MONCUPA v ENRILE

G.R. No. L-63345 GUTIERREZ, JR; Jan 30, 1986 FACTS: - Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982, 10:50 P.M., at Quezon Avenue, QC. He was detained at MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay. Next day, Apr 23, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and 8 other persons. - After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under PD 33. - Two separate informations were filed against Moncupa, one for illegal possession of firearms before CFI Rizal, and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of QC. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. - Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. As his motions for bail were denied by the lower court, Moncupa filed this petition for habeas corpus. - Respondents, in their return of the writ, justified the validity of Moncupas detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to Moncupa. - However, on Aug 30, 1983, respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, Moncupa was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the President, and that since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the petition may be deemed moot and academic... - It should be noted that attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him: 1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that Moncupa gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.

2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case he wants to change his place of residence. 3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." 4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. - Moncupa argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom, and his temporary release "merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents." ISSUE: WON the petition academic in view release. has become moot and of Moncupa's temporary

HELD: NO Ratio A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. - Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell, but the restraints attached to his temporary release preclude freedom of action. The reservations of the military in the form of restrictions constitute restraints on his liberty, and limit his freedom of movement. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. The latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus, as held in Villavicencio v Lukban, has, in law, remained undiminished up to the present. - Villavicencio v. Lukban: A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is

restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.... - Caunca v. Salazar: (case involving employment agencies restricting freedom of movement of prospective employees/maids) Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion. - Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al.: Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer (on the ground that) the release being merely 'temporary', it follows that they can be rearrested at anytime despite their acquittal is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. Disposition Petition granted. The conditions attached to the temporary release of Moncupa are declared null and void. The temporary release is declared absolute.

CHAVEZ V CA
24 SCRA 663 (1968) Habeas Corpus as remedy in cases of violation of the right against self-incrimination. FACTS: Roger Chavez, Actor Ricardo Sumilang, Edgardo Ging Pascual, Pedro Rebullo, Luis Baby Asistio and Lorenzo Meneses and three John Does were accused of car napping a Thunderbird car form Johnson Lee.

The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy and acquitted all of the accused except for Roger Chavez. He was found guilty of qualified theft. His guilt was proven basing heavily on his testimony when he was called as witness in the proceedings in the trial court by the prosecution on the first day of trial for which he stated that he will not testify. The Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal and the related MR. Chavez now comes to the Supreme Court alleging that he was forced to testify against himself. ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of the writ habeas corpus is available. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that clearly Chavez protested against being asked to be presented as witness. The Court also ruled that there was no waiver of his right against self-incrimination. On the issue of the propriety of the writ the Court stated: The course which the petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are discarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right is violated. The void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. The writ may issues even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. Roger Chavez is ordered released.

The SC ruled that the 5 petitioners who continued to languish in jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez. FACTS: 1. Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of them has served more than 13 years. 2. The other accused, however, appealed their conviction, resulting in a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to the effect that there can be no complex crime of rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. As a result, while those who appealed were now free, those who did not remained in jail. 3. Petitioners now premise their stand on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be granted. They also invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code Art. 22 as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has been rendered and the convict is serving the same. ISSUE: Is the writ of habeas corpus available under the circumstances? HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1. The write of habeas corpus is the writ of liberty, "the most important human rights provision" in the fundamental law, and one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the remedy challenged the validity of the order of the then respondent

Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. In the opinion of Justice Malcolm: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. ANY restraint which will preclude freedom of action is SUFFICIENT. 2. Range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding: No writ if person is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. 3. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 4. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. Contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. 5. The continued incarceration after the twelveyear period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. Teehankee, concurring and dissenting: The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial doctrines, and its corollary rule of the law of the case, have no application here. Here, the whole question turns simply on the nature of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the Revised Penal Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under section 135 of the same Code. The case at bar presents a clear case of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. On this

GUMABON V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

37 SCRA 420 (1971)

ground, a crime that the law at the time of their conviction as well as now punishes only with prision mayor which they have more than fully served, would be to deny them their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.

