Asia-Pacific Security, 9th October 2019

Lecture 3 – Hegemonic Stability: US Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific

Hegemony - how power is distributed in the international system

Realists say the international system is anarchic; the priority is survival: you must
maximize your chances for this (external and internal balance)

Patterns in the distribution of power in the international system

 Neorealists maintain that patterns in the distribution of power in the

international system, and changes in it, provide key explanations to state
behaviour.

 Unipolarity: the existence of one dominant (super)power. Hegemony – Realists

predict unipolarity won’t last for very long

 Bipolarity: the existence of two dominant (super)powers – realists say it’s

stable; the weaker states just have to pick a side, it’s simple; cold war: historical
context in which realism was written

 Multipolarity: the existence of multiple (great) powers – realists say it’s the
most dangerous of these patterns; you have a lot of choices to make, that
depend on the shift of power, it’s very messy (ex. Europe before WW1)

 Waltz maintained that a bipolar structure provided the most stability, while
multipolarity was the most dangerous.

Hegemony: how has IR understood it?

 Waltz maintained that hegemony/unipolarity would not last long.

 But nevertheless, we do see cases where hegemony lasted for quite a long time
(British hegemony/Pax Britannica?; Chinese hegemony in East Asia?) –
American unipolar era has lasted for quite a long time, after the fall of the
soviet union (China might be getting there in terms of power) – why has this
been possible?

o Answer: Hegemonic stability theory: Robert Gilpin forwards the most

famous Realist variant – the unipolarity will be maintained if it provides
public goods for other countries (economically, security, etc.)
  What’s this hegemony weakness? They could run out of benefits,
and then other states are not gonna put up with the hegemon
anymore

 Hegemonic war: one of the smaller powers will grow form the
hegemon’s benefits until they grow enough to challenge the current
hegemon in the long term

o Robert O. Keohane forwards a different argument, which says the

institutions laid down by the hegemon can last longer, even after
hegemonic decline – international cooperation is possible, as long as states
are both benefiting

 A hegemon can actually lay down the rules for cooperation

 Continued interest in cooperation = it will prevail even after the

hegemon starts to decline (the institutions stay) – egotistical self-
interest

o Gramscian hegemony: the hegemon supplies a ‘hegemonic

culture/ideology’ that gives legitimacy to hegemonic dominance – non-
material argument – the hegemon doesn’t have to hand out tons of
benefits, it’s got an ideology in place that makes other countries accept it as
the hegemon

*student’s phone rings* That’s my wife, tell her I’ll call her later

I’ve come to terms with my mediocrity

US Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: implications for security

 The US, through its use of military bases (‘unsinkable carriers’) in Asia, gains a
powerful military presence in the region to keep the USSR in check

o Communism spreading through Asia and eastern Europe

o America decides to establish a network of allies throughout Asia to help

stop communism – it also mantains its huge presence in the Asia-pacific
through its military bases; it also provides economic aid to these countries

 US allies in the region frequently get to ‘free-ride’ off American security

provision, including the extension of the US nuclear umbrella  Japan gets to
concentrate most of its resources to domestic economic growth

o Their allies were given access to America’s massive markets

 o It dominates security structure and provides a lot of public goods SO these
countries were able to concentrate on their own economic growth

o Meanwhile USA makes sure these countries don’t join communism

o For Japan’s neighbours, the US presence helps keep the Japanese

militaristic ‘genie in the bottle’: Christensen argues that this helps keep the
emergence of ‘security dilemmas’ to a minimum.

 Japan had a record of invading other countries

 USA security provision kept Japan’s own security low (to the point
that without American presence it would be very vulnerable)

o ‘You may be giving liqueur chocolates to an alcoholic’ (Singaporean ex PM,

Lee Kwan Yew, on Japan playing a greater security/military role)

Defeat and occupation of Japan by USA after WW2

1949 – Communist regime in China

1950 – Korean War

Asia in many ways is a region where realism dynamics are still in place – totalitarian
regime in North korea, it becoming a nuclear power, communist one party state in
china… (democratic peace doesn’t apply to Asia)

History factor: exacerbates mistrust between several countries (Asian international

politics are complicated)

My uncle is a doctor. A medical doctor, a real one.

