Part 1: The Mathematics of Social Choice

Voting and Elections

The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

I What is the best way to conduct an election?

The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

I What is the best way to conduct an election?

I That is, what is the fairest way to transform a set of

individual preferences into a single societal preference?
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

I What is the best way to conduct an election?

I That is, what is the fairest way to transform a set of

individual preferences into a single societal preference?

I How can we use mathematics to design, analyze and

compare different election methods?
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

I What is the best way to conduct an election?

I That is, what is the fairest way to transform a set of

individual preferences into a single societal preference?

I How can we use mathematics to design, analyze and

compare different election methods?

I How can we use mathematics to say what “fair” means?

The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

I What is the best way to conduct an election?

I That is, what is the fairest way to transform a set of

individual preferences into a single societal preference?

I How can we use mathematics to design, analyze and

compare different election methods?

I How can we use mathematics to say what “fair” means?

I Mathematical fact: No voting method can succeed in

being completely fair all the time.
Example: 1998 Minnesota Gubernatorial Election
Candidate Percentage of Votes1
Jesse Ventura (I) 36.99% (winner)
Norm Coleman (R) 34.29%
Skip Humphrey (D) 28.09%
All others 0.63%

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minnesota_gubernatorial_election,_1998
Example: 1998 Minnesota Gubernatorial Election
Candidate Percentage of Votes1
Jesse Ventura (I) 36.99% (winner)
Norm Coleman (R) 34.29%
Skip Humphrey (D) 28.09%
All others 0.63%

I Given that the winner only received ≈ 37% of the votes,

how sure can we be that the system produced an
outcome that reflected the will of the voters?

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minnesota_gubernatorial_election,_1998
Example: 1998 Minnesota Gubernatorial Election
Candidate Percentage of Votes1
Jesse Ventura (I) 36.99% (winner)
Norm Coleman (R) 34.29%
Skip Humphrey (D) 28.09%
All others 0.63%

I Given that the winner only received ≈ 37% of the votes,

how sure can we be that the system produced an
outcome that reflected the will of the voters?
I Important Point: As mathematicians, we are studying
election methods. Who the particular candidates are, or
which parties they belong to, doesn’t matter.

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minnesota_gubernatorial_election,_1998
Who Is Society’s Choice?

Ventura: 37% Coleman: 34% Humphrey: 28%

Who Is Society’s Choice?

Larry: 37% Curly: 34% Moe: 28%

Who Is Society’s Choice?

Larry: 37% Curly: 34% Moe: 28%

Scenario 1: Supporters of both Curly and Moe would have

listed Larry as their second choice. Maybe Larry should be the
winner.
Who Is Society’s Choice?

Larry: 37% Curly: 34% Moe: 28%

Scenario 2: Supporters of both Curly and Moe would have

listed Larry as their last choice. Maybe there should be a
runoff between Curly and Moe.
Who Is Society’s Choice?

Larry: 37% Curly: 34% Moe: 28%

Scenario 3: One of the “others” would have been perfectly

satisfactory to supporters of all three named candidates.
Maybe that candidate should be the winner.
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

Suppose that voters were allowed to rank all the

candidates instead of having to choose just one.
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)
Suppose that voters were allowed to rank all the
candidates instead of having to choose just one.
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

Suppose that voters were allowed to rank all the

candidates instead of having to choose just one.

I In what different ways might we use that additional

information to design a voting method?
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

Suppose that voters were allowed to rank all the

candidates instead of having to choose just one.

I In what different ways might we use that additional

information to design a voting method?

I How can we use mathematics to analyze whether a voting

method is fair, or to compare methods to each other?
The Mathematics of Voting (Chapter 1)

Suppose that voters were allowed to rank all the

candidates instead of having to choose just one.

I In what different ways might we use that additional

information to design a voting method?

I How can we use mathematics to analyze whether a voting

method is fair, or to compare methods to each other?

I How can we use mathematics to analyze how resistant a

voting method is to strategic voting?
Strategic Voting

I In many situations, voters can affect election results by

strategic voting (a.k.a. insincere voting).