ABADIA V CA
September 23, 1994; KAPUNAN, J. FACTS - Respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt. - He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges. - A charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively. - A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the Court of Appeals on March 7, 1991 which was, however, dismissed by the said court's Fourth Division on the ground that pre-trial investigation for the charges against the respondent was already ongoing before a PreTrial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO). - Three months after these charges were filed, the Pre-Trial Investigative Panel came out with a Resolution finding no evidence of direct participation by the private respondent in the December 1989 coup. - Said panel nonetheless recommended that respondent be charged with violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection) and the 96th Article of War in relation to the 94th Article of War. - Consequently, all existing charges against respondent were dismissed and a new charge for violation of Article of War No. 96 for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman for having allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with other military officers for the purpose of overthrowing the government, carrying with it the penalty of dismissal from service was filed with the General Court Martial (GCM) No. 8.

- Additionally, the Judge Advocate General's Office endorsed the filing of charges for violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code to the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. The City Prosecutor eventually came out with a resolution dismissing the charges. - Upon private respondent's arraignment (and before entering his plea) in General Court Martial No. 8 for violation of the 96th Article of War, private respondent entered a special motion to dismiss the case on grounds of prescription under AW 38. The private respondent contended that the offense was supposed to have been committed between August to November, 1989, more than two years before his arraignment on April 22, 1992. - Favorably resolving the motion to dismiss for being "substantial . . . meritorious and legally tenable," the General Court Martial dropped the last remaining charge against private respondent. - The Assistant Trial Judge Advocate submitted a report to the Chief of Staff quoting the Resolution of GCM No. 8 for "info/notation". - Respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals where he assailed his continued detention at the ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal of all charges against him. He contended that his continued confinement under the circumstances amounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus." - The 12th Division of the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile, Commanding General of the Philippine Army "(t)o produce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q. Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued detention. - 12th Division of CA promulgated the questioned decision issuing a writ of habeas corpus and commanding herein petitioners to release the private respondent. - Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari ISSUE WON the Resolution of the 12th Division of CA contravenes a previous decision by a co-equal body, the Special 4th Division of the Court of Appeals which dismissed respondent's petition for habeas corpus.

HELD - NO. The factual circumstances surrounding both decisions are different. - First, at the time of the first petition, the private respondent was being held in the detention center for eleven months without charges being filed against him. The pre-trial investigative panel had not yet been constituted. Because of his confinement without charges, a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed in his behalf on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and continued detention without charges violated his constitutional rights. - The Fourth Division found adequate support upholding military jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the Articles of War. It also noted that the case against the private respondent was ongoing and that it would be difficult to order respondent's release on a writ of habeas corpus without giving military authorities reasonable time within which to investigate and try the case. The Court nonetheless urged the Chief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with all deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case." - Second, by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was before the court's Twelfth Division (herein respondent court), the JAGO's Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against the petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. The latter subsequently dismissed the case. - Moreover at the time the Twelfth Division rendered its assailed decision, respondent was already languishing in a military detention center for three years, half of those spent in the limbo between the GCM's decision dismissing the cases filed against him and the uncertainty of when the military appellate process would finally come around in either exonerating him or overturning the GCM's findings. This in spite of the fact that even during the first petition before the Fourth Division, the court had already urged speedy disposition of the case. - Finally, in dismissing the cases against the private respondent, the General Court Martial had made a determination that the charges against respondent had prescribed under Article 38 of the Articles of War. Conformably with this conclusion and with this Court's ruling in Domingo vs

Minister of National Defense, the lower court was correct in stating that the respondent could no longer be tried b the General Court Martial if a period of two years had elapsed prior to the arraignment of the accused. - Clearly, the circumstances, noted above, had changed so radically in the intervening period that the appellate court's Twelfth Division had no choice, given the incredible delay in forwarding the documents to the military appellate authority, but to issue the writ. - The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." - Petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his continued confinement. Court uphold the proposition that courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper military authorities to review the general court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in petitioners' argument that the Constitution's guarantees are guarantees available not to all of the people but only to most of them. Disposition Petition is hereby DENIED.

