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Chapter 3.3

a Guide to the Russian revolution

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
75 views5 pages

Chapter 3.3

a Guide to the Russian revolution

Uploaded by

Zhi Yi Lim
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Sunway College

A Level – History 9489/2

Russian Revolution – Chapter 3 – Part 3 – Impact of World War 1

The impact of the First World War


When war broke out in July 1914, Russia’s internal divisions were temporarily forgotten and Nicholas rode a
wave of popular support. Paintings of the Tsar were carried in processions and crowds sang the national
anthem. The Times correspondent wrote: ‘For perhaps the first time since Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, the
people and their Tsar were one, and the strength that unity spreads in a nation stirred throughout the
Empire.’ But the enthusiasm did not last long.
At the Front
The Russians had the largest army and gained some early successes against theAustro-Hungarians. But it was a
different story against the Germans. In August1914, at the battle of Tannenberg, and in September at the
Masuria Lakes, the Russians took heavy losses and were driven back. There followed a long retreat throughout
1915. By the autumn of 1915 they had been forced out of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Between May and
December of that year one million Russians were killed and a similar number were taken prisoner. The
Russians recovered during the winter of 1915–16 and in the summer of 1916 GeneralBrusilov launched a
brilliant offensive, which brought the Austrians to their knees with over half their army killed or captured. But
the Germans moved troops to reinforce them and the Russians were pushed back once more.

The real problem for the Russians was at the top: the quality of leadership was poor, with notable exceptions
like Brasilia. Many of the top officers had been appointed because of their loyalty to the Tsar. They had no
experience of fighting and little military expertise. There was no clear command structure and no war plan was
developed. The performance of the War Ministry was dire, compounded by the breakdown of the distribution
system: there was a lack of supplies and equipment, especially rifles, ammunition and boots. The shortage of
rifles was so bad on some parts of the Front that soldiers had to rely on picking up the rifles of men shot in
front of them. Often the war materials were available but they were not where they were needed.

1
Russian battle lines, 1914–17

When Mikhail Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, went on a special fact-finding tour, he received a lot of
complaints about poor administration and the lack of basic supplies. He also found that provision for
dealing with wounded soldiers was abysmal. The morale of the soldiers was hard hit by the incompetence
of their officers and the lack of regard for their welfare –tens of thousands deserted.
Rodzianko’s son, who was in the army, told of criminal incompetence and
lack of co-operation in the high command. He reported the following attack on the Rai-
Mestro Height to his father. It had been ordered by the Grand Duke who had been warned
about a swamp which lay in the way, but he still ordered the advance
The troops found themselves in the swamp, where many men perished. . . . My son
sank up to his armpits and was with difficulty extricated. . . . The wounded could
not be brought out and perished in the swamp. Our artillery fire was weak . . .
and the shells fell short and dropped among our own men. . . . Nevertheless, the
gallant guards fulfilled their task, WHICH THEY WERE THEN ORDERED TO
ABANDON.

Could tsarism have survived? 1906–1917


When Mikhail Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, went on a special fact-finding tour, he received a lot of
complaints about poor administration and the lack of basic supplies. He also found that provision for dealing
with wounded soldiers was abysmal (see Source 3.8). The morale of the soldiers was hard hit by the
incompetence of their officers and the lack of regard for their welfare –tens of thousands deserted.

2
However, the Russian war effort was not the total disaster it has sometimes been portrayed as, by mostly
Soviet historians. Norman Stone has pointed out that by 1916 the Russians were matching the Germans in
shell production and there had been a 1000 per cent growth in the output of artillery and rifles. They had
success against the Austrians and contributed significantly to the Allied victory by mounting attacks on the
Eastern Front to relieve pressure on the Western Front. In 1916, Brusilov saved the French at Verdun when
the Germans
had to pull out 35 divisions to counter his offensive. The Eastern Front engage enormous numbers of German
troops. Also, according to Stone, the army was not on the verge of collapse at the beginning of 1917; it was
still intact as a fighting force.

