Christopher J. Dart - The Social War, 91 To 88 BCE - A History of The Italian Insurgency Against The Roman Republic-Routledge (2014)

THE SOCIAL WAR, 91 TO 88 bce
For Antonia
The Social War, 91 to 88 bce
A History of the Italian Insurgency
against the Roman Republic
CHRISTOPHER J. DART
University of Melbourne, Australia
Routledge
ROUTLEDGE
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2014 by Ashgate Publishing
Published 2016 by Routledge
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Copyright © Christopher J. Dart 2014
Christopher J. Dart has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, to be identified as the author of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

Dart, Christopher J.
The Social War, 91 to 88 BCE : a history of the Italian insurgency against the Roman Republic
/ by Christopher J. Dart.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4724-1676-6 (hardcover)
ISBN 978-1-4724-1678-0 (ePub) 1. Rome – History – Social War, 90–88 B.C. 2. Insurgency
– Italy – History – To 1500. 3. Italy – History, Military. I. Title.
DG257.3.D37 2015
937’.05—dc23
2014023590
ISBN 9781472416766 (hbk)

Contents
List of Figures vii

Acknowledgements ix
List of Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1 The Modern Study of the Social War 9
2 Ancient Perspectives on the Social War 23
3 Italians and the Roman State in the Second Century bce 43
4 Livius Drusus, Poppaedius Silo and the Looming Conflict

(91 bce) 69
5 The Outbreak of the War (91 to 90 bce) 99
6 The War in Italy (90 bce) 125
7 The Collapse of the Italian Insurgency (89 to 88 bce) 149
8 The Lex Iulia, Lex Plautia Papiria and Enfranchisement

(90 to 88 bce) 171
9 Ongoing Conflicts and Enfranchisement (88 to 70 bce) 189
Conclusions 213
Appendices
1 Important Legislation 215
2 Roman and Italian Commanders 221
vi The Social War, 91 to 88 bce
3 Cities Besieged during the Social War 225

4 Examples of Enfranchised Individuals 231
Bibliography 235
Index 249
List of Figures
1 Cities of Italy at the time of the Social War 7

2 Ethnic Regions of Italy at the time of the Social War 8
3 Anonymous insurgent coin of the Social War depicting an
oath scene. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum 112
4 Bilingual insurgent coin of Paapius Mutilus depicting the
dioscuri. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum 115
5 Anonymous insurgent coin showing a wolf attacked by a bull.
Image © The Trustees of the British Museum 131
6 Anonymous insurgent coin depicting Italia and Victory.
Image © The Trustees of the British Museum 131
7 Insurgent coin of Paapius Mutilus in Oscan depicting an oath
scene. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum 165
8 Anonymous insurgent coin of the Social War. Image © The
Trustees of the British Museum 166
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Acknowledgements
The genesis of this book occurred many years ago when I was in the final stages
of completing my PhD thesis under the supervision of Prof. Ronald Ridley. The
concept lay dormant for several years until through many subsequent discussions
with Prof. Ridley and upon the frequent encouragement of Frederik Vervaet I
first began to work on this book in earnest in 2011. I have been very fortunate
throughout this period to have been an Honorary Fellow of the School of
Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne and this
book would certainly not have been possible without the University’s excellent
facilities. I would like to thank all the colleagues, both here in Australia and
abroad, who have generously offered their advice, sent articles, posed challenging
questions for which I have endeavoured to find answers and made valuable
suggestions in the course of writing this book, including Fiona Tweedie, Federico
Santangelo, the late Ernst Badian and Erich Gruen. I thank the Istituto di
Cultura Sicilia Australia (ICSA), which supported an enlightening visit to Italy
in 2013 during which much valuable work on the manuscript was completed.
I wish to thank the readers, editors and staff at Ashgate and most especially Sarah
Charters, from whom I have received prompt and insightful feedback at every
stage. Many thanks must go to copy-editor Lindsey Brake; those faults which
remain are mine. I have had the good fortune at the University of Melbourne to
be surrounded by many talented colleagues and good friends. I am particularly
indebted to three: Dr Trudie Fraser, Dr Frederik Vervaet and Prof. Ronald
Ridley, I have benefited immensely from their many insights, ardent backing
and consistent generosity over many years. It is a well-worn trope to thank one’s
family but it could not be more genuinely called for than in my case. I would
like to thank my family, and especially my mum Gayle and my sister Cassie; they
have been eternally supportive of me. Finally, I cannot thank enough my wife
Camilla and our daughter Antonia, who are a constant inspiration to me.
List of Abbreviations
The following is a list of abbreviations for modern works cited throughout

this book. Ancient sources are in the main abbreviated in accordance with
the conventions set out in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (4th edn), edited by
S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth and E. Eidinow (2012).
Ascon. Asconius’ commentary on Cicero, ed. A. C. Clark,

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909
CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarium, ed. Th. Mommsen
et al., Berlin: G. Reimer, 1869–
ILS Incriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau (3 vols),
Berlin, 1892–1916
Imag. Ital. Imagines Italicae: A Corpus of Italic Inscriptions,
ed. M. Crawford (3 vols), London: Institute of
Classical Studies, 2011.
Inscr. Ital. Inscriptiones Italiae, ed. A. Degrassi, vol. 13.1, Rome,
1947
Mommsen, Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (3 vols), Leipzig,
Hist. Rom. 1854–55
Mommsen, R.St. Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht (3 vols),
Leipzig, 1887–88
Broughton, MRR T. R. S. Broughton, Magistrates of the Roman
Republic (2 vols), New York: American Philological
Association, 1951–52.
Brennan, Praetors T. C. Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman
Republic (2 vols), New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000
RE Realencyclopädie der classischen
Altertumswissenschaft, ed. A. Pauly, G. Wissowa,
W. Kroll et al., Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1893–1980
Introduction
The main fighting of the Social War lasted little more than two years but it is
widely recognised, by both ancient and modern scholars alike, as having been
immensely important in shaping the history of Italy in the late Republican
period. The central purpose of this book is to reconstruct a history of the Social
War in Italy. Where many previous works have studied the Social War as part
of a broader investigation of what might be labelled ‘Italian unification’, this
book seeks to reconstruct an account of the direct antecedents of the Italian
insurgency in the lead-up to the Social War, to present an account of the war
itself and then to discuss the ongoing resistance and unrest which occurred as
a direct result of the war. There are good reasons for such an approach: the war
is badly documented in ancient literary source material and not one ancient
source preserves a detailed and chronological account of the Social War, which
has resulted in frequent disagreements in modern works as to the sequence of
events and their interconnections.
The Social War was one of the most devastating conflicts faced by the Roman
Republic and one which is commonly viewed as having had lasting social and
political ramifications for the Italian peoples. The war was fought against
peoples in Italy who were at the time technically ‘foreign’, even though they
had long histories of having served the interests of Rome. Indeed many of the
ancient literary sources claim that at the heart of the war was the demand of the
insurgents for inclusion within the Roman citizen body. While many modern
works have to varying degrees accepted this and viewed the Social War as driven
by a demand for Roman citizenship and inclusion, a number of works in recent
decades have argued that the Italians sought independence from Rome. These
modern arguments will be discussed in detail and contrasted with the views of
ancient writers in Chapter 1.
It is by reason of the political goals of the Italians in the Social War (whether
these are interpreted by the modern viewer as being ones of inclusion or
exclusion from Rome) that in this work I have chosen to characterise the war as
waged by an ‘Italian insurgency’.1 There are examples throughout the nineteenth
1
The study of the late second and early first centuries bce is frequently plagued by
confusion of terminology, a problem which is in no small measure a legacy of the ancient
sources themselves, which frequently failed to adequately distinguish between the major
2 The Social War, 91 to 88 bce
and twentieth centuries of the term being used to describe the rebel allies in the
Social War but, more importantly, of the range of terms available ‘insurgents’ is
the one which carries the most accurate connotations for a modern audience.2
The Social War was an extremely costly conflict for Roman Italy. It engulfed
central and southern Italy in several years of heavy fighting, causing severe
casualties on both sides and the destruction of communities throughout a large
area of the peninsula. Velleius Paterculus claims that in the span of little more
than two years a total of 300,000 Romans and Italians died in the war, while even
the most conservative estimates still place the loss at over 150,000 lives.3 Iulius
Obsequens similarly writes of ‘hundreds of thousands’ having died in the Social
War and the civil war in the 80s.4 Such numbers would make the Social War as
bloody as many modern conflicts and, while Velleius’ very high figure has been
questioned, it remains indicative of the perceived destruction and waste of human
life which the war inflicted upon the Italian peninsula. In addition to these losses,
and of far more lasting social and political consequence, were the repercussions
of the war for the many Italian cities, on both sides, that were devastated as a
result of the conflict. The geographer Strabo, writing several generations after the
war, described the devastation of Samnium as a result of the war in bleak terms:
he claimed it had turned what were once cities into mere villages.5
civic, ethnic and political groups of the period. For the purposes of this work the general
appellation of ‘the Italians’ is used to refer to all those residents of the peninsula who did
not possess a civic status conferred by the Roman state, that is those who did not possess full
citizenship, limited citizenship or Latin rights. Those ‘Italians’ who took up arms against the
Roman state in 91 bce are referred to as the Italian insurgents.
2
The modern Italian equivalent, insorti, has been frequently used by Italian scholars.
Dickson’s 1894 translation of Mommsen’s history of Rome similarly refers to the rebel
Italians as insurgents (for instance, see Mommsen, 1894, vol. 3, pp. 504–505), similarly
Gruber (1970, vol. 2, pp. 317f ). Keaveney variously used ‘rebels’ and ‘insurgents’ in his Rome
and the Unification of Italy (2005).
3
Vell. Pat. 2.15: Id bellum amplius trecenta milia iuuentutis Italicae abstulit. The figure
was accepted by Kiene (1844) and Lange (1876), however, Brunt (1971, p. 439) argues
that the figure is greatly exaggerated. It should be noted that Brunt uses Eut. 5.9, which
says 150,000 lives were lost in the Social and Civil Wars and Oros. 5.22.2, who says over
150,000 were lost in both wars. In both cases, the ancient sources are probably derived from
another source such as Livy, and preserve a reckoning of the numbers of enlisted Roman
soldiers killed and not the non-Roman deaths. Orosius is inconsistent in so far as he first
asserts 150,000 Romans died over the period of the Social and Civil Wars (Oros. 5.22.2)
but then says that as many men died as had been on the census in the time of Alexander or
approximately 250,000 (Oros. 5.22.3, cf. Liv. 9.19.2).
4
Iul. Ob. 57: centena milia hominum consumpta Italico civilique bello relata sunt.
5
Strab. 5.4.11.
Introduction 3
As has so often been the case with civil wars throughout documented history,
the Social War was particularly brutal, even by the standards of the Roman
world, and this was also observed by ancient writers.6 The very divisive nature of
the war is demonstrated by individual examples such as the atrocities committed
at Pinna7 and captured Roman soldiers who sided with the insurgents, and
generally by the enormous numbers that were mobilised for the conflict and the
high casualties suffered on both sides.8 The desperate and bloody nature of the
war is further demonstrated by the deaths of a number of the military leadership
on both sides. For the Italians, most of their senior commanders appointed in
91/90 bce were dead by 88 bce. Similarly, in both 90 and 89 one of the year’s
two consuls was defeated and killed in battle fighting the insurgents: P. Rutilius
Lupus in 90 and L. Porcius Cato in 89.9 The significance of the war for Romans
a few generations later is visibly indicated on the Augustan-era fasti capitolini,
with the outbreak of the war specially marked with the words BELLVM
MARSICVM on a separate line beneath the names of the consuls of 91 bce.10
The Social War is historically significant for two reasons in particular. First,
it prompted a radical change in the make-up of the Roman citizen body and in
turn Roman Italy. This change would see the Italian peninsula become akin to a
territorial state of Roman citizens, possessing features analogous with the nation
states that would emerge 1,800 years later. Second, the Social War ushered in a
period of savage and politically motivated violence in Italy that would continue
on and off for several more generations (see Gabba, 1976, pp. 115f ). Yet the
Social War has also, to an extent, been overshadowed by the study of the sixty
years of recurrent civil war that followed it (Ridley, 2003). It is the period after
the main hostilities of the Social War, between the consul of 88, L. Cornelius
Sulla, receiving the command against Mithradates VI Eupator and Octavian’s
return to Italy in 29 bce, which has occupied the attention of generations of
modern scholars and for which we possess a wealth of surviving ancient source
material. While the period that followed the Social War was indeed bloody and
marked by serious political upheavals, it was the Social War which profoundly
changed the socio-political landscape of the Italian peninsula and set the tenor
6
For instance, see remarks in Serv. Aen. 8.8; Sisenna, fr. 16; Diod. Sic. 37.19–21; Vell.
Pat. 2.15.3.
7
Diod. Sic. 37.19.
8
Vell. Pat. 2.15: Id bellum amplius trecenta milia iuuentutis Italicae abstulit. See fn. 3,
above.
9
So, too, the praetor L. Postumius (pr. 90), Q. Servilius Caepio (leg. 90) and
M. Claudius Marcellus (leg. 90).
10
Inscr. Ital. pp. 54f, 129 and 480f.
of later conflicts and in turn it was a critical influence on the social and political
landscape of the decades that followed.
By the early part of the first century bce Italy was, in some respects, already
moving towards a single community, albeit one that was divided by fundamental
differences in the legal and political rights of its inhabitants. Italian allies along
with people of Latin and Roman status had served together in the Roman
military for centuries; throughout the peninsula Romans and non-Romans
utilised Roman public land (ager publicus) side by side; Roman and allied elites
had aligned commercial interests in the provinces; in some limited circumstances
there was an increasing infusion of elites from Latin allied communities into the
Roman citizen body and increasingly close ties between Roman magistrates and
members of the local elite. These features held the capacity both to demonstrate
the interconnected nature of Roman and Italian interest and to highlight for
Italians ways in which they were disadvantaged. It should come as no surprise
that it is frequently the inherent unity of Italy which is acknowledged by
the writers of the ancient literary sources and contrasted against the ensuing
brutality of the Social War.11
Any effort to study the Social War is immediately confronted by the
significant problem of source material. Despite the importance of the Social War
in Roman history, the surviving literary sources for it are almost all fragmented
or summary in nature. A number of literary sources that were written shortly
after the Social War and which are known to have covered the period of the
early first century bce in detail are now largely lost. For instance, the histories
of L. Cornelius Sisenna (pr. 78), L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74) and Sallust are
only preserved in fragments, and Livy in the periochae for the period, while the
historical compendium of Diodorus Siculus, of which many of the early books
survive largely intact, is for the most part lost for the era of the Social War.
The authors of the literary sources frequently express sympathy for the Italians’
cause and this is perhaps best reflected by a writer such as Appian who, though
living in a vastly different Roman world, was born without citizenship and
whose career profited greatly from his enfranchisement. Roman commentators
could, perhaps, better comprehend the aspirations of the Italian insurgents in
the Social War than they could those of the combatants of most of Rome’s other
wars. After all, Appian, Livy, Plutarch, Ovid and Velleius Paterculus were either
enfranchised in their own lifetime or would have been keenly aware of just how
recently their families had received Roman citizenship.
11
See the discussion in Chapter 2.
Introduction 5
The Social War has inspired radically different interpretations on

many fundamental issues related to the war. Recent scholarship has been
particularly influenced by Henrik Mouritsen’s Italian Unification (1998).12
Mouritsen’s overarching interpretation of the Italian insurgents as waging a
war of independence against Rome, and the subsequent implications for our
understanding of the preserved ancient sources will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 1 and revisited recurrently in other chapters.
It is amid a sizable body of scholarship related to the Social War that this
book seeks to present a coherent and reconstructed narrative history. Therefore
this book seeks not only to maintain a specific focus on the Social War, its
direct antecedents and its direct repercussions but to outline and address a
number of issues within existing scholarship. First, it seeks to provide a new and
comprehensive reassessment of the events surrounding the Social War, analysing
both the long-term and the immediate context of the conflict. Critical to this
study is discussion of the nexus of citizenship, political rights and land, which
dominated much of second century bce politics. Second, building from this,
it seeks to provide a new chronological reconstruction of the conflict itself,
reconstructing the war and analysing the strategies of both the Romans and the
Italian insurgents. Third, the book assesses the repercussions of the Social War,
investigating the legacy of the insurgency during the civil wars and its role in
reshaping Roman and Italian identity on the peninsula in the last decades of
the Republic.
In Chapter 1, the modern scholarship is surveyed, analysing the ways in
which modern works have dealt with what is the most debated question of the
Social War, the aims and motives of the insurgents. In Chapter 2, the views
of ancient writers on the causes of the Social War and the ways in which the
motives of the insurgents were viewed are examined. This is followed in Chapter
3 by an investigation of the changing relationship of the Italian allies with Rome
and an investigation of calls for citizenship and/or greater legal equality in
Italy in the years before the Social War. Chapter 4 deals with the momentous
year of 91 bce. It was in that year that groups among the Italian allies asserted
themselves aggressively, and here the foremost leader of the insurgency, Quintus
Poppaedius Silo, emerged as an important figure. The planning of the war and
the campaigns of the Romans and the Italian insurgents between the winter of
91/90 and 88 bce are discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This concludes with a
discussion of the legacy of the war in the final two chapters. Chapter 8 deals
with the citizenship laws, the first of which was passed late in 90 bce with the
12
In particular see the discussion of the Social War in Pobjoy (2000).
war still raging in parts of the peninsula. Chapter 9 looks at some of the overt
repercussions of the insurgency and investigates the ‘new citizens’ in the decades
that followed the war.
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Chapter 1
The Modern Study of the Social War
In light of the importance of the Social War for understanding the broader issues
of the evolution of Roman Italy it is no wonder that there has been a significant
range of modern scholarship devoted to the conflict. The issues are diverse and,
to some extent, vary depending upon the interpretation of the war adopted.
Of all the issues associated with the Social War probably the most contentious
and the most debated has been the question of the motivations and underlying
goals of the Italian insurgents in the years leading up to the war and their aims
during its actual hostilities. Similarly, despite the incredible importance of the
conflict to the history of Roman Italy there remains a high level of disagreement
about basic aspects of it. The result has been a considerable range of modern
interpretations of the Social War and it is this vexed issue which is investigated in
detail in this chapter. Obviously, given the significance of the war for the history
of the late Roman Republic, many modern works discuss it in some respect and
so this is not an expansive survey but rather a focused investigation of key works.
This is followed in the next chapter by an investigation of ancient perspectives
on the causes of the war.
Searching for the Origins of the Social War
Investigating the ‘origins’ of the Social War poses a fundamental problem to any
study of it: the factors which led to the war and the aspirations of those who
joined the insurgency in 91 are intimately connected with the general process of
what is often termed Italian unification. Identifying the emergent needs of the
Italian allies, the sources and reasons for their grievances in the decades prior
to the war, assessing the fundamental goals of their political activities in 91 and
their underlying intentions in going to war at the end of 91 are all issues central
to forming a proper understanding of the Social War. In turn, the reaction of
the allies (both those who had supported the insurgency and those who had
remained loyal to Rome) to the extension of the Roman franchise in Italy in the
wake of the war, and the involvement of former insurgent groups in the civil wars
of the 80s and beyond, are important as they help to contextualise the intent
of the insurgents during the Social War.1 That these issues are also connected
with the extension of Roman citizenship and with the changing status of allied
communities on the Italian peninsula in the 90s immediately prior to the
outbreak of the war can be reasonably asserted.2 Certainly, citizenship was one
of the demands made by some allied representatives prior to the war and, in turn,
extension of the franchise was used by the Romans in a belated effort to dissuade
still more allied communities from joining the insurgency in the latter part of
90 bce and after. The general reluctance of Rome to extended the franchise to
the Italian allies in the decades prior to the war and the apparent imperative to
do so in the midst of the Social War signal a clear change in attitudes which the
war triggered.
How and why these issues are related to the franchise question, however, has
been the subject of wide-ranging modern debate. One common interpretation
forwarded by modern scholars is that the insurgents retained their aim of securing
Roman citizenship during the war. In stark contrast, some scholars, including
most prominently Mouritsen, have argued that the allies came to seek a truly
independent and distinct state from Rome. Between these two interpretations
there is what might be reasonably termed a middle-ground position. This is
found in (among others) Mommsen and Keaveney, where it is argued that an
initial goal of citizenship transformed into a desire for an independent Italian
state and that then, in the face of defeat, the insurgents accepted citizenship.
The Motives of the Insurgents
Any survey of the modern scholarship on the Social War will almost immediately
reveal that there have been fundamentally different interpretations forwarded
for what the insurgency hoped to achieve by going to war in the winter of
91/90 bce. Indeed, the question of what factors drove some groups within
the allies to demand enfranchisement in the period prior to the war and then
subsequently what were the goals of the insurgency during the war are central
to forming an understanding of the history of the insurgency as a whole. The
complexities of these questions will be explored over the next two chapters but
the question of Italian motivation and of understanding the underlying goals of
the insurgents is an important and recurrent topic throughout this book.
1
In contrast, Mouritsen (1998, p. 129) has suggested that they need not have been
linked.
2
Indeed, Gabba (1976, p. 123) argued that the reason why the allies sought citizenship
was a fundamental problem in understanding the Social War.
The Modern Study of the Social War 11
While modern scholars have variously ascribed a wide range of potential

goals to the Italian insurgency as it emerged during 91 bce and then waged
the Social War, the ancient literary sources are typically very definite that
immediately prior to the war the Italian allies demanded Roman citizenship.3
Modern scholarship has been frequently divided as to how and why this desire
emerged and why this should have translated into the daring but hazardous
decision to make war upon Rome. Arguments put forward have included that
those who joined the insurgency principally desired legal equality with Romans,
that it was a means to secure protection from fickle Roman judicial decisions or
indeed a reaction to progressive Roman encroachment in a multitude of aspects
of the lives of allied Italians and their home communities. The emergence of
such desires has been in turn explained as resulting from a breakdown of trust
between Rome and the allied communities in the decades or even the century
prior to the outbreak of the war.4 Roman citizenship would have in many of
these cases alleviated a pre-existing ill. Other scholars have offered a more
positive view of shared experiences in the provinces having triggered a desire
for greater equity between Romans and allies.5 A related but distinct view is
that the insurgents sought Roman citizenship and general enfranchisement as a
means to future political participation.6 More radical arguments have suggested
that they entertained hopes of achieving full independence from Rome or even
that calls for citizenship and equality were motivated by quasi-nationalistic or
pan-Italic sentiments.7
These modern views need not always be mutually exclusive and, indeed, some
scholars have argued for goals which shifted over the course of the war.8 It should
also be borne in mind that different groups within the insurgency may well have
had distinct reasons for supporting it and consequently differing aspirations for
what the war might achieve for them. Such debate has, however, contributed
to a conflicting picture of the reasons behind the Italian uprising that occurred
3
In particular see Ascon. 69c. This point is illustrated in the survey of sources in Haug
(1947), but similarly see Brunt (1965).
4
For instance, Mommsen, Hist. Rom. and Badian (1962, pp. 225f ).
5
The strongest argument in favour of such as view is Gabba (1954).
6
This was argued by Taylor (1949) but the capacity for direct political participation is
recognised by others such as Gabba (1976).
7
Mommsen, Hist. Rom.; De Sanctis (1976); Mouritsen (1998).
8
As is suggested by Mommsen, Hist. Rom. Examples include Salmon (1967) and
Sherwin-White (1973) who identified a hard-line anti-Roman component to the insurgency,
and Keaveney (2005, 1st edn 1987) who argued that the insurgents abandoned their goal of
independence in the face of military defeat.
in 91 bce.9 That the war was fought to determine the place of the insurgents,
socially and politically within Italy, is, however, I believe widely accepted. How
and why this desire emerged and then consequently whether the outbreak of the
war represents a desperate bid to forcefully acquire citizenship and/or inclusion
within the existing Roman Italy or, alternatively, a reaction against past failures
and an attempt to establish a permanent independent state remains contentious.
Modern Scholarship
Many works have attempted to reconstruct from the limited and very fragmented
ancient source material a coherent account of the Social War.10 A very early study
was that of Prosper Merimée, whose Essai sur la guerre sociale was published
in 1841. It was, however, Adolf Kiene’s Der römische Bundesgenossenkrieg,
published in 1844, which was the first full narrative history of the Social War.
In it Kiene both constructs an account of the war and presents an extended
analysis of the long-term impacts of the war. Many features of Kiene’s work and
his approach to the topic have been echoed in later works. Thus, for instance,
Kiene (1844, pp. 182f ) broke his account of the war during both 90 and 89
between a northern and southern front, presenting the consuls of 90 as directly
opposed to the Italian commanders Poppaedius Silo in the north and Paapius
Mutilus in the south. Similarly, Kiene recognised that there would have been
long delays in the enrolment of the new citizens after the war and an even longer
time before they would have been able to have an effect on the vote in Rome.
A number of modern scholars have argued to varying degrees that the
insurgents in 91 were motivated by a desire to establish their own independent
state or, indeed, to achieve total independence from Rome, and within this
interpretation a wide range of conflicting theories and explanations have been
offered. One such example is presented in Theodore Mommsen’s popular history
Römische Geschichte. Mommsen’s history, first published in the 1850s, devoted
significant attention to the Social War. Mommsen argued that the goals of the
Italians shifted significantly once the war began.11 He interpreted their pre-war
9
In a 2003 article, Ronald Ridley conducted a survey of modern works and
demonstrated that there has been more than two centuries of ongoing conflicting modern
interpretations of the Social War.
10
See the survey of scholarship on the Social War in Ridley (2003) which traced
scholarship on the Social War back as far as Carlo Sigonio’s 1556 edition of the fasti.
11
Mommsen, Hist. Rom., bk 4, ch. 7. See also Mouritsen (1998, pp. 23–38) with the
argument critiqued by Keaveney (2005, pp. ix–xii).
stance as having been focused upon the acquisition of citizenship but that this
had rapidly changed to fighting for independence from Rome. He viewed this
shift in insurgent goals as having been marked by the Italians’ establishment of
a confederate ‘capital’ at Corfinium, which they renamed Italia in Latin and
Viteliú in Oscan. According to Mommsen, ‘the Italians now no longer thought
of wresting equality of rights from the Romans, but proposed to annihilate
or subdue them and to form a new state’ (1894, vol. 3, p. 505). It should be
noted that central to such an argument is the inferred structure of the insurgent
organisation established at Corfinium and it is here that two major issues occur.
First, there is the question of the extent to which the insurgent organisation was
indeed a full-fledged counter-state to Rome. Second is the question of how the
Italians could have entertained any realistic hope that this state could survive the
inevitable Roman response to its establishment. The problems associated with
understanding the structure of this organisation will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 5.
A number of subsequent works surveyed and investigated the surviving
sources for the war. The first of these was the 1884 dissertation of Erich Marcks.
In 1924 Alfred von Domaszewski produced an impressively concise thirty-
one page monograph, Bellum Marsicum, which similarly sought to survey
and organise much of the ancient source material for the war.12 In both cases a
major focus was the establishment of a chronological scheme to the problematic
information provided by the ancient literary sources. In a substantial paper in
1947 Irmentraud Haug again surveyed the preserved literary sources, this time
with an ostensible focus upon the lost books of Livy for the Social War but
offering broad conclusions for the other sources as well.
During the Social War the rebel Italians minted their own coinage with which
to pay their soldiers. These coins provide a vivid, albeit limited, window into the
aspirations and message of the insurgency. They are the only direct contemporary
evidence of how the insurgents sought to present themselves and have long been
recognised as therefore important as the only uniquely rebel Italian perspective
on the conflict which has been preserved. Irrespective of the extent to which the
writers of the surviving ancient literary sources may have been sympathetic to
allied Italian grievances, most of the sources were produced by the generations
12
Domaszewski attempts to address the questions of the changing ancient names
applied to the war (pp. 3–7) and the sources (pp. 7–10), the Italic tribes and state structure
(pp. 10–16), the outbreak of the war and its beginning (pp. 16–19), the Italian and Roman
commanders (pp. 19–23) and lastly provides a point-form chronological reconstruction of
the conflict (pp. 23–31). His text has been in many ways superseded by subsequent works;
see, for instance, Cornell (1988, p. 203).
after the war. The study of these coins has a long history with works specifically
devoted to their study including Henri Bompois’ survey, published in 1873.
In 1987 Alberto Campana published the major corpus of the coinage of the
insurgency along with the most detailed discussion and interpretation of its
related issues. In addition to these there are the many general catalogues which
contain sections devoted to the Italian issues. In particular are Jean Bebelon’s
catalogue of the De Luynes numismatic collection at the Bibliothèque Nationale
in Paris, which contains a section representing the main examples of the coins
issued, including the highly questionable gold ‘cista mystica’ stater (Bompois,
1873, pp. 10–15), Gruber’s important survey (1970) based upon the British
Museum collection, and the relevant sections of both Sydenham’s (1952) and
Crawford’s (1974) compilations of Republican coinage. Added to these, there
has also recently appeared a new survey in Imagines Italicae.13 Much of this work
has illustrated the different ways in which the sequence of the coinage can be
reconstructed and, in turn, the significant implications for understanding their
potential messages. These works also demonstrate the problems associated
with assessing a rich set of numismatic examples that were created in a very
narrow time frame (see for examples Voirol, 1954; Buttrey, 1973; Pobjoy, 2000;
Tataranni, 2005; Tweedie 2008).
A particularly distinctive interpretation of the Italian insurgents’ motives
was presented by Gaetano De Sanctis. Although not published as a monograph
until 1976, it would have formed part of his planned but never completed fifth
volume of Storia dei Romani and has often been overlooked. The work briefly
relates the major events of the war, closely following the literary source material
on a number of points. De Sanctis quite emphatically argued that the Italians’
aim in the war was a national state based upon what he saw as a common history,
interests, culture and geography in Italy. He suggested that the insurgents desired
a single territorial state for Italy, a desire which could be achieved through
citizenship or war, whether the capital were to be Rome or Italia/Corfinium.14
Applying De Sanctis’ interpretation, the demands of the allies in the years prior
to the war, characterised in the ancient literary sources as civitas and/or libertas,
can both be viewed as goals subservient to the overriding desire for a single state
in Italy. In so doing De Sanctis very clearly alludes to a parallel between the aims
13
Imag. Ital. pp. 67–74.
14
De Sanctis (1976, p. 42): ‘Per gli Italici invece, che la prevalenza del cantone sulla
citta preparava alla istituzione di uno Stato territoriale, non l’Italia doveva essere una
grande Roma, ma la capitale, fosse Roma o fosse Corfinio, una picola Italia. E Italica o forse
anche Italia essi chiamarono appunto Corfinio e nel sacro nome di Italia batterono moneta
affermando l’Italia, per la prima e l’ultima volta nell’evo antico, come entitá politica.’
of the Italians in 91 bce and the spirit of the Risorgimento in nineteenth-century

Italy, a point which is explicitly restated at the end of the work (De Sanctis,
1976, pp. 39–44). He argues that:
It was therefore clear that the purpose of the Italians was significantly different
from that expressed in the oath to Drusus. For them it was not to Romanise Italy,
but rather to create an Italy of the Italians: such high idealism, which rose and
set with the war, be it called the Social or Marsic War, after the name of one of
the people who most resolutely took up arms for it, was not to be reborn for
twenty centuries.15
Possibly one of the most interesting aspects of De Sanctis’ work is that he

saw clear parallels between the modern unification of Italy and the events of
the Social War, and the work is imbued with this interpretative framework.16
De Sanctis’ personal experience of national unification in modern Italy appears
to have greatly influenced him in envisaging the Social War as an expression of
pan-Italic national sentiment,17 a parallel clearly articulated in the later part of
the work.18
Many of the works produced during the twentieth century have, however,
argued that the Italians sought inclusion within the Roman state through going
to war. These have forwarded a diverse range of explanations for how and why
this desire emerged. In this respect the work of Emilio Gabba is of particular
importance, despite his argument being frequently questioned. Beginning in
the 1950s, Gabba produced a number of significant works directly on or related
to the Social War. His large body of works directly dealing with the Social
War includes his 1956 study of Appian’s Civil Wars and the subsequent 1958
commentary on book one of Appian. It is, however, his monumental 1954 paper
on the origins of the Social War and his broader survey in the ninth volume of
15
De Sanctis (1976, p. 41): ‘Era dunque chiaro che il proposito degli Italici era
assai diverso da quello espresso nel giuramento per Druso. Non si trattava piu per essi di
romanizzare l’Italia, ma di creare un’Italia degli Italiani: alto ideale che nacque e tramonto
con la guerra detta sociale o marsica dal nome di uno dei popoli che piu risolutamente per
esso impugnarono le armi, per non rinascere che venti secoli dopo.’ The English translation is
mine.
16
See discussion of De Sanctis’ chapter on the Social War and its place within the
planned but never completed fifth volume of Soria dei Romani in Ridley (2008).
17
See the discussion of its relationship to De Sanctis’ body of work in Ridley (2003,
2008).
18
Interestingly De Sanctis’ interpretation also has clear similarities with Florus’ opening
remarks on the war (Flor. 2.6.18).
the second edition of the Cambridge Ancient History (Gabba, 1994) where these
arguments are most accessibly set out.19
Gabba’s works have emphasised that the extension of citizenship in the wake
of the Social War was linked to the allies’ motivations for waging it and a series of
works published in the 1960s explored the fundamental reasons which motivated
the allied call for citizenship. According to Gabba, the Italians had distinctly
political motives for demanding citizenship and then subsequently going to war.
These were concerns particular to the upper classes within allied communities.
He has similarly emphasised that the insurgents sought real participation
in Roman political life. He argued that the desire for Roman citizenship was
central to understanding allied motivations: ‘the object of the revolt had always
been the grant of civitas’ (Gabba, 1976, p. 89) and he characterised the lex Iulia
as having ‘removed the principal raison d’être of the insurrection’ (Gabba, 1994,
p. 123). While recognising the role of internal political considerations within
Rome, he observed that in regard to the extension of Roman citizenship to the
Latins and Italians that occurred as a result of the war ‘there is one point that can
be regarded as certain: its origin is linked with the question of res agraria raised
by the Gracchi at the end of the second century bc’ (Gabba, 1976, p. 70).
Another aspect of Gabba’s explanation of the origins of the Social War was
what he argued to have been a ‘profound change in ideals, interests, attitudes
and demands’ which he viewed as having taken place between the time of the
Gracchi and 91 bce (1976, p. 215). Gabba viewed the experiences of Italian
negotiores operating outside of Italy as a significant factor in explaining the
war. In his view the Italian commercial class increasingly became aware of how
their affairs were tied up in Roman foreign policy and that it was through their
experiences that the allies developed a realisation of their powers and inevitably
demanded citizenship and eventually encouraged war in order to achieve it (see
Gabba, 1976, pp. 74–87).20 Such an interpretation has also been advanced by
E. Togo Salmon (1962, 1967). In the second edition of the Cambridge Ancient
History Gabba argues that the insurgents had sought citizenship throughout the
war. He argues strongly in favour of the view found in Appian and suggests that
there was an ‘Italian problem’ which emerged at the time of the Gracchi:
19
Gabba (1954) is a broad piece which encompasses discussion of the reverberations
of the war in the 80s and 70s bce. The article is most widely available translated into English
in the 1976 collection Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies. Gabba (1976) surveys the
state of modern scholarship on the issue since its first publication.
20
More broadly, Gabba’s argument derives from a major scholarly division over the
nature of conflict between the Senate and the equestrian order in the second and first
centuries bce.
as a result of the rapid deterioration in the general political situation, the allies
became progressively more aware of the need to cease to be subjects and to share
in the exercise of imperial power, hence to acquire Roman citizenship. (Gabba,
1994, p. 105)
He observes that in the aftermath of the war ‘the military failure of the allies was
complete; but the victors had in fact had to recognize and accept precisely those
demands of the allies for which they had fought and lost’ (Gabba, 1994, p. 126).
Ernst Badian (1958b, pp. 192–225) saw the emergence of an enfranchisement
movement among the allies that was partly fuelled by Marius’ activities in the
previous decades. Peter Brunt has similarly argued that there was a significant
shift in Italian attitudes between the period of the Gracchi and the 90s. He
identified attempts to abuse ius migrationis with a desire for citizenship and
argues that by the time of the Social War ‘the desire for citizenship was almost
universal in Italy’ (Brunt, 1965, p. 93).
In the last twenty-five years there has been a wealth of new work published
studying the process of unification in Italy, regional cultural and ethnic
identities and significant debate concerning the demographics of ancient Italy.
While by no means exclusively concerned with the Social War, this work has
often continued to view the war as an event of central importance to the broader
process of Italian unification. This is particularly true of Salmon’s The Making
of Roman Italy (1982) and Keaveney’s Rome and the Unification of Italy (1987,
rev. 2005), both of which deal extensively with the Social War. A key feature
of recent work has been a strong tendency to place increased emphasis on the
diversity of Italy. Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapters, Italy’s
response to the outbreak of the Social War was very much indicative of this
diversity.21 Some communities joined the uprising, some remained staunchly
loyal to Rome; others were compelled by fear to change sides.
Many scholars have opted for a view of the insurgent aims as shifting from an
initial goal of citizenship to independence. Thus, for instance, Salmon argued in
his history of Roman Italy that the Italians had sought a change in the power-
relationship with Rome, and that this drove them to the establishment of a
rival state.22 In his substantial article on the Social War from 1958 he argues in
21
On the unification of Italy, see Dench (1995), David (1997) and Bispham (2007).
In recent years there have been a number of collections of essays highlighting the diversity
of Roman Italy in numerous aspects; see, for instance, Bradley, Riva and Isayev (2007), Roth
and Keller (2007) and Roselaar (2012).
22
See, for example, Salmon (1982, p. 129): ‘The insurgent leaders had a plan for a new,
non-Roman system in Italy in which decision-making would rest with them; and they lost no
favour of a highly schematic interpretation of the Italian wartime organisation,

which clearly implies a goal of greater political power in Italy. Salmon viewed
the Social War in the context of a process of unification which began during the
early Republic and continued into the first century, and his discussion of the
Social War in chapter 6 of his work focuses on the repercussions of the conflict
rather than on reconstructing the war or the events that led up to it. Indeed, this
view often sees the Social War as the concluding phase of unification. Salmon’s
extensive contribution to the study of the Social War is, however, spread across a
number of other works (Salmon, 1958, 1962, 1964, 1967).
Sherwin-White (1973, pp. 119–149) sought to explain the allies’ demand
for citizenship in reference to a desire for social and political equality. He argued
that ‘the Italian allies were not only justified in their demands, but fitted, from
a Roman point of view, to receive the citizenship’ (1979, p. 129). In turn, he
viewed the insurgency as containing a secessionist element and that following
the murders at Asculum, negotiation was out of the question and the insurgents
were committed to the establishment of an independent state (Sherwin-White,
1973, pp. 144ff ).23 In Rome and the Unification of Italy (2005) Keaveney similarly
views the goals of the Italians as having changed from a call for enfranchisement
to seeking independence from Rome during the Social War (see also Mouritsen,
1998, pp. 5f ).24 In turn, he argued that the desire for independence was
abandoned once they were incorporated into the citizen body and they came
to fully embrace Roman political life in the period between 88 and 82 bce
(Keaveney, 2005, p. 189).
Others have pointed to alternative factors which may have been significant
forces in motivating the Italian allies to go to war. For instance, Nagle (1973,
pp. 367f ) has suggested that economic factors were a cause of the war and
has emphasised Roman encroachment upon regions populated by allied
communities and colonial activities as significant factors. While such an
argument suggests a plausible explanation for general allied dissatisfaction with
Rome (something which was clearly a serious issue at the time of the Gracchi)
it does not account for why there was widespread support for the insurgency
in certain parts of the peninsula but why in regions such as Etruria, Umbria,
Campania and Apulia most people seem to have initially adhered to their
alliances with Rome. Campania and Apulia were compelled to revolt, in part by
force, during 90 bce while the first indications that some parts of Etruria and
time in implementing it.’
23
In this respect his interpretation echoes that of Mommsen.
24
In contrast, see Mommsen, Hist. Rom., Kiene (1844), Brunt (1965, pp. 90–109) and
Salmon (1982, pp. 128–129f ).
Umbria were willing to join the insurgents occurred late in 90, possibly as much
as a year after Asculum.
It is, however, the argument forwarded by Henrik Mouritsen in Italian
Unification: A Study in Ancient & Modern Historiography (1998) which
represents the most radical assessment of Italian motives during the Social War.
Mouritsen approached the topic of the unification of Italy with a particularly
critical approach to the ancient literary sources. A central part of his analysis
is the theory that the ancient literary sources preserve divergent historical
traditions, particularly in regard to the evidence concerning the goals of the
insurgency (Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 5–22). Mouritsen argues in consequence
that the call for citizenship is inconsistent with the brutal war that followed25
and, indeed, that ‘in order to understand the character of the Social War it is, I
believe, important to separate the outbreak from the outcome; there need not
be any direct connection between the two’ (1998, p. 129). Mouritsen argues
that the ancient literary sources, which do indeed date to the post-war period,
are heavily influenced by the enfranchisement of Italy which occurred after the
war (as similarly argued by Pobjoy, 2000). Mouritsen (1998, p. 7) identifies two
separate ancient traditions about the motivations of the Italians in the war as
having already existed in the first century bce. This approach is appealing for
explaining certain features of the war but also creates fresh issues. Thus, with
so many assertions in ancient literature that allied Italian activities in 91 were
directed towards acquiring citizenship and a number of preserved anecdotes
asserting that even after the war had begun many of the insurgents still hoped
for a negotiated resolution, if Mouritsen’s argument is accepted in its entirety
then it ought to cast doubt on the reliability of much of the surviving ancient
material (see, for instance, Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 5–12, 124–125, 165, n. 36).
Where scholars such as Gabba, and indeed Keaveney, repeatedly found merit in
elements of Appian’s account of the Social War, Mouritsen conversely frequently
argues that Appian has imbued his text with a world view contemporary to the
second century ce and is therefore inaccurate.
In a new preface to the second edition of Rome and the Unification of
Italy (2005, pp. ix–xii), Keaveney criticised aspects of the approach found in
Mouritsen, questioning a number of the work’s conclusions and in particular
Mouritsen’s assessment of Appian and the interpretation of the role of the Latins
during the Social War. While many modern works have remained tempered
in their acceptance of some of the most challenging elements of Mouritsen’s
25
See, in particular, Mouritsen (1998, p. 7): ‘a fight for citizenship cannot easily be
reconciled with a subsequent fight to destroy Rome’s power’.
interpretation,26 a number have revised related issues in light of an insurgency

driven by a desire to achieve independence. Pobjoy has gone so far as to argue
that the Italian insurgents sought ‘full independence’ in the war. Furthermore,
that the organisation which the insurgents set up in 91/90 and named Italia
‘was founded in order to provide an alternative political focus to Rome’ and
should therefore be viewed as ‘the first Italia’ (Pobjoy, 2000, p. 189). In this
respect Pobjoy notably parallels Mouritsen and also echoes aspects of De Sanctis.
Pobjoy argues in favour of viewing the insurgent organisation as a full-fledged
rival state to Rome.27
Recent work on the structure of the Roman army has also suggested allied
resentment was a by-product of allied service. Pfeilschifter (2007) has argued
that there was no widespread integration of Roman and allied soldiers in the
army. Similarly Rosenstein (2012, pp. 100f ) has rightly suggested that allied
soldiers would have likely acquired rudimentary Latin and interacted with
Roman comrades but that the experience of serving in the Roman army likely
fuelled resentment.28 Both Pfeilschifter and Rosenstein have in consequence
tended to suggest that this supports the position that the Social War insurgents
sought independence.29
While the experiences of allied soldiers within the Roman army again provide
further evidence for their disaffection with Roman systems and with the nature
of allied obligations to Rome more generally, demonstrating that Italian allies
had good reason to be frustrated with Roman systems and with the obligations
26
See, for example, Ridley (2003, p. 52) who argues that calls for equality and the
franchise probably co-existed with a minority who sought independence; Dench (2005,
pp. 125–130) who argues for merits in multiple goals of the rebels; the general treatment
in Santangelo (2007), in particular p. 4, n. 11 where it is observed that ‘at least a part of
the Italian elites must have seen the war as a formidable chance to put an end to Roman
hegemony’; and discussion in MacKay (2009) and Steel (2013, pp. 80–87).
27
Pobjoy (2000, p. 190): ‘What we are being asked to envisage by those who hold that
the fighting in the Social War was directed toward achieving such a goal [of citizenship] is
that the rebel forces, after savage violence and bloodshed on the battlefield, would regard
themselves as being in a position to demand full incorporation in the state whose citizens
they had just killed in their thousands. To say the least, this is not an easy thing to imagine.’
28
An interesting comparison is proposed with the segregation of black soldiers in the
United States army and the intentional separation of Romans from Italian allies. Vell. Pat.
2.15.2 claims that Italian soldiers could outnumber Romans two to one in military camps,
which Brunt (1971, p. 686) suggests was a reasonable estimate. Soldiers in these camps were
indeed rigorously segregated with the strict layout of a Roman camp described in the well-
known passage of Polyb. 6.27–32. See the discussion in Rosenstein (2012, pp. 93f ).
29
Keller (2007) also addresses the notion of elite disaffection with Rome in the second
century bce.
placed upon them explains why by 91 bce they might resort to the extreme
measures to change their circumstances, but it does not suggest which specific
solutions the allies sought and Roman citizenship was, of course, an effective
path to removing these disadvantages. A common element in the explanations
forwarded by Gabba, Brunt and Salmon (among others) has been that there
was an inherently political motivation to the allies’ demand for citizenship.
In this respect Mouritsen has revitalised elements of the view found in
Mommsen, but also more conditionally forwarded by Sherwin-White, of a war
fought for liberty and independence.
Chapter 2
Ancient Perspectives on the Social War
In contrast to the wide-ranging debate in modern scholarship about the

underlying factors which contributed to the war and the goals of the insurgents
during the war, many of the surviving ancient sources assert comparatively
simplistic motivations for the Italian allies on the eve of the Social War. Assertions
that the allies demanded to be enfranchised in 91 and that the failure to achieve
this end was the immediate and principal cause of the war are typical in ancient
literature. It should, however, be remembered that the majority of the surviving
ancient literary sources date to the period after the Social War and as such were
written after the widespread enfranchisement of Italy which occurred in the war’s
wake. Indeed, the most important literary source for the events of the war itself,
Appian’s history, was written more than two centuries later, in a period where
Roman citizenship had come to be increasingly distributed throughout the
Mediterranean World. These ancient literary sources, writing in full knowledge
that the result of the Social War was the mass extension of the Roman franchise
to the Italian allies, understandably seek to offer explanations for the causes of the
war that are closely tied to accounting for this known outcome. In particular two
key demands of the Italian allies prior to the outbreak of the war are frequently
identified by ancient writers: these are a demand for civitas, the rights of Roman
citizenship, and a demand for libertas, a complex ancient concept which might
be very simplistically thought of as the possession of liberty.
That ancient historians were writing in full knowledge of the results of the
war need not in itself undermine the validity of many of the ancient literary
sources when they assert that the desire for civitas and/or libertas was a central
motivation for allied communities to join the insurgency in 91 and 90. It does,
however, explain the tendency of ancient writers to ascribe the causes of the war
directly to the demand for citizenship, without properly explaining what factors
might have driven some of the Italian allies in 91 to demand from the Romans
that they receive citizenship and to then subsequently accept citizenship when it
was offered to them in the wake of the war.
The State of the Surviving Sources
The surviving literary sources for the Social War present a significant problem
for historians. We are primarily dependent upon the idiosyncratic work of
Appian. His account is highly condensed in the treatment of many issues and
key details are often omitted or incidentally referenced out of proper context.
Many works which were written shortly after the war, by men who had firsthand
experience of fighting in it, are unfortunately lost or preserved only in fragments.
Of such works a number would likely have been particularly important had
they survived. L. Cornelius Sisenna (pr. 78) lived through the Social War and
may have served as a military tribune in Campania under Sulla in 89 bce.1 His
history covered in detail the period of the Social War and then the civil wars of
the 80s bce, extending to as many as twenty-three books. It thus would have
been a true primary source for the events of the Social War, but unfortunately
all that is preserved are small fragments.2 Similarly, L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74),
one of the dictator Sulla’s key lieutenants, fought in the Social War and on the
suggestion of Q. Hortensius Hortalus and Sisenna wrote a history of the conflict
in Greek. This history has not survived but Plutarch knew of it as still being
extant in his own time (Plut. Luc. 1.5). In addition, Sulla’s own autobiography
dealt with his involvement in the war. This autobiography, along with the works
of Sisenna and Lucullus, was, without doubt, instrumental in the grandiose
claims that Sulla had been fundamental in bringing the war to a close found in
many other sources.
Cicero turned 16 in January 90 and served during the Social War on the staff
of Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89), meeting the Marsic general Vettius Scato in
89 bce. Cicero’s preserved works, also written in the decades after the Social
War, make frequent reference to the war and to the situation of the newly
enfranchised citizens in its aftermath, but provide little information about the
war itself. Spread across his many letters, speeches and literary works, however,
are numerous invaluable pieces of information, including considerable otherwise
unpreserved detail about the tribunate of M. Livius Drusus (trib. pl. 91). Cicero
also preserves particularly important insights on the political machinations of
91 bce and is a critical source for understanding the functions and scope of the
various pieces of enfranchisement legislation triggered by the Social War. In the
main, however, these are individually very brief pieces of information.
1
On Sisenna’s possible military service under Sulla, see Badian (1964b, pp. 429–430)
and Rawson (1979, pp. 333–334).
2
The fragments of Sisenna are collected in Bertini and Barabino (1967, pp. 203–239).
See also the discussion of Sisenna’s works in Badian (1966, pp. 25–26).
Ancient Perspectives on the Social War 25
Sallust was born in 86 bce in Amiternum and wrote his histories sometime
between 44 and 35 bce (McGushin, 1992, pp. 3–4, 18–20). These seem to
have been influenced strongly by the legacy of both the Social War and the civil
wars of the 80s bce. Discussion of the Social War formed part of book 1 in his
histories, although evidence of Sallust’s views on the war is badly preserved.3
In McGushin’s reconstruction of the fragments of Sallust’s history it is argued
that the war was treated in broad terms by Sallust and that he concentrated his
account upon ‘the breakdown of the strong moral principles which had marked
Roman contacts with the Italian allies’ (1992, p. 85). Possibly a key insight into
Sallust’s interpretation of the war is represented by a short fragment that claims
‘all Italy defected in spirit’.4 This assertion is possibly indicative of his general
view of the insurgent’s cause, but more importantly it sheds light upon a number
of similar statements in later literary sources.
The surviving fragments of Diodorus Siculus’ Library of History provide
one of the most detailed literary sources for the events of the Social War.
Diodorus produced his compilation in the mid-first century bce, approximately
between 60 and 30 bce,5 and possibly continued to work into the early years
of Octavian/Augustus’ sole rule. Diodorus sought to write a universal history
from mythic times to about 60 bce. His work is compiled and organised into
forty books derived from previous writers, of which the major part of book
37 was devoted to an account of the Social War. Unfortunately what survives
of the book is a sequence of individual fragments. These are derived from the
four surviving Excerpta that were compiled for the tenth-century emperor
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. In addition, there is a long summary of the
Social War, derived from the Library of Photius, a ninth-century scholar and
patriarch.6 The sequence of the fragments from book 37 and the events to which
they refer is often conjectural or cannot be firmly determined.
Diodorus is often thought to have been primarily dependent upon the
Greek philosopher and historian Posidonius for his later Roman material.7
3
Sallust’s general treatment of emerging interfactional rivalries in the latter half of the
second century bce is also set out in Sall. Iug. 41–42.
4
Sall. Hist. 1.18 in McGushin.
5
Diodorus’ earliest reference to work on the Library is a journey to Egypt c. 60 bce
(Diod. Sic. 1.44.1). The last reference to a contemporary event appears to be the founding of
the colony of Tauromenium, possibly in 36 bce (Diod. Sic. 16.7.1) and Diodorus claims that
he spent thirty years compiling the work (Diod. Sic. 1.4.1). On the time of composition, see,
for instance, Oldfather’s introduction (Oldfather, 1933, pp. vii–xi).
6
The summary of Photius is presented in the Loeb edition as Diod. Sic. 37.2.
7
Thus Mouritsen (1998, pp. 5–6) argues on the basis of E. Schwarz, in RE, 5, 663–704
and in particular Cassola, that it is a work primarily derived from Posidonius, although he
In his first chapter, Mouritsen argues that Diodorus would have relied heavily
upon Posidonius’ history in book 37 and that as a result there is a ‘confusion of
two different versions’ in the text. Similarly, Mouritsen identifies two distinct
versions present in Strabo’s brief history of the insurgency (1998, pp. 5–6).
Sacks’ 1990 study of Diodorus’ Βιβλιοθηκη, however, identifies a long tradition
within modern scholarship of presuming Diodorus to be directly reflective of the
earlier writers which he used and to ascribe very little, if any, of the work to the
intellect of Diodorus himself. The general thesis of Sacks’ study is that there is,
in fact, extensive evidence of Diodorus’ deliberate and quite careful compilation
of different ancient sources. Writing in the third edition of the Oxford Classical
Dictionary, Sacks (1996, pp. 472–473) notes that in the absence of Diodorus’
sources being preserved what is accurate, inaccurate or interpolated in his text
cannot be ascertained with certainty. A central issue for analysis of Diodorus’
book 37 on the Social War is that the preserved fragments from the Excerpta
are not entirely consistent with the large summary of Photius. To what extent
this summary is directly reflective of Diodorus’ original text, and in turn what
component of it may have been derived from Posidonius or other contemporary
writings is almost entirely conjectural.
Livy’s detailed account of the Social War extended across six books of his
monumental history. These books have regrettably not survived, although
there is an indication of their content in the form of the short summaries in
the Periochae and in the compilation of prodigies made by Julius Obsequens.8
The impact of his history cannot be dismissed lightly and even in the summaries
there are indications of a distinctive line of interpretation. It is debatable which
sources Appian used for his section on the Social War although he likely drew
upon Livy for material in the period (see Haug, 1947, pp. 224f; Gabba, 1956,
pp. 89f ). There are also the brief sections on the Social War preserved in the
historical epitomes, including Velleius Paterculus, Florus and Orosius, each
with its own problems of inconsistencies and highly compressed chronologies.
Beyond this there are sporadic references to the Social War in other sources.
Examples include anecdotes in Valerius Maximus and Aulus Gellius, Plutarch’s
biographies of Sulla, Marius and others,9 Strabo’s Geographia and a number of
acknowledges Diodorus’ possible authorship of the proems, citing Sacks (1990). According
to the Suda, Posidonius’ histories covered the period between 143 and 88 in fifty-two books.
Born about 135 bce and dying in 55 Posidonius was not present in Italy during the war
although he probably preserved a reasonably contemporary account of the war.
8
Liv. Per. 71–76 and Iul. Ob. 54–56a.
9
Primarily in Plutarch’s lives of Cato the Younger, Sulla and Pompeius Magnus.
short references to the tribunate of Livius Drusus and the Social War in Pliny
the Elder’s Natural History.
Unfortunately a genuinely contemporary Italian insurgent perspective is
difficult to discern in many of the surviving sources. Epigraphic evidence for the
insurgency is slight, something which is no doubt a by-product of its short lifespan
but which may also be indicative of the insurgent organisation’s intended short-
term nature.10 Roman epigraphic evidence on the other hand provides some
important information on specific issues, in particular the elogium of M. Livius
Drusus (trib. 91) and the bronze plate, now in the Musei Capitolini in Rome,
preserving two acts of Pompeius Strabo carried out while in camp near Asculum
in November 89 bce.11 A rare instance of the ancient source material preserving
a uniquely Italian perspective, and not one that has been filtered through the
experiences of later generations of enfranchised Italians, is the coinage that was
issued by the insurgents during the war. This coinage emulates Roman standards
in both its weight and much of its imagery and was issued variously with Latin
and/or Oscan legends.12 While it is only possible to connect broadly issues of
this coinage to different phases of the war, the insurgents’ coins are potential
evidence for the structure of the insurgency and most importantly for the
aspirations of those Italians who supported it during the war.
Ancient Sources on the Italian Call for Citizenship
Cicero provides a unique perspective on the Social War by virtue of having

served under Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89) during the conflict. Little is
preserved about Cicero’s actual military service in the war but in 89 bce he
witnessed a conference between the consul Pompeius Strabo and the Italian
insurgent commander P. Vettius Scato. Despite the bloody events of 90 bce and
what must have been by 89 bce an increasingly bleak outlook for the Italian
insurgents at the time of this conference, Cicero accounted for the very dignified
nature of the meeting between the commanders as due to the fact that
10
In the recently produced corpus of Italic inscriptions, six bronze tablets from the
Museo di Antichitá in Turin are grouped with one from the Museo Archeologico in Bari
(Imag. Ital., pp. 77–83), on the grounds that they were the product of the Italian organisation
during the war.
11
CIL, 12, 1, p. 199 and ILS, 8888.
12
See discussion in Chapter 5.
non enim ut eriperent nobis socii civitatem, sed ut in eam reciperentur petebant.
the allies were not seeking to deprive us of our citizenship, but to be admitted to
it themselves.13
When in the year and where the meeting took place is uncertain but Cicero
unequivocally asserts that the insurgents’ goals were the same in 89 as they had
been in 91 bce.14 Even if Scato only represented the desires of his native people
the Marsi, their influence and their leadership in the war was clearly significant.
Cicero repeatedly asserts in his writings that the Italians desired citizenship,
although his rationale for why they desired the franchise is not always consistent.15
That his preserved texts date to the period after the war does not in itself cast
doubt on the validity of Cicero as a source. He lived through the war, fought
in the war and his early public career was closely tied up with the multitude of
legal and political repercussions of the Social War. A similar view is preserved
in an anecdote in the fragments of Diodorus Siculus. The summary records the
story of a Cretan soldier who had offered to betray the Italian insurgents to one
of the consuls. When he was offered Roman citizenship as a reward, the Cretan
refused and remarked on the hypocrisy of offering citizenship as a reward to a
man who did not desire it while continuing to fight others over its acquisition.16
While the books of Livy’s history devoted to the period of the war are now
lost, some idea of his interpretation of the Social War can be gleaned from the
summarisers and epitomators who used his work. The surviving summaries of
Livy directly connect violent action on the part of the allies with the failure of
Drusus’ citizenship bill. It says that when Drusus could not deliver upon his
promise of citizenship the Italian allies became enraged and began agitating for
a revolt.17 This is a highly compressed and inaccurate chronology, although not
entirely unexpected given the nature of the summary. As argued in Chapters 4
and 5, the revolt at Asculum probably did not occur immediately after Drusus’
murder and nor was the revolt at Asculum specifically in response to Drusus’
13
Cic. Phil. 12.27.
14
Mouritsen (1998, pp. 164f ) forwards several different arguments to explain this. The
timing of the meeting is important as it affects the dating of the insurgent attempt to relieve
Asculum in 89, discussed in Chapter 6.
15
See for instance Gabba (1976, pp. 70f ) on Cicero’s explanation of the origins of the
war.
16
Diod. Sic. 37.18.
17
Liv. Per. 71: Cum deinde promissa sociis civitas praestari non posset, irati Italici
defectionem agitare coeperunt.
death. The summary does, however, show that Livy presented the war as
directly connected with allied agitation in 91 bce for citizenship. This is
clearly demonstrated by the description of Poppaedius Silo as dux et auctor (the
leader and author) of the war. The summaries indicate that Livy likely treated
the insurgents in general as having consciously sought a war in response to the
failure of the citizenship bill and that Poppaedius Silo had been instrumental in
driving this course of action forward.18
Velleius Paterculus produced a two-book compendium of Roman history
dedicated to his friend, the consul of 30 ce M. Vinicius. His compendium is
for the most part structured as short sections devoted either to particular events
or to providing character sketches of individuals, and he devoted a generous
amount of his account to discussion of the Social War (Bispham, 2011, p. 20).
He begins by providing a description of the outbreak of the Social War in a short
section which though laced with hyperbole also presents a degree of nuance as
to the reasons for the war and the desires of the rebel allies. He makes the very
clear assertion that the Italian insurgents sought citizenship and that this was in
response to prolonged unhappiness at their treatment by the Romans. On the
issue of the citizenship, Velleius states:
Quorum ut fortuna atrox, ita causa fuit iutissima: petebant enim eam civitatem,
cuius imperium armis tuebantur.
their fortune was as cruel as their cause was most just, for they sought citizenship
in the state whose power they were defending by their arms.19
Velleius strongly implies that the Italians’ demand for enfranchisement was
justified upon the basis that they had throughout many years consistently
displayed ardent loyalty to Rome and her interests, had exceeded their legal
commitments and yet were denied the benefits which stemmed from the
possession of citizenship:
per omnis annos atque omnia bella duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi
neque in eius civitatis ius recipe, quae per eos in id ipsum pervenisset fastigium, per
quod homines eiusdem et gentis et saguinus ut externos alienosque fastidire posset.
18
It is reasonable to suppose that the story of Silo seeking Drusus’ support for
enfranchisement, found in Plutarch and in Valerius Maximus, also occurred in Livy’s lost
text.
19
Vell. Pat. 2.15.2.
every year and in every war they were furnishing a double number of men, both
of cavalry and of infantry, and yet were not admitted to the rights of citizens in
the state which, through their efforts, had reached so high a position that it could
look down upon men of the same race and blood as foreigners and aliens.20
Even so, Velleius relays with pride that his grandfather, though not a Roman
citizen, had sided with the Romans in the war. By implication his family’s
citizenship was all the more noble for it.
Velleius claims that the death of Livius Drusus in late 91 bce fanned the
long-smouldering fires of war, and that ‘all Italy’ was caught up in the rebellion.21
He also describes the war as having ‘spread to all regions’ of Italy (in omnis
penetrasset regiones).22 Velleius shows in the passages that follow that he knew
that ‘all Italy’ had not sided with the insurgency when he relates that his own
ancestor had raised a force among the Hirpini to support the Roman cause.
Thus, while a gross exaggeration, Velleius’ statement is perhaps best viewed
in comparison with the fragment of Sallust from half a century earlier: both
assert that the aspirations of the insurgents were broadly understood by people
throughout Italy, that many sympathised with them, and that all Italy had been
affected by the war. The reality was that support for the insurgents was mixed
throughout Italy. Velleius ends his account of the war by observing that ‘all Italy’
received the citizenship.23
Pompeius Trogus, a near contemporary of Velleius, probably presented a
similar interpretation, in his now lost history written during the Augustan era
(Syme, 1988).24 Preserved in a lengthy epitome of Trogus, a speech delivered
by Mithradates it is claimed that throughout Rome’s history it had unfairly
subjugated Italy, with some desiring liberty and others membership in Rome’s
empire. 25 This situation had led to the Italians seeking partnership in Roman
power and citizenship:
20
Vell. Pat. 2.15.2 (trans. Shipley, 1924).
21
Vell. Pat. 2.15.1: iam pridem tumescens bellum excitavit Italicum … uniuersa Italia.
22
Vell. Pat. 2.15.1.
23
Vell. Pat. 2.17.1: quo quidem Romani victis adflictisque ipsi exarmati quam integri
universis civitatem dare maluerunt.
24
Pompeius Trogus’ sources are debatable but, like Diodorus, he may have extensively
relied upon Posidonius’ history. Syme (1988) suggested Justin’s epitome to have been written
in the fourth century ce.
25
Justin, 38.4.11: Roma condita sit, satis illi pacatam, sed adsidue per omnes annos pro
libertate alios, quosdam etiam pro uice imperii bellis continuis perseuerasse.
hoc ipso tempore uniuersam Italiam bello Marsico consurrexisse, non iam libertatem,
sed consortium imperii ciuitatisque poscentem.
at this time in all Italy the Marsic War flared up, not for liberty, but for
participation in empire and citizenship.26
Again this passage echoes the sentiment of Sallust. The passage’s contrast of
libertas with consortium as two apparently distinct Italian insurgent goals was
argued by Mouritsen to be evidence of two separate argumentative traditions.27
The passage from Trogus can, however, equally be interpreted as closely aligned
with the interpretation found in Cicero’s twelfth Philippic and in Velleius
Paterculus; the statement of Trogus is an observation of the irony that the
violence of the Italian insurgency was carried out in the cause of inclusion
and due recognition within the Roman state and not as a result of a reasserted
independence of once loyal Roman allies.
Probably writing in the second century ce, Florus argued that even using the
name bellum sociale (‘the Ally War’) was unjustified. He observed that
Sociale bellum vocetur licet, ut extenuemus invidiam, si verum tamen volumus,

illud civile bellum fuit.
Though we call this war a war against allies, in order to diminish its abhorrence, if
we are truthful, it was a war against citizens.28
Despite the charged rhetoric of Florus, there is an underlying assumption

in his text that the Italian allies had every right to demand citizenship as an
entitlement. Florus asserted that the multi-ethnic nature of the Roman people,
incorporating numerous Italian groups, meant that the war was in essence a civil
war.29 Furthermore, there is considerable consistency on the part of the primary
sources. These frequently assert that non-Romans in Italy perceived there to
26
Justin, 38.4.13. My translation.
27
In turn, Mouritsen (1998) argued that Velleius’ account of the Battle of the Coline
Gate in 82 bce displays a comparable link.
28
Flor. 2.18.1.
29
Flor. 2.18.1–3: Quippe cum populus Romanus Etruscos, Latinos, Sabinosque sibi
miscuerit et unum ex omnibus sanguinem ducat, corpus fecit ex membris et ex omnibus unus est;
nec minore, flagitio socii intra Italiam quam intra urbem cives rebellabant. The peoples that
Florus chooses to highlight are significant – he is essentially comparing the Social War to the
semi-mythic accounts of the wars of the regal period and the early Republic.
be great injustice in their treatment and that there was a widespread desire to
acquire Roman citizenship on the peninsula. There is a strong emphasis within
the ancient sources that securing citizenship had come to be seen as a necessary
step in ensuring equitable inclusion within the Roman state.
Plutarch and others relay a significant story in which the Italian leader
Poppaedius Silo stayed in the home of the tribune M. Livius Drusus and
attempted to induce the young half-brothers Servilius Caepio and Porcius Cato
to intercede on the Italians’ behalf for citizenship.30 The incident with Silo
lobbying for the citizenship and other instances recorded where Italians openly
advocated for enfranchisement clearly demonstrate that there were influential
Italian allies attempting to engage with Roman counterparts over the issue and
should cast serious doubt on the notion that all rebel Italians sought to assert
their independence or destroy the Roman state. In his Life of Marius and in
reference to the military campaigns of 90 bce Plutarch describes Silo as the
insurgent commander of the greatest reputation and military power.31 Plutarch’s
description of the war in the same biography can be read as implying a goal of
independence for the insurgents:
τὰ γὰρ μαχιμώτατα τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ πολυανθρωπότατα κατὰ τῆς Ῥώμης
συνέστησαν καὶ μικρὸν ἐδέησαν συγχέαι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν.
That is, the most warlike and most numerous of the Italian peoples combined
against Rome, and came within a little of destroying her supremacy.32
As with many of the other ancient sources, Plutarch’s description is laced with
hyperbole. The war is described as waged against the ‘most numerous’ people
and nearly destroying Rome’s power. He does not, however, make a judgement
as to the insurgents’ underlying aspirations in the above passage.
Appian is the single most valuable ancient literary source on the Social War.
The only other ancient source which provides a level of detail approaching
Appian is Photius’ summary of Diodorus Siculus. Appian’s account is important
for two specific reasons. First, his work presents a developed view of the historical
significance of the war. In this respect, Appian is unique among the surviving
ancient sources in the way that he explicitly constructs a historical argument
about the origins of the Social War. Ancient historians such as Sisenna, Sallust or
30
Plut. Cat. Min. 1–2; Val. Max. 3.1; Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 80.1.
31
Plut. Mar. 33.
32
Plut. Mar. 32 (trans. Perrin, 1920).
Livy, no doubt did this also, but only suggestions of their likely interpretations
survive from the preserved fragments of their works, or in the case of Livy from
the Periochae and the later historical epitomators Florus and Velleius Paterculus.
A second important factor is Appian’s obvious interest in the ‘Italians’ as a
social group. This is in evidence in the distinctive information which he preserves
about the Social War itself. That Appian should have been particularly attuned
to the experiences of non-Romans during the late second and first centuries bce
is possibly explained by his personal background. He was born in Alexandria in
the late first century ce and did not acquire Roman citizenship until he was a
young man. He enjoyed a successful career as an advocate in Rome, eventually
rising to the position of procurator. Yet Appian’s account of the Social War
is problematic for a number of reasons. The sections covering the Social War
occur in the first book of his discussion of the civil wars (books 13 to 17 of his
histories) and form part of his introductory survey of the decades leading up
to the civil wars of the first century bce. In the book Appian briefly deals with
the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, civil unrest in the late second
century bce and the Social War as antecedents to the civil wars of the 80s bce.
Appian’s narrative becomes markedly more chronological in structure and much
more detailed following his discussion of the end of major hostilities with the
Italian insurgents. Even so, the principal focus of his five books on the civil wars
is the later period from 60 bce onward (see Gabba, 1967, pp. xxviii–xxxiii).
For Appian the Social War was an important event for explaining the
origins of the civil wars of the first century bce. Appian saw the demand
of the Italians for citizenship and the refusal of the Romans to yield it as a
central cause of the Social War. As a result, Appian argued that the Social War
had its origins in the land commission of Tiberius Gracchus and particularly
the programmes of Fulvius Flaccus, the first Roman magistrate to propose
widespread enfranchisement of the peninsula. Appian saw the Social War as
having had a direct influence on the civil war in the mid-80s and in consequence
his discussion of the 80s and 70s bce makes sporadic references throughout to
the role of the newly enfranchised Italians.33 This perspective also leads Appian
to not give due significance to a number of other factors that contributed to the
war. Appian certainly underplays a serious legacy of the 130s and 120s, the way
that factional conflicts within the Republic had prompted Roman politicians
to seek out Italian involvement in their policies. So, too, while uncertainty over
land rights and calls for enfranchisement were important concerns, and were
33
See Chapter 7 for discussion of the role played by the newly enfranchised in the 80s
and 70s bce.
in turn employed as significant levers for Romans seeking to cultivate Italian

support, they do not explain why members of the Roman elite would seek to
exploit Italian support. Italian grievances made them open to such entreaties,
but it was the factional disputes in Rome which encouraged Roman politicians
to appeal to Italian support. As is discussed in Chapter 4, the transfer of control
of the courts to the equestrians and the ways in which these had been used as
political weapons in the 90s bce were a major motivation for Livius Drusus.
Gabba (1976, p. 70) argued that while the motivation which Appian cites for the
allied desire for citizenship is a generic one, it still remains a better interpretation
of the overall situation than other ancient sources. He elsewhere argued that
Appian preserves a uniquely Italian perspective and theorised that this may be
the result of Appian using a pro-Italian source (Gabba, 1956, pp. 79f ).34
There are signs in Appian’s text of the difficulties which he must have faced
in attempting to recount a complex set of interrelated military actions during
the Social War. These are often clearly evident, as he opts for a set of anecdotes
loosely organised according to the geographic region in which they occurred.
This often results in events being placed out of chronological order and/or the
transposition of the actions of one Roman magistrate to another. In the most
prominent example of this occurring in Appian’s text he repeatedly confuses
Lucius Iulius Caesar (the consul of 90 bce and censor in 89) with Sextus
Iulius Caesar (the consul of 91 bce and proconsul in 90 bce).35 Conversely,
one great advantage of Appian’s history is that, while he does not present a
proper narrative account, he does provide a coherent historical interpretation
not only of the Social War but also of the origins of the conflict. Whether his
arguments are accepted or not (and indeed, Chapters 1 and 3 critique his views
significantly) there remains immense value in the capacity to study an ancient
historical interpretation.
Appian asserted that citizenship was the principal driver of the conflict and
he traced the origins of the Social War to the proposal of Q. Fulvius Flaccus to
extend citizenship to the Italian allies in 125 bce.36 Appian saw this proposal
as arising out of the grievances of Italians who believed they had been unjustly
34
The argument that Appian drew upon the now almost entirely lost history of Asinius
Pollio for the sections covering the Gracchi through to Livius Drusus and the Social War was
significantly undermined by Badian (1958a).
35
On confusion between Sex. and L. Caesar and between consuls in 90 bce, see
Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 25 and Keaveney (1983).
36
App. BC. 1.34: Φούλβιος Φλάκκος ὑπατεύων μάλιστα δὴ πρῶτος ὅδε ἐς τὸ φανερώτατον
ἠρέθιζε τοὺς ᾽Ιταλιώτας ἐπιθυμεῖν τῆς ῾Ρωμαίων πολιτείας ὡς κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀντὶ
ὑπηκόων ἐσομένους.
treated by the Gracchan land commission.37 This is an interesting focus for

Appian to have selected and his argument is far less ambitious than many modern
scholars in tracing back the antecedents of the Social War. Appian’s probable
reasons for seeing Fulvius Flaccus as the root cause will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 3. At a number of points in his narrative Appian reinforces
his argument that the Italians sought citizenship and that this was motivated by
an underlying desire for political equality with the Romans. In reference to the
events after the massacre of Roman citizens at Asculum, Appian records that
Italian ambassadors were sent to Rome and he asserts that
πέμψασι δ’ αὐτοῖ ἐς ‘Ρώμην πρέσβεις αἰτιωμένους, ὅτι πάντα ‘Ρωμαίοις ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν
συνεργασάμενοι οὐκ ἀζιοῦνται τῆς τῶν βεβοηθημένων πολιτείας.
they sent ambassadors to Rome to complain that although they had co-operated
in all ways with the Romans in building up the empire, the latter had not been
willing to admit their helpers to citizenship.38
Similarly, in reference to the initial extension of citizenship under the lex Iulia
to loyal allies in late 90 bce, Appian asserts that Roman citizenship was the one
thing which the Italian allied communities desired most.39
Ancient Sources on the Italian Call for Libertas
A number of ancient sources characterise the Italian allies as demanding libertas.