-Several years after his conviction, SC in People v. Simon (July 29, 1994), interpreted Sec.20 of RA6425 as last amended by RA7659 [effective Dec 31, 1993] to mean that if the quantity of the marijuana involved is less than 250grams, imposable penalty shall be w/in range of prision correccional (6mos and 1day to 6yrs). -De Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more than 10yrs now. Petitioners allege that his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that, therefore, he should be released from prison without further delay. In aid of judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from prison. ISSUE: WON de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law. HELD: YES. -The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth: (see Rule 102.3) 1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; 2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; 3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and 4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person. Disposition Petition is granted. Writ of habeas corpus issued. Director of New Bilibid Prisons commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's discharge from confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further confinement.

ORDOEZ V. VINARAO
[In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Oscar De Guzman] 239 SCRA 114; J. Romero; Dec 8, 1994 NATURE: Original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before SC FACTS: -Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez was tried and convicted by RTC San Jose City Br. 39 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in particular the fact that de Guzman willfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and costs. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court.

FACTS - The petition for alleges that Yolanda Gordula was arrested without warrant by elements of the Metrocom Intelligence Service Group [MISG] under the command of respondent Abadilla. petitioners exerted efforts to locate her. Among other steps, they visited the Constabulary Security Group [CSG], the PC-INP Stockade, PC 12, MISG, M-2, Special Operations Group [SOG], and the Metrocom Investigation Unit [MIU]. They said they did not detain Yolanda. Petitioners also made inquiries with the Ministry of National Defense, the Office for Detainee Affairs and the Civilian Relations Division. Her detainment was neither confirmed nor denied. - On April 19, 1983, petitioner Leticia H. Gordula went to M-2 [intelligence Unit], Camp Crame, Quezon City. There she was allowed to see M-2's log book. On page 41 of said log book was written: #1831 18-13-15/83 MISG SCR - Petitioner Leticia was told that the above numbers refer to her sister YOLANDA. She was further told that YOLANDA was had been brought to MISG sometime in the evening of April 18, 1983, and that YOLANDA was now detained at MISG. - A writ of habeas corpus was issued and asked respondents to file a return. Respondents, in their return asked for the dismissal of petition, averring that Yolanda is not in the custody of the military and that the logbook entry referred to by the petitioners does not relate to the detention of Yolanda but rather to the letter-communication of petitioners dated April 11, 1983, requesting the Honorable Minister of National Defense to locate the whereabouts of Yolanda. ISSUE/S 1. WON petition should be dismissed HELD 1. YES Reasoning Considering that the respondents have persistently denied having Yolanda H. Gordula in their custody and absent convincing proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to dismiss the petition. The writer has received a letter from Mrs. Lolita Gordula who lives in Virginia Beach, Virginia, U.S.A. Mrs. Gordula, who is Yolanda's mother, asks that the case be decided.

GORDULA V ENRILE
125 SCRA 152 ABAD SANTOS; October 24, 1983 NATURE Petition for habeas corpus

This is the response to the request. Mrs. Gordula, I commiserate with you but this is the best that can be done under the circumstances Disposition Petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of another as may be warranted by new factual circumstances

ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

GR 132601 Puno; 19 January 1999 FACTS: For resolution are public respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that: the Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar after the judgment attained finality and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. This came because of: a. the public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes. b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. ISSUES 1. Whether the court loses all its powers over the case upon attainment of finality of its own judgment? 2. Whether the issuance of the TRO by the SC suspending the execution of petitioner encroaches upon executive prerogatives? HELD: The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution7 [Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.] vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions

where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.8 [Section 5(f), Rule 135.] For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonble time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. The Court through the 1987 Constitution for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. 2..No Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution is only the source of power of the President to grant reprieves commutations and pardons and it cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after finality. In truth, an accused who

has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and the same can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R. A No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

MARTINEZ V MARTINEZ
BADILLO V FERRER 152 SCRA 407 GANCAYCO; July 29, 1987 FACTS -Macario Badillo died intestate on Feb 4, 1966, survived by his widow, Clarita Ferrer, and 5 minor children: Alberto 16, Nenita 14, Hilly 12, Cristy 9, and Maria Salome 5. He left a 77sqm land in Lumban, Laguna with a house erected thereon, valued at P7,500 (PROPERTY). Hence, each minor plaintiff inherited a 1/12 share or P625 each. -Jan 18, 1967: Ferrer, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of minor plaintiffs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of the PROPERTY through which the PROPERTY was sold to defendant-appellants. Register of Deeds recorded such and issued new TCT. -Nov 11, 1968: Modesta Badillo, Macarios sister, was able to obtain guardianship over minors and their property, without personal notice to their mother, who was alleged could not be located inspite of the efforts exerted. -July 23, 1970: Modesta, as guardian, filed for annulment of the sale of minors share, conceding the validity of the sale of widows share, and asked that as co-owners, they be

