Ford V Montana 8th Judicial District

FORD MOTOR CO. v. MONT EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIST.
COURT 1017
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
decision rests on anything beyond an

‘‘analysis of the common law of arrest.’’ FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Petitioner
Ante, at 1003. But there is no surmise
v.
about it. The majority itself tells us that its
decision is also justified by the need to MONTANA EIGHTH JUDICIAL
‘‘avoi[d] TTT line-drawing problems,’’ pro- DISTRICT COURT, et al.;
tect ‘‘personal security,’’ and advance the
‘‘privacy’’ interests that form the ‘‘essence’’ Ford Motor Company, Petitioner
of the Fourth Amendment. Having invoked
v.
these sundry considerations, it’s hard to
see how the majority might disown them. Adam Bandemer
* Nos. 19–368 and 19–369
To rule as it does, the majority must Supreme Court of the United States.
endow the term ‘‘seizure’’ with two differ-
ent meanings at the same time. It must Argued October 7, 2020
disregard the dominant rule of the com- Decided March 25, 2021 *
mon law. It must disparage this Court’s Background: In first of two cases, non-
existing case law for erasing distinctions resident vehicle manufacturer filed petition
that never existed. It cannot even guaran- for writ of supervisory control, following
tee that its new rule will offer great effi- an order of the Eighth Judicial District
ciencies or meaningfully vindicate the pen- Court of Montana, Cascade County, Eliza-
umbral promises it supposes. Instead, we beth Best, J., denying its motion to dismiss
are asked to skip from one snippet to for lack of personal jurisdiction in action
another, finally landing on a long-aban- for design defect, failure to warn, and neg-
doned debt-collection practice that must be ligence brought by personal representative
reengineered to do the work the majority of resident driver who died following vehi-
wishes done. Our final destination confuses cle rollover in Montana. The Montana Su-
a battery for a seizure and an attempted preme Court, Laurie McKinnon, J., 395
seizure with its completion. All this is Mont. 478, 443 P.3d 407, granted the writ,
miles from where the standard principles and affirmed. In second case, which in-
of interpretation lead and just as far from volved a different model manufactured by
the Constitution’s original meaning. And the same manufacturer, passenger who
for what? A new rule that may seem was injured in an automobile accident in
tempting at first blush, but that offers Minnesota brought claims for products lia-
those like Ms. Torres little more than false bility, negligence, and breach-of-warranty.
hope in the end. The District Court of Minnesota, Todd
Respectfully, I dissent. County, Douglas P. Anderson, J., denied
manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. Manufacturer ap-
, pealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals,

913 N.W.2d 710, Reyes, J., affirmed. Re-
view was granted. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, McKeig, J., 931 N.W.2d 744, af-
* Together with No. 19–369, Ford Motor Co. v. L.Ed.2d 519, on certiorari to the Supreme
Bandemer, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 916, 205 Court of Minnesota.
1018 141 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
firmed. Certiorari was granted in both 3. Constitutional Law O3964

cases. Under the Due Process Clause, a
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Justice state court may exercise general personal
Kagan, held that: jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
when a defendant is essentially at home in
(1) due process test for specific personal
the State. U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
jurisdiction did not depend on a strict
causation-only approach that would ask 4. Courts O13.3(7)
where the vehicles were originally sold, General personal jurisdiction extends
or where they were designed and man- to any and all claims brought against a
ufacture, and nonresident defendant, and those claims
(2) manufacturer’s substantial business in need not relate to the forum State or the
forum States supported specific per- defendant’s activity there; they may con-
sonal jurisdiction under due process cern events and conduct anywhere in the
principles. world.
Affirmed. 5. Courts O13.3(7), 13.4(3)
In the paradigm case, an individual is
Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in
subject to general personal jurisdiction in
the judgment.
her place of domicile, and the equivalent
Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concur- forums for a corporation are its place of
ring in the judgment, in which Justice incorporation and principal place of busi-
Thomas joined. ness.
Justice Barrett took no part in the consid- 6. Constitutional Law O3964

eration or decision of the cases. For the Due Process Clause to allow a
court to exercise specific personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant, the de-
1. Constitutional Law O3964 fendant must take some act by which it
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
conducting activities within the forum
Process Clause limits a state court’s power
State, and the contacts must be the defen-
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
dant’s own choice and not random, isolat-
nonresident defendant. U.S. Const.
ed, or fortuitous, thereby showing that the
Amend. 14.
defendant deliberately reached out beyond
2. Constitutional Law O3964 its home, by, for example, exploiting a
market in the forum State or entering a
A court’s authority under the Due
contractual relationship centered there.
Process Clause to exercise personal juris-
U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
diction over a nonresident defendant de-
pends on the defendant’s having such 7. Courts O13.3(8)
contacts with the forum State that the For specific personal jurisdiction over
maintenance of the suit is reasonable, in a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff’s
the context of the federal system of gov- claims must arise out of or relate to the
ernment, and depends on the exercise of defendant’s contacts with the forum State,
jurisdiction not offending traditional no- or put just a bit differently, there must be
tions of fair play and substantial justice. an affiliation between the forum State and
U.S. Const. Amend. 14. the underlying controversy, principally, an
FORD MOTOR CO. v. MONT EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT 1019
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
activity or an occurrence that takes place as it must to adequately protect defen-

in the forum State and that is therefore dants who are foreign to a forum, but the
subject to the State’s regulation. specific jurisdiction inquiry does not al-
ways require proof of causation, i.e., proof
8. Constitutional Law O3964
that the plaintiff’s claim came about be-
Due process principles with respect to
cause of the defendant’s in-state conduct.
specific personal jurisdiction reflect two
sets of values—treating defendants fairly
and protecting interstate federalism. U.S. 12. Constitutional Law O3965(4)
Const. Amend. 14. When a nonresident corporation has
9. Constitutional Law O3964 continuously and deliberately exploited a
State’s market, it must reasonably antici-
Due process principles with respect to
pate being haled into that State’s courts to
specific personal jurisdiction seek to en-
defend actions based on products causing
sure that States with little legitimate inter-
injury there, for purposes of due process
est in a suit do not encroach on States
limits on specific personal jurisdiction.
more affected by the controversy. U.S.
Const. Amend. 14.
13. Constitutional Law O3965(4)
10. Constitutional Law O3965(4)
Courts O13.5(8) Courts O13.5(8)
Determination of whether nonresident Nonresident vehicle manufacturer’s
vehicle manufacturer’s activities in two fo- substantial business in two forum States,
rum States were sufficiently connected to which included advertising, selling, and
products liability suits brought in those servicing vehicle models that allegedly
States by the estate of a resident driver or were defective, constituted sufficient con-
by a resident passenger, relating to acci- tacts with forum States, so that due pro-
dents in which the vehicles allegedly mal- cess would allow specific personal jurisdic-
functioned in a forum State, so that due tion for products liability suits brought in
process would allow state courts to exer- forum States by the estate of a resident
cise specific personal jurisdiction over driver or by a resident passenger, relating
manufacturer, did not depend on a strict to accidents in which the vehicles allegedly
causation-only approach that would ask malfunctioned in a forum State. U.S.
whether the manufacturer originally sold Const. Amend. 14.
in each forum State the particular vehicle 14. Constitutional Law O3965(4)
involved in the accident, or whether the
Courts O13.5(8)
manufacturer designed and manufactured
Principles of interstate federalism
the vehicle in the forum State; rather, it
supported determination that due process
would be sufficient if the suits related to
allowed specific personal jurisdiction for
manufacturer’s contacts with forum States.
products liability suits against nonresident
vehicle manufacturer in two forum States,
11. Constitutional Law O3964 brought by the estate of a resident driver
For a suit to ‘‘relate to’’ a nonresident or by a resident passenger, relating to
defendant’s contacts with the forum accidents in which the vehicles allegedly
States, for purposes of due process limits malfunctioned in a forum State; forum
on specific personal jurisdiction, the States had significant interests in provid-
phrase ‘‘relate to’’ incorporates real limits, ing their residents with a convenient forum
for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of- Held: The connection between the
state actors, as well as enforcing their own plaintiffs’ claims and Ford’s activities in
safety regulations. U.S. Const. Amend. the forum States is close enough to sup-
14. port specific jurisdiction. Pp. 1023 – 1032.