These calls have sometimes been argued to be evidence of a contrary ancient
historical tradition in which the Italians had sought independence from Rome.
In many instances, however, the ancient sources do not preclude a desire to be
enfranchised when they claimed that they had called for liberty. An important
recent work by Valeria Arena (2012) provides a detailed analysis of how Romans
conceived of libertas. Arena argues that Roman concepts of libertas had a
particularly political dimension, encompassing protection by legal institutions
as a fundamental component. Importantly Arena has argued that the right to
suffragium and provocatio, and the general rule of law, were ‘true foundations of
Roman liberty’ (2012, p. 48).
37
App. BC. 1.21.
38
App. BC. 1.39 (trans. White, 1913).
39
App. BC. 1.49.
Two passages contained in the treatise known as Rhetorica ad Herennium

(4.13 and 4.16) have been read by some modern scholars as suggesting an
alternate contemporary view of insurgent motivations during the Social War
(Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 134–137; Pobjoy, 2000, p. 197). The ad Herennium
preserves a collection of rhetorical extracts which are presented for the most
part detached from any specified historical context. Although the collection was
once tentatively attributed to Cicero, its exact date and authorship are unknown.
While the two passages may derive from the same speech, given the structure of
the ad Herennium, with its numerous out-of-context extracts, this is not entirely
certain. If the two passages in the treatise are indeed authentic, they likely date
to 90 bce and the ad Herennium would therefore preserve a truly contemporary
Roman view of the Italian’s motivations during the Social War.
The first extract begins with the statement, ‘Men of the jury, you see against
whom we are waging war’,40 and may thus be from a prosecution carried out
under the lex Varia. This law was set up by Q. Varius Hybrida (trib. pl. 90) to
prosecute Romans accused of having incited the insurgents to rebel and was
active in 90/89 bce during the height of the conflict despite the crisis having led
to the closure of the other courts in Rome.41 The second passage, which contains
an accusation that the insurgents were in league with ‘evil and audacious men’
from Rome,42 may be from the same speech or derived from a similar prosecution
in the Varian court. Alternatively it many have been derived from an earlier
speech given by Varius when speaking in favour of his law to establish the court.43
The context of the speech is important. Serious fighting was going on
throughout a significant portion of the Italian peninsula at the time and it would
be startling to find assertions of the honesty or just nature of the rebel Italians’
claim, or indeed overt admission that insurgents may be justly seeking Roman
citizenship, given that it was delivered against supposed Roman agitators of the
Italians. Varius had been hostile to Livius Drusus, his supporters and their aims.
The apparent absence of such assertions is not, however, evidence counter to
the claims of other ancient sources on the matter. The passages imply that even
in Rome during the war the insurgent demand for citizenship was well known;
certainly, Livius Drusus’ proposal to extend citizenship to them in 91 had been
40
Ad Heren. 4.13: quibuscum bellum gerimus, iudices, videtis.
41
Cic. Scau. 1.3; Cic. Corn. fr. in Ascon. 73; Val. Max. 3.7.8; Ascon. 22 and 73; App.
BC, 1.37. See the discussion of the activities of the court below, pp. 62f.
42
Ad Heren. 4.13: malos homines et audaces.
43
Mouritsen (1998, p. 135–136) argues that both passages are part of a contemporary
speech delivered in the winter of 91/90 bce.
public knowledge and, as is discussed in Chapter 4, was one of the causes of

unrest in Rome in that year.
In reference to the motivation of the insurgents for going to war with
Rome the speaker in ad Herennium poses the question, quaeret aliquis: ‘Quid?
Fregellani non sua sponte conati sunt?’ The Latin colony of Fregellae had
demanded Roman citizenship in 125 bce and was destroyed by Lucius Opimius
(cos. 121) in response. Its example cannot have been raised simply as one of the
consequences of allied uprisings against Rome (something to which the speaker
does also refer) but rather serves as an individual case of the demand for citizen
rights, in the context of centuries of staunch loyalty to the Roman Republic.
Fregellae, like the rebel allies, had demanded rights from Rome which were not
willingly conceded.
The poet Ovid in his Amores contrasts the fame of the cities of Mantua and
Verona with that of his native Paelignian territory. He does this in reference to
the Paeligni’s role as members of the rebel allies during the war:
Paelignae dicar gloria gentis ego,

quam sua libertas ad honesta coegerat arma,
cum timuit socias anxia Roma manus.
I shall be called the glory of the Paelignian race,

whose love of liberty compelled to honest arms,
when anxious Rome feared the allies.44
The libertas to which Ovid refers is ambiguous; this may be viewed as freedom
from the onerous burdens of allied status through the acquisition of Roman
citizenship or freedom from Roman hegemony altogether (Mouritsen, 1998,
pp. 9–10; Pobjoy, 2000, pp. 197–198).45 Ovid, a Roman citizen who was proud
of his descent from an equestrian family of Sulmo and asserted that his works
would rival those of other famous Roman poets from Italy, is in the passage
quoted reflecting on the honesty of the allied cause in the Social War.46 He wrote
under the sole rule of Augustus more than seventy years after the Social War
and his description indicates that the cause of the Italians in the war was still
reflected upon with pride several generations on. Ovid’s lines also need to be
44
Ovid, Am. 3.15.8–10. My translation.
45
Pobjoy tentatively suggests it refers to independence from Rome: ‘I incline to think
that the libertas at issue here is freedom from Roman control, although the alternative cannot
be excluded’ (2000, p. 198).
46
Ovid, Tr. 4.10 and Am. 2.16.1.
viewed in the context of a number of other sources which similarly characterise

the insurgents as fighting for their ‘liberty’ (libertas). Ovid contrasts the ‘honest’
call for liberty of the Paeligni against Rome’s ‘anxiousness’ and, as with many of
the other examples discussed above, while he emphasises the righteousness of
the insurgents’ claims, he nowhere explicitly asserts that their cause was directed
towards securing independence; instead it is the righteous call to share the
liberties of their Roman counterparts.
The most prominent example of an ancient source asserting that the
insurgents sought ‘liberty’ (ἐλευθερία) in conjunction with citizenship is Strabo’s
Geography in which he very explicitly states that the insurgents demanded both
freedom and citizenship from Rome.47 Strabo writes of the Italian peoples who
joined the insurgency that
πρῶτον μὲν ἡνίκα ἐπολέμουν, δεύτερον δὲ ὅτε συνεστράτευον, τρίτον δ᾽ ὅτε δεόμενοι
τυχεῖν ἐλευθερίας καὶ πολιτείας μὴ τυγχάνοντες ἀπέστησαν καὶ τὸν Μαρσικὸν
καλούμενον ἐξῆψαν πόλεμον.
firstly as enemies, secondly as allies; and thirdly, having demanded liberty and
citizen rights, and being denied, they revolted and ignited the Marsic war.48
Strabo concludes his description of the Social War with the observation that
the conflict finally ended once the insurgents ‘achieved the rights for which they
had gone to war’.49 Strabo’s meaning is clear in the extreme; the Italians sought
both ἐλευθερία (liberty) and πολιτεία (citizenship). These were both desired by
the Italians before the outbreak of the war according to Strabo and significantly
these are not presented as two distinct goals or contradictory desires; they
are presented as having been directly linked to one another. He furthermore
emphasises that through the war the allies achieved the equality with the
Romans which they had desired through inclusion within the Roman citizen
body. Far from being mutually exclusive, citizenship was a means for achieving
the liberties they desired.
The notion that the libertas of individual communities went hand in hand
with the acquisition of citizenship50 is also reflected in Cicero’s eyewitness
account of the conference between Pompeius Strabo and Vettius Scato. Cicero
emphasises the equity implicit in the insurgents’ central demand:
47
Strab. 5.4.2.
48
Strab. 5.4.2. My translation.
49
Strab. 5.4.2.
50
For a treatment of the connection between the two concepts, see Arena (2012).
non enim ut eriperent nobis socii civitatem, sed ut in eam reciperentur petebant.
For the allies were not fighting to deprive us of our citizenship, but sought to be
admitted to it themselves.51
In Eutropius’ Breviarium ab Vrbe Condita the Italian insurgent cause is again

characterised as fighting for libertas. Eutropius, however, makes clear that he
means by this equality with Romans:
in Italia gravissimum bellum Picentes, Marsi Pelignique moverunt, qui, cum

annis numerosis iam populo Romano obedirent, tum libertatem sibi aequam
adserere coeperunt.
In Italy the gravest of wars was initiated by the Picentines, Marsi and Paeligni,
who, for many years had served the Roman people, then began to claim equal
freedom for themselves.52
Eutropius’ description of the insurgent’s motivations as tum libertatem sibi

aequam does not imply a ‘liberty’ from being subjects of external Roman
rule, but rather a ‘liberty’ through acquiring equal status with their Roman
counterparts. In this regard Eutropius’ explanation of the motivation of the
insurgents parallels that provided by Strabo.
There is also much indirect evidence in the ancient literary sources about the
significance of the Italian demands for inclusion prior to the war and prominent
examples from during the war itself. These include the insurgent embassy sent
to Rome in late 91 bce which demanded citizenship as the price of avoiding
impending bloodshed. Similarly, the efforts made by the insurgents to negotiate
during the war, such as the conferences between Vettius Scato and Pompeius
Strabo or indeed Poppaedius Silo and Marius. Lastly, and most conspicuously
of all, there is the universal acceptance of enfranchisement by eligible Italian
communities which occurred from 90 bce. The general consistency of the
ancient literary sources in forwarding this interpretation should not be dismissed
lightly and in the wake of the war there are further examples. In particular, there
was ongoing agitation in Italy over the full and equal inclusion into the citizen
body of the newly enfranchised citizens under the lex Iulia (90 bce) and the
51
Cic. Phil. 12.27.
52
Eut. 5.3.1. My translation.
lex Plautia Papiria (89 bce).53 Such discontent was initially widespread, not
only influencing the civil wars of the 80s bce but reflected during the struggles
to fully restore the tribunes in the 70s and the resumption of the census in 70.
Even then, the legacy of the Social War continued to be felt in various ways. In
62 bce for instance the poet Archias’ enfranchisement under the lex Plautia
Papiria was challenged by his political enemies.54 Cicero’s return in 58 bce was
made possible by the mobilisation of the ‘Italian vote’. Finally, the memory of
the Social War was still sufficiently potent that among those proscribed by the
triumvirs in 43 bce was a man called Statius the Samnite. He had been made a
Roman senator in recognition of his work as an advocate of Italian rights both
during and after the Social War.55
Ancient Names for the War
As discussed above, Florus argued that the terminology used to describe the
Social War failed to do justice to the true nature of the conflict. He refers to
the war as the bellum sociale, attesting to the general use of the term, but then
asserts that in reality it was a bellum civile.56 Strabo in fact cites two reasons
for the name Marsic War, that they were the people who initiated the war and
also that it was in particular on account of the active role played by Poppaedius
Silo.57 Domaszewski (1924, pp. 3–7) argued that the name ‘Marsic War’ (bellum
Marsicum) was originally the most commonly used ancient term and that in
the late Republic it came to be called the Italic War (bellum Italicum) and
then under the Emperors it came to be commonly referred to as the ‘Ally War’
(bellum sociale).58 While this is in general correct, such a schematic view should
be approached with reticence given the debate found in Florus and Strabo as to
the appropriateness of these labels.
In Cicero’s many works the terms bellum Marsicum and bellum Italicum
are both used to refer to the Social War. In one instance he even describes it as a
53
See the detail discussion of the citizenship laws in Chapter 8.
54
Cic. Arch. For discussion of the lex Plautia Papiria, see Chapter 8.
55
App. BC. 4.25.
56
Flor. 2.18.1. Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 75.5 similarly demonstrates the use of bellum Sociale as
the common imperial term.
57
Strab. 5.4.2.
58
Domaszewski argues that ‘Die älteste und amtliche Bezeichnung ist: bellum
Marsicum … Schon in Sullanischer Zeit tritt als neue amtliche Bezeichnung der Name
bellum Italicum ein.’
‘war with allies’ (bella cum sociis, Fregellanum, Marsicum).59 A fragment of Sallust
preserved in Gellius calls it the Marsic War.60 Velleius Paterculus, Asconius and
Iulius Obsequens use Bellum Italicum.61 Epigraphic evidence similarly shows
that the two terms were interchangeable. The fasti consulares (preserved in
an Augustan-era inscription) uses the title Bellum Marsicum, while a senatus
consultum, issued on the 22 May 78 bce and preserved on a bilingual bronze
tablet found at Rome, recognises the service of three ship’s captains from the east
in the bellum Italicum.62
The role of the Marsi in the war is consistently asserted. That these two
labels are common reflects a contemporary recognition that the Marsi, and in
particular Poppaedius Silo, had been a driving force behind the war but that
support for the insurgents had been widespread though not universal.63 The
changing terminology is indicative of a shifting and maturing interpretation of
the war, a view which will be discussed further in the final chapter of this work.
Significant groups of Italians demanded citizenship immediately prior to the
war and many Latin and allied communities received it in the war’s wake. Thus,
a war fought for outright independence from Rome is unreasonable. Instead,
the question can be approached from the perspective of an Italian demand
for inclusion and therefore the questions of on what terms and for what ends
become the more significant analytical problems.
59
Some examples include for Bellum Marsicum: Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.90, Phil. 8.31, Div.
1.99, 2.54, 2.59; for Bellum Italicum: Cic. Clu. 21, Leg. Agr. 2.80, Arch. 4(8), and possibly Off.
2.21(75). See also Ascon. 73 on Cic. Corn.
60
Gell. 2.27.2 (Sall. Hist. 1.77 in McGushin).
61
On Velleius’ use, see Bispham (2011, p. 20). For examples of usage, see Vell. Pat.
2.15.1; Ascon. 73; Iul. Ob. 54.
62
CIL, 12, 588.
63
Vell. Pat. 2.15.1 claims that the insurgency spread to all parts of Italy (in omnis
penetrasset regions), a statement which is only true in so far as the war involved all of Italy and
there were likely many sympathetic to the insurgents in regions that did not generally join the
rebellion.
Chapter 3
Italians and the Roman State in the
Second Century bce
This chapter will investigate antecedents of the range of aspirations that the
insurgents would profess in 91 bce. This will be followed by an investigation of
the emergence of the Italian insurgent movement and its organisation in 91 in
Chapter 4. Emilio Gabba argued that if a cause of the Social War is to be sought
then the tribunate of Livius Drusus and the political conflicts at Rome must be
put to one side and that instead ‘the real, substantial cause of the war lies in the
long and complex process which produced in the allies a new kind of need and a
new kind of outlook’ (1976, p. 87). The motivation of the Italians in the century
before the Social War, both from the perspective of those who supported the
insurgency and those who did not, will be investigated in this chapter. What are
perceived to have been the causes of the Social War are very much determined
by the time frame being investigated.
A fairly simplistic argument can be found in many of the ancient writers,
one that better attests to the motivation of the insurgents in the late 90s, already
on the verge of going to war. For the most part the ancient sources do not
adequately account for the emergence of this desire in preceding decades or the
social factors that contributed to it. Thus for instance Pompeius Trogus wrote of
‘all Italy’ having risen up against Rome in a bid for partnership in Rome’s empire
and her citizenship. Using similar terms Velleius Paterculus claimed that the
allies had called for citizenship in the empire they had defended with their own
arms.1 Appian asserts that the Italians cared more for the citizenship than they
did for their own lands. As stated in the previous chapter, the overarching theme
of ancient explanations for the emergence of the allied demand for citizenship
was the indignation at the disparity of their rights which, in turn, prompted
their call to cease being treated as foreigners and to be extended the liberty
enjoyed by Roman citizens in Italy.
1
Justin, 38.4.13: uniuersam Italiam… … non iam libertatem, sed consortium imperii
civitatisque poscentem. Vell. Pat. 2.15.2: petebant enim eam civitatem, cuius imperium armis
tuebantur.
Differentiating Allied Motives
Simple explanations of grievances over disparity of status, found in a number of

the ancient sources, do not take into account an important feature of the Social
War; the distribution of the communities which supported the insurgency.
In 91/90 bce the call for enfranchisement was neither uniformly promoted by
allied peoples nor supported on the Italian peninsula. The insurgency initially
occurred in parts of central and southern Italy, with Picenum at its northern
extreme and Lucania at its southernmost. While many communities in southern
Italy rapidly joined the insurgency (either willingly or after being compelled
by force), the Roman allies in Cisalpine Gaul (now northern Italy) and the
Tranpadana remained loyal. Indeed, the ancient literary sources frequently
claim entire ethnic groups from the south as having supported the uprising. Yet,
even within the regions of southern Italy in which the insurgency was strongest,
all but one of the communities with Latin status remained loyal to Rome despite
being rapidly surrounded by the insurgents. The cities of Latin status were
among the first to be targeted by them in 90 bce and a number paid dearly for
their fidelity.2 Even so these communities remained staunch in their adherence
to Rome.
A central concern of non-Romans within Italy that was raised at the time of
the Gracchan land commission had been the threat of Roman encroachment on
their land. Rather than advocating for radical change, allied Italian energies were
focused upon protection of the status quo, a situation which the Gracchan land
commission had threatened to overturn. This was also a concern which had cut
across social distinctions; a generation later in the 90s bce allied Italian anger
seems to have been much more squarely focused upon their unequal rights within
Italy. Thus while the Italian insurgents demanded citizenship, the demand was
not the by-product of a desire for integration per se; it was a pragmatic response
to emergent political exigencies. Citizenship offered the allied elites the capacity
to openly participate directly in the Roman political process and for them to
muster their local communities in support of or in opposition to decision-
making in Rome. Such a desire was not so prevalent in communities with Latin
rights because the elites from these communities had already been provided with
pathways to political inclusion if they so desired.
A contrast, however, needs to be drawn with the situation in Etruria and
Umbria which in some respects was more interesting. Communities in Etruria
2
For instance, the Latin communities of Carsioli (Flor. 2.6.11) and Alba Fucens (Liv.
Per. 72).
Italians and the Roman State in the Second Century bce 45
and Umbria withheld their support for the insurgents initially only to be
the first to be granted citizenship, albeit begrudgingly, by the Republic as an
emergency measure, through the lex Iulia in 90 bce.3 That such a grant from
the Romans only came at the height of the war and in fear of the prospect of
communities in Etruria and Umbria supporting the insurgency is not surprising.
The incorporation of most of Italy into the citizen body was a reluctant measure
taken by the Romans to alleviate the threat of further unrest, though it should be
noted that such a concession proved highly effective at safeguarding the loyalty
of these communities. Thereafter violence in Italy focused upon interfactional
Roman conflict.4
In the centuries prior to the Social War, there are a number of examples of
individual communities on the Italian peninsula receiving Roman citizenship
through several established mechanisms. Throughout this period there appears
to have been no widespread desire for Roman citizenship. A very different
situation existed, however, among the Latins, who had long had a more complex
relationship with the Roman state. The ancient Latin communities were closely
connected to Rome by geography, religion, language and kinship,5 while the
Latin colonies included within their populations people originally drawn from
Roman citizen communities. Despite their unique relationship with the Republic
these colonies were not only geographically positioned on the periphery of the
Roman community in Italy, but their capacity for civic participation was also
limited. Latins in Latium in the mid-fourth century demanded, and succeeded
in acquiring, Roman citizen rights. This was followed by Latin colonies in the
second century which also agitated for full citizen rights. These efforts were
neither a cause nor an antecedent of the Social War but they do provide a
possible analogue for the emergence of the Italian demand for citizenship.
The Picentines and the Marsi where probably keenly aware of the importance
of their manpower for the Romans. Pliny the Elder claims that Picenum
had once been home to about 360,000 able-bodied men.6 The heart of the
insurgency, Picenum and the territories of the Vestini, Marruncini and Marsi,
continued to be important sources of manpower after the Social War in spite
of heavy losses suffered during the conflict.7 In particular, both Asculum in
Picenum and the Paelignian city of Corfinium continued to be communities of
3
See discussion of the lex Iulia in Chapter 8.
4
The repeated failure of citizenship bills perhaps indicates the broader reluctance of
Romans to permit extension of the franchise in this period (see Millar, 1986).
5
Stated in one well-known example: Liv. 8.6.15.
6
Plin. HN. 3.13(110).
7
Caes. BCiv. 1.15–17.
strategic importance in the decades after the Social War. In 88, though recently
having triumphed over Asculum, Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89) used Picenum
as a base of operations following his illegal resumption of command over of his
former soldiers. Similarly, during the civil war in 49 bce, his son Cn. Pompeius
(Magnus) still enjoyed strong support in Picenum: Alba Fucens was used as a
staging point for mobilisations against Caesar and the territory of the Marsi,
Paeligni and surrounding regions were used for recruitment.8 That these peoples
were aware of their military importance to the Republic is possibly reflected
in a number of references in the ancient literary sources to their long history
of service.
If it can reasonably be suggested that they were aware of their importance in
recruitment then it should also be noted that these same men were of potential
electoral importance. This importance is also observed by the author of the ‘letter
to Caesar’ in reference to the Social War but it was most vividly demonstrated
in the decades after the war as the ‘Italian vote’ emerged as a political force.
This is explicitly discussed by Cicero, such as in his attack on Torquatus (a man
who was himself descended from a Picentine family from Asculum). In the
speech Cicero cautions against neglecting the vote of regional Italians, which is
indicative of the potential electoral power which they could wield when called
upon.9 It is also demonstrated, for instance, by Cicero when he speaks in his First
Verrine oration (the only one to have been delivered publically in 70 bce) of a
‘great crowd from all over Italy’ having been drawn to the City to participate
in the comitia, the games and for the census.10 Similarly, Quintus Cicero in the
so-called Commentariolum Petitionis urged his brother Marcus to keep in mind
‘all of Italy’ when campaigning, and that he should as such take particular note
throughout the peninsula of each community and its tribal division within
the assemblies.11
Gabba’s argument as to the influence of the experience of Italian negotiaores
in the provinces may have thus co-existed with these much more general reasons.
In this respect Gabba’s argument need not automatically entail the dismissal of
Badian’s argument concerning the role military experience in the late second
8
Caes. BCiv. 1.15.
9
Cic. Sull. 24–25.
10
Cic. Verr. 1.18(54): quae convenit uno tempore undique comitiorum ludorum
censendique causa.
11
Cicero, Comment. pet. 30–31. In Cic. Leg. 2.5 the duel nature of citizenship for
Italians is discussed; asserting that in their time Italians possessed two patriae, their local
community (their municipium) and the source of their citizenship, Rome.
century and early first century may have played in the insurgent peoples’ growing
aspiration to secure inclusion.
Precedents for Latins and Italians Seeking Enfranchisement
There were indeed many potentially illuminating examples in the centuries prior
to the war where allies in Italy had sought Roman citizenship. The Latin War
of the fourth century bce is of particular interest in this respect. The parallels
between the conflict with the Latins and the Social War are not only apparent
to the modern reader, but have probably influenced the Roman historical
tradition’s explanation of the Latin War as well. That such a link was more than
pure historical invention, however, is suggested by Roman and Italian actions
in 91/90 bce.12 Indeed, in 90 bce the Senate ordered one of the consuls to
oversee the repair of the Temple of Iuno Sospita at Lanuvium, a religious site
of significance to the Latin War.13 In 341 bce a difficult diplomatic situation
emerged between the Romans, Samnites, Latins, Sidicini and Campanians.14
The Samnites, who were on peaceful terms with the Romans, were attempting
to conquer the Sidicini, an Oscan-speaking people who lived in the region of
Teanum Sidicinum at the northernmost end of Campania. With the prospect
of a Samnite victory, the Sidicini initially attempted to surrender to the Romans
and when this was refused by the Roman Senate then approached the Latins
instead.15 In 340 bce an envoy, L. Annius Setinus, was sent to the Roman Senate
on behalf of the Latins. In response to the Senate’s request that the Latins desist
from their attacks upon the Samnites, Annius demanded that all the Latins and
Romans be integrated into a single state, that there should be one Roman and
one Latin consul, that the Senate be equally composed of Latins and Romans
and that there should be unum populum, unam rem publicam fieri, ‘one people
12
On the association in the historical tradition of the Social War with the Latin War,
see Forsythe (2005, pp. 289f ). On the association of the Italian conspiracy to murder the
Roman consuls in 91 at the ferriae Latinae with the Latin War, see Chapter 4.
13
This act seems to have been a contemporary recognition of the similarity of the two
conflicts. Cic. Div. 1, 4 and Iul. Ob. 55. Schultz (2006) compares the two conflicts in terms
of the issues of integration versus the sovereignty of the Italian peoples. Similarly, the Italian
plot to assassinate the consuls in 91 bce was to have used the ferae Latinae as the venue for
the murders. The historical significance of the festival cannot have been lost on the Italian
conspirators when it was chosen as the location for the assassination attempt.
14
Liv. 8.1–4.
15
Liv. 8.2.5–8.
and one Republic’, with Rome as its capital.16 After two years of fighting, a
number of communities in Latium did receive full citizenship and in essence
much of Latium was converted into a Roman territory.17
In 216 the military disaster at Cannae threatened a potential crisis of allied
cities being unwilling to supply further resources to Rome. As a result a proposal
was mooted to enrol leading men from the Latin allies into the Roman Senate
and to permit a Capuan to be elected consul. When the Capuans sided with the
Carthaginians the Romans responded with military force, while in the case of
the Latins their complaints of military service were rebuffed. It is, however, in the
early second century bce that the first indications of agitation over civic status
in Italy within Latin colonies are found. In several situations in the 180s and
170s citizens from either communities of Latin status or allied cities attempted
to claim Roman citizen rights. In the case of communities with Latin status
these activities were typically seen as an abuse of the privilege of ius migrationis,
but when coupled with comparable references to residents of Italian cities also
attempting to change their status they attest to a development in which cities
in Italy were increasingly looking to have a voice directly within Roman civic
structures. In turn, these actions provide a precedent for the events of the 90s
bce which culminated in the Social War.
In 187 bce a number of cities in Latium possessing Latin rights complained
to the Senate that they had lost large numbers of their citizens to the city of Rome
and that they had been counted in the Roman census. Livy does not provide any
explanation of how these individuals had acted illegitimately or why they were
not rightly entitled to the ius migrationis. The subsequent investigation carried
out by the praetor Q. Terentius Culleo identified 12,000 Latins who were deemed
to be illegitimately acting as Roman citizens.18 According to Livy the 12,000
that were identified were verified as having been either allies or the sons of allies
at time of the census of C. Claudius Nero (cos. 207) and M. Livius Salinator
16
The speech which Livy puts in the mouth of the ambassador is particularly
impassioned: consulem alterum Roma, alterum ex Latio creari oportet, senatus partem aequam
ex utraque gente esse, unum populum, unam rem publicam fieri; et ut imperii eadem sedes sit
idemque omnibus nomen, quoniam ab altera utra parte concedi necesse est, quod utrisque bene
vertat, sit haec sane patria potior, et Romani omnes vocemur (Liv. 8.5.5–6).
17
Mouritsen (1998, pp. 138–141) proposes the highly speculative argument that the
demands of the Latins in 340 were in fact a retrojection of the demands of the Italian embassy
sent to Rome in 91 bce shortly after the murders at Asculum. Livy seems to emphasise
the similarity, but his treatment is independent of the actual outcome which his account
preserves (see Forsythe, 2005, pp. 289f and 368).
18
Liv. 39.3.4–6.
(cos. 219, 207) in 204 bce,19 the implication being that some had been assessed as
legitimate citizens at multiple censuses. In 177 Livy again records a large number
of non-citizens having been identified as resident in Rome and having been
assessed in the Roman census. These communities of Latin status complained
that they were becoming increasingly depleted of manpower. In turn a number
of Samnite and Paelignian communities complained that 4,000 families had
migrated to the region around the Latin community of Fregellae.20 The passage
in Livy is corrupted but still provides a garbled account of two mechanisms that
were presumably being used by local communities to abuse ius migrationis. The
simplest reconstruction of Livy’s meaning is that entire households were leaving
Latin communities and claiming ius migrationis. This may have been either by
leaving a son behind in the local Latin community, selling that son into slavery,
then having the owner manumit them, at which point that son was also by right
a Roman citizen and could re-join their family, or by legally adopting someone
who had no intention of leaving the home community and thereby was at leisure
to move their entire household and take up full-citizen rights.
In both the case of 177 and the previous example in 187 bce, Livy makes
it clear that the primary concern of both the Roman Senate and the Latin and
other allied communities was the potential implications for the distribution
of manpower in Italy. Large-scale movements of able-bodied men would
inequitably spread the obligations of supplying soldiers for military service. In
177, however, the Latins not only requested that those who were deemed to
have abused the system be expelled but also that a law be passed prohibiting the
acquisition or release of a son for the purpose of effecting a change in civic status
and that any who had done so in the past should have their claim to Roman
citizenship invalidated.21 As a result, the consul of 177, C. Claudius Pulcher, had
a law passed that required all Latins who had held Latin status at the time of the
census in 189 and any of their descendants to return to their home communities
by the Kalends of November in that year. The consul Claudius issued an edict to
that effect and the praetor L. Mummius was appointed to investigate any Latins
who were subsequently accused of not abiding by this law. In addition, a senatus
consultum required that any magistrate who had a slave brought before him for
19
Liv. 39.3.4–6: legatis deinde sociorum Latini nominis, qui toto undique ex Latio
frequentes convenerant, senatus datus est. The census in 204 bce was also unusual because it
had included all citizens who were on active service at the time (Liv. 29.37.5–6). Typically
those on active service were not counted.
20
Liv. 41.8.6–12. See the discussion in Salmon (1967, pp. 318–319).
21
Liv. 41.8.12.
manumission should require that an oath be taken to the effect that the slave was
not being freed for the purposes of effecting changes in civic status.22
Four years later the consul L. Postumius Albinus in 173 proclaimed that
any Latin who had been returned to their home community as a result of the
edict of Claudius in 177 should not be counted in the current census. That some
Latins must have again returned to Rome in the interim is demonstrated by the
reduced number that the censors of 174, Q. Fulvius Flaccus and A. Postumius
Albinus, returned at the lustrum.23 While ius migrationis does not appear to
have been outlawed by the lex Claudia in 177, between 187 and 173 it appears
that a legal mechanism was established for overriding it. In 187 bce the Romans
and the leadership in regional communities had been content to return those
acting illegitimately. But Livy implies that the proclamation of the consul in 173
was targeted at any who had been previously expelled under the edict of 177,
whether their subsequent migration had been legitimate or not.
Understanding both the motivation of the individuals who attempted to
change their status or claim a status to which they were not technically entitled
and also the reasons why the Roman Senate and the local allied communities in
Italy should have been so concerned about these migrations helps to illuminate
the origins of the social and political pressures that culminated in the Social
War. For the individual there were a range of everyday activities in which it
is conceivable that they may have wanted to illegitimately claim either Latin
status if they were an ally or Roman citizenship if they were a Latin, without
anyone either noticing or caring to check their actual legal status – for instance,
negotiating contracts, conducting business activities or claiming a share in public
distributions. In many circumstances, if a person asserted they were a citizen this
would have been sufficient to be presumed a citizen. There was, however, a clear
incentive for an individual to fraudulently claim to be either a Roman citizen
or a citizen of another community when it came to the issue of military service.
By claiming to be a Roman citizen an individual could avoid being called up in
a levy of allied troops. By moving to a more populous community, or migrating
from an allied community to a Latin one, an individual might hope to be called
upon less frequently.
As Livy makes clear, the major concern for the cities which petitioned
the Senate was this issue of fairly distributing the burdens of military service
within their local community. With members leaving the home community the
total pool of remaining members from which to draw the annual levy would
22
Liv. 41.9.9–12.
23
Liv. 42.10.1–5.
be reduced and, in consequence, there would be a higher demand upon those

remaining to do military service. Something which is not so clearly explained by
Livy, but which may already have been a concern for the Roman Senate in the
180s and 170s is the potential electoral effects of these migrations. Livy does, in
each of the instances discussed above, indicate that many of these migrants had
been assessed in a census and would thereby have been allocated to a property
qualification and registered in a voting tribe. Within an early second century
bce population that was by Roman reckoning approximately 250,000 males,24
12,000 individuals illegitimately acting as citizens in the right tribes or property
qualifications could conceivably have directly affected voting outcomes in
the assemblies.
Italians, Ager Publicus and Land Reform
There were also antecedents of the Social War in the manner in which arable
land in Italy had been conquered by the Romans and the subsequent processes
by which the communities of the Italian peninsula had increasingly came under
the control of, or had been integrated into, the systems of the Roman Republic.
In particular, Roman citizenship was linked to the issue of securing access to ager
publicus and protecting private land ownership. The issue in part stems from the
important distinction between the status of land in Italy, lands over which the
person using the land had possessio and those who had dominatio. These can be
clearly delineated in the following manner: possessio of land meant that the holder
had control over a defined portion of land on an enduring basis, typically owned
by the Roman state as ager publicus. This land could be passed to descendants
and any livestock or infrastructure on the land was the private property of the
possessor. If the possessor was a Roman citizen these assets were assessable by the
Censors in determining in which property qualification in the comitia centuriata
they should vote. Much of Italy under the late Republic was possessed in this
manner and such land was acquired through assignation. Dominatio of land
meant that the holder owned that land outright. It was theirs to lease or sell
as they saw fit. The land and the above ground assets were the private property
of the dominator and thereby land and infrastructure were assessable by the
Censors. Small parcels of land were sometimes distributed as gifts to the original
participants in colonial projects. There were strong incentives for limiting the
amount of land that was transferred into dominatio. First, by granting possession
24
Livy’s figure for the year 189 bce is 258,318 (Liv. 38.36).
of ager publicus instead of outright ownership ongoing state revenue from the
land was protected. Second, it also theoretically guarded against concentration
of land, as there had been restrictions on the quantity of ager publicus that could
be held by a father and his sons dating back to the fourth century bce.25
Roman and non-Roman alike could lease ager publicus at a set rate and arable
land in the vicinity of Italian communities could be ager publicus. An important
and dangerous precedent was created by the Gracchan land commission which
was first established in 133 bce. The commission possessed the power to make
judgements (without a right of appeal) about who rightly had possessio of ager
publicus. This meant that the commission had the capacity to override prior land
distributions to non-Romans and it is for these reasons that the commission
posed a serious threat to allied communities that were using Roman public land
in Italy. It is probably for this reason that Cicero denounced the commissioners
in De re publica as having disregarded both iura and foedera with allies and Latins
alike in conducting their affairs.26 By 129 bce the commissioners’ judgements
were perceived to be deeply biased against non-Romans and had incited intense
anger over the displacements they were causing.27 A group of Italian allies
enlisted the assistance of Scipio Aemilianus (cos. 147, 134), who was indebted
to them for the ardent support they had given him in war, and were thus able
to induce him to attack the commission publicly. The focus of his opposition
was not directed against the concept of the land commission assigning access
to ager publicus but rather at its possession of a judicial power detrimental to
the interests of the Italian allies. Accordingly he proposed a measure to transfer
the iudicandis power of the commissioners to the consul of 129, Tuditanus.28 In
turn, when the consul realised the enormity of the task and the dangers that
were inherent in adjudicating in such delicate claims he refused to preside and
the conflicts went unresolved.
25
On rights of land holders, see Tibiletti (1948), Richardson (1980) and Ridley
(2000).
26
Cic. Rep. 3.41: Ti. Gracchus, perseveravit in civibus, sociorum nominisque Latini iura
neglexit ac foedera. Similarly, in reference to the challenges in 129 bce to the iudicandis power
of the commission Cicero asserts that, concitatis sociis et nomine Latino, foederibus violates,
triumvirs seditiosissimis aliquid cotidie novi molientibus (Cic. Rep. 1.31). See Gabba (1994,
p. 104) and Dart (2011).
27
App. BC. 1.19.
28
App. BC. 1.18–19. On Latin and allied resistance to the Gracchi, see Sall. Iug. 42.1.
Proposals for Reform and Extension of the Franchise in the 120s
In his history Appian traced the origins of the Social War to the proposal of
M. Fulvius Flaccus to extend citizenship to the allies in 125 bce.29 Appian is
correct in some respects in identifying this proposal as an important turning
point; it was the first time that a Roman magistrate had proposed the wholesale
enfranchisement of the Italian allies. In this one respect, it proposed a model for
resolving these issues with allied communities. Yet, even so Appian recognised
that this proposal did not occur in isolation and he asserted that Flaccus was
attempting to allay pre-existing allied grievances over the activities of the
Gracchan land commission.
Radical as the proposal in 125 bce may have been, it demonstrates that
there was already recognition that the equalisation of civic status could
alleviate some allied grievances. Also, Flaccus’ proposal, for the first time,
made enfranchisement through engaging with Roman political processes
a realistic possibility for the allies. In turn it must also have suggested that,
should sufficient pressure be applied, Italians could induce Roman magistrates
to propose advantageous reforms. This was a radical change from the climate
that had existed fifty to sixty years earlier, when both the Roman Senate and
local communities, albeit frequently those already possessing Latin status, had
seen eye to eye on the issue of curbing transition of individuals to the Roman
citizen body. In the wake of the failed attempt of Scipio Aemilianus to intercede
on behalf of the Italian allies and his sudden death in 129 bce, existing Italian
land holders continued to try to stall the activities of the land commission.30 In
126 bce Fulvius Flaccus was elected as consul for 125 bce. Once in office he
proposed extension of citizenship to any in Italy who desired it and the right
of appeal to the Roman people for any who wished to retain their existing
citizenship.31 There is good reason to believe that this proposal had been
anticipated in the lead-up to the consular elections for 125 bce. In 126 bce
the tribune M. Iunius Pennus expelled all non-Romans from the city. Cicero
directly compares Pennus’ measure to attempts to restrict those not entitled to
citizenship from acting as citizens. Pennus may have been seeking to prevent
29
App. BC. 1.21 and 34, cf. 1.39.
30
App. BC. 1.21: τὴν δὲ διαίρεσιν τῆς γῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι καὶ ὣς ἐπὶ προφάσεσι ποικίλαις
διέφερον ἐπὶ πλεῖστον. καί τινες εἰσηγοῦντο τοὺς συμμάχους ἅπαντας, οἳ δὴ περὶ τῆς γῆς μάλιστα
ἀντέλεγον, εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πολιτείαν ἀναγράψαι, ὡς μείζονι χάριτι περὶ τῆς γῆς οὐ διοισομένους.
31
Val. Max. 9.5.1; App. BC. 1.21.
non-citizens supporting Flaccus’ election.32 As they were unable to vote, the

Italians were probably attempting to drum up support for Flaccus among their
Roman associates. This support may have involved intimidation (as did support
for Livius Drusus in 91 bce), but it may also have involved open canvassing on
Flaccus’ behalf. Indeed, a Fregellan is reported by Cicero to have spoken publicly
in Rome in defence of his home community’s interests and those of other Latin
cities in the period.33 Given that Fregellae revolted and was brutally repressed
later in the same year, it is plausible that the two events were linked. Despite the
tribune Pennus’ efforts to negate Italian support, Flaccus was still elected by the
comitia centuriata to the consulship of 125.
According to Velleius Paterculus, the proposed lex Fulvia de civitate in
125 bce contained provisions ‘for giving Roman citizenship to Italians and the
ius provocationis to those people who did not wish to be made full citizens’.34
Any ally who did not wish to receive the franchise could instead receive ius
provocationis. That this was included in the proposed reform implies that Flaccus
expected some communities would refuse the franchise: thus while all non-
Roman communities could be expected to readily accept the right of appeal,
not all would want to become full Roman citizens. Appian claims that at the
time the allies were readily willing to accept the franchise, even preferring it to
the possession of their land.35 This is probably a misunderstanding on the part
of Appian. Instead, Italian allies who were in fear of losing their estates may have
rightly concluded that by accepting citizenship they would gain greater political
clout to safeguard their holdings.
There are several factors that seem to have influenced Flaccus. First, he had
been one of the triumvirs on the Gracchan land commission since 130 bce36 and
would have been well aware of the difficulties that Latins and allied Italians faced.
Many non-Romans were angry at what they perceived to be disadvantageous
decisions of the Gracchan land commission.37 Extension of the franchise would
equalise the situation, but it might also have been seen as a way of purchasing
32
Cic. Off. 3.47: Male etiam, qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant,
ut Pennus apud patres nostros, Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non
licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola; usu vero urbis prohibere
peregrinos sane inhumanum est. See also Broughton, MRR, 1, p. 508.
33
Cic. Brut. 170: ex Latio L. Papirium Fregellanum Ti. Gracchi P. F. fere aetate; eius
etiam oratio est pro Fregellanis colonisque Latinis habita in senatu.
34
Val. Max. 9.5.1: de civitate Italiae danda et de provocatione ad populum eorum qui
civitatem mutare noluissent.
35
App. BC. 1.21.
36
Broughton, MRR, 1, p. 503.
37
App. BC. 1.18–21.
Italian acquiescence. Second, and possibly most importantly, enfranchisement

would generate many newly indebted Roman citizens within Italy. For Flaccus,
as both consul and triumvir, placating the Italians would have freed the land
commission to get on with its work of completing the land distributions, leaving
him and his fellow triumvir C. Gracchus in a position of immense power. On the
other hand there were considerable disadvantages and dangers. Flaccus relied
upon support from the lower orders and a policy of extending the franchise was
no more popular with them than it was with the Senators. In addition, it would
be reasonable to expect that the chances of such a proposal being passed by the
comitia centuriata (by its very structure an assembly which reflected the will of
the wealthy, landed elite over the rank and file) would have been slim. Flaccus
could have remained in Italy and continued to champion his proposal; however,
the opportunity to take an overseas command offered him a convenient way to
distance himself from a policy that was widely unpopular with the citizen body
(Dart, 2010a). This was the first time in Roman history that universal citizenship
in Italy had been proposed. Flaccus’ suggested alternative, that ius provocationis
would be made a right of all allied Italians, was an equally revolutionary proposal
(Wirszubski, 1950, pp. 68–70). Had it succeeded it would have likely alleviated
the grievances of the Italians and conferred upon them the right to appeal
unfavourable decisions. Furthermore, it seems to indicate that there was a shift
in perception taking place on the Italian peninsula, in so far as it was the first
time that the Romans had considered applying a consistent status under the law
on the basis of being Italian.
Instead of pursuing the proposal Flaccus was sent to Massilia and subsequently
had his magistracy prorogued for 124 and in 123 bce.38 Appian gives two
different reasons for Flaccus’ departure, both of which he connects with the
citizenship proposal. At one point Appian asserts that Flaccus abandoned the
citizenship proposal in the face of senatorial resistance,39 at another that the
Senate sent him away to take command in a war in order to obstruct the passage
of the bill.40 This second explanation cannot be the case as, until 122 bce,
it was normal practice for the Senate to assign consular provinces after the
consuls had taken up office and it was within their prerogative to redefine
these arrangements in the case of emergencies.41 Had Flaccus desired to pursue
38
Liv. Per. 60; App. BC.1.21 and 1.34; Plut. C. Grac. 15. On prorogation of Flaccus, see
Broughton, MRR, 1, pp. 512–515.
39
App. BC. 1.21.
40
App. BC. 1.34: εἰσηγούμενος δὲ τὴν γνώμην καὶ ἐπιμένων αὐτῇ καρτερῶς, ὑπὸ τῆς
βουλῆς ἐπί τινα στρατείαν ἐξεπέμφθη διὰ τόδε.
41
This is lucidly demonstrated by Vervaet (2006).
his citizenship bill, he could have resisted the Senate’s decree himself or have
arranged for a tribune to veto the allotment. Flaccus did neither and instead
took the politically expedient decision to take up his overseas command (Dart,
2010a, pp. 98–101). It is therefore worth considering the period of the Gracchi
not as a ‘cause’ of the Social War but rather as a symptom of an emerging crisis
in the interactions between Rome and its allies. Rome was expected to show
leadership in resolving a problem which was of its own making.
The Harsh Treatment of Allies and Latins
The proposal of Fulvius Flaccus to extend a right of appeal to allies is significant

as it highlights another important antecedent of the Social War: the arbitrary
and sometimes brutal treatment the allies could receive at the hands of Roman
officials. Allies might be expected to assume the subservient role in interactions
with Roman officials and there are a number of particularly extreme examples
of Roman brutality towards communities of allied or Latin status in Italy in
the 120s bce. These are important as they shed light on the actual nature of
the disparities and injustices cited by the ancient literary sources as one of the
underlying reasons for the grievances of the Social War. As with the issue of
the use of, and right to retain the use of, public land in Italy, the potential for
members of allied Italian communities to have unreasonable demands made of
them or, in extreme instances, to be exposed to cruel and arbitrary punishment
by Roman officials was an issue which affected not only local elites but lower
strata of the local community as well.
In 173 the consul L. Postumius was sent to Campania to assess the boundaries
between private land holdings and Roman ager publicus. Postumius was angry
that on a previous occasion he had travelled to the city Praeneste as a private
citizen and had not received the formal reception by the local people that he
had expected. Taking advantage of his present position, he made a number
of demands including that the local magistrates should receive him upon his
arrival and make arrangements for his accommodation. Livy argued that this
established a precedent for increasingly burdensome demands to be placed upon
allied communities.42
A series of important examples from the late second century bce, are preserved
by Aulus Gellius in his Attic Nights. These are quoted by Gellius from a speech of
Gaius Gracchus, de legibus promulgates, which cites instances of extreme abuse
42
Liv. 42.1.6–12.
of Latins and allies in Italy. These were almost certainly contemporary examples;
at one point Gracchus refers to a Roman envoy as travelling from Asia in the last
few years (his annis paucis ex Asia missus est) which is plausibly a reference to the
reorganisation of Asia under Man. Aquillius (cos. 129) which occurred between
129 and 125 bce.43 In the speech Gracchus refers to a number of instances of
extremely harsh and arbitrary treatment being meted out by Roman magistrates
in Italian communities.
The first example he cited succinctly demonstrates the excessive behaviour of
some Roman magistrates and the dangerous position in which local non-Roman
elites could find themselves when interacting with Roman officials:
Nuper Teanum Sidicinum consul venit. Uxor eius dixit se in balneis virilibus lavari
velle. Quaestori Sidicino M. Marius datum est negotium, uti balneis exigerentur qui
lavabantur. Uxor renuntiat viro parum cito sibi balneas traditas esse et parum lautas
fuisse. Id circo palus destitutus est in foro, eoque adductus suae civitatis nobilissimus
homo M. Marius. Vestimenta detracta sunt, virgis caesus est.
The consul lately came to Teanum Sidicinum. His wife said that she wished
to bathe in the men’s baths. Marcus Marius, the quaestor of Sidicinum, was
instructed to send away the bathers from the baths. The wife tells her husband
that the baths were not given up to her soon enough and that they were not
sufficiently clean. Therefore a stake was planted in the forum and Marcus Marius,
the most illustrious man of his city, was led to it. His clothing was stripped off, he
was whipped with rods.44
In response to this incident the people of Cales (a short distance south-east of

Teanum), apparently fearful that something similar might happen in their own
city, declared that no one should use the local baths when a Roman magistrate
was present in the town.45 This precautionary measure attests to the immense
fear which could be engendered in the local community. Gracchus also speaks of
a similar incident at Ferentinum (a Hernician community on the Via Latina46)
where a Roman praetor had ordered the arrest of the local quaestors. One of the
men threw himself from the city walls to his death, while the other was caught
and, as in Teanum, was publicly beaten with rods.47 In both examples men of
43
Gell. NA. 10.3.5.
44
Gell. NA. 10.3.3 (trans. Rolfe, 1927).
45
Gell. NA. 10.3.3.
46
Strab. 5.237; Plin. HN. 3.64.
47
Gell. NA. 10.3.3.
high status within their own community were subjected to extreme public
humiliation for seemingly minor infractions.
In what was surely a contemporary instance, sometime in 125 bce the Latin
city of Fregellae revolted over the issue of granting citizenship and the extension
to Latin allies of the right of appealing judicial decisions before the Roman
people.48 The city had a long history of loyalty to Rome, having held firm in the
midst of the Samnite Wars and the Second Punic War, despite being placed under
serious threat.49 Furthermore, not only had Fregellae acted as the representative
of the loyal Latin colonies in 209 bce, when twelve of the colonies refused to
supply additional men,50 but, as with other Latin colonies, in spite of centuries
of loyalty, it had not received citizenship while Italian allied communities had
been enfranchised.51 The Roman response was swift: the praetor L. Opimius
(cos. 121) was sent out to the city and rapidly repressed the insurrection. The
city was betrayed by a local citizen, Q. Numitorius Pullus, who narrowly escaped
punishment after the destruction of Fregellae thanks to a debate in Opimius’
council.52 The colony of Fabrateria Nova was established the following year.53
The incident is an early indication that there were some communities in
Italy ready to resort to violence over the issue of enfranchisement. The people of
Fregellae cannot have hoped to withstand the Roman army and as such must have
expected that their revolt would either trigger other disgruntled communities
to do likewise or that some form of accommodation could be reached. As
Fregellae was a colony established by the Romans with Latin rights, many of the
Fregellans were probably the descendants of Romans. The apparent weakness of
the community and the failure of other Latin or allied peoples to support their
demands highlight the swift and crushing force applied by Rome and, indeed,
in a passage from the ad Herennium Roman treatment of Fregellae is directly
48
Liv. Per. 60; Vell. Pat. 2.6.4; Cic. Pis. 95, Phil. 3.17. On the refusal of a triumph for
Opimius, see Val. Max. 2.8.4 and Amm. Marc. 25.9.10.
49
Situated on territory originally belonging to the city of Signia, it had become
controlled by the Volscians (Liv. 8.22), before being established as a Latin colony in
328 bce (Liv. 8.22). The placing of the colony on the Samnite side of the Liris River acted
as a catalyst for war with the Samnites (Liv. 8.23–4). The city was subsequently surrendered
to the Samnites in 321 bce (Liv. 9.1–7) but was recaptured by the Romans in 313/2 bce.
50
Liv. 27.9–10.
51
For instance, members of Campanian communities, dispersed as a consequence of
the Second Punic War, were permitted to be enrolled in the urban tribes: Liv. 38.28.
52
On the betrayal of Fregellae by Pullus, one of the town’s own citizens, and his
subsequent encounter with the praetor L. Opimius, see Cic. Phil. 3.17, Fin. 5.22(62) and
Inv. Rhet. 2.34(105).
53
Vell. Pat. 1.15.4. See Crawford et al. (1986) and Launaro (2011, pp. 130–132).
compared with the notorious examples of Numantia, Carthage and Corinth.54

