safety

Communication
Technical Failures in Helicopters: Non-Powerplant-Related Accidents
Alex de Voogt 1, * and Keyashia Nero 2

1 Department of Business, Drew University, Madison, NJ 07940, USA

2 Department of Psychology, Drew University, Madison, NJ 07940, USA
* Correspondence: [email protected]

Abstract: Technical failures in helicopters are a main concern for helicopter safety. The prominence of
mechanical failures differs for specific helicopter operations. This analysis used 151 General Aviation
accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board online database from an 11-year
time period. The information in each report was collated, including the list of findings for each
accident. Possible relations between causes and specific flight operations were analyzed by looking at
significant differences between expected and actual values within the dataset of categorical data. It is
found that the proportion of fatal accidents in this category of accidents is low (16.6%) compared with
the percentage of fatal helicopter accidents in general, as well as those of specific helicopter operations.
Instructional flights appear significantly more likely to be associated with maintenance-related causes.
Causes related to fatigue of aircraft parts are more often associated with ferry and positional flights,
as well as helicopters with turbo-shaft engines. Future research is recommended for these specific
associations to further mitigate the number of accidents with non-powerplant failures.

Keywords: non-powerplant failures; helicopter; instructional; fatigue; maintenance

1. Introduction
In the study of helicopter safety, “most of the reviewed studies viewed pilot error
and technical failure as the most important risk factors” [1]. Previous research has shown
that accidents with helicopters in maintenance-related accidents include failures of main
rotors, tail rotors, transmission systems, and engines of rotorcraft [2,3]. They are considered
Citation: de Voogt, A.; Nero, K. the most critical and the most exposed components to maintenance errors. Improper
Technical Failures in Helicopters: maintenance, however, is only one possible cause of a technical failure. For instance, in
Non-Powerplant-Related Accidents. a study on sling load operations, 88 (38%) accidents were attributed to mechanical failures
Safety 2023, 9, 10. https://doi.org/ of all types, but only 23 (10%) were cited for inadequate maintenance as a probable cause [4].
10.3390/safety9010010 Furthermore, the role of technical failures in helicopter accidents is confounded by the
Academic Editor: Raphael Grzebieta diversity of helicopter designs and by the variety of helicopter operations.
A comparison of twin- and single-engine Part 135 helicopter operations for the period
Received: 19 December 2022
between 2005 and 2015 showed 20.1% fatal accidents for twin- and 28% for single-engine
Revised: 17 February 2023
helicopters. It was found that twin-engine helicopters were more often exposed to night
Accepted: 20 February 2023
and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), even though their fatality rate was not
Published: 22 February 2023
affected [5]. The comparison between twin- and single-engine helicopters was inspired by
the suggestion that the increased complexity of the twin-engine aircraft would contribute
to the risk of technical failures, but the evidence did not support that idea [6]. A previous
Copyright: © 2023 by the authors. study showed that the type and number of engines, as well as the number of blades, were
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. relevant covariates in predicting helicopter accidents but did not significantly relate to
This article is an open access article technical failures.
distributed under the terms and In contrast, specific types of helicopter operations have shown differing proportionate
conditions of the Creative Commons numbers of fatalities, as well as a varying prominence of “mechanical failures of all types”
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// (see Table 1) [4,7]. These studies suggest that specific technical failures of helicopters are
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ more likely associated with particular operations than with the number or kind of engines.
4.0/).

Safety 2023, 9, 10. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety9010010 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/safety

Safety 2023, 9, 10 2 of 5

Table 1. Previous research on operations, fatalities, and mechanical failures.

Operation Years Fatal 1 Mechanical

Aerial application [7] 1998 thru 2005 9% (N = 12) 23% (N = 32)
Sling load [7] 1995 thru 2005 22.5% (N = 27) 40% (N = 48)
Sling load [4] 1980 thru 1995 25% (N = 57) 38% (N = 88)
1 N indicates the number of fatal accidents; the number of fatalities may be higher.

The following study analyzes U.S. helicopter accidents that suffered technical failures.
The data are limited to non-powerplant failures, since emergencies in helicopters have
historically concentrated on engine failures for which autorotations provide the neces-
sary recovery procedure. Emergency procedures for non-powerplant technical failures
are less commonly practiced and the frequency and severity of their occurrence are less
understood [8].
The aim of this study is to determine if types of technical failures can be associated with
particular helicopter operations and to suggest strategies for mitigating future accidents.
A better understanding of the significance of technical failures that do not affect the engine
may also help to guide training priorities of helicopter pilots.

