Full download ebooks at https://ebookmeta.

com

Principles and Practice of Marketing 10th

Edition Fiona Ellis-Chadwick

For dowload this book click link below

https://ebookmeta.com/product/principles-and-practice-of-
marketing-10th-edition-fiona-ellis-chadwick/

OR CLICK BUTTON

DOWLOAD NOW
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Entrepreneurship Marketing Principles and Practice of

SME Marketing 2nd Edition Sonny Nwankwo

https://ebookmeta.com/product/entrepreneurship-marketing-
principles-and-practice-of-sme-marketing-2nd-edition-sonny-
nwankwo/

Principles and Practice of Marketing 9th Edition David

Jobber

https://ebookmeta.com/product/principles-and-practice-of-
marketing-9th-edition-david-jobber/

Social Marketing Principles and Practice for Delivering

Global Change 4th Edition Gerard Hastings

https://ebookmeta.com/product/social-marketing-principles-and-
practice-for-delivering-global-change-4th-edition-gerard-
hastings/

Principles of Microeconomics 10th Edition Mankiw

https://ebookmeta.com/product/principles-of-microeconomics-10th-
edition-mankiw/
Educational Psychology: Developing Learners (10th
Edition) Jeanne Ellis Ormrod

https://ebookmeta.com/product/educational-psychology-developing-
learners-10th-edition-jeanne-ellis-ormrod/

Principles of Marketing, 19th Global Edition Philip

Kotler

https://ebookmeta.com/product/principles-of-marketing-19th-
global-edition-philip-kotler/

How to revise and practice 2nd Edition Fiona Mcpherson

https://ebookmeta.com/product/how-to-revise-and-practice-2nd-
edition-fiona-mcpherson/

Principles of Marketing 1st Edition Dr. Maria Gomez

Albrecht

https://ebookmeta.com/product/principles-of-marketing-1st-
edition-dr-maria-gomez-albrecht/

Cancer of the Breast From Cancer Principles and

Practice of Oncology 10th Edition Vincent T Devita
Theodore S Lawrence Steven A Rosenberg

https://ebookmeta.com/product/cancer-of-the-breast-from-cancer-
principles-and-practice-of-oncology-10th-edition-vincent-t-
devita-theodore-s-lawrence-steven-a-rosenberg/
 page i

Tenth Edition

Principles and Practice of

Marketing

David Jobber and

Fiona Ellis-Chadwick

page ii
 page iii

Tenth Edition

Principles and Practice of

Marketing

David Jobber and

Fiona Ellis-Chadwick
 page iv

Principles and Practice of Marketing, Tenth Edition

David Jobber and Fiona Ellis-Chadwick

ISBN-13 9781526849533
ISBN-10 1526849534

Published by McGraw-Hill Education (UK) Limited

Unit 4, Foundation Park,
Roxborough Way,
Maidenhead
SL6 3UD
T: +44 (0) 1628 502500
Website: www.mheducation.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

The Library of Congress data for this book has been applied for from the Library of
Congress

Portfolio Manager: Sabrina Farrugia

Content Developer: Maggie du Randt
Content Product Manager: Ali Davis
Marketing Manager: Ros Letellier

Text design by Kamae Design

Cover design by Adam Renvoize
Printed and bound in the UK by Bell and Bain Ltd, Glasgow

Published by McGraw-Hill Education. Copyright © 2024 by McGraw-Hill Education.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in
any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the
prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education, including, but not limited to, in any
network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance
learning.

Fictitious names of companies, products, people, characters and/or data that may
be used herein (in case studies or in examples) are not intended to represent any
real individual, company, product or event.

ISBN-13 9781526849533
ISBN-10 1526849534
eISBN-13 9781526849540
© 2024. Exclusive rights by McGraw-Hill Education for manufacture and export.
This book cannot be re-exported from the country to which it is sold by McGraw-
Hill Education.
 page v

Dedication
To Jackson, River, Rosie, Molly, Evie and Bohdi.
 page vi

Brief Table of Contents

Detailed Table of Contents vii
Vignettes xi

Case Guide xiii

Preface xvii
Guided Tour xx

Technology to Enhance Learning and Teaching xxiii

About the Authors xxvii
Acknowledgements xxviii

PART 1
Fundamentals of Marketing 1
1 Marketing and the Organization 3

2 The Marketing Environment 41

3 Sustainable Marketing and Society 93

4 Customer Behaviour 133

5 Value Through Relationships 183

6 Digital Marketing Analytics and Customer Insights 215

7 Market Segmentation and Positioning 253

PART 2
Creating Customer Value 303
8 Value Through Brands 305

9 Value Through Pricing 349

10 Value Through Innovation 387

11 Value Through Service 423

PART 3
Communicating and Delivering Customer Value 463
12 Introduction to Marketing Communications 465

13 The Marketing Communications Mix: Mass Communications

503
14 Digital Marketing and Media 555

15 Direct Marketing, Social Media and Direct Messaging 595

16 Place: Distribution, Channel Management and Retailing 639

PART 4
Marketing Planning and Strategy 679
17 Marketing Strategy and Planning 681

18 Analysing Competitors and Creating a Competitive Advantage

717
19 Product Strategy: Lifecycle, Portfolio and Growth 759

20 Global Marketing Strategy 799

21 Managing Marketing Implementation 837

Glossary 875
Company Index 887
Subject Index 896
 page vii

Detailed Table of Contents

Vignettes xi
Case Guide xiii

Preface xvii
Guided Tour xx
Technology to Enhance Learning and Teaching xxiii

About the Authors xxvii

Acknowledgements xxviii

PART 1
Fundamentals of Marketing 1
1 Marketing and the Organization 3
Introduction to Principles and Practice of Marketing 4
What is Marketing? 5
Adopting a Market Orientation in a Changing World 7
Understanding Market-driven Businesses 11
Creating Customer Value, Satisfaction, Loyalty and Relationships 16
Marketing Planning 21
Does Marketing Have All the Answers? 22
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 25
Detailed Review 25
 Key Terms 27
Study Questions 28
Recommended Reading 28
References 28
CASE 1 The Rivalry Between Coca-Cola and Pepsi 31
CASE 2 H&M and Fast Fashion 35

