Introspective and Traditional Views of L-2
Introspective and Traditional Views of L-2
Introspective and Traditional Views of L-2
Maria K. Timofeeva
1. Introductive remarks
What do we really conceive when we conceive the content of some text during
our ordinary communication? Do we generally conceive the senses of sepa-
rate words? Do we in fact comprehend a proposition as some well-defined
part of content separated from its pragmatic constituents? Do we really dis-
tinguish truth and falsity as some external characteristics of a proposition?
We consider these questions in sections 3, 4; this allows us to see the
core of the divergences between introspective and traditional (pedagogically-
based) views of language and to depict the essential principles of the intro-
spective framework. The outline of certain introspective theories and con-
siderations is given in Section 5. The whole reasoning about this approach
is summarized in Section 6.
It would be too much to insist that a given speaker does perceive the
content C in the same way as we do, say, colors, sounds or other qualita-
tive (phenomenal) experiences, so-called qualia. Although some philosophers
(e.g. G. Strawson) believe that to grasp the content C means to grasp certain
qualia, i.e., that the nature of C is qualitative, a large number of other schol-
ars (e.g. M. Tye) do not think so: they suppose that this content can include
some phenomenal components but they are constituted only by the present
and/or past perceptions, feelings, emotions and, in sum, never amount to
the whole content as such [13]. Although there may be other arguments in
favor of both positions, there is no indubitable fact that could give us an
unambiguous evidence to make us prefer one of them. Besides, it is generally
accepted in psychology that no one can directly observe his own thoughts
(and therefore the content C) at the very moment of their presence in his
mind. But in any case, it is doubtless that we do somehow conceive the
contents of texts. Otherwise what do we point at by asking “Do you really
think so?” (or “Have you really meant this?”, or “That is what you have
told me an hour before!”, or “But in fact you have not told me that!”) if
not to the content of some previously uttered text? If there were no such
contents those sentences would be senseless. The previously uttered text is
a sort of a (temporal) name, indicating certain content and thereby allowing
one to point at this content by different means, e.g. by the above sentences.
It is possible to state the introspective principles of dividing C into parts
which can be considered as introspective counterparts or prototypes of P , V ,
PP, A. Let us label those parts C P ,C V , C P P , and C A and call them proto-
typical proposition, prototypical judgment about its truth value, prototypical
presuppositions, and prototypical associated ideas, respectively. (Those parts
are not considered as self-dependent, they exist only within C.)
Prototypes of a proposition and its presuppositions should be thought
of as obligatory parts of C: their presence cannot be disregarded by those
who have understood the utterance. We cannot make sense of a prototypical
proposition unless its prototypical presuppositions are true: every content
is understandable only due to some presupposed data. That is, if N con-
ceives C P , he inevitably conceives also C P P too; C P P penetrates into C,
so to speak, “automatically”. However, disregarding other prototypes may
be compatible with a successful understanding of U . For example, some
thinkable ideas, which might be associated with P , can pass unnoticed and
not conceived by N at the moment τ ; thereby C A would not include the
corresponding prototypes.
Introspective and Traditional Views of Language 223
I. the ideas expressed by U explicitly from those which are not expressed
explicitly but can enter into C only implicitly: the prototypical propo-
sition is expressed explicitly, the other parts of C are only implicit;
II. the necessary and accidental parts of C: the prototypes of the propo-
sition and the corresponding presuppositions are necessary, while the
prototypes of associations are accidental;
III. the ideas, making it possible to assess U as (in)adequate for the cir-
cumstances of its usage, from the other constituents of C: it seems
natural to qualify the former as the prototypical judgment about the
truth value.
the utterance in question, but they can be conceived at the time of compre-
hending U as parts of the content C. While conceiving C, the person N does
not conceive those groups of ideas as separate ones, i.e., he does not really
conceive in C the boundaries between the above-mentioned prototypes, he
conceives C as a single whole. But he can—due to his introspection—divide
the content C along the lines (I)–(III).
We shall use (I)–(III) for determining C P , C V , C P P , and C A . Those
principles of dividing C seem to be in accordance with the most abstract
features of a proposition, judgment about its truth value, presuppositions,
and associated ideas.
Now it will be useful to compare the traditional approach with the in-
trospective one.