2. Materials and Methods

A total of 151 accidents from an 11-year period from January 2009 to December 2019
were extracted from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) online database
using the Case Analysis and Reporting Online (CAROL) query tool [9]. CAROL allows
database users to select “non-powerplant failures” in their search menu, a term which
follows the coding of NTSB investigators.
Each accident report consists of a factual report and a probable cause statement. The
factual reports include a series of standardized items of information about the pilot(s),
aircraft, weather, and wreckage, as well as an autopsy summary in cases of fatal accidents.
In addition, the reports include a narrative statement with the history of the flight. The
probable cause statement has a list of findings and a conclusion about the causes of the
accident. The reports were selected using the category “non-powerplant failures”, “General
Aviation”, as well as the aircraft category “helicopters”, and only included accidents that
occurred in the specific time period, in the region of the United States, and that were
classified as accidents. Additionally, only accident reports that were completed before 2021
were included.
The categorical information provided in each report was collated, including the list of
findings for each accident. The findings consist of causes, (contributing) factors and occurrences,
and make up additional columns in the final dataset. From these standardized sections of the
reports, organized information pertaining to pilot characteristics (e.g., total flight hours accrued),
meteorological information (e.g., visibility and light conditions), and impact information (e.g.,
number of fatalities and damage to the aircraft) were listed. Additionally, the narrative
statement in each report was coded for the presence of autorotations.
Significant differences between expected and actual values within the dataset of
categorical data were determined using Pearson’s chi-squared analysis using one degree of
freedom, a 0.05 significance level, and a Fisher’s exact test when cell counts fell below 5.

3. Results
Out of the 151 accidents, 25 (16.6%) were fatal, with 44 people sustaining fatal injuries
and 16 additional accidents reporting serious injuries. Sixteen aircraft were destroyed
(10.6%), of which only four reported a fatal injury. There appears no significant relationship
between injury severity and damage to the aircraft (p < 0.05) in this dataset (see Table 2).
The average age of the pilot was 49.9 years old. Three female pilots were involved
in accidents. More than half (N = 64 have less, 77 more 51%, 10 unknown) of the pilots
had more than 3000 h of total flight experience. This flight experience was not significantly
related to fatality (p > 0.05).
Safety 2023, 9, 10 3 of 5

Table 2. Injury severity compared with damage to the helicopter (# accidents).

Damage/Injury Fatal Serious Minor None

Destroyed 4 2 3 8
Substantial 21 14 26 73
Minor 0 0 0 0
None 0 0 0 0

All accidents in this dataset occurred in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), with
the exception of one fatal accident with seven casualties where a helicopter continued into
IMC conditions. There were eight accidents at night, three at dawn, and two at dusk, none
of which were fatal.
Causes that pertain to non-powerplant accidents include failures to the navigation
systems (N = 1), flight instruments (N = 2), flight control systems (N = 3), electrical systems
(N = 1), communication systems (N =2), and pressure/environmental pressure system
(N = 4), but few of these are commonly attested. The main technical failures are mechanical
and include part separation (N = 23), system component failure (N = 9), failures pertaining
to fluids (N = 10), fatigue (N = 35), tail rotor (N = 36), and main rotor failure (N = 33). Several
of these are attributed to maintenance causes (N = 36). Causes were specified by the NTSB
investigators, and in several cases multiple causes were attributed to the same accident.
The relation of specific causes identified by the NTSB investigators and injury severity
was only in some cases proportionally higher or lower, but rarely significantly so. For
instance, maintenance-related causes led to fatal and/or serious injury in 14 out of 36 cases,
and this proportion is higher than the 27 fatal or serious injuries in the 115 remaining
accidents (χ2 = 3.2919, df = 1, p = 0.0696), but only significantly so at the p < 0.10 level. The
only significant relation to fatality was found when causes related to main rotor and tail
rotors were combined. Only 5 out of 69 accidents with tail or main rotors were fatal, while
20 out of 82 were fatal in all other accidents combined (χ2 = 7.9716, df = 1, p = 0.004752).
Autorotations were reported in 13 cases since they can also be initiated in cases other
than powerplant failures. For instance, one pilot encountered a cyclic-input problem and
entered a 180-degree autorotation to lose altitude, but landed near trees and rolled over
after landing, which substantially damaged the helicopter. Accidents with autorotations
included two fatalities.
Out of 151 accidents, 12 reported a helicopter with twin engines, and 68 with turboshaft
versus 83 with reciprocating engines. Specific operations included 23 instructional flights,
nine external load, 19 agricultural (aerial application as well as landscaping), 12 ferry or
positioning flights, six test flights, and eight aerial observation flights. It is noted that
all accidents with external load included helicopters with turboshaft engines. Significant
relations between specific operations/aircraft and types of causes are listed in Table 3.

Table 3. Significant relations between specific operations/aircraft and types of causes.