Syllabus * (a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Ford Motor Company is a global auto Process Clause limits a state court’s power
company, incorporated in Delaware and to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.
headquartered in Michigan. Ford markets, The canonical decision in this area remains
sells, and services its products across the International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
United States and overseas. The company U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. There,
also encourages a resale market for its the Court held that a tribunal’s authority
vehicles. In each of these two cases, a state depends on the defendant’s having such
court exercised jurisdiction over Ford in a ‘‘contacts’’ with the forum State that ‘‘the
products-liability suit stemming from a car maintenance of the suit’’ is ‘‘reasonable’’
accident that injured a resident in the and ‘‘does not offend traditional notions of
State. The first suit alleged that a 1996 fair play and substantial justice.’’ Id., at
Ford Explorer had malfunctioned, killing 316–317, 66 S.Ct. 154. In applying that
Markkaya Gullett near her home in Mon- formulation, the Court has long focused on
tana. In the second suit, Adam Bandemer the nature and extent of ‘‘the defendant’s
claimed that he was injured in a collision relationship to the forum State.’’ Bristol-
on a Minnesota road involving a defective Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
1994 Crown Victoria. Ford moved to dis- Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. ––––,
miss both suits for lack of personal juris- ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779, 198 L.Ed.2d 395
diction. It argued that each state court had
That focus has led to the recognition of
jurisdiction only if the company’s conduct
two types of personal jurisdiction: general
in the State had given rise to the plaintiff’s
and specific jurisdiction. A state court may
claims. And that causal link existed, ac-
exercise general jurisdiction only when a
cording to Ford, only if the company had
defendant is ‘‘essentially at home’’ in the
designed, manufactured, or sold in the
State. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
State the particular vehicle involved in the
S. A v. Brown, 564 U.S 915, 919, 131 S.Ct.
accident. In neither suit could the plaintiff
make that showing. The vehicles were de- 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796. Specific jurisdiction
signed and manufactured elsewhere, and covers defendants less intimately connect-
the company had originally sold the cars at ed with a State, but only as to a narrower
issue outside the forum States. Only later class of claims. To be subject to that kind
resales and relocations by consumers had of jurisdiction, the defendant must take
brought the vehicles to Montana and ‘‘some act by which [it] purposefully avails
Minnesota. Both States’ supreme courts itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
rejected Ford’s argument. Each held that ties within the forum State.’’ Hanson v.
the company’s activities in the State had Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2
the needed connection to the plaintiff’s al- L.Ed.2d 1283. And the plaintiff’s claims
legations that a defective Ford caused in- ‘‘must arise out of or relate to the defen-
state injury. dant’s contacts’’ with the forum. Bristol-
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber
of the Court but has been prepared by the & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct.
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
Myers, 582 U. S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at allegedly malfunctioned in those States.
1786. Pp. 1023 – 1026. Apart from sales, the company works hard
(b) Ford admits that it has ‘‘purpose- to foster ongoing connections to its cars’
fully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of con- owners. All this Montana- and Minnesota-
ducting activities’’ in both States. Hanson, based conduct relates to the claims in
357 U.S., at 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228. The compa- these cases, brought by state residents in
ny’s claim is instead that those activities the States’ courts. Put slightly differently,
are insufficiently connected to the suits. In because Ford had systematically served a
Ford’s view, due process requires a causal market in Montana and Minnesota for the
link locating jurisdiction only in the State very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege mal-
where Ford sold the car in question, or the functioned and injured them in those
States where Ford designed and manufac- States, there is a strong ‘‘relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the
tured the vehicle. And because none of
litigation’’—the ‘‘essential foundation’’ of
these things occurred in Montana or
specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacio-
Minnesota, those States’ courts have no
nales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
power over these cases.
408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404.
Ford’s causation-only approach finds Allowing jurisdiction in these circum-
no support in this Court’s requirement of a stances both treats Ford fairly and serves
‘‘connection’’ between a plaintiff’s suit and principles of ‘‘interstate federalism.’’
a defendant’s activities. Bristol-Myers, 582 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 293,
U. S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1776. The most 100 S.Ct. 580. Pp. 1026 – 1030.
common formulation of that rule demands
(c) Bristol-Myers and Walden v.
that the suit ‘‘arise out of or relate to the
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188
defendant’s contacts with the forum.’’ Id., L.Ed.2d 12, reinforce all that the Court
at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1776. The second half has said about why Montana’s and Minne-
of that formulation, following the word sota’s courts may decide these cases. In
‘‘or,’’ extends beyond causality. So the in- Bristol-Myers, the Court found jurisdiction
quiry is not over if a causal test would put improper because the forum State, and the
jurisdiction elsewhere. Another State’s defendant’s activities there, lacked any
courts may yet have jurisdiction, because connection to the plaintiffs’ claims. 582 U.
of a non-causal ‘‘affiliation between the S., at ––––. That is not true of these cases,
forum and the underlying controversy, where the plaintiffs are residents of the
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence forum States, used the allegedly defective
involving the defendant that takes place products in the forum States, and suffered
within the State’s borders.’’ Id., at –––– w injuries when those products malfunc-
––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1776. tioned there. And Walden does not show,
And this Court has stated that specific as Ford claims, that a plaintiff’s residence
jurisdiction attaches in cases identical to and place of injury can never support ju-
this one—when a company cultivates a risdiction. The defendant in Walden had
market for a product in the forum State never formed any contact with the forum
and the product malfunctions there. See State. Ford, by contrast, has a host of
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood- forum connections. The place of a plain-
son, 444 U. S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 tiff’s injury and residence may be relevant
L.Ed.2d 490. Here, Ford advertises and in assessing the link between those con-
markets its vehicles in Montana and nections and the plaintiff’s suit. Pp. 1030 –
Minnesota, including the two models that 1032.
No. 19–368, 395 Mont. 478, 443 P. 3d Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of
407, and No. 19–369, 931 N. W. 2d 744, the Court.
affirmed.
In each of these two cases, a state court
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of
held that it had jurisdiction over Ford
the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and
Motor Company in a products-liability suit
BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and
stemming from a car accident. The acci-
KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. ALITO, J.,
dent happened in the State where suit was
filed an opinion concurring in the
brought. The victim was one of the State’s
judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion
residents. And Ford did substantial busi-
concurring in the judgment, in which
ness in the State—among other things,
THOMAS, J., joined. BARRETT, J., took
advertising, selling, and servicing the mod-
no part in the consideration or decision of
el of vehicle the suit claims is defective.
the cases.
Still, Ford contends that jurisdiction is
improper because the particular car in-
Sean Marotta, Washington, DC, for the volved in the crash was not first sold in the
petitioner. forum State, nor was it designed or manu-
Deepak Gupta, Washington, DC, for the factured there. We reject that argument.
respondents. When a company like Ford serves a mar-
Neal Kumar Katyal, Jessica L. Ells- ket for a product in a State and that
worth, Sean Marotta, Counsel of Record, product causes injury in the State to one of
Kirti Datla, Mitchell P. Reich, Reedy C. its residents, the State’s courts may enter-
Swanson, Erin R. Chapman, Hogan Lo- tain the resulting suit.
vells US LLP, Washington, D.C, Counsel
for Petitioner. I
Jennifer Bennett, Neil K. Sawhney, Ford is a global auto company. It is
Gupta Wessler PLLC, San Francisco, CA, incorporated in Delaware and headquar-
Deepak Gupta, Counsel of Record, Daniel tered in Michigan. But its business is ev-
Wilf-Townsend, Gregory A. Beck, Larkin erywhere. Ford markets, sells, and ser-
Turner, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washing- vices its products across the United States
ton, DC, Kyle W. Farrar, Wesley Todd and overseas. In this country alone, the
Ball, Mark Bankston, Kaster, Lynch, Far- company annually distributes over 2.5 mil-
rar & Ball, LLP, Houston, TX, Dennis P. lion new cars, trucks, and SUVs to over
Connor, Keith D. Marr, Conner & Marr 3,200 licensed dealerships. See App. 70,
PLLP, Great Falls, MT, Counsel for re- 100. Ford also encourages a resale market
spondents. for its products: Almost all its dealerships
Neal Kumar Katyal, Jessica L. Ells- buy and sell used Fords, as well as selling
worth, Sean Marotta, Kirti Datla, Mitchell new ones. To enhance its brand and in-
P. Reich, Reedy C. Swanson, Erin R. crease its sales, Ford engages in wide-
Chapman, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Wash- ranging promotional activities, including
ington, D.C., for petitioner. television, print, online, and direct-mail ad-
vertisements. No matter where you live,
For U.S. Supreme Court Briefs, see:
you’ve seen them: ‘‘Have you driven a
2020 WL 2133053 (Reply.Brief) Ford lately?’’ or ‘‘Built Ford Tough.’’ Ford
2020 WL 1531238 (Resp.Brief) also ensures that consumers can keep their
2020 WL 1154744 (Pet.Brief) vehicles running long past the date of sale.
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
The company provides original parts to hicle involved in the accident.1 In neither
auto supply stores and repair shops across suit could the plaintiff make that showing.
the country. (Goes another slogan: ‘‘Keep Ford had designed the Explorer and
your Ford a Ford.’’) And Ford’s own net- Crown Victoria in Michigan, and it had
work of dealers offers an array of mainte- manufactured the cars in (respectively)
nance and repair services, thus fostering Kentucky and Canada. Still more, the com-
an ongoing relationship between Ford and pany had originally sold the cars at issue
its customers. outside the forum States—the Explorer in
Accidents involving two of Ford’s vehi- Washington, the Crown Victoria in North
cles—a 1996 Explorer and a 1994 Crown Dakota. Only later resales and relocations
Victoria—are at the heart of the suits be- by consumers had brought the vehicles to
fore us. One case comes from Montana. Montana and Minnesota. That meant, in
Markkaya Gullett was driving her Explor- Ford’s view, that the courts of those States
er near her home in the State when the could not decide the suits.