In fact switching from the pedagogically-based view to the introspective
one means changing the way of conceptualizing and choosing the language
data. Therefore it will be helpful to compare the way used within the tradi-
tional approach with that suitable for the introspective one. We shall state
the difference by appealing to the framework of first-order logic. If we are to
use first-order logic for describing those two approaches, the crucial point is:
how to determine the intended universes and standard interpretations. The
two ways of conceptualization differ in their answer to this question. Within
the traditional framework we use the universe which is constituted by the
entities thought of as commonly accessible for many people (propositions,
their truth values, etc.); within the introspective framework—by individu-
alized entities thought of as unique for each human (contents of a certain
individual mind). Thus, the basic differences between the traditional view
and the introspective one can be summarized as follows:
The sentence ‘It has stopped raining now’ is true if and only if
it has stopped raining now.
But it has stopped raining now.
Then the sentence ‘It has stopped raining now’ is true.
In this case the difference between (1) and (2) would be unclear.
The T-sentence constitutes one of the ways of formalizing our ordinary
notion of truth but not the way in which we conceive it in C. It seems that
within the introspective framework the difference between the utterances (1)
and (2) lies in the difference between the location of C V : in the first case
it is located in the prototypical presupposition C P P , in the second case—in
the prototypical proposition C P .
Let us now return to (1). Here C P P includes the information which
is necessary for understanding C P . This presupposed information tells us
(among other things) that the utterance reports a real (observable) fact.
Thus CP P includes the idea which can be indicated by the sentence
Actually, if we remove (3) from the content of the sentence (1) the re-
mainder would not yield the understanding of this sentence because it will
not be clear what kind of facts it is supposed to be about.
Thereby, the prototypical propositions expressed by (1) and (2) are not
equal, and thus nothing gives us any right to think that hit has stopped
raining nowi from (1) is interchangeable with hit has stopped raining nowi
from (2). In fact it is not the invariant common part of the contents ascribed
to (1), (2). In the first case the speaker is interested in the very situation;
strictly speaking, it is the answer to the question like ‘What is being observed
now?’, it is not the question about ‘is’. In the second case the speaker is
interested in the reality of this situation; it is the answer to the question
‘Is this situation really being observed now?’. Thus these two texts have
different contents; their contents have different prototypical propositions and
are thought of as the answers to different questions.
When we utter (1) the assertion about the location (in one’s mind, in
the observable world, in an imagined world, etc.) lies in the area of C P P ,
when we utter (2) it lies in the area of C P . And this appears to be the
only substantial difference between (1) and (2). In ordinary communication
we do not usually discover the truthfulness (by comparing the prototypical
proposition with some state of affairs), but presuppose it.
Now let us suppose that U is false. In what case would N , for example,
conceive the sentence ‘It is raining now’ as false? It happens when the
adequate prototypical presupposition appears to be absent and C contains
a prototypical presupposition about some other—wrong—location (if N is
mistaken or lies). It is impossible to find the rain (or Q) ‘now’ due to its
incompatibility with the presupposed wrong location. There appears to be
no situation which can be indicated by uttering this sentence; this fact makes
it false. And really, in such a case the reaction will often be: ‘You are wrong,
where did you seen the rain?’. It is important that introspectively the non-
existence of a situation compatible with this sentence is seen directly, it is
not yielded by any conscious inference. The failure of designation constitutes
the corresponding truth value, and this failure is seen directly.
Truth/falsity does not characterize the content of an utterance from out-
side (relative to some state of affairs), it is a constituent of this very content,
its internal feature.
To elucidate the introspective perspective let us look at a well-known
problem connected with the notions of truth/falsity, namely, at that of in-
terchangeability. The following reasoning should be considered not as solving
this problem (in the form of its usual definition within the traditional frame-
228 Maria K. Timofeeva
work) but as depicting the situations prototypical for this problem within the
introspective framework. The point is that this problem does exist within
the traditional approach but it does not generally arise within ordinary com-
munication: we usually have no difficulties with interchangeability. How
does the difference between introspective and traditional views explain this
discrepancy?
