IE Apunts Exam1

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‭1.

GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE‬

‭ Globalization‬ ‭is‬ ‭a‬ ‭fact‬ ‭because‬ ‭of‬ ‭technology,‬ ‭because‬ ‭of‬ ‭an‬ ‭integrated‬ ‭global‬ ‭supply‬ ‭chain,‬ ‭because‬ ‭of‬

‭changes in transportation, and we’re not going to be able to build a wall around that.”‬‭, B. Obama 2016‬
‭International trade (as migration) is part and parcel of globalization‬

‭Globalization‬ ‭as‬ ‭some‬ ‭great‬ ‭unbundling‬ ‭force‬‭:‬ ‭sectors,‬ ‭firms,‬ ‭people,‬ ‭tasks‬ ‭that‬ ‭were‬ ‭stick‬ ‭together‬ ‭in‬ ‭some‬
l‭ocations (bundled together), thay are more footloose (more free to move thanks to globalization).‬
‭Before‬ ‭Globalization‬‭:‬ ‭presence‬ ‭of‬ ‭costs‬ ‭of‬ ‭moving‬ ‭goods,‬ ‭people‬ ‭and‬ ‭ideas‬ ‭pushed‬ ‭for‬ ‭the‬ ‭clustering‬ ‭of‬
‭production and people.‬
‭With Globalization‬‭: drop of transportation and communication‬‭costs let the movement of all factors more free.‬

‭ lobalization has not been just one smooth and unique process:‬
G
‭First Unbundling‬‭:‬‭drop of transportation costs‬‭→ production‬‭and consumption can happen in different places‬
‭Second Unbundling‬‭:‬‭drop of communication costs‬‭→ split‬‭of the tasks of the production process‬
‭They have different relevance/consequences (1‬‭st‬ ‭had‬‭a stronger impact) and different implications‬

‭1.‬ ‭First Unbundling‬


‭Two waves, interrupted by the World Wars and the Great Depression: 1850 - 1914; 1960 - today‬
‭●‬ ‭Importance of technological changes‬

‭ rop of transportation costs as main aspect‬‭(including‬‭tariffs): characterized by sis main facts:‬


D
‭1‭.‬ Industrialization/Deindustrialization:‬
‭●‬ ‭Fist wave: industrialization north, deindustrialization south‬
‭●‬ ‭Second wave: deindustrialization north, industrialization south‬
‭2‭.‬ International Divergence/Convergence (economically)‬
‭●‬ ‭Fist wave: divergence north - south (richer and poorer)‬
‭●‬ ‭Second wave: convergence north - south (industrialized India, China, South Africa)‬
‭3‭.‬ International Trade:‬
‭●‬ ‭Explosion with the first wave, stop due to wars, and back on track afterwards‬
‭●‬ ‭More countries to trade with: increase after the end of Soviet Union‬
‭●‬ ‭Increase of trade openness after the entering of China in the world trade organization (2002)‬
‭●‬ ‭Drop of tariffs (as part of transportation costs) in all countries: protect international product‬
‭●‬ ‭Variation in the basket of goods traded: increase manufactures, decrease agricultural products‬
‭4‬‭.‬ ‭Growth‬ ‭Take-off:‬ ‭income‬ ‭convergence‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭second‬ ‭wave‬‭is‬‭driven‬‭also‬‭by‬‭the‬‭spectacular‬‭growth‬‭due‬‭to‬
‭globalization (same magnitude effect as Industrial Revolution)‬
‭5‭.‬ Urbanisation: linked with an unprecedented urbanisation,‬‭particularly among developed countries‬
‭6‭.‬ Internal Divergence: rise of inequality, due to‬‭the redistributive effects of trade and migration‬

‭ he effect happened differently across nations and over time (not gradual)‬
T
‭Economic forces that explains such heterogeneous pattern:‬
‭1‭.‬ Agglomeration’s Hump Shaped Effect‬
‭2‭.‬ Home Market Magnification Effect‬

‭ gglomeration’s Hump Shaped Effect‬‭:‬


A
‭→ Tendency of spatial clustering (getting together) of economic activities, which foster further spatial clustering‬
‭Agglomeration‬‭forces‬‭explain‬‭the‬‭creation‬‭of‬‭productive‬‭clusters‬‭(ex.‬‭Silicon‬‭Valley)‬‭and‬‭also‬‭contributes‬‭to‬‭the‬
‭creation of bigger markets (ex. European Unique market).‬
‭Therefor, it comes from: nearness to customers and nearness to suppliers‬
‭However, agglomeration forces are strongest for intermediate level of trade freeness:‬
‭●‬ ‭Restricted trade - no possibility to agglomerate: producers have to stay close to consumers‬
‭●‬ ‭Perfectly Costless trade - pointless to agglomerate: you can produce wherever you prefer‬
‭This‬ ‭nature‬ ‭of‬ ‭agglomeration‬ ‭forces‬ ‭explain‬ ‭the‬ ‭industrialization‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭North‬ ‭and‬ ‭deindustrialization‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬
‭ outh, and the opposite in the second wave.‬
S

‭ ome Market Magnification Effect‬‭:‬


H
‭→ Explain why we do not have all the production process clustered in some area‬
‭Pull‬‭effect:‬‭big‬‭countries‬‭have‬‭larger‬‭(domestic)‬‭demand‬‭than‬‭small‬‭countries;‬‭they‬‭attract‬‭firms‬‭and‬‭production‬
‭plants (access to more consumers) → increase of clustering‬
‭Push‬ ‭effect:‬ ‭since‬ ‭many‬ ‭firms‬ ‭are‬ ‭attracted,‬ ‭these‬‭big‬‭markets‬‭face‬‭an‬‭increase‬‭of‬‭competition,‬‭which‬‭implies‬
‭less control over factors’ of production and goods’ prices (increase) → decrease clustering‬

‭ hese two economic forces able to explain the six facts described above?‬
T
‭With lower transportation costs:‬
‭1‭.‬ Firms start to move to big markets, but this phenomenon‬‭is balanced by an increase of local competition‬
‭●‬ ‭Increase industrialization (north), trade and urbanisation‬
‭2‭.‬ Agglomeration and clustering of resources fostered‬‭innovation → trigger of economic growth‬
‭3‭.‬ After 1960, transportation costs (of goods and‬‭ideas) so low that could reach also less developed regions‬
‭●‬ ‭Industrialization of South‬
‭4‬‭.‬ ‭Deindustrialization‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭North‬ ‭can‬ ‭be‬ ‭then‬ ‭explained‬ ‭by‬‭both‬‭a‬‭change‬‭in‬‭demand‬‭(service‬‭oriented)‬‭and‬
‭competition‬

‭ onsequences‬‭:‬
C
‭Globalization triggered competition between sectors:‬
‭●‬ ‭Winning sectors (and related firms and workers): increase sales‬
‭●‬ ‭Losing sectors (and related firms and workers): decrease sales‬
‭Winners and losers of trade‬
‭Policy perspective crucial to help the losers, to avoid political consequences. Winners and losers are predictable‬

‭2.‬ ‭Second Unbundling‬


‭ rom the 1980s, due to the continuous drop of transportation and communication costs‬
F
‭It triggered a new possibility: outsource part of the production process (tasks) out of the firm →‬‭offshoring‬
‭Rise of‬‭Global Value Chain‬‭: different stages of the‬‭production process are located across different countries‬
‭New paradigma: competition within firm → tasks level‬

‭ ew implications‬‭:‬
N
‭1‭.‬ Competition at task-level (before, competition‬‭between sectors)‬
‭2‭.‬ Winners and losers are less predictable‬
‭3‭.‬ Changes are more rapid and sudden‬
‭4‭.‬ Since competition is new at individual level, rather‬‭than sector level, policy should keep it in mind‬

‭3.‬ ‭Globalization and Trade‬


‭ lobalization‬‭is‬‭an‬‭unbundling‬‭process:‬‭sectors/firms/tasks‬‭that‬‭were‬‭stuck‬‭together‬‭start‬‭to‬‭be‬‭more‬‭footloose,‬
G
‭with sizeable implications for our societies‬
‭Trade is an important aspect related to globalization. Another relevant one is Migration‬
‭Macroeconomic factors can explain the first unbundling: we will focus on it‬
‭2. BASIC INDICATORS‬

‭Basic economic indicators: GDP & Measures of International Competitiveness‬

‭1.‬ ‭Gross Domestic Product: definition‬


‭ o measure the capacity of a country to produce, we rely on the GDP‬
T
‭It is probably the variable that takes the higher attention to grasp the status of an economy‬
‭Understanding the income level of an individual, says a lot about his economic status‬
‭The GDP provides similar information at country level. Hence, GDP is a flow variable, not a stock variable‬

‭GDP is the market value of all final goods and services produced in an economy during a certain period of time‬

‭ ey features‬‭:‬
K
‭1. Market Value: goods and services evaluated with the current prices (taxes included). GDP is the sum‬
‭Ex. A fictitious economy produce 1 apple and 1 orange, with‬‭P‬‭a‭=‬ 2€‬‭,‬‭P‬‭o‭=
‬ 3€‬‭→ GDP = 1·2 + 1·3 = 5€‬
‭2. Goods and Services‬
‭3. Final: sold to the final consumers, hence no additional process of transformation related to the good/service‬

‭ DP is not accounting for‬‭:‬


G
‭Intermediate goods: to avoid double counting‬
‭Informal sector: the national accounts are unable to grasp the activity of the informal sector‬
‭Home production‬
‭Financial Products‬
‭Remittances:‬‭inflow‬‭and‬‭outflow‬‭of‬‭money‬‭due‬‭to‬‭immigrants‬‭and‬‭emigrants‬‭are‬‭not‬‭accounted.‬‭To‬‭measure‬‭the‬
‭capacity of production of citizens, Gross National Income (GNI)‬