allowed to exercise the right of legal redemption. TC completely ruled in favor of minor-plaintiffs, herein appellees. ISSUES 1. WON appellees redemption 2. WON sale was appellees can valid still and exercise binding legal upon

HELD 1. NO. Ratio The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within 30 days from notice in writing by the prospective vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. (Art. 1623, CC) The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than P2,000, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. (Art. 320, CC) When the property of the child under parental authority is worth P2,000 or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than P2,000, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the petition required by section 2 hereof. For good reasons the court may, however, appoint another suitable person. (Rule 93.7) Reasoning Using these provisions and relying on Villasor v Medel (an analogous case; minor plaintiff received property together with cousins by donation from grandmother), SC concluded: After Macarios demise, Ferrer automatically became the minors legal guardian, their property being less than P2,000 each. As such, she acquired the plenary powers of a judicial guardian except that power to alienate or encumber her childrens property without judicial authorization. When Ferrer signed and received on Jan 18, 1967, her copy of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, such document served as the required written notice in Art. 1623

and she received it also on behalf of her children. The period of redemption commenced then. Right after Modestas appointment as guardian (Nov. 11, 1968), she tried to redeem the widows portion of the PROPERTY but the period for legal redemption has clearly expired. 2. NO. Reasoning Appellants contend that the sale is voidable. If it is annulled, restitution of things received by both parties is proper. But they concede that the minors can only be required to restore partially to the extent of benefits to them. SC said that voidable contracts arise from vice of consent. In this case, however, appellee minors were not even parties. Their names were merely dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed to represent them. This contract is unenforceable having been executed by one who has acted beyond her powers. Ferrer was only granted the power of administration, not disposition. The appellee minors never ratified the sale. In fact, they question its validity. Hence, the contract remains unenforceable. No restitution may be ordered from them because the law does not sanction any. In sum, appellants can retain the 7/12 of the PROPERTY but must return the 5/12, representing appellee minors share. Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby modified accordingly and appellants are directed to deliver possession of above appellees share (5/12), with no pronouncement as to costs.

- Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that the latter owed him P482.14. - CFI found that Teran, as administrator of said estate, owed Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46. ISSUE WON Leopoldo Teran is liable. HELD NO. Reasoning Teran was the duly appointed and recognized representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen in the administration of their interests in the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from Sept.17, 1901 until March 18, 1902. - Teran was appointed as administrator of said estate on Sept.17, 1901. He entered into a bond of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such representative. - On March 18, 1902, the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y Gomez as guardian for said minors and she gave the required bond for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian. - While there are some indications that Teran continued to act as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of Maria Munoz y Gomez, up to Oct. 6, 1906, yet the fact exists that said Maria Munoz was the actual representative of the minors from and after March 18, 1902 until Oct.6, 1906, and therefore she, must be held responsible for the property belonging to said minors during the period. - Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not a resident of the Philippines at the time of her apppointment, was removed as guardian by the CFI. Felix Samson was then appointed as guardian. The mere fact that she was removed as guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. If during the time that she was the guardian she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. Therefore, if any loss occurred to the minors between March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906, they have a right of action only against said Maria Munoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property of their estate. - Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal representative of

GUERRERO VS TERAN
13 Phil 212 JOHNSON; March 19, 1909 NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI FACTS - Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz, filed an action against Leopoldo Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 on the theory that Teran had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906.

the said minors in the management of their estate, from Sept.17, 1901 up to the time that he was superseded by Maria Munoz y Gomez, on March 18, 1902. There is no proof showing that any of the losses claimed by Guerrero occurred within this period. Thus, Teran is liable only for the amount of P188.39, the amount he admitted he owed the plaintiff. - On appointment of administrators or guardians: Maria Munoz was removed on the theory that her appointment was void because she was not a resident of the Philippines. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. The courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. Dispositive Reversed.

