2024-09-16 - Defendants' Reply Written Submissions On Power
2024-09-16 - Defendants' Reply Written Submissions On Power
2024-09-16 - Defendants' Reply Written Submissions On Power
We are counsel for the defendants in the above-noted proceeding, in which Justice
Crerar has judgment on a certification application under reserve. We write further to the
Court’s memorandum of July 19, 2024. We ask that you please direct this
correspondence to Justice Crerar.
These submissions respond briefly to the plaintiff’s submissions dated August 30, 2024.
There is nothing in the plaintiff’s submissions on Power that requires response (beyond
what the defendants have already submitted in our letter dated August 30, 2024).
Towards the end of the plaintiff’s submissions, the plaintiff cites Ingram and remarks
that “the extent of political involvement [in the PHO’s orders] by the executive and
various committees is not publicly known at this time”.1 In Ingram, the Court of King’s
Bench of Alberta found that certain public health orders made by Chief Medical Officer
of Health for Alberta (CMOH) had not been made independently by the CMOH, but
rather implemented decisions that had actually been made by the Cabinet of Alberta.
1Plaintiff’s submissions dated August 30, 2024 at para. 33; Ingram v. Alberta (Chief Medical Officer of
Health), 2023 ABKB 453.
First, the plaintiff has not pleaded—nor has the plaintiff ever previously suggested, at
any point since commencing this action some 43 months ago—that the PHO did not
make her orders independently. Perhaps anticipating this objection, the plaintiff says
there was “witness testimony, cross-examination, and discovery” in Ingram but none of
this “is available in the pre-certification procedure in British Columbia”.2 In this
submission the plaintiff is precisely backwards. Pleadings always come before
discovery. Discovery is not a fishing expedition in which a plaintiff casts around for facts
that can later be pleaded. Rather, the pleadings control the scope of discovery. As
McLachlin C.J.C. emphasized for a unanimous Court in Imperial Tobacco, a plaintiff
cannot rely on the possibility that more facts may turn up later:
It is incumbent on the claimant to clearly plead the facts upon which it relies in
making its claim. A claimant is not entitled to rely on the possibility that new
facts may turn up as the case progresses. The claimant may not be in a
position to prove the facts pleaded at the time of the motion [to strike]. It may
only hope to be able to prove them. But plead them it must. The facts pleaded
are the firm basis upon which the possibility of success of the claim must be
evaluated.3
To be clear, this is not an invitation for the plaintiff to deliver yet another proposed
amended pleading, which is already in its eighth iteration.4 The plaintiff has had ample
opportunity to develop its theory of the case. The time for the plaintiff to propose
amendments has long passed.
Second, and in any event, even if the plaintiff had pleaded that the PHO did not make
her orders independently, there would be no basis in fact for that allegation. The
evidence is that the PHO regularly briefed Cabinet and various deputy ministers to
provide updates on “the current state of COVID-19 and the epidemiological situation in
British Columbia”.5 This should come as no surprise: under the Public Health Act, it is
part of the PHO’s role to advise public officials on public health issues.
The plaintiff’s late-breaking, unpleaded, and wholly speculative suggestion that there
may have been “political involvement” in the PHO’s orders does not change anything.
The certification application should be dismissed and the action should be dismissed
pursuant to R. 9-5.
Yours truly,
Emily Lapper
Legal Counsel