tread separated from a rear tire. The vehi- Both the Montana and the Minnesota
cle spun out, rolled into a ditch, and came Supreme Courts (affirming lower court de-
to rest upside down. Gullett died at the cisions) rejected Ford’s argument. The
scene of the crash. The representative of Montana court began by detailing the var-
her estate sued Ford in Montana state ied ways Ford ‘‘purposefully’’ seeks to
court, bringing claims for a design defect, ‘‘serve the market in Montana.’’ 395 Mont.
failure to warn, and negligence. The sec- 478, 488, 443 P.3d 407, 414 (2019). The
ond case comes from Minnesota. Adam company advertises in the State; ‘‘has thir-
Bandemer was a passenger in his friend’s ty-six dealerships’’ there; ‘‘sells automo-
Crown Victoria, traveling on a rural road biles, specifically Ford Explorers[,] and
in the State to a favorite ice-fishing spot. parts’’ to Montana residents; and provides
When his friend rear-ended a snowplow, them with ‘‘certified repair, replacement,
this car too landed in a ditch. Bandemer’s and recall services.’’ Ibid. Next, the court
air bag failed to deploy, and he suffered assessed the relationship between those
serious brain damage. He sued Ford in activities and the Gullett suit. Ford’s con-
Minnesota state court, asserting products- duct, said the court, encourages ‘‘Montana
liability, negligence, and breach-of-warran- residents to drive Ford vehicles.’’ Id., at
ty claims. 491, 443 P.3d at 416. When that driving
Ford moved to dismiss the two suits for causes in-state injury, the ensuing claims
lack of personal jurisdiction, on basically have enough of a tie to Ford’s Montana
identical grounds. According to Ford, the activities to support jurisdiction. Whether
state court (whether in Montana or Minne- Ford ‘‘designed, manufactured, or sold
sota) had jurisdiction only if the company’s [the] vehicle’’ in the State, the court con-
conduct in the State had given rise to the cluded, is ‘‘immaterial.’’ Ibid. Minnesota’s
plaintiff ’s claims. And that causal link Supreme Court agreed. It highlighted how
existed, Ford continued, only if the compa- Ford’s ‘‘marketing and advertisements’’ in-
ny had designed, manufactured, or—most fluenced state residents to ‘‘purchase and
likely—sold in the State the particular ve- drive more Ford vehicles.’’ 931 N.W.2d
1. Ford’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dis- Support of Motion to Dismiss in No. 77–cv–
miss in Lucero v. Ford Motor Co., No. DV–18– 16–1025 (7th Jud. Dist., Todd Cty., Minn.), pp.
247 (8th Jud. Dist., Cascade Cty., Mont.), pp. 11w12, and n. 3.
14w15; Ford Motor Co.’s Memorandum in
744, 754 (2019). Indeed, Ford had sold in Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
Minnesota ‘‘more than 2,000 1994 Crown 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796
Victoria[s]’’—the ‘‘very type of car’’ in- (2011).
volved in Bandemer’s suit. Id., at 751, 754.
That the ‘‘particular vehicle’’ injuring him [3–5] A state court may exercise gen-
was ‘‘designed, manufactured, [and first] eral jurisdiction only when a defendant is
sold’’ elsewhere made no difference. Id., at ‘‘essentially at home’’ in the State. Ibid.
753 (emphasis in original). In the court’s General jurisdiction, as its name implies,
view, Ford’s Minnesota activities still had extends to ‘‘any and all claims’’ brought
the needed connection to Bandemer’s alle- against a defendant. Ibid. Those claims
gations that a defective Crown Victoria need not relate to the forum State or the
caused in-state injury. See id., at 754. defendant’s activity there; they may con-
We granted certiorari to consider if cern events and conduct anywhere in the
Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these world. But that breadth imposes a correla-
cases. 589 U. S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 917, 205 tive limit: Only a select ‘‘set of affiliations
L.Ed.2d 519 (2020). We hold that it is. with a forum’’ will expose a defendant to
such sweeping jurisdiction. Daimler AG v.
II Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746,
187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). In what we have
A
called the ‘‘paradigm’’ case, an individual is
[1, 2] The Fourteenth Amendment’s subject to general jurisdiction in her place
Due Process Clause limits a state court’s of domicile. Ibid. (internal quotation marks
power to exercise jurisdiction over a defen- omitted). And the ‘‘equivalent’’ forums for
dant. The canonical decision in this area a corporation are its place of incorporation
remains International Shoe Co. v. Wash- and principal place of business. Ibid. (in-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 ternal quotation marks omitted); see id., at
L.Ed. 95 (1945). There, the Court held that 139, 134 S.Ct. 746, n. 19 (leaving open ‘‘the
a tribunal’s authority depends on the de- possibility that in an exceptional case’’ a
fendant’s having such ‘‘contacts’’ with the corporation might also be ‘‘at home’’ else-
forum State that ‘‘the maintenance of the where). So general jurisdiction over Ford
suit’’ is ‘‘reasonable, in the context of our (as all parties agree) attaches in Delaware
federal system of government,’’ and ‘‘does and Michigan—not in Montana and Minne-
not offend traditional notions of fair play sota. See supra, at 1022.
and substantial justice.’’ Id., at 316–317, 66
S.Ct. 154 (internal quotation marks omit- [6, 7] Specific jurisdiction is different:
ted). In giving content to that formulation, It covers defendants less intimately con-
the Court has long focused on the nature nected with a State, but only as to a
and extent of ‘‘the defendant’s relationship narrower class of claims. The contacts
to the forum State.’’ Bristol-Myers Squibb needed for this kind of jurisdiction often
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Fran- go by the name ‘‘purposeful availment.’’
cisco Cty., 582 U. S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
1773, 1779, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) (citing 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528
cases). That focus led to our recognizing (1985). The defendant, we have said, must
two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general take ‘‘some act by which [it] purposefully
(sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction avails itself of the privilege of conducting
and specific (sometimes called case-linked) activities within the forum State.’’ Hanson
jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct.
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The contacts dants fairly and protecting ‘‘interstate fed-
must be the defendant’s own choice and eralism.’’ World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
not ‘‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’’ Kee- Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 293, 100 S.Ct. 580,
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); see id., at 297–298,
770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 100 S.Ct. 580. Our decision in Internation-
(1984). They must show that the defendant al Shoefounded specific jurisdiction on an
deliberately ‘‘reached out beyond’’ its idea of reciprocity between a defendant
home—by, for example, ‘‘exploi[ting] a and a State: When (but only when) a com-
market’’ in the forum State or entering a pany ‘‘exercises the privilege of conducting
contractual relationship centered there. activities within a state’’—thus ‘‘enjoy[ing]
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285, 134 the benefits and protection of [its] laws’’—
S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (internal the State may hold the company to account
quotation marks and alterations omitted). for related misconduct. 326 U.S., at 319, 66
Yet even then—because the defendant is S.Ct. 154; see Burger King, 471 U.S., at
not ‘‘at home’’—the forum State may exer- 475w476, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Later decisions
cise jurisdiction in only certain cases. The have added that our doctrine similarly pro-
plaintiff ’s claims, we have often stated, vides defendants with ‘‘fair warning’’—
‘‘must arise out of or relate to the defen- knowledge that ‘‘a particular activity may
dant’s contacts’’ with the forum. Bristol- subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign
Myers, 582 U. S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., 1780 sovereign.’’ Id., at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (in-
(quoting Daimler, 571 U.S., at 127, 134 ternal quotation marks omitted); World-
S.Ct. 746; alterations omitted); see, e.g., Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S., at 297, 100
Burger King, 471 U.S., at 472, 105 S.Ct. S.Ct. 580 (likewise referring to ‘‘clear no-
2174; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom- tice’’). A defendant can thus ‘‘structure
[its] primary conduct’’ to lessen or avoid
bia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104
exposure to a given State’s courts. Id., at
S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); Interna-
297, 100 S.Ct. 580. And this Court has
tional Shoe, 326 U.S., at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154.
considered alongside defendants’ interests
Or put just a bit differently, ‘‘there must
those of the States in relation to each
be ‘an affiliation between the forum and
other. One State’s ‘‘sovereign power to
the underlying controversy, principally,
try’’ a suit, we have recognized, may pre-
[an] activity or an occurrence that takes
vent ‘‘sister States’’ from exercising their
place in the forum State and is therefore
like authority. Id., at 293, 100 S.Ct. 580.
subject to the State’s regulation.’ ’’ Bristol-
The law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks
Myers, 582 U. S., at –––– w ––––, ––––,
to ensure that States with ‘‘little legitimate
137 S.Ct., at 1780 (quoting Goodyear, 564
interest’’ in a suit do not encroach on
U.S., at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846).
States more affected by the controversy.