The home fronts


The strain of equipping and feeding millions of soldiers proved too much for thRussian economy and revealed
its structural weaknesses. Military needs had priority and the railways, which were barely able to cope with
freight trafficking peacetime, were now overloaded. There were bottlenecks at Moscow. The signalling system
collapsed and trains were left stranded on lines due to engine failure. Early in the war, goods and supplies
were available but trucks ended upon sidings waiting for engines or lines to be unblocked.

The loss of land in Poland and the West knocked out the more important of the two main lines from northern
to southern Russia. As a result, there was a major problem moving grain from the south to the cities, and
Petrograd suffered particularly. Making matters worse was the lack of grain coming onto the market. The
peasants were not selling it as there was little incentive for them to do so. The government would not pay
higher prices and the conversion of factories to military work meant there was little for peasants to buy – the
production of agricultural implements was only 15 per cent of the pre-war level. Inflation compounded these
problems. Russia abandoned the gold standard and started printing money to pay wages, and so government
spending rose.

With people desperately seeking goods in short supply, inflation kicked in. Whilst wages more or less doubled
between 1914 and 1916, the price of food and fuel quadrupled. The expansion of the workforce in factories
and mines servicing military needs and the influx of refugees from German occupied areas led to very serious
overcrowding in the towns and a deterioration in living standards. There were food and fuel shortages and
endless queues. Petrograd suffered more than other places because it was remote from food-producing areas.
By 1916, it was receiving barely a third of the food and fuel it required. The shortage of food was a major
source of anger, matched only by the ban on vodkas ales. Strikes had broken out in 1915 and they increased in
number, frequency and militancy during 1916. The war also took its toll in a more personal way. As the list of
casualties mounted there was hardly a family that had not been affected by a son killed or captured.

The role of the Tsar in the war


The support the Tsar enjoyed at the beginning of the war faded as the military defeats piled up. As in 1905,
confidence in the government evaporated as its incompetence and inability to effectively organise supplies for
the military at the Front and the people in the cities became apparent. The zemstvo and municipalities started
forming their own bodies to provide medical care, hospitals and hospital trains for the thousands of wounded
soldiers. The bodies eventually united to form one organisation – Zemgorr. They went on supply uniforms,
boots and tents. Professional groups and businessmen formed War Industries Committees (WICs) to shift
factories over to military production. Leading liberals played an important role in these non-government
organisations that seemed to offer an alternative – and much more effective –form of government. So, even
though these organisations were fully supportive of the war, the autocracy regarded them with suspicion and
would not co-operate with them. The Tsarina, in particular, saw them as revolutionary bodies undermining the
autocracy; and indeed, they did act as a focus for criticism of the bureaucracy’s failings.

3
The Tsar was pressurised into reconvening the Duma in July 1915.Progressive elements in the Duma (about
two-thirds of the total deputies) formed the ‘Progressive Bloc’. They wished to be fully involved in the war
effort and wanted to prevent the country slipping into revolution and anarchy, which frightened them as much
as anybody else. The Bloc called for a ‘ministry of national confidence’ in which elected members of the Duma
wouldreplaceincompetent ministers to form a new government. This offered a real chance for the Tsar to be
seen to be working with the people and offload some of the responsibility for the war. But the Tsar would not
countenance it and suspended the Duma, which only met again briefly in 1916 and 1917. The Progressive Bloc
became frustrated by his intransigence. In November 1916, Miyoko, thecae leader, made a speech listing the
government’s shortcomings around the question: ‘Is this stupidity or treason?’ He also declared that the Duma
would fight the government ‘with all legitimate means until you go’.

In August 1915 the Tsar made a huge mistake: he decided to take direct control of the army and went off to
military headquarters in Mogilev, 600 kilometres from Petrograd. This had a number of serious consequences
for him:

1 He now became personally responsible for the conduct of the war. If things went badly he would be directly
to blame. He could not pass off the responsibility to his generals.
2 He was away from Petrograd for long periods of time, leaving the Tsarina and Rasputin (see opposite) in
control of the government. ‘Lovey,’ she wrote to her husband, ‘I am here, don’t laugh at silly old wifey, but she
has
“trousers” on unseen.’