2 The Marketing Environment 41

Technological Forces and the Digital Revolution 43
Economic Forces 48
Political and Legal Forces 57
Legal and Regulatory Responses to Ethical Issues in Marketing 62
The Physical Environmental Forces 62
Culture and Society 66
The Influence of Consumerism and Environmentalism 70
The Microenvironment 72
Monitoring the Marketing Environment 75
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 76
Detailed Review 77
Key Terms 78
Study Questions 78
Recommended Reading 79
References 79
CASE 3 The New [Augmented] Reality for Fashion Retailing 83
CASE 4 Sodastream: Using Environmental Awareness to Reach
Generations X, Y and Z 89

3 Sustainable Marketing and Society 93

The Environment, Society and the Changing Marketing Landscape 95
Sustainability Marketing 96
Practical Approaches Towards Developing Sustainable Marketing Strategies:
Corporate Social Responsibility 113
 Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 119
Detailed Review 119
Key Terms 121
Study Questions 121
Recommended Reading 121
References 122
CASE 5 Mcdonald’s and Its Plan for Environmental Change: Not
Everyone is ‘Lovin’ It’ 125
CASE 6 Unilever: In Pursuit of Purpose 129

4 Customer Behaviour 133

The Changing Context of Consumer Behaviour 134
The Dimensions of Consumer Behaviour 136
Influences on Consumer Behaviour 145
Business-to-Business Customers 153
Why is B2B Marketing Important? 157
People and Processes in Purchasing 159
Influences on Buying Decisions 165
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 167
Detailed Review 167
Key Terms 169
Study Questions 171
Recommended Reading 171
References 172
CASE 7 Coffee Shop Wars 175
CASE 8 Naked Wines: A Community of Winemakers and Wine
Drinkers 178

5 Value Through Relationships 183

Value Creation 184
Value and Relational Networks 187
Key Concepts of Relationship Marketing 189
 Relationship Management and Managing Customer Relationships 192
How to Build Relationships 194
Benefits for the Organization 196
Benefits for the Customer 197
Developing Customer Retention Strategies 198
Customer Relationship Management 201
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 205
Detailed Review 205
Key Terms 206
Study Questions 207
Recommended Reading 207
References 207

page viii

CASE 9 Starbucks: Brewing Great Customer Experiences Through

Outstanding Digital Marketing 210
CASE 10 Manchester City Football Club: Co-Creating the Future
212
6 Digital Marketing Analytics and Customer Insights 215
Digital Marketing Analytics: Goals, Performance and Measurement 216
Customer Insights and Data-driven Marketing 222
Marketing and Research 224
The Market Research Process 225
Ethical Issues in Marketing Research, Analytics and Customer Insights 238
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 240
Detailed Review 241
Key Terms 242
Study Questions 243
Recommended Reading 244
References 244
 CASE 11 Accelerating Market Research: Harley-Davidson Turns to
Albert 246
CASE 12 Hubspot: Harnessing the Power of Artificial Intelligence
for Marketing 250

7 Market Segmentation and Positioning 253

Why Bother to Segment Markets? 254
The Process of Market Segmentation and Target Marketing 256
Segmenting Consumer Markets 257
Segmenting B2B Markets 268
Target Marketing 272
Positioning 279
Building an Effective Marketing Mix 283
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 286
Detailed Review 287
Key Terms 288
Study Questions 289
Recommended Reading 289
References 289
CASE 13 Unleashing the Power of Nablabs 293
CASE 14 Boots: Managing Own-Label Products and Their
Positioning Within a Changing Environment and Dynamic
Market(s) 297

PART 2
Creating Customer Value 303
8 Value Through Brands 305
Products and Brands 306
The Product Line and Product Mix 307
Brand Types 307
 Why Strong Brands are Important 308
Brand Equity 312
Brand Building 314
Key Branding Decisions 320
Global Branding 330
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 333
Detailed Review 334
Key Terms 335
Study Questions 336
Recommended Reading 336
References 337
CASE 15 Dr. Martens: Engaging Consumers for More Than Half a
Century 340
CASE 16 Brand Strategy Changes at Burberry 344

9 Value Through Pricing 349

Why an Economist’s Approach to Pricing is Important 351
Cost-orientated Pricing 352
Competitor-orientated Pricing 354
Customer-orientated Pricing 355
Dynamic Pricing 364
Pricing and Marketing Strategy 365
Initiating Price Changes 370
Reacting to Competitors’ Price Changes 372
Big Picture: Key Topics in This Chapter 374
Detailed Review 375
Key Terms 376
Study Questions 376
Recommended Reading 377
References 377
CASE 17 A Recipe for Success: Adding New Innovations to the Pot
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
goodness,” i.e., all His works, only the thirteen middot are
mentioned, because they include those acts of God which refer to
the creation and the government of mankind, and to know these
acts was the principal object of the prayer of Moses. This is shown
by the conclusion of his prayer, “that I may know thee, that I may
find grace in thy sight, and consider that this nation is thy people”
(Exod. xxxiii. 16), that is to say, the people whom I have to rule by
certain acts in the performance of which I must be guided by Thy
own acts in governing them. We have thus shown that “the ways”
used in the Bible, and “middot” used in the Mishnah, are identical,
denoting the acts emanating from God in reference to the universe.

Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe to

God that emotion which is the source of the act when performed by
ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from the verb
expressing that emotion. We see, e.g., how well He provides for the
life of the embryo of living beings; how He endows with certain
faculties both the embryo itself and those who have to rear it after
its birth, in order that it may be protected from death and
destruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in the
performance of all that is required [for its development]. Similar
acts, when performed by us, are due to a certain emotion and
tenderness called mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to be
merciful; e.g., “Like as a father is merciful to his children, so the Lord
is merciful to them that fear Him” (Ps. ciii. 13); “And I will spare
them, as a man spareth (yaḥamol) his own son that serveth him”
(Mal. iii. 17). Such instances do not imply that God is influenced by a
feeling of mercy, but that acts similar to those which a father
performs for his son, out of pity, mercy and real affection, emanate
from God solely for the benefit of His pious men, and are by no
means the result of any impression or change—[produced in God].—
When we give something to a person who has no claim upon us, we
perform an act of grace; e.g., “Grant them graciously unto us”
(Judges xxi. 22). [The same term is used in reference to God, e.g.]
“which God hath graciously given” (Gen. xxxiii. 5); “Because God
hath dealt graciously with me” (ib. 11). Instances of this kind are
numerous. God creates and guides beings who have no claim upon
Him to be created and guided by Him; He is therefore called
gracious (ḥannun).—His actions towards mankind also include great
calamities, which overtake individuals and bring death to them, or
affect whole families and even entire regions, spread death, destroy
generation after generation, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence
there occur inundations, earthquakes, destructive storms,
expeditions of one nation against the other for the sake of
destroying it with the sword and blotting out its memory, and many
other evils of the same kind. Whenever such evils are caused by us
to any person, [77]they originate in great anger, violent jealousy, or a
desire for revenge. God is therefore called, because of these acts,
“jealous,” “revengeful,” “wrathful,” and “keeping anger” (Nah. i. 2);
that is to say, He performs acts similar to those which, when
performed by us, originate in certain psychical dispositions, in
jealousy, desire for retaliation, revenge, or anger; they are in
accordance with the guilt of those who are to be punished, and not
the result of any emotion; for He is above all defect! The same is the
case with all divine acts; though resembling those acts which
emanate from our passions and psychical dispositions, they are not
due to anything superadded to His essence.—The governor of a
country, if he is a prophet, should conform to these attributes. Acts
[of punishment] must be performed by him moderately and in
accordance with justice, not merely as an outlet of his passion. He
must not let loose his anger, nor allow his passion to overcome him;
for all passions are bad, and they must be guarded against as far as
it lies in man’s power. At times and towards some persons he must
be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of mercy and
compassion, but according to their merits; at other times and
towards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath in
proportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He must
be able to condemn a person to death by fire without anger, passion,
or loathing against him, and must exclusively be guided by what he
perceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense of the great
benefit which a large number will derive from such a sentence. You
have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how the commandment to
annihilate the seven nations, and “to save alive nothing that
breatheth” (Deut. xx. 16) is followed immediately by the words,
“That they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which
they have done unto their gods; so should you sin against the Lord
your God” (ib. 18); that is to say, you shall not think that this
commandment implies an act of cruelty or of retaliation; it is an act
demanded by the tendency of man to remove everything that might
turn him away from the right path, and to clear away all obstacles in
the road to perfection, that is, to the knowledge of God.
Nevertheless, acts of mercy, pardon, pity, and grace should more
frequently be performed by the governor of a country than acts of
punishment; seeing that all the thirteen middoth of God are
attributes of mercy with only one exception, namely, “visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children” (Exod. xxxiv. 7); for the
meaning of the preceding attribute (in the original ve-nakkeh lo
yenakkeh) is “and he will not utterly destroy”; (and not “He will by
no means clear the guilty”); comp. “And she will be utterly destroyed
(ve-nikketah), she shall sit upon the ground” (Isa. iii. 26). When it is
said that God is visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children,
this refers exclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no other sin. That
this is the case may be inferred from what is said in the ten
commandments, “upon the third and fourth generation of my
enemies” (Exod. xx. 5), none except idolaters being called “enemy”;
comp. also “every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth” (Deut.
xii. 31). It was, however, considered sufficient to extend the
punishment to the fourth generation, because the fourth generation
is the utmost a man can see of his posterity; and when, therefore,
the idolaters of a place are destroyed, the old man worshipping idols
is killed, his son, his grandson, and his great-grandson, that is, the
fourth generation. [78]By the mention of this attribute we are, as it
were, told that His commandments, undoubtedly in harmony with
His acts, include the death even of the little children of idolaters
because of the sin of their fathers and grandfathers. This principle
we find frequently applied in the Law, as, e.g., we read concerning
the city that has been led astray to idolatry, “destroy it utterly, and
all that is therein” (Deut. xiii. 15). All this has been ordained in order
that every vestige of that which would lead to great injury should be
blotted out, as we have explained.

We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but we
have shown why it has been considered sufficient to mention only
these (thirteen) out of all His acts; namely, because they are
required for the good government of a country; for the chief aim of
man should be to make himself, as far as possible, similar to God:
that is to say, to make his acts similar to the acts of God, or as our
Sages expressed it in explaining the verse, “Ye shall be holy” (Lev.
xxi. 2): “He is gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so
be you also merciful.”

The principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributes
ascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply that God
has any qualities.

[Contents]
 CHAPTER LV
We have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise that
everything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to be
negatived in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change;
and the agent producing that state is undoubtedly different from the
object affected by it; and if God could be affected in any way
whatever, another being beside Him would act on Him and cause
change in Him. All kinds of non-existence must likewise be negatived
in reference to Him; no perfection whatever can therefore be
imagined to be at one time absent from Him, and at another present
in Him: for if this were the case, He would [at a certain time] only be
potentially perfect. Potentiality always implies non-existence, and
when anything has to pass from potentiality into reality, another
thing that exists in reality is required to effect that transition. Hence
it follows that all perfections must really exist in God, and none of
them must in any way be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise
to be denied in reference to God, is similarity to any existing being.
This has been generally accepted, and is also mentioned in the
books of the Prophets; e.g., “To whom, then, will you liken me?”
(Isa. xl. 25); “To whom, then, will you liken God?” (ib. 18); “There is
none like unto Thee” (Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind are frequent.
In short, it is necessary to demonstrate by proof that nothing can be
predicated of God that implies any of the following four things:
corporeality, emotion or change, non-existence,—e.g., that
something would be potential at one time and real at another—and
similarity with any of His creatures. In this respect our knowledge of
God is aided by the study of Natural Science. For he who is ignorant
of the latter cannot understand the defect implied in emotions, the
difference between potentiality and reality, the non-existence implied
in all potentiality, the inferiority of a thing that exists in potentiâ to
that which moves in order to cause its transition from potentiality
into reality, and the [79]inferiority of that which moves for this
purpose compared with its condition when the transition has been
effected. He who knows these things, but without their proofs, does
not know the details which logically result from these general
propositions; and therefore he cannot prove that God exists, or that
the [four] things mentioned above are inadmissible in reference to
God.

Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapter

the error of those who believe that God has essential attributes;
those who have some knowledge of Logic and Natural Science will
understand it.

[Contents]
 CHAPTER LVI
Similarity is based on a certain relation between two things; if
between two things no relation can be found, there can be no
similarity between them, and there is no relation between two things
that have no similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say this heat is
similar to that colour, or this voice is similar to that sweetness. This
is self-evident. Since the existence of a relation between God and
man, or between Him and other beings has been denied, similarity
must likewise be denied. You must know that two things of the same
kind—i.e., whose essential properties are the same, and which are
distinguished from each other by greatness and smallness, strength
and weakness, etc.—are necessarily similar, though different in this
one way; e.g., a grain of mustard and the sphere of the fixed stars
are similar as regards the three dimensions, although the one is
exceedingly great, the other exceedingly small, the property of
having [three] dimensions is the same in both; or the heat of wax
melted by the sun and the heat of the element of fire, are similar as
regards heat; although the heat is exceedingly great in the one case,
and exceedingly small in the other, the existence of that quality
(heat) is the same in both. Thus those who believe in the presence
of essential attributes in God, viz., Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom,
and Will, should know that these attributes, when applied to God,
have not the same meaning as when applied to us, and that the
difference does not only consist in magnitude, or in the degree of
perfection, stability, and durability. It cannot be said, as they
practically believe, that His existence is only more stable, His life
more permanent, His power greater, His wisdom more perfect, and
His will more general than ours, and that the same definition applies
to both. This is in no way admissible, for the expression “more than”
is used in comparing two things as regards a certain attribute
predicated of both of them in exactly the same sense, and
consequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].
When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-called
essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes of
other things, and should according to their own opinion not be
included in one of the same definition, just as there is no similarity
between the essence of God and that of other beings. They do not
follow this principle, for they hold that one definition may include
them, and that, nevertheless, there is no similarity between them.
Those who are familiar with the meaning of similarity will certainly
understand that the term existence, when applied to God and to
other beings, is perfectly homonymous. In like manner, the terms
Wisdom, Power, Will, and Life are applied to God and to other beings
by way of perfect homonymity, admitting [80]of no comparison
whatever. Nor must you think that these attributes are employed as
hybrid terms; for hybrid terms are such as are applied to two things
which have a similarity to each other in respect to a certain property
which is in both of them an accident, not an essential, constituent
element. The attributes of God, however, are not considered as
accidental by any intelligent person, while all attributes applied to
man are accidents, according to the Mutakallemim. I am therefore at
a loss to see how they can find any similarity [between the attributes
of God and those of man]; how their definitions can be identical, and
their significations the same! This is a decisive proof that there is, in
no way or sense, anything common to the attributes predicated of
God, and those used in reference to ourselves; they have only the
same names, and nothing else is common to them. Such being the
case, it is not proper to believe, on account of the use of the same
attributes, that there is in God something additional to His essence,
in the same way as attributes are joined to our essence. This is most
important for those who understand it. Keep it in memory, and study
it thoroughly, in order to be well prepared for that which I am going
to explain to you.
[Contents]
 CHAPTER LVII
On attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding. It is
known that existence is an accident appertaining to all things, and
therefore an element superadded to their essence. This must
evidently be the case as regards everything the existence of which is
due to some cause; its existence is an element superadded to its
essence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to any
cause—God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said, is
absolute—existence and essence are perfectly identical; He is not a
substance to which existence is joined as an accident, as an
additional element. His existence is always absolute, and has never
been a new element or an accident in Him. Consequently God exists
without possessing the attribute of existence. Similarly He lives,
without possessing the attribute of life; knows, without possessing
the attribute of knowledge; is omnipotent without possessing the
attribute of omnipotence; is wise, without possessing the attribute of
wisdom; all this reduces itself to one and the same entity; there is
no plurality in Him, as will be shown. It is further necessary to
consider that unity and plurality are accidents supervening to an
object according as it consists of many elements or of one. This is
fully explained in the book called Metaphysics. In the same way as
number is not the substance of the things numbered, so is unity not
the substance of the thing which has the attribute of unity, for unity
and plurality are accidents belonging to the category of discrete
quantity, and supervening to such objects as are capable of receiving
them.

To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence,

and in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity is as
inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God’s unity is
not an element superadded, but He is One without possessing the
attribute of unity. The investigation of this subject, which is almost
too subtle for our understanding, must not be based on current
expressions employed in describing it, for these [81]are the great
source of error. It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in any
language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject, and we can
only employ inadequate language. In our endeavour to show that
God does not include a plurality, we can only say “He is one,”
although “one” and “many” are both terms which serve to
distinguish quantity. We therefore make the subject clearer, and
show to the understanding the way of truth by saying He is one but
does not possess the attribute of unity.

The same is the case when we say God is the First (Kadmon), to
express that He has not been created; the term “First” is decidedly
inaccurate, for it can in its true sense only be applied to a being that
is subject to the relation of time; the latter, however, is an accident
to motion which again is connected with a body. Besides the
attribute “first” is a relative term, being in regard to time the same
as the terms “long” and “short” are in regard to a line. Both
expressions, “first” and “created,” are equally inadmissible in
reference to any being to which the attribute of time is not
applicable, just as we do not say “crooked” or “straight” in reference
to taste, “salted” or “insipid” in reference to the voice. These
subjects are not unknown to those who have accustomed
themselves to seek a true understanding of the things, and to
establish their properties in accordance with the abstract notions
which the mind has formed of them, and who are not misled by the
inaccuracy of the words employed. All attributes, such as “the First,”
“the Last,” occurring in the Scriptures in reference to God, are as
metaphorical as the expressions “ear” and “eye.” They simply signify
that God is not subject to any change or innovation whatever; they
do not imply that God can be described by time, or that there is any
comparison between Him and any other being as regards time, and
that He is called on that account “the first” and “the last.” In short,
all similar expressions are borrowed from the language commonly
used among the people. In the same way we use “One” in reference
to God, to express that there is nothing similar to Him, but we do
not mean to say that an attribute of unity is added to His essence.