[8, 9] These rules derive from and re- Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at ––––, 137
flect two sets of values—treating defen- S.Ct., at 1780.2
2. One of the concurrences here expresses a modern features, and it decides them on
worry that our International Shoe-based body grounds that (as it agrees) are much the same
of law is not ‘‘well suited for the way in which as ours. See post, at 1033 – 1034; compare
business is now conducted,’’ and tentatively ibid. with infra, at 1027 – 1030. The other
suggests a 21st-century rethinking. Post, at concurrence proposes instead a return to the
1032 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). mid-19th century—a replacement of our cur-
Fair enough perhaps, see infra, at 1028 – rent doctrine with the Fourteenth Amend-
1029, n. 4, but the concurrence then acknowl- ment’s original meaning respecting personal
edges that these cases have no distinctively jurisdiction. Post, at 1038 – 1039 (GORSUCH,
B state court may exercise specific jurisdic-

[10] Ford contends that our jurisdiction. But not quite so far as Ford wants.
tional rules prevent Montana’s and Minne- None of our precedents has suggested that
sota’s courts from deciding these two suits. only a strict causal relationship between
In making that argument, Ford does not the defendant’s in-state activity and the
contest that it does substantial business in litigation will do. As just noted, our most
Montana and Minnesota—that it actively common formulation of the rule demands
seeks to serve the market for automobiles that the suit ‘‘arise out of or relate to the
and related products in those States. See defendant’s contacts with the forum.’’ Id.,
Brief for Petitioner 6, 9, 13. Or to put that at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1780 (quoting Daim-
concession in more doctrinal terms, Ford ler, 571 U.S., at 127, 134 S.Ct. 746; empha-
agrees that it has ‘‘purposefully avail[ed] sis added; alterations omitted); see supra,
itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
at 1025. The first half of that standard
ties’’ in both places. Hanson, 357 U.S., at
asks about causation; but the back half,
253, 78 S.Ct. 1228; see supra, at 1024 –
after the ‘‘or,’’ contemplates that some re-
1025. Ford’s claim is instead that those
lationships will support jurisdiction without
activities do not sufficiently connect to the
a causal showing. That does not mean
suits, even though the resident-plaintiffs
anything goes. In the sphere of specific
allege that Ford cars malfunctioned in the
forum States. In Ford’s view, the needed jurisdiction, the phrase ‘‘relate to’’ incorpo-
link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction rates real limits, as it must to adequately
attaches ‘‘only if the defendant’s forum protect defendants foreign to a forum. But
conduct gave rise to the plaintiff ’s claims.’’ again, we have never framed the specific
Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in origi- jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring
nal). And that rule reduces, Ford thinks, to proof of causation—i.e., proof that the
locating specific jurisdiction in the State plaintiff ’s claim came about because of the
where Ford sold the car in question, or defendant’s in-state conduct. See also Bris-
else the States where Ford designed and tol-Myers, 582 U. S., at ––––, ––––, 137
manufactured the vehicle. See id., at 2; S.Ct., at 1779–1780, 1780–1781 (quoting
Reply Brief 2, 19; supra, at 1023 (identify- Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846)
ing those States). On that view, the place (asking whether there is ‘‘an affiliation be-
of accident and injury is immaterial. So tween the forum and the underlying con-
(Ford says) Montana’s and Minnesota’s troversy,’’ without demanding that the in-
courts have no power over these cases. quiry focus on cause). So the case is not
[11] But Ford’s causation-only ap- over even if, as Ford argues, a causal test
proach finds no support in this Court’s would put jurisdiction in only the States of
requirement of a ‘‘connection’’ between a first sale, manufacture, and design. A dif-
plaintiff ’s suit and a defendant’s activities. ferent State’s courts may yet have jurisdic-
Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at ––––, 137 tion, because of another ‘‘activity [or] oc-
S.Ct., at 1776. That rule indeed serves to currence’’ involving the defendant that
narrow the class of claims over which a takes place in the State. BristolMyers, 582
J., concurring in judgment). But that opinion by proceeding as the Court has done for the
never reveals just what the Due Process last 75 years—applying the standards set out
Clause as understood at its ratification rein International Shoe and its progeny, with
quired, and its ground for deciding these attention to their underlying values of ensur-
cases is correspondingly spare. Post, at 1039. ing fairness and protecting interstate federal-
This opinion, by contrast, resolves these cases ism.
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
U. S., at ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct., 1780, 1780– designed and made overseas and sold in
1781 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919, New York. For, the Court explained, a
131 S.Ct. 2846).3 company thus ‘‘purposefully avail[ing] it-
And indeed, this Court has stated that self ’’ of the Oklahoma auto market ‘‘has
specific jurisdiction attaches in cases iden- clear notice’’ of its exposure in that State
tical to the ones here—when a company to suits arising from local accidents involv-
like Ford serves a market for a product in ing its cars. Ibid. And the company could
the forum State and the product malfunc- do something about that exposure: It could
tions there. In World-Wide Volkswagen, ‘‘act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
the Court held that an Oklahoma court litigation by procuring insurance, passing
could not assert jurisdiction over a New the expected costs on to customers, or, if
York car dealer just because a car it sold the risks are [still] too great, severing its
later caught fire in Oklahoma. 444 U.S., at connection with the State.’’ Ibid.
295, 100 S.Ct. 580. But in so doing, we [12] Our conclusion in World-Wide
contrasted the dealer’s position to that of Volkswagen—though, as Ford notes, tech-
two other defendants—Audi, the car’s nically ‘‘dicta,’’ Brief for Petitioner 34—has
manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the car’s appeared and reappeared in many cases
nationwide importer (neither of which con- since. So, for example, the Court in Keeton
tested jurisdiction): invoked that part of World-Wide Volks-
‘‘[I]f the sale of a product of a manufac- wagen to show that when a corporation
turer or distributor such as Audi or has ‘‘continuously and deliberately exploit-
Volkswagen is not simply an isolated ed [a State’s] market, it must reasonably
occurrence, but arises from the efforts anticipate being haled into [that State’s]
of the manufacturer or distributor to court[s]’’ to defend actions ‘‘based on’’
serve, directly or indirectly, the market products causing injury there. 465 U.S., at
for its product in [several or all] other 781, 104 S.Ct. 1473 (citing 444 U. S., at
States, it is not unreasonable to subject 297–298, 100 S.Ct. 580); see Burger King,
it to suit in one of those States if its 471 U.S., at 472–473, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (simi-
allegedly defective merchandise has larly citing World-Wide Volkswagen). On
there been the source of injury to its two other occasions, we reaffirmed that
owner or to others.’’ Id., at 297, 100 rule by reciting the above block-quoted
S.Ct. 580. language verbatim. See Goodyear, 564
Or said another way, if Audi and Volks- U.S., at 927, 131 S.Ct. 2846; Asahi Metal
wagen’s business deliberately extended Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
into Oklahoma (among other States), then Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 110, 107 S.Ct.
Oklahoma’s courts could hold the compa- 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (opinion of
nies accountable for a car’s catching fire O’Connor, J.). And in Daimler, we used
there—even though the vehicle had been the Audi/Volkswagen scenario as a para-
3. In thus reiterating this Court’s longstanding tiff based on an accident occurring in Ohio
approach, we reject Justice GORSUCH’s ap- involving a car purchased in Ohio. Removing
parent (if oblique) view that a state court the need for any connection between the case
should have jurisdiction over a nationwide and forum State would transfigure our specif-
corporation like Ford on any claim, no matter ic jurisdiction standard as applied to corpora-
how unrelated to the State or Ford’s activities tions. ‘‘Case-linked’’ jurisdiction, see supra, at
there. See post, at 1039. On that view, for
1024 – 1025, would then become not case-
example, a California court could hear a
linked at all.
claim against Ford brought by an Ohio plain-
digm case of specific jurisdiction (though those whose warranties have long since
now naming Daimler, the maker of Mer- expired. And the company distributes re-
cedes Benzes). Said the Court, to ‘‘illus- placement parts both to its own dealers
trate[ ]’’ specific jurisdiction’s ‘‘province[ ]’’: and to independent auto shops in the two
A California court would exercise specific States. Those activities, too, make Ford
jurisdiction ‘‘if a California plaintiff, in- money. And by making it easier to own a
jured in a California accident involving a Ford, they encourage Montanans and Min-
Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued Daim- nesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.
ler [in that court] alleging that the vehicle
was defectively designed.’’ 571 U.S., at 127, [13] Now turn to how all this Montana-
n. 5, 134 S.Ct. 746. As in World-Wide and Minnesota-based conduct relates to
Volkswagen, the Court did not limit juris- the claims in these cases, brought by state
diction to where the car was designed, residents in Montana’s and Minnesota’s
manufactured, or first sold. Substitute courts. Each plaintiff ’s suit, of course,
Ford for Daimler, Montana and Minnesota arises from a car accident in one of those
for California, and the Court’s ‘‘illus- States. In each complaint, the resident-
trat[ive]’’ case becomes TTT the two cases plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehi-
before us. cle—an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria
To see why Ford is subject to jurisdic- in the other—caused the crash and result-
tion in these cases (as Audi, Volkswagen, ing harm. And as just described, Ford had
and Daimler were in their analogues), con- advertised, sold, and serviced those two
sider first the business that the company car models in both States for many years.
