Baksh Vs Court of Appeals

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and

MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
1993-02-19 | G.R. No. 97336
DAVIDE, JR., J:
The private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges the petitioner courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore argued to get married after the end of the
school semester. The petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents to secure their approval to the
marriage. The petitioner forced her to live with him; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain, a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to
someone. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's
fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
The petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment;
he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner
was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. The decision is anchored on the trial court's
findings and conclusions that, among others:
● private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances;
● petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent;
● because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him ;
by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents - in accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions - made some preparations for the wedding by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors,
● such acts have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions.
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. The Court promulgated the
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling.
Issue
Whether the petitioner shall be liable for damages for breaching the promise to marry the private respondent
Ruling
Yes, the petitioner shall be liable.
The Supreme Court held that the existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.
Quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In
the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the
New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to. be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between
these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud
and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction - the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.

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GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and

1993-02-19 | G.R. No. 97336

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