[Contents]
 CHAPTER LVIII
This chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that
the negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not
include any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference
to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are
inadequate, as we have already shown. It is now necessary to
explain how negative expressions can in a certain sense be
employed as attributes, and how they are distinguished from positive
attributes. Then I shall show that we cannot describe the Creator by
any means except by negative attributes. An attribute does not
exclusively belong to the one object to which it is related; while
qualifying one thing, it can also be employed to qualify other things,
and is in that case not peculiar to that one thing. E.g., if you see an
object from a distance, and on enquiring what it is, are told that it is
a living being, you have certainly learnt an attribute of the object
seen, and although that attribute does not exclusively belong to the
object perceived, it expresses that the object is not a plant or a
mineral. Again, if a man is in a certain house, and [82]you know that
something is in the house, but not exactly what, you ask what is in
that house, and you are told, not a plant nor a mineral. You have
thereby obtained some special knowledge of the thing; you have
learnt that it is a living being, although you do not yet know what
kind of a living being it is. The negative attributes have this in
common with the positive, that they necessarily circumscribe the
object to some extent, although such circumscription consists only in
the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded. In the
following point, however, the negative attributes are distinguished
from the positive. The positive attributes, although not peculiar to
one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know, either some
part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative attributes,
on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the thing which
we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it be
indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.

After this introduction, I would observe that,—as has already been

shown—God’s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition,
as will be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He
exists, not His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold
that He has any positive attribute; for He does not possess existence
in addition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that the one
may be described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He
[in addition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two
constituent elements to which the attribute could refer; still less has
He accidents, which could be described by an attribute. Hence it is
clear that He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative
attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the
mind to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on
the one hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other,
they convey to man the highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it
has been established by proof that some being must exist besides
those things which can be perceived by the senses, or apprehended
by the mind; when we say of this being, that it exists, we mean that
its non-existence is impossible. We then perceive that such a being
is not, for instance, like the four elements, which are inanimate, and
we therefore say that it is living, expressing thereby that it is not
dead. We call such a being incorporeal, because we notice that it is
unlike the heavens, which are living, but material. Seeing that it is
also different from the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living,
owes its existence to some cause, we say it is the first, expressing
thereby that its existence is not due to any cause. We further notice,
that the existence, that is the essence, of this being is not limited to
its own existence; many existences emanate from it, and its
influence is not like that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the
sun in sending forth light, but consists in constantly giving them
stability and order by well-established rule, as we shall show: we
say, on that account, it has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not
feeble or ignorant, or hasty, and does not abandon its creatures;
when we say that it is not feeble, we mean that its existence is
capable of producing the existence of many other things; by saying
that it is not ignorant, we mean “it perceives” or “it lives,”—for
everything that perceives is living—by saying “it is not hasty, and
does not abandon its creatures,” we mean that all these creatures
preserve a certain order and arrangement; they are not left to
[83]themselves; they are not produced aimlessly, but whatever
condition they receive from that being is given with design and
intention. We thus learn that there is no other being like unto God,
and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods than one.

It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either
denotes the quality of an action, or—when the attribute is intended
to convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions
—the negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributes must
not be formed and applied to God, except in the way in which, as
you know, sometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a
thing, although that attribute can naturally never be applied to it in
the same sense, as, e.g., we say, “This wall does not see.” Those
who read the present work are aware that, notwithstanding all the
efforts of the mind, we can obtain no knowledge of the essence of
the heavens—a revolving substance which has been measured by us
in spans and cubits, and examined even as regards the proportions
of the several spheres to each other and respecting most of their
motions—although we know that they must consist of matter and
form; but the matter not being the same as sublunary matter, we
can only describe the heavens in terms expressing negative
properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus we say
that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and therefore
not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the
sensations of taste and smell; or we use similar negative attributes.
All this we do, because we do not know their substance. What, then,
can be the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge
of a Being that is free from substance, that is most simple, whose
existence is absolute, and not due to any cause, to whose perfect
essence nothing can be superadded, and whose perfection consists,
as we have shown, in the absence of all defects. All we understand
is the fact that He exists, that He is a Being to whom none of His
creatures is similar, who has nothing in common with them, who
does not include plurality, who is never too feeble to produce other
beings, and whose relation to the universe is that of a steersman to
a boat; and even this is not a real relation, a real simile, but serves
only to convey to us the idea that God rules the universe; that is,
that He gives it duration, and preserves its necessary arrangement.
This subject will be treated more fully. Praised be He! In the
contemplation of His essence, our comprehension and knowledge
prove insufficient; in the examination of His works, how they
necessarily result from His will, our knowledge proves to be
ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all our
efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure!