‭2.‬ ‭Gross Domestic Product: how to compute ir‬


‭ ethodologies to compute GDP‬‭, which deliver exactly‬‭the same result:‬
M
‭1. GDP as the sum of incomes → GDP from income side‬
‭2. GDP as the sum of the expenditures → GDP from the demand side‬
‭3. GDP as the sum of the value added → GDP from the supply side‬

‭They provide the same result:‬


‭●‬ ‭Supply = demand → value of what we consume should be equal to what we produce‬
‭●‬ ‭Demand = income → value of what we consume should be equal to out income‬

‭2.1.‬ ‭GDP from the Supply Side‬


‭ o‬‭see‬‭the‬‭supply‬‭side‬‭of‬‭GDP,‬‭hence‬‭the‬‭production‬‭side‬‭(firms),‬‭and‬‭to‬‭avoid‬‭double‬‭counting,‬‭we‬‭can‬‭compute‬
T
‭the GDP as the sum of the value added by production.‬
‭Value added is the difference between the value of the output and the input‬
‭We should compute the value added produced at each stage of production.‬
‭𝑁‬
‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬ = ∑ ‭𝑉𝐴‬‭𝑖‬ + ‭𝑇𝐴𝑋‬
‭𝑖‬=‭1‬
‭ here;‬‭N‬‭is‬‭the‬‭different‬‭sectors‬‭in‬‭an‬‭economy,‬‭VA‬‭i‬ ‭is‬‭the‬‭value‬‭added‬‭of‬‭sector‬‭i‭,‬‬‭TAX‬‭is‬‭net‬‭taxes‬‭on‬‭production‬
w
‭(‭T
‬ AX‬‭can be seen as the‬‭VA‬‭of the public sector coming‬‭from national/domestic production)‬

‭ .2.‬
2 ‭GDP from the Demand Side‬
‭Based on the sum of all the expenditures in the economy:‬ ‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬ = ‭𝐶‬ + ‭𝐼‬ + ‭𝐺‬ + ‭𝑋‬ − ‭𝑀‬
‭where;‬ ‭C‬ ‭is‬ ‭the‬ ‭private‬ ‭(household)‬ ‭consumption‬ ‭of‬ ‭goods‬ ‭and‬ ‭services,‬ ‭G‬ ‭the‬ ‭public‬ ‭(state),‬ ‭I‬
‭(investment/capital)‬ ‭is‬ ‭the‬ ‭expenditures‬ ‭made‬ ‭by‬ ‭private‬ ‭and‬ ‭public‬ ‭sector‬ ‭which‬ ‭will‬ ‭not‬ ‭lead‬ ‭to‬‭immediate‬
‭consumption,‬‭X‬‭is‬‭the‬‭export‬‭and‬‭demand‬‭or‬‭foreign‬‭consumers‬‭of‬‭domestic‬‭products‬‭(inflow‬‭of‬‭income),‬‭M‬‭is‬
‭the import and demand of domestic consumers of foreign products (outflow of income)‬
‭2.3.‬ ‭GDP from the Income Side‬
‭GDP as the sum of revenues of all the actors of the economy (firms, employees, state,...)‬
‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬ = ‭𝑊‬ + π + ‭𝑖‬‭𝐾‬ + ‭𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐼‬
‭where:‬ ‭W‬ ‭is‬ ‭wages,‬ π ‭is‬ ‭profits‬ ‭or‬ ‭other‬ ‭sources‬‭of‬‭firms’‬‭income,‬‭i‭K‬ ‬ ‭is‬‭interest‬‭from‬‭capital,‬‭NTPI‬‭is‬‭net‬‭tax‬
(‭ tax-subsidies) on production and imports‬

‭3.‬ ‭GDP‬
‭For developed economics, GDP has a positive trend over time.‬

‭However, since GDP is computed at the market values (p), two forces can explain is positive trend:‬
‭●‬ ‭Goods and services: we produce more‬
‭●‬ ‭Prices: goods are more expensive → inflation‬

‭ e have to types of GDP:‬


W
‭Nominal GDP‬‭: prices and quantities are year‬‭t‭.‬ Hence,‬‭given an economy with‬‭J‬‭goods and services:‬
‭𝐽‬
‭𝑁‬
‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬ = ∑ ‭𝑥‬‭𝑡‭𝑝 ‬
‬ ‭𝑡‬
‭𝑗‬=‭1‬
‭N‬
‭GDP‬ ‭increases over time if:‬‭x‭t‬‬ ‭increases or‬‭p‭t‬‬ ‭increases.‬

‭Real GDP‬‭: quantities at year‬‭t‭,‬ but prices fixed at‬‭a years of reference‬‭b‬‭:‬
‭𝐽‬
‭𝑅‬
‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬‭𝑡,‬‭𝑏‬ = ∑ ‭𝑥‬‭𝑡‭𝑝 ‬
‬ ‭𝑏‬
‭𝑗‬=‭1‬
‭R‬
‭GDP‬ ‭increases over time if:‬‭x‭t‬‬ ‭increases or‬‭p‭b‬ ‬ ‭(fixed‬‭over time) increases.‬

‭If you want to compute the economic growth of a country use real GDP rather than nominal.‬

‭ DP per Capita‬‭:‬
G
‭By dividing the GDP for the population → GDP per Capita‬
‭Proxy for the average expenditure/revenues of inhabitants‬
‭Used as a proxy for society well-being:‬
‭●‬ ‭Pros: correlated with several factors of the economy, like education, inequality,...‬
‭●‬ ‭Cons: rather rough measure of well-being‬

‭ xercise 2‬‭: Different definitions of GDP arrive to‬‭the same result‬


E
‭GDP income = other income + comp. Empl + n tax p& imp = 344493.2‬
‭GDP demand = c (consumption private) + i (investment) + g (public consumption) + x (exports) - m (imports)‬
‭GDP‬‭d‬‭=‬‭(FCEH‬‭+‬‭FCR‬‭of‬‭N…)‬‭+‬‭(changes‬‭in‬‭inventory‬‭(ch‬‭inv)‬‭+‬‭grosse‬‭capital‬‭formation)‬‭+‬‭FCEGG‬‭+‬‭exp‬‭-‬
‭imp = 344493.2‬
‭Ch inv (vriable that we dont know) = 344493.2 - 343796.7 = 696.5‬
‭GDP supply = production = sum VA + Net tx products‬
‭GDP supply = VA (all) + Net tax =‬
‭VA other = 344493.3 - 242107.6 = 102385.6‬
‭Share‬ ‭of‬ ‭agriculture‬ ‭Austrisa‬ ‭=‬ ‭VA‬ ‭agricultureal‬ ‭secotr‬ ‭/‬ ‭GDP‬ ‭=‬‭1.1%‬‭→‬‭small‬‭share‬‭of‬‭economy‬‭=‬‭develop‬
‭economy‬
‭3. BASIC INDICATORS‬

‭ oday we face some measures to proxy countries competitiveness‬


T
‭Competitiveness‬‭is‬‭a‬‭country's‬‭capacity‬‭to‬‭export‬‭their‬‭goods‬‭abroad‬‭and‬‭to‬‭use‬‭domestic‬‭production‬‭to‬‭satisfy‬
‭domestic demand (rather than using imports).‬
‭With‬ ‭competitiveness‬ ‭we‬ ‭are‬ ‭measuring‬ ‭countries‬ ‭capacity‬ ‭to‬ ‭sell‬ ‭abroad‬ ‭and‬ ‭to‬ ‭be‬ ‭competitive‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬
‭international market of goods and services → evaluation through exchange rates and trade flows‬

‭ .‬
1 ‭Exchange Rates‬
‭Nominal‬‭exchange‬‭rate‬‭(‭e‬ ‬‭)‬‭is‬‭the‬‭number‬‭of‬‭units‬‭of‬‭the‬‭domestic‬‭currency‬‭that‬‭are‬‭needed‬‭to‬‭purchase‬‭a‬‭unit‬‭of‬
‭a given foreign currency.‬

‭Lower‬‭e‬‭: appreciation/revaluation, value of my currency‬‭compared to the foreign one is growing‬


‭●‬ ‭– exports (send goods to other countries), + imports (cheap international products)‬
‭Higher‬‭e‬‭: depreciation/devaluation, value of my currency‬‭compared to the foreign one is declining‬
‭●‬ ‭– imports (hard to buy, products more expensive), + exports (goods cheaper); currency is losing value‬

‭What determines whether a currency has the “correct” value? Law of one price and Purchase Power Parity‬

‭The nominal exchange rate is not a sufficient measure for competitiveness, we also need the level of prices‬

‭𝑒𝑃‬*
‭To have a proper measure of competitiveness, we can compute the‬‭Real exchange rate‬‭(‭E
‬ ‭)‬ :‬ ‭𝐸‬ = ‭𝑃‬
‭where,‬‭eP*‬‭are the foreign prices transformed to domestic‬‭prices and‬‭P‬‭are domestic prices.‬

‭Transforming‬‭the‬‭foreign‬‭prices‬‭in‬‭domestic‬‭currency,‬‭we‬‭can‬‭compare‬‭the‬‭price‬‭of‬‭domestic‬‭vs‬‭foreign‬‭goods,‬
‭ ence we can retrieve a proper measure of domestic goods competitiveness‬
h
‭●‬ ‭E‬ ‭>‬ ‭1‬ ‭→‬ ‭eP*‬ ‭>‬ ‭P‬ ‭domestic‬ ‭goods‬ ‭are‬ ‭cheaper‬ ‭than‬ ‭foreign‬ ‭goods,‬ ‭one‬ ‭expressed‬ ‭with‬ ‭the‬ ‭same‬
‭currency → high competitiveness‬
‭●‬ ‭E‬‭<‬‭1‬‭→‬‭eP*‬‭<‬‭P‬‭domestic‬‭goods‬‭are‬‭more‬‭expensive‬‭than‬‭foreign‬‭goods,‬‭one‬‭expressed‬‭with‬‭the‬‭same‬
‭currency → low competitiveness‬