regularly conducts in Montana and Minne- (Contrast a case, which we do not address,
sota. See generally 395 Mont. at 488, 443 in which Ford marketed the models in only
P.3d at 414; 931 N.W.2d at 748; supra, at a different State or region.) In other
1023 – 1024. Small wonder that Ford has words, Ford had systematically served a
here conceded ‘‘purposeful availment’’ of market in Montana and Minnesota for the
the two States’ markets. See supra, at very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege mal-
1025 – 1026. By every means imaginable— functioned and injured them in those
among them, billboards, TV and radio States. So there is a strong ‘‘relationship
spots, print ads, and direct mail—Ford among the defendant, the forum, and the
urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy litigation’’—the ‘‘essential foundation’’ of
its vehicles, including (at all relevant specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros, 466
times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. U.S., at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (internal quota-
Ford cars—again including those two mod- tion marks omitted). That is why this
els—are available for sale, whether new or Court has used this exact fact pattern (a
used, throughout the States, at 36 dealer- resident-plaintiff sues a global car compa-
ships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota. ny, extensively serving the state market in
And apart from sales, Ford works hard to a vehicle, for an in-state accident) as an
foster ongoing connections to its cars’ own- illustration—even a paradigm example—of
ers. The company’s dealers in Montana how specific jurisdiction works. See Daim-
and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly ler, 571 U.S., at 127, n. 5, 134 S.Ct. 746;
maintain and repair Ford cars, including supra, at 1027.4
4. None of this is to say that any person using malfunctions after arrival. We have long
any means to sell any good in a State is treated isolated or sporadic transactions dif-
subject to jurisdiction there if the product ferently from continuous ones. See, e.g.,
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
The only complication here, pressed by er—even when he buys his car from out of
Ford, is that the company sold the specific state. He may make that purchase because
cars involved in these crashes outside the he saw ads for the car in local media. And
forum States, with consumers later selling he may take into account a raft of Ford’s
them to the States’ residents. Because that in-state activities designed to make driving
is so, Ford argues, the plaintiffs’ claims a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers
‘‘would be precisely the same if Ford had stand ready to service the car; that other
never done anything in Montana and auto shops have ample supplies of Ford
Minnesota.’’ Brief for Petitioner 46. Of parts; and that Ford fosters an active re-
course, that argument merely restates sale market for its old models. The plain-
Ford’s demand for an exclusively causal tiffs here did not in fact establish, or even
test of connection—which we have already allege, such causal links. But cf. post, at
shown is inconsistent with our caselaw. See 1033 – 1034 (ALITO, J., concurring in
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4; supra, at 1026 – 1027. judgment) (nonetheless finding some kind
And indeed, a similar assertion could have of causation). Nor should jurisdiction in
been made in World-Wide Volkswagen— cases like these ride on the exact reasons
yet the Court made clear that systematic
for an individual plaintiff ’s purchase, or on
contacts in Oklahoma rendered Audi ac-
his ability to present persuasive evidence
countable there for an in-state accident,
about them.5 But the possibilities listed
even though it involved a car sold in New
above—created by the reach of Ford’s
York. See supra, at 1026 – 1027. So too
Montana and Minnesota contacts—under-
here, and for the same reasons, see supra,
score the aptness of finding jurisdiction
at 1027 – 1028—even supposing (as Ford
here, even though the cars at issue were
does) that without the company’s Montana
first sold out of state.
or Minnesota contacts the plaintiffs’ claims
would be just the same. For related reasons, allowing jurisdic-
But in any event, that assumption is far tion in these cases treats Ford fairly, as
from clear. For the owners of these cars this Court’s precedents explain. In con-
might never have bought them, and so ducting so much business in Montana and
these suits might never have arisen, except Minnesota, Ford ‘‘enjoys the benefits and
for Ford’s contacts with their home States. protection of [their] laws’’—the enforce-
Those contacts might turn any resident of ment of contracts, the defense of property,
Montana or Minnesota into a Ford own- the resulting formation of effective mar-
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 arises from the decoy?’’ Ibid. The differences
U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 between that case and the ones before us
(1980); supra, at 1025. And we do not here virtually list themselves. (Just consider all our
consider internet transactions, which may descriptions of Ford’s activities outside its
raise doctrinal questions of their own. See home bases.) So we agree with the plaintiffs’
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290, n. 9, 134 counsel that resolving these cases does not
S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (‘‘[T]his
also resolve the hypothetical. See id., at
case does not present the very different ques-
39w40.
tions whether and how a defendant’s virtual
‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘con-
tacts’ with a particular State’’). So consider, 5. It should, for example, make no difference if
for example, a hypothetical offered at oral a plaintiff had recently moved to the forum
argument. ‘‘[A] retired guy in a small town’’ State with his car, and had not made his
in Maine ‘‘carves decoys’’ and uses ‘‘a site on purchasing decision with that move in mind—
the Internet’’ to sell them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. so had not considered any of Ford’s activities
‘‘Can he be sued in any state if some harm in his new home State.
kets. International Shoe, 326 U.S., at 319, once (many years earlier) bought the car
66 S.Ct. 154. All that assistance to Ford’s there. In other words, there is a less sig-
in-state business creates reciprocal obli- nificant ‘‘relationship among the defendant,
gations—most relevant here, that the car the forum, and the litigation.’’ Walden, 571
models Ford so extensively markets in U.S., at 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (internal quota-
Montana and Minnesota be safe for their tion marks omitted). So by channeling
citizens to use there. Thus our repeated these suits to Washington and North Da-
conclusion: A state court’s enforcement of kota, Ford’s regime would undermine,
that commitment, enmeshed as it is with rather than promote, what the company
Ford’s government-protected in-state busi- calls the Due Process Clause’s ‘‘jurisdic-
ness, can ‘‘hardly be said to be undue.’’ tion-allocating function.’’ Brief for Petition-
Ibid.; see supra, at 1027 – 1028. And as er 24.
World-Wide Volkswagen described, it can-
not be thought surprising either. An auto- C
maker regularly marketing a vehicle in a Ford mainly relies for its rule on two of
State, the Court said, has ‘‘clear notice’’ our recent decisions—Bristol-Myers and
that it will be subject to jurisdiction in the Walden. But those precedents stand for
State’s courts when the product malfunc- nothing like the principle Ford derives
tions there (regardless where it was first from them. If anything, they reinforce all
sold). 444 U.S., at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580; see we have said about why Montana’s and
supra, at 1027. Precisely because that ex- Minnesota’s courts can decide these cases.
ercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable, it is
Ford says of Bristol-Myers that it
also predictable—and thus allows Ford to
‘‘squarely foreclose[s]’’ jurisdiction. Reply
‘‘structure [its] primary conduct’’ to lessen
Brief 2. In that case, non-resident plain-
or even avoid the costs of state-court liti-
tiffs brought claims in California state
gation. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.,
court against Bristol-Myers Squibb, the
at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580.
manufacturer of a nationally marketed
[14] Finally, principles of ‘‘interstate prescription drug called Plavix. The plain-
federalism’’ support jurisdiction over these tiffs had not bought Plavix in California;
suits in Montana and Minnesota. Id., at neither had they used or suffered any
293, 100 S.Ct. 580. Those States have sig- harm from the drug there. Still, the Cali-
nificant interests at stake—‘‘providing fornia Supreme Court thought it could ex-
[their] residents with a convenient forum ercise jurisdiction because Bristol-Myers
for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of- Squibb sold Plavix in California and was
state actors,’’ as well as enforcing their defending there against identical claims
own safety regulations. Burger King, 471 brought by the State’s residents. This
U.S., at 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174; see Keeton, Court disagreed, holding that the exercise
465 U.S., at 776, 104 S.Ct. 1473. Consider, of jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth
next to those, the interests of the States of Amendment. In Ford’s view, the same
first sale (Washington and North Dako- must be true here. Each of these plaintiffs,
ta)—which Ford’s proposed rule would like the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, alleged
make the most likely forums. For each of injury from a particular item (a car, a pill)
those States, the suit involves all out-of- that the defendant had sold outside the
state parties, an out-of-state accident, and forum State. Ford reads Bristol-Myers to
out-of-state injuries; the suit’s only connec- preclude jurisdiction when that is true,
tion with the State is that a former owner even if the defendant regularly sold ‘‘the
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
same kind of product’’ in the State. Reply cer working at an Atlanta airport
Brief 2 (emphasis in original). searched, and seized money from, two Ne-
But that reading misses the point of our vada residents before they embarked on a
decision. We found jurisdiction improper in flight to Las Vegas. The victims of the
Bristol-Myers because the forum State, search sued the officer in Nevada, arguing
and the defendant’s activities there, lacked that their alleged injury (their inability to
any connection to the plaintiffs’ claims. See use the seized money) occurred in the
State in which they lived. This Court held
582 U. S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1781
the exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada im-
(‘‘What is needed—and what is missing
proper even though ‘‘the plaintiff[s] experi-
here—is a connection between the forum
enced [the] effect[s]’’ of the officer’s con-
and the specific claims at issue’’). The
duct there. 571 U.S., at 290, 134 S.Ct. 1115.
plaintiffs, the Court explained, were not
According to Ford, our ruling shows that a
residents of California. They had not been
plaintiff ’s residence and place of injury
prescribed Plavix in California. They had
can never support jurisdiction. See Brief
not ingested Plavix in California. And they
for Petitioner 32. And without those facts,
had not sustained their injuries in Califor-
Ford concludes, the basis for jurisdiction
nia. See ibid. (emphasizing these points).
crumbles here as well.