The irony of this situation was that the only authority to which the allies might
appeal was Rome and in particular to empowered Romans sympathetic to their
situation. Indeed, an acknowledgement both of allied grievances and a Roman
obligation to the allies to address unreasonable treatment is implicit in Gaius
Gracchus’ speech. It is similarly attested in the actions of Fulvius Flaccus and
then later in those of the younger Livius Drusus (see Sherwin-White, 1973,
pp. 134f ).
Extension of the Franchise to Local Elites
In 124 bce both Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus were away from Rome,
Gracchus as proquaestor in Sardinia and Flaccus as proconsul in Liguria.55
Gracchus returned early in order to stand for the tribunate of 123 bce, but
Flaccus did not return to Rome until sometime during 123 bce.56 In 123 bce
Gaius Gracchus campaigned heavily throughout Italy, according to Appian
securing support from many tradespeople.57 He made a range of proposals for
new colonies and advocated that Latins demand extension of the franchise to
them.58 This second policy advocated a radical method of acquiring citizenship
but the demand itself was not unreasonable, particularly in light of many cities
of Latin status having been colonies sourced from parent cities with Roman
citizenship. As such, many Latins would have had Roman ancestors who had
relinquished their rights in exchange for participation in a colony and the land
which went with such a venture.59 This common heritage of Latins and Romans
was a reasoning forwarded by Gracchus for the proposal.60
For 122 bce, Gaius Gracchus was re-elected and Fulvius Flaccus newly
elected to the tribunate. Gracchus had supported the candidacy of C. Fannius
for the consulship of 122.61 The consul C. Fannius expelled all non-citizens
from the city to prevent them supporting Gracchus’ proposed extension of the
54
Ad Heren. 4.37. See also Ad Heren. 4.9(13).
55
On Gracchus, see Plut. C. Grac. 2–3; App. BC. 1.21. On Flaccus, see Liv. Per. 60;
Plut. C. Grac. 15 and 18; App. BC. 1.34. As supported by Broughton, MRR, 1, pp. 512–515.
56
Liv. Per. 60; Plut. C. Grac. 15 and 18.
57
App. BC. 1.23.
58
Plut. C. Grac. 8; App. BC. 1.23.
59
Many of the post-338 Latin colonies had been sourced from Roman citizen
communities.
60
App. BC. 1.23.
61
Plut. C. Grac. 8.1–2.
franchise.62 The conservative tribune M. Livius Drusus (the elder) was engaged
by a hostile senate to fight Gracchus and Flaccus. Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius
Flaccus proposed the extension of voting rights to all Italians. The elder Livius
Drusus proposed ius provocationis for Latins,63 a measure which no doubt aimed
to negate the complaints raised by Gaius Gracchus of unfair treatment but
without recourse to yielding full citizen rights. As discussed above the harsh
and unreasonable treatment by Roman magistrates of allied Italians and Latins
had been protested in a speech of Gaius Gracchus.64 Drusus likely reasoned that
such a measure would alleviate much of the pressure from the Italians and seems
to reflect the hope of conservatives that they could silence the Italians without
having to yield full citizenship to them.
In the face of these difficulties Gaius Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus and Papirius
Carbo remained on the land commission until 121 bce.65 With Drusus having
shaken the peoples support for Gracchus’ reforms, those opposed now rallied
behind the newly elected consul Lucius Opimius, who as praetor in 125 bce had
destroyed Fregellae. The consul executed 3,000, including Gaius Gracchus and
Fulvius Flaccus.66 C. Papirius Carbo, the only surviving land commissioner, who
was elected to the consulship of 120 bce, defended and secured the acquittal
of Opimius on charges of unlawful conduct over the murders.67 The murder of
Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus aroused even greater dissatisfaction among
the Italians68 and despite the violent opposition of the conservatives it was not
until 111 bce that a new lex agraria effectively shut down the last vestiges of the
Gracchan commission.69
The provision that magistrates in Latin cities should receive individual grants
of full citizenship (civitas per magistratum) is often conveniently associated
with the revolt of Fregellae in 125 bce (Tibiletti, 1953a, pp. 45f; Brunt, 1965,
pp. 90–91; Salmon, 1967, p. 334). While the provisions of the lex Sempronia
Repetundarum indicate that the measure should be dated to the 120s bce, there
is little hard evidence for connecting the measure with Fregellae, save that the
city is the only known example of a Latin colony revolting in the period. As
the extension of citizenship in the wake of the Social War would have rendered
62
Plut. C. Grac. 12; App. BC. 1.23. See also Cic. Brut. 99, De or. 3.183.
63
Plut. C. Grac. 9, cf. Cic. Att. 5.11.2; Diod. Sic. 37.12.3.
64
Gell. NA. 10.3.1–6.
65
66
Plut. C. Grac. 14–7.
67
Cic. De or. II, 106.
68
App. BC. 1.34.
69
CIL, I2, 585.
any such special privilege redundant, Appian’s view that the Social War had its
origins in the consulship of 125 bce might be offered as supporting evidence
(Tibiletti, 1953a, pp. 45f; Brunt, 1965, pp. 90–91).
Instead, the measure can be plausibly associated with the events of 122, when
C. Gracchus proposed the extension of citizenship to the Latins and Latin rights
to the other allies. The concession of full citizenship for local Latin elites would
have been consistent with the programme of the elder M. Livius Drusus and
the efforts of anti-Gracchus members of the Senate, who systematically sought
to undermine Gracchus’ popular support base.70 The ruling elite in each Latin
community would be more readily able to exercise their rights as citizens anyway,
not only by virtue of greater financial resources but also through exploiting
existing interpersonal links with their Roman counterparts. Satisfying any
desire these men may have had for a greater role in Roman political processes,
and by it, achieving greater protection from the potentially arbitrary actions of
Roman legislators, was valuable and thus may have been a concession to stifle
any broader demand for enfranchisement.
The Lex Licinia Mucia
In 95 bce the consuls L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola passed a

law pertaining to the expulsions of Italian allies from Rome. This was by now
a century-old problem of unwanted migrations from the Roman perspective.
While once this problem had been largely constrained to Latins, now citizens of
allied Italian communities were also attempting to enter the Roman citizen body.
This was a relatively new feature and it again suggests that Roman citizenship was
becoming increasingly desirable for some members of the allied cities in Italy.
The lex was put forward by L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola.
Scaevola’s uncle by birth was P. Licinius Crasus Dives Mucianus, one of the
triumviri on the Gracchan land commission in 133 bce. Crassus, who was
married to a daughter of Scaevola, had prosecuted C. Papirius Carbo, also a
member of the land commission, prompting the suicide of Carbo in 119 bce.71
Crassus supported the popular proposal to plant a colony at Narbo and while
tribune in 107 bce72 he must have reserved his veto on the transfer of the
command against Jugurtha to Marius and also on the introduction of secret
70
Plut. C. Grac. 8.3-4 and App. BC. 1.23.
71
Cic. Brut. 103, De or. 1.40. Contra: Val. Max. 3.7.6.
72
ballots. Both he and Scaevola were friends of M. Antonius, C. Aurelius Cotta

and P. Sulpicius Rufus.73 Both Crassus and Scaevola would support Livius
Drusus a few years later.
In a fragment from the pro Cornelio, Cicero described the purpose of the law
as having been the withdrawal of citizens’ rights (de civibus redigendis) and claims
that, despite the widely accepted skills of the two magistrates who proposed the
law, it proved to be pernicious for the Republic.74 In his commentary on this
passage, Asconius further elaborates on the purpose of the lex Licinia Mucia.
He writes:
Hi enim legem eam de qua loquitur de redigendis in suas civitates sociis in consulatu
tulerunt. Nam cum summa cupiditate civitatis Romanae Italici populi tenerentur
et ob id magna pars eorum pro civibus Romanis se gereret, necessaria lex visa est
ut in suae quisque civitatis ius redigeretur. Verum ea lege ita alienati animi sunt
principum Italicorum populorum ut ea vel maxima causa belli Italici quod post
triennium exortum est fuerit.
For these two, in their own consulship, passed the law that he speaks of for
returning the allies to their own states. For since the Italian peoples were possessed
by a terrible desire for Roman citizenship and for that reason a great portion of
them were passing themselves off as Roman citizens, a law seemed necessary to
return them all to their own states. But by this law, the leading men of the Italici
were so alienated, that it was the principal cause of the Italic War which broke out
three years later.75
It is largely upon the basis of this passage in Asconius that many modern
scholars have identified the lex Licinia Mucia as a catalyst for the Social War.76
For instance, Last and Gardner described the lex as ‘an outstanding blunder. It
declared in solemn and authoritative form the adamant exclusiveness of Rome,
and it did so at a time when the patience of the allies was near its end’ (1932,
p. 175). An obvious problem with such an argument is explaining the interval
of four years between the lex and the outbreak of the Social War. Brunt (1988,
73
Cic. De or. 1.24–5.
74
Cic. Corn. in Ascon. 67: Legem Liciniam et Muciam de civibus redigendis video
constare inter omnis, quamquam duo consules omnium quos vidimus sapientissimi tulissent,
non modo inutilem sed perniciosam rei publicae fuisse.
75
Ascon. 67c.
76
On the role the Lex Licinia Mucia played in alienating Italian allies, see in particular
Badian (1970–71, pp. 390f ) and the recent survey of the issue in Coşkun (2009, pp. 149f ).
pp. 100–101), for instance, accepted Asconius’ assessment and argued that the
interval could be explained as the result of long planning on the part of the
Italians and the ongoing hope that a resolution could be peacefully achieved.
Badian (1958b, pp. 264–70, 297) has, however, argued that this was not its
purpose. In his view the law probably attempted to cancel the enrolment as
citizens of Italians who were not legally entitled to it, probably (as in previous
examples) illegitimately claiming ius migrationis. In many respects assessments
such as those of Last and Gardner or Brunt risk placing too much importance
upon this particular measure as a catalyst for the war. The lex Licinia Mucia
not only had a number of precedents but was also enforcing existing legal
expectations on non-citizens in Italy. First, there had been a number of instances
in the second century where Latins and Italian allies had attempted to acquire
Roman citizenship and had been treated in a similar fashion. Second, such
expulsions had been the typical measure taken when such supposed fraud was
detected. In de Officiis Cicero, however, contrasts the lex Licinia Mucia with the
measures of Pennus and Papius. He argues that, while both Pennus and Papius
had unreasonably excluded foreigners from the city, Crassus and Scaevola’s law
had rightfully prohibited non-citizens from exercising the rights of citizens and
the privileges associated with it.77 That the lex Licinia Mucia was not directed
at denying legitimately held citizen rights is also stated by Cicero in pro Balbo.
Here Cicero refers to an instance in which the law was unsuccessfully used in
an attempt to invalidate an individual grant of citizenship to a member of a
Latin community.78
While the measure was not a radical departure from previous acts, an
important factor in 95 bce appears to have been a significant change in the
attitudes of Italian allies. In earlier instances Latins and Italians had manipulated
or abused the system for personal advantage, or in the case of 125, desired
citizenship as a mechanism for protecting themselves against the ongoing
activities of the Gracchan land commission. The passage from Asconius implies
that Italians were now motivated by an extreme desire (summa cupiditate) for
both legal equity and political inclusion. He suggests a much more complex
driver had now emerged. Italian actions in these preceding years and the heavy-
handed responses of the Romans are indicative of increasing assertiveness on
the part of the Italic allies. Equally the incident demonstrates a pronounced
tactlessness on the part of Rome in its interactions with Italian allies. As will be
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, even in the midst of a looming military conflict
77
Cic. Off. 3.11(47).
78
Cic. Balb. 21(48).
with the allies in 91, the Romans continued to underestimate the extent of
allied unhappiness.
Many of the Italians affected by the lex Licinia Mucia had probably been
illegitimately enrolled by the censors M. Antonius and L. Valerius Flaccus
in 97/6 bce.79 Antonius was a friend of Gaius Marius, while Flaccus’ great-
grandfather had been a friend of Cato. Both Antonius and Flaccus may have
been sympathetic to the Italians, although evidence for the stance towards the
Italian allies of most leading Romans in the period is tenuous at best. Indeed, as
shall be seen in the following chapter, particularly stunning and brazen acts of
interference in the Roman political process occurred in 91 bce at the instigation
of Poppaedius Silo. In 91/90 all the Latin colonies initially remained loyal
to Rome.
The Population Question
In a letter that purports to have been written around 50/49 bce, attributed to
Sallust and addressed to Caesar, is a discussion of contemporary reactions to
Livius Drusus’ citizenship bill in 91 bce. Sallust’s authorship of the letter has
long been rightly questioned, but the interpretation presented by the author of
the Epistula ad Caesarem still provides a useful insight into the way in which the
factors that contributed to war could be interpreted by Romans.80 In the letter
the author contests that the Roman nobles would oppose any proposal by an
individual magistrate to extend citizenship on the basis that it would enslave the
existing citizens to the new and that such a concern had been a significant factor
in opposition to Drusus’ enfranchisement proposal.81
Sed non inscius neque imprudens sum, quom ea res agetur, quae seruitia quaeque
tempestates hominum nobilium future sint … antiquis civibus hanc servitutem
imponi, regnum denique ex libera ciuitate futurum, ubi unius munere multitude
ingens in ciuitatem pervenerit.
I am not, however, ignorant or unaware what rage and what tempests the
execution of this project will rouse among the nobles … that this is the same thing
as enslaving the original citizens; in short, that a free state will be transformed
79
80
See discussion of the authorship and dating of the letter in Syme (1958, 1962) and
the recent discussion of its historical value in Santangelo (2012).
81
Sall. [Ad Caes, sen.] 6.1–2.
into a monarchy, if citizenship is conferred upon a great multitude through the

bounty of one man.82
Here the letter maintains that Roman resistance to Livius Drusus’ citizenship
bill in 91 bce was over this very issue, arguing that in one stroke the state would
be turned into a monarchy. The letter also asserts that a faction within the ruling
elite sought to obstruct the citizenship bill on the basis that they
Ubi intellexerunt per unum hominem maximum beneficium multis mortalibus

dari, videlicet sibi quisque conscious malo atque infido animo esse, de M. Druso iuxta
se existumaverunt.
perceived that the greatest of benefits was being conferred upon many by one
man; and just because all of them were conscious of having evil and disloyal
minds, they judged Marcus Drusus to be like themselves.83
As explained by the author, the central concern of the Roman elite was focused
upon new citizens being by nature indebted to the individual who had provided
them with their new citizenship. An enduring loyalty to a patron was not merely
typical for Romans; it was a social expectation. The magistrate proposing to
extend the Roman franchise thus stood to gain throngs of new, fiercely loyal
clients, who could be called upon in support of their new patron and even rallied
to make the journey to Rome which was a necessity for them to cast their votes in
the assemblies. As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, other ancient literary sources
also betray an awareness of this issue and Romans cannot have been ignorant of
the potential political and electoral repercussions of enfranchisement proposals,
particularly when they involved as many as half a million or more men in Italy
in 91 who stood to gain citizenship. The effect that incoming Italian allies could
have (and more importantly the potential effects that these new citizens might
desire to have) are particularly important for understanding the evolution of
the political climate in Italy in the period between the era of the Gracchan land
commission and 91 bce.
That such fears were justified can be vividly seen in the first two census results
taken after the Social War. These record a sudden jump in the number of citizens.
In 86 bce the number of males counted by the censors was 463,000.84 This
82
Sall. [Ad Caes, sen.] 6.1 (trans. Rolfe, 1931).
83
Sall. [Ad Caes, sen.] 6.4 (trans. Rolfe, 1931).
84
Jerome, 61, 173,4.
figure represents an increase of approximately 68,000 on the previous recorded

census in 115 of 394,336 males.85 The census was not conducted in the period
of Sulla’s dominance of the Roman state. However, when censors were finally
elected for 70/69 bce, they returned a result of 910,000 males.86 This figure
almost certainly preserves the product of enfranchisement in the wake of the
Social War and shows an increase of more than half a million on the last recorded
pre-war figure. While a significant volume of modern scholarship has been
devoted to devising a number of different methods of adjusting the preserved
census results, this doubling of the assessable male population can only be a
result of the lex Iulia, lex Plautia Papiria and the Senatus consultum of 86 bce.
This jump in the assessed population ought to be seen as central to any
understanding of policies advocating enfranchisement, colonial projects or land
reform from the second century through to the Social War. Setting aside the
long-standing argument as to exactly who was or was not assessed by the Roman
censors in this period,87 there are a few important observations that can be made.
First, whatever part of the male population was counted by the censors, on the
basis of the 70 bce figure Italians/Latins clearly outnumbered Romans in Italy
in 91 bce. Second, any proposal to extend citizenship to this half-million plus
group had the potential to fundamentally change Roman political dynamics.
There has been a long-standing and contentious debate about who exactly
was counted by the censors in order to generate the preserved figures. The
recent debate over high- and low-count interpretations of the Roman census
results is too complex to summarise here but does have significant implications
for our understanding of which particular groups of people within the Roman
population were or were not counted in the census.88 Central to this debate
has been whether the recorded figures include all adult male citizens or instead
record only those men who ranked in one of the property qualifications (thus
excluding those men who were deemed to be only assessable by their heads or
capite censi). In the context of the present investigation the key issue is that so
long as the method and criteria for who was counted was relatively the same
between the pre- and post-war figures, then the Italians qualifying for the
85
Liv. Per. 63.
86
Liv. Per. 98.
87
Some examples of the radically different interpretations concerning which citizens
were counted can be found in Beloch (1886), Frank (1924), Brunt (1971), Lo Cascio (1994),
Launaro (2011) and Hin (2013).
88
Such interpretations are heavily dependent upon analysis of the Augustan era figures
and the implications for the early results. For a detailed recent survey of the state of this
debate, see Launaro (2011, pp. 11–24) and de Ligt (2012).
census roughly equalled or outnumbered the pre-existing Roman citizens in real

terms. On either interpretation the incoming Italians threatened to become an
influential voting bloc within the Roman assemblies.
If the census statistics before and after the war are taken to reflect the total
number of adult Roman males, then the new citizens would have outnumbered
existing citizens in the tribal assembly. They may also have outnumbered them in
the comitia centuriata depending on whether the profile of wealth distribution
was comparable to the existing citizen body. Certainly, if these new citizens were
distributed evenly among all thirty-one of the rural tribes in proportion to the
existing Roman citizens then they would have easily outnumbered the existing
citizens and would have controlled the tribal assembly and the election of the
tribunes. If the alternate interpretation is applied to the statistics, the electoral
outcome is much the same. In a like manner, any programme which gave
ownership of land to impoverished individuals had the potential to affect the
numbers of men who qualified in the comitia centuriata, or whatever property
qualifications those individuals fell into. It becomes immediately obvious that
any proposal to extend the franchise was fraught with difficulty. The four urban
tribes each contained a great many more individuals than did the thirty-one
rural tribes. This meant the existing citizen body was concentrated in four tribes,
even though each tribe had an equal vote within the tribal assembly. With the
recipients of extensions of the franchise almost certainly resident on land in
regional communities, these incoming citizens’ voting power would be localised
in the very place where it could be most felt in electoral terms, if the new citizens
were to vote as a bloc.
Small, sporadic extensions of the franchise could have had minimal impact
on the political status quo. In the climate of the late second and early first
centuries, however, with the tribunate a powerful vehicle for bypassing the
comitia centuriata, the extension of citizenship to militant and organised Italians
such as Q. Poppaedius Silo and his 10,000 supporters must have posed a very
real threat. In turn, there was another very significant reason for resistance from
existing citizens, and in particular for members of the empowered Roman elite
to be concerned over large-scale enfranchisement proposals. The man who
secured citizenship for so large a body of people would command their enduring
loyalty and political support. Such a concern is succinctly expressed in the Letter
to Caesar attributed to Sallust. Such an argument might also be reasonably
extended to the Italian elite, who no doubt knew that their positions of
significant influence in their home communities would be all the more valuable
to them once the members of their native towns and regions all possessed equal
political rights with their Roman counterparts.
Chapter 4
Livius Drusus, Poppaedius Silo and the
Looming Conflict (91 bce)
Marcus Livius Drusus entered the office of Tribune of Plebs on 10 December

92 bce.1 He was a talented and ambitious politician,2 a member of the pontifical
college,3 wealthy and well-connected, but his bold actions and political dealings
would propel his tribunate out of his control.4 Drusus was by no means a radical
by Roman standards and like his father he was closely aligned with conservative
interests that were well represented in the Senate. Cicero in the Pro Milone
describes Drusus as having defended the Senate’s interests in his tribunate and
even having acted as though he were the patron of the entire Senate.5 A similar
assertion is found in the Ad Caesarem of pseudo-Sallust. Here Drusus is described
as not simply devoting all his powers during his tribunate to the interests of the
nobiles but repeatedly seeking their sanction for his actions as well.6
The initial aim of Drusus as tribune appears to have been fairly straightforward
even though it was targeted at one of the great political challenges of the
90s bce – reform of the divisive system of courts which had been the source of
1
There are only a few dates that can be asserted with any certainty during the tribunate
of Livius Drusus. In this period the tribunes took up their office on the 10 December. He
was still alive on 13 September 91, for Drusus was denounced in the senate by the consul
Philippus and defended by Licinius Crassus. Crassus died one week later with Drusus still
alive, meaning that he was murdered sometime between 20 September and 10 December 91
bce (when he would have been required to stand down).
2
Vell. Pat. 2.13.1.
3
CIL, 12, 1, p. 199; Cic. Dom. 120.
4
Drusus is described by Cic. Off. 1.108 as (along with Marcus Aemilius Scaurus) a
man of unusual seriousness. Diod. Sic. 37.10 describes him as the most competent orator
of his generation, the most trustworthy and magnanimous and the wealthiest man in the
city. Plin. HN. 33.50(141) claims that in 91 bce Drusus possessed 10,000 pounds of silver.
Plin. HN. 25.21(52) claims that Drusus was cured of epilepsy in Anticyra: constat hoc
medicamento liberatum comitiali morbo in Anticyra insula. ibi enim tutissime sumitur,
quoniam, ut diximus, sesamoides admiscent. Italia veratrum vocat. See also the short biography
in Aur. Vic. Vir Ill. 66.
5
Cic. Mil. 16: nobilissimus vir, senatus propugnator atque illis quidem temporibus paene
patronus.
6
M. Drusi semper consilium fuit in tribunate summa ope niti pro nobilitate; neque ullam
rem in principio agere intendit, nisi illei auctores fuerant. Sall. [Ad Caes, sen.] 6.3.
considerable internal strife.7 His central aim was to secure the transfer of the
courts from the control of the equites to the direct control of the Senate.8 The
pre-existing tensions between the Senate and the equestrians over the courts
were recognised by Appian as significant to Drusus’ reform proposals, but he
incorrectly saw the citizenship proposal as the prime motivation of Drusus.9
These equestrian courts had been particularly contentious in their conviction
and exile of a number of prominent members of the Roman elite. As such, this
was a policy that was closely aligned with conservative interests within the
Senate.10 In turn, the principal reasons for Drusus adopting it can be, in large
part, explained with reference to his interpersonal connections.
Livius Drusus and Judicial Reform
At the beginning of his tribunate it would seem that Drusus had neither a broad
reform agenda nor a particular long-term political vision. He appears to have
instead progressively constructed a raft of proposals that would attempt to
appease the conflicting interests of the Senate, the equestrian order, the Roman
populace and the Italian allies. At least initially he enjoyed the support of
quite powerful members of the Roman elite, many of whom wanted to see the
equestrians’ control of the courts diminished, and it is their interconnections
that are significant. These included two particularly important associates: the
princeps senatus M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115) and the famous orator L. Licinius
Crassus (cos. 95).11
The ancient literary sources ascribe different motives to Drusus’ judicial
law, a diversity which is replicated in modern scholarship, which has shown
particular interest in the study of the issue.12 A major factor in the adoption
of the proposed judicial reform was the recent prosecution and conviction of
7
See the important article by Gruen (1966) on the topic of courts in the 90s. Gruen
writes that ‘bitter struggles were fought primarily in the criminal courts, splitting the Roman
aristocracy and bringing into the open issues which were ultimately to explode into the Social
War’ (1966, p. 32).
8
Liv. Per. 70 and 71; Vell. Pat. 2.13.
9
App. BC. 1.35.
10
Liv. Per. 71. While App. BC. 1.35 presents Drusus as motivated by a desire to
enfranchise the Italian allies, a number of other sources show that Drusus was seen as a
champion of the Senate’s interests. See Diod. Sic. 37.10.1; Cic. Mil. 16.
11
Broughton, MRR, 1, pp. 531–532 and 2, p. 11.
12
Weinrib (1970) places primary emphasis on the trial of Rutilius as a motivation for
Drusus’ judicial law. Kallet-Marx (1990) argues for both an earlier date for the trial and a
Livius Drusus, Poppaedius Silo and the Looming Conflict (91 bce) 71
P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105). Rutilius was married to a Livia, most likely the sister
of the elder M. Livius Drusus (trib. 122, cos. 112), the father of the tribune of
91 bce.13 While serving as a legate of the proconsul Q. Mucius Scaevola in 97,
Rutilius had defended the interests of some cities in Asia against exploitation
from local publicani. This enraged some members of the equestrian order in
Rome, who in 92 bce succeeded in having him charged with repetundae. Despite
Q. Mucius Scaevola and the young C. Cotta speaking in his defence Rutilius was
condemned and went into exile in Smyrna on the west coast of Asia Minor.14
A second factor is the interests of several of Drusus’ backers. One of these,
M. Aemilius Scaurus, had been a former rival of Rutilius at the consular elections
for 115. Following Rutilius’ failure to be elected he and Scaurus made successive
accusations that the other had engaged in bribery.15 Scaurus was named princeps
senatus in 115 and in 109 held the censorship with the elder M. Livius Drusus
(cos. 112).16 In 92 bce Scaurus was again engaged in accusations and counter-
accusations of bribery, this time with Q. Servilius Caepio, the personal rival and
former relative of the younger M. Livius Drusus.17 According to Asconius, not
only did Scaurus successfully defend himself but also in turn brought charges
against Caepio and urged Drusus to reform the courts.18
Several ancient sources account in part for Drusus’ behaviour during his
tribunate with reference to the interpersonal rivalries that existed between
him and Q. Servilius Caepio.19 The two men had been friends at one stage
diminished significance of Rutilius’ conviction in prompting the judicial reform. See also
Hardy (1912, 1913), Hands (1977) and Alexander (1982).
13
Plin. HN. 7.49 (158). See Münzer (1999, p. 276).
14
Cic. Scaur. in Ascon. 21: P. Rutilio damnato nemo tam innocens videretur ut non
timeret illa. See Vell. Pat. 2.13.2; Dio 28, fr. 97 and 96; Oros. 5.17.12–13. On Scaevola
speaking on Rutilius’ behalf, see Cic. Brut. 30 (115), De or. 1.53 (229–230). On Rutilius
being condemned and exiled, Liv. Per. 70 says that P. Rutilius, vir summae innocentiae,
quoniam legatus C. Mucii pro cos. a publicanorum iniuriis Asiam defenderat, invisus equestri
ordini, penes quem iudicia errant, repetundarum damnatus in exilium missus est, with an error
in Mucius’ praenomen. Tac. Ann. 4.43 says that Rutilius was forced into exile by popular
vote.
15
Cic. Brut. 30 (113); Tac. Ann. 3.66.
16
Broughton, MRR, 1, p, 545.
17
Ascon. 21.
18
Ascon. 21: M. quoque Drusum tribunum plebis cohortatus sit ut iudicia commutaret.
19
For instance, the enmity between the two is used as an example of extreme
interpersonal rivalries in a hypothetical example in Cic. Dom. 120. This animosity is
frequently referred to in ancient sources (see the examples below), although not always cited
as a motivating factor in Drusus’ decisions.
and brothers-in-law, Caepio having been married to Drusus’ sister.20 She

subsequently married a member of the gens Porcia Cato, with whom she had a
son in 95 bce, M. Porcius Cato (later known as Uticensis).21 The divorce and
subsequent remarriage of Drusus’ sister indicate that the falling-out between
Drusus and Caepio occurred sometime before 95 bce.22 According to Pliny
the Elder the animosity between the two men stemmed from a dispute over
the purchase of a ring at an auction.23 A similar explanation is provided by a
fragment of book 28 of Cassius Dio, which asserts that while once having been
both close friends and related by marriage a private falling-out was the cause of
their public conflicts.24 Indeed, a number of anecdotes demonstrate the extent
to which the two men were driven by their rivalry. For instance, one story claims
that Drusus drank goat’s blood to falsify an attempt by Caepio to poison him,25
while another claims that Drusus threatened to throw Caepio from the Tarpeian
Rock for having obstructed his tribunate.26
As discussed above, a more concrete factor which signalled that a break had
occurred between the two men was that Caepio engaged in legal proceedings
against Aemilius Scaurus in 92. That the dispute was as much political as it was
personal is furthermore indicated. After Drusus’ death Caepio continued to
pursue Drusus’ supporters up until his own death in 90 bce, for instance in
attempting to prosecute Aemilius Scaurus under the lex Varia.27 The suggestion
of Münzer (1999, pp. 276–277) that Caepio may have been allied with
Philippus (cos. 91) and Varius (tr. pl. 90) in 91, citing the example of a political
alliance between the great-grandfathers of Caepio and Philippus in 169, is not
entirely consistent with these men’s own shifting political positions. It is ironic
20
That the marriage to Caepio pre-dates that to Cato is indicated by Plut. Cat. Min.
8.1–2 and by Ascon. 21. See Münzer (1999, pp. 273–274).
21
Plut. Cat. Min. 1.
22
Münzer (1999, p. 274) places the estrangement in 98 bce. In the Realencyclopädie
Münzer instead dated the quarrel to 103 bce, connecting the conflict over the ring with the
elder Caepio’s death (RE, 13, 863).
23
Plin. HN. 33.20: inter Caepionem quoque et Drusum ex anulo in auctione venali
inimicitiae coepere, unde origo socialis belli et exitia rerum.
24
Dio, 28, fr. 96.3: Ὅτι ὁ Δροῦσος καὶ ὁ Καιπίων ἰδίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχθραν ἐκ φιλίας πολλῆς
καὶ γάμων ἐπαλλαγῆς ποιησάμενοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πολιτικὰ αὐτὴν προήγαγον.
25
Plin. HN. 28.148: Drusus tribunus plebei traditur caprinum bibisse, cum applore et
invidia veneni sibi dati insimulare Q. Caepionem inimicum vellet.
26
Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 66.8: Caepionem inimicum actionibus suis resistentem ait se de saxo
Tarpeio praecipitaturum.
27
Ascon. 22. The outcome of the prosecution is uncertain, although Scaurus may have
been acquitted (Gruen, 1965, pp. 63–64; Badian, 1969, p. 467). For further discussion of the
activities of the court, see Chapter 5.
that Caepio was himself later lured into an ambush and killed by Q. Poppaedius
Silo, Drusus’ ally among the Italian leadership.28
Drusus’ Proposed Reforms and Italian Support
It is unlikely that Drusus had the extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian
allies as a legislative goal at the outset of his term. Indeed, both the summary of
Livy and Velleius Paterculus claim that the citizenship proposal was a reaction
to the difficulties Drusus faced in passing his initial set of reforms: the transfer
of the equestrian courts and the land and grains laws.29 A prominent feature of
Drusus’ tribunate was that he aggressively adopted new platforms in an attempt
to secure greater support for what was initially a programme of conservative
reforms. In this respect his strategy is similar to that of his father in 122 bce.
The elder Livius Drusus had, in support of the cause against C. Sempronius
Gracchus and his backers, progressively offered a range of measures including a
proposal to lead out twelve large citizen colonies and to grant legal exemptions
for Latins. The colonies may not have been established but the strategy had its
desired effect of costing Gracchus re-election as tribune of Plebs.30
There are indications, however, that it was very soon after Drusus assumed
office (December 92) that the possibility of exploiting non-Roman support was
raised with him. This was a somewhat dangerous course of action. Influential
members of Latin and allied communities in Italy could exert private influence
on their Roman associates and friends but they, of course, had little direct
electoral power. There were other potential methods, however, from the lobbying
of Romans to vote in favour of Drusus to the Italians making their presence felt
physically in the streets of Rome during assemblies and thereby spreading fear
of an Italian backlash, to interfering with the casting of votes. The events of the
past decades had demonstrated that such intervention was perfectly possible.
Saturninus had passed his colonial bill with violence against his fellow tribune
Baebius in 103 and in the same period the voting areas had been vandalised in
28
App. BC. 1.44. Silo, claiming to be defecting to the Romans, lured Caepio into an
ambush and killed him along with much of his army.
29
Liv. Per. 71: M. Livius Drusus tribunus plebis, quo maioribus viribus senatus causam
susceptam tueretur, socios et Italicos populos spe civitatis Romanae sollicitavit. Vell. Pat. 2.14.1:
tum conversus Drusi animus, quando bene incepta male cedebant, ad dandam civitatem Italiae.
30
App. BC. 1.23–24; Plut. C. Grac. 9–10.
order to prevent Saturninus’ grain law.31 It is certain that Drusus was accused by
his opponents of having employed violence during his tribunate to secure the
passage of his laws.32
In an attempt to garner the support of the Roman populace for his restructure
of the courts, Drusus proposed a number of measures including laws for the
distribution of land and grain.33 Velleius claims that these measures angered
the Senate, despite having been designed to secure the support of the populace
for the reform of the courts.34 More significant was that the equestrians were
unwilling to relinquish control of the courts and for this reason were hostile
to Drusus. Unable to secure support for a total transfer of the courts to the
Senate, Drusus then instead proposed that 300 equites should be enrolled into
the Senate. From this enlarged body, jurors for the courts could then be drawn.
This would thereby compensate the equestrians for the loss of control of the
courts. He also proposed that the equites should be liable for prosecution over
charges of bribery.35
Appian similarly claims that the establishment of a number of colonies
was directed at securing support from the Roman populace.36 The order and
timing of these proposals is not entirely clear, yet Drusus did succeed in having
a number of his measures passed. A reference in Diodorus implies that some
form of his judicial law succeeded37 and epigraphic evidence confirms that a bill
which provided for a land commission was passed and that ten commissioners
were elected.38 This land commission was empowered to distribute land but
not to lead out colonies. At this point Drusus had probably not reached a total
political impasse, but he had created a situation in which he had alienated major
special interest groups.
None of the above mentioned policies, nor for that matter the interpersonal
motivations for either championing or opposing them, were of any real benefit
to members of non-Roman communities in Italy. On the contrary, a new round
31
Ad Heren. 1.21. See discussion of the use of violence to obstruct political processes in
Lintott (1968, pp. 67f ).
32
In particular, Liv. Per. 71: per vim legibus agrariis frumentariisque latis iudicariariam
quoque pertulit. See the discussion in Lintott (1968, pp. 186f ).
33
Liv. Per. 70–71; Vell. Pat. 2.13–14; App. BC. 1.35.
34
Vell. Pat. 2.13.
35
Plin. HN, 33.46 also refers to a measure for the revaluation of the coinage that would
have alloyed the silver coin with one-eighth copper. How this proposal fitted into the scheme
of reforms is not clear: Livius Drusus in tribunatu plebei octavam partem aeris argento miscuit.
36
App. BC. 1.35.
37
Diod. Sic. 37.10.3.
38
CIL, 10, 44 and CIL, 12, 1, p. 199.
of land distributions and potential colonial projects (as proposed by Livius

Drusus) possibly threatened to once more evict non-Romans from ager publicus
on the peninsula. This had been a primary concern of many Italians during the
period of the Gracchan land commission several decades earlier.39 In that case
the land commission had not only been obstructed by contesting claims over
land, which had enraged those allies that were affected, but also prompted the
disastrous intervention of Scipio Aemilianus on behalf of the affected allied
communities. Thus, the proposal to extend Roman citizenship to the Latins
and Italian allies, while a drastic departure from Drusus’ otherwise conservative
position, was consistent with his existing strategy of attempting to appease each
group that threatened to oppose him.
The Italians could offer little if any legitimate political support of value
to Drusus in the short term (certainly not within the term of his tribunate).
There would have been a long ‘lag-time’ between any act of enfranchisement,
allocation of new citizens to a property qualification by the censors and the
first time that any Italians could potentially cast a vote in the comitia centuriata.
Once installed, however, there would be a large body of new voters, who would
be heavily indebted to Drusus and ready to repay him and his supporters with
their support.40 With his term of office due to expire in December, Drusus
might have best hoped for re-election as tribune for 90 bce on the back of the
support of the newly enfranchised, but such a strategy was a dangerous gambit.
Allocation of the newly enfranchised to a tribus might have been included in the
proposed legislation, allowing for the beneficiaries of the law to vote in the tribal
assembly almost immediately. But this faced a very serious obstacle, none other
than that the existing citizen body would have to pass the legislation by which
they would subsequently be outnumbered in their own tribes. The Roman tribes
varied greatly in size, with a concentration of citizens in the four urban tribes
(Taylor, 1960). As such, for maximum electoral effect new citizens would ideally
be distributed unevenly (more new citizens being required to gain a majority in
the larger tribes), so as to outnumber existing citizens in all the tribes. To do this
quickly would have required it to be done in a very public fashion. Facing these
obstacles, the greatest political advantage which the Italians could offer Drusus
during his tribunate in 91 was perhaps through stand-over tactics, the indirect
39
App. BC. 1.19–21.
40
Evidence for this political approach can also be found in the context of Pompeius
Magnus permitting a census to be conducted in 70 bce (see discussion in Chapter 9) or in
Caesar’s sudden adoption of the platform of citizenship for the Tranpadanes in 68/7 bce.
threat of violence or impersonating citizens during votes.41 While this was a

dangerous course of action for Drusus, he stood to gain whether the Italians
got citizenship or not. If the Italians were enfranchised there were enormous
potential benefits in the coming years through many hundreds of thousands of
new voters, all indebted to Drusus for their equalised civic status. Alternatively,
if his other reforms could be passed he would have broken the deadlock, and
could then leave the Italians high and dry.
The essentially conservative motivations of Livius Drusus should not be
doubted. For instance, even in the context of September 91 and increasingly
aggressive opposition to his laws being spearheaded by the consul Philippus,
Cicero describes Drusus as still championing his reforms in support of the power
of the Senate: pro Senatus auctoritate susceptus.42 This is contrasted with the
actions of the consul which are described by Cicero as vehemently opposed: cum
igitur vehementius inveheretur in causam principum consul Philippus.43 Similarly,
in Diodorus Siculus the description of Drusus’ reaction to the annulment of his
laws by the Senate implies the opposition of only a faction within the Senate.44
Gabba dismissed ‘any idea that Drusus revolted against the Senate’, even in the
face of increasingly vehement public attacks upon him (1976, pp. 73f ).
Quintus Poppaedius Silo Lobbies Livius Drusus
As seen in the above mentioned sequence of reforms, a consistent feature of

Drusus’ behaviour was to attempt to offer to each of the major interest groups
some incentive for supporting his suite of reforms. Given their inability to vote
and Drusus’ own apparently conservative platform, it is not surprising that
Drusus did not attempt to exploit the potential capacity of the Italians and did
not, it would seem, initially seek it. It was instead Q. Poppaedius Silo, a leading
man among the Marsi and future commander of the Italian insurgency, who,
while visiting Drusus in Rome and staying in his house, lobbied him to adopt
the citizenship proposal.45 Such relationships of reciprocal hospitality between
41
That this was a realistic concern for Romans is attested not only by examples of actual
fraud in the second century bce but also by the measures taken from the fourth century
onwards to stamp out ambitus.
42
Cic. De or. 1.7(24).
43
Cic. De or. 1.7(24).
44
Diod. Sic. 37.10.3.
45
As Silo is referred to as having considerable military experience it is possible that he
and Drusus had served together at some stage.
members of the Roman and Italian elite were common, as was the use of
associations within Latin and allied communities for Roman factional political
ends.46 The incident indicates that Silo was well connected with the Roman
political elite.
As Drusus is described as a tribune by Plutarch, this meeting must have
occurred after December 92 bce, probably early in 91 bce. Silo was the leading
man of the Marsic community,47 but as his later leadership in the Social War
would demonstrate, it is likely that he was also influential throughout parts of
the south in general. According to Plutarch he was an experienced soldier, which
in the context of the early first century almost certainly means he had served in
an allied contingent for the Roman army.48 It is also clear from other ancient
sources that he had the backing of a substantial group of Italians, commanding
a following in the order of 10,000 men or more, who were seeking citizenship
in order to avoid potential prosecution prior to the war.49 Here we have a clear
reminder of an important feature of allied demands in 91 bce. Silo represented
a group of allies who saw citizenship as a solution to their particular problems.
He may even have presented this call as though it were universal among allied
communities, but in fact allied communities expressed their grievances in a
diversity of ways.
While staying in Drusus’ home Silo attempted to induce the young half-
brothers Servilius Caepio the younger and M. Porcius Cato (Uticensis) to
intercede with their uncle on behalf of the Italian cause. While Caepio accepted,
Cato refused to do so. Silo responded by hanging the young boy out of a window
and threatened to throw him to his death if he did not change his mind. Cato
continued to refuse and Silo relented.50 Consistent with Plutarch’s particular
interests, the story very clearly illustrates particular elements of both Cato’s
and Silo’s characters. Cato, even as a boy, displays the obstinacy and fortitude
that would be hallmarks of his later life, while Silo is represented as ruthless,
readily threatening and prepared for violence, even while he is still trying to
46
On the general practice of mutual hospitality, see Liv. 42.1.10. The measures of
C. Mamilius Limetanus were obstructed through Latin and allied elites: Sall. Iug. 40.2.
47
Diod. Sic. 37.2.6. Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 80.1 describes him as the princeps of the Marsi.
Plut. Mar. 33 describes him as the man who ‘had the greatest authority and power among the
enemy’ (trans. Perrin, 1920).
48
Plut. Cat. Min. 1–2.
49
This is explicitly stated by Diod. Sic. 37.13, but is similarly implied by Diod. Sic.
37.2.6 and Plut. Cat. Min. 1–2.
50
Plut. Cat. Min. 1–2 and Val. Max. 3.1. Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 80.1: cum in domo auunculi
Drusi educaretur, nec pretio nec minis potuit adduci a Q. Popedio Silone Marsorum principe, ut
fauere se causae sociorum diceret.
negotiate. This behaviour is a parallel for Silo’s actions in the war. Importantly,
the story also very clearly implies that Silo was unwilling to raise the proposal
with Drusus directly. What occurred between them is not clear but some sort
of understanding must have been reached. Some form of agreement having been
made between them would be consistent with the events that followed. These
included accusations that Drusus had received an oath from some Italian allies
for political support in exchange for citizenship, the regular assertions in literary
sources that Drusus’ death galvanised the Italians to an armed rebellion51 and
Silo actively assisting Drusus, coupled with the claim of the summary of Livy
that Drusus’ laws were passed with violence.52
Mouritsen (1998, p. 6) argued that the passage in Plutarch’s Life of Cato the
Younger describing Silo and Cato’s interaction is ‘contradicted’ by a statement in
Plutarch’s Life of Marius. In the Life of Marius Plutarch characterises the Social
War as having been a conflict in which the most warlike and populous peoples
of Italy united against Rome and nearly destroyed her hegemony in Italy.53 The
two statements, however, need not be viewed as contradictory at all. In the Life
of Cato, Silo is represented as on the one hand beseeching assistance in his call
for enfranchisement and on the other hand readily threatening overt violence if
unsuccessful; in this respect the anecdote parallels the Italians’ actual behaviour
between 91 and 90. Plutarch’s observation in the Life of Marius, which relates
specifically to the period during the war, nowhere states what the broader
political goals of the insurgents were for fighting the Social War, merely that the
Italians were the equals of the Romans in the field.
Appian provides a brief description of Livius Drusus’ decision to propose a
citizenship bill:
ἐπὶ δὲ ἐκείνοις καὶ Λίβιος Δροῦσος δημαρχῶν, ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανέστατος ἐκ γένους, δεηθεῖσι
τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις νόμον αὖθις ἐσενεγκεῖν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὑπέσχετο: τούτου γὰρ δὴ
μάλιστα ἐπεθύμουν ὡς ἑνὶ τῷδε αὐτίκα ἡγεμόνες ἀντὶ ὑπηκόων ἐσόμενοι.
After them the tribune Livius Drusus, a man of most illustrious birth, promised
the Italians, at their urgent request, that he would bring forward a new law to give
them citizenship. They desired this especially because by that one step they would
become rulers instead of subjects.54
51
The connection between the death of Drusus and the outbreak of the war is explicitly
stated by Vell. Pat. 2.15.1. See the discussion in Dart (2010b).
52
Liv. Per. 71, supported by Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 80.
53
Plut. Cat. Min. 1–2 and Marius, 32.2–3.
54
This picture is, indeed, entirely consistent with the Plutarch story about
Poppaedius Silo and the young Cato. As with so many references in Appian,
however, Ἰταλιώτης cannot be read literally as meaning all ‘Italians’.
The personal motives of Silo in seeking the franchise, along with those of
the other leaders of the insurgency, are not clearly documented but need not
have been the same as the many thousands who followed them. For leading men
within Italian allied communities, citizenship would have meant a considerable
advance in their political influence and power. Men such as Silo had existing
connections with members of the Roman elite, variously a product of years of
military service in allied contingents, business activities in Italy and abroad and
personal or familial relationships. Importantly, they also had influence with
local Italian communities and, if enfranchised along with these communities,
they could hope to use their citizenship as a springboard for becoming an active
participant in Roman politics. Local Italian elites were already able to act as
intermediaries between their local communities and their Roman associates:
examples such as the appeal to Scipio Aemilianus in 129 or indeed obstruction
of C. Mamilius Limetanus in 109 (Sall. Iug. 40.2) demonstrate this. With their
home communities enfranchised these local Italian elites would be greatly
empowered: for a member of the existing Roman elite mobilising communities
in Samnium or Marsic territory to make the journey to Rome to vote would have
been difficult, local leaders such as Poppaedius Silo could have hoped to become
important brokers for substantial blocs of new citizens and potential voters.
The alternative for Italian allies in 91 was potentially disastrous because
Drusus would secure the appointment of a new land commission which would
engage in another round of distributions and redistributions of land. This was
something which must have again raised the spectre of the Gracchan land
commission and the potential that Italian communities using ager publicus might
be once again disadvantaged by the commission’s activities. While citizenship
could not in itself protect individuals from having land in their local community
redistributed, mass extensions of citizenship possibly would have fundamentally
changed the dynamic of any such activities. In the past, commissions such as the
one set up by Tiberius Gracchus had made decisions that affected citizen and
non-citizen alike, but the commissioners ultimately only answered to the Roman
citizens involved in such disputes. The commissioners could rightly fear future
reprisal from the citizen body if they disadvantaged too many Romans but were
largely politically insulated from the ire of non-citizens. Mass enfranchisement
would have forced the commission to proceed more carefully and to consider
the implications of their decisions in terms of future backlashes from new
citizens. It would also have meant that all communities in Italy might be treated
in one consistent fashion. This may have been the solution proposed by Fulvius
Flaccus in 125, but where Flaccus had bowed to resistance and desisted from the
proposal, Drusus was already deeply committed to his raft of measures.55
The Italian Oath to Livius Drusus
That a request for the citizenship bill came from some members of the allied
cities and not at the instigation of Drusus is also indicated by the oath which
one of the fragments of Diodorus Siculus asserts Drusus received from the
Italians. This oath was sworn by Jupiter Capitolinus, Vesta, Mars, Sol, Terra and
the demigods who founded Rome. The oath required that if the Italians should
acquire Roman citizenship, then they should consider Rome their country and
that they should provide political support to Drusus.56 The oath is dismissed by
Mouritsen as ‘probably a piece of political fabrication against Drusus’ (1998,
p. 6). There is, however, evidence that the structure of the oath is consistent with
another example of an oath found at Ostia (Koch, 1933, p. 89; Taylor, 1949,
pp. 46f )57 and Harris (1979, pp. 122–123) has suggested that Diodorus may
have provided a ‘clumsy rendering’ of a real text, whether it be an actual oath
extracted by Drusus or a fabrication of his political enemies.
While the apparent plausibility of the wording of the oath is not in itself
evidence that the oath is a genuine agreement between Drusus and Italian
allies, some form of arrangement made by members of the Italians to provide
political support to Drusus in exchange for his promotion of the citizenship
issue is consistent with the actions of some allies in 91 bce. Certainly the story
of Poppaedius Silo attempting to coerce the young Cato into interceding on
55
Fulvius Flaccus’ proposal and the context in which it was put forward were distinctly
different to the situation in 91 bce and the enfranchisement proposal of Livius Drusus.
While in both cases ambitious Roman politicians used the proposition of extending the
franchise as a means of rallying Italian support for their programmes, there are a number of
important differences. First, the political climate in 125 was radically different to that in 91,
in particular the 90s were marked by the divisive issue of control of the courts. In 125 bce
Flaccus had been able to abandon the proposed extension, but in 91 Drusus had committed
to securing a solution to the problem of control of the courts. This meant that where Flaccus
stood down in the face of elite resistance, Drusus continued to push and, similarly, where in
125 bce the allies tolerated the failure of the reform (with the possible exception of the Latin
city of Fregellae), in 91 bce the Italians refused to accept the collapse of the enfranchisement
policy.
56
Diod. Sic. 37.11.
57
Both argue on the basis of CIL, 14, sup. 4547 that the oath is probably authentic.
behalf of the Italians and the Italian attempt to support the passage of Drusus’
legislative reforms by making their numbers felt in the city in the hope of securing
the franchise are suggestive that the Italians anticipated that the citizenship bill
would be secured by Drusus. Some form of agreement is also consistent with
Drusus’ behaviour. The most compelling reason why a conservative member of
the Roman elite would endorse a radical extension of the franchise is explained
by the nature of the oath as preserved in the fragments of Diodorus. Whether it
was a formal oath or simply reflective of some form of agreement with members
of the Italian elite, the central requirement was that the Italians provide
immediate political support for Drusus’ measures. In exchange they would
secure enfranchisement and in turn show long-term political loyalty to Drusus,
something which was entirely consistent with Roman social expectations. It
should, however, also be noted that whether or not the oath was genuine, there
is no certainty that Drusus intended to honour his part in any such agreement
with the Italians.
The Italian Conspiracy to Murder the Consuls
Throughout the early months of 91 bce the conflicts associated with Drusus’
proposed reforms seem to have remained essentially political. Silo and his
supporters appear to have been engaged in lobbying. The first indication that
some groups among the Italian allies were inclined to take violent action came
in mid-year when a plot was exposed to assassinate the Roman consuls Sextus
Iulius Caesar and Lucius Marcius Philippus, while they presided over the annual
ceremonies of the feriae Latinae.
The Latin Festival was an ancient ceremony held annually on the Alban
Mount in honour of Jupiter Latiaris. It was a particularly important event in
the calendar of Roman state/religious rituals, carrying historical resonance as
symbolising the unity of the peoples of ancient Latium, and was traditionally
observed prior to the departure of the consuls for their provinces.58 By tradition
representatives of each of the ancient Latin communities withheld from hostilities
towards one another for the duration of the festival. Representatives of each
brought portions of food to a banquet held on the mountain, located a short
distance from Rome.59 Following the treaty of 338 bce and the enfranchisement
58
As is demonstrated by the well-known example of Flaminius in 216 bce.
59
For a detailed recent study of the feriae Latinae and its significance for the ceremonial
legitimisation of the powers of the consuls, see Simón (2011). Smith states that ‘the feriae
Latinae were in a sense a ritual performance of community’ (2012, p. 268).
of many of the Latin cities, the Romans had continued the observation of the
festival but with the Roman consuls now as the principal presiding magistrates.60
The date of the festival was not fixed, however the preserved fragments of the
fasti feriarum Latinarum from the Alban Mount show that it was held either in
late April or May during the late third century bce.61 While they do not preserve
the date of the festival in 91 bce the Italian conspiracy might be tentatively
dated to April or May.62
The plot was exposed when Drusus warned the consuls prior to the festival,
although the would-be assassins were never identified.63 This aroused suspicion
over how Drusus had come to be aware of the plot and his unexplained knowledge
of it may have fuelled accusations that he was complicit in the plan.64 His
contact and probable agreement with Poppaedius Silo seems the most obvious
explanation for his cognisance of the plot (Dart, 2010b, pp. 115–116). In turn,
whether it was unjustified or not, the accusation is an indication that Drusus
was publicly believed to be colluding with prominent members of the allied
peoples in Italy prior to his death and that such collusion was not a retrospective
accusation after the outbreak of the war (cf. Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 129f ).
There were a number of likely Italian motives for the plot. First, the ceremonies
at the festival were an important part of the annual state religious cult and were
closely associated with securing the sanction of the gods for the powers of the
magistrates for the year. Second, is the association of the feriae Latinae with
the extension of Roman citizenship in 338 bce to the people of Latium and its
function from very ancient times of sanctifying the alliance of the Latin peoples.
Assassinating the consuls at the festival may have been intended to act as a
political statement about the disparity of civic status in Italy. In his recent study
of the feriae Latinae Smith has argued that the festival became ‘a mechanism
for local stability, before acquiring increasingly symbolic attributes of Rome’s
relationship with the wider allied community, especially in the context of the
preparation for war’ (2012, p. 278). As such, the murder of the consuls by allied
Italians would have inverted this relationship and the act would highlight the
exclusion of allies from the rights of citizens. Simón (2011) has suggested also
60
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.49. See the discussion in Alföldi (1965, pp. 19–25), Simón
(2011) and Smith (2012).
61
Inscr. Ital. 13, pp. 143–151.
62
Badian (1964a, p. 51–52) suggests the Sex. Iulius Caesar had departed for a province
outside of Italy in 91. If so it is likely that the festival would have been held at the typical time.
See the discussion in Keaveney (1983, pp. 273f ).
63
Flor. 2.6.8–9; Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 66.12; Dio, 28, fr.96.4.
64
Dio, 28, fr. 96.4.
that as the worship of Jupiter Latiaris was associated with practices of human
sacrifice, the death of the consuls may have taken the place of the symbolic
offerings at the festival. The motives for revealing the plot, however, can only be
speculated at but suggest an important aspect of the attitudes of the allies and
the nature of support for the insurgency. If Drusus was indeed alerted to the plot
by some of his Italian associates then there was likely disagreement between the
Italians over whether to resort to violence or continue political lobbying.
The Land Commission of Livius Drusus
In De Domo Sua, Cicero implies that Drusus passed multiple laws with only a
single sorting of lots, writing that si etiam pluribus de rebus una sortione tulisti.65
The meaning of this passage is not entirely clear; Drusus may have only cast lots
once to determine which order the tribes would vote in, while putting to the
assembly multiple measures at once. This does not mean that he only held one
vote in the assembly but rather that once the voting order was established it was
then used for the vote on each of his laws. Unfortunately, the specific laws that
were passed in this way are not preserved. The rationale for taking these measures,
however, can be suggested. As discussed above, Drusus had constructed a raft
of legislation that collectively attempted to pay off major interest groups but
individually were liable to arouse great anger. Laws could not be vetoed once the
sortitio had been conducted. Thus Drusus engineered a situation where his laws
could be voted on in sequence without, for instance, the land commission being
vetoed after the judicial law was passed by the people.66
Certainly, the bill establishing Drusus’ land commission was passed by
the assembly, the commissioners were elected and some preliminary effort to
begin work initiated. This is confirmed by an inscription from Vibo in southern
Italy, which preserves a partial list of the commissioners and by the elogium of
Drusus.67 The elogium reads:
65
Cic. Dom. 50.
66
Lintott (1968, p. 142) suggests that obstructing a potential veto was the reason for
conducting the vote in this way.
67
On the Vibo inscription, see CIL, 10, 44. On the elogium of Drusus, see CIL, 12,
1, p. 199. See also Inscr. Ital. 13.3.74. On the connection between the two inscriptions, see
Cichorius (1922, pp. 116–125) and Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 22–23.
M·LIVIVS·M·F·C·N·DRVSVS·PONTIFEX|·TR·MIL·X·VIR·STLIT·IVDIC|
TR·PL·XVIR·A·D·A·LEGE·SVA|ET·EODEM·ANNO·V·VIR·A·D·A·LEGE·S
AVFEiA|
IN·MAGISTRATV·OCCISSVS·EST.68
The elogium very clearly cites two laws, both passed in 91 bce, which provided
for land commissions: a decemvirate established under Drusus’ own law and a
quinquevirate established under a lex Saufeia. Both of these special commissions
are described as empowered for agris dandis adsignandis, that is, for the
distribution and assignment of land. Neither commission was established with
the capacity of deducendis, the power to lead out colonies.69 These two land
commissions were thus defined in similar terms to that of the Gracchan land
commission established in 133 bce. The definition of the powers of the decimvirs
replicates the form of the Gracchan land commission from 129 bce. As with the
Gracchan commission it possessed both the power to assign land (adsignandis)
and the power to give land (dandis). There is, however, no indication that Livius
Drusus’ commission possessed a judicial power (iudicandis) as the Gracchan
land commission had done between 133 and 129.70
Customary procedure was that the commissioners were elected by the
people. The names of the first eight decemviri and the praenomen of the ninth
are preserved on the Vibo inscription. Livius Drusus is listed first and the second
of the commissioners elected was L. Licinius Crassus, the consul of 95 bce.71
It then lists P. Al[bius], [L. Sempronius As]ellio, Q. Ancius [Gallus], [C. De]
cidius Rufus, C. Ma[milius Limetanus], C. Egnatius Rufus72 and a C. […]. The
size of the commission may well be an indication of the extent of the anticipated
assignments and gifts of land that were to occur. It may also be indicative of
the speed with which Drusus intended to achieve these distributions.73 Not
having a judicial power and providing for a very rapid land distribution may
68
The elogium, however, omits Drusus’ aedileship (c. 94) and quaestorship. See
Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 12 and 14, n. 1.
69
See discussion in CIL, 12, 1, p. 199.
70
App. BC. 1.18–19. Confirmed by an inscription that describes the Gracchan
commission as IIIvir. a.d. a. i. (ILS, 26). See discussion of the powers of the Gracchan land
commission in Dart (2011).
71
72
This man’s name may indicate that he was of Samnite descent.
73
The special ten man commission proposed by the tribune P. Servilius Rullus in
63 bce would have been far more radical in the range of powers that it combined had Cicero
not successfully opposed it: Cic. Leg. Agr. 1, 2 and 3; Plin. HN. 7.117; Plut. Cic. 12.2–5.
have been a strategy for overcoming the fatal problem of the Gracchan land
commission. Tiberius Gracchus’ commission had become stalled by contesting
claims of dominatio and/or possessio by local land holders. Decisions that were
unfavourable to non-Romans had aroused substantial anger in Italy.74 With the
Latins and allies to be enfranchised and mass land distributions to occur very
rapidly, Drusus possibly hoped that his popular support base could be appeased
and permit his other reforms. Little is known of the second land commission,
the quinqueviri agris dandis adsignandis, established by a lex Saufeia75 and the
identity of the magistrate that proposed the law is unknown.76 This second
land commission may have been an effort to continue Drusus’ programme after
Drusus’ own leges were struck down by the Senate.
In addition to these preserved measures Appian also claims that Drusus
attempted to initiate a number of colonies in Italy and Sicily. This he viewed
as an attempt to conciliate the ‘plebs’ to his other measures. He says that these
had been voted on at some previous time, but had not yet been led out.77 The
colonies may have been the prospective colonies of the elder Livius Drusus
(Lintott, 1992, p. 55). These had been proposed in 122 in an opportunistic
effort to undermine the tribunate of C. Gracchus but following his death had
never been led out. The influence these associated measures may have had in
further inflaming existing tensions and confirming existing fears about the
repercussions is unclear.78 Appian claims that the potential colonies were the
source of great concern for allied communities in Etruria and Umbria,79 however
neither region witnessed widespread support for the insurgency, at least initially.
A role in inciting the initial bloc of insurgent peoples is also problematic as it is
likely that both the land commissions and any proposed colonial projects had
already been annulled by the Senate at the time of the initial revolt at Asculum
late in 91 bce.
74
The key source for this discontent is App. BC. 1.18–19.
75
CIL, 12, 1, p. 199 and Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 22–23.
76
A man by the name of Gaius Saufeius was elected as quaestor for 99 and was an
adherent of Saturninus. In civil strife caused by Saturninus in December 100, Saufeius
took control of the Capitol and was killed in the Curia after attempting to surrender (App.
BC. 1.32–33).
77
78
Carcopino (1929) and Bernardi (1944–45) argued that a significant factor was fear
of a new land commission on the model of the Gracchan land commission. Such a view has
been rightly dismissed by Brunt (1965) and Salmon (1967).
79
App. BC. 1.36.
Poppaedius Silo’s March on Rome
According to the summary of Livy, Drusus’ failure to secure the citizenship

bill having passed the other reforms with Italian assistance enraged his former
supporters among the allies and prompted the beginning of a conspiracy among
regional Italian leaders:
Cum deinde promissa sociis civitas praestari non posset, irati Italici defectionem
agitare coeperunt.
When after this the promised grant of citizenship for the allies could not be
effected, the Italians were enraged and began to agitate for revolt.80
These actions were on a significant scale as is indicated by a tantalising sentence

which attests to the significant loss of Livy’s original text. The summariser of
Livy records that the Italian insurgents’ ‘gatherings and conspiracies, and the
speeches in conference of their leading men’ were reported in book 71.81 Even
so, it appears that at this time Rome’s leaders did not take seriously the risk posed
by allied unrest in Italy.82
It was possibly around this time that Poppaedius Silo led a group of
approximately 10,000 armed men in a march on Rome.83 The incident is only
preserved in a passage summarising Diodorus Siculus. It again shows that
Poppaedius had friends and associates within the leading Roman families.
Poppaedius and his band of armed men were stopped on the road by a Roman
man named in the text as Gaius Domitius. This was possibly Cn. Domitius
Ahenobarbus (cos. 96, cens. 92), although his identity is uncertain.84 Domitius
challenged Poppaedius as to where he was going and Silo asserted that he was
going to Rome at the ‘behest of the tribunes’, almost certainly a reference to
Livius Drusus. Domitius claimed that the Senate was in favour of extending
80
Liv. Per. 71.
81
Liv. Per. 71: Eorum coetus coniurationesque et orations in consiliis principum referentur.
82
Kendall (2012, pp. 108f ) argues the Romans were unaware of the full extent of the
allied conspiracies that were taking place until after the murders in Asculum.
83
Diod. Sic. 37.13.
84
Mouritsen (1998, p. 130) suggests that he was a praetor. Keaveney (2005,
pp. 117–118) suggests either a special envoy sent by the senate or a praetor of 91. This
argument is speculative and, indeed, neither Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 20f nor Brennan,
Praetors, 2, pp. 371–373 treat Domitius as having been a praetor in 91.
citizenship and that Poppaedius would be more likely to succeed if he peacefully

petitioned them. This exchange is claimed to have convinced Silo to desist.
It has been suggested that Domitius was sent by the Senate to negotiate with
Silo. This is not an implausible interpretation but it has significant implications
for the timing of the event. Domitius’ conciliatory approach and, in response,
Silo’s willingness to desist suggest that this meeting probably occurred prior to the
death of Livius Drusus, and certainly prior to the arrival of the praetor Servilius
at Asculum.85 Once Servilius was murdered at Asculum, Silo began openly
inciting allied communities to join the insurgency86 and it is unfathomable that
the Senate would have sent Domitius to Silo at the head of 10,000 men to assure
him that there remained support for extending the franchise. Domitius likely
believed he was dealing with an allied political protest associated with Drusus’
reforms and not with the vanguard of an allied rebel army.
Silo’s role as a leading figure within the rebel movement can be easily
explained in light of this anecdote. It shows that he already had the capacity
to rally substantial armed support for his agenda prior to the war. The passage
summarising Diodorus contrasts the interchange between Poppaedius and
Domitius with the heavy-hand actions of Servilius in Picenum. This should not
be taken as an indication, however, that the two events occurred virtually at the
same time. The passage is attempting to contrast the example of Italian allies and
Romans interacting in an honest and dignified manner over the pressing issue of
Italian rights (Silo and Domitius) with an interchange that was both aggressive
and occasioned an act of violence (Servilius at Asculum).87 Indeed, this is a
contrast that may not have been directly rendered in Diodorus’ original text but
is rather the product of the summariser’s interpretation. These two events are
unlikely to have occurred parallel to one another as Poppaedius is claimed to
have been convinced to desist by his exchange with Domitius. Given that he is
described in other sources as having been actively responsible for inciting the
Italians immediately after the murder of the Romans at Asculum,88 his march
might reasonably be viewed as having occurred shortly before the events in
Picenum would irrevocably commit the Italian conspirators to war. Similarly,
85
Mouritsen (1998, p. 130) couples the dispatch of Domitius with Ser. Galba at
Grumentum in Lucania and Servilius at Asculum. Keaveney (2005, pp. 117–118) similarly
argues that Domitius, Servilius and Galba were all despatched to investigate Italian plottings.
Tweedie (2012) rightly argues the meeting could have taken place any time after the
tribunician election for 91 bce.
86
87
Diod. Sic. 37.13.
88
See Chapter 5 for further discussion of this issue.
the account of Silo’s march on Rome implies that Drusus was still alive, while the
revolt at Asculum clearly occurred sometime after Drusus’ death.
The Annulment of Drusus’ Laws
Cicero’s de Oratore presents a dialogue conducted at the villa of L. Licinius