‭ ifferences in the quality of the goods are not accounted for (all the goods are homogeneous)‬
D
‭Real‬‭effective‬‭exchange‬‭rate:‬‭weighted‬‭average‬‭of‬‭the‬‭bilateral‬‭exchange‬‭rates,‬‭where‬‭the‬‭weights‬‭can‬‭be‬‭related‬
‭to the trade flows/numbers of trade partners‬

‭ .‬
2 ‭Trade Flows‬
‭We can check to size of countries’ trade flows to grasp information of their competitiveness‬
‭Balance of trade = exports (X) – imports (M)‬

‭Trade Openness‬‭: captures the relevance of international‬‭trade with respect to the size of the economy‬
‭𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒‬‭‬‭𝑂𝑃‬ = ( ‭ +
𝑋 ‬ ‭𝑀‬
‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬ ) ∗ ‭100‬
‭Countries‬ ‭characterized‬ ‭by‬ ‭being‬ ‭active‬ ‭on‬ ‭the‬ ‭international‬ ‭market‬ ‭are‬ ‭characterized‬ ‭by‬ ‭a‬ ‭Trade‬‭OP‬‭>‬‭100.‬
‭ rade OP > 100‬‭→ economy defined as small open economy‬‭(open economy means tha exports means a lot)‬
T

‭Export Quota‬‭: to capture how much export is relevant‬‭for the economy‬


‭𝑋‬
‭𝐸𝑥𝑝‬‭‬‭𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎‬ = ‭𝐺𝐷𝑃‬
∗ ‭100‬
‭Export Quota increases suggests a country where exports matters a lot for the productive capacity of the country.‬
‭5. ABSOLUTE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE‬

‭ wo relevant theories of why countries trade:‬


T
‭Absolute‬ ‭Advantage‬‭:‬ ‭countries‬ ‭with‬ ‭high‬ ‭productivity‬‭in‬‭the‬‭production‬‭of‬‭a‬‭good‬‭tend‬‭to‬‭be‬‭new‬‭exporter‬‭of‬
‭that good → more productive country should dominate the international market‬
‭Comparative‬‭Advantage‬‭:‬‭countries‬‭with‬‭low‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭in‬‭the‬‭production‬‭of‬‭a‬‭good‬‭tend‬‭to‬‭be‬‭net‬‭exporter‬
‭of‬‭that‬‭good‬‭→‬‭what‬‭matters‬‭is‬‭the‬‭opportunity‬‭cost,‬‭countries‬‭with‬‭higher‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭of‬‭a‬‭product‬‭should‬
‭dominate the world with the product‬

‭1.‬ ‭Adam Smith and Absolute Advantage‬


‭ If‬ ‭a‬ ‭foreign‬‭country‬‭can‬‭supply‬‭us‬‭with‬‭a‬‭commodity‬‭cheaper‬‭than‬‭we‬‭ourselves‬‭can‬‭make‬‭it,‬‭better‬‭buy‬‭it‬‭of‬

‭them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage”‬

‭Main‬‭idea:‬‭if‬‭a‬‭country‬‭is‬‭“better‬‭at‬‭producing”‬‭than‬‭another‬‭one,‬‭the‬‭one‬‭that‬‭is‬‭“better”‬‭will‬‭produce‬‭and‬‭export‬
t‭he goods, and the others will buy.‬

‭“Being better at producing”: →‬‭higher productivity‬


‭●‬ ‭Higher number of output produced with the same amount of input‬
‭●‬ ‭Same number of output produced with lower amount of input‬

‭When‬‭a‬‭country‬‭has‬‭a‬‭higher‬‭productivity‬‭compared‬‭to‬‭the‬‭other‬‭country‬‭in‬‭producing‬‭a‬‭specific‬‭good,‬‭it‬‭has‬‭an‬
a‭ bsolute advantage in the production of the good.‬

‭Given‬ ‭two‬ ‭countries,‬ ‭and‬ ‭given‬ ‭good‬ ‭z‬‭,‬ ‭the‬ ‭country‬ ‭with‬ ‭the‬ ‭highest‬ ‭productivity‬ ‭(hence‬ ‭use‬ ‭less‬ ‭input‬ ‭to‬
‭ roduce the same amount of output) had an absolute advantage in the production of good‬‭z‬‭.‬
p
‭Countries‬‭should‬‭specialize‬‭in‬‭the‬‭production‬‭of‬‭goods‬‭in‬‭which‬‭they‬‭hold‬‭an‬‭absolute‬‭advantage‬‭and‬‭then‬‭trade‬
‭it with the rest of the world.‬

‭ he‬ ‭intuition‬ ‭of‬ ‭Adam‬‭Smith‬‭was‬‭the‬‭following:‬‭if‬‭there‬‭is‬‭no‬‭trade,‬‭each‬‭country‬‭has‬‭to‬‭produce‬‭both‬‭goods.‬


T
‭But,‬ ‭if‬ ‭trade‬ ‭exists,‬ ‭each‬ ‭country‬ ‭can‬ ‭specializa‬ ‭in‬ ‭producing‬ ‭goods‬ ‭which‬ ‭hold‬ ‭an‬ ‭absolute‬ ‭advantage‬ ‭and‬
‭import the rest.‬

‭2.‬ ‭David Ricardo and Comparative Advantage‬


‭ ased‬‭on‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭:‬‭given‬‭two‬‭goods,‬‭A‬‭and‬‭B,‬‭the‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭of‬‭A‬‭is‬‭the‬‭amount‬‭of‬‭goods‬‭B‬‭that‬‭I‬
B
‭have to renounce to produce 1 additional unity of A (= cost of production)‬

‭ iven‬‭two‬‭countries,‬‭X‬‭and‬‭Y,‬‭and‬‭a‬‭given‬‭good‬‭z‬‭,‬‭the‬‭country‬‭with‬‭the‬‭lowest‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭(hence‬‭having‬‭to‬
G
‭renounce‬ ‭to‬ ‭less‬ ‭units‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭other‬ ‭good‬ ‭to‬ ‭produce‬ ‭1‬ ‭additional‬ ‭unit‬ ‭of‬ ‭z‬‭)‬ ‭has‬ ‭a‬ ‭comparative‬ ‭advantage‬ ‭in‬
‭producing‬‭z‭.‬‬
‭Comparative advantage → lowest opportunity cost‬

‭ ountries should specialize in the producing and export the goods in which they hold a comparative advantage.‬
C
‭If‬ ‭each‬ ‭country‬ ‭specializes‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭production‬ ‭of‬ ‭goods‬ ‭which‬ ‭holds‬ ‭a‬ ‭comparative‬ ‭advantage,‬ ‭means‬ ‭that,‬
‭compared‬ ‭to‬ ‭other‬ ‭countries,‬ ‭they‬ ‭have‬ ‭to‬ ‭renounce‬ ‭less‬ ‭units‬‭of‬‭the‬‭other‬‭goods‬‭and‬‭through‬‭trade,‬‭the‬‭final‬
‭bundle of goods of each country can be better off.‬

‭2.1.‬ ‭Opportunity Cost and Relative Price‬


‭ he opportunity cost is equal to the relative price of each good with respect to the other.‬
T
‭If there is a difference between the opportunity cost and prices on the international markets → profitable trade‬

‭Once‬‭there‬‭is‬‭a‬‭difference‬‭between‬‭countries'‬‭opportunity‬‭costs/relative‬‭prices‬‭in‬‭the‬‭international‬‭market,‬‭there‬
i‭s a way to profit through an arbitrage.‬
‭For a given good‬‭z‬‭and a country‬‭X‬‭:‬
‭●‬ ‭If‬‭P‬‭z‭i‬nt‬‭> OppCost‬‭z‭X‬ ‬ ‭→‬‭X‬‭will produce and trade the‬‭good‬‭z‬
‭●‬ ‭If‬ ‭P‬‭z‭i‬nt‬ ‭<‬ ‭OppCost‬‭z‭X‬ ‬ ‭→‬ ‭X‬ ‭will‬ ‭buy‬ ‭the‬ ‭good‬ ‭z‬ ‭from‬ ‭the‬ ‭international‬ ‭market‬ ‭(cheaper‬ ‭to‬‭buy‬‭it‬‭than‬
‭produce it; higher cost of production)‬
‭Define the prices on the international market which allows a profitable trade for both countries‬

‭Given‬ ‭a‬ ‭two‬ ‭countries‬ ‭model,‬ ‭to‬ ‭have‬ ‭trade,‬ ‭the‬ ‭prices‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭international‬ ‭markets‬ ‭need‬ ‭to‬ ‭be‬ ‭between‬ ‭the‬
‭ pportunity costs of the two countries.‬
o

‭2.2.‬ ‭Graphical Illustration‬


‭ udget constraints: relation between input and output‬
B
‭Input = Output → efficient‬
‭Input > Output → possible, inefficient‬
‭Input < Output → not possible, spending more of what you have‬

‭ roduction‬‭Possibility‬‭Curve:‬‭represents‬‭all‬‭the‬‭combinations‬‭of‬‭amounts‬‭of‬‭different‬‭products‬‭that‬‭an‬‭economy‬
P
‭can produce. The bundle of goods located over the PPC uses all the inputs available.‬
‭Trade line: where the slope of the line is the price on the international market‬

‭Absolute Advantage‬

‭ pportunity Cost‬
O
‭Cheaper‬ ‭for‬ ‭the‬ ‭US‬ ‭to‬ ‭buy‬ ‭cloth‬ ‭=‬
‭higher cost of production (2W/C)‬