In short, the plaintiffs were engaged in
forum-shopping—suing in California be- But Waldenhas precious little to do with
cause it was thought plaintiff-friendly, the cases before us. In Walden, only the
plaintiffs had any contacts with the State
even though their cases had no tie to the
of Nevada; the defendant-officer had never
State. See id., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1782–
taken any act to ‘‘form[ ] a contact’’ of his
1783 (distinguishing the Plavix claims from
own. 571 U.S., at 290, 134 S.Ct. 1115. The
the litigation in Keeton, see supra, at 1027,
officer had ‘‘never traveled to, conducted
because they ‘‘involv[e] no in-state injury
activities within, contacted anyone in, or
and no injury to residents of the forum
sent anything or anyone to Nevada.’’ Id.,
State’’). That is not at all true of the cases
at 289, 134 S.Ct. 1115. So to use the lan-
before us. Yes, Ford sold the specific prod-
guage of our doctrinal test: He had not
ucts in other States, as Bristol-Myers
‘‘purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privi-
Squibb had. But here, the plaintiffs are
lege of conducting activities’’ in the forum
residents of the forum States. They used
State. Hanson, 357 U.S., at 253, 78 S.Ct.
the allegedly defective products in the fo-
1228. Because that was true, the Court had
rum States. And they suffered injuries
no occasion to address the necessary con-
when those products malfunctioned in the
nection between a defendant’s in-state ac-
forum States. In sum, each of the plaintiffs tivity and the plaintiff ’s claims. But here,
brought suit in the most natural State— Ford has a veritable truckload of contacts
based on an ‘‘affiliation between the forum with Montana and Minnesota, as it admits.
and the underlying controversy, principal- See supra, at 1027 – 1028. The only issue is
ly, [an] activity or an occurrence that whether those contacts are related enough
t[ook] place’’ there. Bristol-Myers, 582 U. to the plaintiffs’ suits. As to that issue, so
S., at –––– w ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct., at what if (as Waldenheld) the place of a
1779–1780, 1780–1781) (internal quotation plaintiff ’s injury and residence cannot cre-
marks omitted). So Bristol-Myers does not ate a defendant’s contact with the forum
bar jurisdiction. State? Those places still may be relevant
Ford falls back on Waldenas its last in assessing the link between the defen-
resort. In that case, a Georgia police offi- dant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff ’s
suit—including its assertions of who was nothing distinctively 21st century about
injured where. And indeed, that relevance the question in the cases now before us,
is a key part of Bristol-Myers’ reasoning. and the answer to that question is settled
See 582 U. S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1782 by our case law.
(finding a lack of ‘‘connection’’ in part be- Since International Shoe, the rule has
cause the ‘‘plaintiffs are not California res- been that a state court can exercise per-
idents and do not claim to have suffered sonal jurisdiction over a defendant if the
harm in that State’’). One of Ford’s own defendant has ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with
favorite cases thus refutes its appeal to the the forum—which means that the contacts
other. must be ‘‘such that the maintenance of the
* * * suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’ ’’ Id., at
Here, resident-plaintiffs allege that they
316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (quoting Milliken v. Mey-
suffered in-state injury because of defec-
er, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85
tive products that Ford extensively pro-
L.Ed. 278 (1940)).
moted, sold, and serviced in Montana and
Minnesota. For all the reasons we have That standard is easily met here. Ford
given, the connection between the plain- has long had a heavy presence in Minneso-
tiffs’ claims and Ford’s activities in those ta and Montana. It spends billions on na-
States—or otherwise said, the ‘‘relation- tional advertising. It has many franchises
ship among the defendant, the forum[s], in both States. Ford dealers in Minnesota
and the litigation’’—is close enough to sup- and Montana sell and service Ford vehi-
port specific jurisdiction. Walden, 571 U.S., cles, and Ford ships replacement parts to
at 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (internal quotation both States. In entertaining these suits,
marks omitted). The judgments of the Minnesota and Montana courts have not
Montana and Minnesota Supreme Courts reached out and grabbed suits in which
are therefore affirmed. they ‘‘have little legitimate interest.’’ Bris-
tolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
It is so ordered. Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. ––––,
–––– (2017) (slip op., at 6). Their residents,
Justice BARRETT took no part in the
while riding in vehicles purchased within
consideration or decision of these cases.
their borders, were killed or injured in
Justice ALITO, concurring in the accidents on their roads. Can anyone seri-
judgment. ously argue that requiring Ford to litigate
these cases in Minnesota and Montana
These cases can and should be decided
would be fundamentally unfair?
without any alteration or refinement of our
case law on specific personal jurisdiction. Well, Ford makes that argument. It
To be sure, for the reasons outlined in would send the plaintiffs packing to the
Justice GORSUCH’s thoughtful opinion, jurisdictions where the vehicles in question
there are grounds for questioning the stan- were assembled (Kentucky and Canada),
dard that the Court adopted in Interna- designed (Michigan), or first sold (Wash-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. ington and North Dakota) or where Ford
310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). And is incorporated (Delaware) or has its prin-
there are also reasons to wonder whether cipal place of business (Michigan).
the case law we have developed since that As might have been predicted, the Court
time is well suited for the way in which unanimously rejects this understanding of
business is now conducted. But there is ‘‘traditional notions of fair play and sub-
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
stantial justice.’’ And in doing so, we mere- question here would never have been on
ly follow what we said in World-Wide the roads in Minnesota and Montana if
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. they were some totally unknown brand
286, 297–298, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 that had never been advertised in those
(1980), which was essentially this: If a car States, was not sold in those States, would
manufacturer makes substantial efforts to not be familiar to mechanics in those
sell vehicles in States A and B (and other States, and could not have been easily
States), and a defect in a vehicle first sold repaired with parts available in those
in State A causes injuries in an accident in States. See ante, at 1029 – 1030 (describing
State B, the manufacturer can be sued in this relationship between Ford’s activities
State B. That rule decides these cases. and these suits). The whole point of those
activities was to put more Fords (including
Ford, however, asks us to adopt an un-
those in question here) on Minnesota and
precedented rule under which a defen-
Montana roads. The common-sense rela-
dant’s contacts with the forum State must
tionship between Ford’s activities and
be proven to have been a but-for cause of
these suits, in other words, is causal in a
the tort plaintiff ’s injury. The Court prop-
broad sense of the concept, and personal
erly rejects that argument, and I agree
jurisdiction can rest on this type of link
with the main thrust of the Court’s opin-
without strict proof of the type Ford would
ion. My only quibble is with the new gloss
require. When ‘‘arise out of ’’ is understood
that the Court puts on our case law. Sever-
in this way, it is apparent that ‘‘arise out
al of our opinions have said that a plain-
of ’’ and ‘‘relate to’’ overlap and are not
tiff ’s claims ‘‘ ‘must arise out of or relate really two discrete grounds for jurisdic-
to the defendant’s contacts’ ’’ with the fo- tion. The phrase ‘‘arise out of or relate to’’
rum. See ante, at 1025 (citing cases). The is simply a way of restating the basic
Court parses this phrase ‘‘as though we ‘‘minimum contacts’’ standard adopted in
were dealing with language of a statute,’’ International Shoe.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
Recognizing ‘‘relate to’’ as an indepen-
341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979),
dent basis for specific jurisdiction risks
and because this phrase is cast in the
needless complications. The ‘‘ordinary
disjunctive, the Court recognizes a new
meaning’’ of the phrase ‘‘relate to’’ ‘‘is a
category of cases in which personal juris-
broad one.’’ Morales v. Trans World Air-
diction is permitted: those in which the
lines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct.
claims do not ‘‘arise out of ’’ (i.e., are not
2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). Applying
caused by) the defendant’s contacts but
that phrase ‘‘according to its terms [is] a
nevertheless sufficiently ‘‘relate to’’ those project doomed to failure, since, as many a
contacts in some undefined way, ante, at curbstone philosopher has observed, ev-
1026 – 1027. erything is related to everything else.’’
This innovation is unnecessary and, in California Div. of Labor Standards En-
my view, unwise. To say that the Constitu- forcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A.,
tion does not require the kind of proof of Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136
causation that Ford would demand—what L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
the majority describes as a ‘‘strict causal To rein in this phrase, limits must be
relationship,’’ ante, at 1026—is not to say found, and the Court assures us that ‘‘re-
that no causal link of any kind is needed. late to,’’ as it now uses the concept, ‘‘incor-
And here, there is a sufficient link. It is porates real limits.’’ Ante, at 1026. But
reasonable to infer that the vehicles in without any indication what those limits
might be, I doubt that the lower courts will 581 U. S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1549, 1558,
find that observation terribly helpful. In- 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017).
stead, what limits the potentially boundless Today’s case tests the old boundaries
reach of ‘‘relate to’’ is just the sort of from another direction. Until now, many
rough causal connection I have described. lower courts have proceeded on the prem-
I would leave the law exactly where it ise that specific jurisdiction requires two
stood before we took these cases, and for things. First, the defendant must ‘‘pur-
that reason, I concur in the judgment. posefully avail’’ itself of the chance to do
business in a State. Second, the plaintiff ’s
Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice suit must ‘‘arise out of or relate to’’ the
THOMAS joins, concurring in the defendant’s in-state activities. Typically,
judgment. courts have read this second phrase as a
Since International Shoe Co. v. Wash- unit requiring at least a but-for causal link
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 between the defendant’s local activities and
L.Ed. 95 (1945), this Court’s cases have the plaintiff ’s injuries. E.g., Tamburo v.
sought to divide the world of personal Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 708–709 (C.A.7
jurisdiction in two. A tribunal with ‘‘gener- 2010) (collecting cases); see also Burger
al jurisdiction’’ may entertain any claim King, 471 U.S., at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174
against the defendant. But to trigger this (discussing ‘‘proximate[ ] results’’). As ev-
power, a court usually must ensure the ery first year law student learns, a but-for
defendant is ‘‘ ‘at home’ ’’ in the forum causation test isn’t the most demanding.
State. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. At a high level of abstraction, one might
117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 say any event in the world would not have
(2014). Meanwhile, ‘‘specific jurisdiction’’ happened ‘‘but for’’ events far and long
affords a narrower authority. It applies removed.
only when the defendant ‘‘ ‘purposefully Now, though, the Court pivots away
avails’ ’’ itself of the opportunity to do busi- from this understanding. Focusing on the
ness in the forum State and the suit phrase ‘‘arise out of or relate to’’ that so
‘‘ ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to’ ’’ the defen- often appears in our cases, the majority
dant’s contacts with the forum State. asks us to parse those words ‘‘as though
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. we were dealing with language of a stat-
462, 472, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d ute.’’ Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
528 (1985). 330, 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931
While our cases have long admonished (1979). In particular, the majority zeros in
lower courts to keep these concepts dis- on the disjunctive conjunction ‘‘or,’’ and
tinct, some of the old guardrails have be- proceeds to build its entire opinion around
gun to look a little battered. Take general that linguistic feature. Ante, at 1026 –
jurisdiction. If it made sense to speak of a 1027. The majority admits that ‘‘arise out
corporation having one or two ‘‘homes’’ in of ’’ may connote causation. But, it argues,
1945, it seems almost quaint in 2021 when ‘‘relate to’’ is an independent clause that
corporations with global reach often have does not.
massive operations spread across multiple Where this leaves us is far from clear.
States. To cope with these changing eco- For a case to ‘‘relate to’’ the defendant’s
nomic realities, this Court has begun cau- forum contacts, the majority says, it is
tiously expanding the old rule in ‘‘ ‘excep- enough if an ‘‘affiliation’’ or ‘‘relationship’’
tional case[s].’ ’’ BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, or ‘‘connection’’ exists between them. Ante,
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
at 1025, 1028, 1030. But what does this those causation questions, or are they now
assortment of nouns mean? Loosed from to be abandoned?
any causation standard, we are left to Consider, too, a hypothetical the majori-
guess. The majority promises that its new ty offers in a footnote. The majority imag-
test ‘‘does not mean anything goes,’’ but ines a retiree in Maine who starts a one-
that hardly tells us what does. Ante, at man business, carving and selling wooden
1026. In some cases, the new test may duck decoys. In time, the man sells a
prove more forgiving than the old causa- defective decoy over the Internet to a pur-
tion rule. But it’s hard not to wonder chaser in another State who is injured. See
whether it may also sometimes turn out to ante, at 1029, n. 4. We aren’t told how.
be more demanding. Unclear too is wheth- (Was the decoy coated in lead paint?) But
er, in cases like that, the majority would put that aside. The majority says this
treat causation and ‘‘affiliation’’ as alterna- hypothetical supplies a useful study in con-
tive routes to specific jurisdiction, or trast with our cases. On the majority’s
whether it would deny jurisdiction out- telling, Ford’s ‘‘continuous’’ contacts with
right. Montana and Minnesota are enough to es-
For a glimpse at the complications invit- tablish an ‘‘affiliation’’ with those States;
ed by today’s decision, consider its treat- by comparison, the decoy seller’s contacts
ment of North Dakota and Washington. may be too ‘‘isolated’’ and ‘‘sporadic’’ to
Those are the States where Ford first sold entitle an injured buyer to sue in his home
the allegedly defective cars at issue in the State. But if this comparison highlights
cases before us. The majority seems to anything, it is only the litigation sure to
suggest that, if the plaintiffs had sought to follow. For between the poles of ‘‘continu-
bring their suits in those States, they ous’’ and ‘‘isolated’’ contacts lie a virtually
would have failed. The majority stresses infinite number of ‘‘affiliations’’ waiting to
that the ‘‘only connection’’ between the be explored. And when it comes to that
plaintiffs’ claims and North Dakota and vast terrain, the majority supplies no
Washington is the fact that former owners meaningful guidance about what kind or
once bought the allegedly defective cars how much of an ‘‘affiliation’’ will suffice.
there. Ante, at 1030. But the majority nev- Nor, once more, does the majority tell us
er tells us why that ‘‘connection’’ isn’t whether its new affiliation test supplants
enough. Surely, North Dakota and Wash- or merely supplements the old causation
ington would contend they have a strong inquiry.
interest in ensuring they don’t become Not only does the majority’s new test
marketplaces for unreasonably dangerous risk adding new layers of confusion to our
products. Nor is it clear why the majority personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The
casts doubt on the availability of specific whole project seems unnecessary. Immedi-
jurisdiction in these States without bother- ately after disavowing any need for a
ing to consider whether the old causation causal link between the defendant’s forum
test might allow it. After all, no one doubts activities and the plaintiffs’ injuries, the
Ford purposefully availed itself of those majority proceeds to admit that such a
markets. The plaintiffs’ injuries, at least link may be present here. Ante, at 1029.
arguably, ‘‘arose from’’ (or were caused by) The majority stresses that the Montana
the sale of defective cars in those places. and Minnesota plaintiffs before us ‘‘might’’
Even if the majority’s new affiliation test have purchased their cars because of
isn’t satisfied, don’t we still need to ask Ford’s activities in their home States.
They ‘‘may’’ have relied on Ford’s local cess in the jurisdiction, that State’s courts
advertising. And they ‘‘may’’ have depend- were generally thought competent to ren-
ed on Ford’s promise to furnish in-state der judgment on any claim against the
servicers and dealers. If the majority is defendant, whether it involved events in-
right about these things, that would be side or outside the State. Pennoyer v. Neff,
more than enough to establish a but-for 95 U.S. 714, 733, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878);
causal link between Ford’s in-state activi- Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Coun-
ties and the plaintiffs’ decisions to pur- ty of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 610–611, 110
chase their allegedly defective vehicles. S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990); J. Sto-
Nor should that result come as a surprise: ry, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
One might expect such causal links to be 912–913 (3d ed. 1846); Massie v. Watts, 6
easy to prove in suits against corporate Cranch 148, 157, 161–162, 3 L.Ed. 181
behemoths like Ford. All the new euphe- (1810).2
misms—‘‘affiliation,’’ ‘‘relationship,’’ ‘‘con- International Shoe’s emergence may be
nection’’—thus seem pretty pointless.1 attributable to many influences, but at
* least part of the story seems to involve the
rise of corporations and interstate trade.
With the old International Shoe dichoto- See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S.
my looking increasingly uncertain, it’s 415, 431, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336
hard not to ask how we got here and (1994). A corporation doing business in its
where we might be headed. State of incorporation is one thing; the old
Before International Shoe, it seems due physical presence rules for individuals
process was usually understood to guaran- seem easily adaptable to them. But what
tee that only a court of competent jurisdic- happens when a corporation, created and
tion could deprive a defendant of his life, able to operate thanks to the laws of one
liberty, or property. In turn, a court’s com- State, seeks the privilege of sending
petency normally depended on the defen- agents or products into another State?
dant’s presence in, or consent to, the sov- Early on, many state courts held con-
ereign’s jurisdiction. But once a plaintiff duct like that renders an out-of-state cor-
was able to ‘‘tag’’ the defendant with pro- poration present in the second jurisdiction.
1. The majority says personal jurisdiction 2. Some disagree that due process requires
should not turn on a plaintiff’s ability to ‘‘al- even this much. Recent scholarship, for exam-
lege’’ or ‘‘establish’’ his or her reasons for ple, contends Pennoyer’s territorial account of
doing business with the defendant. Ante, at sovereign power is mostly right, but the rules
1029. But the implicit assumption here—that it embodies are not ‘‘fixed in constitutional
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving per- amber’’—that is, Congress might be able to
sonal jurisdiction—is often mistaken. Perhaps change them. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95
because a lack of personal jurisdiction is a
Texas L. Rev. 1249, 1255 (2017). Others sug-
waivable affirmative defense, some States
gest that fights over personal jurisdiction
place the burden of proving the defense on
would be more sensibly waged under the Full
the defendant. Even in places where the
plaintiff bears the burden, I fail to see why it Faith and Credit Clause. Jackson, Full Faith
would be so terrible (or burdensome) to re- and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Con-
quire an individual to plead and prove his or stitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1945).
her reasons for purchase. Frequently, doing Whether these theories are right or wrong,
so may be simple—far simpler than showing they at least seek to answer the right ques-
how the defendant’s connections with the ju- tion—what the Constitution as originally un-
risdiction satisfy a new and amorphous ‘‘affil- derstood requires, not what nine judges con-
iation’’ test. sider ‘‘fair’’ and ‘‘just.’’