Fatigue Other Significance (df =1)

Turbo-shaft 21 47 χ2 = 4.123
Reciprocating 14 69 p = 0.042303
Positioning/ferry 8 4 χ2 = 13.8455
Non-positioning/ferry 27 112 p = 0.000198
Maintenance Other Fisher-exact: p < 0.05
Instructional 10 12 χ2 = 6.254
Non-instructional 26 103 p = 0.010053

4. Discussion
Fatality was not strongly related to any specific cause with the exception of problems
with the main or tail rotor, which showed a significantly lower proportion of fatal accidents.
Safety 2023, 9, 10 4 of 5

This result confirms the premise that training on the emergency procedures for main and
tail rotor failures, which includes autorotations, may prevent fatalities [8].
Pilots that were part of non-powerplant failures did not show a lack of experience
and did not fall within a certain age group. It is noted that there was no significant
relation between injury severity and damage to the aircraft, an absence that is uncommon
and thus far only attested for accidents with ballooning and accidents with helicopters
standing [10,11]. The absence of this relation may be partially explained by the highly
diverse nature of non-powerplant failure accidents.
This study of accidents concerning non-powerplant failures has a relatively low pro-
portionate number of fatal accidents (16.6%) compared with, for instance, twin engine
(23.7%) or sling load (22.5%) accidents. While mechanical failures contribute to the overall
number of accidents in helicopter operations, they appear to be less often fatal and were
infrequently associated with low visibility conditions, which in recent studies has been
identified as the main concern in helicopter accidents in general [12–15].
Specific causes were related to instructional flights and the combination of position-
ing and ferry flights, which showed significantly higher proportions of maintenance and
fatigue-related causes, respectively. In addition, twin-engine helicopters were proportion-
ally more often associated with fatigue-related causes, a result that may help mitigate
twin-engine helicopter accidents, which otherwise have fewer accidents than single-engine
helicopters and for which little explanation is present in the literature [5].

5. Conclusions
In view of a low proportion of fatalities for non-powerplant accidents, as well as the
significantly lower proportion of fatal accidents in case of main or tail rotor failures, the
assertion that “pilot error and technical failure as the most important risk factors” for
helicopter accidents may be interpreted differently [1]. Risk factors may affect accidents,
but not necessarily fatal ones, while non-powerplant technical failures are likely less
important. Instead, as recent research on helicopter accidents has suggested, weather and
light conditions, especially instrument meteorological conditions, are an increasing cause
of concern [12–15].
This study emphasizes that a fine-grained analysis of aviation accidents is necessary to
identify which combination of operations, causes, and aircraft need most attention in future
aviation accident analysis studies. Non-powerplant failures in helicopters are particularly
diverse. Despite the fragmented nature of the data, this study found that fatigue-related
failures and maintenance-related causes were specific to certain operations. This study
focuses on General Aviation accidents only, and maintenance is less regulated in operations
following Part 91 flight rules. Instructional flights as well as ferry flights may benefit
from stricter maintenance procedures to mitigate the number of accidents. Fatigue and
maintenance, as well as different flight rules, form starting points for future studies, which
may assist in identifying operations where the above findings need to be communicated.
Future studies that compare helicopters and other aircraft, including the associations
of type of accident and operation, may further assist in our understanding of helicopter
safety. The training of autorotations for other than just engine failures remains of primary
importance despite the variety of possible technical failures.
Although the NTSB data allow insight in non-powerplant-related accidents of heli-
copters, they do not contain information about the organization behind helicopter opera-
tions. Therefore, it remains unclear what organizational factors may affect, for instance,
the presence of fatigue-related accidents and for which additional measures may mitigate
future accidents. Technical failures are not always identified as a cause of an accident but
were reported and part of the accident description. Despite this limitation of the data, the
results identify areas where further research may be directed.
It is also noted that the current dataset does not have a sufficient number of accidents
related to specific types of failures or operations to conduct a statistical analysis for each of
them or draw more detailed conclusions. While this limitation may be addressed by including
Safety 2023, 9, 10 5 of 5

more years of accidents, a longer time-span may introduce other factors, such as technological
developments over time, that complicate interpretations. Alternatively, international compara-
tive studies as well as the inclusion of incidents may assist in more detailed analysis in future
studies, of which only few examples have been published [16,17]. Finally, while denominator
data for each type of helicopter operation are not available, the proportionate number of failures
allows for initial comparisons in the absence of such data [18].

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.d.V.; methodology, K.N. and A.d.V.; formal analysis,
K.N. and A.d.V.; data curation, K.N.; writing—original draft preparation, A.d.V.; writing—review
and editing, A.d.V.; visualization, A.d.V.; All authors have read and agreed to the published version
of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding but we wish to thank Dean Ryan Hinrichs for
funding a summer program at Drew University, during which most of this work was completed.
Data Availability Statement: Data used in this study can be found in the National Transportation
Safety Board online database: https://data.ntsb.gov/ (accessed on 1 July 2022).
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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