YANGCO v CFI MANILA

29 Phil 183 MORELAND; January 6, 1915 FACTS - Luis Yangco was 21 years of age, the owner of property valued at nearly P1M, a resident of the Philippines and temporarily traveling abroad at the time the proceedings were had which terminated in the declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointment of a guardian of his property. - The proceedings were begun by Teodoro R. Yangco, as a relative and friend. No notice was given to the petitioner personally, the only notice of any kind in the proceedings was required by the CFI to be sent to Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, the mother-in- law and brotherin-law, respectively, of Luis, the latter being the acting manager of the business of Luis. ISSUE WON the CFI decree is void

HELD YES. The decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing a guardian for his property was and is void for lack of jurisdiction. In proceedings of this case notice as required by the statute is jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a valid decree in the premises. Sec 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires personal notice to the alleged spendthrift when he is a resident of the Philippine Islands. It provides that notice is to be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced on the hearing. - The statute does not authorize a substitute service except in cases where, as in Sec 572, the person for whose property the guardian is sought to the appointed is a resident of a foreign country. Personal notice being essential under the statute, the notice to the mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the alleged spendthrift was of no legal value. - To declare a person of full age to be imcompetent to manage his affairs and thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold and manage his property is a serious thing. It takes from him one of the greatest privileges of life in contravention of those fundamental rights which all men naturally have to possess, control, manage and enjoy their own property. It is for this reason that the courts generally hold that the statute permitting a declaration incompetency and the appointment of guardians for the property of incompetents must be strictly followed, and any material departure therefrom, especially with respect to notice, results in a loss of jurisdiction. So careful was the Legislature to see to it that no one should be declared an incompetent and deprived of his property without full opportunity to be heard that, in framing Sec 559, it not only required personal notice to the alleged incompetent but also provided that he shall be present in court during the proceedings, if he be able to attend; and the ability to attend does not, in our judgment, relate to absence but to physical condition. -It has been urged that sec 572 permits the practice adopted in this case. It provides: "When a person liable to be put under guardianship, according to the provisions of this chapter, resides without the Philippine Islands, and has

estate therein, any friend of such person, or anyone interested in his estate, in expectancy or otherwise, may apply to the judge of Court of First Instance in any province in which there is any estate of such absent person, for the appointment of a guardian, and if, after notice given to all interested, in such manner as such court orders, by publication or otherwise, and a full hearing and examination, it appears proper, a guardian for such absent person may be appointed.... - The word "resides" as used has, as a matter of language, a meaning perfectly clear and definite and requires no interpretation or construction to give it full significance. That the petitioner in this case did not reside "without the Philippine Islands" is unchallenged by the facts in this case. He resided here and his absence was for travel and not for residence. - Even if sec 572 is applicable, still the notice required by the section has not been given. No notice whatever was given to the alleged incompetent, either by publication or otherwise, and he certainly is one of the parties "interested." - Although no personal notice was given to the alleged spendthrift, the only notice given at all being solely to his mother-in-law and brother-inlaw, the court, nevertheless, made a decree declaring him a spendthrift and appointing a guardian of his property without taking any evidence and with absolutely nothing before it to justify such a decree except the petition and the answer thereto of Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, which says that according to our information and belief the facts stated in said petition are true, and we do not oppose the petition made by the said Teodoro R. Yangco. - No evidence of any kind was taken in the case so far as appears of record, and the court, in making the order of prodigality and decreeing the appointment of a guardian, had no more knowledge of the alleged spendthrift's incompetency to manage his affairs that he had before the petition was presented. - Sec 560 provides that the court shall appoint a guardian of his person and estate only "after a full hearing and examination upon such petition" and where "it appears to the court or Judge" from such full hearing and examination "that the person in question is incapable of taking care of himself and managing his property." - It is not a full hearing and examination to have A allege that B is an incompetent and to have C