(“If my favorite candidate has no chance to win,

then I will vote instead for someone I like less,
but who has a chance to win.”)
Example: The 2000 US Presidential Election
Popular Vote Popular Vote Electoral
Candidate (US)2 (FL)3 Votes
George W. Bush 47.87% 48.847% 271
Al Gore 48.38% 48.838% 266
Ralph Nader 2.74% 1.635% 0
All others 1.01% 0.680% 0

2
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm
3
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm
Example: The 2000 US Presidential Election
Popular Vote Popular Vote Electoral
Candidate (US)2 (FL)3 Votes
George W. Bush 47.87% 48.847% 271
Al Gore 48.38% 48.838% 266
Ralph Nader 2.74% 1.635% 0
All others 1.01% 0.680% 0

“Most Nader supporters probably preferred Gore to Bush. If

they had voted for Gore, then Gore might have won Florida.”

“Some Nader supporters probably did vote for Gore. If they

had voted sincerely, Bush might have won Florida easily.”

2
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm
3
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm
Strategic Voting

I In many situations, a bloc of voters can affect election

results by strategic voting (a.k.a. insincere voting).
(“If my favorite candidate has no chance to win,
then I will vote instead for someone I like less,
but who has a chance to win.”)
Strategic Voting

I In many situations, a bloc of voters can affect election

results by strategic voting (a.k.a. insincere voting).
(“If my favorite candidate has no chance to win,
then I will vote instead for someone I like less,
but who has a chance to win.”)

I Mathematics takes no stance on whether strategic voting

is moral or immoral.
Strategic Voting

I In many situations, a bloc of voters can affect election

results by strategic voting (a.k.a. insincere voting).
(“If my favorite candidate has no chance to win,
then I will vote instead for someone I like less,
but who has a chance to win.”)

I Mathematics takes no stance on whether strategic voting

is moral or immoral.

I The real problem with strategic voting is that it reduces

the effectiveness of the voting system itself.
Impossibility Theorems

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: No voting method is

completely resistant to strategic voting.
Impossibility Theorems

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: No voting method is

completely resistant to strategic voting.

Arrow’s Theorem: No matter what voting method you

choose, it is possible for the vote to turn out in such a way
that the system produces a seemingly unfair result.
Impossibility Theorems

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: No voting method is

completely resistant to strategic voting.

Arrow’s Theorem: No matter what voting method you

choose, it is possible for the vote to turn out in such a way
that the system produces a seemingly unfair result.

I These “impossibility theorems” are what makes voting

theory interesting. There is room for debate about which
system is “best”, but that debate should be informed by
objective truth (that is, mathematics).
Ballots and Preference Schedules (§1.1)

Example (Tannenbaum, p.4): Electing a Math Club president.

I Candidates: Alisha (A), Boris (B), Carmen (C), Dave (D).

I Each of the 37 club members submits a ballot listing his

or her first, second, third and fourth choices.

I Who should be the winner?

Voting Theory Terminology

Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all

eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
Voting Theory Terminology

Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all

eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
I Transitivity assumption: If voter prefers P over Q and
prefers Q over R, then that voter must prefer P over R.
Voting Theory Terminology

Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all

eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
I Transitivity assumption: If voter prefers P over Q and
prefers Q over R, then that voter must prefer P over R.
I Elimination assumption: If a voter prefers P over Q,
and R drops out of (or enters) the race, then that voter
still prefers P over Q.
The Transitivity Assumption
The Elimination Assumption
Voting Theory Terminology

Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all

eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
I Transitivity assumption: If voter prefers P over Q and
prefers Q over R, then that voter must prefer P over R.
I Elimination assumption: If a voter prefers P over Q,
and R drops out of (or enters) the race, then that voter
still prefers P over Q.
Voting Theory Terminology

Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all

eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
I Transitivity assumption: If voter prefers P over Q and
prefers Q over R, then that voter must prefer P over R.
I Elimination assumption: If a voter prefers P over Q,
and R drops out of (or enters) the race, then that voter
still prefers P over Q.

Preference schedule: A table of how many times each

possible ballot was submitted.
Voting Theory Terminology
Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all
eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
I Transitivity: If voter prefers P over Q and prefers Q over
R, then that voter must prefer P over R.
I Elimination: If a voter prefers P over Q, and R drops
out of (or enters) the race, then that voter still prefers P
over Q.

Preference schedule: A table of how many times each

possible ballot was submitted.
Voting Theory Terminology
Preference ballot: A ballot on which each voter ranks all
eligible candidates, from first to last place. (Ties are not
allowed.)
I Transitivity: If voter prefers P over Q and prefers Q over
R, then that voter must prefer P over R.
I Elimination: If a voter prefers P over Q, and R drops
out of (or enters) the race, then that voter still prefers P
over Q.