This created chronic instability in the government. There were constant changes of ministers – a game of
ministerial leapfrog in which the hand of the Tsarina can be detected. Competent people were dismissed: for
instance, the War Minister, Polivanov, who was rebuilding the army and supply system with some success
after the disasters of 1915, was discharged. The Tsarina regarded him as a traitor and a ‘revolutionist’ because
of his willingness to work with Zemgor and the WICs. Incompetent people were appointed, often because they
flattered the Tsarina or because they were recommended by Rasputin. The appointment of Sturmer as Prime
Minister in February 1916caused great disquiet: not only was he incompetent and dishonest but he also had a
German name.

It is not surprising that by the end of 1916 support for the Tsar was haemorrhaging fast. All classes in society
were disillusioned by the way the government was running the war and since the Tsar embodied the
government and had taken direct control of the armed forces it was towards him that the finger of
responsibility was pointed. The governing élite was in disarray and even some of the nobility were supporting
the Progressive Bloc in the Duma. People were talking about an impending revolution.

The situation in Petrograd was becoming tense. A secret police report at the end of 1916 said that the workers
in Petrograd were on the verge of despair, with the cost of living having risen by 300 per cent, food almost
unobtainable and long queues outside most shops. The secret police reported a rising death rate due to
inadequate diet, unsanitary and cold lodgings and ‘a mass of industrial workers quite ready to let themselves
go to the wildest excesses of a hunger strike’.

4
THE IMPACT OF RASPUTIN
Grigori Yefimovich, born into a Siberian peasant family gained a reputation as a holy man, or ‘starets’, and the
name Rasputin. It was rumoured that he belonged to the Krystyna sect that found religious fulfilment and
ecstasy through religious senses and, in particular, sexual acts. In 1905, Rasputin was introduced into polite
society in St Petersburand became known to the royal family. The Tsar’s son, Alexis, suffered from
haemophilia, and doctors found it difficult to stop the bleeding that resulted from this. In 1907, when Alexis
was experiencing a particularly bad episode, Rasputin was called in and Alexis recovered. This happen on other
occasions. It is not known how Rasputin did this: he may have had some skill with herbal remedies or some
ability in hypnosis that calmed Alexis. The Tsarina, a deeply religious woman, believed that Rasputin had been
sent by God to save her son. This gave him an elevated positioat the Russian court with direct access to the
royal family.

Women from the higher social circles flocked to him to ask for advice and healing or to carry petitions to the
Tsar to advance their husbands’ careers. There were rumours that Rasputin solicited sexual favours for this
help and stories of orgies emerged. However, secret police report a subsequent investigation seemed to show
that his sexual activity – and he was very active – was restricted mainly to actresses and prostitutes rather
than societywomen. Whatever the truth about Rasputin’s relationships, his reputation for debauchery played
a significant role damaging the standing of the royal family and caused the Tsar political problems. The Tsar
had newspaper reports about Rasputin censored. He fell out with the Duma over this and Rasputin’s
influential position at court. Ministers like Stolypin profoundly disapproved of Rasputin, but any mention of
the problems he caused brought short shrift the Tsar.

The impact of Rasputin became even more damaging during the war. When the Tsar went to the Front, he left
the Tsarina and Rasputin effectively in control of domestic matters. They played havoc with ministers and
contributed to the government’s instability. As a result, they became focus of growing public anger and
antagonism towards the regime. She was portrayed as a German spy, deliberately conniving with Rasputin to
betray Mother Russia. Pornographic cartoons (see Source 3.15) and letters found their way into the press and
implied that she was having an illicit relationship with Rasputin and was under his control. Even the rapidly
diminishing supporters of the Tsar could not put up with the degenerate monk and the ‘German woman’
running the country. In December 1916, a mamboed the royal family, Prince Yusupov, arranged to
murdeRasputin in a last ditch effort to save the autocracy. But the damage had been done: many were now
convinced the regime was not worth saving

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