through Judge Jaranilla overrule both petitions, declaring that the art metal filing
cabinet and the books and papers claimed by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to
Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the company, respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an
examination thereof to be made in the presence of the interested parties, that they contain nothing
showing that they have been used to commit fraud against the Government. Remo appealed

Issue: WON the search warrant was valid.

Ruling: No. The search warrant in question could not and should not in any way affect the appellant
attorney on the ground that he is not the person against whom it had been sought. It is Santiago Sy Juco
alone against whom the search warrant could be used, because it had been obtained precisely against
him; so much so that Narciso Mendiola, who applied for it, mentioned him expressly in his affidavit and
again did so in his report to his superior, that is, the Collector of Internal Revenue and at the trial of this
case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in the premises occupied by Santiago
Sy Juco because an investigation was then pending against him, for having defrauded the Government in
its public revenue. The doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Rubio (57 Phil., 384), invoked against
the appellant, is not applicable to the case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither books
nor record indicating fraud were found in his possession, and it is not he against whom the warrant was
issued. The court could not and cannot order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet in question
because, it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant attorney and that in it he keeps the
records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in violation of his right as such attorney, since it
would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his clients,
which should be kept secret, unless she is authorized by them to make such disclosure, it being a duty
imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the secrets or communications made to him.

“Fruits of the poisonous tree”.

Read: Alih v Castro, 151 SCRA 279;
Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A
shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number
of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –
printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle,
grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned
to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that
they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of
the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and
are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held: The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had
against
petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the
constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due
process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the
law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any
showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as
evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was
done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be
acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law
(custodia egis).
 However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of
the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-
incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.

Stonehill v Diokno, 20 SCRA 383

Facts:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason
that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

2. Exceeding authority in executing search warrant

If the public officer, in executing a search warrant for opium, seized books, personal letters, and other
property having a remote or no connection with opium, even if he believed or suspected that they had
some relation with opium, such public officer may be held liable under Article 129.
But the possession of contraband articles, like firearm without license, is a flagrant violation of the law
and the contraband can be seized without a writ.

Elements
1. offender is a public officer or employee
2. he has legally procured a search warrant
3. he exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same

Read: Uy Kheytin v Villareal, 42 Phil 886

Facts: Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, stating in his application; "That in the house of
Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain
amount of opium." Upon that application the said judge, on the same day, issueda search warrant.
Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, accompanied by some of his
subordinates, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found
therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the ground-floor of the
house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted
to be sure, and for this reason he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed
therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next morning he
learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin
was the one who was rentingthe bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and hissubordinates resumed
the search and then and there found and seized other articles such as opiumliquid, empty opium
containers, opium pipe and the like. Furthermore, officers seized books, papers, etc.
A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of the Opium Law. They were
duly arrested, and a preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he
found that there was probable cause for believing that the crime complained of had been committed
and that the defendants were the persons responsible therefor. Petitioners herein filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private papers, books and other property" which the
Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground that they had been soseized
illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants.
Petitioners contend that the search was illegal and therefore asking for the return of the items seized.
Issue: May the opium, books, papers, etc. be returned?
RULING: (Opium and its paraphernalia – NO; Books, papers, etc. – YES) In the present case there was an
irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the
complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having
been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an
improper arrest, we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of
the opium found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter. That the
officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as evidence
against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no
reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly
described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned
in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the
purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to
be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.
From all of the foregoing our conclusions are: 1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in
question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the
petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and
seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission
of the judge. 2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the
previous day, and, therefore, did not require another search warrant. 3. That the seizure of the
petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium and
the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners'
constitutional rights. Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents
herein, their assistants or successors, be, and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any
use of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., and they are hereby ordered to immediately return the said
articles to the petitioners.---

Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers, or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in
their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.

Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. He is armed with search warrant legally procured
3. He searches domicile, papers or other belongings of any person
4. The owner, or any member of his family, or two witnesses residing in the same locality are not
present.