Crassus (cos. 95) near Tusculum. In his introductory remarks Cicero says that the
meeting was reported to him by C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75).89 It was convened in
September 91 bce in response to the consul L. Marcius Philippus’ increasingly
vehement public opposition to Drusus. Crassus, Q. Mucius Scaevola and
M. Antonius met at Crassus’ residence along with two close friends of Livius
Drusus, C. Aurelius Cotta and P. Sulpicius Rufus, both of whom intended to
run for the tribunate for the coming two years in turn.90 The meeting is described
by Cicero as occurring
cum igitur vehementius inveheretur in causam principum consul Philippus, Drusique

tribunatus, pro Senatus auctoritate susceptus, infringi iam debilitarique videretur.
at the time when Philippus, though consul, was furiously assailing the policy of
the leading men, and the tribuneship of Drusus, undertaken in support of the
power of the Senate, had begun to show signs of shock and weakness91
According to Cotta it was at this meeting that Crassus, Scaevola and Antonius
had foreseen the coming calamities.92 The dialogue is of particular significance
as it shows that even in mid-September the principal opposition to Drusus
and his laws was from the consul Philippus and not from the majority of the
Senate. Crassus returned to Rome following a report that Philippus had made
a vehement attack against the Senate at a contio.93 At the official public address,
the consul had claimed that he was unable to steer the Republic with the current
Senate.94 On 13 September 91 Drusus called a meeting of the Senate at which
he attacked Philippus for having publicly criticised the Senate and proposed a
89
Cotta had defended P. Rutillius Rufus in 92 bce.
90
Cic. De or. 1.7(25).
91
Cic. De or. 1.7(24) (trans. Sutton and Rackham, 1967).
92
Cic. De or. 1.26.
93
Cic. De or. 3.1(2): vehementer commotus ea oratione quae ferebatur habita esse in
contione a Philippo.
94
Cic. De or. 3.1(2): illo senatu se rempublicam gerere non posse.
motion that the consul had made an invective against the Senate in contione.
Crassus spoke forcefully in defence of Drusus in the Senate and Philippus
responded by threatening to extract a surety from him.95
Thus Livius Drusus appears to have retained the goodwill of the majority of
senators until late 91 bce. It seems that the situation probably turned against
him significantly in late September although the reasons for any potential
senatorial hostility are not clearly explained in the sources. Around 20 September
91 L. Licinius Crassus, Drusus’ principal backer in the Senate, died. The very
public opposition of the consul Philippus presumably continued. Worse still,
the delicate balance of complementary reforms could not be enacted and there
was widespread unrest among non-Romans on the peninsula. Significantly, it is
on this last point that the summary of Livy claims that
propter quae Livius Drusus invisus etiam senatui factus velut socialis belli auctor,
incertum a quo domi occisus est.
These events made Livius Drusus detested, even by the Senate, for being an agitator
of war among the allies and he was killed in his home by an unknown man.96
If accurate, the summary indicates that it was in direct response to allied unrest
that members of the Senate grew hostile towards Drusus. Cicero is clear that
Drusus still enjoyed the active support of the Senate until at least early September.
Indeed, the summary of Livy offers an explanation which is potentially consistent
with Cicero as to why the Senate should have turned against Drusus. Allied
Italian unrest, which Drusus was personally accused of having enflamed, was
a dangerous new eventuality. If the summary of Livy is indeed consistent with
Cicero, then it is referring to events that must have occurred late in September
or thereafter.
Appian’s explanation for the Senate becoming hostile to Drusus is far more
problematic. Appian probably greatly conflates the chronology of events,97
presenting senatorial and equestrian backlash against Drusus as occurring in
direct response to his reforms.98 Importantly, he accurately identifies a serious
dichotomy between ordinary citizens, who hoped to be beneficiaries of the
95
Cic. De or. 3.1–2.
96
Liv. Per. 71.
97
On the compressed chronology in Appian’s text for 91, see Badian (1958b,
pp. 216f ), rightly questioned in Gabba (1964) and now in Gabba (1976, pp. 131–141) and
also Gabba (1976, pp. 73f ).
98
App. BC. 1.36.
proposed new colonies, and the Italians, who were fearful of the potential
of fresh impositions being placed upon them. He confuses, however, very
real Senatorial fears about public fallout due to Drusus’ reforms with actual
Senatorial opposition to Drusus or his laws. This distinction is made clear by
Aconius in his commentary on Cicero’s pro Cornelio, who writes of Drusus that
qui cum senatus partes tuendas suscepisset et leges pro optimatibus tulisset, postea eo
licentiae est progressus ut nullum in his morem servaret.
Though he had undertaken to protect the interests of the Senate and had
proposed laws in favour of the optimates, thereafter he came to behave without
any restraint.99
It was specifically following this that the consul Philippus finally convinced the
Senate to annul Drusus’ laws:
Itaque Philippus cos. qui ei inimicus erat obtinuit a senatu ut leges eius omnes uno
S.C. tollerentur. Decretum est enim contra auspicia esse latas neque eis teneri populum.
Therefore the consul Philippus, who was his enemy, obtained from the Senate a
single decree repealing all his laws. It was decreed that these were passed contrary
to the auspices and therefore the people were not bound by them.100
It is therefore likely that these events occurred in late September or sometime

thereafter but clearly prior to Drusus’ death. This can be determined from
Diodorus Siculus, who writes that in spite of Drusus’ vocal opposition in the
Senate he did not impose his veto when they moved to declare his laws invalid.
Instead he argued that if they moved to repeal his measures it would render the
judicial reforms void as well.101 In so doing he neatly reminded the Senate once
again that he had engaged in a programme intended to be advantageous to the
interests of that body. Drusus may still have been alive when the laws were finally
rescinded, as Badian has argued.102
It is Cicero who provides a more detailed explanation of the mechanism by
which the laws were invalidated. He claims that the Senate declared that Drusus’
99
Ascon. 69A.
100
Ascon. 69A.
101
Diod. Sic. 37.10.3.
102
Badian (1962, pp. 225f ) argued that the agrarian law included was probably annulled
by the senate before Drusus’ death.
laws were in defiance of the lex Caecilia et Didia of 98 bce and for that reason
not binding upon the people.103 How Drusus had breached this law is not clearly
explained by Cicero. It is clear that the lex Caecilia et Didia required that all
measures be promulgated three nundinae in advance (Lintott, 1968, p. 140),104
thus preventing ancillary measures being added on immediately prior to a vote.
That Drusus, with the legal experts Scaurus and Crassus as his backers, should
have made such a simple mistake beggars belief and there is no clear explanation
in the ancient sources as to what was the specific basis upon which Drusus’ laws
were invalidated under the law.
Other literary sources provide variously vague explanations for the fate of
Drusus’ laws. Cicero in a fragment of the Pro Cornelio says that although they
were passed it was decided that the public were not bound by his laws. Asconius
commenting on this statement claims that the Senate declared that Drusus’
laws were passed contrary to the auspices and that the people were not bound
by them.105 Such explanations are consistent with the explanation provided in
De Domo Sua. Florus and the summary of Livy indicate that Drusus’ laws had
been passed with violence.106 Cicero also implies in a separate passage that
Drusus’ laws may have been struck down over the lack of individual casting
of lots for each piece of legislation. The ancient sources thus reflect a range of
allegations that were probably publicly levelled at Drusus in an effort to discredit
his laws. While these may have contributed to the Senate’s decision they need
not suggest rejection of Cicero’s central assertion that the lex Caecilia et Didia
was the legal mechanism used by the Senate to have the laws overturned. The
lex Caecilia et Didia gave the Senate the power to declare laws invalid on the
basis of failing to meet certain procedural requirements.107 Given the allegations
which surrounded Drusus’ laws, including that they had been passed contrary to
the auspices and with violence, and that the measures had subsequently become
anathema to the Senate, the lex Caecilia et Didia provided an avenue for it to
103
Cic. Dom. 16(41).
104
In English the nundinae would be described as having occurred every eighth day,
whereas for Latin speakers this was described as the ‘ninth day’. This was because Romans
described the duration of time between two days as inclusive of the first and last day. Thus
when Cicero says an interval of three nundinae, the minimum time set out by the lex was
probably seventeen days. An eighteen-day interval is suggested by Lintott (1968).
105
Ascon. 69A.
106
Thus the claim is made in both Liv. Per. 71 and Flor. 2.5.8–9.
107
According to Cic. Dom. 41 and Phil. 5.7–8 the law required that any measure must
be promulgated three nundinae before being voted on. Phil. 5.7–8 also elaborates that a law
must have been drafted before it was proposed to the assembly, though this is self-evident
from the requirement for a delay.
be claimed he had breached the law, even if this was not strictly the case.108 As
humiliating as the situation was for Drusus, the Senate’s actions in moving to
invalidate his laws were not necessarily the product of hostility towards him.
Drusus’ stance shows that he was still supportive of the Senate even in the face
of total failure.
Civil Unrest in Italy
By the latter part of 91 bce the climate in Italy had clearly become very tense.
First, there was bitter conflict within the Roman ruling elite over the legislation
of Livius Drusus, characterised by the tussle between Crassus and Philippus. The
animosity between the tribune and the consul too, had escalated. At a contio
one of Drusus’ clients attempted to publicly strangle Philippus and throw him
into prison for having interrupted Drusus during his address. The consul was
only released when he began to bleed from his eyes and mouth.109 Second, the
allies had been embroiled in this political conflict, initially by virtue of Drusus’
proposed land distribution and then consequently by his promises to them
of citizenship. It is in the context of the later part of the year that two serious
incidents indicative of the tension in Italy should be located.
In Picenum, during a public festival an Italian comedian commented while
on stage about the status of non-Romans and was lynched by irate Romans in
the audience. A comedian of Latin status, who was himself the target of Italian
allies in the audience, was then able to conciliate the crowd.110 The presence of
Romans and Italians together in the audience of a Picentine theatre indicates
that it must have occurred prior to the war. The incident shows the simmering
tensions specifically linked to the disparity of status in Italy but particularly
in Picenum shortly before the war and the politically charged nature of these
interactions.111 More broadly the anecdote illustrates growing tension on the
108
Indeed, Lintott observes that the vote in the Senate against Drusus’ laws probably
represents ‘all those who were hostile to the laws for any reason’ (1968, p. 143).
109
Versions of this story are preserved in Val. Max. 9.5.2, Flor. 2.5.8 and Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill.
66.9.
110
Diod. Sic. 37.12.
111
While this incident occurred in Picenum, it is unlikely that it refers to the same
festival as the one that was being held in Asculum and which was interrupted by the Praetor
Servilius sometime after the death of Drusus, for the simple reason that the Latin actor is
described as having succeeded in calming the crowd.
peninsula about the disparity of rights between Romans and allies in 91 and
that large crowds on both sides could be readily incited to violence.
A second example is preserved by Cicero, who says that T. Betucius Barrus, a
native of Asculum, delivered a speech in Rome against Servilius Caepio. Given
that Servilius Caepio (leg. 90) was killed in 90 bce and Asculum was the site
of the initial revolt, this almost certainly refers to a speech delivered prior to
the war.112 Cicero obviously held this man’s oratorical abilities in high regard,
calling him omnium autem eloquentissimus extra hanc urbem. Both Betucius’
speech in Rome and other speeches of his delivered in Asculum were preserved
at the time of Cicero’s writing. As with Poppaedius Silo, this is another example
of an individual from an allied community publicly championing the interests
of allied communities in the lead-up to the war and directly engaging with the
Roman public over the issue.
The Murder of Drusus
There are conflicting accounts of Drusus’ death preserved in the ancient

literary sources. The most detailed description is in Appian, who claims that
while Drusus was beset by a crowd outside his own home, he was stabbed by
a man with a shoemaker’s knife, the weapon being left in his side.113 Velleius
Paterculus and the summary of Livy relay essentially the same account but do
not specify the type of knife or the ethnicity of the assailant. Cicero says Drusus
was murdered in front of his own home, while Florus says simply that Drusus’
death was opportune.114
Although the man responsible was never caught it is asserted by Appian that
Drusus was murdered by one of the Etruscans and Umbrians who had come to
Rome to oppose Drusus’ colonial bill, although Appian may in fact be referring
to Drusus’ land commission.115 The identification is probably the product of
pure speculation on the part of Appian (or more likely his sources), although it
is curious given that the Etruscans and Umbrians supposedly remained loyal at
the outbreak of the war and that none of the ancient sources mount the claim
that Drusus was murdered by one of the peoples who had initially joined the
insurgency. It is also likely that Appian is incorrect in implying that Etruscans
and Umbrians were present in the City at the same time as Drusus was killed.
112
Cic. Brut. 46(169).
113
App. BC. 1.36.
114
Vell. Pat. 2.14; Liv. Per. 71; Cic. Mil. 16; Flor. 2.6.
115
App. BC. 1.36.
The allied communities of Etruria and Umbria remained steadfast in their

support of Rome up until late 90 bce when some may have briefly taken up
arms.116 Appian states that these people had come to the City to oppose Drusus’
agrarian policies. Such an action probably refers to either the period before the
members of his land commission were elected or the period between when the
bill establishing the land commission was passed and when the Senate annulled
Drusus’ laws. Such opposition to Drusus would have been unnecessary once his
laws where annulled, although those already adversely affected by his legislation
may have harboured ongoing resentment towards him (Gabba, 1976, p. 73).
Appian, Velleius, the summary of Livy and Florus are all, however, reflective
of a historical tradition which held that Drusus had become broadly detested
by Romans and allied Italians alike by the last months of his tribunate.
Furthermore, Appian’s account is more useful from a different perspective. He
is probably correct in recognising that many non-Roman communities feared
the adverse effects of Drusus’ laws and proposals but he conflates this with the
reasons for Drusus’ murder. According to Appian, the principal objection of the
Etruscan and Umbrian communities to Drusus’ policies was that his colonial
projects might distribute ager publicus which was currently being used by them.117
Such fears had not only been expressed by Italian allies in previous decades, but
been proven to be well-founded in the era of the Gracchan land commission.118
Poppaedius Silo and his supporters were likely angered by the failure of Drusus’
measures but those allies that feared further Roman encroachment upon local
regional areas would be expected to have been relieved by the laws being struck
down. Cicero, on the other hand, preserves an alternate explanation for Drusus’
murder, accusing Q. Varius Severus Hybrida of having orchestrated it.119 Varius
was strongly supported by equestrians who were angry with Drusus’ judicial law
and after the outbreak of the Social War he established a court for prosecuting
a number of Drusus’ former political allies on the charge that they had incited
the Italians to revolt.120 Suetonius may be referring to the same tradition when
116
See Chapter 6 for discussion of a possible uprising in Etruria and Umbria late in
90 bce.
117
App. BC. 1.36: οἱ Ἰταλιῶται δ᾽, ὑπὲρ ὧν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ὁ Δροῦσος ταῦτα ἐτέχνάζε, καὶ
οἵδε περὶ τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀποικίας ἐδεδοίκεσαν, ὡς τῆς δημοσίας Ῥωμαίων γῆς, ἣν ἀνέμητον οὖσαν ἔτι
οἱ μὲν ἐκ βίας, οἱ δὲ λανθάνοντες ἐγεώργουν, αὐτίκα σφῶν ἀφαιρεθησομένης, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ
τῆς ἰδίας ἐνοχλησόμενοι.
118
See discussion of the Gracchan land commission in Chapter 3.
119
Cic. Nat. D. 3.81: Summo cruciatu supplicioque Q. Varius homo importunissumus
periit; si quia Drusum ferro Metellum veneno sustulerat, illos conservari melius fuit quam
poenas sceleris Varium pendere.
120
On the activities of this court, see Chapter 5.
he asserts that Drusus was murdered by an opposing faction,121 a description

which seems incongruent with Appian’s account. A similar claim is made that
Philippus and Servilius Caepio had conspired together in the murder.122
The date of Drusus’ murder cannot be securely fixed. Licinius Crassus
(cos. 95) died about a week after he defended Drusus in the Senate on 13
September 91.123 The Senate then began proceedings to annul Drusus’ legislation,
a decision which Drusus argued against but did not veto. Drusus was thus still
alive in the last weeks of September but Appian is very clear that Drusus died
prior to the end of his tribunate.124 Thus Drusus was killed sometime between
approximately 20 September and 10 December, when he would have been
required to relinquish his office anyway.
In all events the murder of Drusus meant that the Italians agitating for
citizenship, such as Poppaedius Silo and his supporters, had lost their most
powerful Roman advocate. Nonetheless, this did not mean that their hopes
of acquiring citizenship were entirely thwarted. This is indicated by Appian,
who claims that even after the subsequent murders at Asculum, Italian envoys
were sent to Rome in the hope of negotiating a resolution.125 Both Velleius and
Florus imply that there was a direct connection between Drusus’ death and
the subsequent Italian revolt, but their language is typically vague and both
are making general statements about the causal relationship between Drusus’
death and the outbreak of the revolt.126 Velleius, for instance, describes the death
of Livius Drusus as causing the long-building tension in Italy to be suddenly
released.127 Pliny the Elder seems to imply that blame for the war was unjustly
laid on Drusus by his opponents within the oligarchy.128 Another statement of
Pliny’s is much more ambiguous, explicitly placing the beginning of the war in
91,129 and yet in reference to a prodigy occurring in the consulship of L. Marcius
121
Suet. Tib. 3.2: Eius abnepos ob eximiam adversus Gracchos operam patronus senatus
dictus filium reliquit, quem in simili dissensione multa varie molientem diversa factio per
fraudem interemit.
122
Aur. Vic. De Vir. Ill. 66.13: Inuidia caedis apud Philippum et Caepionem fuit.
123
Cic. De or. 3.1–6.
124
App. BC. 1.37.
125
App. BC. 1, 39.
126
Vell. Pat. 2.15.1; Flor. 2.6.4.
127
Vell. Pat. 2.15: Mors Drusi iam pridem tumescens bellum excitavit Italicum.
128
Plin. HN. 25.52: Drusumque apud nos, tribunorum popularium clarissimum, cui ante
omnis plebs adstans plausit, optimates vero bellum Marsicum inputavere. Yet contrast with
Pliny, HN. 33.20: inter Caepionem quoque et Drusum ex anulo in auctione venali inimicitiae
coepere, unde origo socialis belli et exitia rerum.
129
Plin. HN. 33.55: Sexto Iulio L. Marcio cos., hoc est belli socialis initio.
and Sex. Caesar (91 bce) he describes the event as the year before the Social
War.130 The discrepancy is repeated in other ancient sources and is likely the
product of the murders at Asculum having occurred very late in 91, thereby
meaning that it was not until the new consuls took up office in 90 that the war
seriously began.
While both Keaveney and Mouritsen have argued that the war broke out
almost immediately upon Drusus’ death,131 Mouritsen (1998, p. 40) rightly
argues that the revolt at Asculum was not provoked by news of Drusus’ murder.
Keine (1844), Mommsen and others have argued that the war broke out several
months after Drusus’ death, during the winter of 91/90 bce. Although Appian
appears to imply that the revolt at Asculum occurred very soon after Drusus’
murder, Gabba (1976, p. 73) has rightly argued that Appian’s chronology of
events around the time of Drusus’ death is highly compressed and conspicuously
omits key details, such as reference to the annulment of Drusus’ laws. Similarly,
neither Velleius Paterculus nor Florus state that the war followed immediately
after Drusus’ murder. Instead, both are probably better read as indicating a
causative relationship between Drusus’ death, the failure of the citizenship bill
and the outbreak of the war: suggestive of a view that without the prospect of
a peaceful resolution of their grievances war was the only option remaining to
those groups of allies. Such an argument is also found in the summary of Livy.
There are a number of significant factors which indicate that Drusus’ death
was not the direct catalyst for the Social War. First, Poppaedius’ abortive march
on Rome with approximately 10,000 of his supporters indicates that substantial
numbers of Italians were prepared to resort to violence irrespective of Drusus’
actions. Furthermore, it shows that local leaders such as Poppaedius were willing
and able to act independently of Drusus or the political processes going on in
Rome. While it is not clear from the summary of Diodorus whether this march
occurred before or after Drusus’ death, either way it shows Italians such as Silo
acting in accordance with their own interests and pursuing their own policy
with or without the prospect of the citizenship bill being passed. Second, the
summary of Livy asserts that the conspiracy to initiate a war was already well
underway prior to the death of Drusus. Indeed, the plot to murder the consuls at
the feriae Latinae (approximately dated to April or May 91) is likely a reference
to just such an Italian ‘conspiracy’, if not the earlier presence of Poppaedius Silo
in Livius Drusus’ home in late 92 or early 91. This indicates that the emerging
130
Plin. HN. 2.199.
131
Keaveney asserts ‘war followed almost immediately on the death of Drusus’ (2005,
p. 99). Similarly, Mouritsen writes ‘both events probably took place around the middle of
October’ (1998, p. 129).
Italian allied leadership was operating in parallel to Livius Drusus and, in light
of growing unrest in Italy, that they had probably anticipated that Drusus would
be unable to secure the citizenship bill. By late 91 bce, these groups of Italian
allies had every reason to be dissatisfied with Drusus’ tribunate. He had passed
the bill establishing his land commission and with it a number of other measures
but he had failed to secure for them the extension of citizenship. Drusus’ death
and the annulment of his laws signalled that Poppaedius Silo’s efforts at securing
a citizenship bill had failed. Third, both Drusus’ death and the murders at
Asculum probably occurred between late September and December 91. This
further supports the summary of Livy that Italian preparations for an armed
revolt were already well underway.132 Fourth, following the murder of Servilius
at Asculum the Italians still attempted to negotiate terms with the Senate but
were rebuffed. This demonstrates that while prepared for war, it was not Drusus’
death but rather the Senate’s refusal to negotiate that committed them to this
course of action.
132
In light of the summary’s implication that the conspiracy had been going on through
the year, Livy may have treated either the planned murders in April or Silo’s overtures towards
Drusus through to the massacre at Asculum as the duration of the conspiracy.
Chapter 5
The Outbreak of the War (91 to 90 bce)
By late 91 bce the situation in Italy had become dangerously unstable, although
in spite of these tensions it was probably still inconceivable to the Romans that
any of the allied communities in Italy might take up arms against them. Rome’s
allies had frequently, although not always, willingly accepted the treatment
which the Romans meted out and the example of Fregellae had demonstrated
the potential severity of any Roman response.1 Such an attitude possibly explains
why the Romans continued to fail to recognise the gravity of the situation.2
In Picenum, however, a sequence of events would be set in motion that would
commit the peninsula to war.
The Murders in Asculum
Sometime late in 91 bce one of the praetors Q. Servilius went to the city of
Asculum in Picenum accompanied by his legate Fonteius.3 There is some modern
debate about whether this event occurred late in 91 bce or early in 90 bce. This
is the product of disagreement in the sources as to whether Servilius was still a
praetor or a praetorian proconsul at the time.4 Both Appian and the summary
of Livy describe Servilius as pro consule and there is no reason to doubt this,
given that they can be shown to be consistent with the other sources. Mommsen
demonstrated that Servilius had probably received imperium pro consule, thus
1
The example of Ad Heren. 4.9(13) is particularly telling concerning this point.
A passage derived for a speech contemporary with the Social War asserts that Fregellae
provided an example of precisely what the Roman response would be: Fregellani non sua
sponte conati sunt? Eo quidem isti minus facile conarentur, quod illi quemadmodum discessent
videbant.
2
Indeed, Kendall (2012, pp. 108–113) rightly suggests that the Romans were ignorant
of how significant the threat of the allied uprising was until after the insurgent embassy in the
winter of 91/90.
3
This praetor is a distinct individual from Q. Servilius Caepio, the political rival of
Livius Drusus.
4
Servilius is described as a praetor by Vell. Pat. 2.15, Diod. Sic. 37.13, Flor. 2.6.9
and Oros. 5.18.8. Whereas Caepio is described by Liv. Per. 72 and App. BC. 1.38 as a
proconsul. See further discussion in Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 24, n. 4 and Brennan, Praetors, 2,
pp. 371–373.
explaining why some sources give him as a praetor (the magistracy to which
Servilius had been elected), while Livy and Appian accurately preserve Servilius’
command at the time of his death at the hands of the people of Asculum.5
Asculum was the principal city of Picenum, situated north-east of Rome
on the Via Salaria.6 The sources are inconsistent as to the exact reasons why
Servilius went to the city although his enhanced imperium suggests that the
Senate was aware of growing agitation within some allied communities and took
the matter at Asculum seriously. According to Appian, when the Romans learnt
of Italian preparations, agents were sent to an unspecified number of towns. One
of these agents witnessed a hostage being taken from Asculum and reported this
to Servilius.7 Following Servilius’ arrival in the city, he is described by Appian as
having behaved in a very heavy-handed manner towards the local people. The
summary of Diodorus makes a similar claim, asserting that Servilius did not treat
the Picentines as ‘free men and allies’ but instead more in a manner consistent
with them being slaves.8 This description of Servilius’ behaviour has echoes of
the threatening and haughty actions of Roman officials relayed in the speech
of Gaius Gracchus and discussed in Chapter 3. Servilius likely expected that
the people of Asculum would be immediately intimidated by his presence and
terrified into submission. His actions instead proved to be counterproductive.
What followed is clear however, the Asculans turned on Servilius, killing
him and his legate Fonteius.9 The ancient sources are again divided as to whether
the murders were in direct response to Servilius’ behaviour or to fear that he
had discovered the pre-existing Italian ‘conspiracy’.10 Appian and the summary
of Livy claim he discovered a pre-existing conspiracy.11 Both the frustration and
the anger within some Italian communities at this time are clearly demonstrated
by the events that followed. The people of Asculum killed and despoiled all the
remaining Romans within their city.12
5
Mommsen, R.St., 2, p. 235. Keaveney (2005, p. 117) argues in favour of Mommsen
and locates Servilius’ death in 91 bce.
6
Strab. 5.241; Flor. 1.14. See Appendix 3 for further information.
7
App. BC. 1.38.
8
Diod. Sic. 37.13.2.
9
Diod. Sic. 37.13.2; App. BC. 1.38; Liv. Per. 72. Cic. Font. 18 (41) in his defence of the
legate’s son sometime after 70 bce says that deinde recens memoria parentis, cuius sanguine
non solum Asculanorum manus, a qua interfectus est, sed totum illud sociale bellum macula
sceleris imbutum est.
10
Diod. Sic. 37.13.2. The summary asserts that it was as a result of threats of punishment
that the Italians took vengeance upon both him and the other Romans present at the time.
11
App. BC. 1.38; Liv. Per. 71.
12
Liv. Per. 72; App. BC. 1.38; Iul. Ob. 54.
The Outbreak of the War (91 to 90 bce) 101
Although the exact sequence of events which followed the slaughter at

Asculum is not entirely clear, most ancient sources produce a list of peoples
who rapidly joined the insurgency. These accounts are unfortunately so heavily
condensed that despite their apparent differences many of them may not be
fundamentally inconsistent. Unquestionably a prominent feature of these lists
is the central role of the Marsi. Not only are they consistently asserted to have
been involved in agitating for a revolt prior to Asculum, and then instrumental
in organising the insurgents after the murders there, but the war was for several
generations afterwards commonly known as the bellum Marsicum.13
As investigated in the previous chapter, the place of prominence given to the
Marsi is explained by the reported activities of Q. Poppaedius Silo, who was one
of the foremost men of the Marsic community. Indeed, Silo is claimed to have
been dux et auctor eius rei, ‘the leader and author’ of the war, in the summary of
Livy.14 Strabo similarly singles Poppaedius out as the leader of the insurgency in
his brief summary of the events of the war.15 The claim is supported by Florus
who asserts that following the events at Asculum, Poppaedius Silo moved from
city to city and was personally responsible for the spread of the uprising.16 While
many of the other ancient sources are less specific they nonetheless are consistent
on the central role played by the Marsi (under the leadership of Silo). Velleius
Paterculus says that following the uprising of the people of Asculum, the war
was incited by the Marsi and inspired people in ‘all regions’ to take up arms.17
According to Appian, the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini and Marrucini simultaneously
revolted and were then subsequently joined by the Picentes, Frentani, Hirpini, the
peoples of Pompeii and Venusia, Iapyges, Lucani, Samnites and all other peoples
south of the Liris River.18 This brief statement is a compression of the chronology
of events, for instance Venusia was induced by one of the Italian commanders
after the beginning of fighting in 90.19 It also asserts that Picenum joined after
the revolt, despite Asculum being a Picentine community, and lists the Hirpini
13
The war is prominently labelled as such on the fasti Capitolini (Inscr. Ital. 13.1,
pp. 54f ). The changing terminology used in the Roman world for the war is discussed in
Chapter 2. See also the argument of Domaszewski (1924).
14
Liv. Per. 76.
15
Strab. 5.4.2.
16
Flor. 1.6.10–11.
17
Vell. Pat. 1.15.1. It is not entirely clear how Velleius’ claim that the insurgent cause in
omnis penetrasset regionis should be read. It is not clear whether this is hyperbole or, in a like
manner to Sall. Hist. 1.18 (in McGushin), refers to individuals throughout Italy supporting
the insurgency. Support for the insurgent cause was not universal in any region.
18
App. BC. 1.39.
19
App. BC. 1.42.
(one of the principal peoples of Samnium) as distinct from the Samnites. Other
ancient sources provide similarly vague statements. The Breviarium of Eutropius
says that the Picentes, Marsi and Paeligni provoked the war, but does not specify
the other peoples who participated.20 Orosius renders an even more simplistic
version, claiming that the Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Samnites
and Lucani were engaged in a secret conspiracy to rebel,21 thereby claiming that
the Lucani and Samnites were a part of the conspiracy prior to the revolt of
Asculum. As Silo was a Marsian with considerable influence, Velleius Paterculus,
Appian and Eutropius are most likely consistent with Florus when they assert
that the Marsi (by implication under the leadership of Silo) were directly
responsible for inciting the other peoples to revolt in the wake of the massacre
at Asculum but are overly summary in nature. Equally, however, it should be
remembered that while the ancient literary sources label entire peoples as having
supported the insurgency individual communities remained loyal to Rome.
Pinna, the most significant city among the Vestini, resisted the insurgents, and
was in the years after the war famous for its loyalty to Rome.22
The sudden and violent reaction clearly took many Romans and Latins in
insurgent regions by surprise. In Picenum, captured Romans were tortured and
killed by the insurgents,23 possibly as Silo’s force moved through the region.24 In
Lucania, one of the praetors of 91 bce, Ser. Sulpicius Galba, had been staying in
the home of a local woman. He was initially taken prisoner by local supporters
of the insurgents and was then helped to escape by his host.25
Mouritsen asserts that ‘when Rome heard about the plottings, praetors were
sent to investigate the rumours’ and it is further suggested that Servilius (at
Asculum), Domitius Ahenobarbus (encountering Silo on the road to Rome) and
Sulpicius Galba (in Lucania) were all sent to investigate (1998, p. 130). Keaveney
similarly observes that ‘the Romans, suspecting something was afoot sent spies
to the affected areas in order to discover more exactly what was happening’ and
observes that the Romans were possibly alerted by Silo’s march on Rome (2005,
p. 117 and n. 3). He further argues that these spies were intended to supply the
20
Eut. 5.5.
21
Oros. 5.18.8. In general Orosius’ language is imprecise rather than entirely inaccurate.
For instance, cf. Oros. 5.18.1 and 5.18.2 for his use of ‘Latins’ and ‘allies’ interchangeably.
22
Ad Heren. 2.28(45) compares the loyalty of the peoples of Alba Fucens and Pinna
during the Social War. Diod. Sic. 37.19 and Val. Max. 5.4.7 relate the atrocities committed
during the siege of the city.
23
Iul. Ob. 55: A Picentibus Romani barbaro more excruciati. It is implied that this
action occurred after the massacre at Asculum (Iul. Ob. 54).
24
Flor. 1.6.10–11.
25
Liv. Per. 72.
praetors who had already been dispatched with information. There are, however,
problems posed by interpreting the presence of these men in Italy immediately
prior to the war as all the product of Roman cognisance of an allied plot prior
to the death of Servilius at Asculum. Why the Romans would respond in such a
passive way in two of the three instances is unclear. But first and foremost, there
appears to have been distinct reasons for the presence of each. Appian asserts
that Servilius went to Asculum to investigate information brought to him by an
informer26 and he seems to be the only one of the three who was acting on actual
reports of an allied conspiracy. In turn, Servilius’ response was characterised
by typical Roman pugnacity and inevitably prompted the revolt rather than
prevent it.
Domitius, the man who Poppaedius Silo encountered on the road to
Rome, cannot be securely identified as a praetor in 9127 and had he been sent
knowingly by the Senate to deal with 10,000 armed allies headed for Rome, then
his interaction with Silo was uncharacteristically diplomatic. In the previous
chapter it was argued that the encounter between Domitius and Poppaedius
occurred sometime prior to the murders at Asculum, possibly in response to the
mounting difficulties Livius Drusus faced in passing his citizenship bill. If so
the civility of the encounter is possibly explained by the Senate as yet having no
indication of a potential uprising among the allied states. Significantly, when
Galba was captured in Lucania by the Italians, the account of his capture and
subsequent escape suggests that he was unaware that the conspiracy was being
put into action, just as the Roman commanders at Aesernia seem to have been
trapped unaware of the full scale of the revolt. Galba is thus described as having
been ‘apprehended’ (comprehensus) and there is no mention of who may have
been accompanying him.
In the treatise ad Herennium, a quoted speech probably dated to 90 bce
reflects upon the extent to which the insurgents’ actions in the early phase of
the war exploited their knowledge of Roman strategic concerns and military
practice. The speaker observes that:
Hi cum se et opes suas et copiam necessario norunt, tum vero nihilominus propter
propinquitatem et omnium rerum societatem quid omnibus rebus populus Romanus
posset scire et existimare poterant.
26
App. BC. 1.38.
27
Not only must they have known themselves, their resources, and their manpower,
but their nearness to us and their alliance with us in all affairs enabled them no
less to learn and appraise the power of the Roman people in every sphere.28
It suggests that the men who had formulated the Italian conspiracy had exploited
their intimate knowledge of Roman practices and that, as a result, the sudden
coordinated violence of their reaction was completely unanticipated by the
Romans. In like fashion Plutarch describes the rebel allies:
οὐ μόνον ὅπλοις ἐρρωμένα καὶ σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τόλμαις στρατηγῶν καὶ δεινότησι
χρησάμενα θαυμασταῖς καὶ ἀντιπάλοις.
they were not only strong in arms and men, but also had generals whose daring
and ability were amazing and made them a match for the Romans.29
It is thus, not unreasonable to conclude the Romans were genuinely surprised by

the coordination and extent of the insurgency.
The Lex Varia de Maiestate
Q. Varius Severus Hybrida was one of the incoming tribunes for 90 bce and
would have taken up office on 10 December 91, shortly after the death of
M. Livius Drusus. Varius enjoyed strong support from members of the equestrian
order and proposed setting up a court to prosecute all those accused of having
incited the Italians to revolt. The court is described by Valerius Maximus and
similarly in Pseudo-Aurelius Victor as prosecuting those who had incited the
allies to take up arms.30 Appian presents the initiative for this court as coming
from members of the equestrian order and says that it was directed at the Senate
as a whole.31 His description again implies that the Senate had been generally
supportive of Drusus’ proposals, including the proposed grant of citizenship.
Despite the veto of Varius’ colleagues in the tribunate, the threat of violence
from equestrians who were in favour of the court was sufficient to ensure that the
28
Ad Heren. 4.9(13).
29
Plut. Mar. 32.
30
Val. Max. 8.6.4: quorum dolo malo socii ad arma ire coacti essent. Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill.
72.11: socios et Latium ad arma coegisset.
31
App. BC. 1.37.
act setting up the court was passed. During 90 bce, with the war raging in Italy,
the court indeed prosecuted a number of Drusus’ most prominent supporters.
The purpose of this court does not make sense if it is placed, as Appian seems
to imply, prior to the revolt of Asculum.32 Its aim, to prosecute those who had
incited the allies to take up arms, makes much better sense in the context of
some point in early 90 bce, when Italian demands had translated not simply
into violence (in late 91) but into a full-blown military crisis for the Romans
over the winter. The actual crime committed by many of the court’s Roman
aristocratic targets can have been little more than their perceived association
with Livius Drusus or their having advocated for concessions being made to
allied Italians. As such, Varius and his associates seem to have been intent upon
using the war as a pretext for a purge of their rivals. So much so that (according
to Cicero’s description of the court’s activities in the Brutus) even though all
others courts in Rome were suspended because of the war, prosecutions under
the Varian law were continued and spearheaded by Philippus, the consul of
91, while his colleague Sex. Iulius Caesar (cos. 91) took the field.33 Indeed, the
hostility towards Varius in some sources is evident: he is described by Cicero as
a man who gained great public popularity despite being a person of a ‘wild and
horrid’ nature (Q. Varium, vastum hominem atque foedum).34 Those prosecuted
included Drusus’ supporter Aemilius Scaurus, who may have been acquitted.35
Others were C. Cotta, Calpurnius Bestia, Mummius Achaicus, L. Mummius,
Q. Pompeius and M. Antonius.36 In an ironic turn of events, Varius was
eventually convicted under his own law in 90/89 and sent into exile.37
According to Asconius, reports that new cities had joined the insurgency
came in day by day.38 The two events are clearly linked in the sources and further
suggestive of the chronology. The lex Varia was passed early in Varius’ term of
32
This court has received considerable scholarly attention. For specific studies of the
lex Varia, see Gruen (1965), Seager (1967) and Badian (1969). See also the discussion of
the significance of the court to the Social War in Mommsen, Hist. Rom., 3, pp. 503f and
Mouritsen (1998, pp. 131–134).
33
Cic. Brut. 89(304–305).
34
Cic. De or. 1.25(117).
35
Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 72.11: Scaurus senex cum a Vario tribune plebis argueretur, quasi
socios et Latium ad arma coegisset. On the outcome of Scaurus’ trial, see Gruen (1965,
pp. 63–64) and Badian (1969, p. 467). Tansey (2003, p. 383) argues that Scaurus died
sometime between late 89 and early 88.
36
Cic. Scau. 1.3; Cic. Corn. fr. in Ascon. 73; Val. Max. 3.7.8; Ascon. 22 and 73; App.
BC, 1.37. See the summary in Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 26–27.
37
Cic. Brut. 89(305).
38
Ascon. 73–74 on Cic. Corn.: crebraeque defections Italicorum nuntiarentur.
office. Furthermore it must have been passed before the full seriousness of the
insurgency was understood, for the court was already in operation when it was
decided that all other courts should be suspended due to the severity of the
war and that the Roman populace should put on their military cloaks (sagae).
Poppaedius Silo’s actions at spreading the revolt from city to city occurred over
the winter simultaneously with the accusations being laid under the court’s
powers. Report of individual cities having joined the insurgency flooded in over
the winter and this is reflected in the speech preserved in the ad Herennium
presumed to be associated with the trials carried out under the lex Varia. In turn,
this explains the accusations levelled at Varius in both Valerius Maximus and
Cicero that the prosecutions of the court had helped to cause the war. With
members of the Roman elite who had been sympathetic to Drusus’ citizenship
proposal being charged with having actively incited the Italians, a peaceful
resolution must have seemed all the more remote for the insurgents.
The Establishment of Italia and the Italian Commanders
During the winter of 91/90 bce, an embassy was sent to Rome by the rebel allies.
The Roman Senate received the ambassadors but after hearing their complaints
refused to negotiate with the rebels and sent them away. It was at this point that
outright war became inevitable.39 Discussion of the embassy is found only in
a brief passage of Appian although there is no compelling reason for rejecting
its authenticity.40 It is strongly implied by Appian that the central demand put
before the Senate by the Italian ambassadors was the extension of citizenship:
πέμψασι έμψαὐτοῖ ἐς ‘Ρώμην ώρέσβειςν ἰτιωμένους, ὅτι τάνταντΡωμαίοις ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν

συνεργασάμενοι οὐκ ἀζιοῦνταιιτῆς τῶν ῶνοοηθημένων ηολιτείαςι.
39
Indeed, App. BC. 1.39 says that the Italians despaired of a resolution and pursued
their plans for war when the embassy failed.
40
Mouritsen (1998, pp. 138–141) speculated that the Italian ambassadors had made
especially unreasonable demands including that they receive a right to one of the consulships
and enrolment in the Senate. Kendell rightly rejects this argument but then suggests that
‘there seems no reason at all to suggest that Livy knew what the allies sought in 91’ (2012,
p. 106 n. 3). This is equally unreasonable given that the summaries are highly condensed and
do indicate that Livy discussed at length the intentions of the Italians (Liv. Per. 71: eorum
coetus coniurationesque et orations in consiliis principum referentur). The absence of mention
of the embassy in other literary sources is not surprising given the frequency with which
important incidents from the war are only reported in a single literary source.
They sent ambassadors to Rome to complain that although they had cooperated
in all ways with the Romans in building up the empire, the latter had not been
willing to admit their helpers to citizenship.41
At this time the Roman Senate can have been in no doubt about this central
grievance: the ambassadors had unequivocally tied the war to the issue of the
citizenship and what is implied by Appian in his brief discussion of this embassy
is that citizenship was stipulated as the price of peace.
The reason why the ambassadors were rebuffed is indicated clearly by Appian:
ἡ βουλὴ μάλα καρτερῶς ἀπεκρίνατο, εἰ μεταγινώσκουσι τῶν γεγονότων, πρεσβεύειν

ἐς αὐτήν, ἄλλως δὲ μή.
The Senate answered sternly that if they repented of what they had done they
could send ambassadors, otherwise not.42
The Senate could not negotiate with the insurgents: they had been complicit in
the murder of a Roman magistrate and they were under arms; Rome’s honour
was now at stake and any such concession would risk emboldening allied
communities still further to make demands of Rome accompanied by threats of
violence.43 This was a serious consideration as Rome was heavily reliant upon the
manpower of allies. Conversely, for the rebels the events of 91 bce had probably
demonstrated that the most valuable bargaining tool they possessed was the
threat of violence.
During the winter those who had already joined the insurgency established
an organisational structure, based at the Paelignian city of Corfinium, which
was renamed Italia, and designated a number of supreme commanders for their
available manpower. Unsurprisingly, there are again nonetheless significant
discrepancies between the ancient literary sources as to the nature of this
organisation and its structure. Analysis of the Italian organisation is critical for
41
42
43
Kendell (2012) discusses a broad range of factors for why the Romans were unwilling
to yield the citizenship but these in fact, illustrate a range of reasons why the Romans had
not more liberally extended it in the decades prior to the war. The sheer affront of rebellious
allies, with the blood of a Roman magistrate on their hands, demanding concessions from the
Senate made an armed conflict essential for Rome to assert her supremacy.
interpreting the motivation and goals of the insurgents.44 This entity was given
an intentionally emotive name, Italia in Latin and Viteliú in Oscan. The divine
personification of Italia, labelled as such in both Latin and Oscan, appears
prominently on the insurgent coinage. The nature of this council and indeed the
use by some of the ancient literary sources of Roman political terminology (such
as consul and praetor) to describe its leaders have led, as referenced in Chapter
1, to some modern scholars arguing that the insurgents were now intent upon
independence from Rome and even in some instances seeking to establish a
lasting unified and independent state.45 De Sanctis (1976, p. 42), for instance,
saw this as a particularly significant act, one which signified that the Italian
insurgents desired to achieve a fully autonomous Italian territorial state.46
Given the considerable confusion in the ancient source material as to the exact
structure of the Italian organisation it is no wonder that this has prompted a range
of modern reconstructions of how it operated and the nature of its command
structures (see Meyer, 1958).47 Some elements of the Italian organisation can
be separated out from this debate however. There is clear evidence that the
Italians established a military apparatus for the conduct of the war and that this
command structure, to an extent, followed along ethnic/regional distinctions
within the rebellion. Certainly a number of insurgent armies appear to have
been drawn from particular areas and commanded by a leading man from that
region/ethnic group. In turn, however, this undermines attempts to apply an
overly schematic structure; certainly there were not twelve insurgent ‘peoples’ to
be represented by individual praetors. According to the summary of Diodorus a
rival Italic senate consisting of 500 leading Italians was established at Corfinium.48
The ancient literary sources, however, do not consistently describe this body as a
senate and there is no indication in the ancient sources that this body ever acted
as anything more than a war council. The identity of the majority of these men
is not known, although the body may have included the named principal Italian
44
Thus for instance Sherwin-White (1973, pp. 137f ) argued that Italia embodied an
Italic ideal of an ‘essentially supplementary citizenship from which purely political interests
were excluded’. For further discussion of how understanding the insurgent organisation has
implications for interpreting their aims, see Dart (2009).
45
Mommsen (1894, vol. 3, p. 505) argued that prior to the war the Italians had sought
equality of citizen rights from Rome but that with the outbreak of the war the insurgency
intended to either conquer or destroy the Roman state and replace it with their own. He
similarly accepted that the insurgents elected two consuls and twelve praetors.
46
47
For a summary and discussion of views on the question of the structure of the Italian
organisation, see Dart (2009).
48
Diod. Sic. 37.2.4–5.
military commanders.49 Yet, in the surviving ancient literary sources all decision-
making is attributed to the commanders in the field.
The sending of an embassy to Rome in the winter of 91/90 and the surviving
members of the council fleeing to Aesernia (and possibly to Bovianum) in the
final phase of the war may be the only identifiable acts of the rebel ‘senate’ or
war council. Indeed, the significance placed on the Italian organisation, its
senate and military hierarchy in the summary of Diodorus seems suspiciously
consistent with a historiographical tradition bemoaned by Florus, which he
claimed had emphasised the independence of the Italians as a means of avoiding
the unpleasant conclusion that the war had been fought against men with
legitimate grievances and making reasonable demands of the Roman Republic.50
Other ancient sources, in particular Appian and the summary of Livy, present
the Italian organisation as a much more temporary wartime entity, not as a
mirror counter-state for Rome.51 The site of Corfinium was, however, well
suited as a centre for the Italian insurgents both in terms of equality among
the members of the insurgency and strategically. De Sanctis has rightly argued
that politically, as a Paelignian town, it was sited outside of the home territories
of either of the rebellion’s two principal commanders52 and that strategically
the city was situated in a position dominating one of the important routes
between Rome and the Adriatic.53 Cutting parts of the south-east off from the
Romans was instrumental in inducing communities in the south to join the
Italian insurgency. Domaszewski (1924, pp. 10–11) argued that the Italians
fell into two distinct groups and he accepted that there were twelve Italian
peoples. He further concluded that Q. Poppaedius Silo and C. Paapius Mutilus
were designated as the supreme commanders of these two factions within the
Italian forces, with twelve subordinate commanders each representing one
of the twelve rebel peoples (Domaszewski, 1924, pp. 13–15).54 Salmon (1958,
pp. 164–166) convincingly demonstrated that Domaszewski’s argument
was based upon a flawed understanding of Italian ethnic distinctions, but
49
Diod. Sic. 37.2.5.
50
51
Thus, for instance, Kiene (1844, pp. 190f ) and Mommsen, Hist. Rom. Cf. Meyer
(1958) and Dart (2009).
52
De Sanctis (1976, p. 42): ‘La posizione fu scelta assai opportunamente nel rispetto
stategico, ma forse non per sole ragioni strategiche si colloco la capitale fuori del territorio
delle due maggiori tribu belligeranti, i Marsi e i Sanniti.’
53
De Sanctis argued that ‘la citta pertanto era in posizione dominante sopra una delle
grandi linee di communicazione di Roma con l’’Adriatico’ (1976, p. 43).
54
Also argued by Gabba (1967, pp. 132–134).
Domaszewski was correct to view the Italian organisation as much simpler than
has often been inferred from Photius’ summary of Diodorus.
The ancient literary source material describes the Italian insurgent
organisation in radically different terms. Appian claims that the Italian forces
were divided among a group of στρατηγοὶ. He also identified nine men whom
he terms Italian αὐτοκράτορες and it was among these men that the available
soldiers were divided for the campaigning season of 90 bce. When the form
of the names is reconstructed in full, Appian lists the principal commanders
as T. Lafrenius, C. Pontilius, Marius Egnatius, Q. Poppaedius Silo, C. Paapius
Mutilus, M. Lamponius, C. Vidacilius, Herius Asinius and P. Vettius Scato.55
This list does indeed appear to be reflective of the most active Italian
commanders during the war, but as he includes the names of the two supposed
Italian ‘consuls’, Poppaedius Silo and Paapius Mutilus, among the other seven
names and without any form of formal distinction, Appian clearly followed a
radically different historical tradition to Diodorus/Photius. Similarly, Velleius
Paterculus provides a list of only seven Italian commanders, which he claims
were the ‘most celebrated’ duces for the insurgents.56 He lists Q. Poppaedius Silo,
Herius Asinius, Vettius Scato, C. Pontilius, Pontius Telesinus, Marius Egnatius
and Paapius Mutilus.57 With the exception of Telesinus these men also occur on
Appian’s list. Significantly Velleius does not indicate a formal distinction of rank
between Silo and Mutilius and the other commanders. Florus also presented
a list of major Italian commanders, although he names only five commanders
who he claims each commanded the forces of a specific region of Italy. He gives
these as Poppaedius (in command of the Marsi and the Paeligni), Afranius (of
the Latins, a mistake possibly for Lafranius), Plotius (in command of Umbria),
Egnatius (Samnium) and Telesinus (Lucania).58 The regions attached to these
commanders are not consistent with either their actual military campaigns
during the war or their regions of origin. Q. Poppaedius was a Marsian and
Marius Egnatius from Samnium. T. Lafrenius operated in Picenum in 90 bce,
Pontius Telesinus was a Samnite, who throughout much of the 80s bce was still
under arms in the south. There was no widespread support for the insurgency in
55
App. BC. 1.40. The Greek text renders these names as Τίτος Λαφρήνιος καὶ Γάιος
Ποντίλιος καὶ Μάριος Ἐγνάτιος καὶ Κόιντος Ποπαίδιος καὶ Γάιος Πάπιος καὶ Μᾶρκος Λαμπώνιος
καὶ Γάιος Οὐιδακίλιος καὶ Ἕριος Ἀσίνιος καὶ Οὐέττιος Σκάτων.
56
Domaszewski suggests of the list in Velleius ‘Daß es jene Führer der Italiker sind, die
sich siegreich gegen die Romer behauptet haben, sagt Velleius selbst’ (1924, p. 23).
57
Vell. Pat. 2.16.1: Italicorum autem fuerunt celeberrimi duces Silo Popaedius, Herius
Asinius, Insteius Cato, C. Pontidius, Telesinus Pontius, Marius Egnatius, Papius Mutilus.
58
Flor. 2.18.6–7.
Umbria and furthermore a man by the name of A. Plotius was a Roman legatus
probably dispatched to the region in late 90 bce.59
The often suggested structure of twelve confederate tribes, each represented
by a military commander, derives from Photius’ summary of Diodorus and is
probably an artificially created structure imposed on what was clearly a flexible
military organisation.60 It is similarly conspicuous that Appian, Velleius, Florus
and the summary of Livy imply a similar division of forces among a number
of leading commanders and that the ancient Latin literary sources variously
style the Italian commanders as praetor, dux or imperator.61 Appian describes
the leading commanders as all being αὐτοκράτορες, equivalent to describing
the principal group collectively as imperatores, military commanders with
independent authority. Perhaps the most compelling evidence though is that
some insurgent coins carry the Oscan form of imperator, embratur (Sydenham,
1952, nos. 640–641, p. 94).62 Importantly the insurgent coinage does not show
an oath scene of either twelve or fourteen figures and as such it can hardly be used
as evidence for the number of insurgent peoples. The collective participation
in the oath, of either four or eight individuals flanking the sacrifice, shows no
indication of distinctions of rank among the participants. Additionally, it is
highly likely that the issuing of coinage in both Latin and Oscan was carried
out initially from the one location at Corfinium which was also the point
from which the insurgency coordinated its muster. As such it is not evidence
of a consular-style division of command. Only the summary of Diodorus by
Photius and Strabo assert that the Italians consistently used the titles consul and
praetor as a direct analogue of the Roman state.63 Yet, many modern scholars
have accepted this and assert that there were two consuls and twelve praetors
elected for 90 bce, with six praetors under the command of each consul and that
the two Italian consuls were re-elected for 89 bce (for example Gabba, 1994,
pp. 118–119). This conveniently explains there being two insurgent commanders
drawn from the Marsi, Poppaedius Silo and Vettius Scato, and that there were
at least two Samnites commanders, Paapius Mutilus and Marius Egnatius, but
also likely Pontius Telesinus. As will be seen in Chapter 6, the insurgent armies
moved rapidly, their efforts were coordinated and initially very successful,
59
Liv. Per. 74; Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 29.
60
Diod. Sic. 37.2.4–7.
61
Thus also Eut. 5.3.2.
62
On the Oscan language, see Buck (1904) and Campanile (1985).
63
There is a sling bullet found with the inscription Itali. T. Laf[renius] pr[aetor] (CIL,
I2, 848). Even if made by an insurgent, the use of the broad title of praetor does not confirm
that the insurgents established a formal counter-state to Rome.
but the conduct of the war does not show evidence of a Roman counter-state
in operation.
Figure 3 Anonymous insurgent coin of the Social War depicting an oath

scene. Ob. divine personification of Italy. Rev. Eight warriors,
four on each side of a ninth figure holding an animal for sacrifice.
A similar oath scene occurs on the example which identifies its
issuer as Q. Silo. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum
Cicero, who met Vettius Scato while serving in the army of Pompeius Strabo,
describes Scato as dux Marsorum and gives no indication that the Italians used
formal military titles paralleling those of Roman magistrates.64 Although the
notion that the Italians erected a parallel state to Rome is often accepted, many
modern scholars have nevertheless been reluctant to use the terminology of
consul and praetor. De Sanctis, for instance, described Poppaedius Silo and
Paapius Mutilus as ‘duci supremi’ and Gabba stated that the insurgents were
‘divisi in due gruppi di sei, algli ordini dei comandanti supremi’ (1967, p. 132).
Similarly Salmon (1958, pp. 169–171), though accepting in principle the
structure of two Italian consuls and twelve praetors, consistently described the
men as supreme commanders rather than as consuls. There have been a number
of attempts to reconstruct which peoples were commanded by each of the
named Italian generals.65
64
Cic. Phil. 12.27. Cicero suggests that he knew Scato in Brut. 46(169) and also knew
a man probably most reliably identified as a son. See Syme (1939, p. 91, n. 5) on Cic. Dom.
116, Ad. Att. 4.5.2 and 6.1.15.
65
Two notable modern reconstructions are those of Salmon (1958, pp. 169–177) and
Keaveney (2005, pp. 215–219). The reconstruction presented by Keaveney is indicative
of the problems posed by attempts to reconstruct the commands, for instance treating the
There is every indication that the Italians did not set up an elaborate mirror
Roman state (see Dart, 2009). Instead, they probably established an ad hoc
confederacy for the specific purpose of conducting the war. This fairly simple
organisation is consistent with the assertions of the ancient sources that the
Italians’ primary goal was citizenship and inclusion within the Roman state. The
two supreme commanders of the Italians were Q. Poppaedius Silo and C. Paapius
Mutilus. The choice of Silo is easily understandable in light of his instrumental
role in initiating the conflict. Far less is known about Mutilus. He may have
been a descendant of the same Samnite family that had played a leading role
in the wars with the Romans in the fourth century bce (see De Sanctis, 1909,
pp. 207f; Gabba, 1967, pp. 132–134). His name is consistently written in Oscan
script on the insurgent coinage as C. Paapi. C., written from right to left, is Gaius
Paapius, (son of ) Gaius.
The Insurgent Coinage
The scale and severity of the war demanded the mass production of coin on both
sides in order to pay the huge numbers of soldiers that were being mobilised
for the conflict. The extent and speed with which the insurgent coinage was
produced was truly astounding. This is demonstrated by the large number of
coin dies that were manufactured by the Italians as well as the diversity of the
imagery on their coinage in spite of the war lasting little more than two years
and the period in which they were producing coins being limited.66 Indeed, the
insurgent output of coinage may have equalled that of the Roman state at the
time.67 This feat is still further evidence that the insurgents were well prepared
and fully understood the magnitude of the war.
The insurgent coinage has been subjected to considerable study by modern
scholars but unfortunately reveals little firm evidence about the nature and
structure of the Italian insurgency (see Campana, 1987; also Gruber, 1970,
pp. 319f; Buttrey, 1973; Cappelletti, 1999; Tataranni, 2005; Imag. Ital. 1,
pp. 67–74). The coins issued by the rebels were based on the Roman standard
for the denarius and were minted in silver. They variously use Oscan or Latin
people of Venusia, a Latin colony which surrendered to the insurgents, as an insurgent people
with their own praetor.
66
Campana (1987) identified over 150 reverse dies in use by the Italians. See the
discussion in Gruber (1970, vol. 2, pp. 319f ), Burnett (1998, pp. 166f ) and Williams (1998).
67
The war had significant long-term financial repercussions for the Romans. Williams
(1998) has argued that the war created an ongoing monetary shortage for the Republic.
legends. Some issues carry a moneyer’s name and a small number of surviving
examples use both Latin and Oscan script on the same coin (see Figure 4). The
one possible exception to this is an issue in gold with a legend in Oscan. The
date of its issue, however, is disputed and it should probably be dated to after
the Social War.68 Many of the Italian coins overtly imitate Roman coins in their
imagery. It is typically asserted that coins were primarily issued during 90 and
89. While a central mint was probably initially established at Corfinium, as the
war became increasingly desperate for the insurgents, coins were presumably
minted at other locations with Bovianum and/or Aesernia as likely locations as
both were used as insurgent centres in the later part of the war.69 The collapse
of the insurgency between 89 and 88 bce probably precluded the minting of
new coins beyond 87.70 As is indicated in the section devoted to the insurgent
coinage in Imagines Italicae, the chronology of the mints for the Italians cannot
be asserted with much certainty, but they are unlikely to be the product of
separate Latin and Oscan mints.71
It is tempting to infer a political significance in the choice of language on
the coins as many scholars have done. Coins issued by Poppaedius Silo carry
Latin legends while those issued by Paapius Mutilus use Oscan legends. It should
be noted that many are simply stamped with Italia or the Oscan equivalent,
Viteliú. With Silo holding the supreme command in the northern war zone
and Mutilus commanding insurgent operations in the south, both Keaveney
(2005) and Salmon (1982) have inferred distinct political motives for what are
sometimes termed a ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ group of insurgents. Instead, this
division probably reflects basic linguistic realities of southern Italy up until the
time of the Social War. While clearly much of the insurgent Italian elite would
have been able to communicate in Latin, many communities in Samnium and
other parts of the southern regions of the insurgency were still predominately
Oscan speaking.72 Even so, Paapius Mutilus issued some bilingual coins. On
one example the obverse depicts the helmeted divine personification of Italy,
with ITALIA in Latin script while on its reverse the dioscuri are depicted with
68
See discussion of the gold coin in Chapter 9.
69
The issue of the sequence in which these cities were used as a base of operations by
the insurgents is not well documented. The insurgent ‘senate’ probably fled to Aesernia,
while Bovianum was used as a base of operations by Poppaedius Silo in 88 bce. See further
discussion in Chapter 7.
70
See the discussion of the chronology of the Italic issues in Campana (1987,
pp. 31–34).
71
Imag. Ital. 1, p. 67. See Bernareggi (1966, pp. 78f ), Campana (1987) and Eychenne
(1990, p. 84).
72
Convincingly argued by Mouritsen (1998, pp. 79–82).
C. Paapi[us son of ] C. in Oscan characters beneath (Gruber, 1970, vol. 2, no. 34,
p. 331). An additional consideration is that coins issued individually in Oscan
and Latin were probably being produced and then subsequently used in parallel
to pay rebel soldiers. The insurgency used the Roman standard for the denarius
which indicates that the insurgent coins were indented to be circulated amid
existing Roman denarii (Campana, 1987, pp. 35–38; Imag. Ital. 1, pp. 67–69).
This is a measure that would have saved time and resources but which also should
mediate efforts to infer complex ideological messages in the insurgent coins.
Figure 4 Bilingual insurgent coin of Paapius Mutilus. Ob. divine

personification of Italy, helmeted with ITALIA in Latin script.
Rev. the dioscuri with C. Paapi[us son of ] C. in Oscan characters
beneath. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum
There are a number of surviving examples of rebel coins showing a central

figure holding a sacrificial animal and flanked by variously two, four, six or eight
figure (Sydenham, 1952, nos. 617–624 and 634).73 One example of this coin
type shows eight figures surrounding a standard with a ninth figure kneeling
and holding a sacrifice, with Q. SILO in exergue (Bompois, 1873, pl. 1, no. 5;
Gruber, 1970, vol. 2, p. 329). Such oath scenes also appear on issues bearing
Mutilus’ name, for instance an issue with the obverse of a helmeted and draped
bust of Mars (r.) with Italia in Oscan and a reverse of two soldiers either side
of a kneeling youth holding a pig (Sydenham, 1952, no. 637; Campana, 1987,
p. 83). Issues such as these had once been thought to be reflective of the number
of insurgent peoples (see, for instance, Last and Gardner, 1932, pp. 185f ). As
Salmon (1958, pp. 162–164) has rightly argued, however, the coins showing
oath scenes need not be reflective of the actual number of insurgent peoples
73
Campana (1987, pp. 31–34) dates the oath scenes to 90 bce.
(see also Domaszewski, 1924, p. 15). The coin type is also heavy influenced by
existing Roman examples, in particular a coin issued by a Ti. Vet(urius) in the
late second or early first century (see Sydenham, 1952, nos 527 and 614; Gruber,
1970, vol. 2, pp. 319f ).74 As argued above, the modern interest in establishing
the participation in the war of entire ethnic groups within Italy is likely to be
un-historical. The ancient sources refer to entire peoples and entire regions for
convenience but as is well known, some communities even in those regions
where the insurgency was strongest still remained loyal to the Romans.
The coins issued by the Italians are consistent in their usage of either the
Latin form ITALIA or the Oscan form VÍTELIÚ. Only late in the war is there
any sign that the insurgent coinage carries a more local or regional message.
Thus, for instance, there are coins of Paapius Mutilus which carry the legend
Safinim, the Oscan name for Samnium. These probably date to 89 or 88 bce as
blocs of the insurgents were increasingly surrendering and as those still under
arms found themselves in an increasingly dire predicament (Campana, 1987,
nos. 149–50). What was being referred to on the insurgent coins when they
struck them with the name Italia/Viteliú is not as clear as many modern scholars
have asserted. They many have been struck with the intention of giving the name
of the Italian confederation although they cannot all refer to a minting location
of Corfinium (renamed Italia). They may, however, be referring to the Italian
peninsula in general or forwarding the name as a rallying cry to the rebels rather
than labelling the coins with the name of a counter-Roman state. If the Italians
were indeed seeking inclusion in the Roman state, as so many of the ancient
sources assert, then a more generic usage would seem the most likely. As such,
these coins were possibly not an assertion of ‘Italian’ independence but rather
meant to be a call to arms, to unify behind the common symbol of Italia.75 As the
political rhetoric of the post-Social War era demonstrates, such calls to Italian
unity continued to resonate with the Italian population at large.76 As such,
between late 91 and the early months of 90 bce the insurgency had established
itself as a formidable entity. Clearly under no allusions as to the risks involved,
the insurgents had assembled a representative body, a military command and the
means to fund their armies.
74
Sydenham (1952, p. 66) argues that the models for the oath scene (perhaps minted
about twenty years prior to the Social War) were produced at a non-Roman mint, possibly in
Samnium.
75
Tataranni (2005) emphasised the nationalist characteristics of the coinage and in
particular the expression of a Samnite identity in the coinage of Paapius Mutilus. See also
Burnett (1998, pp. 166–167) and Tweedie (2008).
76
See Chapters 8 and 9, and also the discussion in Syme (1939, pp. 286f ).
The Roman Commanders and the Muster
There are a number of indications that the war broke out after the election of the
consuls for 90, which would thus place the uprising sometime between October
and December 91. There is no reference to either Drusus’ death or the murders
of the Romans at Asculum as having influenced the consular elections for
90 bce. Although unfortunately the timing of the consular elections in the
period is not certain, as a general rule up until the time of Sulla they were
frequently held late in the year. As argued above, it is highly likely that the actual
seriousness of the war became progressively apparent as more and more people
joined the insurgency. In turn, the delegation sent to Rome by the insurgents
must have made clear the unyielding stance of both the Senate and the insurgents.
It is possible that the consuls of 91 had remained in Italy throughout
the year. Certainly, the consul Philippus had been in Rome until late in 91,
spearheading the public campaign against Livius Drusus. As discussed above,
he was subsequently involved in the activities of the court set up by the lex Varia
in 90. The activities of the other consul, Sex. Iulius Caesar, are not documented
although he must have remained in Italy up until after the celebration of the
feriae Latinae.77 As is clearly stated by Appian, rather than the consuls of 91
taking the field immediately, both of the consuls for 90 were assigned Italy as
their command and must have departed soon after taking up office.78 Even so,
according to Cicero a vote of the Senate directed the consuls L. Iulius Caesar
and P. Rutilius Lupus to restore the temple of Iuno Sospita in accordance with
a dream of Caecilia Metella.79 The significance of such an omen would have
been apparent to Romans. The cult of Iuno Sospita at Lanuvium had been held
in common between the people of Rome and the Latins since the conclusion
of the Latin War in the fourth century. As with the feriae Latinae (discussed
in Chapter 4) the site had associations with the war which had resulted in the
enfranchisement of a number of the ancient Latin cities.
The rapid departure of the consuls in 90 may have been facilitated by the
quick action taken to begin the process of raising troops. Q. Sertorius (pr. 83)
as quaestor oversaw the raising of soldiers and the collection of arms for the
conduct of the war in Cisalpine Gaul.80 Many of the men raised in the region
77
In consequence, Badian (1964a, p. 51) and Keaveney (1983) speculated that he had
been assigned a province outside of Italy.
78
App. BC. 1.40: ἄμφω γὰρ ὡς ἐς μέγαν τε καὶ ἐμφύλιον πόλεμον ἐζῄεσαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς
πύλας οἱ ὑπόλοιποι καὶ τὰ τείχη διὰ χειρὸς εἶχον ὡς ἐπ᾽ οἰκείῳ καὶ γείτονι μάλιστα ἔργῳ.
79
Cic. Div. 1.2 (4) and Iul. Ob. 55.
80
Plut. Sert. 4.1; Sall. Hist. in Gell. AN. 2.27.2.
would have been loyal allies, although local Romans were probably also enlisted.81
These activities almost certainly occurred during the winter of 91/90, although
whether Sertorius was elected for 91 or 90 is debatable.82 It is plausible that he
was already present in Cisalpine Gaul in the early months of the year and that
therefore recruitment in the region began very rapidly.83 This interpretation of
the timing of the revolt at Asculum and the subsequent military response by the
Romans is consistent with the preserved fasti consulares from the Capitoline.
The Social War is labelled as bellum Marsicum on a separate line and centred,
below the names of the consuls of 91 and above those of 90 bce.84 The inscribed
fasti are written in two columns with a small break between the names of the
two consuls for each year. Other examples from the fasti show that when such
‘headings’ occur (for example, bellum Antiochinum above the consuls of 191,
bellum Persicum above those for 171 and bellum Punicum tertium for 149) they
refer to the names of the consuls written below.85
The consul L. Iulius Caesar was assigned command of Roman operations in
the southern regions where the insurgency had taken root, operating during 90
throughout parts of Samnium and the fiercely contested Campania, while the
consul P. Rutilius Lupus oversaw operations to the northwest of Rome in Latium
and the regions of the Marsi and neighbouring peoples. One of the consuls of
91, Sex. Iulius Caesar, was prorogued and commanded an army in Picenum in
90 bce.86 Such Roman actions would have occurred contemporaneously with
the insurgent moves to raise men, issue coin and install garrisons at strongholds
throughout regions that were most sympathetic to their cause. The Roman
Senate likely overrode any existing division of commands for 90 and allowed
81
Gabba (1967, p. 130) argued that they were primarily citizens, although given
references to large numbers of allies from Cisalpine Gaul serving in the war it is logical to
associate these troops with Sertorius. See further discussion below.
82
Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 27 and Katz (1983, pp. 53–56) argue that Sertorius served
as quaestor in 90 and therefore would have begun his tenure in December 91. Such timing
would imply he was specially sent as a result of the looming war and is consistent with Plut.
Sert. 4.2. Both Spann (1987, pp. 161–162) and Konrad (1994, pp. 52–53) instead argue
that Sertorius took up office in December 92 and therefore spent the final months of his
quaestorship in Cisalpine Gaul raising soldiers until his replacement arrived, probably
sometime during the winter of 91/90.
83
That is, following the argument forwarded by Konrad (1994, pp. 52–54).
84
Inscr. Ital. pp. 54f, 129 and 480f.
85
Inscr. Ital. pp. 48, 50 and 52.
86
Keaveney (1983) suggests he may have been brought back to Italy from an overseas
command in the middle of 90 bce.
sufficient time for an initial muster, prior to the consuls taking up office on 1
January 90.
Appian asserts that it was only once the severity of the war had become
apparent that legati were also appointed, implying that they were selected by
the Senate after the departure of the consuls from the city.87 In turn, Appian
further supports the view that in December 91 the extent of the war was
not yet fully understood by the Senate. As discussed previously, according
to Asconius day after day fresh reports of cities having joined the insurgency
were reaching Rome.88 This may indicate that, as the insurgents began to move
against communities which had not spontaneously declared their support for
the rebel cause, the Senate became increasingly aware that they would need to
confront the Italians with armies on multiple fronts and for this reason made
preparation for a substantial increase on their initial deployment. In addition,
men continued to be enlisted as fighting escalated. Appian provides the names
of the five legati that were assigned to each of the consuls of 90 bce. While this
gives the impression of a highly schematic distribution between the two consuls
this does not preclude there having been additional legates which he simply
fails to name.89 The consul L. Iulius Caesar received P. Cornelius Lentulus,
T. Didius (cos. 98), P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97), L. Cornelius Sulla (cos. 88 and
80) and M. Claudius Marcellus, while his colleague P. Rutilius Lupus received
Cn. Pompius Strabo (cos. 89), Q. Servilius Caepio, C. Perperna, C. Marius (cos.
107, 104–100, 86) and [M.] Valerius Messala. Appian omits to name the other
legates that were active in the year – for instance the propraetor L. Porcius Cato
(cos. 89) was active in Etruria in late 90 (although the extent of military action
is debateable) with A. Plotius serving as his legatus.90 There were also two legati
later mentioned by Appian, L. Cornelius Scipio (possibly Asiagenes, cos. 83) and
L. Acilius, who escaped from the city of Aesernia when it was besieged by the
insurgents.91 When the city was captured by the rebel allies in 90 the legatus
M. Claudius Marcellus, serving under L. Iulius Caesar, was taken prisoner.92 In
light of the operation of the consul in the region in 90, Scipio and Acilius may
have been under his command.
87
App. BC. 1.40. This is possibly supported by report of friction between C. Marius
(leg. 90) with the consul Rutilius Lupus.
88
Ascon. 73–74 on Cic. Corn.: crebraeque defections Italicorum nuntiarentur.
89
App. BC. 1.40. On the possibility of additional legates, see Domaszewski, (1924,
pp. 20f ) and Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 28–30.
90
On the suggested identification, see Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 29.
91
App. BC. 1.41.
92
Liv. Per. 72; Diod. Sic. 37.19.1–2; App. BC. 1.41.
Appian implies that the legates each received specific territories, and that
the consuls moved from location to location to oversee the campaign within
their respective command spheres (provincae).93 Many of these legati were of
praetorian or even consular rank, and some likely commanded at some stage with
praetorian imperium (that is, as legati pro praetore).94 The senate’s long-standing
aversion to extraordinary commands (that is, imperia granted to private citizens
‘extra ordinem’, outside of the traditional magisterial cursus honorum) may,
perhaps, explain why there are no indications of such appointments. While it
is not impossible to preclude the designation of independent propraetors (with
full praetorium imperium auspiciumque) by the Senate (Vervaet, 2009, 2014),
there is no indication whatsoever of popular votes establishing extraordinary
proconsular commands, on the model of what had happened during the Second
Punic War and on account of C. Marius in 88 bce.95 The choice to operate
instead through a wide range of legati (pro praetore) also placed a constraint
on overly adventurous commanders. As legati, these commanders were entirely
subordinate to the (pro)magistrates holding independent imperium auspicumque
and had, moreover, no hope of winning for themselves triumphal honours.96 In
the case of both 90 and 89 bce one of the year’s consuls appears to have acted
rashly and been killed in battle as a result. As discussed below, in both these
instances existing legati were probably made legati pro praetore.
Appian’s own account does indeed show a number of the legates operating
in particular regions or apparently based around a particular city, but over the
course of 90 bce communities throughout the southern interior were continuing
either to willingly join the rebel Italians or to be forcibly compelled to give their
support. Distributions of subordinate commanders may well not have been the
product of defined operational regions but rather the product of basic military
necessity. As the account found in Appian and other sources indicates, the
two consuls advanced against major Italian insurgent positions. These actions
are consistent with two major concerns in 90: on the one hand, trying to put
down the insurgency with military force and, on the other, trying to discourage
additional people in the south from joining the Italians.
93
Appian BC. 1.40 claims that they both visited all parts of the field of operation.
94
Cic. Font. 19(43) cites the consuls of 90 and 89 as having had many subordinate
commanders of praetorian rank, specifically describing them as praetorios homines.
95
See discussion of these appointments in Vervaet and Ñaco del Hoyo (2007) and
Vervaet (2014).
96
An explanation of the distinction is provided in Caes. BCiv. 3.51. As shown by
Vervaet (2014, pp. 93–97), it was particularly important for determining eligibility for the
award of triumphal honours.
The considerable number of commanders and, in consequence, the increasing