Suppose that N utters the following sentence:
Since we know that Cervantes is the author of “Don Quixote”, we can form
the sentence:
Is it possible to conclude that it does not matter which utterance was as-
cribed to N : (4) or (5); that (4) can be equally replaced by (5)? Within
the traditional approach it is usually thought that we cannot do so (if this
sentence is considered de dicto) because N may be fully ignorant of the
authorship of “Don Quixote”. However, both expressions indicate the same
person and thus should be interchangeable. This fact is treated (by G. Frege,
S. Kripke, W.V. Quine and other authors) as puzzling. But let us look at
the situation from the introspective standpoint and compare the two cases:
in the first N utters (4), in second (5).
Generally we cannot speak about substituting Y for X unless we are
sure that this operation is applied within some unaltered context, i.e., the
context of X will not be changed after replacing X by Y. But it does not
seem to be the case. Let us take X to be hCervantesi and Y to be hthe
author of “Don Quixote”i. After replacing, the rest of C should remain the
same. But in (4) X is included in the prototypical proposition while Y only
may be among the prototypical associative ideas (i.e., X is the necessary part
of C, while Y only may be its accidental part); in the second case it is vice
versa: Y is contained in the prototypical proposition, X—(may be) among
the prototypical associated ideas. How could it be possible to substitute the
prototypical proposition for the prototypical associated idea or vice versa?
This operation doesn’t meet the above-mentioned condition and hence it
cannot be though of as warranted.
Introspective and Traditional Views of Language 229
Surely we do not think about this relativity every time, at every moment of
an ordinary dialogue. But we should keep it in mind.
In his summary Grzegorczyk challenges antipsychologism:
Semantic antinomies seem to be consequences of antipsychologistic
paradigm adopted by logicians at the beginning of 20 Century. We
shall loose more radically from troubles caused by antinomies if we dis-
card antipsychologism which is, in effect, a huge simplification of the
description of semantic situations. [4, p. 126]
Introspective view is a sort of psychologism (if we mean by this word all the
appeals to the psychological reality), and, as we have seen earlier, a shift
from antipsychologism towards psychologism can give us a renewed vision
of certain language problems.
G. Frege is traditionally considered to be a proponent of antipsycholo-
gism, but his own thoughts are not so one-sided. Let us consider some of
his ideas without going too deep into the heart of the confrontation between
psychologism and antipsychologism.
In connection with the sign Frege speaks about the reference, the idea,
and the sense. The reference is “an object perceivable by the senses”. (We
can note here that the act of perception can be only individual, that is why
one can have only individualized subjective information about the object of
reference.)
The idea is subjective: my idea is an internal image, arising from my
memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal
and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often saturated
with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The
same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the
same idea. [5, pp. 25–26)]
Thus, feelings, impressions, all aspects of individual experience may enter
into the content of a text. This part of Frege’s reasoning is compatible with
the introspective view.
Still, one should distinguish the sense of a sign from the associated idea.
When Frege says that a sense “may be common property of many and there-
fore not a part or a mode of the individual mind” [5], that it is “not the
subjective performance of thinking but its objective content” [5, p. 28], he
moves away from the introspective view.
Hence, Frege does not wholly deny the subjective nature of the content of
a text, but he implicitly postulates the existence of the objective constituent
of this content and is interested in investigating this very constituent. Grze-
gorczyk thinks that postulating such objective entities is risky.
Introspective and Traditional Views of Language 231
The horizontal stroke, which is part of the symbol ⊢, ties the symbols which
follow it into a whole; “and the assertion, which is expressed by means of the
vertical stroke at the left end of the horizontal one, relates to this whole”
[6]. Here Frege also raises an objection against the traditional notions of
subject and predicate. He believes that the subject contains the whole con-
tent, and the predicate serves only to present this as a judgement. There
is only one predicate common for all judgements (namely, “is a fact”) and
there are no subject and predicate in the usual sense. This single predicate
is expressed by the symbol ⊢. Thus, Frege postulates the abstraction “the
common predicate for all judgements” and thereby disjoins the truth value
from the content of a text. This disagrees with the introspective perspective
described above, in sections 3 and 4.
Thus, in contrast to the introspective view, Frege postulates not only
senses as common entities but also the separations of assertion (and thereby
truth and falsity) from the content of a text. Those two decisions refer to
metalanguage which he uses for describing human language. Appealing to
Grzegorczyk we can repeat that such a metalanguage only relatively corre-
sponds to the nature of human language and although we need not think
about this relativity all the time we should keep it in mind.