The secret to the longevity (?) of US Hegemony

 US ‘public goods’  cheap security: ‘This guard dog pays for its own food’
(Japanese PM Yoshida Shigeru); many Asian states find it beneficial to keep the
US military presence

 US also provides access to its market, helping the economic recovery and
growth of Asian states

 US aid and political support is useful for economic growth, and, in some cases,
clinging on to power

 But what are the limitations here (of USA-Asia arrangement)?

 o Once these countries became stronger, they ought to have challenged US
dominance—but most of them haven’t. Why?

o Hasn’t US power waxed and waned over the years? Has it always been able
to provide ‘public goods’? Surely we would have seen some evidence of
abandoning the US by now?

This highlights the realist limitations to explaining hegemony

Additional reasons for the longevity of US Hegemony

 (Maybe) the US is the least mistrusted power in the region, and its hegemony is
accepted by the region by default. The US is the worst power to provide
stability to the region—except for all those other powers.

o Chinese hegemony?  no way (Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam)

o Japanese hegemony?  hell no (ROK, China)

 The US has provided various institutions that provide benefits to its allies,
which simultaneously prevent it from exercising destabilising, unilateral foreign
policy. This allays fears of US hegemony, and also helps to ‘lock in’ beneficiaries
(NATO, post-war global trading and financial order etc—see Ikenberry’s work) –
America has provided not only rules but also institutions, rules that lock
everybody in and maintain order and American power

 Consequently, any hegemonic order other than US hegemony has become

‘unthinkable’?  Van Ness’ idea of Gramscian hegemony – Idea of American
being a relatively benign hegemon has ingrained itself in the region

China was a great beneficiary of USA hegemony because of its economy (market
expansion)

Weakening of American hegemony

 Competing dynamics

o Challenges to American power  shifts in the distribution of power in the

international system

o American impulses to withdraw  changes in security thinking within the

United States (remember that the US used to be much more isolationist
prior to WWII)
China appears to have changed its mind – they started to view American hegemony as
a nuisance

I love Independence Day, I think it’s a great movie, if not slightly nationalistic.

End of pax Americana: external reasons

 Often a point made by Realist scholars

o Great powers have always risen and fallen, and in some ways, the decline of
the US is inevitable, and was always to be expected (cyclical view of history)

o The (inevitable) rise of challengers: history has demonstrated that rising

powers are dangerous, and tend to challenge the power of the existing
hegemon (Mearsheimer). China is now taking on this role  evidence:
assertive behaviour in the South China Sea; challenges to ‘global order’
through alternative international institutions (AIIB); greater economic
presence in places traditionally considered the US/West’s ‘back yard’ (e.g.
Africa)

Cycle: rise of great power, followed by its fall – China has begun to challenge American
hegemony

But beware of ‘American Decline’ talk…!

 The American chattering classes in Washington have frequently talked about

the ‘decline of America’

o During the Cold War: we’re losing the Cold War to the Soviets!!  result: the
USSR collapsed, and US is still here;

o Shortly after the Cold War: America is in decline! Japan is going to take over
the world!  result: Japan went into a deep recession, from which it still
hasn’t fully recovered from; overtaken by China in terms of GDP

o After Japan’s ‘decline’: America is in decline! China is going to take over the
world!  result: China was actually quite cooperative during 1990-2000s.

o American empire!: American hegemony is durable! Liberal empire that has

legitimacy! American hegemony is good for the world, and others know it!

o American decline: ‘this time it’s real’  you sure? Or is this all about
nationalistic talk within Washington?
There’s a pattern of americans talking about threats to America – these (countries)
change according to what’s happening in the world at the time

When talking about American decline always think about Japan Threat Theory

Domestic pulls towards isolationism?

