2024-09-16 - Defendants' Reply Written Submissions On Power

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September 16, 2024 via email

Vancouver Law Courts


Supreme Court Scheduling
800 Smithe Street
Vancouver, BC V6Z 2E1

Attn: William Gallagher


Manager, Supreme Court Scheduling (Civil)

Dear Mr. Gallagher:

Re: CSASPP v. HMK & PHO


Supreme Court of British Columbia Vancouver Registry No. S210831

We are counsel for the defendants in the above-noted proceeding, in which Justice
Crerar has judgment on a certification application under reserve. We write further to the
Court’s memorandum of July 19, 2024. We ask that you please direct this
correspondence to Justice Crerar.

These submissions respond briefly to the plaintiff’s submissions dated August 30, 2024.

There is nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions on Power that requires response (beyond
what the defendants have already submitted in our letter dated August 30, 2024).

Towards the end of the plaintiff’s submissions, the plaintiff cites Ingram and remarks
that “the extent of political involvement [in the PHO’s orders] by the executive and
various committees is not publicly known at this time”.1 In Ingram, the Court of King’s
Bench of Alberta found that certain public health orders made by Chief Medical Officer
of Health for Alberta (CMOH) had not been made independently by the CMOH, but
rather implemented decisions that had actually been made by the Cabinet of Alberta.

In response, the defendants make two points.

1Plaintiff’s submissions dated August 30, 2024 at para. 33; Ingram v. Alberta (Chief Medical Officer of
Health), 2023 ABKB 453.

Ministry of Attorney General Legal Services Branch Phone: 604 660-6795


Litigation Group Email: [email protected]
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First, the plaintiff has not pleaded—nor has the plaintiff ever previously suggested, at
any point since commencing this action some 43 months ago—that the PHO did not
make her orders independently. Perhaps anticipating this objection, the plaintiff says
there was “witness testimony, cross-examination, and discovery” in Ingram but none of
this “is available in the pre-certification procedure in British Columbia”.2 In this
submission the plaintiff is precisely backwards. Pleadings always come before
discovery. Discovery is not a fishing expedition in which a plaintiff casts around for facts
that can later be pleaded. Rather, the pleadings control the scope of discovery. As
McLachlin C.J.C. emphasized for a unanimous Court in Imperial Tobacco, a plaintiff
cannot rely on the possibility that more facts may turn up later:

It is incumbent on the claimant to clearly plead the facts upon which it relies in
making its claim. A claimant is not entitled to rely on the possibility that new
facts may turn up as the case progresses. The claimant may not be in a
position to prove the facts pleaded at the time of the motion [to strike]. It may
only hope to be able to prove them. But plead them it must. The facts pleaded
are the firm basis upon which the possibility of success of the claim must be
evaluated.3

To be clear, this is not an invitation for the plaintiff to deliver yet another proposed
amended pleading, which is already in its eighth iteration.4 The plaintiff has had ample
opportunity to develop its theory of the case. The time for the plaintiff to propose
amendments has long passed.

Second, and in any event, even if the plaintiff had pleaded that the PHO did not make
her orders independently, there would be no basis in fact for that allegation. The
evidence is that the PHO regularly briefed Cabinet and various deputy ministers to
provide updates on “the current state of COVID-19 and the epidemiological situation in
British Columbia”.5 This should come as no surprise: under the Public Health Act, it is
part of the PHO’s role to advise public officials on public health issues.

However, there is no evidence whatsoever that any public officials pressured or


influenced the PHO in the exercise of her statutory power to make public health orders.
There is simply no evidence whatsoever that the PHO did not make her orders
independently.

2 Plaintiff’s submissions dated August 30, 2024 at fn31.


3 R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 at para. 22 (internal citations omitted).
4For a list of the various interactions, see the defendants’ submissions dated August 30, 2023 at para.
14. (These are the submissions that were delivered after the plaintiff delivered a sixth version of its
proposed further amended notice of civil claim on June 5, 2023, more than five weeks after the
certification hearing had concluded and judgment had been reserved.)
5 Brazier Affidavit at para. 13 (AR, vol. 7, tab 43).
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The plaintiff’s late-breaking, unpleaded, and wholly speculative suggestion that there
may have been “political involvement” in the PHO’s orders does not change anything.
The certification application should be dismissed and the action should be dismissed
pursuant to R. 9-5.

Yours truly,

Emily Lapper
Legal Counsel

cc: Polina Furtula, counsel for the plaintiff (via email)

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