come in and admit the allegation. The court, before it can make the decree as provided for in the law, must have before it competent evidence demonstrating the facts necessary to sustain the decree, and that evidence must be clear and definite. The law is not satisfied unless the court has before it facts which will justify the decree. In proper cases, of course, the admissions made by way of answer or otherwise by the party alleged to be a spendthrift may be taken into consideration by the court in the determination of the question involved and, under certain circumstances, will doubtless be sufficient to sustain a decree of incompetency; but even such admissions should be received with caution, for in cases of this character the foundation of the petition is, in a way, the incompetency of the person against whom the petition is directed and the court should accept his admissions with considerable hesitation. If there is doubt the court should, in spite of his admissions, proceed with the hearing of the case and require the production of evidence substantiate the allegation of incompetency. Except by his own consent, it is legally impossible to declare a and incompetent and deprive him of his property without clear and positive evidence upon which the declaration and the deprivation are based. Dispositive Proceedings to declare the petitioner an incompetent and all orders, judgments, and decrees made and entered in said proceedings are null and void.

- Dec 11. Lopez decreed continuous confinement. - Dec 21. Lopez appointed Gochangco as special guardian over person of Justina. - Faustino presented alleged affidavit of Justina that she desires to stay in hospital and she doesnt want a guardian except Faustino. - Lopez insisted in carrying out her order, saying there are 57 contending parties claiming to be relatives, that Justina has no will, that other relatives charge Faustino w/ selfish motives. She says it was w/in power of court, in guardianship proceedings, to appoint special / temporary guardian. - Faustino went to SC. - Dec 24. Lopez appointed Gochangco as regular guardian. Faustino appealed to the CA, which certified the case (appointment as regular guardian) to the SC and is now pending. ISSUE WON court has authority to appoint Gochangco as special guardian HELD ISSUE NOT RESOLVED. Because of appointment of Gochangco as regular guardian, present petition is MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

authority or permission of the court to enter into this contract of lease for and on behalf of his ward, the action of the guardian in executing said contract was approved by the probate court. Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant for the rescission and declaration of nullity of the contract of lease. The RTC ruled in favor of defendants. Other Facts Defendant commenced destruction of a wall of a building in the leased premises, writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. Philippines Drug Company intervened. It alleged that it is the actual owner of the pharmacy situated in the leased premises, which formerly belonged to the defendant. ISSUE WON the contract of lease is voidable because of the minority of one of the lessors HELD NO Article 1548 of the Civil Code reads: The husband can not give in lease the property of the wife, the father and guardian, that of the son or minor, and the administrator of property, not having a special power, for a period exceeding six years. Article 398 of the same code provides: The decision of a majority of the coowners as to the management and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common shall be obligatory. There shall be no majority, unless the resolution has been adopted by the coowners representing a majority of the interests which constitute the object of the community. Should there be no majority, or the resolution of the latter is seriously prejudicial to the parties interested in the thing owned in common, the judge, at the instance of a party, shall decree what may be proper, including the appointment of an administrator. - Counsel for the plaintiffs do not claim that the contract of lease which was made for a period of more than six years is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the minor, nor do they claim that said contract, of itself, prejudices in any way the minor's interest. - In the execution of the contract of lease under consideration, the minor was represented by his judicial guardian, who not only asked the court for and obtained authority to execute this

SINGCO V LONGA MARGATE V RABACAL ENRIQUEZ ET v A. S. WATSON & CO.

SANTOS V. LOPEZ
1 SCRA 1332 PAREDES; Apr 29, 1961 FACTS - Doa Justina is 93. Afflicted w/ infirmities, bedridden, blind and all alone. - Faustino asserts Wong Heng is exploiting Justina and appropriated use, enjoyment, ownership of her properties by fraud. - Faustino presented petition for appointment of guardian over person & prop of Justina. - Judge Lopez authorized Faustino to bring doctors. The doctors recommended transfer of Justina to hospital. - Justina was confined. - Dec 1, 1951. Justina expressed desire to go back home.

FACTS The eight plaintiffs (Rafael, Antonio, Trinidad, Cayetano, Rosario, Gertrudis, and Carmen Enriquez, and Antonio Gascon ) each have a oneeighth undivided interest in 3 properties in Escolta, City of Manila. The properties were leased to the defendant for a period of twelve years with permission to renew the lease for a further period of six years. Seven of these plaintiffs were of age when they executed this contract of lease. The other, Antonio Gascon, was a minor. At the time this contract of lease was executed, the minor was represented by his judicial guardian. The guardian having obtained

141 SCRA 436 Trent; March 30, 1912

contract of lease on behalf of his ward, but his act, after the execution, was approved by the court. The interest of the minor has not been prejudiced by reason of the fact that this contract of lease was executed for a term of more than six years. Under the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain, it would appear that this contract of lease would not be valid if the minor had not been represented by his guardian. The minor having been represented by his duly appointed guardian, there can be no question about the validity of this contract of lease.