‭ ssumption‬ ‭that‬ ‭both‬ ‭have‬


A
‭100h of labour inputs:‬
‭BC‬‭US‬‭: 100h=2h*W+4h*C‬
‭●‬ ‭W=50-2C‬
‭BC‬‭RoW‬‭: 100h=1.5h*W+1h*C‬
‭●‬ ‭W=67-0.67C‬

‭ S: maximum cloth 25‬


U
‭2‬‭=‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭of‬‭cloth:‬‭to‬
‭produce‬‭1‬‭unit‬‭of‬‭cloth‬‭we‬‭have‬
‭to renounce 2 units of wheat‬

‭ S comparative advantage = Wheat (50W) — RoW comparative advantage = Cloth (100C)‬


U
‭By‬‭specializing‬‭in‬‭the‬‭product‬‭of‬‭the‬‭good‬‭in‬‭which‬‭they‬‭hold‬‭a‬‭comparative‬‭advantage‬‭and‬‭trading,‬‭each‬‭country‬
‭can be better off.‬
‭If the prices in the international market are between the opportunity costs, trade can happen‬
‭●‬ ‭US:‬‭P‬‭C‬‭int‬ ‭=‬‭1W‬‭(US can produce 50W and can buy 50C,‬‭because the price of W=C)‬
‭Point C: trade that both can arrive, before trade nether could arrive to this level of production and well being‬
‭Comparative‬‭advantage‬‭principle‬‭(David‬‭Ricardo):‬‭trade‬‭does‬‭not‬‭rely‬‭on‬‭productivity,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭not‬‭important‬‭to‬‭be‬
t‭he most productive in absolute terms rather than in relative terms. He promotes a full specialization.‬
‭Absolute‬‭Advantage,‬‭Adam‬‭Smith‬‭:‬‭countries‬‭should‬‭specialize‬‭in‬‭the‬‭production‬‭and‬‭trade‬‭of‬‭goods‬‭in‬‭which‬
‭they‬ ‭hold‬ ‭an‬ ‭absolute‬ ‭advantage,‬ ‭hence‬ ‭in‬ ‭which‬ ‭they‬‭have‬‭a‬‭higher‬‭productivity‬‭(ex.‬‭less‬‭input‬‭for‬‭the‬‭same‬
‭amount of output)‬
‭Comparative‬‭Advantage,‬‭David‬‭Ricardo‬‭:‬‭countries‬‭should‬‭specialize‬‭in‬‭the‬‭production‬‭and‬‭trade‬‭of‬‭goods‬‭in‬
‭which‬‭they‬‭hold‬‭a‬‭comparative‬‭advantage,‬‭hence‬‭in‬‭which‬‭they‬‭have‬‭a‬‭lower‬‭opportunity‬‭cost‬‭(ex.‬‭they‬‭have‬‭to‬
‭renounce to a lower amount of other goods)‬

‭ xercise:‬‭Assume‬‭that‬‭both‬‭an‬‭American‬‭and‬‭a‬‭Japanese‬‭worker‬‭produces‬‭4‬‭cars‬‭per‬‭year.‬‭An‬‭American‬‭worker‬
E
‭in‬‭the‬‭agricultural‬‭sector‬‭produces‬‭10‬‭tons‬‭of‬‭wheat‬‭per‬‭year,‬‭while‬‭a‬‭Japanese‬‭worker‬‭produces‬‭5‬‭tons‬‭of‬‭wheat‬
‭per‬‭year.‬‭Assume‬‭that‬‭both‬‭countries‬‭have‬‭100‬‭millions‬‭of‬‭workers,‬‭that‬‭the‬‭world‬‭is‬‭composed‬‭by‬‭just‬‭these‬‭two‬
‭countries, and there is no money.‬
‭CARS‬ ‭WHEAT‬

‭US‬ ‭4C‬ ‭10W‬

‭JAPAN‬ ‭4C‬ ‭5W‬

‭1.‬ S‭ ynthesize‬ ‭in‬‭a‬‭table‬‭the‬‭number‬‭of‬‭years‬‭(per‬‭worker)‬‭to‬‭produce‬‭1‬‭car‬‭and‬‭1‬‭ton‬‭of‬‭wheat,‬‭for‬‭each‬


‭country‬
‭CARS‬ ‭WHEAT‬

‭US‬ ‭0.25Y‬ ‭0.1Y‬

‭JAPAN‬ ‭0.25Y‬ ‭0.2Y‬


‭ S-Cars → 1 year/4 cars = 0.25 year per 1 car‬
U
‭Japan-Wheat → 1 year/5 wheat = 0.2 years per 1 wheat‬

‭2.‬ D‭ efine‬‭the‬‭production‬‭possibility‬‭curve‬‭for‬‭an‬‭American‬‭and‬‭a‬‭Japanese‬‭worker,‬‭given‬‭a‬‭year‬‭as‬‭amount‬
‭of time‬

‭3.‬ ‭Define the opportunity costs for each good and each country‬
‭CARS‬ ‭WHEAT‬

‭US‬ ‭2.5 W‬ ‭0.4 C‬

‭JAPAN‬ ‭1.25 W‬ ‭0.8 C‬


‭ pportunity cost: relative price of each good with respect to the other‬
O
‭US-Cars → wheat/cars = 10/4 = 2.5W/C → to produce 1 unit of C we would have to renounce to 2.5 units of W‬
‭US-Wheat → cars/wheat = 4/10 = 0.4C/W → to produce 1 unit of W we have to renounce to 0.4 units of C‬
‭4.‬ ‭Which country holds an absolute advantage? And comparative advantage? Define it for both goods‬
‭ bsolute advantage (higher productivity): Wheat = US; Cars = non (same productivity)‬
A
‭Comparative‬‭advantage‬‭(lower‬‭opportunity‬‭cost;‬‭renounce‬‭less):‬‭Wheat‬‭=‬‭US;‬‭Cars‬‭=‬‭Japan‬‭(renounce‬‭less‬‭of‬‭the‬
‭other product)‬

‭5.‬ W‭ ithout‬ ‭international‬ ‭trade,‬ ‭assume‬ ‭that‬ ‭half‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭population‬ ‭of‬ ‭each‬ ‭country‬ ‭is‬ ‭dedicated‬ ‭to‬ ‭the‬
‭production‬‭of‬‭each‬‭good.‬‭Compute‬‭the‬‭production‬‭of‬‭wheat‬‭and‬‭cars‬‭for‬‭each‬‭country‬‭in‬‭a‬‭year,‬‭and‬‭the‬
‭global amount‬
‭US:‬
‭Car production: 50 million workers · 4C = 200 million C‬
‭Wheat production: 50 million workers · 10W = 500 million W‬

J‭ apan:‬
‭Car production: 50 million workers · 4C = 200 million C‬
‭Wheat production: 50 million workers · 5W = 250 million W‬

‭ otal:‬
T
‭Cars = 400 million‬
‭Wheat = 750 million‬

‭6.‬ G‭ iven‬ ‭your‬ ‭previous‬ ‭results,‬ ‭do‬ ‭the‬ ‭US‬ ‭and‬ ‭Japan‬ ‭gain‬ ‭from‬ ‭trade?‬ ‭If‬ ‭tes,‬ ‭provide‬‭an‬‭example‬‭of‬‭a‬
‭beneficial outcome for both countries‬
‭Yes, US should specialize with the production of Wheat (compatible advantage) and Japan of Cars‬
‭US: 100 million workers · 10W = 1000 million W‬
‭Japan: 100 million workers · 4C = 400 million C‬

‭7.‬ ‭Define the level of prices in the international market to allow gains from trade for both countries‬
‭6. INCREASING MARGINAL COSTS AND FACTORS AVAILABILITY‬

‭ hy do countries trade?‬
W
‭Comparative‬ ‭Advantage,‬ ‭David‬ ‭Ricardo:‬ ‭countries‬ ‭should‬ ‭specialize‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭production‬ ‭and‬ ‭trade‬ ‭of‬‭goods‬‭in‬
‭which‬ ‭they‬ ‭hold‬ ‭a‬ ‭comparative‬ ‭advantage,‬ ‭hence‬ ‭in‬ ‭which‬ ‭they‬ ‭have‬ ‭a‬ ‭lower‬ ‭opportunity‬ ‭cost‬‭(they‬‭have‬‭to‬
‭renounce to a lower amount of other goods)‬
‭Issue:‬‭this‬‭principle‬‭will‬‭suggest‬‭that‬‭countries‬‭fully‬‭specialize‬‭in‬‭the‬‭product(s)‬‭in‬‭which‬‭they‬‭hold‬‭comparative‬
‭advantage‬
‭However, countries trade but they do not fully specialize in the production:‬
‭By‬ ‭introducing‬ ‭increasing‬ ‭marginal‬ ‭cost/opportunity‬ ‭cost,‬ ‭the‬ ‭theory‬ ‭predicts‬ ‭trade,‬ ‭but‬ ‭without‬ ‭the‬
‭unreasonably conclusion on full specialization‬
‭Trade‬ ‭will‬ ‭generate‬ ‭grains‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭terms‬ ‭of‬ ‭consumption‬ ‭and‬ ‭total‬ ‭well-being‬ ‭and‬ ‭shifts‬ ‭in‬ ‭production‬ ‭and‬
‭consumption‬

‭Comparative advantage principle is based on the fact that countries hold different opportunity cost‬

‭1.‬ ‭Increasing Marginal cost in Production‬


‭ ssumption‬ ‭that‬ ‭the‬ ‭opportunity‬ ‭cost‬ ‭(marginal‬ ‭opportunity‬ ‭cost)‬ ‭of‬ ‭one‬ ‭additional‬ ‭unit‬ ‭was‬ ‭constant‬
A
‭(comparative advantage theory)‬
‭Increasing marginal cost: opportunity cost of one additional unit increases with the volume of production‬