But how can we articulate or assess this relativity? For this purpose
we should develop the introspective view and investigate the language of
ordinary human communication viewed from the introspective perspective.
Rather a detailed analysis of the introspective perspective can be found
in the works by Robin G. Collingwood, especially in his Autobiography [2]
and in The Principles of Art (Book II, Ch. XI. Language) [3]. Collingwood’s
introspective view of language is well articulated and detailed; he considers
the whole subjective process of acquiring and using a language.
Before adverting to the ideas of Collingwood we should also mention the
name of Benedetto Croce who was rather influential in the first half of the
20th century. Among his followers were Robin G. Collingwood and Karl
Vossler. All of them are adherents of the introspective stance.
Characterizing the linguistic conception of Collingwood it is first of all
necessary to say that he treats the content of a text as a whole which includes
individual impressions, feelings, etc. and which is not divided into senses of
words, phrases or any other entities; truth (falsity) can also be part of this
content, it is not considered as something added to the content (as it was
considered by Frege).
Collingwood treats words, phrases and other well-known linguistic no-
tions as metaphysical fictions; he does not assume that the science about
Introspective and Traditional Views of Language 233
such entities investigates the nature of human language. I think that the
large quotation below clearly expressing his position is appropriate here:
And this does not presuppose community of language between the speaker
and hearer. Instead Collingwood presupposes the existence of some pri-
mary “natural” (non-verbal) language natively assigned for expressing the
emotions and qualifies the traditional understanding of sign as inversed.
According to this tradition we speak about symbols that conventionally
correspond to some contents or senses. But there should be some basis for
such a convention, some other language out of which the agreement is arrived
at. Collingwood imputes this role to the primary language.
A similar idea about the necessity of a basic primary language can also
be found in the works by L. Wittgenstein and T. Reid (Reid called the latter
the “natural language”, Wittgenstein used the term “natural expression”);
R. Harré and D.N. Robinson [7] draw a comparison between their thoughts
on this subject.
According to the theory of such a primary language one initially has
some feeling and expresses it in a “natural” (non-verbal, e.g. physiological)
way, only then does s(he) learn the other, verbal, way of expressing the
same feeling. Thus, one becomes aware of words for feelings as alternatives
to natural ways of expressing feelings. It is precisely in this way that one
Introspective and Traditional Views of Language 235
He remarks that logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense
in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that
can be said is that we construct ideal languages (§ 81); he specially stipulates
that we are analyzing not a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g.
that of thinking) (§ 383). Whereas the introspective view can just be equated
with that of natural sciences; and it considers a language as a phenomenon.
At the same time, some of Wittgenstein’s ideas express the introspective
view. Indeed, the confusions which occupy us arise when language, like
an engine, is idling, not when it is doing work (§ 132) and philosophical
problems arise when language goes on holiday (§ 38). Indeed, we understand
the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and
what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the ‘use’ which
is extended in time! (§ 138) Nevertheless, his ideas of this kind do not form
any explicit introspective conception.
6. Concluding remarks
Scientific theories deal only with abstractions but those abstractions can
be of different kinds. Prototypes of a proposition, judgment about its truth
value, presupposition, and associated idea are abstractions, but—in contrast
to the traditional view—they do not posit the unobservable commonly acces-
sible entities, instead, they posit certain introspective (i.e., observable for a
certain individual) principles. Making difference between introspective and
traditional views is important because it helps avoid ascribing objectivity
to the traditional abstractions (e.g. to propositions): we do not see those
entities by introspection; we use them only because of their convenience and
usefulness in a certain type of our reasoning. But there are still other types
of reasoning, in which it is more adequate to posit different ideas—those
which correspond to the introspective view.
References
[1] Ajdukiewicz, K., “Proposition as the Connotation of Sentence”, Studia Logica
V.XX (1967).
[3] Collingwood, R.G. The Principles of Art, US: Oxford University Press, 1958.
Introspective and Traditional Views of Language 237
Maria K. Timofeeva
Laboratory of Mathematical Logic
Institute of Mathematics
Koptug prospect, 4
630090, Novosibirsk, Russia
[email protected]