Preference schedule: A table of how many times each

possible ballot was submitted.
Voting method: A mathematical procedure that uses data
from the preference schedule to determine a winner.
The Plurality Method (Tannenbaum, §1.2)

The Plurality Method: Whoever receives more first-place

votes than any other candidate wins the election.

(a.k.a. “simple plurality”; “first-past-the-post”; “standard

voting”)
The Plurality Method (Tannenbaum, §1.2)

The Plurality Method: Whoever receives more first-place

votes than any other candidate wins the election.

(a.k.a. “simple plurality”; “first-past-the-post”; “standard

voting”)

I By far the most simple and widely-used voting method

The Plurality Method (Tannenbaum, §1.2)

The Plurality Method: Whoever receives more first-place

votes than any other candidate wins the election.

(a.k.a. “simple plurality”; “first-past-the-post”; “standard

voting”)

I By far the most simple and widely-used voting method

I May require a tiebreaker (which we won’t worry about)
The Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
The Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
The Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1 Candidate Votes

1st choice A C D B C A 14
2nd choice B B C D D B 4
3rd choice C D B C B C 11
4th choice D A A A A D 8
The Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1 Candidate Votes

1st choice A C D B C A 14
2nd choice B B C D D B 4
3rd choice C D B C B C 11
4th choice D A A A A D 8

I Candidate A is declared the winner.

The Plurality Method

The Plurality Method: Whoever receives more first-place

votes than any other candidate wins the election.
The Plurality Method

The Plurality Method: Whoever receives more first-place

votes than any other candidate wins the election.

An important distinction:
The Plurality Method

The Plurality Method: Whoever receives more first-place

votes than any other candidate wins the election.

An important distinction:

I Majority means “more than 50% of the votes”

I Plurality just means “more votes than any other
candidate”

These terms are not synonyms!

Majority vs. Plurality

I Majority means “more than 50% of the votes”

I Plurality means “more votes than any other candidate”
Majority vs. Plurality

I Majority means “more than 50% of the votes”

I Plurality means “more votes than any other candidate”

Every majority is a plurality,

but not every plurality is a majority.

In every election, some candidate receives a

plurality,
but there need not be a majority candidate.
Majority vs. Plurality

I Majority means “more than 50% of the votes”

I Plurality means “more votes than any other candidate”

Every majority is a plurality,

but not every plurality is a majority.

In every election, some candidate receives a

plurality,
but there need not be a majority candidate.
Majority vs. Plurality

Example 1: Math Club election.

I 37 votes cast; majority = 19 votes (since 37/2 = 18 1 ).
2
I Results: Alisha 14, Boris 4, Carmen 11, Dave 8.

I Alisha received a plurality, but not a majority.

Example 2: 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election.

I Majority = any percentage above 50%.

I Results: Ventura 37%, Coleman 34%, Humphrey 28%.

I Ventura received a plurality, but not a majority.

Evaluating the Plurality Method

The Plurality Method: Count the first-place votes received

by each candidate. Whoever receives the most first-place votes
is declared the winner.

I If there is a majority candidate, the Plurality Method

selects that candidate as the winner (because every
majority is also a plurality).

I If there is no majority candidate, then the Plurality

Method may produce problematic results.

To see why, we need to look at the whole preference schedule.

Evaluating the Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
Evaluating the Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A
Evaluating the Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1 Candidate Votes

1st choice A C D B C A 14
2nd choice B B C D D B 4
3rd choice C D B C B C 11
4th choice D A A A A D 8
Evaluating the Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1 Candidate Votes

1st choice A C D B C A 14
2nd choice B B C D D B 4
3rd choice C D B C B C 11
4th choice D A A A A D 8

I Candidate A is declared the winner. . .

Evaluating the Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1 Candidate Votes

1st choice A C D B C A 14
2nd choice B B C D D B 4
3rd choice C D B C B C 11
4th choice D A A A A D 8

I Candidate A is declared the winner. . .

I despite being the last choice of a majority of voters!
Evaluating the Plurality Method

Example: The Math Club election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1 Candidate Votes

1st choice A C D B C A 14
2nd choice B B C D D B 4
3rd choice C D B C B C 11
4th choice D A A A A D 8

I Candidate A is declared the winner. . .