LICHAUCO V TAN PHO LIM CHU LAN v. LIM CHU KUN

G.R. No. 31316 STREET; December 28, 1929 NATURE Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila removing the appellant, Lim Chu Kun, from the position of guardian of the minor, Lim Chu Lan and appointing in his stead one Chin Chong Gui, husband of Lim Chu Lan. FACTS - Lim Chu Lan is now over 20 years of age and the wife of Chin Chong Gui. - A motion was filed by Lim Chu Lan where it is stated that the estate of the minor is in the hands of Lim Chu Kun, a brother of Lim Chu Lan, in the character of guardian. - The value of the estate of the petitioner ending with the year 1927 was in the amount of P333,496.04 and that the annual average income of the petitioner's property has been more than P15,000. - Lim Chu Lan contracted marriage with Chin Chong Gui and since that date, the guardian, Lim Chu Kun, has supplied no maintenance to the Lim Chu Lan. She therefore asks that her guardian be required to supply maintenance in the amount of P500 per month and that he be substituted in the guardianship by the petitioner's husband, Chin Chong Gui. ISSUE WON there is sufficient ground to remove Lim Chu Kun as the guardian of Lim Chu Lan. HELD

YES. The order appealed from was a proper exercise of the discretion vested in the Court of First Instance in such matters, since it is clear that in the language of section 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant had shown himself to be unsuitable for the position of guardian of the petitioner. - The fact of marriage alone introduces a change in the conditions of guardianship over a minor woman, and although the marriage of a girl who is under guardianship does not ipso facto abolish the guardianship over the property, it does terminate the guardianship over the person. - Moreover, the existence of a guardianship over the estate of a married woman in other hands than those of the husband is in certain respects undesirable, since the husband is legally entitled to the management of conjugal property, and the earnings of the paraphernal property of the wife constitute community property. Therefore, if the husband is found to be a suitable person, he is the proper individual to fill the office. In the case before us it is not shown that the husband is unfit for the office to which he was appointed by the trial court. - The sum of P500 per month is not improper for a person having the standing of the petitioner in the community, in view of the size of the capital of her estate and its earning capacity. Disposition The order appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

-1960 Carmen alleged she had regained her competence and filed a petition for terminating the guardianship and delivery of the residuary estate. Attached was a medical certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full knowledge of her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by Veterans Administration that by reason of her advanced age (78), physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. - Francisco Bengson, the son of the ward, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent; that if appointed guardian of her estate instead of PNB, he will comply with all the provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any remuneration for his services, and will file a nominal bond. - CFI - ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate to substitute PNB upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties. The required bond was filed and letters of guardianship issued to Francisco Bengson. - MFR - denied but raised the bond to P13,000, based on a finding that the cash balance of the estate then amounted to P11,464.34 plus the monthly income estimated at P134, or P1,608 per annum. Hence, this joint appeal by the Philippine National Bank and the Veterans Administration. ISSUE WON PNB should be removed as guardian of Carmen HELD NO Ratio Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian cannot be legally removed from office except for the causes therein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno). Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya) has been held sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is unsuitable or incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be said that removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised within the law, and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those grounds.

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
3 SCRA 751 JBL REYES; December 28, 1961 FACTS - 1957 - Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson, mother of a veteran who died in World War II, became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits worth P10,738 and a monthly death compensation for the rest of her life extended by the United States Veterans Administration. CFI La Union found Carmen to be an incompetent and appointed PNB as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the Veterans Administration.

