Art and Evolution Oke
Art and Evolution Oke
Art and Evolution Oke
Some philosophers have started to take a longer historical perspective when addressing
questions about what art is. Looking back to the Pleistocene period, the longest period of
human evolution, they maintain that art arises from instincts and that its biological origins
shed light on what it is and why it is so important to all human cultures. Denis Dutton (1944–
2010), for instance, has written about an ‘art instinct’, a universal phenomenon that explains
why, for example, there is a widespread appreciation of landscape paintings that show rolling
hills, water, and trees: this is because the depicted environment is one that would have been
hospitable for early humans. The idea is that a preference for such scenes in real life would
have led to a greater chance of survival, and that over the long period of human evolution in
the Pleistocene, humans evolved to prefer such scenes.
Evolutionary theory can also give an explanation of why artists and works of art are so highly
prized despite being of no practical use. They are like the male peacock’s tail – flamboyant
display gestures that indicate that their possessors/creators have a surplus of energy and
prowess. The male peacock’s huge and beautiful tail is a burden to it, making it easier for
predators to catch, but at the same time it signals to potential mates how healthy and fit it is.
Similarly, creating works of art serves no immediate practical purpose, but those who do
create them signal their virtuosity and skill. Like the peacocks with their elaborate tails, artists
have an advantage in terms of sexual selection, even though their activity does not appear to
have practical use.
ART CRITICISM
Another important area of philosophical debate about the arts has focused on the methods and
justifications of various kinds of writing about art. One of the central debates in this area has
been about the extent to which an artist’s stated intentions are relevant to critical
interpretation of a work of art.
ANTI-INTENTIONALISM
Anti-intentionalists argue that we must pay attention only to intentions embodied in the work
of art itself. Anything gleaned from diaries, interviews with the artist, artistic manifestos, and
so on, is not directly relevant to the act of genuine critical interpretation. Such information is
more relevant to a study of the artist’s psychology. Psychology is an interesting subject in
itself, and it can tell us much about the origins of works of art. But the origin of a work
should not be confused with its meaning. Criticism should deal only with evidence internal to
the work (i.e. contained within it). Personal statements about what the artist had in mind are
external to the work, and so irrelevant to genuine criticism. Anti-intentionalists, such as the
critics William Wimsatt (1907–75) and Monroe Beardsley (1915–80), writing in the 1940s,
call the supposed mistake of relying on external evidence the Intentional Fallacy.
This anti-intentionalist view is used to defend close readings of literary texts and close
analyses of other artworks. It is based on the idea that works of art are public in some sense,
and that once they have created them the artists should have no more control over their
interpretation than anyone else.
A similar claim has been made more recently, in metaphorical terms, by those, such as Roland
Barthes (1915–80), who have declared the death of the author. Part of what they mean by this
is that once a literary text is made public, it is for the reader to interpret it: the author should
no longer be considered to hold a privileged position in this respect. A consequence of this
view is that texts are considered more important than the authors who produce them, and the
role of the critic is upgraded. The meaning of texts is created by the reader’s interpretation
rather than the writer’s intentions. The anti-intentionalist view is, then, a claim about which
aspects of a work are relevant to the critic’s assessment of it.
CRITICISMS OF ANTI-INTENTIONALISM
MISTAKEN VIEW OF INTENTION
One criticism of the anti-intentionalist’s position is that it rests on a mistaken view of what
intentions are. It treats intentions as if they were always mental events which occur just
before we do anything. In fact many philosophers believe that intentions are typically
involved in the way we do things: they are not so easily separated from the actions
themselves. So when I intentionally turn on the light I do not have to have a mental event just
prior to reaching for the switch: it can occur at the same time as I reach for the switch, and the
very act of reaching for the switch embodies the intention.
However, this is not really a satisfactory argument against antiintentionalism since what the
anti-intentionalists object to is not simply basing criticism on intentions, but rather basing it
on anything external to the work of art. Anti-intentionalists are happy to treat intentions that
are actually embodied in the work as relevant to criticism.
IRONY
Another, more telling objection to anti-intentionalism is that certain sorts of artistic device,
such as irony, require an appreciation of an artist’s intentions. In many cases these will be
intentions of an external kind.
Irony is saying or depicting one thing, but meaning its opposite. For instance, when a friend
says ‘It’s a lovely day’, it may not be obvious whether this is meant literally or ironically.
One way of deciding would be to look at such things as the context in which it was said – was
it pouring with rain, for instance? Another would be to pay attention to the tone of voice in
which it was said. But if neither of these pieces of evidence decided the issue, an obvious way
of finding out would be to ask the speaker whether it was meant ironically: in other words to
appeal to intentions of the external kind.
In some uses of irony in art, evidence external to the work can be extremely useful in
deciding the meaning. It seems unreasonable to dismiss completely this source of information
about the work. An anti-intentionalist would probably reply to this that if the irony is not
readily understandable from a close analysis of the work, then it is not relevant to criticism
since criticism deals with what is public. Any irony which relies on the external intentions of
the artist is too much like a secret code to matter very much.