I despite being the last choice of a majority of voters!
I Any other candidate would beat A in a
head-to-head election!
Fairness Criteria

A fairness criterion is a mathematical statement about our

expectations for a voting system.
Fairness Criteria

A fairness criterion is a mathematical statement about our

expectations for a voting system.

The Majority Criterion:

“If Candidate X receives a majority of the first-place
votes, then X should win the election.”
Fairness Criteria

A fairness criterion is a mathematical statement about our

expectations for a voting system.

The Majority Criterion:

“If Candidate X receives a majority of the first-place
votes, then X should win the election.”
The Majority Criterion

The Majority Criterion:

“If Candidate X receives a majority of the first-place
votes, then X should win the election.”
The Majority Criterion

The Majority Criterion:

“If Candidate X receives a majority of the first-place
votes, then X should win the election.”

I The Plurality Method satisfies the Majority Criterion

because every majority is also a plurality.
The Majority Criterion

The Majority Criterion:

“If Candidate X receives a majority of the first-place
votes, then X should win the election.”

I The Plurality Method satisfies the Majority Criterion

because every majority is also a plurality.

Note: “Satisfies” means “always satisfies.” That is, if there

is a majority candidate, then that candidate is always declared
the winner by the Plurality Method.
The Condorcet Criterion

The Condorcet Criterion: If Candidate Z would beat any

other candidate in a head-to-head contest, then Candidate Z
should win the election.

(Such a candidate Z, if one exists, is called a Condorcet

candidate or Condorcet winner. Not every election
necessarily has one.)
Back to the Math Club Election

# Voters 14 10 8 4 1
1st choice A C D B C
2nd choice B B C D D
3rd choice C D B C B
4th choice D A A A A

Is there a Condorcet winner?

The Condorcet Criterion

The Condorcet Criterion: If Candidate Z would beat any

other candidate in a head-to-head contest, then Candidate Z
should win the election.
The Condorcet Criterion

The Condorcet Criterion: If Candidate Z would beat any

other candidate in a head-to-head contest, then Candidate Z
should win the election.

I The Plurality Method fails the Condorcet Criterion.

I That is, it is possible for an election to have a Condorcet

candidate, but for that candidate not to win under the
Plurality Method.

I (This doesn’t mean that a Condorcet candidate never

wins — only that s/he might not win.)
The Plurality Method and Fairness Criteria

The Plurality Method satisfies the Majority Criterion.

I That is, in every election held using the Plurality
Method, if there is a majority candidate, then that
candidate will win.

The Plurality Method fails the Condorcet Criterion.

I That is, in some elections held using the Plurality
Method, there is a candidate who would beat every other
candidate head-to-head, but does not win the election.
The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting

The Plurality Method is often vulnerable to strategic voting:

“If my favorite candidate has no chance to win, then

maybe I should vote instead for someone I like less,
but who has a chance to win.”
The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting
Example: The KU Tiddlywinks Club is trying to decide what
kind of pizza to order — sausage, eggplant, or pineapple. The
club members’ preferences are as follows:

# Voters 5 3 7 2
1st choice S S E P
2nd choice E P P E
3rd choice P E S S

1. Who wins?
2. If you are one of the two voters who loves pineapple and
hates sausage, what should you do?
The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting

Example: The KU Tiddlywinks Club is trying to decide what

kind of pizza to order — sausage, eggplant, or pineapple.

Real preferences Actual vote

# Voters 5 3 7 2 5 3 9
1st choice S S E P S S E
2nd choice E P P E E P P
3rd choice P E S S P E S

Plurality winner: Sausage

Plurality winner: Eggplant
The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting

I Whenever voters have an incentive to vote strategically

(that is, to vote differently from their true preferences),
the voting method may be flawed.
The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting

I Reminder: Mathematics takes no position on whether

strategic voting is moral or immoral.
The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting

I Reminder: Mathematics takes no position on whether

strategic voting is moral or immoral.

I Strategic voting is impossible to eliminate entirely.

The Plurality Method and Strategic Voting

I Reminder: Mathematics takes no position on whether

strategic voting is moral or immoral.

I Strategic voting is impossible to eliminate entirely.

I On the other hand, strategic voting reduces the

effectiveness of the voting method.
I So, in order to reflect society’s preferences as accurately
as possible, mathematics should try to minimize the
opportunities for strategic voting.