commitment of soldiers to the war in Italy must have had significant flow-on to
regions under Roman control beyond the peninsula. At the time of the Social
War the Romans annually elected six praetors, the number not being raised to
eight until under Sulla. Brennan argued that between 92 and 88 bce the five
praetors/propraetors required to command the provinces were all continuously
prorogued. In the provinces he argues that the praetors were as follows:
C. Norbanus (probably Sicily), P. Servilius Vatia (probably Sardinia), C. Valerius
Flaccus (in charge of both Spains), C. Sentius Saturninus (Macedonia) and
P. Sextilius [Rufus?] (probably Africa).97 This leaves as many as nine other
praetors and propraetors in 90 bce, most of whom are assumed to have served in
Italy. Among these were certainly C. Caelius (Gallia Transalpina),98 M. Caecilius
Cornutus, L. Cornelius Cinna, L. Cornelius Merula, Cn. Octavius (operating in
the east) and L. Potumius (operating in Samnium).99 In addition, C. Cassius is
suggested as a praetor for 90 bce by Broughton.100 Meanwhile there were at least
two propraetors active in Italy: L. Porcius Cato, who may have been sent out to
Etruria late in 90 bce,101 and possibly Ser. Sulpicius Galba in Lucania.102
For the consuls to have departed immediately the muster must have begun
in November/December 91 and the levy would have been truly enormous. The
summary of Livy gives some indication of its size when it reports that Livy set
out in his history an account of the Latin communities and foreign peoples who
sent auxiliaries.103 According to Appian the Romans continued to raise men
throughout the year104 and the Italians ultimately mobilised an army of 100,000
men (both foot and horse) in addition to those men who they had serving as
97
Brennan, Praetors, 2, pp. 707–708.
98
Called C. Caecilius in Liv. Per. 73. On the emendation, see Broughton, MRR, 2,
p. 25.
99
He is described as having been captured and killed by the Samnites (Liv. Per. 73).
100
101
Liv. Per. 74; Flor. 2.6.13.
102
Based on Liv. Per. 74. The identity of this man is problematic, see the discussion in
Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 31, n. 18.
103
Liv. Per. 72: auxilia deinde Latini nominis et exterarum gentium missa populo
Romano. This listing may have been akin to those found in preserved sections such as the
section setting out the Latins who had promised to provide all possible support during
the Hannibalic War or the list of those who fought at Pydna. A contrary interpretation
is forwarded by Mouritsen (1998, pp. 159–161) who argues that the summary is possible
evidence of difficulties raising Latin auxiliaries and attributes early military setbacks to their
wavering support. This argument is briefly refuted by Keaveney (2005, p. xii).
104
App. BC. 1.40.
garrisons in sympathetic cities and strongholds.105 He claims that the Romans

fielded an equal number of citizens and Italian allies, although whether this
figure refers to their peak mobilisation during the war and, if so, when that point
might have occurred is uncertain. That the Roman muster probably exceeded
the initial figure of 100,000 is, however, clear. Domaszewski argued that the
Romans mobilised for the campaigns of 90 fourteen legions, two for each of the
consuls and one for each of the ten specially appointed legati. Upon the basis
that the legatus C. Perpena’s army numbered 10,000 men, he estimated the total
number of men mobilised by the Romans to have been 140,000 (Domaszewski,
1924, pp. 22f ).
Significant numbers of men from allied communities in Spain, Cisalpine
Gaul and Numidia are specifically attested serving during the war. These
included 10,000 Gauls and Numidian auxiliaries who served in the army of
L. Iulius Caesar in Campania in 90 bce and men from Cisalpine Gaul and
Spanish auxiliaries serving in the army of Pompeius Strabo.106 Furthermore,
the exceptional seriousness of the war is demonstrated by the fact that warships
were enlisted from various parts of the east and brought to Italy. Several specific
examples are known. A bilingual bronze tablet found at Rome preserves a senatus
consultum issued on 22 May 78 bce that three ship’s captains (from Carystus,
Clazomenae and Miletus respectively) had given long and valiant service to the
Republic since first being called upon in the bellum Italicum.107 Similarly, in
a badly garbled reference to the Social War, the historian Memnon (possibly
dating to the second century ce) claimed that two triremes were sent by his
native city of Heraclea Pontica on the southern coast of the Black Sea to fight in
the Social War and returned eleven years later.108 These examples are unlikely to
have been isolated instances and it suggests that ships were probably also taken
from other cities in the east.
Apparently during late 91 and throughout 90 bce the communities of
Cisalpine Gaul in the peninsula’s north remained quiet. There is no indication
that they participated in the political wranglings in Rome caused by Livius
Drusus’ tribunate, the agitations that were associated with Poppaedius Silo or,
indeed, became restive in the way in which the peoples of Etruria and Umbria
105
App. BC. 1.39. The figure looks suspiciously like a broad approximation, although it
has been accepted by, for instance, Mommsen, Hist. Rom. 3, p. 507.
106
App. BC. 1.42; CIL, 12, pp. 560f; ILS, 8888.
107
CIL, 12, p. 588.
108
Memnon, History of Heracleia in FGrH 434. 21. The text describes the Marsi, Paeligni
and Murrancini as peoples of Africa. See the recent discussion of this highly problematic
ancient text in Dueck (2006).
did in the later part of 90. Q. Sertorius (pr. 83) served as quaestor in Cisalpine
Gaul during the Social War, where he levied troops and sourced arms for the war.
This appointment is described by Plutarch as occurring just before the outbreak
of the war and thus plausibly fell over the winter of 91/90 bce. He probably
served there during 91, raising troops after the murders at Asculum but prior to
the major hostilities of 90.109 He is described by Sallust as having been of ‘great
use’ during the Social War in raising soldiers and arms.110 The region appears to
have remained relatively quiet until fighting between Octavius and Cinna in 87
led to the region becoming a source of support for Cinna and his allies (among
them Sertorius). For this reason Sertorius’ service during the Social War, in
which he was permanently disfigured, probably occurred after his quaestorship
on the staff of one the consuls in 90 and again in 89.111
A number of legati in 90 bce were particularly active: C. Marius, C. Perperna
(pr. 91), Cn. Pompeius Strabo, Q. Servilius Caepio and M. Valerius Messalla all
served as legati under the consul Rutilius. Marius, and then shortly afterwards
Caepio, was given command of Rutilius’ army following his death in 90 bce.
Caepio received the command of part of the consul’s army by decree of the
Senate with imperium equal to that of Marius.112 The two held equal rank,
possibly as legati pro praetore.
109
Plut. Sert. 4.1, As discussed above the date is uncertain, see Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 27
and Katz (1983, pp. 53–56); cf. Spann (1987, pp. 161–162) and Konrad (1994, pp. 52–57).
110
Quoted in Gell. 2.27.2 (Sall. Hist. 1.77 in McGushin).
111
See the reconstruction of Sertorius’ service during the war in Konrad (1994,
pp. 55–57).
112
Liv. Per. 73; App. BC. 1.44.
Chapter 6
The War in Italy (90 bce)
The initial Italian offensive was rapid and occurred on multiple fronts. This
military campaign may have been directly triggered by Silo’s initial efforts
to induce communities in the neighbouring regions to support them in the
aftermath of the murders at Asculum. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the insurgent military campaign almost certainly began during the winter of
91/90 bce, although the exact timing of it is not clear from the ancient literary
sources.1 Some indication can be gleaned, however, from the sequence of
preparations that was suggested in the previous chapter. Certainly the insurgents
had likely already begun attacking cities that had not willingly supported their
cause before the consuls of 90, who would have taken up office on 1 January 90,
could muster sufficient soldiers to take the field against them. This is indicated
by the fact that the Italians had captured or laid siege to a number of key citadels
and, in the process, trapped Roman commanders and their garrisons apparently
unaware of the impending danger. Thus the capture of one of the praetors of
91, Sulpicius Galba, at Grumentum probably occurred shortly after Asculum
and as the insurgents forces were mustering.2 The experience of the insurgent
leadership in working within Roman military systems must surely have given
them a significant advantage in terms of timing their actions and determining
initial targets for their attacks.
Initial insurgent efforts appear to have focused on taking key cities in
insurgent regions, in particular the fortified Latin colonies of the south, which
at the outbreak of the war remained defiantly loyal to Rome. The insurgents also
attempted to secure the major Roman routes eastward and southward from the
city of Rome before the Romans could adequately muster their forces for the
campaign of 90 bce. It was also almost certainly an intentional by-product of
this policy that a number of their initial advances triggered either the revolt or
the acquiescence of other cities, as key routes through central and southern Italy
were cut off from Roman protection.3 That such military activity was necessary
at all indicates something very important concerning the sentiment in central
1
See the sequence proposed in Kiene (1844, pp. 191–206).
2
Liv. Per. 72. On Galba’s praetorship having been in 91, see Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 21.
3
Recognition that the insurgents had a detailed knowledge of Roman practice occurs
in Ad Heren. 4.9(13).
and southern Italy towards the insurgency. While Poppaedius Silo appears to
have been persuasive in inducing people to support the insurgent cause the
events of the winter of 91/90 and the establishment of Italia did not occasion
a wholesale abandonment of treaties to Rome throughout all of the south. The
social and political divisions in Italy and the aspirations of different interest
groups had contributed to the unrest of 91 but probably equally served as an
obstacle to the insurgents building a consensus in Italy against Rome as it had
done for Livius Drusus attempting to build a consensus for reform. Had allied
discontent with Rome been equally felt throughout Italy the course of the war
would have been radically different.
The Initial Italian Offensive
The first moves of the insurgents indicate that they had not only planned well
but that they were taking full advantage of their detailed knowledge of the
typical strategy and operations of the Roman army. The insurgent commanders
and many of their soldiers would have, without doubt, had experience of serving
with the Roman army,4 many of them possibly in the mass mobilisation that
had occurred for the Cimbric War. That note, support for the Italian cause was
by no means unanimous, with communities possessing Latin and Roman rights
remaining steadfast against their rebellious allies. In the northernmost regions
where the Italian insurgency had particularly taken hold they do not seem to
have moved out from their own territories initially; what little can be gleaned
from the literary sources suggests that they were preoccupied with besieging
communities that did not voluntarily join them. A clear example of this is the
Vestini, who occupied a small area of land to the north of the insurgent ‘capital’
of Corfinium/Italia in the vicinity of the centres Pinna and Amiternum. Pinna
was the most important city of the Vestini5 and it remained loyal to Rome when
the war erupted. It was the scene of particularly brutal murders at the hands of
the rebels and was famous among the generation after the war for its adherence
to Rome in spite of these horrors.6
4
This intimate knowledge is observed by the speaker in Ad Heren. 4.9(13). Similarly,
Plut. Cat. Min. 1–2 describes Poppaedius Silo as having extensive military experience, which
must surely refer to service in an allied contingent.
5
Ptolemy, Geo. 3.1; Strab. 5.4.2(240).
6
On the brutality of the siege at Pinna, see Diod. Sic. 37.19 and Val. Max. 5.4.7.
Ad Heren. 2.28(45) compares the loyalty to Rome during the Social War of the people of
Alba Fucens with that of the people of Pinna.
The War in Italy (90 bce) 127
As the campaigns of early 90 would demonstrate, the flexible structure of the

Italian organisation allowed for the Italian armies to fight autonomously, either
trapping Roman garrisons or intercepting the advancing Roman commanders,
then to unite, as would happen at the Tolenus River or Mt Falernus in order to
swamp Roman armies and annihilate them. The insurgents clearly seem to have
aimed at inciting as many people as possible to support their cause. The timing
of the revolt may also not have been as coincidental as the murders at Asculum
seem to indicate, the winter giving the Italians time to send a delegation to Rome
in the hope of brokering a resolution to the situation.7 This attempt having
failed, the Italians went on an active offensive in southern Italy, probably hoping
that campaigns in these regions might induce more communities to join the
insurgency and thereby raise all of southern Italy against the Republic. As such, it
is also possibly indicative of a broader Italian strategy: if the Romans elected not
to advance against the Italians they could remain holed up in home territories
and wait out a political solution or until they had raised overwhelming support.
Equally the Romans could march into hostile terrain in the south where the
Italians would be at a greater advantage. This was a strategy reminiscent of the
Samnite wars centuries before. The intention of this would seem to have been to
bog the Romans down in a costly conflict, thereby forcing a negotiation.
The size and severity of the conflict is clearly indicated by the Roman
distribution of commands. In response the Romans deployed both consuls,
L. Iulius Caesar and P. Rutilius Lupus, the proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar,8 the
praetor L. Postumius and the propraetors L. Porcius Cato and Ser. Sulpicius
Galba. A number of Roman legati were also sent out to key regional centres,
two notable examples being the Latin colony of Aesernia and Nola. The legates
L. Acilius and L. Cornelius Scipio were sent out to Aesernia in the western
part of Samnium, while the praetor L. Postumius went out to Nola in central
Campania.9 These deployments are documented because they are mentioned
in subsequent accounts of insurgent assaults on the cities involved, but it is
likely that other pro-Roman regional centres were also used as bases for Roman
operations against the Italians. One such documented example is Capua, which
did not fall to the insurgents despite the taking of many of the coastal cities in
Campania during 90.
7
Diod. Sic. 32.2.6–7; App. BC. 1.39.
8
If Sex. Iulius Caesar (cos. 91) had been assigned a provincia for 90 (as was common
practice in the era), it is likely that as the crisis in Italy became increasingly severe he did not
depart.
9
Liv. Per. 73.
The army of Vettius Scato laid siege to the Latin colonies of Aesernia (in
Samnium) and Alba Fucens (north-west of the Fucine Lake).10 As Latin colonies
these cities were historically intended to serve as bulwarks of Roman power
in their respective regions and it is not coincidental that they were immediate
targets of the insurgency. Indeed, the bravery displayed by the residents of Alba
Fucens, like that of the inhabitants of Pinna, became synonymous with ardent
loyalty to Rome.11 Similarly the stronghold of Nola (in Campania), which had
famously withstood multiple sieges by Hannibal in the Second Punic War,
was besieged by the insurgents.12 In the case of Aesernia, the siege lasted a
considerable time and drove the local inhabitants, first to expel their slaves from
the city and then to feed on their dogs and other animals.13 In turn, there were
a number of Roman attempts to relieve these sieges. The extent of these cities’
fortifications and/or the strategic importance of their locations are evident from
the fact that, once taken, they were used as key strongholds of the insurgency.
The widespread turmoil that must have existed in early 90 bce is also evident
from the confusion which exists in the source material over the sequence of events
and the causal relationships between the actions of the different commanders
on both sides. Appian’s account discusses events in a loosely geographical order.
The brief summaries of Livy, having the advantage of deriving from Livy’s now
lost extensive account, appear to be in predominately chronological order but
other major sources such as Photius’ summary of Diodorus Siculus, Florus
and Velleius Paterculus all adopt non-chronological structures. As such, it is
particularly dangerous to argue from absences of evidence: Poppaedius Silo was
the senior Italian commander in the northern part of the conflict zone but there
is no reference to him being in command of an army until the middle of 90 bce,
while Vettius Scato appears as the most active commander in the northern front
of the war.
In early 90 bce the Italian commanders made a number of interrelated
movements. The sequence of these events can only be tenuously reconstructed
due to the summary nature of Appian’s account. It appears that in 90 bce Vettius
Scato (operating between Aesernia on the western fringe of Samnium through
Marsic, Paelignian and Picentine territory) and Paapius Mutilus (in Campania
and Samnium) were the most successful, but also possibly the most active of
the Italian commanders. Scato’s prominent military role, particularly in 90,
and the absence of any mention of Silo’s activities in the first half of the year is
10
Liv. Per. 72.
11
Ad Heren. 2.28(45).
12
Liv. Per. 72.
13
Diod. Sic. 32.19.
unexplained. Similarly, contrary to some assertions in modern scholarship that

the Samnites were intent upon independence, it was in fact the men under the
supreme command of Paapius Mutilus who showed themselves the most willing
to accept into their service Roman soldiers and civilians. In the north, in the
second half of 90, the soldiers under the supreme command of Q. Poppaedius
Silo in fact showed far less leniency towards captured Romans.
This policy of mercy toward pro-Roman combatants meant that Paapius
Mutilus was extremely successful in acquiring support from communities in
Campania that had initially remained loyal to the Romans. One such example
is provided by events at Nola. According to the summary of Livy, the praetor
L. Postumius was active in Samnium in 90 bce.14 He and 2,000 of his troops
were trapped inside the city by Paapius Mutilus. When Mutilus’ soldiers
eventually took Nola, they captured these men along with their commander.15
The Italian general offered the Roman captives the opportunity to serve under
him,16 Postumius and the officers refused and so were starved to death whereas
the ordinary soldiers accepted. The exact status of Postumius’ command affects
when this siege should be located. If he was indeed one of the elected praetors
of 90 bce posted to Nola when it was captured then the siege almost certainly
began in 90 bce after Postumius had taken up office and not in the last months
of 91 immediately following Asculum.17
The surrender of these Roman soldiers is also interesting in light of later
examples of desertions during the Social War and the subsequent interfactional
conflicts of the first century bce. The mutiny of Roman soldiers was most often
against the specific commander and did not involve disloyalty to the Republic
per se (see Gruen, 1995, pp. 373f; Keaveney, 2007). The willingness of Roman
soldiers to side with the insurgents highlights the distinctive character of the
war. It was these Roman turncoats who then likely accompanied Mutilus on his
campaign south and would therefore have participated in the taking of the cities
14
Münzer suggested that he was L. Postumius Albinus, praetor in 91. Broughton,
MRR, 2, p. 26 accepts that Postumius was an elected praetor in 90. Brennan, Praetors, 2,
p. 372 offers three possibilities: first, praetor with a special provincia for 90; second, praetor
in 91 prorogued for 90; or third, a legate with a special grant of imperium.
15
App. BC. 1.42; Liv. Per. 73. Postumius is not named by Appian, however the summary
of Livy asserts that he was captured and killed by the Samnites at Nola.
16
App. BC. 1.42.
17
Mouritsen (1998, p. 130) views the siege as having begun in 91 bce. As stated in
n. 13, Brennan, Praetors, 2, p. 372 offers three possibilities, although on p. 383 he also raises
the possibility of a date very late in 91.
of Stabiae, Surrentum and Salernum.18 At these cities also, both prisoners and
captured slaves were drafted into the Italian general’s service. With his enlarged
army Mutilus then moved north again, this time into the territory of Nuceria.
The city and the surrounding towns surrendered and were compelled to provide
10,000 infantry and 1,000 horse to the rebels.19 Paapius Mutilus now possessed a
greatly enlarged military force, more than double that of any of his fellow Italian
generals. It is likely that not all of these were taken with his campaigning army
as he would need to have garrisoned the major strongholds in Campania. With
this army he then moved against the city of Acerrae and laid siege to it.20 In
Campania, despite the military campaign of Paapius Mutilus, the important
regional centre of Capua remained loyal and continued to provide assistance to
Rome throughout the war. Thus, in spite of the impression of wholesale calamity
conveyed in the ancient literary sources, as with other regions in Italy, insurgent
successes were not successful in turning the entire region against Rome.21
Campana has suggested that a number of particularly recognisable coins
were issued in 90 bce to commemorate this initial sequence of victories won
by Mutilus in Campania.22 Perhaps the most evocative coin-type issued in this
group is an example showing on the obverse the head of Bacchus surrounded by
a laurel wreath and on the reverse the vivid image of a wolf gored by the bull with
Viteliú (Italia) in Oscan characters (see Figure 5). Other coins that are plausibly
associated with this type include the designation of Paapius Mutilus as embratur.23
These images may well commemorate the insurgent victories won during the
18
Appian (BC. 1.42) gives the names of these cities as Slabiae, Minervium and
Salernum.
19
App. BC. 1.42. The summary of Livy says only that complures populi ad hostes
defecerunt (Liv., Per. 73).
20
App. BC. 1.42.
21
Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.3. 3.
22
Campana (1987, p. 31): ‘Nella serie 6 la propaganda antiromana raggiunge il culmine,
arrivando a rappresentare il toro sannita che abbatte le lupa romana. Essa e strettamente
collegata alla serie 5 per la comune leggenda con la designazione di embratur (=imperatore),
senza dubio commemorante le prime folgoranti vittorie di C. Papio nella Campania.’ See also
Campana (1987, p. 34, Table 1).
23
Campana (1987, nos. 98–102) identifies as Series 6 a number of coins depicting the
wolf gored by a bull, some of which explicitly name Mutilus as the moneyer. Campana argues
that the head of Bacchus/Liber is a direct reference to the freedom sought by the insurgents
(Campana, 1987, no. 103c and Sydenham, 1952, no. 628 with discussion in Campana,
1987, pp. 85–89.) Campana further argued that coins issued with Paapius Mutilus styled
as embratur were closely linked with the series showing the Italian bull goring the Roman
she-wolf. See also Gruber (1970, vol. 2, no. 41, p. 333). A recent discussion which emphasises
the ‘Samnite’ identity expressed in these coins is Tatarani (2005).
early part of 90, although as they all seem to be associated with Mutilus they
more likely refer specifically to those victories won by Mutilus in Campania.
This plausible association highlights that apparently anti-Roman propaganda
on the coinage is not a later feature of the insurgency’s coins or the product of
an increasingly extreme or hard-line attitude among the remaining insurgents.
Instead, the intended message of these coins is significant, commemorating
initial victories and potentially promoting the message to the insurgency’s
soldiers that they could hope to defeat the Roman army in the field.
Figure 5 Anonymous insurgent coin showing a wolf attacked by a bull.

This coin was probably issued by Paapius Mutilus. Ob. Head of
Bacchus/Liber surrounded by a laurel wreath. Rev. The wolf
(Rome) being trampled by a bull (Italia), below VITELIÚ (in
Oscan), with control mark above. Image © The Trustees of the
British Museum
Figure 6 Anonymous insurgent coin depicting Italia and Victory. Ob. The
divine personification of Italy with a star below. Rev. A warrior,
seated, holding a spear and being crowned by Victory. Below
ITALIA in Latin. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum
Operations in Apulia, Campania and Lucania
In the early part of 90 in Apulia, the Italian general Vidacilius induced a number
of communities, among them Canusium and the Latin colony of Venusia, to
support the insurgency. These were significant achievements. Canusium was one
of the principal cities of Apulia and was located upon one of the main roads
between Beneventum and Brundisium, where it crossed the Aufidus River.24
Venusia was a Latin community and was located in the strategically important
region to the south of Samnium, between Apulia and Lucania. As such it was a
natural staging point for Roman armies operating in southern Italy. At Venusia
the insurgents also captured Oxynta, a son of the former Numidian king Jugurtha.
Venusia had had a long record of loyalty to Rome since its establishment as a
Latin colony in the 260s, including receiving the consul Varro after his flight
from the disaster at Cannae in 216 bce.25 The reason for the colony to defect
may have been largely geographic: Venusia was situated on the Via Appia at the
southern extreme of Apulia, bordering on northern Lucania,26 and with many of
the regions north of Venusia having joined the insurgency it was effectively cut
off. According to Appian, Vidacilius’ army also laid siege to a number of other
unnamed cities and executed the leading Roman citizens within each of them,
enrolling captured Roman citizens and slaves into the army.27
Early in 90 bce a number of Roman legati were operating in the vicinity of
Aesernia. Located north of Venafrum to the east of the Volturnus River, the city
was in an important strategic post between Corfinium and Beneventum and
was able to withstand a protracted siege. An Italian army under the command of
Vettius Scato moved on the city early in 90.28 Scato encountered the army of the
consul L. Iulius Caesar outside of the city. The insurgent army forced the consul
to retreat, killing 2,000 Romans in the battle, and then laid siege to the town, in
the process trapping inside the legati L. Acilius and L. Cornelius Scipio who were
in command of the city.29 Caesar’s army was almost certainly coming to relieve
24
Canusium had been a loyal ally during the Second Punic War, receiving the survivors
of Cannae (Polyb. 3.107; Liv. 22.52–54; Val. Max. 4.8.2).
25
On the colony’s establishment, see Hor. Sat. 2.1.34 and Vell. Pat. 1.14. On the city’s
role during the Second Punic War, see Polyb. 3.116–117; Liv. 22.49 and 27.10.
26
Hor. Sat. 2.1.34.
27
App. BC. 1.42.
28
Liv. Per. 72.
29
App. BC. 1.41, who incorrectly believed Sex. Iulius Caesar to have been consul in
90 bce. The siege, but not the commanders, are referenced in Liv. Per. 72. This should not
be conflated with the reference in Liv. Per. 73. Oros. 5.18.14 says that the battle occurred
outside Aesernia.
the city and for this reason the battle should probably be located in the first half
of 90 bce.30 According to Appian, the legates L. Acilius and L. Cornelius Scipio
escaped in disguise.31 L. Cornelius Sulla, one of the consul’s legates, was sent in
command of twenty-four cohorts and succeeded in dislodging the besiegers.32
Appian asserts that M. Claudius Marcellus was one of the consul’s legates33 and
according to the summary of Livy he was captured when Aesernia fell in the later
part of 90.34
The consul L. Iulius Caesar, in command of 30,000 foot and 5,000 horse,
was attacked by Marius Egnatius while attempting to cross a rocky defile. He was
driven back to a river crossing where much of the army was destroyed. This defeat
was significant enough to be recorded in the summary of Livy.35 The survivors
retreated to Teanum where they were reinforced and then moved to relieve the
city of Acerrae.36 Egnatius had earlier in the same year taken Venafrum and killed
the soldiers in the two Roman cohorts stationed there.37 Venafrum was situated
on the Volturnus River, north of Teanum and south-west of Aesernia. As such,
the consul’s army may have been attempting to retake Venafrum, retreating over
the Volturnus to Teanum, from there heading south-east to the city of Acerrae.
As discussed above, in the early part of 90 bce, the insurgent general
C. Paapius Mutilus had succeeded in either taking or inducing the surrender
of a number of Campanian communities. He took Nola before moving south
through the Surrentine peninsula, taking Stabiae, Surrentum and then Salernum.
With an army greatly enlarged by enlisting captives he laid siege to Acerrae.38
Following his retreat to Teanum, the consul L. Iulius Caesar arrived with an army
re-enforced with 10,000 Gallic foot and North African auxiliaries.39 Mutilus used
Oxynta, the son of Jugurtha who had been captured by the Italian insurgents at
Venusia, to shake the loyalty of the North African soldiers in the consul’s army.
30
Oros. 5.18.14.
31
App. BC. 1.41.
32
Oros. 5.18.14.
33
App. BC. 1.40.
34
Liv. Per. 73. The summary says that he was captured by the Samnites, and yet Scato,
the general who had initially laid siege to the city, was a Marsi.
35
App. BC. 1.45 gives details of the battle but says Sextus. However, as a number of
passages betray, Appian is confused between which actions relate to the consul of 90, L. Iulius
Caesar and which to the proconsul of 90, Sex. Iulius Caesar.
36
App. BC. 1.45.
37
App. BC. 1.41.
38
App. BC. 1.42.
39
App. BC. 1.42.
Despite desertions, when Mutilus attacked the Roman camp, Caesar made a
successful counter-attack with his cavalry and killed 6,000 of the enemy troops.40
Appian incorrectly asserts that this army was under the command of the
proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar and places it confusingly in his text before the
events at Venusia. In this instance it is clearly the product of Appian’s confusion
between L. Iulius Caesar and the consul of 91 Sex. Iulius Caesar (pro. cos. 90).41
Orosius provides a brief but clear account of the sequence of these events,
writing that after being forced near Aesernia to flee, the consul’s army killed
many thousands and that it was in consequence of this victory that the consul
was hailed as imperator by his soldiers and that the Senate removed their military
cloaks.42 Both the summary of Livy and Orosius state that the consul L. Iulius
Caesar suffered a defeat at the hands of the Samnites in the early part of the year
and that then later in the year he fought a particularly successful battle against
them,43 which might reasonably be associated with this battle rather than with
the actions in the vicinity of Aesernia.44
In Lucania, P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97), serving as a legate of the consul L. Iulius
Caesar,45 waged an apparently disastrous campaign against an army under the
command of the native Lucanian insurgent leader Marcus Lamponius. Events in
Lucania are only alluded to in the ancient literary sources but can be tentatively
reconstructed. According to Frontinus, Crassus’ army narrowly escaped being
cut off from their camp after the insurgents set fire to the surrounding woods.46
This may be the same engagement in which a fragment of Diodorus claims that
during battle Lamponius ran headlong at the legatus Crassus.47 Crassus’ army
was badly defeated by Lamponius’ soldiers with the loss of 800 men and the
40
App. BC. 1.42; Liv. Per. 73.
41
Appian incorrectly believed Sextus to have been consul in 90 (App. BC. 1.40), a
mistake which is consistently repeated throughout his account of 90 bce. It should also be
noted that it is unlikely that such a large army would have been under the command of the
proconsul. This army was a significant proportion of the total Roman forces deployed in the
year and would therefore much more likely have been under the command of the consul.
42
Oros. 5.18.14–15. See the recent discussion of the appellation by Assenmaker (2012,
pp. 128–130).
43
Liv. Per. 73; Oros. 5.18.
44
See the discussion of the sequence of these events in Keaveney (2005) and Gabba
(1994).
45
Cic. Font. 43 and listed as one of the legates in App. BC. 1.40.
46
Frontin. Str. 2.4.16 and 4.7.41.
47
Diod. Sic. 37.23. The anecdote contained in the fragment could be an out of place
reference to the Battle of the Colline Gate, in which case it refers to M. Licinius Crassus
Dives (cos. 70).
survivors were chased into the central Lucanian city of Grumentum.48 The status
of the city is not clearly documented but it was likely an allied city that remained
loyal to Rome. It had been used as a base of operations by Hannibal during the
Second Punic War, but would have been of allied status following the entire
region’s return to normality.49 According to Florus the city was sacked during
the Social War,50 presumably by Lamponius’ army, although the fate of the
Roman army in Lucania is not clear. The city retained it position of importance
within the region. It was known to both Strabo and Pliny the Elder,51 and the
remains of an impressive first century ce amphitheatre are still extant at the site.
The Battle of the Tolenus River (11 June 90)
The Italian general P. Presentaeus defeated the legate Perperna, killing 4,000
of the 10,000 men under his command. For this humiliating failure Perperna
was stripped of his position by the consul Rutilius and the 6,000 survivors were
transferred to the command of the consul’s legate C. Marius.52 In June 90 the
consul Rutilius, accompanied by his legate Gaius Marius, moved to cross the
Tolenus River by building parallel bridges.53 The Tolenus (the modern Salto
River) is a tributary of the Velinus (modern Velino River) and is located east of
Rome, running near the Latin city of Alba Fucens.54 Appian says instead that
the battle which followed occurred while crossing the Liris River. This claim
is not necessarily as far-fetched as it may at first seem. The Tolenus River (also
called the Trerus) is a tributary of the Liris and its course also runs near the site
of Alba Fucens.
The principal reason for the crossing of the river can also be suggested.
Alba Fucens was situated on the Via Valeria and the road was the main means
of access to the territories of the Marsi and Paeligni. Furthermore it was the
main route between Rome and the cities of Alba Fucens and Corfinium, where
the Italian war council had its seat.55 As such, the Latin colony of Alba Fucens
48
App. BC. 1.41. The city’s location is described in Strab. 6.1.
49
In Liv. 27.41–42 Hannibal camped before the walls and was forced to leave by the
Roman consul Nero. The entire region later resumed its alliance with Rome (Liv. 28.11.16).
50
Flor. 2.6.11.
51
Strab. 6.1; Plin. HN. 3.15.11.
52
App. BC. 1.41.
53
App. BC. 1.43.
54
On the location of the river, see Ovid, Fasti, 6.5.561. Alba Fucens is situated at the
base of Mt Velino.
55
Strab. 5.3.11.
occupied a particularly important strategic location and had been besieged by

the Italian insurgents very early in the war; whether it had already fallen is not
clear. Furthermore, Alba Fucens was situated at the southern extreme of Marsic
territory and was only a short journey from Marruvium, the principal city of
the Marsi, located on the eastern banks of the Fucine Lake.56 As such, it would
appear that Rutilius intended to secure the Via Valeria, possibly in preparation
for an assault on Corfinium. Rutilius is described as having been acting rashly,
supposedly contrary to the advice of his legate Marius and with disregard to
unfavourable omens.57 An attempt to relieve Alba Fucens, or indeed an attempt
on Marruvium or Corfinium, may explain why Rutilius was unduly hasty in his
advance. It was already mid-year and he may have been pressing for an outright
victory that would end the war before the end of his consulship.
The armies of Rutilius and Marius prepared to cross the river via parallel
bridges that they had constructed in early June, the consul selecting a position
that was up-river of his legate. The Italian general Vettius Scato moved to
block these armies and pitched his camp on the opposing side of the river (to
the east), closer to the bridge of the consul Rutilius.58 On the night of 10 June
Scato concealed soldiers in ravines near the consul’s bridge which was located
upstream of that being readied by Marius’ army.59 On the following morning,
11 June, the two Roman armies then began to cross the river. Scato permitted
Rutilius’ army to cross before trapping them on the far side of the river and there
killing the Roman soldiers or driving them in disorder into the river. The consul
was severely wounded in the head during the battle and died shortly afterward.60
The crossing of Marius’ soldiers was also opposed, but by an unnamed Italian
commander. These were possibly detachments from Scato’s army as there is only
one insurgent camp mentioned in the account. When bodies from the consul’s
army began to drift down the river and were spotted by Marius’ army, he pushed
through, marched his soldiers along the bank of the river and took Scato’s camp.61
This left Scato without provisions and he was forced to retreat on the morning
of 12 June. At the Tolenus River, Scato conceded the crossing of the river in the
hope of trapping the consul’s army and destroying it. This battle would seem
56
On the area around the Fucine Lake, see Letta (1972).
57
Iul. Ob. 55.
58
App. BC. 1.43.
59
App. BC. 1.43. No date is given by Appian, but it can be inferred from the date of the
battle supplied by Ovid, Fasti, 6.563–6.
60
App. BC. 1.43.
61
App. BC. 1.43; Liv. Per. 73. A somewhat garbled account is also provided in Oros.
5.18.
to be indicative of the broader Italian strategy in the war. The large number of
bodies, including those of the consul and many patricians, caused such a calamity
in Rome that the Senate decreed that the Roman dead should be buried where
they fell.
Post-June 90 bce
The seriousness of the war by this stage and the impossibility of recalling the
surviving consul, L. Iulius Caesar, to Rome in order to preside over the election
of a suffectus consul meant that for the second half of the year there would be only
one consul.62 The circumstances at this point in mid-90 undermine Keaveney’s
argument that the proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar had ‘succeeded to the position
of supreme commander once held by Rutilius’.63 Instead, as is stated in a number
of literary sources, the Senate in the days after the battle at the Tolenus River
appointed C. Marius to the command of the survivors of Rutilius’ army. In all
likelihood, this decision merely formalised what had already occurred in the
field on the evening of 11 June, when Marius would have assumed the command
of the survivors after the battle.
While this situation had been dictated by circumstances, the Senate was not
comfortable with it for long. Marius now indeed commanded the remains of
both the legatus Perperna’s army and the surviving soldiers of Rutilius’ consular
army. In addition, Marius still retained command of his original army. Despite
the heavy losses sustained in Picenum and Latium in the first half of 90 bce,
Marius therefore probably commanded a force comparable to that of the consul
L. Caesar in the south.64 The Senate’s concern at this significant increase in
Marius’ manpower almost immediately prompted them to put another legatus
of 90 bce, Q. Servilius Caepio, on a footing of equality with the former,65 the
62
Explicitly stated by App. BC. 1.44 but implied by other ancient sources.
63
Keaveney argues that Sextus ‘departed for his province early in that year … Upon his
return he was invested with proconsular imperium and succeeded to the position of supreme
commander once held by Rutilius’ (2005, p. 141). This argument is problematic. First, if
Caesar had been assigned a province and had departed then he would already have held
imperium. Second, there is no evidence in this instance of a proconsul succeeding to ‘to the
position of supreme commander’ (in Italy).
64
According to App. BC. 1.45 the consul Caesar had 30,000 infantry and 5,000 horse.
Brunt (1971, pp. 436–439) has reasonably argued that each of the legati in 90 bce would
have commanded ‘on paper’ approximately 10,000 men.
65
Kildahl (1968, p. 145) suggests that after the battle of the Tolenus River Marius had
‘won the most decisive battle of the entire war against the Marsi. In spite of this demonstration
remains of Perpenna’s and Rutilius’ forces being probably partitioned between

the two commanders.
There were several factors which influenced this choice of commander.
According to the summary of Livy, while a legatus of the consul Rutilius (that
is prior to June 90), Caepio had been besieged by the insurgents and made a
successful counter-attack. It was upon the basis of this victory that the summary
asserts that he was elevated to a position of equality with Marius.66 While this
action may have indeed indicated that he would be a commander inclined
to aggressively prosecuting the war (a stark contrast to the accusations in the
sources that Marius delayed and avoided open combat), it does not explain the
underlying reason for splitting the command. Marius is commonly accused
of having been overly timid in his command against the rebel Italians and the
appointment of a more aggressive commander on a footing of equality was
likely an indicator that the Senate expected its commanders to aggressively
pursue the war. Another likely factor is the ongoing factional rivalries in Rome.
As discussed in Chapter 4, Caepio had been prominently opposed to Livius
Drusus in the previous year and in 91/90 bce had been involved in pursuing
through the courts some of Drusus’ closest supporters. Caepio was likely seen
as someone who would be indifferent to Italian rebel attempts to negotiate. The
type of command is not preserved in the ancient sources but given the previous
commands of both men and the role that they were jointly assigned, that of
commanding in the other main combat zone of the year, they were probably
both legatus pro praetore.67
The arrangement did not, however, last long. Caepio was soon thereafter
approached by Q. Poppaedius Silo, the driving force behind the Italian
insurgency. Silo claimed that he wished to defect to the Romans and offered as
security two infants who he claimed to be his children, along with bars of gold
and silver. According to Appian, these infants were in fact the offspring of slaves
and the precious metals counterfeit. Having given these sureties, Silo offered to
lead Caepio to the location of an Italian army. Caepio agreed, and was lead into
an ambush by Silo, in which Caepio and his accompanying soldiers were killed.68
of ability, the chief command was still withheld from him.’ The most decisive battle is an
overstatement and such a view is possibly the product of interpreting App. BC. 1.46 and Plut.
Mar. 33 as referring to separate victories.
66
Liv. Per. 73.
67
The status of Marius’ and Caepio’s command in 90 bce is not suggested by Broughton,
but given that this appointment was made by the Senate without reference to the people it is
highly unlikely that they were given proconsular commands.
68
App. BC, 1.44.
A funerary inscription found near the Porta Ostiensis at Rome records a soldier
by the name of [C.] Sergius as having been killed in battle along with Q. Caepio,
but the inscription does not record Caepio’s magistracy at the time of his death.69
There were two factors that may have influenced Caepio’s decision to believe
Silo. First, given Poppaedius’ relationship with Livius Drusus he may well have
also known Caepio and been able to leverage this relationship. Second, Caepio
was clearly eager for a major success against the Italians and so naively jumped
at the first opportunity presented to him. Diodorus is very explicit that the
children were a ruse, but how such a story could have arisen is not clear. Given
that Caepio believed the children to be Silo’s how it was subsequently discovered
that they were slave-children is not explained. As with the story of Poppaedius
and the young Cato, preserved in Plutarch, this may be an indication that the
non-extant detailed histories of the period such as the original text of Diodorus,
Sisenna, Livy and Cassius Dio recorded insurgent perspectives on the conflict
which have been largely obscured by later summarisers.
After the death of Caepio, his surviving soldiers were placed under the
command of Marius.70 Diodorus, Appian and Plutarch each provide brief
accounts of Marius’ actions in the remainder of the year against the army
of Poppaedius Silo.71 Marius is consistently asserted as having conducted
operations against the Marsi. The problem, however, is that because the war
as a whole is sometimes referred to as the ‘Marsic War’ and insurgents as the
‘Marsi’, these references may be specific references to the Marsian people and
operations within their territory or, alternatively, simply generic references to
operations against the insurgents. Furthermore, the fearsome rivalry between
Sulla and Marius has also likely created apparent inconsistencies in the ancient
sources. There were undoubtedly conflicting claims made by the two about their
respective records during the war. While Sulla successfully capitalised upon his
successes (particularly in the elections for the consulship of 88) and would later
even claim to have witnessed divinely inspired signs of his victories, all of Marius’
actions in the Social War seem to have damaged his reputation.72
At first glance these accounts appear to be contradictory, but in fact they
can be shown to refer to the same events.73 The summary of Livy claims that
Herius Asinius, in command of an army of the Marrucini, was killed in combat
69
ILS, 29.
70
App. BC, 1.44.
71
Diod. Sic. 37.15; Plut. Mar. 32–33; App. BC, 1.46.
72
Thus Plut. Mar. 33 claims that the war added as much to Sulla’s reputation as it took
away from Marius: ὅσον Σύλλᾳ προσέθηκε δόξης καὶ δυνάμεως, τοσοῦτον ἀφεῖλε Μαρίου.
73
Kildahl (1968, pp. 144–146) places the events in sequence.
with Marius’ army, and that following this victory Marius’ soldiers fought
successfully against the Marsi.74 Plutarch asserts that Marius’ conduct during the
war diminished his reputation as much as the Social War enhanced Sulla’s and
claims that Marius was slow in attacking and prone to hesitation.75 Despite these
assertions Marius won a victory over the insurgents which killed 6,000 of the
enemy and captured another 7,000.76 This victory over the Marsi is attributed to
both Sulla and Marius by Appian.77
According to Appian, after this engagement the Marsi rearmed themselves
and moved against Marius’ army but were unwilling to offer battle.78 Plutarch
and the summary of Diodorus provide conflicting stories of Marius’ soldiers
interacting with an insurgent army. Both of these accounts presume that the two
armies were unwilling to engage in open combat. Plutarch describes a hostile
encounter in which Marius and Poppaedius Silo exchanged insults, seemingly
consistent with the statements in Appian and the summary of Livy. The summary
of Diodorus, however, claims that a genial meeting occurred between Marius
and Silo. This text claims that the meeting occurred while Marius’ army was in
Samnite territory and after Silo had assumed command of the Marsic forces.79
Poppaedius Silo is not otherwise recorded as operating in Samnium until
the winter of 89/88 bce, at a time when Marius had almost certainly already
returned to Rome. Given, however, that the territory of the Caraceni bordered
on that of the Marsi it is not implausible that in the later part of 90 Silo’s army
was ranging further east than Marsic territory.
Operations in Picenum and against the Paeligni
The importance of Picenum to the insurgency and, in turn, to Roman efforts to

suppress it, is clearly demonstrated by the Roman appointments to the region.
Both Cn. Pompeius Strabo (leg. 90, cos. 89) and the proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar
(cos. 91) were active in Picenum during 90 bce. Cn. Pompeius Strabo was
one of the six specially appointed legati of the consul Rutilius in 90 as listed
in Appian.80 The posting of Pompeius appears to have been the product of a
74
Liv. Per. 73.
75
Plut. Mar. 33. A similar statement occurs at Plut. Sulla, 6.2.
76
Plut. Mar. 33; Oros. 5.18.15.
77
Plut. Mar. 33; App. BC. 1.46.
78
App. BC. 1.46.
79
Diod. Sic. 37.15.
80
App. BC. 1.40.
deliberate decision on the part of the Senate. Although evidence is very limited,
Pompeius’ estates and his family’s principal sphere of influence appear to have
been in the region prior to the Social War (see Badian, 1958b, pp. 228f; Seager,
2002, pp. 20–21; Nicols, 2014, pp. 62f ). The family’s influence in Picenum
continued after the Social War, as is demonstrated by both Strabo’s actions in 88
and those of his son Cn. Pompeius (Magnus) in 82 when he was able to readily
raise soldiers from the region, men who had been enfranchised after the war.
Operations against the Picentes and Paeligni are badly garbled by Appian,
upon whose account most of our knowledge is based. At the end of Appian’s
account of 90 bce, there is a short digression where he claims that Sex. Iulius
Caesar had his command prorogued for 89 bce and won a significant victory
over an unspecified insurgent army before dying during the siege of Asculum.81
This passage contains a number of basic logical inconsistencies but it is critical
for understanding military actions against the Paeligni and Picentes in 90 bce.
As discussed above, Appian wrongly believed that Sex. Iulius Caesar had been
consul in 90 bce. In reality, Sextus had been consul in 91 and Lucius Iulius
Caesar consul in 90. Most of the references in Appian to operations conducted
under the command of Sex. Iulius Caesar are, in fact, the actions of the consul
of 90 bce, L. Iulius Caesar.82 The person to whom Appian was referring cannot
be the actual consul of 90, for L. Iulius Caesar was censor in 89. As such, Appian
has incorrectly located the proconsulship of the real Sex. Iulius Caesar in 89
when in fact it occurred in 90 bce.83
According to the summary of Livy, Sex. Sul[picius] won a victory over the
Paeligni. At this point the summary may be conflating a victory of C. Sulpicius
Galba with the victory of Sex. Iulius Caesar.84 Thus the following reconstruction
can be suggested. The proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar oversaw operations south
of Asculum against the Paeligni, while the legati Pompeius and Sulpicius
were operating in Picenum, north of Asculum. In the early part of 90 bce the
proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar won a victory over the Paeligni. The proconsul’s
army engaged an insurgent force of 20,000, killing about 8,000.85 After this
success the proconsul’s army marched on Asculum, attempting to lay siege to it.
81
App. BC. 1.48.
82
Appian, apparently knowing that the proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar died while
conducting a siege of Asculum, had to incorrectly locate that proconsulship in 89 in order to
remain consistent with his own account.
83
See Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 27, 31, n. 11 and Gabba (1967, pp. 130, 145–146).
84
Keaveney (1983, 2005, p. 141) reconstructs these operations but the reconstruction
is problematic (see above, fn. 63).
85
App. BC. 1.48.
According to Appian, the Italian generals Vidacilius, Lafrenius and Vettius

Scato united their armies near Mount Falernus and then moved against the
army of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, which was operating in Picenum.86 The ager
Falernus was a small region immediately north of Campania, along the banks
of the Volturnus River.87 Vidacilius had been operating in Apulia, while Scato
had been laying siege to Aesernia in Samnium in the early part of 90 and was at
the Tolenus River at mid-year.88 If Appian were correct it would have required
the insurgent armies to travel southward to northern Campania before making
a journey of hundreds of kilometres northward, through central Italy. Pompeius
was operating in Picenum, on the Adriatic coast, something which is plainly
obvious from the later part of Appian’s own account. It is much more plausible
that, following their successes in Apulia and at the Tolenus River, Scato and
Vidacilius’ armies marched northward to Picenum where they united with the
army under the command of Lafrenius.
According to Appian the insurgent armies intercepted Pompeius and
defeated his army, forcing him to retreat to the city of Firmum. The choice of
city was not coincidental; Firmum was a Latin colony, located north of Asculum,
a short distance from the Adriatic coast.89 Lafrenius then attempted a siege of
Firmum, temporarily trapping Pompeius and his army inside the city. Upon
learning that the Italians were bringing assistance, Pompeius attacked the Italian
positions. Lafrenius was killed in the battle that followed and, after Sulpicius
Galba burned the Italian camp, the survivors of the insurgent army retreated
inland towards Asculum Picenum.
Appian claims that Pompeius then pursued the insurgents and laid siege
to the city.90 Domaszewski, on the basis of a passage in Frontinus, argued that
Lafrenius had successfully defended Asculum from a first attempt to besiege
it.91 Certainly, Pompeius continued campaigning in the region and during the
winter of 90/89 Pompeius’ army intercepted an insurgent force as it attempted
86
App. BC. 1.47.
87
The ager Falernus was the ancient site of Capua, which served as the boundary
between Campania and Falernum. Polyb. 3.90; Liv. 10.20, 22.13.9 and 22.15.3–4. A detailed
description of the topography of the region is provided by Plin. HN. 14.8(6).
88
On Vidacilius, see App. BC. 1.42 and Gabba (1967, pp. 144–145). On Scato, see
App. BC. 1.41 and 1.43.
89
Firmum was established as a colony about 264 bce. Vell. Pat.1.14; Liv. 27.10 and
44.40.1; Plin. HN. 3.18(13).
90
App. BC. 1.47. A sling bullet found near Asculum possibly refers to both Pompeius
and Sulpicius. CIL, 12, pp. 560–563.
91
Domaszewski on Frontin. Str. 3.17.8. ‘bellum gessit bedeutet eine erste Belagerung
der Stadt Asculum, die von T. Lafrenius verteidigt wurde’ (1924, p. 23).
to return south from its failed attempt to raise support in Etruria.92 Second,
in 89 the insurgent general Vettius Scato was still operating in Picenum. His
and Pompeius’ armies met and the commanders conducted a conference.
This clearly suggests that Pompeius was not continuously present at the siege
operations being conducted at Asculum until after he assumed the consulship in
89 bce. While Appian makes no mention of the proconsul Sex. Iulius Caesar’s
army, the simplest explanation is that, following Pompeius’ victory to the north
of Asculum and the proconsul’s own successes to the south of Asculum, the
proconsul Caesar marched on Asculum and laid siege to it. When Caesar died
of disease, C. Baebius was placed in command of the siege operations.93 Once
Pompeius assumed the consulship at the beginning of 89 the ongoing siege at
Asculum Picenum fell under his auspices.
A Revolt in Etruria and Umbria
There is scant evidence regarding a rebellion in Etruria and Umbria in late

90.94 This ‘revolt’ is important for understanding the Roman rationale behind
the lex Iulia and for establishing that act’s date, but it is equally important for
what it implies about the nature of the desires of the loyal allied communities.
These regions had remained loyal to Rome throughout most of 90.95 Appian
makes no mention of an actual rebellion or of a Roman campaign to suppress
it. In contrast, both the summary of Livy and Orosius are quite emphatic that
at least two battles took place, one against a force of Eruscans and one against
Umbrians.96 In turn they imply that the lex Iulia, which was passed when the
consul L. Iulius Caesar returned to Rome late in the year, occurred in response to
an actual armed revolt in these regions. Appian instead, states that a declaration
of the Senate to enfranchise those allies who had remained loyal had been aimed
at preventing a potential revolt in Umbria and Etruria.97 The simplest conclusion
is that as with a number of other examples in Appian’s text he has truncated
the sequence of events. Orosius describes these battles as having been hard-won
and bloody (plurimo sanguine inpenso et difficillimo labore uicerunt) and there
92
See the discussion below.
93
App. BC. 1.48.
94
It is possible that this unrest continued into early 89 bce.
95
Nagle (1973, pp. 368–372) argued that Roman colonial activities may have triggered
the revolt of Etruria and Umbria. Such an argument does not fully account for the delay.
96
Liv. Per. 75; Oros. 5.18.17.
97
App. BC. 1.49–50.
seems no good reason to view Appian as explicitly contradicting Orosius and the
summary of Livy. In turn, the declaration of the Senate to which Appian refers
might reasonably be viewed as the senatus consultum directing the consul Iulius
Caesar to propose the measure to the centuriate assembly.
Appian’s description of insurgent actions during the winter of 90/89
also implies that a minor uprising had in fact taken place. He writes that the
Etruscans had already accepted citizenship by the winter of 90/89 bce when
the Italian insurgents sent an army of 15,000 men, ignorant of the passing of
the lex Iulia. This army was caught by the forces of Cn. Pompeius Strabo shortly
after he assumed the consulship of 89. About 5,000 of the insurgents died in
the battle, while many more were killed during an attempt to retreat through
the mountains during a severe winter.98 Even if it is argued that this was not in
response to a revolt already underway, the insurgents clearly thought one could
be readily ignited. The failed Italian attempt is thus a further indication that at
least some cities in Etruria and Umbria had declared their support for the rebels
or that they were on the verge of doing so prior to the lex Iulia. Though Caesar’s
law was an elegant solution, the lex Iulia thus occurred in the context of a newly
emerging military emergency in late 90.
Two factors compellingly indicate that a minor revolt did take place in Etruria
and Umbria. First, there is the dispatch of Roman commanders to each of the
regions, one of whom was no less than the consul of the following year L. Porcius
Cato. The other is limited evidence of the destruction of a select number of
communities. On the issue of the Roman commanders, Florus erroneously
claims that an insurgent army was in Umbria and was commanded by a man
named in Florus’ text as Plotius.99 In stark contradiction, the summary of Livy
asserts that A. Plotius legatus Umbros, L. Porcius praetor Etruscos, cum uterque
populus defecisset, proelio vicerunt.100 The description of Cato as praetor by the
summary of Livy is problematic. The leges anales required a two-year interval
between elected magistracies and as such ought to have prohibited Cato’s
election as consul for 89. The stipulation of a two-year interval under the leges
anales does not preclude the possibility that the Senate had granted a special
dispensation to Cato in order to stand for the consulship of 89. Indeed, a range
of different reconstructions has been suggested for Cato’s command. Broughton
argues that A. Plotius was a legate in Umbria, possibly serving under L. Porcius
98
App. BC. 1.50.
99
Flor. 2.18.6–7.
100
Liv. Per. 74. Similarly Oros. 5.18.17: Porcius Cato praetor Etruscos, Plotius legatus
Vmbros plurimo sanguine inpenso et difficillimo labore uicerunt.
Cato as propraetor.101 Salmon (1967, p. 360) argues that Cato, as consul elect,
was sent out to Etruria as propraetor with Plotius as legate. Brennan argues that
Cato was likely a praetorius with a special grant of imperium, although he also
acknowledges that he may have been an elected praetor for 90, with dispensation
to stand in 89 bce.102 Brennan, however, elsewhere tentatively associates the
dispatch of Cato to Etruria, Cn. Pompeius Strabo to Picenum and L. Postumius
to Nola with the initial revolt at Asculum, thereby implying all three commands
dated to 91.103
These possibilities noted, the identities of the elected praetors for the 90s are
frequently conjectural and given the highly condensed nature of the summary,
Cato may have been an elected praetor in 92 or 91, prorogued or specially
appointed in 90 and duly dispatched to Etruria when word reached Rome that
some communities were on the verge of revolt, in turn meaning that his election
as consul for 89 involved no irregular or extraordinary procedure. Given the
widespread nature of the crisis in 90 bce, the conflict’s proximity to Rome and
the large number of attested magistracies it is not unreasonable to infer that, as
with a number of other commanders in the period, able commanders were kept
in office until the crisis could be averted.
That a revolt in at least some communities in Etruria and Umbria must have
occurred is secondly, albeit indirectly, indicated by the fate of a number of cities
in the two regions. A fragment of Sisenna indicates that in Umbria the city of
Tuder received a special grant of Roman citizenship, most likely at some later
stage.104 This would imply that the city did not receive its citizen status under the
provisions of either the lex Iulia in 90 or, indeed, the later lex Plautia Papiria in
89. In southern Umbria, Florus claims that the city of Ocriculum was destroyed.
The city was located on the Via Flaminia a short distance north of Rome. Bradley
(2000, p. 218) has plausibly connected the move of the community from a
hill-fort position to a new location close by the Tiber with the events of the
Social War. In Etruria, Florus claims that the city of Faesulae, located near the
Arno River and a few kilometres from the modern site of Florence, was sacked
by the Romans during the Social War.105 Indeed, on this point Salmon (1967,
p. 360) argued that Cato probably engaged the Etruscans at Faesulae and Plotius
the Umbrians at Ocriculum.
101
Broughton, MRR, 2, 28–29.
102
Brennan, Praetors, 2, p. 373.
103
104
Sisenna, fr. 119. Sisenna states that tamen Tudertibus senati consulto et populi iusso dat
civitatem.
105
Flor. 2.18.11. On the location of the city, see Smith (1856, vol. 1, p. 889).
One of the reasons for this revolt may be explained by a passage in Appian
relating to the events immediately prior to Livius Drusus’ death. He says that both
the Etruscans and the Umbrians feared, as did many Italian allies, that Drusus’
land commission might evict them from Roman ager publicus.106 However, that
fear ought to have been to some extent allayed by the repeal of Livius Drusus’
legislation. If communities in these regions were already disaffected in 91, then
a year of fighting in which the Italian insurgents had proven that they could
realistically challenge the Romans and their loyal allies in the field and with
little prospect yet of the war ending probably prompted some to question their
ongoing loyalty.
A further consideration is of particular importance. The uprising in Etruria
and Umbria, or alternatively the impending threat of such an uprising, was
apparently the trigger for the passage of the lex Iulia. While it could be argued
that swift military actions in both regions negated any further threat of revolt,
had military action alone been deemed sufficient for ensuring the loyalty of
Rome’s allies the lex Iulia ceases to have a rationale. On the alternate view, the
law successfully secured the loyalty of allied communities in Etruria and Umbria
and suggests that, while not all allied communities in Italy joined the insurgency
in 91/90, the demand of the insurgents for enfranchisement in 91 was reflective
of broader sentiments within the allied peoples of the peninsula as is claimed by
a number of the ancient literary sources.
Assessment of the Campaigns of 90 bce
There had been a number of substantial successes for the insurgents, in particular
the taking of a number of Latin colonies, the defeats of the legati Perpenna and
Pompeius, Poppaedius’ ambush of Caepio’s army and Scato’s victory at the
Tolenus River in which the consul Rutilius was killed. But despite these early
successes the later part of 90 saw the Italian insurgents unable to stop several
major centres being besieged. Perhaps worse still for the insurgency was that
by the end of the year a number of the Italian generals had fallen in battle or
opted to commit suicide.107 As discussed above, there were a small number of
influential Italians who were the leaders of the insurgency. With their deaths the
insurgency would began to break down in the following year.
106
App. BC. 1.36. See the discussion in Nagle (1973).
107
Thus, for instance, Asinius (Liv. Per. 73), Lafrenius (App. BC. 1.47) and Vidacilius
(App. BC. 1.48).
A critical factor was the passage of the lex Iulia, which is discussed in the
next chapter. The law secured the fidelity of those allies and Latins who were
still loyal. For the Romans it shored-up allied support but it must have greatly
diminished the hopes of the Italians to induce any more communities to join
the insurgency. The perceived trajectory of the war is also clearly demonstrated
by the Roman decision to lay down military cloaks towards the end of the year.108
As had been the case for several centuries the Romans and their allies could
mobilise crushing numbers of soldiers if given sufficient time. Brunt (1971,
pp. 438–439) estimated that by 89 bce the Romans had mobilised no less
than 150,000 citizens, and that this explains the markedly greater successes of
89 bce.
108
Liv. Per. 73. Also referred to by Vell. Pat. 2.16.4 and Oros. 5.18.
Chapter 7
The Collapse of the Italian Insurgency
(89 to 88 bce)
The war against the insurgents remained the focus of the Republic in 89 bce
and, indeed, even with preparations for the coming campaign in the East, there
was still significant military activity against the insurgents in Italy during 88 bce.
The continued focus upon the Social War was not without good reason, as the
events of 89 bce would prove. At the outset of the year the insurgents still held
key citadels such as Asculum, Corfinium and Aesernia, and furthermore proved
that they still posed a real military threat in the field, achieving a number of
significant victories over Roman armies in the year. Brutal and costly campaigns
were required to subdue them and such campaigns seem acts of particularly
senseless violence, in light of the sequence of legislation that was passed in Rome
between the years 90 and 88 bce. This legislative activity initially granted citizen
rights to communities that had honoured their alliances and had not supported
the insurgency, and then subsequent laws progressively extended citizenship to
those who had given up hostilities. In the following chapter this legislation will
be discussed in detail, but it should be remembered that such legislative activity
was taking place in Rome simultaneously with the events investigated in the
present chapter.
In spite of the continued focus during 89 bce on fighting in Italy and
continued campaigning into 88 bce, documentation is much more limited
for these years. Many of the ancient literary sources provide vague and generic
statements about military activity in Italy. As with 90 bce, Appian’s often out
of sequence and sometimes confused account remains the most detailed ancient
source for the Social War. The focus of his history shifts, however, to the political
machinations in Rome at the end of 89 surrounding the consulship of 88 and
to the looming civil war. Consistent with Appian’s purpose, he focuses upon
material which he sees as illustrating the origins of the civil wars; he did not
seek to write a comprehensive history of the Social War and does not provide
one. A further problem is presented by the relevant summaries of Livy covering
the period of 89 and 88 bce. These are the summaries of books 75 and 76 of
Livy’s original text and there are conspicuous discrepancies in the sequencing
of events. In particular, the timings of the surrender of a number of insurgent
peoples, which on the basis of Appian and Orosius must have occurred
during the winter of 89/88 and thus sometime between the fall of Asculum in
November 89 and February or possibly March 88, are clearly defective. The most
reasonable conclusion is that the order of the sentences is not reflective of the
real chronology; this may be because of errors in the summary, the picking out
by the summariser of references to earlier events or, indeed, the compression of
relevant preceding events.1
Roman Commands in 89
The allocation of Roman military commands in 89 appear to have primarily