‭ ave several inputs in the production, with different quality‬


H
‭Products use inputs in the production with a different proportion‬
‭Inputs tend to be allocated efficiently‬

‭ xample‬‭:‬
E
‭We‬ ‭can‬ ‭come‬ ‭back‬ ‭to‬ ‭our‬ ‭standard‬ ‭two‬ ‭goods‬ ‭economies,‬ ‭producing‬ ‭wheat‬ ‭and‬ ‭cloth,‬ ‭and‬ ‭given‬ ‭two‬‭inputs‬
‭(labour and land), we can say:‬
‭I.‬ ‭Wheat producing requires more land than labour‬
‭II.‬ ‭Cloth production requires more labour than land‬
‭Focus on the production of wheat. Production process:‬
‭I.‬ ‭Initially, wheat production uses the best soil‬
‭II.‬ ‭To increase wheat production, it will require:‬
‭A.‬ ‭More land than labour‬
‭B.‬ ‭Best‬ ‭soil‬ ‭it‬ ‭has‬ ‭already‬ ‭been‬ ‭used,‬ ‭hence‬ ‭we‬ ‭can‬ ‭use‬ ‭the‬ ‭soil‬ ‭that‬ ‭is‬ ‭ñess‬ ‭fertile‬ ‭→‬ ‭it‬ ‭will‬
‭require more land to produce the same amount of wheat‬
‭III.‬ ‭But if it will require more land… we will have to renounce to more cloth‬

I‭ ncreasing marginal cost → increasing opportunity cost‬


‭Production‬ ‭possibility‬ ‭curve‬‭:‬ ‭visualization‬ ‭that‬ ‭demonstrates‬‭the‬
‭most efficient production of a pair of goods‬
‭Increasing marginal cost, PPC changes its shape‬
‭Slope of the tangent of PPC → opportunity cost‬

‭Graph:‬ ‭more‬ ‭cloth‬ ‭production‬ ‭makes‬ ‭the‬ ‭slope‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭tangent‬
i‭ncrease (=increase opportunity cost)‬
‭ ood produced by the country will depend on the level of prices‬
G
‭Level of prices is determined by demand → indifference curves‬

‭Indifference‬‭curves‬‭:‬‭shows‬‭the‬‭combination‬‭of‬‭consumed‬‭quantities‬‭which‬
l‭ed to the same level of well-being (or utility)‬
‭Higher indifference curve = higher well-being or utility‬

‭Once the level of prices are given: (ex.‬‭P‬‭C‬ ‭= 2W‬‭)‬


‭●‬ ‭OppCost‬‭C;‬‭< P‬‭C‬ ‭→ produce more cloth‬
‭●‬ ‭OppCost‬‭C;‬‭> P‬‭C‬ ‭→ produce less cloth‬
‭●‬ ‭OppCost‬‭C;‬‭= P‬‭C‬ ‭→ equilibrium‬

‭Once‬ ‭we‬ ‭have‬ ‭introduced‬ ‭both‬ ‭increasing‬ ‭marginal‬ ‭cost‬‭and‬‭community‬‭indifference‬‭curves,‬‭we‬‭can‬‭describe‬


‭ hat would happen to our economies once we have:‬
w
‭No‬ ‭trade‬ ‭scenario:‬ ‭country‬ ‭will‬ ‭produce‬ ‭the‬ ‭bundle‬ ‭of‬ ‭goods‬ ‭which‬ ‭maximize‬ ‭country’s‬ ‭well-being‬ ‭(higher‬
‭indifference curve) given the production possibility curve‬
‭Trade‬‭scenario:‬‭one‬‭the‬‭basis‬‭of‬‭trade‬‭exists‬‭(differences‬‭in‬‭the‬‭opportunity‬‭cost)‬‭the‬‭two‬‭countries‬‭change‬‭their‬
‭production, and they will both gain (in terms both of consumption and well-being) through trade‬

‭1.1.‬ ‭No Trade Scenario‬


‭ utarky: what is produced equals what is consumed (‬‭S‬‭0‬‭)‬
A
‭If‬ ‭we‬ ‭assume‬ ‭a‬ ‭country‬ ‭(US)‬ ‭producing‬ ‭two‬ ‭goods‬ ‭in‬
‭autarky‬‭(self-sufficiency), we would have:‬
‭1.‬ ‭Given‬ ‭the‬ ‭production‬ ‭possibility‬ ‭curve‬ ‭and‬ ‭the‬
‭community‬ ‭indifference‬ ‭curve,‬ ‭the‬ ‭country‬ ‭will‬‭produce‬
‭the‬‭bundle‬‭of‬‭goods‬‭which‬‭maximize‬‭its‬‭well-being‬‭(‬‭point‬
‭S‭0‬ ‬‭)‬
‭2.‬ ‭It‬ ‭they‬‭are‬‭in‬‭S‭1‬ ‭:‬ ‬‭by‬‭selling‬‭wheat‬‭(‭P
‬ ‬‭W‬ ‭decreases),‬‭and‬
‭buying‬ ‭cloth‬ ‭(‭P ‬ ‬‭C‬ ‭increases),‬‭consumers‬‭can‬‭reach‬‭higher‬
‭well-being → economy moves towards‬‭S‭0‬ ‬
‭3.‬ ‭These‬ ‭interactions‬ ‭determines:‬ ‭equilibrium‬ ‭bundle‬ ‭of‬
‭goods in autarky; equilibrium level of price in autarky‬

‭Point‬ ‭S‭0‬ ‬‭:‬ ‭combination‬ ‭of‬ ‭technology‬ ‭of‬ ‭economy‬ ‭(PPC)‬


‭ ith preferences (indifference curve)‬
w

‭1.2.‬ ‭Trade Scenario‬


I‭ f‬ ‭we‬ ‭have‬ ‭two‬ ‭countries‬ ‭(US‬ ‭and‬ ‭RoW),‬ ‭to‬ ‭goods‬ ‭(cloth‬ ‭and‬ ‭wheat)‬ ‭model‬ ‭where‬ ‭countries‬ ‭hold‬ ‭different‬
‭opportunity costs in the no trade scenario:‬
‭●‬ ‭OppCost‬‭C‬‭US‬ ‭=‬‭2W‬
‭●‬ ‭OppCost‬‭C‬‭RoW‬ ‭=‬‭0.67W‬
‭If 0.67W <‬‭P‬‭C‭I‬ NT‬ ‭< 2W both countries will gain from‬‭trade‬

‭ ountries‬‭gain‬‭from‬‭trade‬‭if‬‭the‬‭prices‬‭on‬‭the‬‭international‬‭market‬‭are‬‭between‬‭their‬‭opportunity‬‭cost.‬‭However,‬
C
‭exists‬ ‭only‬ ‭one‬ ‭level‬ ‭of‬ ‭prices‬ ‭with‬ ‭equilize‬ ‭demand‬ ‭and‬ ‭supply‬ ‭of‬ ‭each‬ ‭country.‬ ‭Hence,‬ ‭it‬ ‭exists‬ ‭only‬ ‭one‬
‭equilibrium level of price.‬

‭ sing‬‭the‬‭PPC‬‭and‬‭Community‬‭Indifference‬‭Curves,‬
U
‭we can depict a supply/demand diagram, where:‬
‭●‬ ‭PPC determines the supply curve‬
‭●‬ ‭Community‬ ‭Indifference‬ ‭Curves‬ ‭determine‬
‭the demand curve‬
‭ xample‬‭: Assume that‬‭P‬‭C‬‭INT‬‭= 1W. Let’s look at the US‬
E
‭1.‬ ‭P‬‭C‭I‬ NT‬ ‭<‬‭OppCost‬‭c‭U‬ S‬ ‭→ decrease production cloth,‬‭increase production wheat.‬‭S‭1‬ ‭:‬ ‬ ‭P‭C‬ ‬‭INT‬ ‭=‬‭OppCost‬‭C‭U‬ S‬
‭2. Now US can trade at‬ ‭P‭C‬ ‬‭INT‬ ‭= 1W. Trade until reaching‬‭the highest community indifference curve (‬‭C‭1‬ ‭)‬ ‬
‭3.‬ ‭Clear‬ ‭difference‬ ‭about‬ ‭produced‬ ‭(‭S‬ ‬‭1‬‭:‬ ‭80W‬
‭and‬‭20C)‬‭bundle‬‭and‬‭consumed‬‭(‭C ‬ ‭1‬ ‬‭:‬‭40W‬‭and‬
‭60C) bundle‬
‭After‬ ‭mimicking‬ ‭the‬ ‭same‬ ‭scenario‬ ‭for‬‭RoW‬‭,‬
‭how much is traded by each country?‬
‭●‬ ‭US buys 40C from RoW, sells 40W‬
‭●‬ ‭RoW buys 40W from US, sells 40C‬
‭→‬ ‭With‬ ‭P‬‭C‭I‬ NT‬‭=‬ ‭1W,‬ ‭quantities‬‭that‬‭they‬‭want‬
‭to‬ ‭trade‬ ‭are‬ ‭the‬ ‭same,‬ ‭there‬ ‭are‬ ‭gains‬ ‭from‬
‭trade‬ ‭for‬‭both‬‭countries.‬‭“Trade‬‭triangles”‬‭are‬
‭the same for both countries‬
‭It does not always happen, if‬‭P‭C‬ ‬‭INT‬‭= 0.8W:‬
‭●‬ ‭US: increase W and decrease C (in production) → export (sell) more W‬
‭●‬ ‭RoW: increase W and decrease C (in production) → import (buy) less W‬
‭Not all the‬‭P‬‭C‬‭INT‬ ‭will generate a situation where‬‭the supply/demand of each country of traded goods equilize‬