 Sense of overstretch? Alternative theory: if not declining, America might

withdraw from the region. The debacles of Afghanistan and Iraq have
overstretched the US, and resulted in less attention to the Asia-Pacific region,
as well as a feeling that the US can no longer afford to be the ‘world’s
policeman’?

 Discontent with ‘free-riding’ – After a while, American politicians get tired of

free riding and generosity stops – this starts affecting alliances

o Many states have been able to benefit from American security provision,
despite growing pressure from the US to shoulder more responsibilities.

o Alliance dynamics of ‘abandonment’ vs ‘entrapment’  fear of becoming

embroiled in unnecessary conflict vs being abandoned by your ally –
Alliances is navigating between abandonment and entrapment and making
sure your ally is happy

The inhabitants of the island are goats. JAPANESE goats of course.

Enter Trump…

 ‘You know we have a treaty with Japan where if Japan is attacked, we have to
use the full force and might of the United States’ ‘If we’re attacked, Japan
doesn’t have to do anything. They can sit home and watch Sony television, OK?’

 Japan pays ‘50 percent of the cost’; ‘Why don’t they pay 100 percent?’

 I want Japan and Germany and Saudi Arabia and South Korea and many of the
NATO states, nations, they owe us tremendously, we're taking care of all those
people and what I want them to do is pay up

o Part of the ‘America First’ agenda

o Classic statement of anger towards ‘freeriding’, actual or perceived.

What are the implications for withdrawal?

 Southeast Asia: fear of China filling in the power vacuum left by America’s
withdrawal

o China’s ‘salami slicing’ tactics?

o Constructing an artificial island out of a reef in the South China Seas (around
2015, when America was perceived to be taking its eye off the ball)

o The US does not have any territorial interests in the region, so is the ‘least
distrusted power’ that can maintain stability in the region; growing Chinese
power can cause anxieties.

A lot of potential to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region

At least America doesn’t have territorial interests

Implications for US withdrawl

 Northeast Asia: will the ‘cap’ that keeps in the Japanese ‘militarism genie’ be
removed?

o America’s withdrawal from the US would mean that Japan would have to
increase its defence spending by 300%, according to some – If the USA
withdraw, Japan would have to do something (they could be remilitarized) –
trigger security dilemmas

BUT

o Japan can’t afford it because it’s a rapidly ageing society = less tax payers,
increased taxes to tax payers; old people cost money (pensions, healthcare,
they don’t work), but they still vote so they need to be kept happy – Japan-
centric point of view: no way can we afford this!! We’d like the US to stay
(even if it means putting up with noisy American bases)

o Korea: a Japan with an even more powerful military  You have got to be
kidding

o China: a Japan with an even more powerful military  Hell no

 Implications: the emergence of a security dilemma?

Article 9 in the Japanese Constitutions forbids Japan to use military force for political
feuds (they can only use it for self-defense)

If Japan is attacked, the USA must help, but not the other way around.
Worst case scenario…

 Trump: "It's not like, gee whiz, nobody has them. So, North Korea has nukes.
Japan has a problem with that. I mean, they have a big problem with that.
Maybe they would in fact be better off if they defend themselves from North
Korea.” "With nukes?” "Including with nukes, yes, including with nukes,”

 Withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella: could this mean that Japan might
acquire nuclear weapons?

o DPRK  even more reason to get the bomb

o ROK  we’d better get the bomb?!

 Result: nuclear arms race?

 Proliferation of nuclear weapons?

US hegemony: a necessary ‘evil’ for the Asia-Pacific

 There are many nationalists within the region that dislike the presence of
the US in the region (lack of autonomy over security policy; unequal aspects to
security treaties; badly behaved soldiers)

 But at the same time, many states simply lack the capacity to be able to stand
up to a rising China, so keeping the US in the region is the best option.

 So the US is a country that stirs mixed, contradictory emotions.

 The end of US hegemony—always a possibility

 But perhaps the key driver of the end of US hegemony may not come from a
power-shift, but from US domestic political dynamics?

The USA is a country that prevents Japan from becoming a real sovereign state but at
the same time provides cheap security