Reasoning - The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules. "When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto . . ." - No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any legal ground upon which the removal of PNB as guardian was founded. - Neither in Francisco Bengson's manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that PNB had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout, PNB has discharged its trust satisfactorily. - That it has received commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it, especially since the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would probably have to disburse in bond premiums. - Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for the administration of the estate. - A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent reason; otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal. Disposition Orders are reversed

FACTS On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings. On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment granting the petition for adoption. CA affirmed. Hence, this recourse. The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It

argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. ISSUE 1. Whether or not the Family Code requirement of joint adoption by the H and W should be applied retroactively. 2. Whether or not, on the assumption that the non-inclusion of the H as co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, only the W would be deemed to be the sole adopter. HELD 1. NO. RATIO From a procedural standpoint, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment. Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment. The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises. The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule.

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF INCHAUSTI IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES
205 SCRA 356 REGALADO; January 24, 1992

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A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. REASONING Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. We further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors. Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has

vested. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 2. NO RATIO The H, Dioscoro, submitted an affidavit of consent which he affirmed in Court when he testified on the same. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings. REASONING We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the

adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with. In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed.

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In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life."

REPUBLIC V TOLDENO REPUBLIC V MILLER LAZATIN v CAMPOS

GR No. L-43955-56 TEEHANKEE; July 30, 1979

FACTS: - Jan 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondents Nora and Irma. Margarita commenced an intestate proceeding before CFI. Several persons intervened, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano. - April 11, 1974, Margarita also died, leaving a holographic will. During her lifetime, Margarita kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company, which either she or Nora could open. Five days after Margarita's death, Nora opened the box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister Irma; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Nora claims that she opened the box in good faith, believing that it

was held jointly by her and her mother. Her sole reason for opening it was to get her stock certificates and other small items. When she was to close it, the bank personnel informed her that she needed court authority, in view of her mother's death and so, she removed everything. - June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of Margarita. Ramon, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara, filed a motion claiming that Margarita had executed a subsequent will and demanding its production. He also prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein. - Upon order of the probate court, the deposit box was opened on Nov 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because Nora had already removed its contents. - Nov 22, 1974, seven months after Margaritas death, petitioner Renato intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Mariano as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. On the same date, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box. Probate court ordered Nora to deliver the properties taken from the box to the Clerk of Court. - The two cases were then transferred to the sala of Judge Campos, Jr., who issued an order requiring Nora to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit box within one week. Nora deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of the court. (She was later held in contempt.) - Aug 20, 1975, Renato filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, which stated that Renato was an "illegitimate son" of Mariano and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano and his wife Margarita. - Lower court allowed Renato to intervene as adopted son in the estate of Margarita. But Renato presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead he attempted to prove that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death;

formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be presented, e.g., photo of Irma where she addressed herself as his sister; photo of him and Margarita when he was a boy; document showing that his real name is "Renato Lazatin." - Lower court barred the introduction of Renatos evidence as they do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption was taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene. - Renato then filed in both cases a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in view of Nora's refusal to comply with the orders of the court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita, invoking Rule 29.3 ROC. Court denied motion. - April 26, 1976, Nora deposited with the court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates. - The lower court, ruling on Renatos motion for definite resolution on his previous motion to declare as established the fact of adoption, issued an order stating that he has failed to establish such status. ISSUE: WON Renato has established his status adopted child of the deceased spouses. as

HELD: NO - Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate

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paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. - Renato's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. He merely claims that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. He did not show which court decreed such adoption, and he cited no witnesses to such proceeding. The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that pre-war records were destroyed or burned does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in his favor. This is because there was no proof that he was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in CFI Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was really such adoption, he could have conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the adoption as required under Rule 99.4 or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. The one who gave the written consent to the adoption (Rule 99.3), whether the parents or orphanage, also does not appear. - The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his

majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to Renato as an adopted child necessarily establish adoption. Withal, the attempts of Renato to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of his evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child. - Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. Here, Renato failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. - Renato is also mistaken in claiming Rule 29 should be applied to consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of Nora to produce the document of adoption, because first, the fact or real existence of his adoption had not been established; second, there is no proof that such document of adoption is in the possession of Nora; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora to produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the box have already been surrendered by Nora and no document of adoption in his favor was listed as found in the box. - As a necessary consequence, Renato cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been

done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. A fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary complication. To succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. Disposition Petition dismissed.

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