[Contents]
 CHAPTER LIX
The following question might perhaps be asked: Since there is no
possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God, and
since it has also been proved that the only thing that man can
apprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positive
attributes are inadmissible, as has been shown; what is the
difference among those who have obtained a knowledge of God?
Must not the knowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and by
Solomon, be the same as that obtained by any one of the lowest
class of philosophers, since [84]there can be no addition to this
knowledge? But, on the other hand, it is generally accepted among
theologians and also among philosophers, that there can be a great
difference between two persons as regards the knowledge of God
obtained by them. Know that this is really the case, that those who
have obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from each other;
for in the same way as by each additional attribute an object is more
specified, and is brought nearer to the true apprehension of the
observer, so by each additional negative attribute you advance
toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he who
does not negative, in reference to God, those qualities which you are
convinced by proof must be negatived. There may thus be a man
who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuit of one
science, and to the true understanding of its principles, till he is fully
convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result of this study
the conviction that a certain quality must be negatived in reference
to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it is impossible to
apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have no proof for this, will
doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in the Creator, or not? And
those who are deprived of sight will positively ascribe it to God,
although it has been clearly shown that He does not possess it. E.g.,
while I show that God is incorporeal, another doubts and is not
certain whether He is corporeal or incorporeal; others even positively
declare that He is corporeal, and appear before the Lord with that
belief. Now see how great the difference is between these three
men; the first is undoubtedly nearest to the Almighty; the second is
remote, and the third still more distant from Him. If there be a
fourth person who holds himself convinced by proof that emotions
are impossible in God, while the first who rejects the corporeality, is
not convinced of that impossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly
nearer the knowledge of God than the first, and so on, so that a
person who, convinced by proof, negatives a number of things in
reference to God, which according to our belief may possibly be in
Him or emanate from Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than
we are, and would surpass us still more if we positively believed
these things to be properties of God. It will now be clear to you, that
every time you establish by proof the negation of a thing in
reference to God, you become more perfect, while with every
additional positive assertion you follow your imagination and recede
from the true knowledge of God. Only by such ways must we
approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches and studies
as would show us the inapplicability of what is inadmissible as
regards the Creator, not by such methods as would prove the
necessity of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to His essence, or
asserting that He has a certain perfection, when we find it to be a
perfection in relation to us. The perfections are all to some extent
acquired properties, and a property which must be acquired does
not exist in everything capable of making such acquisition.

You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you are
removed from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, is only
a perfection in relation to us; secondly, He does not possess
anything superadded to this essence; His essence includes all His
perfections, as we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact that
even that knowledge of God which is accessible to man cannot be
attained except by negations, and that negations [85]do not convey a
true idea of the being to which they refer, all people, both of past
and present generations, declared that God cannot be the object of
human comprehension, that none but Himself comprehends what He
is, and that our knowledge consists in knowing that we are unable
truly to comprehend Him. All philosophers say, “He has overpowered
us by His grace, and is invisible to us through the intensity of His
light,” like the sun which cannot be perceived by eyes which are too
weak to bear its rays. Much more has been said on this topic, but it
is useless to repeat it here. The idea is best expressed in the book of
Psalms, “Silence is praise to Thee” (lxv. 2). It is a very expressive
remark on this subject; for whatever we utter with the intention of
extolling and of praising Him, contains something that cannot be
applied to God, and includes derogatory expressions; it is therefore
more becoming to be silent, and to be content with intellectual
reflection, as has been recommended by men of the highest culture,
in the words “Commune with your own heart upon your bed, and be
still” (Ps. iv. 4). You must surely know the following celebrated
passage in the Talmud—would that all passages in the Talmud were
like that!—although it is known to you, I quote it literally, as I wish
to point out to you the ideas contained in it: “A certain person,
reading prayers in the presence of Rabbi Ḥaninah, said, ‘God, the
great, the valiant and the tremendous, the powerful, the strong, and
the mighty.’—The rabbi said to him, Have you finished all the praises
of your Master? The three epithets, ‘God, the great, the valiant and
the tremendous,’ we should not have applied to God, had Moses not
mentioned them in the Law, and had not the men of the Great
Synagogue come forward subsequently and established their use in
the prayer; and you say all this! Let this be illustrated by a parable.
There was once an earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin; he
was praised for owning millions of silver coin; was this not really
dispraise to him?” Thus far the opinion of the pious rabbi. Consider,
first, how repulsive and annoying the accumulation of all these
positive attributes was to him; next, how he showed that, if we had
only to follow our reason, we should never have composed these
prayers, and we should not have uttered any of them. It has,
however, become necessary to address men in words that should
leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordance with the saying
of our Sages, “The Torah speaks in the language of men,” the
Creator has been described to us in terms of our own perfections;
but we should not on that account have uttered any other than the
three above-mentioned attributes, and we should not have used
them as names of God except when meeting with them in reading
the Law. Subsequently, the men of the Great Synagogue, who were
prophets, introduced these expressions also into the prayer, but we
should not on that account use [in our prayers] any other attributes
of God. The principal lesson to be derived from this passage is that
there are two reasons for our employing those phrases in our
prayers: first, they occur in the Pentateuch; secondly, the Prophets
introduced them into the prayer. Were it not for the first reason, we
should never have uttered them; and were it not for the second
reason, we should not have copied them from the Pentateuch to
recite them in our prayers; how then could we approve of the use of
those numerous attributes! You also learn from this that we ought
not to mention and employ in our prayers all the attributes we find
applied [86]to God in the books of the Prophets; for he does not say,
“Were it not that Moses, our Teacher, said them, we should not have
been able to use them”; but he adds another condition—“and had
not the men of the Great Synagogue come forward and established
their use in the prayer,” because only for that reason are we allowed
to use them in our prayers. We cannot approve of what those foolish
persons do who are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in the
prayers they compose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to
approach the Creator. They describe God in attributes which would
be an offence if applied to a human being; for those persons have
no knowledge of these great and important principles, which are not
accessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creator
as a familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in any
expressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praise
Him in that manner, and believe that they can thereby influence Him
and produce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suited to
their object in the words of the Prophets they are still more inclined
to consider that they are free to make use of such texts—which
should at least be explained—to employ them in their literal sense,
to derive new expressions from them, to form from them numerous
variations, and to found whole compositions on them. This license is
frequently met with in the compositions of the singers, preachers,
and others who imagine themselves to be able to compose a poem.
Such authors write things which partly are real heresy, partly contain
such folly and absurdity that they naturally cause those who hear
them to laugh, but also to feel grieved at the thought that such
things can be uttered in reference to God. Were it not that I pitied
the authors for their defects, and did not wish to injure them, I
should have cited some passages to show you their mistakes;
besides, the fault of their compositions is obvious to all intelligent
persons. You must consider it, and think thus: If slander and libel is
a great sin, how much greater is the sin of those who speak with
looseness of tongue in reference to God, and describe Him by
attributes which are far below Him; and I declare that they not only
commit an ordinary sin, but unconsciously at least incur the guilt of
profanity and blasphemy. This applies both to the multitude that
listens to such prayers, and to the foolish man that recites them.
Men, however, who understand the fault of such compositions, and,
nevertheless, recite them, may be classed, according to my opinion,
among those to whom the following words are applied: “And the
children of Israel used words that were not right against the Lord
their God” (2 Kings xvii. 9); and “utter error against the Lord” (Isa.
xxxii. 6). If you are of those who regard the honour of their Creator,
do not listen in any way to them, much less utter what they say, and
still less compose such prayers, knowing how great is the offence of
one who hurls aspersions against the Supreme Being. There is no
necessity at all for you to use positive attributes of God with the
view of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond the limits
which the men of the Great Synagogue have introduced in the
prayers and in the blessings, for this is sufficient for all purposes,
and even more than sufficient, as Rabbi Ḥaninah said. Other
attributes, such as occur in the books of the Prophets, may be
uttered when we meet with them in reading those books; but we
must bear in mind what has already been explained, that they are
either attributes of God’s actions, or expressions [87]implying the
negation of the opposite. This likewise should not be divulged to the
multitude; but a reflection of this kind is fitted for the few only who
believe that the glorification of God does not consist in uttering that
which is not to be uttered, but in reflecting on that on which man
should reflect.