followed the model of commands of 90 bce with successful generals in the
field being continued in the same region and almost certainly with the same
soldiers. This was true not only of both the consuls of 89, Cn. Pompeius Strabo
and L. Porcius Cato, but also of Rutilius’ former legatus L. Cornelius Sulla,
who was, at least initially, appointed as a legatus of the consul Cato. Thus, in
89 bce both of the year’s consuls were again assigned Italy and were active in the
northern front of the war. The consul L. Porcius Cato moved against the Marsi,
probably taking command of those soldiers stationed in the area that had been
under the command of the legatus C. Marius (who from July 90 had probably
been designated legatus pro praetore) in 90 bce following the death of Rutilius
(cos. 90). The other consul of 89, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, oversaw operations in
Picenum and continued the siege of the region’s principal city of Asculum. This
had begun in the previous year and thus Pompeius would have retained those
soldiers who had been under his command in 90 bce.
A reduced number of subordinate commanders are attested in 89, however
their official status is frequently unclear and most are simply described as
legati in the ancient literary source material. Of these men the most significant
to the conduct of the war was probably L. Cornelius Sulla (cos. 88, 80), who
operated through Campania, the territory of the Hirpini, and then other parts
of Samnium during the year. He is described as a legatus in the summary of Livy
and Pliny the Elder.2 Although there has been some debate about the status of his
1
See the discussion of the issue in Domaszewski (1924, p. 31), Haug (1947,
pp. 201–204) and Keaveney (2005, p. 154 and n. 14). Keaveney (2005, p.160, n. 14),
accepting the argument in Haug, suggests that the sentences in Liv. Per. 76 are misplaced
within the summary.
2
Liv. Per. 75; Plin. HN. 3.9. Val. Max. 1.6.4 does not provide compelling evidence to
the contrary.
The Collapse of the Italian Insurgency (89 to 88 bce) 151
command,3 Broughton’s argument remains plausible that on the basis of Sulla’s

apparent ‘independence and prominence’ and also the fact that he had legati in
turn serving under him that he probably received a special grant of imperium
after the death of the consul Cato in 89.4 The summary of Livy and Pliny refer
to Sulla as legatus in connection with events between late April and June 89, but
Cato died in late January or February, at which time it seems likely that on the
model of the previous year, the Senate had simply upgraded his command to
legatus pro praetore.5 Aulus Postumius Albinus (possibly the consul of 99) served
as a legatus with command of a fleet in 89.6 He and Sulla are described simply
as legati by the summary of Livy but he almost certainly served under Sulla’s
command7 and as such Albinus and the fleet may have initially served under the
command of the consul Cato. In 89 the praetor urbanus, A. Sempronius Asellio,
remained in the city and was murdered early in the year.8 The identities of the
other praetors elected for 89 are uncertain, although Brennan argued that they
likely remained in Italy throughout the year.9
3
Salmon (1967, p. 364) argues that Sulla would not have held a higher rank than two
former consuls also operating in the south, A. Postumius Albinus and T. Didius. Doubt is
rightly cast on this by Brennan, Praetors, 2, p. 376.
4
Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 38, n. 7: ‘that after the death of the Consul he received a
command similar to those of Marius and Caepio in 90’. Brennan, Praetors, 2, pp. 376–377
suggests that Sulla, initially a legatus of Cato, was granted imperium pro praetore or pro
consule following Cato’s death. Brennan first suggests that Sulla had received a ‘special grant
of consular imperium’ (p. 376). Second, that ‘Sulla was at least pro praetore’ and that he may
have been elevated to pro consule after the death of T. Didius in June. Fourth, that ‘Eutropuis,
who makes Sulla “praetor” (i.e., pro praetore), is the most credible in light of attested practise
for this war. He should probably be accepted’ (p. 377).
5
A range of solutions have been suggested. Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 35, n. 7 argued
that Sulla’s command had likely been enhanced following the death of Cato on the model
of the legati Marius and Caepio in 90. Salmon (1967, p. 364) is reticent about whether
Sulla’s command was enhanced. Keaveney (2005, pp. 210–211) argues that Sulla was given
imperium pro consule by the Senate after Cato’s death and that Sulla ‘will then have taken
over’ Cato’s legates (T. Didius, A. Gabinius and A. Postumius Albinus).
6
Liv. Per. 75.
7
Plut. Sull. 6.9; see Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 37 and Supp., p. 50.
8
Liv. Per. 74; Val. Max. 9.7.4; App. BC. 1.54.
9
Brennan, Praetors, 2, pp. 375–376, cf. Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 33.
Military Campaigns of 89
According to Dio, the army of the consul Cato consisted of men who were both
too old for service and were drawn from the city. Following the rebuking of his
soldiers for laziness and their unwillingness to follow orders, Cato was pelted
with clods of earth.10 If, as is likely, these troops had been under the command
of Marius in 90 bce then they were the collective remains of four armies: that
of Marius’s own original army combined with the survivors of P. Rutilius Lupus
(cos. 90 bce), Q. Servilius Caepio and C. Perperna. Prior to the Battle of the
Tolenus River, Marius had urged the consul Rutilius to delay an engagement
because of untrained recruits in their armies.11 In the later part of 90 Marius is
again described as having been similarly reluctant to engage the enemy12 and the
poor general readiness of the soldiers may explain this. So, too, Cato supposedly
made no secret about his disregard for Marius, something which led to claims
that the younger C. Marius (cos. 82) had been involved in Cato’s death.13
In spite of these criticisms, Cato was initially successful in his campaign
against what must have primarily been Marsic insurgents. His army reached the
Fucine Lake, the valley of which was strategically important. The Via Valeria ran
eastward through the valley with the Latin colony of Alba Fucens to the north
of the road and Marruvium on the eastern shores of the lake, the principal city
of the Marsi, south of the road. The Fucine Lake was also situated south-west of
the site of Corfinium14 and, thus, Cato was probably intending to move against
the Italian ‘capital’ at the site of Corfinium (as the consul Rutilius had likely
intended in the previous year) and to that end were moving against Marruvium.
Little detail is preserved other than that it seems clear that while in the vicinity
of the Fucine Lake the consul was killed during an attempt to storm a Marsi
camp.15 Appian indicates that this battle occurred during the winter and thus
Cato’s death must have been in the very early months of 89.16 His death meant
that, as in the previous year, there was only one consul for the remainder of 89.
10
Dio, 31.100.
11
Oros. 5.18.11.
12
App. BC. 1.46.
13
Oros. 5.18.
14
From the first century ce onwards attempts were made to drain the lake, until it was
successfully achieved in the nineteenth century.
15
Liv. Per. 75 says that he was killed while storming an enemy camp; App. BC. 1.50 has
him killed while fighting the Marsi; Oros. 5.18 says that Cato was murdered by the son of
C. Marius during the battle against the Marsi.
16
App. BC. 1.50.
According to the summary of Livy campaigns were successfully waged

against the Marsi, however, by two legates.17 Their names are badly corrupted
but have been reasonably reconstructed by Broughton as L. Cornelius Cinna
(cos. 87–84) and M. Caecilius Cornutus.18 It was following the successes of these
two commanders that the Marsi began to petition for peace. The summary is
likely compressing events that occurred between the death of Cato and the
widespread surrender of the rebel Marsi and for this reason might be referring
to a campaign by Cinna in the later part of 89 followed by that of M. Caecilius
Cornutus in early 88.19 Although poorly documented these campaigns were
likely significant to the course of the war. The success of Sulla and his supporters
in the civil wars of the 80s may have coloured the historical tradition in regard
to Cinna’s contribution to the Roman success of 89. A possible indication
of the effectiveness of his campaign against the Marsi is that during 89 both
the insurgent council at Corfinium and the forces under the command of
Poppaedius Silo moved south into Samnium, apparently abandoning the
regions of the Marsi, Vestini, Paeligni and Marrucini to the Romans. It is an
indication that support for the insurgency in these areas was beginning to wane.
While some communities may still have been forcibly subdued by the Romans,
significant victories in other parts of the war, coupled with what must have been
a degree of moderation in their treatment of cities which surrendered, would
have been a powerful impetus. So too, the passage of the lex Plautia Papiria in
89 proved that there was good reason to hope for a positive peaceful outcome
for surrendering communities.
Campaigns in Picenum
The remaining consul, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, continued personal command

of operations in Picenum. Direction of campaigns further south against the
Marsi, Vestini and Marrucini were, following Cato’s death, carried out under
his command although the division of these roles is uncertain; the legatus Ser.
Sulpicius Galba likely directed operations against the Vestini and Marrucini
17
Liv. Per. 76.
18
19
See the discussion in Haug (1947, pp. 204–205); Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 43; Keaveny
(2005, p. 154). Haug rightly observes of Liv. Per. 76 that ‘Die Taten beider sind in der
Periocha zusammengezogen, weil diese sicher unbedeutenderen Gefechte die Unterwerfung
der Marser vorbereiteten’ (1947, pp. 204).
while L. Cornelius Cinna (cos. 87–84) conducted the campaign against

the Marsi.20
During 89 bce Cicero, who served on Pompeius Strabo’s staff, had witnessed
a meeting between the consul and the insurgent general Vettius Scato.21 Indeed,
Scato may have survived the Social War.22 Cicero’s story of the meeting
unfortunately does not indicate when in the year it occurred. It possibly took
place at the site of the ongoing siege of Asculum, although Cicero’s service during
the war is not well understood and Strabo presumably did not remain at the
site of the siege for the entire year, but rather campaigned throughout Picenum
while a portion of his army continued to press Asculum.23 Pompeius did have a
considerable force under his command which probably included soldiers taken
from the armies of legates in the previous year. Sling bullets found at Asculum,
some of which were inscribed with numbers identifying the legions which
launched them, show that soldiers drawn from at least four legions were present
at the siege and that there were also units of Gallic and Spanish auxiliaries.24
Sometime in 89 bce the insurgent general Vidacilius, a native-born citizen of
Asculum, attempted to relieve the city. Appian claims that at this time Vidacilius
was only in command of eight cohorts. He arranged for the defenders inside
20
This division of commands is primarily derived from Liv. Per. 76: Marsi quoque a
L. Cinna et Ceacilio Pio legatus aliquot proeliis fracti petere pacem coeperunt. Broughton, MRR,
2, pp. 36–37 and Salmon (1967, p. 365). On the identity of Galba: Brennan, Praetors 2, p. 336.
21
Cic. Phil. 12.27: ‘For the allies were not seeking to deprive us of our citizenship,
but to be admitted to it themselves’. Cic. Brut. 46(169) asserts that Q. Vettius Vettianus e
Marsis, quem ipse cognovi, prudens vir et in dicendo brevis, implying he may have known other
members of the family as well.
22
Given his attempt to negotiate with Pompeius, and his friendship with the consul’s
brother, Scato may have been among those Marsi who surrendered in 89 bce. Plut. Pomp. 6
says that a man in Picenum, possibly a member of the Vettii Scatones, was killed for speaking
out against Cn. Pompeius (Magnus). On the possibility of descendants and family members
of Vettius Scato’s who survived the war, see the discussion in Syme (1939, p. 91), Gabba
(1967, pp. 142–143) and Wiseman (1971, p. 273).
23
Keaveney (2005, pp. 151 and 159, n. 2) places the meeting early in 89 at Asculum.
In turn, this assumes that Scato commanded the failed insurgent attempt to relieve Asculum
in 89. Mouritsen (1998, pp. 164–165 and n. 35) rightly observes that this is uncertain and
that given Oros. 5.18.18 names the insurgent commander who attempted to relieve the city
as Fraucus that the meeting may have occurred later in the year.
24
On the legions present, see CIL, 12, 867–874. On those of either allies from
Cisalpine Gaul or Roman units identifying themselves as from Gaul, see CIL, 12, 864–865.
For Spanish auxiliaries, see ILS, 8888. Roman efforts at the siege were clearly substantial, as
shown by the very high number of Roman soldiers claimed to have been present in Vell. Pat.
2.21.1–2.
the city to sally out against the besieging Roman army on an appointed signal
of his arrival. His attempt failed when the promised support of the defenders
within the city was not forthcoming, although he engaged the besiegers and did
manage to break inside the city. While it is tempting to conflate this story with
the sally from the city commanded by Fraucus found in Orosius, this appears to
be a distinct event. In Appian, the local defenders failed to come to Vidacilius’
assistance when he attacked the Roman positions with a small insurgent army,
forcing Vidacilius to flee to Asculum. In contrast, in Orosius the defenders of
Asculum marched out against the Romans, in significant numbers and were
brutally defeated.25 When Vidacilius entered Asculum, he concluded that the
situation was hopeless and decided to commit suicide.26 According to Appian he
organised a purge of his enemies within the city, whom he blamed for the failure
of the local defenders to come to his assistance, and then held a drinking party
at which he drank poison, and urging his friends to do the same, threw himself
on a funeral pyre.27 Despite his death the siege continued on through the year
89 bce.
As noted above, in an instance described in Orosius, the city’s defenders
made a sally against the Roman positions. This is described as having occurred
after the siege had gone on for some time and was a substantial attack in the
order of 25,000 insurgents. According to Orosius, in the ensuing battle 18,000
of the ‘Marsi’ were killed along with their general Fraucus and another 3,000
were captured.28 Velleius Patercullus claims that in a single battle which occurred
in the vicinity of Asculum there had been 75,000 Roman soldiers and more
than 60,000 rebel Italians. This appears to have been the product of either
contemporaries inflating the magnitude of the battle or a defect in the surviving
manuscripts. Certainly, the significance of the battles which occurred at or
around Asculum and its eventual fall to the Romans were certainly emphasised
by Pompeius Strabo in his triumph and, most likely, subsequently leveraged
by his notoriously ambitious son.29 Following the defeat approximately 4,000
surviving insurgents fled into the nearby mountains and froze to death in the
cold. Orosius claims that when their bodies were found they had been frozen
in position. Orosius describes this battle as occurring on the same day that the
Picentines engaged the Romans in battle and were defeated; eadem die Picentes
25
Oros. 5.18.18–20.
26
App. BC. 1.48.
27
App. BC. 1.48; Oros. 5.18.21.
28
Oros. 5.18.18 describes the siege as Pompeius diu obsedit Asculum ciuitatem.
29
Vell. Pat. 2.21.1–2.
congressi et uicti sunt. Orosius’ text identifies this as the army of Vidacilius but it
is ambiguous if the battle occurred on the same day as Vidacilius’ death.30
This event has been variously connected with a number of other references
to Asculum in the literary sources. For instance, Gabba (1967, pp. 148–149)
suggested that Vettius Scato died in the battle, although he connects it with
Strabo’s earlier action to cut off the insurgent march on Etruria and Umbria and
thus places it in January or February 89.31 While such an argument places it
squarely within the winter at the start of 89 there are good reasons to assume that
this battle occurred in November 89 with the approach of the following winter.
This is indicated by Orosius as he argues that the Romans would not have taken
the city had the insurgents not made this attempt; nec tamen expugnauisset,
nisi populum in campum prorumpentem grauissima oppressione uicisset.32 He
implies that the defeat directly led to the taking of the city. Similarly, that the
surviving insurgents unexpectedly encountered severe weather when they fled
into the mountains may be an indication that they were caught in the early onset
of a winter. Another consideration is that there is no reference to Scato having
been present at Asculum; any such connection relies on placing the conference
between Scato and Pompeius Strabo at the city. As noted above, Strabo may not
have remained at the siege throughout the year, as is indeed indicated by the
reference to him having cut off the insurgent army sent to Etruria and Umbria.33
That event, as Gabba (1967, pp. 148–149) rightly argued, must have occurred
at the end of winter in the early months of 89 once Pompeius had assumed the
consulship. Instead, Orosius describes a sally from the city and associates it with
the ability of Pompeius to take the city. In fact, the key error in Orosius’ text is the
identification of the defenders as Marsians. The city would have been garrisoned
by a local army of Picentines, augmented by the survivors of Vidacilius’ army,
also probably primarily Picentines, which had broken into the city following
their failed attempt to relieve the siege. The identification of Fraucus as a Marsic
legate is thus probably unreliable, but rather he was the commander of the
remaining insurgent forces in Asculum following Vidacilius’ death.34 As a result
30
Oros. 5.18.21: quorum dux Vidacilius conuocatis principibus suis post magnificas
epulas largaque pocula cunctos ad exemplum sui prouocans hausto ueneno absumptus est, cunctis
factum eius laudantibus sed nemine subsequente.
31
The connection is with the events described at App. BC. 1.50. Keaveney (2005)
suggested the insurgent flight into the mountains might be connected with the defeat and
subsequent retreat of the insurgent army sent to Etruria and Umbria.
32
Oros. 5.18.18
33
App. BC. 1.50.
34
Keaveney (2005, p. 216) views Fraucus as a Marsian and legate of Vettius Scato.
this detailed reference to Asculum in Orosius is out of sequence. This conclusion

is reasonable given that in a clear misrepresentation of the sequence of events
Orosius then proceeds to describe Sulla’s successes in Samnium (approximately
June to September 89), Cato’s failed campaign against the Marsi (early 89),
the death of Poppaedius Silo (sometime in 88), followed by Pompeius Strabo’s
actual entry into Asculum (November 89).35
In a short anecdote preserved in Frontinus, while Pompeius was preparing
to assault Asculum, the residents of the city, using elderly and infirm citizens as
a diversion, marched out and forced Pompieus’ soldiers to flee.36 While this is a
disconnected anecdote in Frontinus’ text, the fact that this event is described as
having occurred as the Romans were preparing to assault the city means that it
should also be placed late in 89 bce and is reasonably associated with Fraucus’
last ditch sally against the Roman camp before the city fell. In all likelihood this
event thus occurred in November 89, in light of the insurgents being caught in
the snow. A rare artefact from the siege has also been preserved. A lead sling
bullet, now held in the British Museum, carries the inscription feri Pomp, or ‘hit
Pomp(eius)’. For others the intended target is less clear. A lead bullet of slightly
larger weight carries the inscription ITAL, referring to Italia, and another asserts
‘you are dead, runaways!’.37
Pompeius Strabo’s soldiers eventually succeeded in taking Asculum,
probably in early November 89. Once inside the city the consul executed the
insurgent military commanders along with the leading men of the city. All
slaves and booty were auctioned off although the surviving population were
permitted to leave the city with their liberty after they were stripped and their
possessions confiscated.38 On 17 November the consul distributed awards
to the men in his army, including grants of Roman citizenship to a number
of his Spanish auxiliaries. He must have departed soon thereafter for Rome,
where he was required to preside over the consular elections and is recorded
as having celebrated a triumph over Asculum and the people of Picenum on
35
Oros. 5.18.22–26. Pompeius’ entry into Asculum is described at Oros. 5.18.26,
whereas Poppaedius’ death is referred to at Oros. 5.18.25. It seems hard to accept that
Orosius may have here slipped into making the common mistake of confusing Asculum in
Picenum with Ausculum in Samnium, which probably did come under Roman control in 88.
Instead, the reason for the reference to Poppaedius’ death being included in Oros. 5.18.25 is
possibly that it adds context to the actions carried out by P. Sulpicius Rufus during 89 and 88.
36
Frontin. Str. 3.17.8: Asculani, oppugnaturo oppidum Pompeio cum paucos sense et
aegros in muris ostendissent, ob id securos Romanos eruptione facta fugaverunt.
37
CIL, 12, pp. 560–563.
38
Oros. 5.18.26. A less detailed version is provided by Liv. Per. 76.
25 December 89.39 This campaign had effectively subdued Picenum by November

of 89 bce and led to Pompeius Strabo being permitted to celebrate the only
documented public triumph over the Italian insurgents in the Social War. The
Senate’s decision to permit this privilege indicates that by the end of 89 they felt
confident of victory over the surviving rebels. It also represented an important
symbolic victory over the insurgents, given that it had been the murders at
Asculum in 91 which had served as a catalyst for the war.
Strabo notoriously withheld from the Roman treasury the booty that he
had collected from Asculum.40 His actions were particularly reckless given that
the state treasury was by this time out of funds as a result of the war and was
unable to pay for distributions of food, a crisis which prompted the auctioning
of publicly owned land in Rome to raise funds.41 Probably at the beginning of
86 and shortly after Strabo’s death, his son Cn. Pompeius (Magnus) was accused
of being illegally in possession of public funds and acquired property.42 These
included the apparently trivial items of hunting nets and books looted from
Asculum. While these items are given prominence in Plutarch’s account of the
trial it is likely that misappropriated booty from Picenum was only a part of the
valuables which were presumed to have been among the possessions of Pompeius
Strabo passed on to his son. The trial proved a farce, with Pompeius agreeing to
a marriage alliance with the judge, P. Antistius, and no less than Q. Hortensius,
L. Marcius Philippus and Cn. Papirius Carbo all speaking in his defence.43
Operations in Campania and Samnium
In the southern part of the conflict zone Sulla achieved an important sequence
of victories, although these are frequently over-stressed as critical to the end of
39
The triumph is described in Ascon. 14 (on Cic. Pis.) as bello Italico de Picentibus.
While in the fasti triumphales (Inscr. Ital. 13.1, pp. 85f ) the triumph was formally celebrated
as Cn. Pompeius Sex. f. Cn. n. Strabo co(n)s(ul) de Asculaneis Picentibus VI k. Ian. a. DCLXIV.
40
On his refusal to pay money into the treasury, see Oros. 5.18.26–27. Plut. Pomp. 1
asserts that Strabo was widely hated for his avarice.
41
Oros. 5.18.27.
42
Plut. Pomp. 4.1–4. On the date of the trial being in 86, see Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 54
and Hillman (1998, p. 179).
43
See the discussion in Hillman (1998). Plut. Pomp. 4.3 makes no mention of the men
who spoke in his favour, but these are mentioned in Cic. Brut. 230 and Val. Max. 5.3.5.
Gruen (1968, pp. 244–246) argued that it may have been a prosecution in an existing
standing court, while Hillman (1998) instead suggested it was an extraordinary court.
the war by the ancient literary sources.44 Initially a legatus of the consul Porcius
Cato, Sulla was almost certainly legatus pro praetore following Cato’s death in the
early months of 89.45 His army’s successes were significant in reasserting Roman
control over Campania and, in combination with the campaign of Pompeius
Strabo in Picenum, in bringing about the collapse of the Italian insurgency.
Sulla’s representation of these achievements was also probably instrumental in his
successful bid at the end of the same year for the consulship of 88.46 Despite the
many claims found in the literary sources as to the importance of Sulla’s campaign
in 89 bce, Appian is the only ancient source that provides any detail of its actual
sequence.47 The summary of Livy states that Sulla waged a successful campaign in
Samnium but then claims that the legati Cosconius and Lucanus48 also defeated
the Samnites in battle, killing the Italian commander Marius Egnatius and in
consequence receiving the surrender of many towns in the region.49 In reality
Cosconius commanded a highly successful campaign in Apulia in 89 bce and
the simplest explanation for the apparent contradiction between the account of
Appian and the summary of Livy is that the summariser has used Samnites as a
synonym for a general cross-section of the Italian insurgents.50
In the early months of 89 bce Sulla’s army moved through Campania taking
a number of coastal communities. Sulla’s soldiers had captured Stabiae by
30 April and completely destroyed the city.51 His army then moved north
against the nearby city of Pompeii. At approximately the same time Minatius
44
Liv. Per. 75 says his victories were of a magnitude rarely equalled by a general before
becoming consul. Similarly, Plut. Sulla, 6.2 says that his exploits impressed many in Rome
while Sulla in his own memoirs claimed that omens observed as he was setting out for the
campaign of 89 foretold the magnitude of his achievements in the war (Plut. Sulla, 6.6–7).
Two factors probably contributed to such rhetoric in the literary sources: in particular Sulla’s
own memoirs and the weight of pro-Sullan propaganda, but surely another component was
that the intense fear the Social War had engendered was relieved in 89 as victory over the
insurgents seemed ever more certain.
45
On Sulla being a legatus of Cato, see Liv. Per. 75; Diod. Sic. 37.2.8; Plin. HN. 3.9
and 22.12. Livy and Pliny describe him as legatus; Diodorus as under the command of Cato.
Cato died at the end of winter in 88 (App. BC. 1.50). However, Sulla is described as legatus
in reference to the end of April (Plin. HN. 3.9).
46
Liv. Per. 75; Vell. Pat. 2.17.1; Diod. Sic. 37.2.8, 37.25; App. BC. 1.52.
47
His campaign in 89 bce is in App. BC. 1.51.
48
Possibly the Lucanius named as a member of Pompeius Strabo’s staff n ILS, 8888. See
Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 37–38 who suggests he served with Cosconius in Apulia in 89.
49
Liv. Per. 75.
50
See the below discussion of Cosconius’ campaign.
51
Plin. HN. 3.(9). According to Pliny, in his own time a sole farmhouse marked the
spot where the city had once stood.
Magius, a native of the Hirpinian city of Aeclanum, raised a legion from among
the Hirpini in support of the Romans and marched on Herculaneum. These
pro-Roman insurgents assisted an army under the command of Titus Didius
in taking the city and then marched on Pompeii where they assisted Sulla’s
army in the siege of that city.52 These events likely occurred prior to mid-June
as Didius was subsequently killed in battle against the insurgents on 11 June
89.53 At Pompeii there are indications of damage caused by Sulla’s artillery to
the walls during the siege and examples of stones balls found inside the city.
There is also possible evidence of the local inhabitants having coordinated the
defence of their walls with the use of graffiti directing people to rallying points
at certain towers.54
While Sulla’s army was encamped near the ‘Pompeian Hills’ the Italian
general Cluentius, in command of an insurgent army of more than 23,000 men,
pitched camp at close distance.55 Although his foragers had not yet returned to
camp, Sulla marched out of camp and attacked the Italian army. The insurgents
initially put the Romans to flight only to in turn be forced to run when the
foragers returned. The surviving insurgents fled towards Nola, the Romans
killing about 3,000 during their flight. Once at Nola, Appian claims that the
local inhabitants forced the Italians to enter through a single gate and that an
additional 20,000 men along with Cluentius were killed.56 This is the full extent
of Appian’s account of actions at Nola in 89 bce. Appian says nothing of laying
siege to the city though it almost certainly occurred immediately following the
defeat of Cluentius before the walls of Nola.
Cicero describes an incident witnessed by his brother Quintus which
probably occurred at this time.57 He says that Sulla’s army was encamped in the
district of Nola and that opposing their approach was a ‘Samnite’ army which
was encamped before the walls of Nola. On the basis of an omen Sulla decided
52
Vell. Pat. 2.16. The story derives from Velleius Paterculus who was the great-
grandson of Minatius Magius. Magius was himself the grandson of Decius Magius, a leading
Campanian. Participation in the sieges of Herculaneum and Pompeii means that Minatius’
pro-Roman movement occurred prior to Sulla’s march into the territory of the Hirpini.
53
Ovid, Fasti, 6.567.
54
On the graffiti, see Vetter (1953) and Cooley and Cooley (2004, no. B5, p. 19).
A brief survey with images of the damage can be found in Zanker (1998, p. 61) and Ling
(2005, pp. 51–52).
55
The number of 23,000 is the total reported casualties in Cluentius’ army in the battles
that followed (App. BC. 1.50). His army must therefore have been significantly larger.
56
App. BC. 1.50.
57
Cic. Div. 1.72, which is addressed to his brother Quintus, describes the incident as
quod te inspectante factum est.
to march against the insurgent camp and succeed in capturing it.58 The camp is
described as strongly guarded and as with many of the achievements of Sulla’s
early life the victory was treated as significant to his future career.59 This may
have been Cluentius’ army, which had withdrawn to Nola and encamped outside
the walls. It possibly also explains why the people of Nola forced the insurgent
army to enter through a single gate.60 Having been overawed by the storming of
the insurgent camp, the local inhabitants were fearful that the Romans might
proceed to take the city.
Sulla laid siege to Nola but as is clearly stated by Velleius, the city was
still holding out when Sulla returned to Campania during his consulship in
88 bce.61 Pliny, citing Sulla’s memoirs, says that Sulla as legatus was presented
with the corona graminea after the siege of Nola.62 As Sulla was consul in 88 and
proconsul in 87, this statement is not consistent with other references to the
city which assert it was still under siege in 88/87. If Pliny is indeed correct that
Sulla received the corona graminea while a legatus then it was almost certainly
awarded for the taking of the insurgent camp and not of the city of Nola. Sulla’s
campaign through Campania was supported by a fleet under the command of
A. Postumius Albinus. Albinus was accused of treason and stoned to death by
his own troops. These charges are claimed to be false by Valerius Maximus, but
are said by Orosius to have arisen from Albinus’ intolerable arrogance.63 The
incident is relayed by Plutarch as an example of the self-serving nature of Sulla’s
actions and interpreted as the product of a desire to challenge Marius and to
gain command against Mithradates.64
These military actions, while not having pacified the entire region, had broken
the Italian insurgent army’s capacity to take offensive action in Campania.
Magius’ Hirpini counter-insurgents occupied the city of Compsa65 and Sulla’s
army moved into the territory of the Hirpini, laying siege to the community of
58
Cic. Div. 1.72 and 2.65. The incident is also relayed in Val. Max. 1.6.4. Valerius
Maximus describes the situation as L. Sulla consul sociali bello, cum in agro Nolano ante
praetorium immolaret. This is not meant to be read as Sulla having been consul at the time
of the event (which would place it wrongly in 88 bce) but rather describes him as a consul
during the Social War.
59
Cic. Div. 1.72. Val. Max. 1.6.4 says of the victory quae victoria futurae eius amplissimae
potentiae gradus et fundamentum extitit.
60
App. BC. 1.50.
61
Vell. Pat. 2.17.1 and 2.18.4.
62
Plin. HN. 22.6(12).
63
Liv. Per. 72; Val. Max. 9.8.3; Plut. Sulla, 6.9; Oros. 5.18.22.
64
Plut. Sulla, 6.9.
65
Vel. Pat. 2.16.2.
Aeclanum. With the support of the army raised by Magius, a native of Aeclanum,
Sulla possibly hoped that the city could be induced to surrender. The residents of
the town instead asked for time to consider whether they should surrender in the
hope that Italian reinforcements could be brought from Lucania. Sulla agreed
but gave them one hour and used the time to pile firewood against the walls.
When the time expired he set fire to the wood and the town was compelled
to surrender. Sulla allowed his troops to plunder the community. Many of the
other towns of the Hirpini rapidly surrendered to Sulla and for that reason were
spared. The situation at Aeclanum is probably telling of the general sentiment
among the Hirpini towards the war. Magius had successful raised a pro-Roman
counter-insurgency and when the city of Aeclanum was besieged it waited for
reinforcements, not from other towns of the Hirpini or from communities in
Samnium, but rather from Lucania. In the wake of the war Magius’ son was one
of the local officials who de senatus sententia oversaw the reconstruction of the
community’s walls.66
Sulla’s army then moved into Samnium. In that region C. Paapius Mutilus’
army maintained control of the roads. Sulla’s army bypassed the roads and
managed to catch Mutilus’ army by surprise. According to Appian, in the battle
that followed Mutilus was wounded and fled with some remaining soldiers to
the city of Aesernia.67 Sulla had likely marched north-west from Aeclanum
towards Saepinum from where there was access to Bovianum and Aesernia.
Rather than moving directly against Aesernia, Sulla first laid siege to Bovianum.68
He camped before the city’s citadels which occupied three peaks above the city.
Detachments from his army succeeded in taking one of the citadels and he
then made an all-out assault; after heavy fighting Sulla’s soldiers succeeded in
taking the city.69 This campaign took place sometime between July and probably
September 89 (Gabba, 1967, pp. 153–154).
Appian claims that the Italian war council had already fled from Corfinium
to Bovianum at the time of Sulla’s siege of the city.70 Gabba (1994, p. 125),
following Appian’s version of events, argued that therefore the insurgent council
had moved to Bovianum (sometime mid-89) and then subsequently to Aesernia.71
Under this scheme these moves would have taken place by September. Appian,
however, says nothing of the fate of the Italian war council and his claim that
66
ILS, 5318. See the discussion in Gabba (1967, p. 152).
67
App. BC. 1.51.
68
App. BC. 1.51.
69
App. BC. 1.51.
70
App. BC. 1.51.
71
Indeed Gabba treats Poppaedius Silo’s death as occurring prior to the fall of Asculum.
they had been moved to Bovianum is therefore possibly the product of his
conflation of the siege in 89 with the retaking of Bovianum by the insurgents
in 88. As argued in Chapter 5, the nature of the Italian war council as presented
in the summary of Diodorus and Strabo is likely to have been exaggerated.
Indeed, an earlier passage in Appian’s text asserts that the insurgency was led
by seven military commanders, while the role of any confederate war council
was probably very limited. This much less overtly Roman command structure
is consistent with the largely autonomous but coordinated actions of the Italian
commanders in different regions throughout the war. An alternate explanation is
that the ‘capital’ was moved from Corfinium to Aesernia early in 88 bce and that
Bovianum was merely a Samnite meeting place (Marcks, 1884, p. 88; Keaveney,
2005, p. 156; cf. Gabba, 1994, pp. 125–126). Mutilus’ flight to Aesernia and the
assertion in the fragments of Diodorus that it was to Aesernia that the council
relocated after the abandonment of Corfinium appear otherwise consistent.72
Operations in Apulia and Lucania
In Apulia during 89 bce the praetor C. Cosconius destroyed Salapia, and then
crossed to the southern side of the Aufidius River and captured Cannae before
laying siege to Canusium. The city was relieved by the Italian general Trebatius,
who forced the praetor to withdraw his army to the northern bank of the Aufidius
at Cannae.73 The Italians pursued and sent word demanding that the praetor
either cross the river against them or withdraw. Cosconius decided to withdraw
and then successfully ambushed the Italians when they attempted to follow,
killing approximately 15,000 men. While the surviving Italians and their general
fled to Canusium, according to Appian Cosconius then overran the territories of
a number of widely separated cities in the region: Larinum, Venusia, Ausculum74
and the territory of the Poediculi who surrendered within two days of the arrival
of his army.75 The Poediculi were an ethnic group in the southern part of ancient
72
Appian is, however, possibly confusing later events when he claims that the leadership
of the insurgency was based at Bovianum during Sulla’s campaign of 89. In 88, with Silo now
acting as sole-supreme commander of the remaining insurgent forces, he had taken control of
Bovianum and used it as a base from which to launch his final campaign.
73
App. BC. 1.52 says that the Romans retreated to Cannae, but the subsequent sentence
in his text implies that the Roman and Italian armies found themselves on opposite banks of
a ‘nearby river’, almost certainly referring to the Aufidius River.
74
In reality this list has likely been rendered out of chronological order. Ausculum in
Apulia is not to be confused with Asculum in Picenum which fell in late 89 bce.
75
App. BC. 1.52.
Apulia76 located south-east of Canusium. Their rapid surrender may have been
in direct reaction to the destruction of Trebatius’ army near Cannae. Cosconius’
army then probably subdued the rebel Latin community of Venusia, which was
inland, south-east of Canusium. Given that both Venusia and Canusium were
still prosperous in the time of the geographer Strabo, they may have surrendered
rather than having been taken following lengthy sieges. Certainly, Strabo viewed
them as having faired far better than many of the nearby cities of the Samnites in
the decades after the Social War, and certainly both eventually enjoyed the status
of Roman municipia.77 From here Cosconius’ army crossed northward back over
the Aufidius River to Ausculum, before taking Larinum situated to the south
of the Bifernus River at the northern extreme of Apulia. The summary of Livy
asserts that Cosconius and another Roman commander, Lucanus, defeated the
‘Samnites’ in battle and killed Marius Egnatius.78 Egnatius had been campaigning
in Campania in 90 bce,79 and the site of his defeat and death in 89 is not
stated. On the basis purely of his name Egnatius may have been from Samnium.
The identity of the other Roman commander involved in this engagement is
debatable; Lucanus may be a mistake for Lucanius, a legate known to have been
serving under Pompeius Strabo in 89.80
Little detail is preserved about fighting in Lucania in 89 bce. According to
the Orosius and the summary of Livy, the legatus A. Gabinius took numerous
cities in the region but was killed while attempting to storm an enemy camp.81
In apparent contradiction Florus credits Gabinius with a victory over the Marsi
while claiming that a general named Carbo defeated the Lucanians.82 The
identity of this man is unclear, although it may have been either C. Papirius
Carbo Arvina (trib. pl. 90) or Cn. Papirius Carbo (cos. 85) serving as praetor,
and if Florus is to be at least partially accepted, Gabinius may have been serving
under whichever Carbo as legate.83 That this campaign was a failure for the
76
See Smith (1856, vol. 1, p. 164; vol. 2, p. 585) who equates them with the Peucetii.
77
On Venusia, see Strab. 5.4.11–12. On the status of Canusium, see Strab. 6.3.9; Plin.
HN. 8.190; CIL, 9, 342–343.
78
Liv. Per. 75.
79
App. BC. 1.41 and 1.45.
80
Münzer in RE, 13, 1552 suggests that this man may have been the Lucanius listed as
serving on Pompeius Strabo’s staff in 89 bce on ILS, 8888. Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 37 instead
suggests that Lucanus was a legatus serving in Apulia with Cosconius.
81
Liv. Per. 76; Oros. 5.18.25.
82
Flor. 2.6.13. Florus may simply have incorrectly conflated the death of the consul
Cato, who was killed while storming a camp of the Marsi, with the death of Gabinius.
83
Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 32–39 and, in particular, p. 39, n. 26 tentatively argues in
favour of Cn. Papirius Carbo although Arvina is credited with the victory on p. 37. Keaveney
Romans is indicated by later events. In 90 the insurgent general M. Lamponius

had successfully trapped the legate P. Licinius Crassus in the Lucanian city
of Grumentum.84 Lamponius presumably continued to command insurgent
operations in Lucania, possibly in conjunction with Cleptius, a Lucanian
insurgent leader who is later mentioned as operating in the region in 89 against
Gabinius. Following the defeat of Gabinius in 89, the insurgent forces under
the command of Lamponius appear to have continued in Lucania and Bruttium
largely unabated in the following years and appear to have been able to harbour
other insurgent leaders, such as Pontius Telesinus, as the war further north
progressively turned in Rome’s favour.85
Figure 7 Insurgent coin of Paapius Mutilus in Oscan depicting an oath

scene. Ob. bust of Mars, wearing a helmet, to left VITELIÚ. Rev.
an oath scene with four warriors, two either side of pig held by an
attendant; in exergue C·PAAPI·C. Image © The Trustees of the
British Museum
Military Engagements in 88 bce
The ongoing campaigning forced a significant delay in the holding of the

consular elections for 88.86 The surviving consul of 89, Cn. Pompeius Strabo,
(2005, pp. 156–157) accepts Gabinius’ command in Lucania, suggesting he was succeeded
by Carbo. Keaveney (2005, p. 211) also suggests that Gabinius was a legate of Sulla.
84
App. BC. 1.41.
85
Lamponius and his supporters also made attempts on several cities in Bruttium but
were repelled by the governor of Sicily. For further discussion of the activities of these rebels,
see Chapter 9.
86
App. BC. 1.51 says that they were not held until winter. See the discussion in Badian
(1958b, p. 231) and Tansey (2003, pp. 379–381).
had concluded the siege of Asculum and gave out awards to his victorious army
on 17 November. Almost immediately he returned to Rome, celebrating the only
known triumph over the insurgents on 25 December 89 bce.87 Possibly by the
end of October 89 Sulla had returned to Rome to campaign for the consulship
of 88 bce.88 In Rome the focus of political debate would dramatically shift to the
impending campaign in Asia Minor. As a result neither Sulla, nor his colleague
in the consulship of 88, Q. Pompeius Rufus, were assigned commands against
the insurgency. Instead, Sulla received by lot the command of the war against
Mithradates and remained in Rome to make preparations for the campaign.
Figure 8 Anonymous insurgent coin of the Social War. Ob. Helmeted bust
of a deity, possibly Mars, with Victory holding a laurel wreath. Rev.
two warriors, clasping hands behind and to the right, the prow of a
warship. Image © The Trustees of the British Museum
Pompeius Strabo’s command would have lapsed at the end of December

and the status of his command in the following year is not well documented. It
can, however, be ascertained from his actions in the early part of 88 bce. Strabo
returned to his army in the northern conflict zone probably shortly after his
triumph in December, indeed he may have departed prior to the beginning of
the new year on 1 January 88. It is likely that his command had been prorogued
by the Senate,89 certainly there is no indication that the conflict between him
and the consul of 88, Pompeius Rufus, occurred in the early months of the year.
During the early part of 88 Strabo campaigned successfully and as commander
he formally received the surrender of the Marsi, Marruncini and Vestini, and
87
Inscr. Ital. 13.1, pp. 85f.
88
Liv. Per. 75; App. BC. 1.51; Diod. Sic. 37.2.8 and 37.25.
89
induced many of the communities in these regions to stand down.90 At least some
of this was achieved by his legate, Sulpicius. The summary of Livy attributes the
defeat of the Marruncini to Sulpicius while Orosius similarly credits Sulpicius
with the defeat of both the Marruncini and the Vestini.91 One of Pompeius’
legates in the previous year had been Ser. Sulpicius Galba,92 and it may be that
some of these military victories over the Marruncini and Vestini had occurred
in 89 but that it was not until early in 88, after Strabo had returned to his army,
that their surrender was formally received. This was likely early in the year as
it happened prior to the tussle for command of the army in Picenum between
Strabo and the consul Pompeius Rufus. Strabo’s triumph had been celebrated
de Asculaneis Picentibus; if the surrender of the Marsi, Marruncini and Vestini
had been already received at the time of the salutatio imperatoria this significant
achievement might reasonably have been included in the fasti triumphales.
At any rate these campaigns would effectively end the war in the northern
part of the conflict zone. Those Italian insurgents who continued to fight appear
to have fled southward, focusing their energies in Samnium and Apulia, probably
in the later part of 89, where they still controlled major tracts of territory and
continued fighting. Among those who fled south was Q. Poppaedius Silo. Sulla’s
campaign in 89 had continued the work of the consul L. Iulius Caesar in the
previous year and succeeded in opening up the southern front. The insurgency
was clearly failing, prompting some communities to surrender and, in at least
the case of Minatius Magius of Aeclanum, inspiring Italians in the rebel zone to
arm themselves in support of the Romans. By the winter of 89/88 the Italians
were increasingly hemmed in; having been successfully beaten back by Strabo’s
army in the north and losing Asculum, the Marsi, Vestini, Marruncini and
Paeligni were on the verge of surrender and Sulla’s army, which was still stationed
in Campania, had subdued the territory of the Hirpini and other parts of the
Samnite territories.93 The reverses of 89 bce prompted a dramatic reorganisation
of the remaining Italian insurgent forces. The victories of the consul Pompeius
Strabo in Picenum and the northern regions and of Cosconius in Apulia had
meant the loss of a number of key strongholds. In particular, the insurgents
had lost Asculum their principal stronghold in Picenum. The remaining Italian
insurgent leadership abandoned Corfinium and moved further south, probably
90
App. BC. 1.52.
91
Liv. Per. 76; Oros. 5.18.25.
92
On the basis of ILS, 8888; cf. Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 37.
93
Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 75.5 credits Sulla with defeat of the Samnites and the Hirpini in the
war.
to Aesernia.94 Some issues of Italian coins may have been produced at Aesernia
or possibly Bovianum in 89 bce while still further coins dating to the period
88–87 may have been produced from a shifting location within Campania
(Gruber, 1970, vol. 2, p. 332; Campana, 1987, pp. 98–117, 118–126). These
included an issue with SAFINIM in Oscan characters (Gruber, 1970, vol. 2,
p. 332; Campana, 1987, nos. 149–150).
The summary of Diodorus at this point describes Poppaedius Silo as one of
five στρατεγοι of the insurgents. This description seems at odds with its previous
claims that Poppaedius had been designated ‘consul’. Instead it implies that
Poppaedius was already on an equal footing with the other surviving generals
and is further indication that the Italians employed a much flatter military
organisation than is implied by other passages in the summary of Diodorus. It
was decided that of the five generals at Aesernia Silo should be designated as the
supreme commander of the surviving Italian forces.95 According to Diodorus,
this group of Italian insurgents still possessed approximately 30,000 soldiers.
Silo then proceeded to raise about 20,000 additional infantry and 1,000 horse
by manumitting slaves.96 The Italian insurgency thus possessed about 50,000
men under arms for 88 bce. The identity of the other four στρατεγοι is not clear
and by this stage in the war nor is it certain to what extent the insurgents in
Samnium were able to coordinate their operations with those farther south in
Lucania or Brutium.
Such a small force cannot have entertained serious intentions of combating
the Romans. Even so, from Samnium Poppaedius Silo prepared to make a
counter-offensive in 88. This was initially successful; his army marched on and
retook Bovianum (situated south-east of Aesernia in Samnium) in early 88 bce
and Silo entered the city in triumphal procession.97 This entry is treated by Julius
Obsequens as an evil omen, one which portended Silo’s imminent death, but the
rationale for his triumphal entry was likely intended to reassert his own power
both over a former stronghold of the Italian insurgency that had been lost during
94
Diod. Sic. 37.2.9 says that the Italian leaders abandoned Corfinium for Aesernia. On
discussion of Aesernia as the primary base of insurgent operations for the later phase of the
war, see Gabba (1967, pp. 152–153) and Keaveney (2005, p. 156).
95
Diod. Sic. 37.2.9–10. Domaszewski (1924, p. 14) suggests that the other four many
have corresponded with the four traditional leaders of the Samnite tribes (the meddices).
Salmon (1967, pp. 368–369) rightly argues this cannot be the case but instead suggests that
there were two Samnite and two Lucanian generals.
96
Diod. Sic. 37.2.9–10.
97
Iul. Ob. 56.
Sulla’s offensive in 89 bce and over his soldiers who cannot have been entirely
ignorant of the precarious position they were in.98
In Apulia, the praetor Cosconius was succeeded by Q. Caecilius Metellus
Pius, probably as a proconsul.99 Following his success at Bovianum, Silo then
crossed the Appenines and moved against the army of Metellus Pius which had
been successfully conducting operations in Apulia.100 Silo’s army was intercepted
by a force under the command of the legate Mam. Aemilius Lepidus. In the
engagement that followed Silo’s army was badly defeated, suffering some 6,000
casualties and with Poppaedius numbered among the dead.101
These events are only briefly mentioned by the ancient literary sources.102
Orosius locates the battle on the ‘Theanus River’, where he claims that both
Poppaedius and another Italian general, Obsidius, were killed.103 This is a very
garbled account and he may be referring to the Tririnus River, or the nearby
Trifernus River. He may also be referring to the Frento River further south, as
the major Apulian city of Teanum was situated on the eastern bank of the Frento
(Smith, 1856, vol. 2, pp. 1115–1116). Teanum had been used previously as a
base for Roman operations in Apulia and its status as a municpium means it
may have remained loyal during the war,104 making it a logical outpost for the
army of the legatus to operate from. According to Appian, Metellus accepted the
surviving insurgents into his army as separate detachments.105
With the death of Poppaedius Silo in Apulia the organised Italian insurgency
appears to have collapsed. Indeed, his death was treated by Appian and Livy as
the end of the Social War.106 Interestingly, Poppaedius had still been able to raise
new soldiers over the winter of 89/88 and he had even gained minor successes.
98
In a similar vein, see the discussion in Keaveney (2005).
99
Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 42. Strabo, as consular proconsul and triumphator in
89 bce, would clearly have had greater authority than Metellus Pius, who had most likely
been praetor in 89 bce. As such, given that Metellus was intended to act as the other
principal commander in insurgent territory it would be consistent with established practice
for him to be a praetorian proconsul.
100
App. BC. 1.53.
101
Liv. Per. 76; Diod. Sic. 37.2.10.
102
Diod. Sic. 37.2.9–10 records that Silo was defeated against Mamercus and lost 6,000
men. App. BC. 1.53 claims that Metellus Pius attacked the Apulians and that Silo was killed
in these actions. Liv. Per. 76 says that the legatus Aemilius was in command of the battle in
which Silo died.
103
Oros. 5.18.
104
Liv. 23.24.
105
App. BC. 1.53.
106
App. BC. 1.53; Liv. Per. 76. Flor. 2.6.10 calls Poppaedius the leader and instigator of
the war, although he associates the end of the war with the fall of Asculum (2.6.14).
Some people in Apulia and Samnium did continue to fight on. Their reasons
were probably several and cannot be simplistically explained away as the product
of obstinate and extreme resistance to Roman authority. Indeed, this is illustrated
by some of the peoples who opted for surrender in 89 and 88. The combination
of crushing military defeats and the hope of enfranchisement, the potential for
which was demonstrated in 90 by the lex Iulia for the loyal allies and then in
89 bce with the lex Plautia Papiria, covering those who had at the time of its
passage stood down, had likely helped to induce large regions to surrender over
the course of 89 bce. Thus the Picentines seem to have largely relented in 89
with the siege of their principal city. Their formal surrender to Pompeius Strabo
was likely advantageous for them. Not only did both the consul of 89 and his
ambitious son cultivate the support of the Picentines after the war, but Asculum
seems to have been restored to its former place of importance within the region
in the decades that followed. The Marsi, widely seen by the ancient sources as
central to the war, had yielded, probably early in the year. So, too, had many of
the Hirpini, who lived in the southern part of Samnium, peacefully surrendered
to Cornelius Sulla after the fall of Aeclanum. The events of late 89 and 88 likely
forced many who had readily been supportive of the insurgency in 91 and early
90 to make pragmatic decisions about how they were to secure their survival.
The converse was that the enfranchisement laws offered no hope to those
still under arms and fighting with the remaining insurgents in 88 bce. The lex
Plautia Papiria had only applied for a sixty-day period after its passage. Those
communities that had not agreed to terms in 89 cannot have been included by
it. Second, in the absence of a Roman military commander willing to show his
leniency (and in turn gain influence with the defeated), those under arms who
attempted to surrender faced the prospect of either enslavement or execution.
The need to negotiate with those still under arms would have been increasingly
negated by the surrender of insurgent peoples and the home states from which
the soldiers had been drawn. Indeed, the impetus for negotiation with the
remaining insurgents came during the new civil war late in 88, when competing
Roman factions sought the support of the remaining insurgents.
Chapter 8
The Lex Iulia, Lex Plautia Papiria and
Enfranchisement (90 to 88 bce)
Between 90 and 86 bce a sequence of laws and declarations of the Senate

provided for the nominal enfranchisement of the majority of Italy’s population
south of the Po. It is a tragic irony that in spite of the eventual defeat of the
insurgents on the battlefield and the deaths of as many as several hundreds of
thousands, their demand prior to the war of enfranchisement was still achieved.
Through the war enfranchisement was realised not just for many within their
own communities but also for all the loyal Latin and allied communities on the
peninsula as well. While for former insurgents grants of citizenship were limited
to those who negotiated settlements, citizenship was universally granted to all
loyal allies and Latins.
The two best documented of these enfranchisement measures are two laws.
The first of these, the lex Iulia, extended Roman citizenship to all those allied
Italian and Latin cities in Italy which had not joined the insurgency, and was
most likely passed by the comitia centuriata in late 90 bce once the consul
L. Iulius Caesar had returned to the city. It is ironic that despite the prominence
of the lex Iulia in the works of both ancient and modern scholars, it was not
responsible for the enfranchisement of the insurgents. The second law was the
lex Plautia Papiria, proposed by two tribunes and passed by the tribal assembly
in 89 bce, which, as will be shown in this chapter, extended the possibility of
citizenship to all those former insurgents who had surrendered at that time so
long as they registered within sixty days.
The attention given to these two laws is in many ways disproportionate to
their significance. The lex Iulia is frequently referred to by ancient sources, but
this can be explained, as its principal significance was to the loyal communities
which received citizenship under it. The prominence of the lex Plautia Papiria
on the other hand is, as Badian (1962, pp. 227–228) rightly argued, the product
of Cicero’s Pro Archia, a legal case in which the lex was of central importance
to Cicero’s defence of Archias.1 These two laws are not sufficient to explain
how Italy emerged from the Social War restructured as a mass Roman citizen
1
Badian’s assertion that it may have been better if the Pro Archia had never been
preserved, however, seems utterly unnecessary.
community. Of equal importance was the hotly contested issue of the conduct
of the censuses in the period between 89 and 70 bce.
There was no single act of enfranchisement but rather an integration process
over a number of years. As such, the lex Iulia and lex Plautia Papiria need to
be viewed in conjunction with the lex Pompeia, the lex Calpurnia, a number of
important senatus consulta, individual agreements with the communities that
still remained outside of the citizen body and finally the censuses of 89, 86 and
70 as collectively constituting the integration process which occurred in response
to the Social War. One corollary of this was that the process of enfranchising the
allies and Italian insurgents occurred concurrently, and was intertwined with the
violent upheavals of the 80s and 70s.
While briefly discussed in previous chapters in terms of their significance for
the ongoing military campaigns in Italy, these laws and associated declarations
of the Senate warrant special attention. These laws extended full citizen rights
to the majority of Italians, but with one important caveat. They constrained
the ability of the newly enfranchised to participate in the tribal assembly. In
so doing, these laws envisioned a new form of limited Roman citizenship, in
which the Italians might have possessed the legal rights of Roman citizens but
had little capacity to influence the passage of legislation or to decide who would
be annually elected by the tribal assembly. This model, in particular, created a
new political problem that would be significant in the civil wars of the 80s bce
and is discussed in the next chapter.
The Date and Rationale for the Lex Iulia
The ancient sources provide only superficial detail about the provisions of the
lex Iulia and conflicting modern interpretations of the law’s date and function
have been suggested (see Badian, 1962, pp. 227–228; Sherwin-White, 1973).2
Appian’s account of a potential revolt in Umbria and Etruria and the subsequent
declaration of the Senate that citizenship would be extended to the loyal allies
assume that the lex was passed by the winter of 90/89.3 This is because the
insurgents clearly believed an uprising in Etruria and Umbria was likely and
attempted to send an army into Etruria in the winter of 90 bce, which ended in
disaster for the insurgents.4 While other ancient sources treated the lex Iulia as
2
In part this is due to Appian’s confusion between Sex. Iulius Caesar (cos. 91, procos.
90) and L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 90, cens. 89).
3
App. BC. 1.49.
4
App. BC. 1.50.
The Lex Iulia, Lex Plautia Papiria and Enfranchisement (90 to 88 bce) 173
a response to an actual revolt which occurred in the same winter,5 there can be
no doubt that the decision to enfranchise the loyal allies and the subsequent law
came in the winter of 90/89.6
The consul L. Iulius Caesar was active in the southern conflict zone during
90 bce, suffering reverses near Aesernia and in southern Campania. Then his
army’s victory over the Samnites, while relieving the city of Acerrae,7 led to the
Romans laying aside their military cloaks in the latter part of 90 bce.8 While
fighting would continue in parts of Italy for another two years, the successes on
the battlefield in late 90 bce and the laying off of military cloaks would seem to
indicate that the Romans believed the final outcome of the war to be determined
even if there was ongoing resistance from the surviving Italian commanders.
The conservative scope of the provisions of the lex Iulia, therefore, only
make sense if the decision was taken late in 90 bce. As discussed in Chapter 6,
there is scant evidence for a rebellion in Etruria and Umbria in late 90, possibly
continuing into early 89 bce. Appian, however, states that a declaration of the
Senate, which appears to have been the basis of the lex, had been a measure
aimed at preventing a revolt, rather than a measure passed in response to one
already underway.9 The threat of cities in Etruria and Umbria joining the
insurgents must have been considered serious, otherwise there would have been
no reason for the Senate suddenly to make concessions to loyal cities in Italy.
But it is equally hard to believe that a widespread revolt would have occasioned
concessions. Indeed, it is likely that a small number of communities had either
made overtures to the insurgents or had in some way refused to honour their
treaties. These same communities would not have received citizenship under the
provision of the lex Iulia. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are a limited number
of communities in these regions for which there is evidence of destruction
and relocation. Furthermore, the dispatch of L. Porcius Cato (probably as
propraetor) to Etruria, along with the legatus A. Plotius to Umbria, served as an
effective deterrent to any would-be insurgents.
5
Liv. Per. 75; Oros. 5.18.7.
6
And yet cf. Badian, who claims that ‘Niccolini’s point that the lex Iulia was probably
passed early in 90 appears sound’ (1962, pp. 227–228).
7
On the siege of Acerrae, see App. BC. 1.40–42; Liv. Per. 73; Diod. Sic. 37.18–19.
Appian incorrectly states that Sex. Iulius Caesar was at Acerrae, whom Appian believed to
have been consul. The summary of Livy attributes a successful defeat of the ‘Samnites’ to the
consul L. Iulius Caesar. Oros. 5.18.14–15 says the victory was won over the Samnites and
Lucanians and that the consul was saluted as imperator following the victory.
8
Liv. Per. 73; Oros. 5.18.14–15. The event is also referred to by Vell. Pat. 2.16.4 but
not in connection with a specific event.
9
App. BC. 1.49–50.
The Latin colonies of the south had been instrumental in the Roman campaign
of 90 bce. They had, with only one exception, remained loyal and a number had
sustained bitter sieges before they fell to the insurgents. In so doing they had
stalled the insurgency. While the war was by the winter of 90/89 increasingly
being contained, the risks of defection to the insurgents must, however, still have
been very real. Since approximately 122 bce Latin cities had possessed the right
for citizens holding local magistracies to acquire Roman citizenship (civitas per
magistratum).10 In the thirty-one years between the introduction of this measure
and the Social War, many of the leading men within communities of Latin status
would have thus come to possess full Roman citizen rights. These men would
have acted as an effective check against revolt in the Latin cities and possibly
explain why only one, the city of Venusia, supported the Italian cause and then
only after it was threatened by the Italian commander Vidacilius.11 Yet by the
passing of the lex Iulia late in 90 bce the Latins were included in the grant of
full citizen rights to all loyal cities. The underlying reason for the passage of the
lex Iulia was likely the looming threat of open revolt in Umbria and Etruria, but
inclusion of other loyal cities and the Latins in the bill was necessary to avoid a
backlash. While the military situation was clearly turning in the Romans’ favour
by the end of 90 bce, the issue of enfranchisement remained a contentious one,
even within the loyal cities of the peninsula.
The Provisions of the Lex Iulia
The exact provisions of the lex Iulia are not clearly preserved in the surviving
ancient source material. As a result, a wide range of modern views have been
forwarded as to its extent and intent. This is further compounded by Appian,
who refers to a decree of the Senate rather than to the actual passage of the
lex. The law included a number of complicated and interconnected provisions.
According to Cicero, it provided that all loyal Latin and allied communities
should be entitled to citizenship if they so wished:
qua lege civitas est sociis et Latinis data, qui fundi populi facti non essent civitatem
non haberent.
10
11
App. BC. 1.42.
A law by which citizenship was given to the allies and Latins, it was decreed that
those people who did not ratify the law should not have the freedom of the city.12
Whether the law included some communities which already at the time
possessed Latin rights in Cisalpine Gaul and Spain remains debatable. Cicero
seems to refer specifically to Italy but the entitlements of those who lived outside
of the peninsula but who may still have been registered in their ancestral home
community is unclear (see Brunt, 1978, pp. 205–209; Bispham, 2007). Cicero’s
assertion that the lex Iulia applied to all Latins is confirmed by a discussion
in Aulus Gellius (derived from Servius Sulpicius) which explicitly describes
the law as quo civitas universo Latio lege Iulia data est.13 Appian claims that a
decree of the Senate was issued in direct response to the potential that cities
in Etruria and Umbria were about to join the insurgents and that the Senate
voted that all Italians who had adhered to their alliance with Rome should be
given the citizenship.14 The publication of this declaration was sufficient to
quell any unrest in Etruria. Though not clearly stated by any ancient source,
the declaration referred to by Appian was most likely subsequently taken to the
comitia centuriata by the consul L. Iulius Caesar and passed into law. Appian’s
discussion of the law is noticeably different to that of Cicero’s: this is because
Cicero describes the repercussions of the lex where Appian describes events at
the time of its passage.
Appian relays a number of measures authorised by the Senate in response
to events in Etruria and Umbria in late 90 including the garrisoning of the
coastline around Ostia and that at this time ‘the Senate also voted that those
Italians who had adhered to their alliance should be admitted to citizenship’.15
This measure included the Etruscans and neighbouring peoples. Appian thereby
omits the suppression of the potential revolt by Cato in 90 although Appian
explicitly delineates the measure as directed at both reaffirming the existing
loyalties of allied communities and reassuring those which were wavering.16
12
Cic. Balb. 21.
13
Gell. NA. 4.4.3: in reference to marriage practices in Latium he observes that they
remained unchanged until the Julian law, quo civitas universo Latio lege Iulia data est.
14
App. BC. 1.49: Ἰταλιωτῶν δὲ τοὺς ἔτι ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ παραμένοντας ἐψηφίσατο εἶναι
πολίτας, οὗ δὴ μάλιστα μόνον οὐ πάντες ἐπεθύμουν.
15
App. BC. 1.49: τότε πρῶτον ἐς στρατείαν δι᾽ ἀπορίαν ἀνδρῶν καταλεγέντων, Ἰταλιωτῶν
δὲ τοὺς ἔτι ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ παραμένοντας ἐψηφίσατο εἶναι πολίτας, οὗ δὴ μάλιστα μόνον οὐ πάντες
ἐπεθύμουν.
16
App. BC. 1.49: καὶ τάδε ἐς Τυρρηνοὺς περιέπεμπεν, οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοι τῆς πολιτείας
μετελάμβανον. καὶ τῇδε τῇ χάριτι ἡ βουλὴ τοὺς μὲν εὔνους εὐνουστέρους ἐποίησε, τοὺς δὲ
ἐνδοιάζοντας ἐβεβαιώσατο, τοὺς δὲ πολεμοῦντας ἐλπίδι τινὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πραοτέρους ἐποίησεν.
It should be noted that while Appian refers to a senatus consultum he does not
contradict Cicero in any way. A directive of the Senate would surely have been
desired by the consul before proposing a measure with such significant political
repercussions. Similarly, Appian’s assertion that the senatus consultum applied
to all allied Italian communities is imprecise but should be read through the
qualification of Cicero’s statement that it applied to Latins and allies (socii et
Latini), a description which excludes supporters of the insurgency.
The lex also appears to have permitted Roman commanders to make grants
of citizenship de consilii sententia, a feature of it which is demonstrated by a
famous inscription. The bronze plate preserved in the Capitoline Museum
in Rome contains two acts of Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89) that occurred in
camp at Asculum (in castreis apud Asculum) on 17 November 89.17 The first of
these two acts was the extension of citizenship to a group of Spanish auxiliaries
serving in Strabo’s army, citing as the basis for this grant the provisions of the
lex Iulia.18 The law probably required that grants be made to specific individuals
(singillatim). This is implied by the text, which individually names the allied
soldiers who are to receive grants of citizenship.19 There was an obvious rationale
for such a provision to have been included in the lex Iulia; in one act all those
Italian allies and Latins who served in the army would have become citizens.
Any man who had been currently serving with the army but was not a citizen of
an Italian community could then be selectively enfranchised by his commander
under the lex Iulia. In the case of the preserved act of Strabo, he used the lex Iulia
to enfranchise auxiliaries as a reward for exemplary service. Such a provision in
the lex reinforces that its underlying purpose was indeed to secure the loyalty of
those already serving in the army, be they Latins, allies or indeed auxiliaries from
outside Italy.
Both Appian and Cicero refer to a dilemma faced by the communities
eligible under the law: they desired the citizenship but were reticent about the
potential risks of diminished rights. Given the Roman record on such issues the
allied Italians were right to be concerned. Cicero refers to local apprehensions
of losing their existing legal privileges with long-term implications for their
17
CIL, 12, 709 = ILS, 8888.
18
As rightly stated by Dessau in the ILS the date of this act is sine dubio and was
supported by Stevenson (1919, pp. 95–96). However, there have been unconvincing attempts
since the publication of the inscription to locate the grant in 90 bce. See, for instance, Ashby
(1909) and Pais (1918, vol. 1, p. 174).
19
Mommsen, R.St. 3, 132 and Gabba (1976, pp. 90–91).
autonomy.20 Appian instead focuses upon the intended method for enrolment
into the Roman tribes. In so doing he highlights that the Romans did indeed
intend to marginalise the former allies joining the citizen body:
Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν δὴ τούσδε τοὺς νεοπολίτας οὐκ ἐς τὰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα φυλάς, αἳ
τότε ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, κατέλεξαν, ἵνα μὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέονες ὄντες ἐν ταῖς χειροτονίαις
ἐπικρατοῖεν, ἀλλὰ δεκατεύοντες ἀπεφηναν ἑτέρας, ἐν αἷς ἐχειροτόνουν ἔσχατοι. καὶ
πολλάκις αὐτῶν ἡ ψῆφος ἀχρεῖος ἦν, ἅτε τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα προτέρων τε
καλουμένων καὶ οὐσῶν ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ.
The Romans did not enrol the new citizens in the thirty-five existing tribes, lest
they should outvote the old ones in the elections, but incorporated them in ten
new tribes, which voted last. So it often happened that their vote was useless, since
a majority was obtained from the thirty-five tribes that voted first.21
These were relevant concerns for allied communities. Indeed, Appian appears
to have been at a loss to explain why the loyal allies should have accepted under
such conditions.22 The response from the eligible cities was unanimous: all
accepted. According to Cicero only two communities, Heraclea and Neapolis,
initially considered accepting foederis sui libertatem instead, but eventually
opted for citizenship.23 Ultimately they did not outweigh the perceived benefits
of enfranchisement, as none of the eligible communities refused. Such a reaction
cannot readily be used as an indicator of insurgent attitudes. The people affected
by the lex Iulia were from communities that had, for whatever reasons, found
the status quo sufficiently tolerable that they had supported the Republic against
the insurgents in the war.
As the examples of Heraclea and Neapolis demonstrate, the lex Iulia must
have also provided for an alternative status in the event that some communities
would not accept full Roman citizenship. In turn, the lex cannot have presumed
what number of new citizens would be enfranchised; which communities would
or would not accept must have been an open question at the time of the law’s
passage. It is, therefore, unlikely that the lex could have stipulated the tribes
20
Cic. Balb. 21: in quo magna contentio Heracliensium et Neapolitanorum fuit, cum
magna pars in iis civitatibus foederis sui libertatem civitati anteferret. postremo haec vis est istius
et iuris et verbi, ut fundi populi beneficio nostro, non suo iure fiant.
21
22
App. BC. 1.49: ὅπερ ἢ λαθὸν αὐτίκα ἢ καὶ ὣς αὐτὸ ἀγαπησάντων τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν
ὕστερον ἐπιγνωσθὲν ἑτέρας στάσεως ἦρξεν.
23
Cic. Balb. 21.
that the new citizens were to be enrolled into, as any such measure would need
clear knowledge of how the distribution to tribes might affect future votes in
the assembly. Without being assigned a tribe, the newly enfranchised needed to
wait until a census was conducted.
Assignment to classes and tribes was an important issue because, according
to Appian, a key feature of the lex Iulia was that it assumed that ten additional
tribes would be created within the tribal assembly for the newly enfranchised
allies.24 Velleius Paterculus similarly states that the citizenship had been
extended on condition of enrolment into eight tribes although he implies that
these were eight of the existing tribes.25 In Appian’s scheme, these new tribes
would exclusively contain Latins and allies enfranchised by the lex Iulia and
were designated always to vote last in the assembly. Taylor (1960, pp. 107–111)
rightly argued that the lex Iulia only envisioned the other allies being enrolled
into specially created new tribes, and that the Latins were to be enrolled into
existing tribes. Local magistrates in Latin cities for several decades had been
entitled to citizenship and would have already been enrolled into the thirty-
five existing tribes. Brunt (1965, pp. 108–109) has, however, alternatively
argued that originally everyone enfranchised by the lex Iulia was to be enrolled
in one of the newly created tribes. Both Niccolini (1946) and Salmon (1958,
pp. 179–184) have argued that in the case of Velleius’ version, in which the new
citizens were restricted to eight tribes in elections, in instances where voting was
conducted sequentially new citizens could not be a majority.
Reasons for Restricting the New Citizens
As already discussed in the previous chapters, land and citizenship laws, both
before and after the Social War, should be viewed in light of the enormous
potential they had to change the political status quo. Throughout history the
Romans had always been greatly concerned about the ways that changes to the
make-up of the citizen body and land ownership might have flow-on affects
to the existing balances of power within the political and electoral processes
of the Republic. Two notable examples of this concern are that colonists were
frequently required to adopt Latin status in exchange for participation in a
colonial project, their right to retain land at the colony then in turn being tied to
24
App. BC. 1.49.
25
Vell. Pat. 2.20.2.
ongoing residence in the colony, and that freed slaves were automatically enrolled
into the four urban tribes where their electoral power could be most muted.
In the years after the passage of the lex Iulia, even while the Social War was
still going on, both existing Romans and the newly enfranchised were greatly
concerned about the method of registration and the restrictions to be placed
upon the incoming Latins and allies. Two reasons above all others explain why
this should have been the case. First, the integration process in Italy which began
in 90 with the lex Iulia and continued on into the mid-80s probably resulted in
the Roman citizen body more than doubling in population, making how these
new citizens were to be distributed to tribes of critical relevance for what level of
control they might be able to exert over the political processes of the Republic.
Second, in the period between 129 bce and 91 bce the Italians had frequently
demonstrated that they were increasingly interested in engaging the support of
Roman magistrates and in influencing the outcomes of Roman affairs to advance
and/or protect their own interests. This behaviour was a clear indication that at
least some of the new citizens had no intention of simply being passive members
of the Roman citizen body: they would attempt to have their voices heard. Lily
Ross Taylor (1960, p. 2) emphasised the perceived danger for the existing Roman
elite of the tribal assembly being controlled by the incoming citizens. This is also
reflected in the assessment by Staveley (1972, p. 139, n. 246), who suggests the
envisioned restriction to a set number of tribes was a measure aimed at delaying
Italian influence until the Roman elite could extend their control through
clientele to the newly enfranchised communities, although this argument does
not take into account the ongoing significance of the enrolment issue.
The Census of 89 bce
The failed census of 89 bce is of particular importance to a study of the Social