KRITIK SENI
Bidang penting lain dari perdebatan filosofis tentang seni telah berfokus pada metode dan
pembenaran dari berbagai jenis tulisan tentang seni. Salah satu perdebatan utama di bidang
ini adalah tentang sejauh mana niat yang dinyatakan seorang seniman dapat menjadi relevan
dengan interpretasi kritis terhadap sebuah karya seni.
ANTI-INTENSIONALISME
Anti-intensionalis berpendapat bahwa kita sebaiknya hanya memfokuskan perhatian pada
niat, sebenarnya tidak memiliki relevensi langsung dengan proses interpretasi yang
terinternalisasi dalam karya seni itu sendiri. Apapun yang diambil dari jurnal pribadi,
wawancara dengan seniman, manifesto artistik, dan sejenisnya kritis yang otentik. Jenis
informasi semacam ini lebih cocok untuk ditelaah dalam konteks psikologi seniman.
Meskipun psikologi merupakan subjek yang menarik dalam dirinya sendiri, dan mampu
memberikan wawasan yang kaya mengenai akar sejarah sebuah karya seni, asal-usulnya tidak
boleh tercampur dengan makna sebenarnya. Kritik seni seharusnya hanya berhubungan
dengan elemen-elemen internal yang terdapat dalam karya (yakni yang ada di dalamnya).
Pernyataan pribadi mengenai apa yang ada di dalam benak seniman berada di luar cakupan
karya itu sendiri, dan oleh karenanya, tidak relevan dalam kritik sejati. Anti-Intensionalis,
seperti para kritikus William Wimsatt (1907-75) dan Monroe Beardsley (1915-80) yang
menulis pada tahun 1940-an, merujuk pada kesalahan yang berusaha mengandalkan bukti-
bukti eksternal sebagai Kekeliruan Intensional atau kekeliruan yang disengaja.
Pandangan anti-intensionalis ini berfungsi sebagai dasar untuk pendekatan yang mendorong
pembacaan teks sastra dan analisis mendalam terhadap karya seni lainnya. Filosofi ini
tumbuh dari gagasan bahwa karya seni memiliki sifat publik tertentu, dan setelah diciptakan,
para seniman seharusnya tidak memiliki kendali lebih besar terhadap interpretasi daripada
orang lain.
Pendapat serupa juga telah dibuat baru-baru ini muncul dalam bentuk metaforis, seperti yang
diusulkan oleh tokoh seperti Roland Barthes (1915-80), yang mengusung konsep 'kematian
penulis'. Di sini, sebagian dari maksudnya adalah bahwa setelah karya sastra dipublikasikan,
pembaca haruslah yang menafsirkannya: penulis tidak boleh lagi memiliki kedudukan
istimewa dalam hal ini. Implikasinya adalah bahwa makna teks dianggap lebih bermakna
daripada identitas penulis yang menghasilkannya, dan peran kritikus menjadi lebih terangkat.
Dengan demikian, makna suatu teks dihasilkan melalui interpretasi pembaca, dan bukan
semata-mata dari niat penulis. Anti-intensionalisme pada dasarnya adalah pernyataan
mengenai aspek mana dari sebuah karya yang releven dalam penilaian kritik
IRONI
Keberatan lain yang lebih jelas terhadap anti-intensionalisme adalah bahwa jenis perangkat
artistik tertentu, seperti ironi, membutuhkan apresiasi terhadap niat seorang seniman. Dalam
banyak kasus ini akan menjadi niat dari jenis eksternal.
Ironi adalah mengatakan atau menggambarkan satu hal, namun sebenarnya bermakna
sebaliknya. Sebagai contoh, ketika seseorang mengatakan "Ini hari yang indah," mungkin
tidaklah jelas apakah ungkapan tersebut dimaksudkan secara harfiah atau ironis. Cara untuk
memutuskan mungkin dilakukan dengan melihat konteks di mana pernyataan itu diucapkan—
apakah saat hujan deras misalnya? Tindakannya lain adalah memperhatikan nada suara yang
digunakan dalam mengutarakan kalimat tersebut. Namun, jika bukti-bukti semacam ini tidak
cukup untuk memutuskan, cara yang paling jelas adalah dengan bertanya langsung kepada
pembicara apakah itu dimaksudkan secara ironis—dengan kata lain, mencari pemahaman dari
sumber niat eksternal.
Dalam beberapa penggunaan ironi dalam seni, bukti eksternal untuk karya bisa sangat
berguna dalam menentukan makna. Mengabaikan sumber-sumber informasi tentang
pekerjaan ini sepenuhnya tampaknya tidaklah rasional. Seorang anti-intensionalis mungkin
akan menjawab bahwa jika ironi tidak dengan mudah dipahami melalui analisis cermat
terhadap karya itu sendiri, maka hal tersebut mungkin tidak relevan dalam konteks kritik,
karena kritik berkaitan dengan apa yang bersifat publik. Setiap ironi yang tergantung pada
niat eksternal dari seniman mungkin terlalu mirip dengan kode rahasia untuk menjadi terlalu
penting dalam konteks penilaian.