We will now conclude our exposition of the wise words of R.

Ḥaninah. He does not employ any such simile as: “A king who
possesses millions of gold denarii, and is praised as having
hundreds”; for this would imply that God’s perfections, although
more perfect than those ascribed to man are still of the same kind;
but this is not the case, as has been proved. The excellence of the
simile consists in the words: “who possesses golden denarii, and is
praised as having silver denarii”; this implies that these attributes,
though perfections as regards ourselves, are not such as regards
God; in reference to Him they would all be defects, as is distinctly
suggested in the remark, “Is this not an offence to Him?”

I have already told you that all these attributes, whatever perfection
they may denote according to your idea, imply defects in reference
to God, if applied to Him in the same sense as they are used in
reference to ourselves. Solomon has already given us sufficient
instruction on this subject by saying, “For God is in heaven, and thou
upon earth; therefore let thy words be few” (Eccles. v. 2).

[Contents]
 CHAPTER LX
I will give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order that you
may better understand the propriety of forming as many negative
attributes as possible, and the impropriety of ascribing to God any
positive attributes. A person may know for certain that a “ship” is in
existence, but he may not know to what object that name is applied,
whether to a substance or to an accident; a second person then
learns that the ship is not an accident; a third, that it is not a
mineral; a fourth, that it is not a plant growing in the earth; a fifth,
that it is not a body whose parts are joined together by nature; a
sixth, that it is not a flat object like boards or doors; a seventh, that
it is not a sphere; an eighth, that it is not pointed; a ninth, that it is
not round-shaped; nor equilateral; a tenth, that it is not solid. It is
clear that this tenth person has almost arrived at the correct notion
of a “ship” by the foregoing negative attributes, as if he had exactly
the same notion as those have who imagine it to be a wooden
substance which is hollow, long, and composed of many pieces of
wood, that is to say, who know it by positive attributes. Of the other
persons in our illustration, each one is more remote from the correct
notion of a ship than the next mentioned, so that the first knows
nothing about it but the name. In the same manner you will come
nearer to the knowledge and comprehension of God by the negative
attributes. But you must be careful, in what you negative, to
negative by proof, not by mere words, for each time you ascertain
by proof that a certain thing, believed to exist in the Creator, must
be negatived, you have undoubtedly come one step nearer to the
knowledge of God.

It is in this sense that some men come very near to God, and others
remain exceedingly remote from Him, not in the sense of those who
are deprived of vision, and believe that God occupies a place, which
man can physically [88]approach or from which he can recede.
Examine this well, know it, and be content with it. The way which
will bring you nearer to God has been clearly shown to you; walk in
it, if you have the desire. On the other hand, there is a great danger
in applying positive attributes to God. For it has been shown that
every perfection we could imagine, even if existing in God in
accordance with the opinion of those who assert the existence of
attributes, would in reality not be of the same kind as that imagined
by us, but would only be called by the same name, according to our
explanation; it would in fact amount to a negation. Suppose, e.g.,
you say He has knowledge, and that knowledge, which admits of no
change and of no plurality, embraces many changeable things; His
knowledge remains unaltered, while new things are constantly
formed, and His knowledge of a thing before it exists, while it exists,
and when it has ceased to exist, is the same without the least
change: you would thereby declare that His knowledge is not like
ours; and similarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus
necessarily arrive at some negation, without obtaining a true
conception of an essential attribute; on the contrary, you are led to
assume that there is a plurality in God, and to believe that He,
though one essence, has several unknown attributes. For if you
intend to affirm them, you cannot compare them with those
attributes known by us, and they are consequently not of the same
kind. You are, as it were, brought by the belief in the reality of the
attributes, to say that God is one subject of which several things are
predicated; though the subject is not like ordinary subjects, and the
predicates are not like ordinary predicates. This belief would
ultimately lead us to associate other things with God, and not to
believe that He is One. For of every subject certain things can
undoubtedly be predicated, and although in reality subject and
predicate are combined in one thing, by the actual definition they
consist of two elements, the notion contained in the subject not
being the same as that contained in the predicate. In the course of
this treatise it will be proved to you that God cannot be a compound,
and that He is simple in the strictest sense of the word.