‭1.3.‬ ‭Assessing the Theory‬


‭ .‬ ‭Introducing‬ ‭increasing‬ ‭marginal‬ ‭cost,‬‭we‬‭have‬‭gains‬‭from‬‭trade‬‭without‬‭full‬‭specialization‬‭→‬‭closer‬‭to‬‭real‬
1
‭world‬
‭2. There are gains from trade:‬
‭●‬ ‭Increase consumption‬
‭●‬ ‭Increase indifference curve → higher well-being (however, redistributive effects)‬
‭●‬ ‭Countries would gain more if they have higher terms of trade‬
‭3. Trade affects both production and consumption:‬
‭Production:‬
‭●‬ ‭Within countries: shift in the production of export-oriented goods‬
‭●‬ ‭World Production: such shift within countries would generate more efficient allocation of resources‬
‭Consumption:‬
‭●‬ ‭Substitution‬ ‭effect‬ ‭→‬ ‭consumers‬ ‭tend‬ ‭to‬ ‭consume‬ ‭more‬ ‭of‬‭the‬‭importable‬‭good,‬‭compared‬‭to‬‭the‬‭no‬
‭trade scenario (since it becomes relative cheaper)‬
‭●‬ ‭By changing the relative prices, consumers are able to consume more (income effect)‬

‭Terms of Trade is the ratio between export prices and import prices: increase ToT = increase gains from trade‬
‭2.‬ ‭Differences in Opportunity costs‬
‭ omparative advantage principle is based on the fact that countries hold different opportunity cost‬
C
‭Demand increase: countries can have indifference curves, that generate differences in the opportunity costs‬
‭Supply‬ ‭increases:‬ ‭countries‬‭can‬‭have‬‭high‬‭technologies,‬‭which‬‭make‬‭them‬‭relatively‬‭more‬‭productive‬‭in‬‭some‬
‭goods compared to others‬
‭Factors‬‭endowment‬‭increase‬‭→‬‭Heckscher-Ohlin‬‭Theory:‬‭Country‬‭exports‬‭the‬‭product(s)‬‭that‬‭uses‬‭its‬‭relatively‬
‭abundant factor intensively and imports the product(s) that uses its relatively scarce factor intensively‬

‭ xample: Heckscher-Ohlin Theory‬


E
‭First,‬‭we‬‭can‬‭better‬‭define‬‭the‬‭concept‬‭of‬‭abundant/intensive.‬‭Coming‬‭back‬‭to‬‭our‬‭wheat/cloth‬‭goods,‬‭and‬‭given‬
‭two inputs (labour and land), we can say:‬
‭●‬ ‭Country‬ ‭is‬ ‭labour‬ ‭(land)‬ ‭abundant,‬ ‭if‬ ‭it‬ ‭has‬ ‭an‬ ‭higher‬ ‭ratio‬ ‭of‬ ‭labour‬ ‭(land)‬ ‭to‬ ‭the‬ ‭other‬ ‭factors‬
‭compared with the rest of the world‬
‭●‬ ‭Product‬‭is‬‭labour‬‭(land)‬‭intensive,‬‭if‬‭labour‬‭(land)‬‭cost‬‭account‬‭for‬‭a‬‭greater‬‭share‬‭of‬‭the‬‭product‬‭values,‬
‭compared to other products‬
‭What‬ ‭is‬ ‭essential‬ ‭to‬ ‭determines‬ ‭the‬ ‭differences‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭opportunity‬ ‭cost‬ ‭lies‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭differences‬ ‭in‬ ‭factors‬
‭proportions, in endowments and production‬
‭In our example, we can assume that wheat is land intensive, and that the United States is land abundant‬
‭𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑‬‭𝑈𝑆‬ ‭𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑‬‭𝑅𝑜𝑊‬
‭H-O predicts that the US will export wheat, because:‬ ‭𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟‬‭𝑈𝑆‬
> ‭𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟‬‭𝑅𝑜𝑊‬

‭ ummary, why and what countries trade?‬


S
‭Adjusting‬‭the‬‭comparative‬‭advantage‬‭principle‬‭by‬‭allowing‬‭increasing‬‭marginal‬‭cost‬‭and‬‭including‬‭community‬
‭indifference‬‭curves‬‭generates‬‭a‬‭theory‬‭that‬‭provides‬‭an‬‭explanation‬‭of‬‭trade‬‭patterns‬‭without‬‭full‬‭specialization.‬
‭Such theory also provides insights on the increase in production and consumption‬
‭We‬ ‭shade‬ ‭new‬ ‭light‬ ‭on‬ ‭the‬ ‭sources‬ ‭of‬ ‭different‬ ‭opportunity‬ ‭cost‬ ‭across‬ ‭countries.‬ ‭In‬ ‭particular,‬ ‭the‬
‭Heckscher-Ohlin‬ ‭Theory‬ ‭suggests‬ ‭us‬ ‭that‬ ‭factors‬ ‭endowment‬ ‭and‬ ‭usage‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭production‬ ‭can‬ ‭explain‬ ‭trade‬
‭patterns‬

‭ roup project, report: point 3 the most important → May 2nd‬


G
‭Part 5: back up the policies, motivate why we want to implement a certain policy‬
‭Presentation:15 min → May‬
‭7. H-O VALIDATION AND INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE‬

‭ he‬‭principle‬‭of‬‭comparative‬‭advantage‬‭provide‬‭us‬‭an‬‭intuitive‬‭framework‬‭concerning‬‭why‬‭countries‬‭trade,‬‭and‬
T
‭which type of goods they could export/import‬
‭Through trade countries can reach a higher level of well-being and resources are allocated more efficiently‬

‭Heckscher-Ohlin‬‭Theory:‬‭country‬‭exports‬‭the‬‭product(s)‬‭that‬‭uses‬‭its‬‭relatively‬‭abundant‬‭factor‬‭intensively‬‭and‬
i‭mports the product(s) that uses its relatively scarce factor intensively‬

‭Differences‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭factors‬ ‭endowments‬ ‭and‬ ‭in‬ ‭factors‬ ‭requirements‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭production‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭goods‬ ‭lead‬ ‭to‬
‭ pportunities from trade‬
o

‭1.‬ ‭Does H-O theory explain trade patterns?‬


‭ o‬ ‭test‬ ‭the‬ ‭H-O‬ ‭theory,‬ ‭we‬ ‭need‬ ‭information‬ ‭on:‬ ‭factors‬ ‭endowment,‬ ‭international‬ ‭trade‬ ‭patterns,‬ ‭factors‬
T
‭proportion in each product‬
‭We‬‭can‬‭assume‬‭the‬‭factors‬‭proportion‬‭is‬‭the‬‭production,‬‭and‬‭we‬‭can‬‭better‬‭check‬‭the‬‭information‬‭concerning‬‭the‬
‭first two aspects‬

‭ .1.‬
1 ‭Factors Endowment‬
‭We have to look at it of each country compared to the rest of the world (in relative terms)‬
‭To‬ ‭grasp‬ ‭the‬ ‭abundance‬ ‭or‬ ‭scarcity‬ ‭of‬ ‭each‬ ‭factor;‬ ‭we‬ ‭have‬ ‭to‬ ‭compare‬ ‭countries'‬ ‭share‬ ‭of‬ ‭each‬ ‭factor‬ ‭(ex.‬
‭labour) with the total availability in the world‬

‭𝐴‬ ‭𝐼‬
‭𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟‬ ‭𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟‬
‭Example‬‭: Country‬‭A‬‭is labour‬‭abundant‬‭compared to‬‭B, C, D,‬‭... if:‬ ‭𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑‬ > ‭𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑‬ ‭‬‭‬‭‬‭𝐼‬‭‬ϵ‭{‬ ‭𝐵‬, ‭𝐶‬, ‭𝐷‬,...}
‭𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟‬ ‭𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟‬

‭ e focus on the following factors‬‭:‬


W
‭Physical Capital: relatively abundant in developed countries (equipment, factories, patents,...)‬
‭Labour: which we can distinguish by level of education (to proxy different types of tasks) → substantial divide‬
‭Land, distinguished by the properties associated to the type of land: crop, pasture and forestland‬
‭Natural resources (coal, oil, minerals,...) hard to have an idea of the world availability‬

‭1.2.‬ ‭Trade Patterns‬


‭ -O‬ ‭theory‬ ‭predicts‬ ‭that‬ ‭countries‬ ‭trade‬ ‭goods‬ ‭that‬‭use‬‭intensively‬‭the‬‭factor(s)‬‭in‬‭which‬‭they‬‭hold‬‭a‬‭relative‬
H
‭abundance compared to the rest of the world‬

‭ ssessment of the theory‬‭:‬


A
‭Pros: some trade patterns seems well explained by the H-O theory‬
‭Cons: there are still some traded products (imported or exported) that do not match the theory‬
‭Intra-industry trade associated to the Second Unbundling of globalization‬
‭2.‬ ‭Intra-Industry Trade‬
‭ everal goods are both exported and imported in a sizeable way‬
S
‭H-O‬ ‭theory,‬ ‭based‬ ‭on‬ ‭the‬ ‭comparative‬ ‭advantage,‬ ‭predicts‬ ‭trade‬ ‭mainly‬ ‭between‬ ‭industry,‬ ‭hence‬ ‭predicts‬
‭inter-industry‬ ‭trade‬ ‭(ex.‬ ‭food‬ ‭against‬ ‭cloth,‬ ‭two‬ ‭different‬ ‭goods).‬ ‭However,‬ ‭there‬ ‭is‬ ‭a‬ ‭substantial‬ ‭part‬ ‭of‬
‭international trade that is intra-industry trade (within industry)‬

‭Intra-industry trade can be explained by the rising of the international supply chain and product differentiation‬