War. Had the census been properly conducted and a figure returned, the number
of former allies enfranchised by the lex Iulia could have been estimated. The
censors were L. Iulius Casear, the consul of 90 bce and the proposing magistrate
of the lex Iulia in the previous year, and P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97). According
to Cicero the censors failed to complete the census although the fasti preserved
at Atium show that the lustrum was conducted.26 Although the failed census is
observed by many of the modern works on the Social War, a clear explanation
26
Cic. Arch. 11: Iulio et Crasso nullam populi partem esse censam. Inscr. Ital. 13.1,
pp. 164–166.
for the exact obstruction to the census is frequently lacking. Wiseman (1969,
pp. 63–64) argued that the censors had failed to properly follow augural law and
that it was for this reason that the census was conducted again three years later.
Linderski (1986, pp. 2186–2188), investigating it from the perspective of a study
of augural procedure, has suggested that a religious technicality may have caused
the lustrum to be closed without a figure. Linderski argued that by announcing
a date for the lustrum and then bringing it forward without the proper decretum
augurum the censors invalidated the lustrum. Given the experience of the two
men and the fact that Caesar was implementing his own law of the previous
year, Linderski argued that the error was obvious and therefore the product of
intent on the part of the censors to stall the enrolment of the new citizens. If
so, it is possible that this was a mechanism for delaying the enrolment of the
Italians. Tibiletti (1959, pp. 118–119) argued that while citizenship had been
granted, the Romans engaged in a range of measures to delay it being used in
practice by the new citizens. As rightly noted by Wiseman (1969, p. 64), the
most important issue is that the censors failed to assign the citizens to classes.
The Lex Calpurnia
The function of a law or laws known as the lex Calpurnia is much more difficult
to determine but it is important for understanding the function and scope of
the lex Iulia.27 According to a fragment of Sisenna a lex Calpurnia authorised
the award of citizenship to soldiers as a reward for bravery.28 This law appears
to have authorised the award of citizenship to allied soldiers serving with the
Romans viritim and de consilii sententia. A second fragment which may either
refer to another provision of the same law or to a separate measure asserts that
two additional tribes were to be created ex senatus consulto.29 On one view,
forwarded among others by Gabba (1976, pp. 89–91; see also Badian, 1958b,
pp. 226–227), these provisions prefigured the much broader scope of the
lex Iulia and thus should probably be dated from early to mid-90 bce, prior
to the lex Iulia. Alternatively it may have been passed in 89 bce or later, after
the passage of the lex Iulia and the lex Plautia Papiria.30 This law (or laws) was
27
See Mommsen, R.St. 3, pp, 132–135; Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 33–34; Taylor
(1960); Sherwin-White (1973, pp. 153–155); Gabba (1976, pp. 89–91); Luraschi (1978).
28
Sisenna, fr. 120: milites ut lex Calpurnia concesserat virtutis ergo civitate donari.
29
Sisenna, fr. 17: L. Calpurnius Piso ex senati consulto duas novas tribus.
30
Thus, for instance, Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 33–34 places the measures in 89.
Sherwin-White (1973, pp. 153–155) places them after the lex Iulia and the lex Plautia
possibly passed by the tribune L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (pr. 74) (Rotondi, 1912,
p. 491).
A possibility suggested by Rotondi (1912, p. 491) was that individuals
such as Minatius Magius, the leader of a pro-Roman counter-insurgency
among the Hirpini, may have been enfranchised under this law. If so, then the
lex Iulia provided for the enfranchisement of auxiliaries serving within the army
but not Italians who, despite fighting in assistance of the Romans, were from
communities that were still at war. The home community’s stance would have its
people ineligible under the provisions of the lex Iulia, which required recipients
to be from allied communities. If the measure relating to the enfranchisement of
soldiers had simply been intended to clarify elements of the existing lex Iulia or,
in the manner in which it is likely that the lex Pompeia did, provide additional
measures not covered by the earlier law, then surely Pompeius Strabo’s grants
of citizenship in November of 89 to allies serving in his army would have cited
the lex Calpurnia and not the lex Iulia as the basis of this prerogative.31 This
has led a number of modern scholars to argue that the lex Calpurnia pre-dated
the lex Iulia (Haug, 1947, pp. 247–248; Carcopino, 1952, p. 393; Brunt,
1965, pp. 108–109). More importantly, a fragment of Diodorus describes
the consul L. Iulius Caesar as offering citizenship to a Cretan.32 This incident
occurred while Caesar was still carrying out his military campaign and thus must
pre-date the passage of the lex Iulia after the consul returned to Rome late in the
year (see Gabba, 1976, pp. 89–91). It is thus conceivable that the lex Calpurnia
authorised commanders to make grants of citizenship viritim (and sigillatim)
de consilii sententia and that the lex Iulia subsequently authorised the extension
of citizenship to whole loyal communities, while providing the more general
power of making grants sigillatim and de consilii sententia. In turn, Velleius
Paterculus’ description of his grandfather having received a grant of citizenship
viritim following his service in 89 cannot be used as evidence for the sequence
of these laws.33
The Lex Pompeia and Lex Plautia Papiria
Over the campaigning season of 89 bce a number of peoples or regions

surrendered. This allowed the Romans to press further south, but it also
Papiria.
31
ILS, 8888.
32
Diod. Sic. 37.18.
33
Vell. Pat. 2.16.3: viritim civitate donando.
necessitated important concessions to the surrendering peoples. Despite the war

clearly turning in the Romans’ favour, there was still heavy fighting and early in
89 bce (for the second time during the war) one of the consuls was killed in
battle while fighting the insurgents.34 Further concessions to the surrendering
Italians, on the model of the lex Iulia the previous year, were thus probably a
belated effort to address the grievances that had caused the war in the first place.
Such measures would have demonstrated that a path to citizenship was still
possible for the insurgents so long as they laid down their arms. Two separate
laws, the lex Plautia Papiria and the lex Pompeia, each appear to have been built
upon elements of the lex Iulia and should therefore be dated to 89 bce.
The consul of 89 bce, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, passed the lex Pompeia. This
law confirmed citizenship for Cispadane communities south of the Po and Latin
rights for the communities north of the Po.35 Several reasons for this law can be
readily identified. The law was probably designed to address ambiguities which
existed as a result of the lex Iulia. The censors of 89 bce, P. Licinius Crassus
(cos. 97) and L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 90), closed the lustrum without completing
a census of citizens.36 A dispute between the censors in this year is particularly
significant; with the passage of the lex Iulia the census had the unprecedented
task of assessing tens of thousands of new citizens in one swoop. The lex Iulia
must have in some way failed to adequately clarify what was to be done with
loyal allied communities north of the Po River, although presumably the censor
L. Iulius Caesar must have asserted a clear interpretation of his own law. The
status of these people remained contentious as the source of a dispute between
the censors of 65 bce as to whether or not they should assess those living north
of the Po as citizens.37
The lex Pompeia thus provided all the allied peoples on the northern side
of the Po with Latin colonial status. This would have in turn permitted local
elites in those communities to gain full citizen rights by being elected to a local
magistracy.38 The replication of a situation that had previously existed south
of the Po and had failed to prevent the Social War is at first glance strange.
34
Liv. Per. 75; App. BC. 1.50.
35
Ascon. 3C and Plin. HN. 3.20(138). See Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 32; Rotondi (1912,
p. 342). On the enfranchisement of Cisalpine Gaul and the rights of the Transpadani,
see Ewins (1955, pp. 73–98), Sherwin-White (1973, pp. 157–159) and Bispham (2007,
pp. 173–174).
36
Cic. Arch. 11. On the dating of the law, see Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 32–33.
37
Dio, 37.9.3.
38
This is explicitly noted by Ascon. 3C. See the discussion in Sherwin-White (1973,
pp. 111, 158–159) and Gabba (1994, p. 126).
There was, however, a key difference which had existed prior to the Social War
throughout much of the Italian peninsula. Pompeius Strabo’s law in 89 bce
probably gave equal status to all communities of the region. In stark contrast,
in the south the principle of civitas cum magistratu would have heightened
pre-existing inequities between communities with Latin rights which had access
to the privilege and the many allied Italian cities which did not. Communities
with Latin status had a pathway to citizen rights for their local elite, who once
they received citizenship could represent the voice of their local community
more forcefully but who also probably negated, to an extent, the need for others
to possess it. Many poorer citizens could not afford the time to journey to Rome
in order to exercise their right to vote as citizens frequently anyway and a small
group of local elites with access to political processes in Rome was probably
sufficient for representing their needs. For the allied communities no such
pathway existed. In this situation the elite in the Latin communities received
enhanced political rights (or what might be considered greater political libertas)
whereas the status of the other allied communities continued as it had always
done; they were required to pay taxes and supply men to the Roman state but
with no prospect of ever having a direct and legally codified voice in broader
politics or decision-making.
By making the grant of Latin status en masse Pompeius Strabo ensured that
the entire elite of the region would have access to the benefits of citizen status,
while at the same time constraining the number of new citizens that the region
would produce. As such it should probably also be viewed from the perspective
of its potential political and electoral effects. The slow introduction of elites
from the Transpadana into the citizen body would have little overt influence
upon the political status quo and yet would re-enforce the links between the
newly enfranchised local elite individual and his non-citizen client community.
That communities in Picenum and Marsicum had demanded citizen rights for
all their members is a testament to the far more grandiose aspirations of the local
elite in these regions.
Another law in 89 is of particular significance, for it probably enfranchised
some of those communities which surrendered early on in the Social War. The
tribunes M. Plautius Silvanus and C. Papirius Carbo39 secured the passage
of the lex Plautia Papiria. Cicero quotes the law in the Pro Archia as giving
citizenship to
39
Papirius was the nephew of C. Papirius Carbo, triumvir on the Gracchan land
commission from 130 bce (RE, 18, 1015).
si qui foederatis civitatibus ascripti fuissent: si tum, cum lex ferebatur, in Italia
domicilium habuissent et si sexaginta diebus apud praetorem essent professi.
any who have been admitted to citizenship in federate cities, if at the time that
the law was passed, had been domicile in Italy and within sixty days had reported
before a praetor.40
That is, anyone who was from an Italian city with a treaty and who was in
a position to present himself before a Roman praetor within sixty days
(see Sherwin-White, 1973, p. 152). In the documented instance of Archias the
Poet, he asserted that he had duly reported to Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, one of
the praetors of 89, and that he had been a long-term resident of Rome.41
As with the other enfranchisement laws, while potentially enfranchising
most of the citizen population of the peninsula, access to the rights provided
by the law was in fact restricted to those who had the capacity to report to one
of the Roman praetors. Those Italian allies who were already resident in Rome
or those who had the resources necessary to travel there to report to one of the
praetors could claim citizenship. As a result, the proviso probably excluded the
many individuals who could not readily approach a praetor. Such a law would
also have been a pointless reiteration of the provisions of the lex Iulia if it were
not aimed at communities which had not been eligible at the time of the passage
of the lex Iulia (see Taylor, 1960, pp. 107f ). Therefore it is likely that, with
large parts of the insurgency having been subdued over the course of 89 bce,
the lex Plautia Papiria aimed to further isolate those insurgents who were still
under arms by enfranchising those who had negotiated terms and agreed to new
treaties. This explains why Cicero described the law as having redefined Italy as a
conglomerate of coloniae and municipia.42
Another factor which likely caused problems with the 89 census was that
there were still serious engagements taking place with the Italian insurgents.
This probably affected the census in several ways. First, soldiers currently on
active service were not typically assessed (Brunt, 1971, pp. 33–37f ), meaning
that the allies and Latins in the army could not be counted. Second, many of
those who had been enfranchised by the lex Iulia or lex Plautia Papiria may
have been reluctant to approach the censors, given ongoing uncertainty about
the allocation to tribes. A further factor may have been that significant numbers
40
Cic. Arch. 4(7).
41
Cic. Arch. 4(7).
42
Cic. Mil. 20, Pis. 41.
did not report to a praetor within the stipulated sixty-day period of the lex
Plautia Papiria.
The census in 86 bce was completed and a figure of 463,000 supposedly
announced by the censors.43 The figure is suspiciously low in light of the
anticipated effects of the lex Iulia and lex Plautia Papiria. While Beloch (1886,
pp. 351–352) sought to amend the figure itself, Salmon (1967, pp. 376–379)
has suggested complacency on the part of the censors, while Brunt (1965,
pp. 107–109) sees it as reluctance to enrol too many Italians into the existing
tribes.44 If the number is accepted, it is likely that the initial group of new
citizens who registered on the census were not representative of the total
numbers that had received (or were entitled to) citizenship by 89 under the lex
Iulia and lex Plautia Papiria. Enrolment of a limited number of new citizens in
the 86 bce census does, however, help to explain the difficulties in the 89 census.
Furthermore, it was the last census conducted until 70 bce. The number of new
citizens that had not been before the censors in 88 or 87, or who subsequently
received citizenship, were thus not assessed until 70 bce, when approximately
half a million new Romans are recorded. Those who surrendered after the cut-
off date of the lex Plautia Papiria were also granted citizenship, but through
individual grants in 88 bce.45
The Proposed New ‘Italian’ Tribes
These laws all appear to have presumed that the enfranchised Latins, allies and
insurgent Italians would be restricted to either eight or ten new tribes that were
to be created.46 Depending on the interpretation of the lex Calpurnia, two
additional tribes were intended to be created, possibly explaining the discrepancy
between Appian and Velleius Paterculus. The policy of restricting the newly
enfranchised to additional tribes would have resulted in the unusual situation of
the tribes being exclusively made up of those who had remained loyal and those
who had joined the insurgency, casting their votes together. These new tribes
were to vote after the thirty-five existing Roman tribes and, as such, would only
43
Jer. Chron. ad ann. 85.
44
Indeed, Beloch amended the figure to 963,000 and accepting the figure for 70/69,
he concluded that ‘Die Abnahme um 53000 seit 85 wäre die Folge des sullanischen
Burgerkrieges’ (1886, p. 352).
45
Vell. Pat. 2.17.
46
App. BC. 1.49 says ten, whereas Vell. Pat. 2.20.2 has eight.
been called upon in those rare occasions when there was not already a majority.47
In name the new citizens would have had full citizenship but in practice they
would have been little better off than with civitas sine suffragio.
This proposal would have had significant consequences for the operation of
the tribal assembly. Under the existing system of four urban and thirty-one rural
tribes48 the approval of eighteen tribes was required for a measure to pass. In
the event that the first eighteen tribes voted in favour of a proposed measure,
seventeen tribes would not be called upon to cast a vote. The addition of ten new
tribes would have raised the total number to forty-five and may have meant that
the approval of twenty-three tribes would then have been needed for a majority.
The new tribes were to vote only if an overall majority could not be reached
among the existing thirty-five; potentially only at those assemblies at which
twelve existing tribes or more voted against a measure would the remaining ten
be called upon.
The rationale for restricting new Romans’ capacity to vote is very obvious.
There were only about 400,000 existing adult Roman males spread across four
urban and thirty-one rural tribes who had been assessed by the census prior
to the Social War. These citizens were disproportionately distributed, the four
urban tribes having far more members than any of the rural tribes. This was
due not only to the substantial population of Rome but also to the fact that
manumitted slaves were automatically enrolled into the urban tribes, a measure
which had also been designed to constrain their ability to affect electoral and
legislative outcomes. As the census in 70/69 bce likely indicates, there were
at least half a million new citizens who were potential extra voters. If these
individuals were evenly distributed across either the thirty-one rural tribes or
even across all thirty-five tribes the Italians would probably have out-numbered
the existing Romans in each of the rural tribes. Alternatively, the Italians could
have been enrolled in a few of the rural tribes. This would limit their ability
to affect outcomes in the tribal assembly but would have ensured them control
of those tribes in which they were placed. A rural tribe was always called to
vote first, after which tribes voted in random order (Taylor, 1966, pp. 70–83;
47
Appian is inconsistent in Book 1 of the BC: he says that the loyal Italians were
enrolled into twelve tribes, but then later that those who surrendered were enrolled into ten.
48
Between 387 and 241 bce the Romans increased the number of tribes to incorporate
new citizens. In 387 bce four tribes were added on Veientine land. In 358 two were added
on lands acquired from Antium. In 332 two tribes were added for Latium. In 318 two were
added in Campania. In 299 two were added, Aniensis and Terentia. In 241 two were added
for Picenum. After 241 bce the number of tribes remained fixed at thirty-five. See Taylor
(1960).
Staveley, 1972, pp. 165–169), and placing the new citizens into a select number
still gave them significant power to steer outcomes in the tribal assembly.
Many Italians accepted the offer on the original terms of ten new tribes to vote
last, but this is not an indication that they were content with being effectively
made second-class citizens. Between 90/89 and 86 bce, when some of them
were finally enrolled, the issue of the manner of their enrolment continued to be
contentious. The proposed gerrymander was in itself nothing new. The oligarchy
had a long history of attempting to exclude or restrict the capacity to participate
politically of both poorer Romans and the newly enfranchised (Staveley, 1972,
pp. 133–142). The enfranchisement of the Italians, advocated by a senatus
consultum in 86, did not eventually include the assignment to the ten additional
tribes and these tribes were never created. Instead, the new citizens were enrolled
in some of the existing thirty-one rural tribes.
The reality of the eventual distribution, however, preserved the original
intent to restrict the new citizens. The former insurgent communities were
concentrated in a small number of tribes, thus the Frentani and Marruncini were
placed in Arnensis and the Marsi and Paeligni in Sergia, of the Samnites, the
Pentri were placed in Voltinia, most of the Herpini were assigned Galeria, while
the people of Aeclanum were put into Cornelia. In contrast the enfranchised
Latin communities were distributed across sixteen of the rural tribes (Taylor,
1960, pp. 109–115f ).49 An interesting feature of this distribution was that the
Samnites were broken up, possibly a reflection of their significant numbers.
Although it remains uncertain, the assignment of the new citizens to tribes may
have occurred as early as 86. However, in the violent climate of the 80s and 70s
many of them were not properly assessed by a census until 70 ce. This possibly
obstructed their ability to fully exploit their newly acquired rights because they
would have been unassessed for a property class.
49
Much of Taylor’s conclusions remain valid, see Linderski’s appraisal in Taylor with
Linderski (2013).
Chapter 9
Ongoing Conflicts and Enfranchisement
(88 to 70 bce)
The insurgent military organisation with Poppaedius Silo as its sole supreme
commander that had been agreed upon in 89 bce between the surviving leaders
collapsed in 88 with Silo’s death in Apulia. It is this event which was widely
treated by the ancient literary sources as the terminal point for the Social War.1
What remained of the insurgency after Silo’s death were pockets of ongoing
resistance, in particular the continuing sieges at Nola and Aesernia,2 though in
neither case can it be established with great certainty when these cities finally
fell to the Romans. In Lucania and Bruttium several of the surviving insurgent
commanders who were still able to muster significant numbers of men continued
to operate, although they appear to have enjoyed few notable successes. These
remaining rebels participated in the civil war of 82 and, indeed, even after
their defeat at the Colline Gate and the slaughter at Praeneste, some surviving
members of the insurgency in Lucania and Bruttium as well as former insurgents
in Campania and parts of Samnium may have continued to be involved in
subsequent conflicts in Italy.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the model for a post-Social War
integration process had already been laid down in 90 bce when those Latins
and allies that had stayed loyal to Rome had been enfranchised. Additional
legislation had followed in 89/88 which had greatly expanded the numbers who
were to be included in the newly enlarged Roman citizen body. An important
consideration is thus that by the end of 88 there were potentially hundreds
of thousands of Italian allies who had sided with the insurgency, either as
combatants or as sympathetic civilians. Many of these people were now newly
entitled to the franchise and are accordingly described as νεοπολίτας or novi cives
1
This is clearly stated in App. BC. 1.53 and it was apparently the concluding event of
the war in Livy’s history (cf. Liv. Per. 76 and 77).
2
Vell. Pat. 2.17.1 describes the war as finished for the most part by 88: finito ex
maxima parte, nisi quae Nolani belli manebant reliquiae, Italico bello. That the siege at Nola
was ongoing is suggested by Vell. 2.17.1; Diod. Sic. 37.19; Liv. Per. 89; Gran. Lic. 36.9.
in ancient literary sources.3 Having surrendered, these people now needed to be

successfully integrated into the new Roman framework for Italy as well.4
The very brutal nature of the Social War, in which former allies and comrades
in arms had slaughtered one another, not for radical independence from Rome
but for direct recognition by the Republic, left an indelible scar on post-Social
War Italy. Significantly, it may have habituated many Italians to willingly resort to
violence to resolve their political differences. Throughout the 80s and 70s there
are indications that former insurgents and their communities were involved in
the ongoing social and political strife in Italy and in continuing to promote the
political aspirations of the insurgents in 91/90. During the 80s the distribution
of the new citizens would be a significant issue in Italy, one which may not have
been fully rectified until the census of 70 bce. Ironically this was an issue which
equally affected enfranchised allies and former insurgents alike.5 Although
having fought on opposing sides of the war they now had a common interest in
ensuring that they were enrolled in such a way that they had an equitable voice
in the Roman assemblies. These considerations noted, it does not follow that the
Social War and the civil wars up to 82 bce should be viewed as one continuous
conflict.6 There is slim evidence at best to indicate this.7
Nonetheless, in the mid-80s bce there were still some bands of former
insurgents who had not surrendered. In particular, it is likely that those
combatants who were from insurgent communities that had been either
destroyed or had not surrendered by the end of 88 bce would have been placed
in a difficult legal situation. As discussed in the previous chapter, the citizenship
laws between 90 and 88 bce had enfranchised all that had surrendered;
insurgents who had not already surrendered would not have been able to do so
safely, and this may explain why in 87 bce there were still Italians under arms.
The organised Italian insurgency had ended by 88 and, as will be seen in this
chapter, the remaining rebel Italians were far less significant for the events of the
80s than were the newly enfranchised Italians.
3
Examples are App. BC. 1.49,Vell. Pat. 2.20.2 and Liv. Per. 84.
4
As App. BC. 1.49 observes, the distribution of these people to the tribes became a
significant issue.
5
For example, Taylor (1960, pp. 111f ) argued that all Vestini – those who fought on
the side of the insurgents, the people of Pinna who sided with Rome and those who already
possessed citizenship – were enrolled into the Quirina tribe.
6
For instance, see the particularly expansive historical argument of Kiene (1844) or,
indeed, Heitland (1909). Heitland (1909, vol. 2, p. 428) argues that the Civil War in the 80s
was a direct continuation of the Social War. See the insightful critiques of Kiene by Salmon
(1964) and Ridley (2003, pp. 39–40).
7
Cogently refuted by Salmon (1964).
Ongoing Conflicts and Enfranchisement (88 to 70 bce) 191
Sulla’s Consulship and the Lex Sulpicia, 88 bce
As discussed in Chapter 8, the lex Iulia, the lex Plautia Papiria and possibly
other citizenship laws had created a system whereby the newly enfranchised
were to be enrolled into additional tribes. This would have created a difficult
political situation for the newly enfranchised Italians had it ever eventuated. On
the one hand it would have marginalised the new citizens, yet on the other it
would have created a bloc of tribes that were dominated by former insurgents or
those Latins and allies who had stayed loyal during the war. These tribes would
have consisted variously of people whose loyalty had been purchased at the end
of 90 and former insurgents whose loyalty had been secured after their surrender
in 89. Instead, as shown by Lily Ross Taylor (1960, pp. 101f ), the eventual result
was that the former allies and insurgents were clustered in a reduced number of
existing tribes (see also Bispham, 2007, pp. 189–199).
After waging a notoriously brutal campaign in the south as a legatus in 89,
L. Cornelius Sulla had returned to Rome and on the strength of his successes
succeeded in being elected consul for 88 bce alongside Q. Pompeius Rufus
(pr. urb. 91). Once the consuls had taken office in 88 bce, Gaius Marius
attempted to oust Sulla from the eastern command prior to his departure. To
achieve this Marius had sought the support of the tribune of the plebs, P. Sulpicius
Rufus.8 Sulpicius proposed a raft of legislation, including on Marius’ behalf a
measure designed both to restore Marius to his former position of dominance
and to undermine Marius’ opponents. These included transference of the
eastern command from Sulla to Marius, the recall of exiles and, significantly, the
enrolment of both new citizens and freedmen into the existing thirty-five tribes.9
The war against Mithradates and the ensuing violence between the partisans
of Sulla and Marius necessitated a radical shift of focus in Italy in 88 bce. Such
a change was probably only possible because of the successes on multiple fronts
in 89 bce and the now strong position that the Romans found themselves in
against the remaining insurgents under arms. Italian insurgents throughout
Picenum and Campania, parts of Samnium and the Marsi and Paeligni had
all either been defeated or were seeking terms under which they could exit the
war by the end of 89 bce. Former insurgents, who as combatants had not been
enfranchised by the previous citizenship laws, were to become a natural target
for sourcing fresh supporters during the period of factional conflicts between
8
Liv. Per. 77; Vell. Pat. 2.18.5–6; Ascon. 64 (on Cic. Corn.).
9
Liv. Per. 77; App. BC. 1.55.
Roman magistrates in the 80s bce which culminated in the bloody civil war of
84–82 bce.
Appian’s account treats the conflict between Sulla and Marius and their
respective supporters in 88 and 87 as directly related not only to ongoing
hostilities associated with the Social War but also with furthering the interests
of the newly enfranchised citizens. Appian writes of the proposal in 88 bce
that Marius
καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας νεοπολίτας, μειονεκτοῦντας ἐπὶ ταῖς χειροτονίαις, ἐπήλπιζεν
ἐς τὰς φυλὰς ἁπάσας διαιρήσειν, οὐ προλέγων μέν τι περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ χρείας, ὡς δὲ
ὑπηρέταις ἐς πάντα χρησόμενος εὔνοις.
also encouraged the new Italian citizens, who had very little power in the elections
to hope that they should be distributed among all the tribes – not in any way
suggesting his own advantage, but with the expectation of employing them as
loyal servants for all his ends.10
The enfranchised Italians were already agitated that their capacity to influence
the outcome of votes in the tribal assembly was hampered by their distribution.
Marius and Sulpicius capitalised on this discontent with their proposal.11 While
this must have been appealing to the new citizens, it also naturally enough
enflamed pre-existing tensions, with the existing citizens disproportionately
concentrated in four urban tribes, the new citizens (and freedmen) would be
handed effective control of the other thirty-one rural tribes and in one fell swoop
be indebted to Marius and Sulpicius for finally having empowered them. This
indeed may have been one of the long-standing reasons for reluctance to extend
citizenship to allied communities.12 In turn, in a single blow, whoever secured
the passage of the bill would be delivered control of the tribes and the election
of the tribunes of the plebs in the future. That such a proposal was intentionally
aimed at achieving control of the tribal assembly is indeed made quite clear by
Appian’s account.
The proposal sparked street fighting in Rome between existing citizens and
the newly enfranchised. Crowds fought with sticks and stones with increasing
ferocity as the day of the vote approached.13 The consuls, Sulla and Pompeius
10
11
Liv. Per. 77; App. BC. 1.55–56.
12
See Kendall (2012, pp. 113–115) on the potential disadvantages of enfranchising
allies for military recruitment.
13
App. BC. 1.55.
Rufus, attempted to stall the vote by imposing a cessation of public business.

Sulpicius in turn publicly denounced the cessation as illegal. With the consuls
refusing to repeal the measure they were threatened with violence by Sulpicius’
supporters. While the consuls managed to escape, the son of the consul Pompeius
Rufus who was also the son-in-law of Sulla was killed by the crowd.14 Following
these deaths the lex Sulpicia was passed by the people.15 Sulla fled Rome for
Campania, where his army was stationed near Nola. Appian says that he readied
his army at the nearby city of Capua while both Plutarch and Velleius Paterculus
claim that soldiers loyal to Sulla were stationed near Nola, where troops of
his where continuing the siege of the city.16 Sulla had six legions assembled in
Campania and with the support of the other consul of 88, Q. Pompeius Rufus,
marched on Rome. The soldiers of the consuls forced their way into the City
and following fighting in the city streets Sulpicius, C. Marius, his son and their
supporters were driven from the City. Sulpicius was soon thereafter caught
and killed. The elder Marius was captured, escaped and managed to join his
son in exile in Africa.17 The lex Sulpicia and the tribune’s other measures were
subsequently repealed by Sulla. Cicero says this was because Sulpicius’ laws had
been passed with the use of violence (per vim) although the legal mechanism is
not entirely clear.18
The Insurgent Appeal to Mithradates VI Eupator
It was possibly contemporary with these events that an attempt was made on
the part of the surviving Italian insurgents to entice Mithradates VI Eupator of
Pontus to send an army to Italy. The appeal is recorded in Photius’ summary of
Diodorus Siculus as occurring after the death of Poppaedius Silo in 88 bce and
the collapse of the insurgency in Apulia. Photius describes the Italian insurgents
as only consisting of ‘Samnites and Sabellians’ based at Nola and Lucanians under
the command of Lamponius and Clepitius.19 The authenticity of this insurgent
14
Liv. Per. 77; Plut. Sulla, 8; App. BC. 1.55.
15
Liv. Per. 77; Plut. Sulla, 9–10; App. BC. 1.55.
16
App. BC. 1.56; Vell. Pat. 2.18.4; Plut. Sulla, 8; Eut. 5.4. Nola, however, had
surrendered at some stage in 88/87 as it is described as being recently enfranchised by App.
BC. 1.65 in the context of 87 bce.
17
Plut. Mar. 35f.
18
Cic. Phil. 8.2.7. Lintott (1968, p. 143) suggests that Sulpicius’ measures where
declared illegal by the Senate on the basis that they had been passed with violence.
19
Diod. Sic. 37.2.11. Gabba (1976, pp. 88–89) places the approach to Mithradates in
88 bce. Conversely, in volume 9 of the Cambridge Ancient History (Gabba, 1994, p. 122) he
embassy is supported by a fragment of Posidonius preserved in Athenaeus which

similarly locates it following the mass murder of Italians in Asia.20
In Lucania a force of rebel Italian allies was still under arms in 88. The
two principal commanders of these men were Pontius Telesinus and Marcus
Lamponius. According to the summary of Diodorus there were three Italian
commanders still operating in Bruttium in 88: Marcus Aponius, Tiberius
Clepitius and Pompeius.21 These names are garbled. M. Aponius is almost
certainly Marcus Lamponius, referred to as such in an earlier passage of the same
summary by Photius. Pompeius is possibly an error for the surviving Samnite
leader Pontius Telesinus, who is referred to as operating in conjunction with
Lamponius by a number of other sources.22 Tiberius Clepitius is almost certainly
Cleptius, the same man who is described in a fragment of book 36 of Diodorus
Siculus. This man had commanded a contingent of 600 Lucanian allies in
103 bce and had assisted the propraetor L. Licinius Luculus during the
suppression of a slave revolt in Sicily.23 As discussed in previous chapters, such
military experience was typical of the senior leadership of the insurgency.
The approach by the remaining rebels to Mithradates to intervene in Italy
cannot readily be used as evidence for the goals of the initial insurgency as it
existed in 91/90 bce.24 First, the original insurgency established under the
leadership of Poppaedius Silo and Paapius Mutilus had represented a far broader
cross-section of the disaffected allied communities in central and southern Italy.
The majority of rebel allies, in those regions which received the most attention
in the ancient literary sources as the scene of fighting during 90 and 89, such as
Campania, the regions of Samniun, Apulia and the territories of the Paeligni
and Marsi, had all surrendered by the end of 88 bce. For communities in these
regions there was now a model for nominal integration into the Roman citizen
body in place. Instead the attempt to induce Mithradates to come to Italy is
indicative of the different character of the surviving insurgents from this point
associates the approach with ‘at the end of the first year of the war’, that is, between the end
of 90 and the beginning of 89 bce.
20
Posidonius in Athen. 5.213C (F253).
21
Diod. Sic. 37.2.13.
22
App. BC. 1.90; Vell. Pat. 2.16 and 27. Telesinus is also listed as an insurgent
commander in Lucania in Flor. 2.18.6–7. Salmon (1967, pp. 368–369) suggested that the
‘Pompeius’ may instead be identified with Paapius Mutilus.
23
Diod. Sic. 36.8.1. On Licinius’ command, see Broughton, MRR, 1, p. 564.
24
Conversely, Mouritsen argues that the approach to Mithradates was ‘in itself an
important indication of the Italian attitude’ (1998, p. 164).
onwards.25 These remaining people seem to have now been committed to much
more aggressive resistance to Rome. In light of Mithradates’ massacres in Asia,
which had targeted Roman and Italian individuals as alike, their appeal for his
assistance appears all the more desperate (Ñaco del Hoyo et al., 2009, 2011).
A unique gold stater from the Cabinet des médailles at the Bibliothèque
Nationale in Paris shows a head of Bacchus/Liber facing to the right on the
obverse with a cista mystica depicted on the reverse face of the coin. In exergue
is a legend in Oscan identifying the coin as issued by an otherwise unknown
moneyer, Mi[nius] Ieius [son of ] Mi[nius] (Babelon, 1924, no. 31; Sydenham,
1952, no. 643; Campana, 1987, pp. 135–137). Although once thought a fake,
this coin has for a long time been identified with the insurgent embassy sent
to Mithradates in 88 (Bompois, 1873, pp. 27f; Babelon, 1924, pp. 10f ).26 Its
use of gold in a period when Rome was experiencing a monetary crisis and the
insurgency had all but collapsed is indeed startling. A solution to this issue
suggested by Bompois (1873, p. 40) was that it had been minted at Amisus.
It has also been suggested that Minius Ieius may have been the leader of the
embassy sent to Mithradates (Garrucci, 1885, p. 107; Gruber, 1970, vol. 2,
p. 335).27 The coin is also included among the insurgent coins in the recently
published catalogue in Imagines Italicae (p. 69). In an appendix devoted to
this unusual coin Campana (1987, pp. 135–137), however, argued that the
coin has been incorrectly identified with the Social War. Harold Mattingly
has also recently argued that the coin may have been minted in 74 bce with
its Oscan legend targeted at undermining the loyalty of southern Italians and
in particular Oscan-speaking soldiers serving in the Roman army. In support
of this he argues that both L. Fannius and L. Magius may have been from
Oscan-speaking communities (Mattingly, 2004, pp. 190–192, esp. the analysis
at p. 191, n. 8).
25
Gabba characterised them as ‘those extremist and independent elements which
reappeared later, for example in 83 BC and alongside Sertorius’ (1976, p. 88).
26
A very useful summary of the issues surrounding the coin is provided in Gruber
(1970, vol. 2, pp. 334–335, n. 1).
27
Sydenham (1952, no. 643) treated it as an authentic insurgent coin and similarly
Pobjoy (2000) has argued in favour of the coin’s association with the Social War. Gruber
(1970, vol. 2, pp. 334–335, n. 1) treats the coin as referencing the insurgent embassy. Gabba
(1994, p. 122, n. 81) observes simply that the coin is normally associated with the appeal.
Cinna, Carbo and Marius in 87 bce
At the end of 88 bce hostility towards Sulla led the People to elect L. Cornelius
Cinna and Cn. Octavius as consuls for 87 bce. Cinna gave assurances to Sulla
that he would uphold Sulla’s measures and took an oath on the Capitol to that
effect.28 Yet, Cinna already styled himself an advocate of the newly enfranchised
Italians. Once Sulla departed to take command of the war against Mithradates,
Cinna, with the assistance of a number of the tribunes of the plebs, proposed
a bill to enrol the new citizens across the existing tribes and another to recall
Marius from exile.29 These measures were opposed by his colleague Octavius.
Cicero saw the cause of the conflict between Cinna and Octavius as specifically
over the enrolment proposal: Cinna cum Octavio de novorum civium sufragiis.30
According to Appian, Cinna had been encouraged by newly enfranchised
citizens in 87 bce to adopt this policy. After failed attempts to induce slaves
to rally to his cause, Cinna travelled to a number of recently enfranchised
Italian cities. Appian lists these as Tibur, Praeneste and, significantly, Nola.31
Meanwhile, in Rome, Cinna was deposed as consul and replaced by L. Merula.
Cinna continued to look for allies in former insurgent regions, at Capua
inducing the army stationed there to support him before travelling among other
‘allied’ cities, receiving troops and funds.32 Cinna marched with these soldiers on
the City and encamped outside the walls, opposed by the proconsul Pompeius.
Meanwhile, Marius arrived in Etruria with a small number of supporters and,
in a like manner to Cinna, asserted that he was in favour of securing equitable
access to the vote for the newly enfranchised in the region.33 Having collected
about 6,000 Etruscans willing to support him Marius joined with Cinna, Carbo
and Sertorius outside Rome. This ‘gang of four’ then proceeded to assault many
of the surrounding communities, sacking the city of Ostia, establishing river
crossings and cutting off the supply of grain to the city. It is at this point that
the summary of Livy claims that the Senate granted citizenship to the peoples
of Italy: Italicis populis a senatu civitas data est.34 Taylor (1960, p. 101–102)
28
Plut. Sulla, 10.3–4.
29
Cic. Phil. 8.7 and Gran. Lic. 35.29.
30
Cic. Phil. 8.7.
31
App. BC. 1.65.
32
App. BC. 1.65–66.
33
App. BC. 1.67 asserts that: καὶ περὶ τῆς χειροτονίας σφόδρα αὐτοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσιν
ἐπαγγελλόμενός τε καὶ πιστὸς εἶναι δοκῶν.
34
Liv. Per. 80. Loeb translator Alfred Schlesinger assumed that this statement was a
belated reference to the enfranchisement legislation of 89 bce (Schlesinger and Geer, 1959,
p. 100, fn. 2).
plausibly argued that in 87 bce the Senate promised citizenship to all former
insurgents who had by that time surrendered. It would have thereby taken in
most of the former insurgents and greatly simplified the legal situation with
the former insurgent communities.35 The senatus consultum referred to in the
summary of Livy may have authorised the enrolment of the Italians within the
existing thirty-one rural tribes, with a subsequent law that is thus otherwise
unpreserved. There are good reasons for interpreting it in this way. First, from
87 bce onwards the issue of whether the new citizens should be enrolled in new
tribes with restricted voting rights or, alternatively, distributed among existing
ones disappears from the ancient sources. After 87 bce the principal concern of
former insurgents is the much more general concern that they might be denied
the rights which they had so far acquired. Second, Sulla and his supporters were
intent upon erasing Sulpicius, Marius, Cinna and their supporters but this does
not mean that they were ignorant of the dangers posed by further incensing the
new citizens, a group which after all consisted of not only the many loyal Latins
and allies but also the former members of the insurgency. Far from it – Sulla’s
actions in 83 bce would demonstrate that he (like his opponents) was willing
to negotiate with the newly enfranchised and provide guarantees of their rights.
True to a policy of asserting Senatorial authority Sulla’s supporters within the
Senate may have permitted a vote to advise the enrolment of the new citizens
in the traditional thirty-one rural tribes. Such a measure would have elegantly
undermined Cinna and Marius who were seeking to capitalise on the grievances
of newly enfranchised Italians. Such a decision would also be consistent with
another taken at about the same time. The siege of Rome had forced the consuls
to send orders to Metellus Pius (likely pro. cos. 88), who had been continuing
operations against insurgent positions in Samnium and Apulia during 87,36
ordering that he should come to terms with the remaining insurgents in those
parts. Metellus obeyed but once he had engaged in talks he apparently refused to
agree to the demands of the insurgents. This created an opportunity for Marius
to offer more favourable terms to them and thereby gain the insurgents’ support.37
When Cinna and Marius took Rome they indulged in mass slaughter and
pillaging, displaying from the rostra the hacked-off heads of senators they
presumed to have been opponents of their interests.38 The lack of restraint and
35
The date was subsequently accepted by Brunt (1965, p. 96).
36
37
App. BC. 1.68 does not specify the nature of the Italians’ demands. Gran. Lic.
35.29 says, however, that the Italian combatants wanted citizenship guaranteed for all as a
condition: qui se negabant nisi civitas ipsis et perfugis omnibus daretur bonaque redderentur.
38
App. BC. 1.70–73 (see Katz, 1976).
the brutality of these actions may in part be explained by the background of

the men in their armies. Many of their soldiers were sourced from insurgent
communities or from former insurgent communities that were now angry over
the issue of enrolment into the tribes. Many of these men may well have been
only a year or two earlier fighting against the Romans in the Social War and
had now been given liberty by one Roman faction to vent their animosity in the
streets of Rome.
In 89 bce, with the Social War still going on in Italy, the censors P. Licinius
Crassus (cos. 97) and L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 90) completed the lustrum but were
unable to return a figure because of a dispute over who should be included as
citizens.39 The censors in 86, L. Marcius Philippus and M. Perperna, succeed
in returning a figure, but of only 463,000 citizens.40 In the Pro Archia Cicero
implies that the censors acted appropriately,41 but it seems obvious that the
census result was defective (in so far as it did not reflect the numbers which had
been enfranchised) when compared with the previous preserved census figure
for 115 bce of 394,336 and the later far higher number.42 Salmon forwarded the
unconvincing argument that the Censors ‘were not very energetic in listing the
Italians’ (1967, pp. 376–377). Brunt (1965, p. 109) has argued that the censors
may have manipulated the count to avoid the necessary task of enrolling into
the existing tribes many of the Italians. Both arguments explain the low figure
through the negligence of the censors but there are several factors in 86 which
probably contributed to a low result being returned. First, the low figure likely
reflects instability in Italy and widespread fear of appearing before the censors.
This was not unreasonable given the violence of 88 and 87 bce. Second, soldiers
on campaign where not included in the assessment, as is stated by Cicero.43
Given that the next census, conducted in 70 bce, returned a figure of 910,000,
approximately half a million or more citizens most likely failed to be counted by
the censors in 86 and thereby probably also failed to be either enrolled in a tribe
or assessed for enrolment in a property class.
39
Inscr. Ital. vol. 13, p. 55; cf. Cic. Arch. 5 (11) and Dio, 37.9.3.
40
Inscr. Ital. vol. 13, p. 55, with the figure reported in Jer. Chron. ad ann. 85.
41
Cic. Arch. 5(11).
42
Liv. Per. 63.
43
Cic. Arch. 11.
Continuation of the Insurgency in Lucania and Bruttium
According to the summary of Livy at this time the ‘Samnites’ chose to take up
arms again.44 This statement must be a generic use of the word Samnites by the
summariser to mean ‘insurgents’, as it cannot refer to all of Samnium and, as
later events show, included many Lucanians. Instead, it is likely referring to an
insurgent army or armies that had already been active in Lucania and Bruttium
in southern Italy from 88 bce.45 This insurgent army or armies was under the
command of Marcus Lamponius (a Lucanian), Pontius Telesinus (a Samnite)
and a third man possibly called Tiberius Clepitius.
Both Lamponius and Telesinus are claimed to have been insurgent
commanders during the main fighting of the Social War.46 Marcus Lamponius
was listed by Appian as one of the nine principal commanders of the insurgency
and he had pursued the army of Licinius Crassus in Lucania, trapping him and
his army in the Lucanian city of Grumentum.47 Velleius Paterculus listed Pontius
Telesinus among the principal commanders of the Social War, as did Florus,48
although in both of these cases it seems possible that they have unduly projected
to the period of 90–88 Telesinus’ prominent role in the period between 87 and
82 bce. What the activities of these men were in the 80s is not clear and the
reasons for them continuing to be under arms, in the face of attempts to come
to terms with other insurgents, is not explained in any ancient source. The newly
enfranchised peoples in Italy, both former insurgents and former loyal allies,
seem to have been content to involve themselves in Roman factional in-fighting
and not to pursue an independent armed resistance. Lamponius, Telesinus and
their supporters did indeed side with the younger Marius in 83 bce and it may
be that they had been among the men who had negotiated an agreement with
Marius and his supporters in 87.
According to Photius’ summary of Diodorus, after Sulla’s departure from
Italy, three generals by the names of Marcus Aponius, Tiberius Clepitius and
Pompeius laid siege to Isiae in Bruttium.49 After failing to capture the city these
commanders left part of their army to maintain the siege and headed southward,
laying siege to Rhegium, a city on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina. This
44
Liv. Per. 80.
45
This was the group that was eventually destroyed by Sulla and his supporters in
83 bce. Plut. Sulla, 29; App. BC. 1.90.
46
For discussion of this, see Chapter 5.
47
Frontin. Str. 2.4.16; App. BC. 1.41.
48
Vell. Pat. 2.16.1; Flor. 2.18.6–7.
49
Diod. Sic. 37.2.13.
army was subsequently repelled by the governor of Sicily at the time, Gaius
Norbanus.50 It has been rightly assumed that the summary of Diodorus has
garbled the names of Marcus Lamponius and Pontius Telesinus to produce this
account. Broughton placed the Italian siege of Rhegium in 87 bce,51 but its date
is dependent upon how long Norbanus is presumed to have been governor of
Sicily and permits radically different interpretations of the motives of this group.
Cicero asserts that Norbanus had been governor ‘while all Italy was ablaze with
the Social War’ (cum bello sociorum tota Italia arderet), clearly meaning that
Norbanus was already in Sicily sometime between 90 and 89 bce.52 Broughton
listed Norbanus as praetor in 88 in Sicily, and as a promagistrate after 87 bce.53
Cicero’s description, however, seems more likely to refer to the period of most
intense fighting in either 90 or 89. Indeed, Badian (1964, pp. 84–85) argued
that Norbanus had probably been governor of the province since 90 bce.
Brennan took this even further and has argued that on the basis of the passage
in Cicero, Norbanus had been in Sicily as early as 92 bce and that he may have
remained on the island until 85 bce.54 The date of Norbanus’ arrival is uncertain
and insurgent attacks on cities in Bruttium, repelled by Norbanus at Rhegium,
probably date to the later part of 88 or 87 bce. The only certain terminus ante
quem that can be identified is Norbanus’ consulship in 83 bce at which time
some of these surviving insurgents were operating in the south and able to
mobilise what is claimed to have been in excess of 70,000 armed supporters by
some accounts.55 Badly documented as these events are they suggest that there
was a significant number of Italians in the south who were either unwilling or
unable to come to terms with the Roman Republic and were actively involving
themselves in the approaching conflict with Sulla and his supporters.
Cinna, Carbo and Sulla’s Return to Italy, 83 bce
During the summer of 83 both sides made attempts to recruit extensively from
the Italian cities. Many communities in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul continued
to willingly support the consuls while Sulla sent messengers throughout the
50
Diod. Sic. 37.2.13–14.
51
52
Cic. Verr. 2, 5.3(8) and also Cic. Verr. 2, 3.49(117) and Diod. Sic. 37.2.13–14.
53
Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 41 and 48. Lovano (2002, p. 90) implies a long tenure in
Sicily without clarifying the timing of the assault on Rhegium.
54
55
Plut. Sulla, 29; App. BC. 1.90. See further discussion of the figure below.
peninsula to raise troops, as Appian describes, ‘by friendship, fear, money and
promises’.56 Aware that Sulla’s army would eventually return from the East,
Cinna and Carbo attempted to shore up support with local Italian communities
for their regime. Appian claims that they sent out emissaries to all parts of Italy
to raise money, soldiers and supplies with which to help confront Sulla.57 These
appeals were particularly directed towards the newly enfranchised, of whose
interests Cinna and Carbo claimed to be the defenders.58 Indeed, some of the
issues of coin in the mid-80s may have been designed to advertise their image
as protectors of ‘Italian rights’.59 Cinna’s actions were certainly part of a range of
activities aimed at undermining the loyalty of Sulla’s troops and thwarting his
inevitable return to Italy (Frier, 1971).
It should, however, also be noted that Cinna and Carbo (coss. 85-84) were
in Italy, Sulla was not. Advocating protection, or even the enhancement, of the
rights of the new citizens was expedient for raising support for their regime
and inducing Italian communities to resist Sulla when his army returned to the
peninsula. In this sense whether Cinna, Carbo and their supporters or, for that
matter, Sulla and his supporters intended to follow through on these assurances
is a separate issue. Appian consistently asserts that Cinna, Carbo, Marius and
his son and their other partisans ‘claimed’ to be protecting the interests of the
newly enfranchised because it was expedient to do so and that the general mood
towards Sulla among the former allied communities was hostile.60 While having
made concessions to the new citizens in order to secure their loyalty, Cinna and
his supporters showed little interest in genuinely incorporating them and in
turn, Sulla’s stance was similarly ambiguous.61 A statement in the periochae of
Livy that the senate ‘gave’ the ‘new citizens’ the right to vote is unfortunately
unexplained, but clearly implies there were ongoing inequities in their rights.62
56
App. BC. 1.86.
57
App. BC. 1.76.
58
App. BC. 1.76: τούς τε δυνατοὺς συνουσίαις ἀνελάμβανον καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἠρέθιζον
μάλιστα τὰς νεοπολιτίδας, ὡς δι᾽ αὐτὰς ὄντες ἐν τοσῷδε κινδύνου.
59
Rowland (1966) has suggested that the coinage minted in the mid-80s under Cinna
had been designed to promote his support for the protection of the civic rights of the newly
enfranchised Italians. While an appealing argument, it depends largely upon the modern
interpretation of mythological themes and the assumption that first-century Italians would
have inferred the same references.
60
App. BC. 1.82 claims that the general sentiment was in favour of the ‘consuls’. App.
BC. 1.86 says that the consuls’ armies were continually reinforced from many parts of Italy.
61
For discussion of the groups potential motives see: Badian, 1958b, pp. 252–253;
Salmon, 1967, pp. 378f; Frier, 1971, pp. 589f.
62
Liv. Per. 84: novis civibus senatus consulto suffragium datum est.
In 84 bce Sulla sent letters to the Senate in which he accounted for his
actions while in the East and in which he also threatened to take revenge on
Cinna, Carbo and their supporters when he returned to Italy. He also, however,
gave assurances to both existing citizens and those newly enfranchised that he
had no quarrel with them.63 Santangelo has rightly argued that during the civil
wars of the 80s, ‘Sulla was keen to build good relations with the communities
and the members of the local elites that were prepared to accept his supremacy
and not to interfere with his rise to power in Rome’ (2007, p. 73). The potential
consequences of failing to appease Italian concerns were also demonstrated.
Carbo wanted to take hostages from all cities in Italy in order to secure their
loyalty but he was blocked by the rest of the Senate.64 Carbo did, however, begin
collecting soldiers from all over Italy. These men were readied for transport to
Liburnia in Illyria from where he intended to oppose Sulla.65 When Cinna’s
soldiers realised that his intention was to march them against Sulla, they
murdered him.66
It is easy to characterise L. Cornelius Sulla as unreservedly opposed to the
interests of former insurgents in the aftermath of the Social War.67 Reference to
the deliberate separation out and execution of Samnites in the civil war of 82 are
easily read as the product of an irrational hatred of the Samnites. This cannot,
however, have been entirely true as is demonstrated by Sulla’s conduct of the
campaigns in Campania and Samnium in 89. Sulla had actually been assisted by
Hirpinian counter-insurgents in subduing Campania and subsequently accepted
the surrender of many Hirpinian communities in southern Samnium. As already
discussed, in the 80s groups of Samnites, along with other former insurgents in
the south, had sided with Sulla’s rivals. In 87 bce assurances by Cinna, Marius
and others that they would rectify the unequal tribal distributions had been
briefly successful in rallying the support of former insurgents. But this support
was not always in the form of military assistance. Many communities in Italy
in the 80s appear to have been intent upon negotiating more equitable rights
within the citizen body but only provided nominal support for one faction or
the other.
63
App. BC. 1.77.
64
Liv. Per. 84.
65
App. BC. 1.77.
66
Liv. Per. 83; Vell. Pat. 2.24; App. BC. 1.78.
67
In particular, see Salmon (1964, pp. 75f; 1967, pp. 382f ) who argues that Sulla
displayed an implacable hostility towards the Samnites. A recent and welcome alternate
perspective is presented by Santangelo (2007). See in particular Santangelo’s discussion of
Sulla’s interaction with former Italian insurgents in the 80s (2007, pp. 67–78).
In 83 bce Sulla landed with his army at Brundisium and marched towards
Rome along the Via Appia.68 Sulla was careful not to arouse unnecessary anger at
his march through former insurgent regions. As events the following year would
prove, when Sulla’s opponents would muster the support of former members of
the insurgency, this was a prudent course of action. Velleius Paterculus describes
Sulla’s approach:
tanta cum quiete exercitum per Calabria Apuliamque cum singulari cura frugum,
agrorum, hominum, urbium perduxit in Campaniam.
so quietly through Calabria and Apulia, with a remarkable care for the crops,
fields, men and cities, did he lead his army into Campania.69
As a result, Sulla’s army marched unopposed through the former heartland

of the Italian insurgency, to be stopped once in Campania by the army of the
consul C. Norbanus near Mount Tifata. Following the defeat of his army, the
consul Norbanus retreated to the nearby city of Capua.70 Sulla’s army continued
their march north-westward along the Via Appia and between Cales and
Teanum were met by the other consul, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes.71 Scipio’s
army was composed largely of newly enfranchised former insurgents who were,
according to Appian, unhappy about the present situation and longing for a
peaceful outcome.72 The two commanders conducted a conference at which the
citizenship and the rights of the newly enfranchised citizens were central issues.73
Sulla successfully allayed the new citizens’ concerns that he might attempt
to restrict or deny them their rights (Gabba, 1954, pp. 102–104), assurances
that probably carried more weight in light of his restrained march through the
68
Liv. Per. 85; Vell. Pat. 2.25; App. BC. 1.84. Plutarch incorrectly claims he landed at
Tarentum.
69
Vell. Pat. 2.25.
70
Liv. Per. 85; Plut. Sulla, 27.4–5. App. BC. 1.84 wrongly places the battle at Canusium,
in central Apulia, but then says that Norbanus withdrew to Capua, located west of Mount
Tifata.
71
Liv. Per. 85; Plut. Sulla, 28.1–2; App. BC. 1.85.
72
Cic. Phil. 12.27 describes the two generals as cum alter nobilitatis florem, alter belli
socios adhibuisset. App. BC. 1.85 describes Scipio’s army as πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχοντος καὶ ποθοῦντος
εἰρήνην γενέσθαι.
73
App. BC. 1.85. Cic. Phil. 12.27 describes the conference: Sulla cum Scipione inter
Cales et Teanum, cum alter nobilitatis florem, alter belli socios adhibuisset, de auctoritate
senatus, de suffragiis populi, de iure civitatis leges inter se et condiciones contulerunt. non tenuit
omnino conloquium illud fidem: a vi tamen periculoque afuit.
south thus far. As a result, Scipio’s army defected en masse to Sulla. So, too,
Cn. Pompeius raised a private army from Picenum. As previously discussed,
his father Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89) had campaigned in Picenum and taken
Asculum. Despite many within the region of Picenum having supported the
insurgents during the war, Velleius Paterculus describes Strabo as having acted as
patron to the entire region, and the younger Cn. Pompeius was apparently able
to leverage his father’s reputation to rally support.74 His father, Pompeius Strabo
had campaigned in Picenum in 89 and taken Asculum.
The Battle of the Colline Gate
The consuls elected for 82 were the 26-year-old son of C. Marius and Cn. Papirius
Carbo (cos. 85, 84). The younger Marius was humiliatingly defeated by Sulla’s
army at Sacriportus and forced to flee to the city of Praeneste, east of Rome.75 As
the remains of his army arrived the city’s gates were shut, with Marius and many
of his supporters trapped outside. Marius was supposedly hauled up over the
wall by rope but many of his soldiers were taken prisoner by Sulla’s army76and all
‘Samnites’ among the prisoners were executed. Appian’s explanation of this act is
vague but clearly refers to partisans of Marcus Lamponius and Pontius Telesinus.77
Telesinus’ brother was certainly with the younger Marius at Praeneste and may
have been the commander of this ill-fated force.78 Bitter fighting raged in Italy
between Carbo and his supporters and Sulla’s armies. One of Carbo’s armies,
a force of eight legions under the command of Marcius, was sent to relieve
Praeneste, but after a humiliating defeat Marcius’ army largely evaporated back
to their home territories.79
According to Appian, Marcus Lamponius and Pontius Telesinus, with a
third man, Gutta the Capuan, had gathered a significant army in support of
the consul Carbo. Having raised some 70,000 men, Telesinus and Lamponius
first marched their army into Campania. There the two generals proceeded to
lay waste to the region ferociously.80 According to Florus they also ransacked
74
Vell. Pat. 2.29.1; qui totus paternis eius clientus refertus erat. See Liv. Per. 85; Plut.
Pomp. 6; App. BC. 1.80. See also Nicols (2014, pp. 62f ).
75
Plut. Sulla, 28.4–8.
76
App. BC. 1.87: ὧν τοὺς Σαυνίτας ἔκτεινε πάντας ὡς αἰεὶ χαλεποὺς Ῥωμαίοις γενομένους.
77
App. BC. 1.87.
78
This is shown by the story of Marius’ death discussed below.
79
App. BC. 1.90.
80
Plut. Sulla, 29.1; App. BC. 1.90; Flor. 2.3.21.24.
Etruria, although this is likely a conflation with the campaigns of C. Carinas