I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God has

not sufficient knowledge concerning the Creator, admits some
association with God, or conceives Him to be different from what He
is; but I say that he unconsciously loses his belief in God. For he
whose knowledge concerning a thing is insufficient, understands one
part of it while he is ignorant of the other, as, e.g., a person who
knows that man possesses life, but does not know that man
possesses understanding; but in reference to God, in whose real
existence there is no plurality, it is impossible that one thing should
be known, and another unknown. Similarly he who associates an
object with [the properties of] another object, conceives a true and
correct notion of the one object, and applies that notion also to the
other; while those who admit the attributes of God, do not consider
them as identical with His essence, but as extraneous elements.
Again, he who conceives an incorrect notion of an object, must
necessarily have a correct idea of the object to some extent; he,
however, who says that taste belongs to the category of quantity has
not, according to my opinion, an incorrect notion of taste, but is
entirely ignorant of its nature, for he does not know to what object
the term “taste” is to be applied.—This is a very difficult subject;
consider it well. [89]

According to this explanation you will understand, that those who do

not recognize, in reference to God, the negation of things, which
others negative by clear proof, are deficient in the knowledge of
God, and are remote from comprehending Him. Consequently, the
smaller the number of things is which a person can negative in
relation to God, the less he knows of Him, as has been explained in
the beginning of this chapter; but the man who affirms an attribute
of God, knows nothing but the same; for the object to which, in his
imagination, he applies that name, does not exist; it is a mere fiction
and invention, as if he applied that name to a non-existing being, for
there is, in reality, no such object. E.g., some one has heard of the
elephant, and knows that it is an animal, and wishes to know its
form and nature. A person, who is either misled or misleading, tells
him it is an animal with one leg, three wings, lives in the depth of
the sea, has a transparent body; its face is wide like that of a man,
has the same form and shape, speaks like a man, flies sometimes in
the air, and sometimes swims like a fish. I should not say, that he
described the elephant incorrectly, or that he has an insufficient
knowledge of the elephant, but I would say that the thing thus
described is an invention and fiction, and that in reality there exists
nothing like it; it is a non-existing being, called by the name of a
really existing being, and like the griffin, the centaur, and similar
imaginary combinations for which simple and compound names have
been borrowed from real things. The present case is analogous;
namely, God, praised be His name, exists, and His existence has
been proved to be absolute and perfectly simple, as I shall explain.
If such a simple, absolutely existing essence were said to have
attributes, as has been contended, and were combined with
extraneous elements, it would in no way be an existing thing, as has
been proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which is
called “God,” is a substance with many properties by which it can be
described, we apply that name to an object which does not at all
exist. Consider, therefore, what are the consequences of affirming
attributes to God! As to those attributes of God which occur in the
Pentateuch, or in the books of the Prophets, we must assume that
they are exclusively employed, as has been stated by us, to convey
to us some notion of the perfections of the Creator, or to express
qualities of actions emanating from Him.
[Contents]
 CHAPTER LXI
It is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are
derived from His actions, except one, namely, the Tetragrammaton,
which consists of the letters yod, hé, vau and hé. This name is
applied exclusively to God, and is on that account called Shem ha-
meforash, “The nomen proprium.” It is the distinct and exclusive
designation of the Divine Being; whilst His other names are common
nouns, and are derived from actions, to which some of our own are
similar, as we have already explained. Even the name Adonay,
“Lord,” which has been substituted for the Tetragrammaton, is
derived from the appellative “lord”; comp. “The man who is the lord
(adone) of the land spake roughly to us” (Gen. xliii. 30). The
difference between Adoni, “my lord,” (with ḥirek under the nun), or
Adonay (with kameẓ) is similar to the difference between Sari, “my
prince,” and [90]Saraï, Abraham’s wife (ib. xvi. 1), the latter form
denoting majesty and distinction. An angel is also addressed as
“Adonay”; e.g., “Adonay (My lord), pass not away, I pray thee” (ib.
xviii. 3). I have restricted my explanation to the term Adonay, the
substitute for the Tetragrammaton, because it is more commonly
applied to God than any of the other names which are in frequent
use, like dayyan, “judge,” shadday, “almighty,” ẓaddik, “righteous,”
ḥannun, “gracious,” raḥum “merciful,” and elohim “chief”; all these
terms are unquestionably appellations and derivatives. The
derivation of the name, consisting of yod, hé, vau, and hé, is not
positively known, the word having no additional signification. This
sacred name, which, as you know, was not pronounced except in the
sanctuary by the appointed priests, when they gave the sacerdotal
blessing, and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement,
undoubtedly denotes something which is peculiar to God, and is not
found in any other being. It is possible that in the Hebrew language,
of which we have now but a slight knowledge, the Tetragrammaton,
in the way it was pronounced, conveyed the meaning of “absolute
existence.” In short, the majesty of the name and the great dread of
uttering it, are connected with the fact that it denotes God Himself,
without including in its meaning any names of the things created by
Him. Thus our Sages say: “ ‘My name’ (Num. vi. 27) means the name
which is peculiar to Me.” All other names of God have reference to
qualities, and do not signify a simple substance, but a substance
with attributes, they being derivatives. On that account it is believed
that they imply the presence of a plurality in God, I mean to say, the
presence of attributes, that is, of some extraneous element
superadded to His essence. Such is the meaning of all derivative
names; they imply the presence of some attribute and its
substratum, though this be not distinctly named. As, however, it has
been proved, that God is not a substratum capable of attributes, we
are convinced that those appellatives when employed as names of
God, only indicate the relation of certain actions to Him, or they
convey to us some notion of His perfection.

Hence R. Ḥaninah would have objected to the expression “the great,

the mighty, and the tremendous,” had it not been for the two
reasons mentioned by him; because such expressions lead men to
think that the attributes are essential, i.e., they are perfections
actually present in God. The frequent use of names of God derived
from actions, led to the belief that He had as many [essential]
attributes as there were actions from which the names were derived.
The following promise was therefore made, implying that mankind
will at a certain future time understand this subject, and be free
from the error it involves: “In that day will the Lord be One, and His
name One” (Zech. xiv. 9). The meaning of this prophecy is this: He
being One, will then be called by one name, which will indicate the
essence of God; but it does not mean that His sole name will be a
derivative [viz., “One”]. In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer (chap. iii.) occurs