‭Product Differentiation: goods that belong to the same category but perceived as different by customers‬
‭●‬ ‭Smartphones: Iphone vs Samsung vs Huawei — Cars — Perfumes‬

‭ easure Intra-industry trade‬‭(IIT) for each good‬‭k‬‭as follows:‬


M
‭1. Net trade of‬‭k‬‭:‬ ‭NT‬‭k‬ ‭= X‬‭k‬ ‭- M‬‭k‬ ‭→ If‬‭NT‬‭k‬ ‭= 0‬‭(export = import), the whole trade is IIT‬
‭2. Computed as residual from total trade of‬‭k‭:‬‬ ‭ITT‬‭k‬ ‭= (X‬‭k‬ ‭+ M‬‭k‬‭) − (|X‬‭k‬ ‭− M‬‭k‭|‬ )‬ ‭→ If X=M, whole trade‬‭is IIT‬
‭𝑠ℎ‬ ‭𝐼𝐼𝑇‬‭𝑘‬
‭3. How much IIT accounts for total trade of‬‭k‭,‬ compute‬‭the relative measure of IIT:‬ ‭𝐼𝐼𝑇‬‭𝑘‬ = ‭𝑋‬‭𝑘+‭𝑀‭𝑘‬ ‬

‭3.‬ ‭Conclusion‬
‭ -O‬ ‭provides‬ ‭relevant‬ ‭predictions‬ ‭for‬ ‭the‬ ‭comparative‬ ‭advantage‬ ‭principle,‬ ‭explaining‬ ‭relevant‬ ‭set‬ ‭of‬ ‭trade‬
H
‭patterns (import and export)‬
‭→‬‭Thanks‬‭to‬‭international‬‭trade,‬‭some‬‭sectors/industries‬‭increase‬‭their‬‭production‬‭and‬‭size,‬‭and‬‭others‬‭will‬‭face‬
‭the opposite dynamic... will there be consequences?‬

‭Countries‬‭do‬‭not‬‭just‬‭trade‬‭between‬‭industries‬‭(inter-industry‬‭trade),‬‭but‬‭a‬‭substantial‬‭part‬‭of‬‭their‬‭trade‬‭flows‬‭is‬
i‭ntra-industry trade!‬
‭→‬ ‭Reduction‬ ‭of‬ ‭transportation‬ ‭costs,‬ ‭tariffs‬ ‭and‬ ‭barriers‬ ‭helped‬ ‭out‬ ‭the‬ ‭rise‬ ‭of‬ ‭intra-industry‬ ‭trade.‬ ‭The‬ ‭EU‬
‭Single Market, for instance, promoted a substantial rise of intra-industry trade across EU countries.‬
‭8. WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM TRADE‬

‭ -O‬ ‭theory‬ ‭predicts,‬ ‭within‬ ‭a‬ ‭country,‬ ‭that‬ ‭export-oriented‬ ‭industries‬ ‭will‬ ‭expand,‬ ‭while‬ ‭the‬ ‭opposite‬ ‭will‬
H
‭happen to the import-affected industries‬
‭But‬‭since‬‭factors‬‭are‬‭used‬‭in‬‭different‬‭proportions‬‭among‬‭industries,‬‭that‬‭will‬‭generate‬‭a‬‭shift‬‭in‬‭the‬‭supply‬‭and‬
‭demand (S&D) of the factors‬

‭1.‬ ‭Winners and Losers‬


I‭ f countries specialise in production of a of good → increase in demand of factors employed in that industry‬
‭However,‬‭if‬‭the‬‭factors‬‭are‬‭employed‬‭in‬‭different‬‭proportion‬‭across‬‭goods,‬‭then‬‭factor(s)‬‭used‬‭intensively‬‭in‬‭the‬
‭export-oriented‬ ‭industry‬ ‭will‬ ‭gain‬ ‭(higher‬ ‭demand),‬ ‭while‬ ‭the‬ ‭factors‬ ‭used‬ ‭intensively‬ ‭in‬‭the‬‭import-oriented‬
‭industry will lose‬

‭ hat determines the remuneration of production factors?‬


W
‭Remuneration is based on their cost‬
‭Marginal cost of each unity is driven by their supply and demand:‬
‭●‬ ‭Demand increases and supply=k → cost and remuneration increases‬
‭●‬ ‭Supply increases and demand=k → cost and remuneration decreases‬

‭ djustments of factors over time‬‭:‬


A
‭Although opening to international trade is a one-shot event, dynamics happen at different points over time:‬
‭1. Short-run: factors supply remiss constant (fix) within each sector → no factors adjustment across sectors‬
‭2.‬ ‭Long-run:‬ ‭factors‬ ‭supply‬ ‭can‬ ‭adjust‬ ‭across‬ ‭sectors‬ ‭→‬ ‭freely‬ ‭move‬ ‭across‬ ‭sectors,‬ ‭towards‬ ‭the‬ ‭ones‬ ‭that‬
‭generate higher return or remuneration‬

‭1.1.‬ ‭Example‬
‭ S has a comparative advantage in the production of wheat, which use intensively land instead of labour‬
U
‭Remuneration = wages and rents‬

‭Short-run (no movement of factors across sectors, supply is fix):‬


‭●‬ ‭Production shift (‬‭S‭0‬ ‬ ‭→ S‬‭1‬‭): wheat increase, cloth‬‭decrease‬
‭●‬ ‭Wheat‬‭increase:‬‭D‬‭W‭L‬ and‬ ‭&‬‭D‭W‬ ‭L‬ about‬ ‭increase‬‭→‬‭remuneration‬‭of‬‭factors‬‭in‬‭the‬
‭wheat sectors increase (export industry)‬
‭●‬ ‭Cloth‬ ‭decrease:‬‭D‭C‬ ‬‭Land‬ ‭&‬‭D‭C‬ ‬‭Labout‬ ‭decrease→‬‭remuneration‬‭of‬‭factors‬‭in‬‭the‬
‭cloth sector decrease (import industry)‬
‭In‬‭the‬‭short-run,‬‭the‬‭owners‬‭of‬‭the‬‭factors‬‭in‬‭the‬‭expanding‬‭industry‬‭gains,‬‭while‬‭the‬
‭owners of the factors in the contracting industry lose:‬
‭●‬ ‭Wages and rents in the wheat sector increase‬
‭●‬ ‭Wages and rents in the cloth sector decrease‬

‭Long-run (movement of factors across sectors, supply move, demand fixed):‬


‭●‬ ‭Factors‬‭move‬‭across‬‭industries,‬‭looking‬‭the‬‭highest‬‭gains‬‭possible:‬‭supply‬‭of‬‭labour‬‭and‬‭land‬‭will‬‭shift‬
‭from cloth to wheat production for higher remuneration (move to export industry)‬
‭●‬ ‭Wheat production:‬‭S‬‭W‭L‬ and‬ ‭&‬‭S‭W‬ ‬‭Labout‬ ‭increase → remuneration‬‭of factors in the wheat sectors decrease‬
‭●‬ ‭Cloth production:‬‭S‭C‬ ‬‭Land‬ ‭&‬‭S‭C‬ ‬‭Labout‬ ‭decrease → remuneration‬‭of factors in the cloth sector increases‬

‭ emuneration of factors not at the same level before trade → total demand of each factor has changed‬
R
‭After factors adjustment, wheat production in land intensive, while opposite happened to labour‬
‭Hence,‬ ‭in‬ ‭the‬ ‭long-run,‬ ‭the‬ ‭remuneration‬ ‭of‬ ‭land-owners‬ ‭will‬ ‭be‬ ‭higher,‬ ‭while‬ ‭the‬ ‭remuneration‬ ‭of‬
‭labour-owners will be lower compared to the no-trade scenario‬
‭●‬ ‭Rent‬‭US‬‭Trade‬ ‭> Rent‬‭US‬‭No Trade‬
‭●‬ ‭Wage‬‭US‬‭Trade‬ ‭< Wage‬‭US‬‭No Trade‬
‭Short-run:‬
‭●‬ ‭Winners: owners of the factors in the export-oriented industry‬
‭●‬ ‭Losers: owners of the factors in the import-oriented industry‬
‭Long-run:‬
‭●‬ ‭Winners: owners of the factors used intensively in the export-oriented industry‬
‭●‬ ‭Losers: owners of the factors used scarcely in the export-oriented industry‬

‭ tolper-Samuelson Theorem‬ ‭(seen at the example)‬


S
‭If‬‭the‬‭economy‬‭can‬‭adjust‬‭its‬‭factors‬‭over‬‭the‬‭new‬‭long-run‬‭equilibrium‬‭after‬‭opening‬‭to‬‭international‬‭trade,‬‭then‬
‭the change in relative prices (‬‭P‭i‬nt‬‭):‬
‭●‬ ‭Raises the real return of factor used intensively in the rising-price industry‬
‭●‬ ‭Lowers the real return of factor used intensively in the falling-price industry‬

‭ orks also in multi-factor economy ( not with just two factors), and it is defined as Specialized-Factor Pattern‬
W
‭Factor-Price Equalization Theorem‬‭:‬
‭Even if factors cannot move across countries, if countries face the same relative price, then:‬
‭●‬ ‭Workers (of the same skill) will earn the same wage in both countries‬
‭●‬ ‭Units of land (of the same quality) will earn the same rental return in both countries‬
‭Long-run wages should equalise in all countries‬

‭2.‬ ‭Implications: Imports‬


‭ heories to predict trade flows and have a direct intuition of who could gain or be harmed form trade liberation‬
T
‭International trade allows to the economic pie to become bigger, but there are redistributional effects (win/lose)‬
‭●‬ ‭Why‬ ‭do‬ ‭we‬ ‭not‬ ‭all‬ ‭agree‬ ‭on‬ ‭international‬ ‭trade?‬ ‭Specialisation‬ ‭of‬ ‭production:‬ ‭economic‬ ‭is‬ ‭getting‬
‭higher – Redistributive effects: some will lose and others will win‬