(pr. 82) and C. Marcius (leg.? 82), two Roman commanders who were aligned
with Papirius Carbo (cos. 82).
Telesinus and Lamponius marched to relieve the siege of Praeneste, however,
finding that the road to the city was blocked by Sulla’s forces and that an army
under the command of Pompey was pursuing them they decided to make a
sudden attack on Rome. They broke camp in the middle of the night, encamping
within a mile of the Colline Gate.81 At dawn a fierce battle ensued, Telesinus
and Lamponius’ soldiers succeed in defeating the city defenders who were sent
out against them but the delay was sufficient for Sulla’s armies to converge
and by afternoon first a cavalry unit under the command of Balbus, and then
Sulla himself arrived.82 A separate army of Lucanians under the command of
Albinovanus deserted their command and went over to the army of Metellus.83
Albinovanus, having initially fled to the camp of the consul Norbanus, contrived
the murder of a number of Norbanus’ leading lieutenants and then turned
himself over to Sulla.
Velleius Paterculus vividly depicts a scene during the battle in which Telesinus
urged his men on:
adesse Romanis ultimum diem vocierabatur eruendam delendamque urbem,

adiiciens numquam defuturos raptores Italicae libertatis lupos, nisi silva, in quam
refugere solerent, esset excise.
‘The last day is at hand for the Romans,’ and in a loud voice exhorted his men to
overthrow and destroy their city, adding: ‘These wolves that made such ravages
upon Italian liberty will never vanish until we have cut down the forest that
harbours them.’84
The principal issue here though is that this speech does not make clear sense,
given that it was spoken by Telesinus as a participant in a Roman inter-factional
conflict (Pobjoy, 2000, p. 203; Bispham, 2007, pp. 175–183). Keaveney (1982,
p. 209) suggested that it better reflected specifically anti-Sullan sentiments
among the Italians and, indeed, it might more reasonably be viewed as Telesinus
81
Plut. Sull. 29.
82
Plut. Sulla, 29.1–8; App. BC. 1.90. Vell. Pat. 2.27.1 claims that Telesinus alone still
had 40,000 men.
83
App. BC. 1.91.
84
Vell. Pat. 2.27.2.
directing his men’s anger towards those Romans who had, like wolves, ravished
Italian rights and liberties.
Fighting continued until night when the armies withdrew and it was not
until the next day that Telesinus was found lying mortally wounded in the field
and was captured alive. He had, according to Velleius, the look of a conqueror
on his face in spite of his defeat. He was decapitated on Sulla’s orders, with his
head displayed atop a spear and carried around the walls of Praeneste.85 Again
Appian claims that Sulla executed the ‘Samnite’ prisoners. That Appian means
non-Roman insurgents is clear from the sentence that follows in which he
describes the capture and execution of Marcius and Carinas, observing that the
two were not spared ‘even though they were Romans’.86 After heavy fighting
near the Colline Gate, the survivors of Telesinus and Lamponius’ army fled to
Antemnae where, upon the promises of Sulla, the local people and the surviving
Italians where induced to slaughter one another before the remainder were
rounded up and execute by Sulla.87 At Praeneste Pontius Telesinus’ younger
brother and Marius killed one another when it became apparent that escape
from the citywould be impossible.88 Once Praeneste was taken the prisoners
were separated into three groups: Roman citizens, ‘Samnites’ and Praenestines.
The captured Samnites were all executed, although according to Appian,
Marcus Lamponius fled the battle.89 There is no further indication of the fate
of Lamponius.
Sulla’s Policy Towards Former Insurgents
Plutarch writes of Sulla that once he returner to Rome, he preoccupied himself

with slaughter and filled the city with murders beyond number or limit.90
Ironically, the situation was not dissimilar to that which had existed in 87 when
Marius and Cinna had entered Rome and butchered their opponents. Like their
army in 87, Sulla’s contained a large contingent of former Italian insurgents,
85
Vell. Pat. 2.27.3. App. BC. 1.93 says simply that he was killed and his camp taken.
Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 75.8.
86
App. BC. 1.93.
87
Plut. Sulla, 29–30.
88
Vell. Pat. 2.27.4–5; App. BC. 1.93. Aur. Vic. Vir. Ill. 68.4: Praeneste confugit, ubi
per Lucretium Afellam obsessus temptata per cuniculum fuga, cum omnia saepta intelligeret,
iugulandum se Pontio Telesino praebuit.
89
App. BC. 1.93.
90
Plut. Sulla, 31: τοῦ δὲ Σύλλα πρὸς τὸ σφάττειν τραπομένου καὶ φόνων οὔτε ἀριθμὸν οὔτε
ὅρον ἐχόντων ἐμπιπλάντος τὴν πόλιν.
whose support he had purchased when he induced them to desert Scipio in 83

with the promise of protecting their rights to citizenship. Santangelo (2007,
pp. 77f ) has rightly argued that Sulla’s policy of, on the one hand, reassuring the
enfranchised Italians that he would not take away their rights and, on the other
hand, carrying out a relentless proscription is not inconsistent. The extremely
brutal way in which Sulla went about destroying his enemies in Italy in 83 and
82 bce makes it easy to overlook the fact that Sulla was making deliberate
decisions about which individuals and communities he would exterminate.
The fate of Paapius Mutilus is possibly recorded in the summary of Livy
and in the fragments of Granius Licinianus. In 80 bce a Paapius Mutilus was
proscribed and fled to the home of his wife Bastia in Teanum. When she refused
him entry he killed himself at her door.91 The last reference to Paapius Mutilius
during the Social War is that he was injured and fled to the city of Aesernia
in Samnium after his army was defeated by Sulla.92 The Mutilus recorded in
80 bce may thus well have been the Social War general C. Paapius Mutilus or
alternatively a surviving relation. A reference to the fate of Pontius Telesinius’
younger brother, the case of a Roman citizen who was possibly a surviving son
of Poppaedius Silo’s a few decades later or indeed the murder of ‘Statius the
Samnite’ in 43 bce show that there were a diverse range of outcomes for the
families of former insurgents. Whether this was Paapius Mutilus himself or a
family member, however, the fact that this man was formally proscribed means
that he was almost certainly a Roman citizen.
In 81 bce, as dictator, Sulla carried out a reorganisation and enlargement of
the Roman Senate. As with the census in 86, this likely provided an opportunity
for some newly enfranchised Italians and possibly even some former insurgents
to enter that body. There are a small number of examples of individuals who
entered the Senate or achieved high office in the first century bce who were
likely to have been from insurgent communities.93 As has recently been
demonstrated by Santangelo, most of the identifiable Italians were in fact from
regions that had remained loyal.94 There are several likely reasons for this. These
include the fact that widespread confiscation of property and the plundering of
a number of major regional centres must have been a serious check on the wealth
91
Liv. Per. 89 and Gran. Lic. 36.8: Papiusque Mutilus inde fugiens, quom ne ab uxore
quidem Bassia noctu Teani reciperetur, quod erat in proscriptorum numero, usus est pugionis
auxilio.
92
It is often assumed that this man was resident in Nola in 80 bce, for instance see
Salmon (1967, pp. 376–379).
93
See Appendix 4 for discussion of some prominent examples.
94
Santangelo (2006, pp. 21–22) has constructed a tentative list of ‘Italian’ senators.
and political aspirations of elites within insurgent regions. Certainly there are
some indications that peoples such as the Marsi never fully recovered from the
impact of the war (see Dench, 1995, in particular pp. 128–130; Bispham, 2007).
A passage in Appian is easily misinterpreted as implying that Sulla doubled the
size of the Senate from approximately 300 to 600.95 Eutropius and Orosius
both estimate that about 200 senators died in the course of the Social War and
the civil wars of the 80s.96 Many of those killed during the Social War would,
however, have been replaced in the census of 86 bce. As recently demonstrated
by Santangelo (2006; 2007, pp. 100f ), Sulla’s enlarged senate was probably about
450 strong. Some of the newly enfranchised Italian aristocracy and probably
even some Samnites were added to the senate at this time. But this can only be
tentatively suggested (Syme, 1939, p. 88; see also Taylor, 1960; Salmon, 1967;
Wiseman, 1971; Santangelo, 2006).
Following the siege of Praeneste the pro-Sulla forces had been embedded
throughout Italy on confiscated lands, in a brazen redistribution of property.97
The status of Volaterrae is particularly well documented, primarily thanks to
Cicero who had a special relationship with the community. Cicero’s connection
with Volaterrae is clearly shown in a letter written to Q. Valerius Orca sometime
between 46 and 45 bce in which he writes in defence of the community’s status.98
Volaterrae was besieged and held out against Sulla’s forces until 79 bce. Sulla
was camped outside the city in 81 bce and the city did not fall until 79 bce.99
A group of proscribed men were holed up in the city and made a futile effort to
flee. Following the taking of the city Sulla seized the land around the city and
took away its citizen status. Land around a number of cities was seized and full
citizen rights denied. This is implied by Cicero in the de Domo Sua.100 In a letter
written to Atticus in 60 bce Cicero specifically mentions both Volaterrae and
Arretium as affected by the measure. At both cities Sulla had their lands declared
ager publicus even though the land was never distributed.101
95
App. BC. 1.100: αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ βουλῇ διὰ τὰς στάσεις καὶ τοὺς πολέμους πάμπαν
ὀλιγανδρούσῃ προσκατέλεξεν ἀμφὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἱππέων, ταῖς φυλαῖς ἀναδοὺς
ψῆφον περὶ ἑκάστου.
96
Eut. 5.9 and Oros. 5.22, both ultimately drawing their information from lost parts of
Livy’s history. App. BC. 1.103 says that about 90 senators died in the proscriptions.
97
Plut. Sulla, 30–31; App. BC 1.95–96f (see Keaveney, 1982, pp. 148f ).
98
Cic. Fam. 13.4.1–4.
99
On Sulla, see Cic. S. Rosc. 20. On the fall of the city, see Gran. Lic. 36.8.
100
Cic. Dom. 30.79: populus Romanus L. Sulla dictatore ferente comitiis centuriatis
municipiis ciuitatem ademit, ademit eisdem agros.
101
Cic. Att. 1.19.4. For an insightful discussion of the issue, see Santangelo (2007,
pp. 174–179).
Italians and Former Insurgents in the 70s
The death of Telesinus and Lamponius along with many of their supporters in
82 bce marked the end of the only significant group of Italian insurgents to have
survived the Roman campaign of 88 bce. In the years which followed, however,
there are occasional indications that former supporters of the insurgency may
have had an involvement in ongoing conflicts. In the second part of Gabba’s 1954
article on the origins of the Social War he argued that Sertorius had mobilised the
support of Italic immigrants to Spain. Although this interpretation is appealing
for explaining certain features of Sertorius’ support in Spain, the argument has
been refuted (Spann, 1987, pp. 169–174; Konrad, 1994, pp. 96f ).
In 73 bce a small band of escaped gladiators led by Spartacus rapidly
developed into a major force of tens of thousands of combatants. While readily
classified as a servile war, a broad range of people in southern Italy are claimed
to have joined Spartacus’ ranks, at one point supposedly numbering as many as
120,000 men. As with many of the armed conflicts in the 80s and 70s in Italy,
while not a direct product of the Social War, the willingness of Italians to join
armed and violent movements against the Republic can in part be explained in
light of ongoing resentment over the Social War and also ongoing tussles for
equitable access to their newly acquired rights.102 Indeed, Appian viewed Italian
support for Spartacus as having been instrumental in his success and that such
support had been directly due to ongoing hostilities over the Social War.103 In
73 bce about seventy-four gladiators escaped from Capua in Campania.104 The
Thracian-born Spartacus had served with the Roman army prior to being taken
prisoner and enslaved.105 Initially a group of brigands, they armed themselves
with weapons stolen from people who they encountered on the road. They
moved south-eastward through Campania and took up position on Mount
Vesuvius.106 This small band successfully scared off a hastily enlisted force under
102
Stampacchia (1980) has highlighted the role that peasants may have played in the
war. See also Rubinsohn (1971) and Piccinin (2004) who have sought to emphasise an anti-
Roman character to the war.
103
App. Mith. 109: ᾔδει δὲ καὶ ἔναγχος τὴν Ἰταλίαν σχεδὸν ἅπασαν ἀπὸ Ῥωμαίων
ἀποστᾶσαν ὑπὸ ἔχθους, καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον αὐτοῖς πεπολεμηκυῖαν, Σπαρτάκῳ τε μονομάχῳ
συστᾶσαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς, ἀνδρὶ ἐπ᾽ οὐδεμιᾶς ἀξιώσεως ὄντι.
104
App. BC. 1.116 says about seventy joined Spartacus. Liv. Per. 95 and Frontin. Str.
2.5(21) state that seventy-four gladiators escaped. Vell. Pat. 2.30 and Oros. 5.24 say it was
sixty-four. Plut. Cras. 8 says that seventy-two escaped.
105
App. BC. 1.116.
106
App. BC. 1.116.
the command of the praetor C. Claudius Glaber.107 The gladiators then rapidly
gathered together a collection of slaves, people from workhouses and even free-
born men from the surrounding fields.108 Following another success against the
praetor P. Varinius,109 still more flocked to Spartacus. Appian at one point says
that Spartacus refused to accept deserters, at another that Spartacus’ numbers
were bolstered by deserters. This may well not be a simple mistake on Appian’s
part but a reference to two different types of people. Spartacus may have quite
sensibly differentiated between deserters from the Roman legions and those
who came of their own free will to him from the citizen communities. While
not bound by the sacrementum these men would still have been deserters in the
eyes of Roman commentators such as Appian.
In 72 bce Spartacus’ army moved northward with the intention of crossing
the Alps. Crixus, in command of approximately 30,000 men, was intercepted
and killed along with two-thirds of his army near Mount Garganus, in Apulia.110
Spartacus, however, defeated the armies of both consuls in northern Italy. At
this point, with a force of approximately 120,000 men, rather than continue to
move northward and leave Italy, he turned his army around and headed south.
Initially the army headed for Picenum with the intention of marching on Rome
but, following another victory over the consuls, Spartacus instead marched to
central-southern Italy. The Germans and Gauls in the group, about 35,000 men,
departed under the command of Castus and Gannicus but were crushed by
Crassus’ army.111 Spartacus still had approximately 60,000 men with him when
he was subsequently defeated by Crassus.112 Many of these men must have been
taken from local Italian communities and, indeed, small bands of Italians and
escaped slaves were still carrying on guerrilla fighting into the 60s.113
107
Frontin. Str. 2.5 (20).
108
App. BC. 1.116. Liv. Per. 95 says that congregata servitiorum ergastulorumque
multitudine, Crixo et Spartaco ducibus bello excitato.
109
The names of the Roman commanders are badly confused in both App. BC. 1.116
and Liv. Per. 95. Frontin. Str. 2.5 (20–21) describes attempts to surround the gladiators while
still on Vesuvius. On the correct form of the commanders’ names, see Broughton, MRR, 2,
pp. 108–109.
110
App. BC.1.117. Liv. Per. 96 says that approximately 20,000 died with Crixus.
111
Liv. Per. 97; Oros. 5.24.
112
Liv. Per. 97.
113
Oros. 5.24 states that survivors of Spartacus’ army fled into the wilderness to be
intercepted by other Roman officials.
The Legacy of the Social War
As consuls in 70 bce, Cn. Pompeius (Magnus) and M. Licinius Crassus set out
to distance themselves from some of Sulla’s more odious policies. In particular,
they cooperated in restoring the powers of the tribunate of the plebs and for
the first time in fifteen years allowed a census to be conducted. As argued
above, the Senate had probably decreed in 87 bce that those enfranchised as
a result of the citizenship laws should be enrolled in the existing tribes. The
censors in 86, L. Marcius Philippus and M. Perperna, returned a figure of only
463,000 citizens.114 In 70 bce the censors Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus
and L. Gellius Publicola returned the greatly increased figure of 910,000 male
citizens.115 The actual number of adult males has been estimated by P. A. Brunt
(1971, p. 97) to have been approximately 1,200,000, of whom about 1,000,000
lived in Italy.
Wiseman observed that, ‘the result was just what the Sullan factio had feared,
and what they had prevented up to now by their avoidance during the seventies
of the lustrum demanded by their popular opponents – a vast new membership
in the centuriate assembly, full of gratitude to Pompey and his friends’ (1969,
p. 65). With nearly half a million new citizens registered on the census, Italian
and Latins enfranchised as a result of the Social War but previously unassessed
must account for a sizable proportion of the assessed increase in 70 bce. The
event was also important because, as discussed above, in the aftermath of the
Social War allocation to tribes had been a highly contentious issue. Some
individuals or communities may have already been assigned to tribes and
property classes in the centuriate assembly, but 70 bce is the first time since the
Social War where it can be assumed that the assignment had been carried out
and that the newly enfranchised citizens (that is those enfranchised under the
lex Iulia and subsequent acts) finally had genuine equal rights.
A coin issued by Q. Fufius Calenus in 70/69 bce symbolically asserted a
new conceptual relationship between Italy and Rome (Crawford, 1974, p. 413).
On both sides the figures are clearly labelled. The obverse depicts Honos and
Virtutia while on the reverse the personifications of Italia and Roma are shown
clasping hands. Roma carries a spear and has her right foot on the orbis terrarium
while Italia is depicted holding the cornucopia and off to the side of her is the
caduceus. Written in exergue appears the name CORDI (Crawford, 1974,
114
Jer. Chron. ad ann. 85.
115
Liv. Per. 98. According to Cic. Verr. 1.18(54) people from tota Italiae had come to
Rome in 70, quae convenit uno tempore undique comitiorum ludorum censendique causa.
no. 403; Gruber, 1970, vol. 1, nos. 3358–3363). It is not a coincidence that this
coin was issued at a particularly significant point in time, after the census of 70
bce. It is also unusual because it provides a rare Roman depiction of a personified
Italia. As discussed above, Italia had been used extensively on the insurgent
coinage but it is not until the second century ce that there are a number of issues
which show a personified Italia. The message of the coin appears very clearly to
be that Italy and Rome are now truly unified as one.
Even so, recovery for the communities which had supported the insurgency
was mixed. Few major urban centres in the central Apennines are observed
by the geographer Strabo as still being prosperous in the period after the
combined misfortunes of the Social War and the devastations of the 80s bce
that followed.116 There are also indications that in the first century the name
of the Marsi, once associated with martial valour, became synonymous with
poverty, and the criticisms levelled at the Marsi attest to the general perception
of former insurgent regions after the Social War as having been depleted of men
and impoverished (see Dench, 1995, pp. 128–130). Latin supplanted other
regional languages as the main language in Italy after the Social War (Bradley,
2007). In general, recent archaeological work has shown that prosperous, albeit
modest urban centres in the pre-Social War period were succeeded by a smaller
number of Roman municipia in the first century and beyond. The result of
archaeological work in recent decades has been to present us with a far more
sophisticated picture of urban development in regions which supported the
insurgency. While there is evidence of urban development in many areas in
the second century bce, it had not in general occurred to the same extent as
is found in other parts of Italy (Dench, 1995, pp. 130–139; Bradley, Riva and
Isayev, 2007).
116
Strab. 5.3–4.
Conclusions
The decades prior to the Social War had shown that the Italian allies had become
increasingly vocal about their discontent with their status in Italy. Their shared
links with the Roman elite and their experiences overseas had demonstrated the
possible benefits of working within existing Roman power systems, just as equally
military service, political exclusion, fear of land redistributions and overbearing
Roman magistrates had reinforced that they were ‘second class’ residents of
Italy. In 91 bce the tribune M. Livius Drusus was engaged in a campaign to
push through a bold reform agenda. Drusus was motivated by internal Roman
factional disputes and it seems plausible that it was Q. Poppaedius Silo who
urged Drusus to take up the issue of addressing the status of Italian allies. During
the same year a campaign was underway among the Italian allies to force Rome
to recognise them as political equals; while Silo had lobbied for citizenship
other allies had adopted a more aggressive stance of plotting assassinations while
yet others seem to have been more ambivalent. The subsequent failure of the
citizenship bill, the annulment of Drusus’ laws, his murder and the slaughter of
Romans at Asculum were not so much causes of the war as they were markers
of an escalation in tension in Italy, a tension the leaders of the insurgency would
capitalise upon.
This book has suggested that one of the central goals of the insurgents was to
achieve the equalization of rights and that for many the acquisition of Roman
citizenship was an effective path to achieving this end. This does not, however,
imply that the aspirations of the insurgents were singular in purpose and nature.
The divided response from the allies to the initial outbreak of the war in late 91
demonstrates Italy’s diversity at the time. Yet even those that were still willing to
take up arms in the late 80s bce cannot have been entirely ‘hard-liners’ seeking
fundamental independence from Rome, for they died in their thousands while
fighting in an interfactional Roman dispute and fell among many Romans in
opposition to Sulla.
The Social War triggered a fundamental shift in the make-up of the Roman
citizen body. In the aftermath of the war Roman citizenship came to correspond
primarily with residency of the Italian peninsula and for centuries after, Italy
would remain something of an oddity in the Roman world: a territory larger than
many modern nations with a common civic status and an increasingly common
language, currency and institutions. Leading Italians, such as Poppaedius Silo,

were responsible for spearheading the campaign for citizenship immediately
prior to the war, and then once the war broke out, in organising and leading the
insurgency. In the decades following the mass extension of the Roman franchise
there was a slow diminution of local, non-Roman identities, and the loss of
many former regional centres and language groups.1 This does not automatically
mean that ‘incorporation’ or ‘integration’ had been the intended outcome of the
insurgents in the lead-up to the war or, indeed, during the war. Equally, the mass
uprising of Italian allied communities and the ferocity with which they fought
cannot entirely be explained as being driven by the Italian allied elite alone. That
the response to the call to arms was so great is indicative of deep frustration with
the Roman organisation of Italy among some allies. The insurgents adopted the
common name of Italia as their rallying cry, but inescapably they also adopted
Roman models of military organisation and issued coins on a Roman standard.
In what is a tragic irony of the Social War, in spite of the brutality and the high
causalities suffered on both sides, the Romans eventually yielded the franchise,
not only to the insurgents but to the other Italian allies as well.
That the manner of enrolment into the tribes was an issue of continuing
contention in the years that followed shows that the new citizens were not merely
politically astute but that they had a very real expectation of utilising their newly
won rights. The Social War not only prompted a fundamental restructure of
civic status in Roman Italy but also facilitated new concepts of the nature of Italy.
This is vividly reflected in the writings of Cicero. A few generations later Florus,
reflecting upon the legacy of the Social War, could liken the conflict with the
Italian allies to a civil war.2 The war was fought between communities which had
long been united in their support of the Roman Republic’s increasing empire in
the Mediterranean. The by-product of the war was also significant: it prompted
the mass extension of Roman citizenship to Latin and allied communities
throughout the Italian peninsula. That an integrated political community
did emerge is undeniable. From the Po Valley in the north to Bruttium in the
south, Italy was now a politically Roman community, and the Social War was
undeniably a defining moment in the history of Roman Italy.
1
For recent discussion of the rapid abandonment of Italic languages following the
Social War, see Bradley (2007) and Imag. Ital. 1.
2
This is attested by men such as Cicero (in particular, see Cic. Phil. 12.27), who served
on the staff of Pompeius Strabo during the Social War.
Appendix 1
Important Legislation
The following is a list of pieces of Roman legislation which variously relate to the
status of non-Romans in Italy, the immediate circumstances of the Social War
or to the enfranchisement of non-Romans in the wake of the Social War. These
leges set out below are organised in chronological order with probable dates
or names of each piece of legislation indicated in square brackets. A number
of those discussed in this appendix are also dealt with in the main chapters. In
particular, see the much more detailed discussion of the lex Varia (in Chapter 5),
lex Iulia and lex Plautia Papiria (in Chapter 8).
177 bce – Lex Claudia
A law passed by the consul C. Claudius Pulcher which required the return of all
Latins who had claim ius migrationis since 189 to their home communities.1 The
consul then issued an edict to all Latin communities requiring compliance. An
accompanying senatus consultum directed Roman magistrates to require oaths
when manumissions occurred that a slave was not being manumitted for the
purposes of changing civic status.
126 bce – Lex [Iunia]
A law passed by the tribune L. Iunius Pennus to expel Italians from Rome. There
is a possible parallel with the Lex Licinia Mucia in 95 bce and the Lex Papia in
65 (see below).
[124/3?] bce – Lex [Livia?]
A law which provided local magistrates in communities with Latin rights Roman
citizenship (civitas per magistratum) after their term of office. It is suggested in
Chapter 3 that this law may have been one of the Senate-sponsored measures
1
Liv. 41.9.9–12. That the law was indeed passed is confirmed by Liv. 42.10.3–4.
proposed by the elder Livius Drusus designed to undermine support for Gaius
Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus between 124 and 123 bce.
100 bce – Lex Servilia
A law passed by the praetor C. Servilius Glauca. It gave Roman citizenship

to citizens of communities with Latin status for successful prosecution
for repetundae.2
98 bce – Lex Caecilia et Didia
A law that stipulated a minimum interval between promulgation of a law and

that being voted on of three nundinae.
95 bce – Lex Licinia Mucia
The law set up a court of inquiry for the purpose of identifying allies who were
illegitimately claiming citizenship and compelled them to return to their home
communities.3 A fragment of Sallust’s Histories refers to the law as having been
detrimental to all living south of the Po.4 A possible motivation behind the
law was to prevent Italian allies who, by claiming citizenship, could potentially
interfere in the elections.
91 bce – Lex [Livia]
A law passed by the tribune Livius Drusus (trib. pl. 91) to set up a land commission,
the decemviri agris dandis adsignandis. Commissioners were successfully elected
as an inscription found at Vibo confirms5 but the land distributions did not take
place due to the annulment of Drusus’ laws and his subsequent murder in late
91 bce.
2
Cic. Verr. 1.9. Examples of such enfranchisements can be found at Cic. Balb. 53.
3
Cic. Balb. 21(48), Off. 3.11(47), Corn. fr. 10.
4
Sall. Hist. 17 (in McGushin).
5
CIL, 10.44.
Appendix 1 217
91 bce – Lex [Saufeia]
A law put forward by the tribune Saufeius, which set up a quinquevirate for
the distribution of land.6 As with the land commission created by the above
lex, Livius Drusus was a member and it was probably styled quinqueviri agris
dandis adsignandis.
90 bce – Lex Varia [de maiestate]
A law passed by the tribune Q. Varius Severus Hybrida. While other judicial
matters were suspended because of the war, the court was active.7 It set up a court
of equestrians to try individuals who were deemed to have incited the Italians to
revolt.8 According to Valerius Maximus, Varius was eventually convicted under
his own law.9
90 bce – Lex Iulia
A law passed by the consul L. Iulius Caesar late in 90 bce which provided
citizenship to all Latins and to any allies within Italy who were not continuing
hostilities.10 The law required the creation of ten additional tribes in the tribal
assembly, in which the newly enfranchised were to be enrolled.11 Appian claims
they were created but there is little evidence that these additional tribes were
ever created.12
6
CIL, 12.1, p. 199.
7
Cic. Brut. 89(304).
8
For two divergent modern reconstructions of the court, see Gruen (1965) and
Badian (1969).
9
Val. Max. 8.6.4: Q. autem Varius propter obscurum ius civitatis Hybrida cognominatus
tribunus pl. legem adversus intercessionem collegarum perrogavit, quae iubebat quaeri quorum
dolo malo socii ad arma ire coacti essent, magna cum clade rei publicae: sociale enim prius,
deinde civile bellum excitavit. sed dum ante pestiferum tribunum pl. quam certum civem agit,
sua lex eum domesticis laqueis constrictum absumpsit.
10
Cic. Balb.
11
App. BC. 1.49.
12
App. BC. 1.49.
89 bce – Lex Plautia Papiria
A law passed by the tribunes C. Papirius Carbo (Cn. f.) and M. Plautius Silvanus.13
It granted citizenship to all allies resident in Italy who registered with a praetor
within sixty days. Archias, a Greek born at Antioch, received citizenship under
the law.14 As with the lex Iulia, those enfranchised under the law were also to be
enrolled into new tribes.
89 bce – Lex Calpurnia and Lex Pompeia
Two laws of debatable function. The lex Calpurnia may have been a preliminary
measure, later superseded by the lex Iulia. The lex Pompeia clarified the position
of northern communities and extended Latin status to communities north of
the Po River. See the discussion in Chapter 8.
72 bce – Lex Gellia Cornelia
A law passed by the consuls of 72 bce, L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Cornelius
Lentulus Clodianus, confirming Cn. Pompeius Magnus’ grants of citizenship to
communities in Spain.15
65 bce – Lex Papia
A law passed by the tribune C. Papius which expelled all non-Romans from
the City who were not residents of an Italian community. It also provided for
the prosecution of those who had illegitimately acted as full citizens in any way.
In 65 bce the censors Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78) and M. Licinius Crassus
(cos. 70, 55) came into conflict over the issue of extending Roman citizenship to
those living north of the Po River. As a result they failed to conduct the census
13
This C. Papirius Carbo is possibly the brother of Cn. Papirius Carbo (cos. 85, 84, 82),
see Nicolini (1934, p. 223) and Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 26 and 30–31, n. 8. Broughton,
MRR, 2, pp. 51–53 suggested that M. Plautius Silvanus may be the same man who served as
a legate under Metelus Pius in 87 (Liv. Per. 80).
14
Cic. Arch. 4(7).
15
Cic. Balb. 19 and 32–33.
Appendix 1 219
and were forced to resign.16 As with similar expulsions prior to the Social War,
this measure was designed to prevent foreigners from illegitimately acting as
Roman citizens.17 In this instance, however, the law explicitly exempted people
from Italian communities.
16
Dio, 37.9.
17
Cic. Leg. Agr. 1.13, Arch. 10, Balb. 52, Att. 4.18.4, Off. 3.47; Val. Max. 3.4.5; Dio,
37.9.
Appendix 2
Roman and Italian Commanders
Constructing a complete list of Roman and Italian commanders during the war is
not possible due to the state of the ancient source material. Though Appian lists
five legati for each consul in 90 bce, this does not mean that this was the total
number assigned to each (Domaszewski, 1924, p. 20).1 In fact whether subordinate
commanders served as legati, privati cum imperio or, indeed, as praetors or as
prorogued praetors is frequently not clear from the ancient source material. In a
number of instances so-called ‘legates’ such as Marius and Caepio in 90 and Sulla
in 89 bce probably commanded with special grants of imperium pro praetore or
pro consule.2 It can be safely asserted that the large number of ‘legates’ or other
subordinate commanders appointed in 90 bce is an indication of the widespread
nature of the revolt and the complex military threat that was posed by the insurgents.
It is even more difficult to construct a comprehensive list of Italian
commanders; while the actions of the principal insurgent generals are preserved
(and are listed here), numerous insurgent forces must have been under local
commanders and as a result their identities are not preserved. Indeed, a number of
sources explicitly state that they do not record local commanders or their military
forces. As such, this appendix is intended to serve as a general reference, not as
a comprehensive list. In an appendix Keaveney (2005) presented a suggested
reconstruction of the Italian commanders. This breakdown was organised along
ethnic lines and follows the particularly formalised ethnic structure suggested
by some of the ancient sources. A similar construction can be found in Salmon’s
1958 article. In line with the argument forwarded in Chapter 5, this appendix
has opted to present a simple list of commands.
Roman Commands – 90 bce
L. Iulius Caesar (cos. 90): commanded operations in Campania and north

towards Aesernia.
1
See the discussion in Broughton, MRR, 2, pp. 28–30.
2
On the apparent autonomy of Sulla in 89, Broughton, MRR, 2, p. 38, n. 7 suggests
some form of command ‘similar to Marius and Caepio’ while Brennan, Praetors, 2,
pp. 376–377 suggests Sulla commanded pro praetore.
P. Lentulus (leg. 90): details of command unknown.3

T. Didius (leg. 90): on the basis of his command in 89, he may have served in
Campania with the consul.
P. Licinius Crassus (leg. 90): commanded a Roman army in Lucania.
L. Cornelius Sulla (leg. 90): active in eastern Latium. Attempted to relieve
Aesernia and fought in conjunction with C. Marius (leg. 90) in the latter half
of 90.
M. Claudius Marcellus (leg. 90): captured by the insurgents at Aesernia.
P. Rutilius Lupus (cos. 90): commanded operations against the Marsi and
Paeligni. Killed in battle while attempting to cross the Tolenus River near
Alba Fucens.
Cn. Pompeius Strabo (leg. 90): operated in Picenum, besieged in Firmum.
Q. Caepio (leg. 90): won a minor victory of the insurgents in the first half of the
year. Elevated to position of equality with C. Marius (leg. 90) after the death of
Rutilius, lured into an ambush and killed by Q. Poppaedius Silo.
C. Perperna (leg. 90): stripped of command by Rutilius after a defeat.
C. Marius (leg. 90): active against the Marsi.
M. Valerius Messalla (leg. 90): details of command unknown.
Sex. Iulius Caesar (pro cos. 90): commanded an army in Picenum, died
near Asculum.
C. Baebius (leg. 90): appointed by Sex. Iulius Caesar to command the army at
Asculum pro praetore before Caesar’s death.
L. Porcius Cato (cos. 89): operating near Rome, killed while storming a
Marsian camp.
L. Cornelius Sulla (leg. pro pr. 89): in conjunction with T. Didius, subdued
much of Campania, received the surrender of the Hirpini and made inroads into
other parts of southern Samnium.
T. Didius (leg. 89): participated in the taking of Herculaneum, killed in June 89.
A. Postumius Albinus (leg. 89): served under Sulla, with command of a fleet.
Killed by his own soldiers.
Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89): oversaw operations in Picenum and parts of the
northern conflict zone. Reduced Asculum.
3
Domaszewski (1924, p. 20) accepts the name as accurate.
Appendix 2 223
Ser. Sulpicius Galba (leg. 89): commanded operations against the Vestini
and Marrucini.
L. Cornelius Cinna (cos. 87–84): continued campaign against the Marsi.
C. Cosconius (pr. 89? or leg. 89): commanded operations in Apulia where he
was highly successful.
Cn. Papirius Carbo: commanded a failed campaign in Lucania.
A. Gabinus: a legate killed while fighting the insurgents. Possibly served under
Carbo in Lucania.
Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89): returned to Picenum, where he may have
overseen the surrender of the remaining Vestini and Paeligni.
Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (cos. 80): probably as proconsul oversaw ongoing
operations in Apulia.
Mam. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 77): legatus under Metellus Pius, credited with
the defeat of Poppaedius Silo.
Insurgent Generals – 90 to 88 bce
Q. Poppaedius Silo: personally commanded operations against the army of

Marius in the later part of 90. Named supreme commander of the remaining
insurgent forces in 89. Killed in battle in Apulia in 88 bce.
C. Paapius Mutilus: commanded insurgent operations in Campania and parts
of Samnium, attacked or subdued numerous communities in Campania in 90.
Unsuccessfully attempted to repel Sulla’s campaign in Samnium in 89.
T. Lafrenius: commanded an insurgent army in Picenum in 89.
C. Pontidius: his role in the war is unknown. The name may be a mistake for
Pontius Telesinus (listed below).
Marius Egnatius: commanded an insurgent army in Campania in 90.
M. Lamponius: commanded an insurgent army in Lucania from 90 bce. Drove
the army of Licinius Crassus into Grumentum.4 Additional successes in 89.
C. Vidacilius: commanded insurgent operations in Apulia in 90. Attempted to
relieve the siege of Asculum. Committed suicide at Asculum in 89.
4
Frontin. Str. 2.4.16; App. BC. 1.42.
Herius Asinius: a leader of the Marrucini, he was killed in a battle with

C. Marius’ army late in 90 bce.
P. Vettius Scato: commanded an insurgent army, moving through Samnium,
eastern Latium and Picenum. He was responsible for the taking of Aesernia, and
the victory at the Tolenus River in mid-90 bce.
Other Insurgent Commanders
Fraucus: attempted unsuccessfully to break the siege at Asculum in 89 bce.

Obsidius: killed with Poppaedius Silo in 88 bce.
Pontius Telesinus: participation in 90 and 89 is unclear. He was killed shortly
after the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82 bce.
Appendix 3
Cities Besieged during the Social War
This appendix provides a selection of specific communities directly affected by

fighting during the Social War. In 90 and 89 bce particularly, a large number
of armies on both sides were involved and numerous cities were either besieged
or destroyed. Given the state of the ancient literary sources, understanding the
interrelated movements of these armies is largely dependent upon a detailed
knowledge of Italian geography. In constructing this list of communities that
were besieged or devastated, a passage in Florus is particularly problematic. As
with his defective list of Italian insurgent generals,1 Florus carelessly assembled
a list of cities that he claimed had been devastated during the Social War. These
seem to have been chosen by Florus to illustrate the widest possible geographic
distribution rather than because they were comparable examples of the
devastation wrought by the war.
Acerrae, a citizen community in Campania, located north-east of Neapolis.

Besieged by Paapius Mutilus in 90 bce.2 The consul L. Iulius Caesar relieved the
siege later in the year.
Aeclanum, a city of the Hirpini in southern Samnium. The pro-Roman

insurgent Minatius Magius was a native of the city.3 The city was besieged by
Sulla and plundered for having delayed in surrendering. Its example triggered
the surrender of most of the Hirpinian communities.4
Aesernia, a city in Samnium, situated in the valley of the Volturnus River on

the road between Aufidena and Bovianum. Aesernia was established as a Latin
colony in 263 bce and was one of the eighteen Latin cities to express support
in 209 bce. The city was garrisoned by the Romans at the start of the war.
In 90 bce Vettius Scato defeated the army of the consul L. Iulius Caesar and
then marched on the city and laid siege to it.5 Two of the Roman commanders,
1
See Chapter 5 for discussion of Florus’ list of Italian commanders.
2
App. BC. 1.42.
3
Vell. Pat. 2.16.
4
App. BC. 1.51.
5
App. BC. 1.41.
L. Scipio and L. Acilius, escaped the siege by disguising themselves as slaves.6

These two probably left with a large body of slaves sent out by the city as a result
of the siege.7 Sulla succeeded in raising the siege in 90 and it was probably at this
time that the city was placed under the command of M. Claudius Marcellus.
The city was eventually reduced by famine8 and M. Marcellus, a legate of the
consul L. Iulius Caesar, fell into the hands of the rebels.9 The city then acted as
a stronghold for the Italians, sheltering Paapius Mutilus after he was routed by
Sulla in 89 bce,10 and eventually besieged by the Romans and destroyed.11
Alba Fucens, a Latin colony situated on the route of Via Valeria, on a high hill
at the base of Mt Velino. The location was also strategically important as it was
located right on the boundaries of Marsic territory, the site being not far from
the principal Marsic city of Marruvium.12 The city was besieged by the insurgents
early in the war, and eventually forced to surrender.13
Asculum, the principal city of Picenum, situated north-east of Rome on the

Via Salaria.14 It was protected both by virtue of its fortifications and because
some of the surrounding mountains were impassable by armies.15 The proconsul
Sex. Iulius Caesar attempted to lay siege to the city in 90 bce. Several attempts
were made by the insurgents to relieve the city, first by Vidacilius and then by
Fraucus; all failed. It was subsequently captured by the army of Cn. Pompeius
Strabo in November 89 bce.16 Strabo executed the leading men. Asculum was a
citizen colony and still the most important city in Picenum in the time of Pliny
the Elder.17
6
App. BC. 1.41.
7
Diod. Sic. 37.19.
8
Diod. Sic. 37.19; App. BC. 1.41.
9
Liv. Per. 73.
10
App. BC. 1.51.
11
Flor. 2.6.11.
12
In the territory of the Aequi, see Liv. 10.1 and 26.11; App. Hann. 39. On the city’s
proximity to Marruvium, see Ovid, Fasti, 6.5.561. For discussion, see Smith (1856, vol. 1,
p. 86 and vol. 2, p. 279).
13
Liv. Per. 72.
14
Flor. 1.14.
15
Strab. 5.4.2(241).
16
Flor. 2.6.14.
17
Plin. HN. 3.18.
Appendix 3 227
Bovianum, a city in Samnium, located in central Samnium near the source of

the Tifernus River (see De Benedittis, 1977). It was the principal city of the
Pentri.18 The surviving members of the Italian war council possibly moved to
the city after the abandonment of Corfinium and were in the city when it was
captured by Sulla after fierce fighting.19 Sulla returned to Rome to stand for the
consulship. Poppaedius Silo then retook the city early in 88 bce and entered it
in triumphal procession.20
Carsioli, a city originally of the Aequiculi, situated on the Via Valeria between
Varia and Alba Fucens.21 Occupied by the Marsi in the late fourth century, the
city was taken by the Romans and a large Latin colony of 4,000 established on
the site.22 The city was sacked by the Italian insurgents during the Social War.23
The Via Valeria was the main route between Rome and Corfinium and there was
heavy fighting along the road in 90 and 89 bce.
Faesulae, a city located in Etruria, near the Arno River and approximately
five kilometres from the modern site of Florence. Florus claims that the city was
sacked during the Social War.24 The destruction of the city in 90/89 bce may
confirm the assertion of the summary of Livy and Orosius that there was an
armed uprising in Etruria and Umbria in 90 bce which influenced the passage of
the lex Iulia.25 Despite its fate during the Social War, the city was later occupied
by veterans of Sulla.26
Grumentum, a city in Lucania, located on the north bank of the Aciris River
(modern Agri).27 The city remained loyal to Rome and Licinius Crassus fled
there after being defeated by the Italian general Lamponius.28 Florus claims the
city was sacked during the war.29
18
Liv. 9.31.4.
19
App. BC. 1.51; Liv. Per. 75.
20
Iul. Ob. 56.
21
Strab. 5.3.11.
22
Liv. 10.3.
23
Flor. 2.6.11.
24
Flor. 2.6.11 and 2.18.11.
25
Liv. Per. 75; Oros. 5.18.7.
26
Cic. Mur.¸ 24 and Cat. Min.3.26.
27
Strab. 6.254.
28
App. BC. 1.41.
29
Flor. 2.6.11.
Heraclea, a city in eastern Lucania, situated a short distance from the coast.
Central to Cicero’s defence of the poet Archias was that the civic records of the
city had been destroyed during the Social War.30 The city was enfranchised in
89 bce under the lex Plautia Papiria, and not the earlier lex Iulia.31 Thus, the
city may have fallen to the insurgents in 90 but been liberated by 89 bce.
Iguvium, a city in Umbria, located in the Apennines. A fragment of Sisenna says

the city was sacked during the war.32 Despite this, the city continued to prosper
after the war and was enrolled in the tribe Clustumina (Taylor, 1960, p. 271). In
49 bce it was used to station five cohorts during the civil war between Caesar
and Pompey.33
Nola, a city in Campania located on the southern Via Popilia, approximately

halfway between Capua and Nuceria.34 Garrisoned by the Romans at the
outbreak of the war, the city was taken by the rebels in 90 bce. Besieged in 89 by
Sulla35 and again in 80 when it was taken by storm.
Nuceria, a city in Campania, south-east of Nola, situated on the banks of the

Sarnus River. Florus says that the city was devastated during the Social War.36
Appian says only that the territory of the city was devastated by Paapius Mutilus
in 90 bce,37 although given his numerous omissions it likely fell to the insurgents.
Oriculum, a town in southern Umbria. Bradley (2000, p. 281) connects the

move of the community from a hill-fort position to a new location close by
the Tiber with the events of the Social War.38 The inhabitants were enrolled in
the Arnensis tribe.
Pinna, a city of the Vestini. According to Diodorus the city remained loyal to
Rome. The insurgents laid siege to the city and resorted to extreme measures in
an effort to induce the city to surrender. An anecdote in Valerius Maximus about
30
Cic. Arch. 4 (8).
31
Cic. Arch. 4 (7).
32
Sisenna, fr. 94.
33
Caes. BCiv. 1.12.
34
RE (1935), 17, pp. 811–814; Stillwell (1976, p. 627).
35
Diod. Sic. 37.2.8.
36
Flor. 2.6.11.
37
App. BC. 1.42.
38
Flor. 2.6.11.
Appendix 3 229
a native of the city, Pulto, assumes that the city was besieged by the Romans.39
This may be an indication that it eventually fell to the insurgents or simply that
Valerius Maximus has confused a Roman defence of the city with an assault on it.
Pompeii, a coastal community in Campania. Appian claims the city willingly

joined the insurgency.40 Sulla’s campaign in Campania in 89 bce laid siege to
Nola in April41 and then moved on to lay siege to Pompeii.42 The outcome of the
siege is not known, although its later status suggests that it may have surrendered.43
Tuder, a community in Umbria. The city was possibly forced to surrender late in
90 bce after briefly having agitated for support of the insurgents.44
Venusia, a Latin colony in the southern extreme of Apulia, on the border with
Lucania. Joined the insurgents in 90 bce but was recovered by the Romans,
possibly surrendered.
39
Diod. 37.19; Val. Max. 5.4.7.
40
App. BC. 1.39.
41
App. BC. 1.50.
42
Diod. Sic. 37.2.8.
43
Cic. Sull. 21.
44
Sisenna, fr. 119. The fragment of Sisenna states that tamen Tudertibus senati consulto
et populi iusso dat civitatem.
Appendix 4
Examples of Enfranchised Individuals
There are a number of examples of former insurgents or their descendants

acquiring citizenship in the aftermath of the Social War and subsequently going
on to become prominent members of the Roman community in Italy. The
example of Paapius Mutilus, one of the principal leaders of the Italian insurgency
who possibly survived the war only to be proscribed by Sulla in 80 bce, has
already been discussed in Chapter 7. Others include L. Statius Murcus, one of
Caesar’s generals, who was likely of Paelignian or Marsic origin and C. Asinius
Pollio, the well-known advocate in the courts who was the grandson of Herius
Asinius. A number of senators and consuls by the name Herennius are also
possible descendants of the insurgent general (see Syme, 1939). For the purposes
of this appendix, a number of individuals have been identified who have not
otherwise been adequately discussed in the main text.
Archias the Poet
The persecution of Archias the Poet in 62 bce is but one example of the lasting
echoes of the Social War for Italy. Archias had been enfranchised under the
provisions of the lex Plautia Papiria in 89 bce. As an adherent of L. Licinius
Lucullus, Archias became embroiled in the rivalry between his patron and
Cn. Pompeius. His citizenship was challenged on the basis that there was no
written record of his entitlement.1 Cicero’s defence of Archias was one of a
number of cases in which Cicero defended the entitlements of the enfranchised.
P. Sittius
Publius Sittius was an associate of P. Sulla, connected with Catiline. He travelled

to Spain and then Maurentania in 64/3 bce. In 62 bce Cicero defended both
Sulla and Sittius.2 Cicero claims in his defence of Sulla that Sittius’ father had
been a native of Nuceria and had remained faithful to the Romans during the
1
For an account of Archias’ life and the trial, see Husband (1914).
2
Cic. Sull. and Fam. 5.17.
Social War.3 Appian says that the territory of Nuceria was devastated by Paapius
Mutilus during his successful march through Campania in 90 bce and the city
may have been for a time taken by the insurgents.4
Statius the Samnite
According to Appian, in 43 bce one of the victims of the proscriptions carried

out under the triumviri res publicae constituendae was an 80-year-old man called
Statius the Samnite. Appian asserts that this man had possessed great influence
with the Samnites during the Social War and that he had been subsequently
made a Roman senator on account of his deeds, ancestry and wealth. Appian
also claims that Statius was proscribed on account of his wealth and records
a story of Statius distributing his possessions before setting fire to his home
and himself.5 Unfortunately Appian does not state which side he fought on
in the Social War. Despite being a Samnite the examples of Minatus Magius
and P. Sittius, both of whom sided with the Romans despite the fact that many
of their compatriots supported the rebels, allows the possibility that he may
not have been an insurgent.6 Emilio Gabba (1976, p. 61) thought that Statius
entered the senate in 86, rather than under Sulla’s enrolment of new senators.
At the Sullan colony of Praeneste an inscription presumed to date to the period
immediately after that city’s (re)foundation records an L. Statius as a duouir.7
P. Ventidius and Q. Poppaedius Silo (the younger?)
When Cn. Pompeius Strabo took Asculum in 89 bce he captured the infant
P. Ventidius and his mother (see Syme, 1939).8 In Strabo’s subsequent triumph
over Picenum at the end of 89 bce, Ventidius was carried in his mother’s arms
in front of the triumphal chariot.9 Despite this he received Roman citizenship
and served under Caesar both in Gaul and during the civil wars. In 45 bce his
years of service were recognised by Caesar and he was made a tribune of plebs
3
Cic. Sull. 20.
4
App. BC. 1.42; Flor. 2.6.11.
5
App. BC. 4.25.
6
On Magius, see Vell. Pat. 2.16. On Sittius, see Cic. Sull., 58.
7
CIL, 14, 3013. See Santangelo (2007, pp. 141–142).
8
For a full biography of Ventidius, see Seaver (1952).
9
Vell. Pat. 2.100; Gell. AN. 15.4; Val. Max. 6.9.9; Plin. HN. 7.44 (135).
Appendix 4 233
and enrolled into the Senate.10 In 39 bce Ventidius and his legatus, a man by the
name of Q. Poppaedius Silo, set out for the east.11 This Silo is almost certainly a
surviving son or grandson of the insurgent leader; it can hardly be coincidental
that a man native to Asculum, the very epicentre of the outbreak of the Social
War, should have had as his legatus a Q. Poppaedius Silo. In Cilicia and then on
the border of Syria, Ventidius and Silo successfully defeated Labienus and his
Parthian supporters.12 Ventidius subsequently returned to Rome and celebrated
a triumph.13
10
Gell. AN. 15.4; Cic. Fam. 10.18.
11
Dio, 48.41.
12
Dio, 48.41; Frontin. Str. 11. 5.37.
13
Vell. Pat. 2.100; Gell. AN. 15.4; Val. Max. 6.9.9; Pliny, HN. 7.135.
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Index
Acerrae, 130, 133, 173, 225 Caecilius Metellus Pius, Q. (pro. cos.? 88),
Acilius, L. (leg. 90), 119, 127, 132–3, 169, 184, 197, 205
225–6 Cales, 57, 203
Aeclanum, 159–62, 167, 170, 187, 225 Campania, 18, 24, 47, 56, 118, 122,
Aemilius Scaurus, M. (cos. 115), 70–72, 91, 127–31, 133, 142, 150, 158–61,
105 164, 167–8, 173, 189, 191, 193–4,
Aesernia, 103, 109, 114, 119, 142, 149, 202–3, 204, 209
162–3, 167–8, 173, 189, 207 Cannae
insurgent siege of, 127–8, 132–4 battle of, 48
Alba Fucens, 46, 102 n22, 126 n6 role in Social War, 163–4
the siege of, 128, 135–6, 152, 226 Canusium, 132, 163–4, 203 n70
Amiternum, 25, 126 Capua
Annius Setinus, L. 47–8 role in Civil Wars, 193, 196, 203, 209
Antonius, M. (cens. 97), 62, 64, 88, 105 role in Second Punic War, 48
Apulia, 18, 132–4, 142, 159, 163–4, 167, role in Social War, 127, 130
169–70, 189, 193–4, 197, 203, Caraceni, 140
210 Carsioli, 44 n2, 227
Appuleius Saturninus, L. (trib. pl. 100), Citizenship (Roman). For individual
73–4, 85 n76 citizenship laws see lex Calpurnia;
Aquillius, Man. (cos. 129), 57 lex Iulia; lex Plautia Papiria; lex
Arretium, 208 Pompeia
Asculum (Picenum), 18–19, 27, 28, 35, allocation of Italians to tribes, 187, 189f
45–6, 85, 87–8, 93, 95–6, 97, 167, ancient perspectives on allied desire for,
170, 176, 213 23–4, 27–40
outbreak of the Social War at, 99–104, insurgent embassy demands, 106–7
117, 123 lobbying by Poppaedius Silo, 76–80
Roman siege of, 141, 142–3, 154–8, modern debate, 9–21
165–6 Claudius Marcellus, M. (leg. 90), 119, 133,
Aufidus (River), 132 226
Ausculum (Apulia), 163–4 Claudius Pulcher, C. (cos. 177), 49–50, 215
Cleptius, Ti., 165, 194, 199
Bifernus (River), 164 Coinage (of the insurgents), 13–14, 27, 108
Bovianum general discussion of, 113–16, 130–31
possible site of an insurgent mint, 114, gold stater, 195
168 use of name, 111–13
possible use as insurgent ‘capital’, 109, Corfinium, 12–14, 45–6
162–3, 167–8 first site of the insurgent ‘capital’,
siege of, 162–3 107–9, 126, 132, 135–6, 152–3
Silo’s base of operations, 168–9 insurgent abandonment of, 162–3, 167–8
Bruttium, 165, 189, 194, 199–200 used as a mint location, 111, 114, 116
Cornelius Cinna, L. (cos. 87–4), 121, 127, Hirpini, 30, 101–2, 150, 159–62, 167, 170,
153–4, 196–7, 200–207 181, 202
Cornelius Lentulus, P. (leg. 90), 119, 222
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P. (cos. 147, Italia/Viteliu/Italica (insurgent state), 13,
134), 52, 53, 75, 79 17–18, 20, 27, 106–13
Cornelius Scipio, L. (leg. 90), 119, 127, issuing of coinage by, 113–16, 135–6,
132–3, 226 162–3, 165, 168
possibly the same as L. Cornelius Scipio Iulius Caesar, L. (cos. 90, cens. 89), 34,
Asiagenes (cos. 83), 203–4, 206–7 117–19, 122, 127, 132–4, 137, 141,
Cornelius Sisenna, L. (pr. 78), 4, 24, 32, 143, 167, 171, 173, 175, 179–82,
139, 145, 180 198, 217
Cornelius Sulla, L. (cos. 88), 24, 119, 133, Iulius Caesar, Sex. (cos. 91), 34, 81, 105,
139–40, 150–51, 153, 158–62, 117–18, 127, 134, 137, 140–43
166–70, 191–208 Iunius Pennus, M. (trib. pl. 126), 53–4, 63,
Cosconius, C. (pr. 89), 159, 163–5, 215
167–9
Lafrenius, T., 110, 142–3
Didius, T. (cos. 98, leg. 90), 119, 151 n3–5, Lamponius, M., 110, 134–5, 165, 193–4,
160 199–200, 204–6, 209
Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn. (cos. 96, cens. Lanuvium, 47, 117
92), encounter with Poppaedius Latin rights and Latin colonies, 4, 16, 19,
Silo, 86–8, 102–3 37, 41, 44–5, 47–51, 53–4, 56–61,
73, 75, 77, 81–2, 85, 92–3, 102,
Egnatius Rufus, C., 84 117, 121, 125–8, 132, 135, 142,
Etruria, 18–19, 44–5, 85, 93–4, 119, 121, 146–7, 152, 164, 171
122, 156, 196, 204–5 enfranchisement of, 174–8, 179,
the lex Iulia and, 172–5 182–9, 191, 197, 211
possible revolt of cities in 90 in, 143–6 Lex Calpurnia (89? bce), 172, 180–81,
185, 218
Faesulae, 145, 227 Lex Claudia (177 bce), 49–50, 215
feriae Latinae, allied assassination plot at, Lex Iulia (90 bce), 16, 35, 39–40, 44–5,
81–3, 96–7, 117 65–6
Ferentinum, 57–8 connection with possible ‘revolt’ in
Firmum, attempted siege of, 142 Etruria and Umbria, 143–7, 170,
Fregellae, 37, 41, 49, 54, 58–9, 60, 99 171–87, 191, 211, 217
Fabrateria Nova established near site of, Lex Licinia Mucia (95 bce), 61–4, 216
58 Lex Papia (65 bce), 218
Fucinus (Lake), 128, 136, 152 Lex Plautia Papiria (89 bce), 39–40, 66,
Fulvius Flaccus, M. (cos. 125), 33–5, 53–6, 145, 153, 170, 171–2, 181–5, 191,
59–60, 64, 80 n55 218, 228, 231
Fulvius Flaccus, Q. (cens. 174), 50 Lex Pompeia (89 bce), 172, 181–3, 218
Lex Sulpicia (88 bce), 191–3
Grumentum, 125, 134–5, 165, 199, 227 Lex Varia (90 bce), 36, 72, 104–6, 117, 217
Licinius Crassus, L. (cos. 95), 61–2, 69 n1,
Herius Asinius, 110, 139–40 70, 84, 88–9, 91, 92, 95
Index 251
Licinius Crassus, M. (cos. 70, 55), 210, Naval warfare, 122, 151, 161
211–12, 218–19 Neapolis, 177–8
Licinius Crassus, P. (cos. 97, cens. 89), 119, Nola, 127–9, 133, 145, 160–61, 189, 193,
134–5, 165, 179, 182, 198, 199 196
Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, P. Nuceria, 130, 228, 231–2
(cos. 131), 61 Numitorius Pullus, Q., 58
Licinius Lucullus, L. (cos. 74), 4, 24
Liris (River), 58 n49, 101, 135 Opimius, L. (cos. 121), 37, 58–9, 60
Livius Drusus, M. (trib. pl. 91), 15, 32, Oxynta (son of Jugurtha), 132–3
36–7, 64–5, 69–97, 104–6, 126,
138–9, 146 Paapius Mutilus, C., 12, 109–16, 128–31,
Livy on the tribunate of, 28–9 133–4, 162, 195
Livius Drusus, M. (trib. pl. 122), 60–62 possible death of, 207, 225–6, 228
Lucania, 44, 102–3, 110–11, 121, 132, Paeligni, 37–9, 45–6, 49, 101–2, 107, 109,
134–5, 162, 163–5, 168, 189, 110, 128, 135, 140–41, 153, 163,
193–4, 199–200, 205 187, 191, 194
Papirius Carbo Arvina, C. (trib. pl. 90),
Mamilius Limetanus, C. (trib. pl. 109), possible commander of campaign in
77 n46, 79 Lucania, 164, 183–5, 218
Possibly a land commissioner in 91 bce, Papirius Carbo, C. (cos. 120), 60, 61
84 Papirius Carbo, Cn. (cos. 85, 84, 82), 158,
Marcius Philippus, L. (cos. 91), 72, 76, 164–5, 196f, 200–205
81–3, 88–90, 92, 95–6, 105, 117, Pentri, 187, 227
158, 198, 211 Perperna, C. (leg. 90), 119, 123, 135, 137,
Marius, C. (cos. 107, 104–100, 86), 17, 26, 152, 198
39, 61, 119, 120, 123, 135–40, 150, Perperna, M. (cens. 86), 198, 211
152, 161, 191–3, 196–8, 199, 201, Picenum, 44–6, 87–8, 92, 99–104, 110,
202 118, 137, 140–43, 145, 150, 153–8,
Marius, C. (the younger) (cos. 82), 152, 199, 159, 167, 183, 191, 204, 210
201, 204–6 Pinna, 3, 102, 126, 128, 228–9
Marsi, 15, 28, 39, 40–41, 45–6, 76, 77, 79, Plotius, A. (leg. 90), 110–11, 119, 144–5, 173
101–2, 110, 111, 118, 128, 135–6, Pompeii, 101
139–40, 150, 152, 153, 153–4, the taking of, 159–60, 229
155–7, 164, 166–7, 170, 183, 187, Pompeius (Magnus), Cn. (cos. 70), 46, 141,
191, 194, 208, 212 154 n22, 158, 211
Marius Egnatius, 110–11, 133, 159, 164 Pompeius Rufus, Q. (cos. 88), 166–7, 191,
Marrucini, 45, 101–2, 139–40, 153–4, 192–3
166–7, 187 Pompeius Strabo, Cn. (cos. 89), 24, 27,
Marruvium, 136, 152 27, 38, 39, 46, 112, 119, 122, 123,
Minatius Magius, 159–62, 167, 181, 225, 232 140–43, 144, 145, 150
Mithradates (VI Eupator), 30, 161, 166, in Picenum in 89 bce and the taking of
191 Asculum, 154–8, 159, 164, 165–7,
insurgent appeal to, 193–5 170, 176, 181–3, 204
Mucius Scaevola, Q. (cos. 95), 61–3, 71, 88 Pontius Telesinus, 110–12, 165, 194,
Mummius, L. (pr. 177), 49–50 199–200, 204–6
Poppaedius Silo, Q., 12, 29, 32, 39, Statius ‘the Samnite’, 40, 207, 232
40–41, 64, 67, 69–97, 101–3, Sulpicius Galba, Ser. (pr. 91), 102–3, 121,
106, 109–16, 122, 125–6, 128–9, 125, 127, 153, 167, 222 see also
138–40, 153, 157 Sulpicius Galba, [C.?]
death of in Apulia, 167–9, 189, 194, Sulpicius Galba, [C.?], a commander in
207, 213–14 90 bce, 141–2
Poppaedius Silo, Q. (leg. 39), 232–3 Sulpicius Rufus, P. (trib. pl. 88), 88,
Porcius Cato, L. (cos. 89), 3, 119, 121, 127, 157 n35, 191–3
144–6, 150–51 Surrentum, 129–30, 133
death in combat with the Marsi, 152–3,
157, 159, 173, 175 Teanum Apulum, 169
Porcius Cato (Uticensis), M., encounter Teanum Sidicinum, 47, 57, 133, 203, 207
with Poppaedius Silo, 32, 72, 77–9, Tolenus (River), 127, 135–7, 142, 146, 152
80, 139 Tullius Cicero, M. (cos. 63), 24, 27–8, 31,
Postumius Albinus, A. (cos. 99?, leg, 89), 38–9, 40–41, 46, 52, 53–4, 62–3,
151, 161 69, 76, 83, 88–9, 90–91, 93, 105–6,
Postumius Albinus, L. (cos. 173), 50, 56 112, 154, 171–2, 174–7, 184, 196,
Postumius (Albinus?), L. (pr. 90), 127, 129, 208, 214
145
Praeneste, 56, 189, 196, 204–6, 232 Umbria, 18–19, 44–5, 85, 93–4, 110–11,
122
Rutilius Lupus, P. (cos. 90), 3, 117–19, 123, the lex Iulia and, 172–5, 196
127 possible revolt of cities in 90 in, 143–6,
death of at the Tolenus River, 135–7, 156
137–8, 140, 146, 152
Rutilius Rufus, P. (cos. 105), 70–71 Valerius Flaccus, C., 121
Valerius Flaccus, L. (cens. 97), 64
Salernum, 129–30, 133 Valerius Messala, M., 119, 123
Samnium, 2, 79, 102, 110, 114, 116, 118, Varius Severus Hybrida, Q. (trib. pl. 90), 36,
121, 127–9, 132, 140, 142, 150, 72, 94, 104–6, 217
153, 157, 158–63, 167, 168, 170, Venusia, 101, 132–4, 163–4, 174, 229
189, 191, 197, 199, 202, 207 Venafrum, 132–3
Sempronius Asellio, A. (pr. urb. 89), 151 Vestini, 45, 101–2, 126, 153–4, 166–7,
Sempronius Gracchus, C. (trib. pl. 123), 33, 190 n5, 228
56–61 Vettius Scato, P., 24, 27–8, 38–9, 110–12,
Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (trib. pl. 133), 128, 132, 136–7, 142–3, 146,
33, 79, 85 154–6
Sertorius, Q. (pr. 83), 117–18, 123, 196, Via Appia, 132, 203
209 Via Latina, 57
Servilius, Q. (pr.? 91), 99–100 Via Valeria, 135–6, 152, 226, 227
Servilius Caepio, Q. (leg. 90), 71–4, 93, 95, Vidacilius, C., 110, 132, 142, 154–7, 174,
119, 123 226
lured into an ambush by Poppaedius Volaterrae, 208
Silo and death of, 137–9, 146, 152 Volturnus (river), 132–3, 142, 225
Stabiae, 129–30, 133, 159

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THE SOCIAL WAR, 91 TO 88 bce

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

Copyright © Christopher J. Dart 2014

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

ISBN 9781472416766 (hbk)

List of Figures vii

1 The Modern Study of the Social War 9

2 Ancient Perspectives on the Social War 23

3 Italians and the Roman State in the Second Century bce 43

4 Livius Drusus, Poppaedius Silo and the Looming Conflict

5 The Outbreak of the War (91 to 90 bce) 99

6 The War in Italy (90 bce) 125

7 The Collapse of the Italian Insurgency (89 to 88 bce) 149

8 The Lex Iulia, Lex Plautia Papiria and Enfranchisement

9 Ongoing Conflicts and Enfranchisement (88 to 70 bce) 189

3 Cities Besieged during the Social War 225

1 Cities of Italy at the time of the Social War 7

The following is a list of abbreviations for modern works cited throughout

Ascon. Asconius’ commentary on Cicero, ed. A. C. Clark,

The Social War has inspired radically different interpretations on

I.. J i/liHTw,i\ PilllKI

0 50 100 LSO 200

Figure 1 Cities of Italy at the time of the Social War

II W 100 150 200

Figure 2 Ethnic Regions of Italy at the time of the Social War

Searching for the Origins of the Social War

The Motives of the Insurgents

While modern scholars have variously ascribed a wide range of potential

of the Italians in 91 bce and the spirit of the Risorgimento in nineteenth-century

Possibly one of the most interesting aspects of De Sanctis’ work is that he

favour of a highly schematic interpretation of the Italian wartime organisation,

interpretation,26 a number have revised related issues in light of an insurgency

In contrast to the wide-ranging debate in modern scholarship about the

The State of the Surviving Sources

Ancient Sources on the Italian Call for Citizenship

Cicero provides a unique perspective on the Social War by virtue of having

Sociale bellum vocetur licet, ut extenuemus invidiam, si verum tamen volumus,

Despite the charged rhetoric of Florus, there is an underlying assumption

in turn employed as significant levers for Romans seeking to cultivate Italian

treated by the Gracchan land commission.37 This is an interesting focus for

Ancient Sources on the Italian Call for Libertas

A number of ancient sources characterise the Italian allies as demanding libertas.

Two passages contained in the treatise known as Rhetorica ad Herennium

public knowledge and, as is discussed in Chapter 4, was one of the causes of

Paelignae dicar gloria gentis ego,

I shall be called the glory of the Paelignian race,

viewed in the context of a number of other sources which similarly characterise

In Eutropius’ Breviarium ab Vrbe Condita the Italian insurgent cause is again

in Italia gravissimum bellum Picentes, Marsi Pelignique moverunt, qui, cum

Eutropius’ description of the insurgent’s motivations as tum libertatem sibi

Ancient Names for the War

Differentiating Allied Motives

Simple explanations of grievances over disparity of status, found in a number of

Precedents for Latins and Italians Seeking Enfranchisement

be reduced and, in consequence, there would be a higher demand upon those

Italians, Ager Publicus and Land Reform

Proposals for Reform and Extension of the Franchise in the 120s