‭ rade liberation generates adjustments in the market:‬


T
‭If‬ ‭there‬ ‭are‬ ‭winners‬ ‭and‬ ‭losers‬ ‭due‬ ‭to‬ ‭trade,‬ ‭that‬ ‭could‬ ‭trigger‬‭both‬‭resentment‬‭and‬‭desire‬‭for‬‭protection‬‭(ex.‬
‭protectionism), which would lead to the support of politicians mirroring these preferences‬
‭Study‬ ‭the‬ ‭impact‬ ‭of‬ ‭import‬ ‭penetration‬ ‭on‬ ‭voting‬ ‭outcomes‬ ‭in‬ ‭local‬ ‭labour‬ ‭markets‬ ‭–‬ ‭Exploit‬ ‭potential‬
‭differences due to ethnic/racial background‬

‭3.‬ ‭Implications: Exports‬ ‭(China example, authoritarian‬‭regime)‬


‭Decrease of exports have consequences in society:‬
‭●‬ ‭Social-political outcomes: Increase of strikes‬
‭●‬ ‭Economic outcomes: Decrease of employment, individual income, night light intensity‬
‭Find a solution → political response‬
‭Turnover of local leaders:‬
‭●‬ ‭Local leader: party secretary‬
‭●‬ ‭Turnover: moved in another prefecture before the due time (less than 3 years) → lateral movements‬
‭Stability measures:‬
‭●‬ ‭Use of ”weiwen” (”maintaining stability”) in political discourses‬
‭●‬ ‭Fiscal and Social Spending‬

‭ .‬
4 ‭Conclusions‬
‭International Trade rises a sizeable trade-off‬
‭Generates efficiency gains: resources are better allocated across countries → economies get bigger and richer‬
‭Not everybody is gaining from it: winners and losers → redistributive effects within a country‬
‭These effects have not only economic consequences, but also political one‬
‭Redistributive‬‭effects‬‭are‬‭behind‬‭voters'‬‭grievances‬‭in‬‭parties‬‭and‬‭institutions...‬‭and‬‭paved‬‭the‬‭way‬‭for‬‭Populist‬
‭politicians.‬
‭9. POPULISM AND GLOBALIZATION‬

‭ ise‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭so‬‭called‬‭populist‬‭leaders/parties‬‭in‬‭several‬‭European‬‭elections‬‭in‬‭recent‬‭years:‬‭UK‬‭(UKIP),‬‭2016;‬


R
‭France (FN) and Germany (AfD), 2017, Italy (M5S and LN), 2018, The Netherlands (PVV), 2023‬
‭In 2016, Trump became the 45th President of the US. Medias and academics labelled him as ”populist leader”‬
‭Positive trend of populism for the last 20 years, important part of Europe‬

‭1.‬ ‭Populism definition‬


‭ olitical Ideology : stressing that values and virtues reside within ”the people”, against the established elite‬
P
‭Opportunistic‬‭Strategy:‬‭used‬‭to‬‭increase‬‭political‬‭support‬‭and‬‭consensus.‬‭It‬‭exacerbates‬‭the‬‭feeling‬‭of‬‭resentment‬
‭already in the society‬
‭Communication‬‭Style‬‭-‬‭hold‬‭by‬‭different‬‭actors‬‭(e.g.‬‭politicians,‬‭journalists,‬‭etc.),‬‭with‬‭continuous‬‭references‬‭to‬
‭the people, an extremely simplified discourse and sound-bite and catchy solutions‬

‭ udde‬‭: populism is based on stressing the difference‬‭between‬


M
‭Good, pure and homogeneous people‬
‭Corrupted and self-centred elite‬

‭ uiso and Docquier‬‭:‬


G
‭Claim to support the people against the elite (anti-establishment stance)‬
‭Tap on the fear of the people, committing to protect them by ”external” threats (commitment to protect)‬

‭ ifferent‬‭cleavages‬‭:‬
D
‭1. Left-Wing Populism (Inequality Cleavage): rich vs poor, redistribution and generalised economic insurance‬
‭2.‬ ‭Right-Wing‬ ‭Populism‬ ‭(National‬ ‭Identity‬ ‭Cleavage):‬ ‭protection‬ ‭of‬ ‭national‬ ‭culture,‬ ‭identity‬ ‭and‬ ‭economic‬
‭system, protectionism vs”foreign” threats‬

‭ W and RW people diffused in different geographical areas: RW in Europe, LW in South-America‬


L
‭The rise of populism in the last decade was mainly due to RW populism‬
‭A substantial share of LW populist parties disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989)‬

‭2.‬ ‭Determinants of Populism‬


‭2.1.‬ ‭Economic drivers‬
‭International Trade‬‭:‬
‭World‬‭Bank‬‭data‬‭shows‬‭that‬‭the‬‭ratio‬‭of‬‭global‬‭trade‬‭value‬‭(import+export)‬‭over‬‭GDP‬‭moved‬‭from‬‭40%‬‭to‬‭60%‬
‭between 1980 and 2008‬
‭China contributed to its increase: share of total export moved from 1% (1985) to 12% (2015)‬
‭Developed societies tend to import low-skill intensive goods, and export high-skill intensive goods‬

‭Example: if the country import low-skill intensive goods (cloths)‬


‭●‬ ‭HS worker could buy it at a lower price, without suffering any threat for his/her job‬
‭●‬ ‭LS worker could suffer the competition, harming his/her employment/wages‬

‭International‬ ‭Trade‬ ‭can‬ ‭have‬ ‭redistributive‬ ‭effects,‬ ‭hence‬ ‭proper‬ ‭safety‬ ‭net‬ ‭should‬ ‭implemented‬ ‭to‬ ‭avoid‬‭the‬
f‭ ormation of an anti-globalization constituency‬
‭Trade generate economic inequality and job polarisation → winners and losers; economic/social consequences‬
‭Inequality express through voting → support this type of politicians because they talk about their fears‬

‭ ocquier et al. (2022) shows that the implication of international trade are skill-specific:‬
D
‭Imports in low-skilled intensive goods increase votes and extent of total and right-wing populist parties‬
‭If anything, imports in high-skill intensive goods reduce votes of right-wing populism‬
‭Increase of diversity in the import basket alleviate the pro-populist effect of low-skill imports‬
‭ echnological progress‬‭:‬
T
‭Transforming labour relations, employment and wages‬
‭Can generate winners and losers‬
‭Winners: increase their productivity by complementing their competences with new technologies‬
‭Losers: substitute by these new technologies, since they are able to perform the same tasks with a lower cost‬

‭Same‬‭type‬‭of‬‭consequences‬‭→‬‭society‬‭more‬‭productive,‬‭do‬‭more‬‭and‬‭get‬‭more‬‭→‬‭redistributive‬‭effect,‬‭not‬‭all‬
‭ ol gain from it (winners vs losers)‬
p
‭More machines = less workers → more votes to right wing‬

‭Role of crisis‬‭: When the economy is weak, voters punish the incumbent parties‬

‭ he recent rise of populism took place in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis → Syriza (Greece), Podemos (Spain)‬
T
‭Before crisis, centre-left and centre-right parties were at the power: populism blamed both‬
‭Bankers and financial elite to be blamed‬
‭Austerity: weakened the social safety net – imposed by supra-national institutions (IMF, EU, ECB) to be blamed‬

‭ .2.‬
2 ‭Identity, Status and Culture‬
‭Recent decades have brought the rise of ”progressive” values, preferences and beliefs‬
‭Example: women empowerment, support for underprivileged minorities, self-expression, cultural globalization‬
‭Rise‬‭of‬‭progressive‬‭values‬‭could‬‭have‬‭lead‬‭to‬‭a‬‭cultural‬‭backlash,‬‭pushing‬‭voters‬‭against‬‭the‬‭elites,‬‭recognised‬
‭and the keepers and promoters of which values‬

‭ wo way to interpret the interplay with economics‬‭:‬


T
‭“Culture‬ ‭plus‬ ‭Economics”,‬ ‭Norris‬ ‭and‬ ‭Inglehart,‬‭2019:‬‭cultural‬‭values‬‭and‬‭economic‬‭conditions‬‭affect‬‭voters’‬
‭support for populist parties‬
‭“Culture‬ ‭times‬ ‭Economics”:‬ ‭economic‬ ‭crisis‬ ‭reinforced‬ ‭the‬ ‭cultural‬ ‭backlash,‬ ‭and‬ ‭the‬ ‭cultural‬ ‭backlash‬
‭reinforced the resentment from the economic crisis‬

‭2.3.‬ ‭Immigration‬
I‭ mmigration can contribute to the rise of populism, due to both its potential threat:‬
‭Economic: labour market competition, welfare recipients,...‬
‭Cultural: different cultural background‬

‭ onsequences‬‭:‬
C
‭Low-skill immigration increases votes for pro nationalistic parties‬
‭High-skill immigration reduces votes for pro nationalistic parties‬
‭→ importance of education‬
‭Mechanisms:‬
‭●‬ ‭LS immigration through revision of voting preferences and attitudes towards migrants‬
‭●‬ ‭HS immigration through increasing turnout and political institutions attitudes‬

‭2.4.‬ ‭Internet and New means of Communication‬


“‭ New”‬‭means‬‭of‬‭communication‬‭are‬‭relevant‬‭for‬‭the‬‭rise‬‭of‬‭populism,‬‭because‬‭“old”‬‭means‬‭of‬‭communication‬
‭are in the hands of the old elite‬

‭ ocial media (and social network) are particularly attractive for populism parties‬‭:‬
S
‭0 entry barriers; anybody can use it without huge investment‬
‭Direct two-way communication with the audience‬
‭Well-suited for disseminating simplistic messages‬

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