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
And a present company could be sued for 796–799, 22 So. 53, 55–56 (Miss. 1897). But,
any claim, so long as the plaintiff served in a series of decisions at the turn of the
an employee doing corporate business last century, this Court eventually provid-
within the second State. E.g., Pennsylva- ed a more receptive audience. On the one
nia Lumbermen’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. hand, the Court held that an out-of-state
Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 413–415, 25 S.Ct. 483, corporation often has a right to do busi-
49 L.Ed. 810 (1905). Other States sought ness in another State unencumbered by
to obviate any potential question about that State’s registration rules, thanks to
corporate jurisdiction by requiring an out- the so-called dormant Commerce Clause.
of-state corporation to incorporate under International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217
their laws too, or at least designate an U.S. 91, 107–112, 30 S.Ct. 481, 54 L.Ed.
agent for service of process. Either way, 678 (1910). On the other hand, the Court
the idea was to secure the out-of-state began invoking the Due Process Clause to
company’s presence or consent to suit. restrict the circumstances in which an out-
E.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila- of-state corporation could be deemed pres-
delphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling ent. So, for example, the Court ruled that
Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95–96, 37 S.Ct. 344, 61 even an Oklahoma corporation purchasing
L.Ed. 610 (1917). a large portion of its merchandise in New
Unsurprisingly, corporations soon York was not ‘‘doing business’’ there.
looked for ways around rules like these. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown
No one, after all, has ever liked greeting Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517–518, 43 S.Ct. 170, 67
the process server. For centuries, individu- L.Ed. 372 (1923). Perhaps advocates of this
als facing imminent suit sought to avoid it arrangement thought it promoted national
by fleeing the court’s territorial jurisdic- economic growth. See Dodd, Jurisdiction
tion. But this tactic proved ‘‘too crude for in Personal Actions, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427,
the American business genius,’’ and it held 444–445 (1929). But critics questioned its
some obvious disadvantages. See Jackson, fidelity to the Constitution and traditional
What Price ‘‘Due Process,’’ 5 N. Y. L. Rev. jurisdictional principles, noting that it of-
435, 436 (1927). Corporations wanted to ten left injured parties with no practical
retain the privilege of sending their per- forum for their claims too. Jackson, 5 N. Y.
sonnel and products to other jurisdictions L. Rev., at 436–438.
where they lacked a charter to do busi- In many ways, International Shoe
ness. At the same time, when confronted sought to start over. The Court ‘‘cast TTT
with lawsuits in the second forum, they aside’’ the old concepts of territorial juris-
sought to hide behind their foreign char- diction that its own earlier decisions had
ters and deny their presence. Really, their seemingly twisted in favor of out-of-state
strategy was to do business without being corporations. Burnham, 495 U.S., at 618,
seen to do business. Id., at 438 (‘‘No longer 110 S.Ct. 2105. At the same time, the
is the foreign corporation confronted with Court also cast doubt on the idea, once
the problem ‘to be or not to be’—it can pursued by many state courts, that a com-
both be and not be!’’). pany ‘‘consents’’ to suit when it is forced to
Initially and routinely, state courts re- incorporate or designate an agent for re-
jected ploys like these. See, e.g., Pullman ceipt of process in a jurisdiction other than
Palace-Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, its home State. Ibid.3 In place of nearly
3. It is unclear what remains of the old ‘‘consent’’ theory after International Shoe’s criti-
everything that had come before, the Ford did in these cases. E.g., Internation-
Court sought to build a new test focused al Shoe, 326 U.S,. at 313–314, 320, 66 S.Ct.
on ‘‘ ‘traditional notions of fair play and 154. But, today, even an individual retiree
substantial justice.’ ’’ International Shoe, carving wooden decoys in Maine can ‘‘pur-
326 U.S., at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (quoting posefully avail’’ himself of the chance to do
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 business across the continent after draw-
S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). ing online orders to his e-Bay ‘‘store’’
It was a heady promise. But it is unclear thanks to Internet advertising with global
how far it has really taken us. Even today, reach. Ante, at 1028 – 1029, n. 4. A test
this Court usually considers corporations once aimed at keeping corporations honest
‘‘at home’’ and thus subject to general about their out-of-state operations now
jurisdiction in only one or two States. All seemingly risks hauling individuals to ju-
in a world where global conglomerates risdictions where they have never set foot.
boast of their many ‘‘headquarters.’’ The
Perhaps this is the real reason why the
Court has issued these restrictive rulings,
majority introduces us to the hypothetical
too, even though individual defendants re-
decoy salesman. Yes, he arguably availed
main subject to the old ‘‘tag’’ rule, allowing
himself of a new market. Yes, the plain-
them to be sued on any claim anywhere
tiff ’s injuries arguably arose from (or
they can be found. Burnham, 495 U.S., at
were caused by) the product he sold there.
610–611, 110 S.Ct. 2105.4 Nearly 80 years
Yes, International Shoe’s old causation
removed from International Shoe, it
test would seemingly allow for personal
seems corporations continue to receive
jurisdiction. But maybe the majority re-
special jurisdictional protections in the
sists that conclusion because the old test
name of the Constitution. Less clear is
no longer seems as reliable a proxy for
why.
determining corporate presence as it once
Maybe, too, International Shoe just
did. Maybe that’s the intuition lying behind
doesn’t work quite as well as it once did.
the majority’s introduction of its new ‘‘af-
For a period, its specific jurisdiction test
filiation’’ rule and its comparison of the
might have seemed a reasonable new sub-
Maine retiree’s ‘‘sporadic’’ and ‘‘isolated’’
stitute for assessing corporate ‘‘presence,’’
sales in the plaintiff ’s State and Ford’s
a way to identify those out-of-state corpo-
deep ‘‘relationships’’ and ‘‘connections’’
rations that were simply pretending to be
with Montana and Minnesota. Ante, at
absent from jurisdictions where they were
1029, n. 4.
really transacting business. When a com-
pany ‘‘purposefully availed’’ itself of the If that is the logic at play here, I cannot
benefits of another State’s market in the help but wonder if we are destined to
1940s, it often involved sending in agents, return where we began. Perhaps all of this
advertising in local media, or developing a Court’s efforts since International Shoe,
network of on-the-ground dealers, much as including those of today’s majority, might
cism. Some courts read International Shoe 4. Since Burnham, some courts have sought to
and the cases that follow as effectively fore- revive the tag rule for artificial entities while
closing it, while others insist it remains via- others argue that doing so would be inconsis-
ble. Compare Lanham v. BNSF R. Co., 305 tent with International Shoe. Compare First
Neb. 124, 130–136, 939 N.W.2d 363, 368–371 Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d
(2020), with Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 16, 20–21 (C.A.2 1998), with Martinez v. Aero
2019-NMCA-023, ¶12–¶14, 458 P.3d 569, Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067–1069 (C.A.9
575–576 (N. M. Ct. App. 2018). 2014).
Cite as 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021)
be understood as seeking to recreate in courts. No one seriously questions that the

new terms a jurisprudence about corporate company, seeking to do business, entered
jurisdiction that was developing before this those jurisdictions through the front door.
Court’s muscular interventions in the early And I cannot see why, when faced with the
20th century. Perhaps it was, is, and in the process server, it should be allowed to
end always will be about trying to assess escape out the back. Jackson, 5 N. Y. L.
fairly a corporate defendant’s presence or Rev., at 439. The real struggle here isn’t
consent. International Shoe may have with settling on the right outcome in these
sought to move past those questions. But cases, but with making sense of our per-
maybe all we have done since is struggle sonal jurisdiction jurisprudence and Inter-
for new words to express the old ideas. national Shoe’s increasingly doubtful di-
Perhaps, too, none of this should come as a chotomy. On those scores, I readily admit
surprise. New technologies and new that I finish these cases with even more
schemes to evade the process server will questions than I had at the start. Hopeful-
always be with us. But if our concern is ly, future litigants and lower courts will
with ‘‘ ‘traditional notions of fair play and help us face these tangles and sort out a
substantial justice,’ ’’ International Shoe, responsible way to address the challenges
326 U.S., at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (emphasis
posed by our changing economy in light of
added), not just our personal and idiosyn-
the Constitution’s text and the lessons of
cratic impressions of those things, perhaps
history.
we will always wind up asking variations of
the same questions.5
None of this is to cast doubt on the
outcome of these cases. The parties have
not pointed to anything in the Constitu- ,
tion’s original meaning or its history that
might allow Ford to evade answering the
plaintiffs’ claims in Montana or Minnesota
5. The majority worries that the thoughts ex- What’s the majority’s real worry anyway—
pressed here threaten to ‘‘transfigure our spe- that corporations might lose special protec-
cific jurisdiction standard as applied to corpo- tions? The Constitution has always allowed
rations’’ and ‘‘return [us] to the mid-19th suits against individuals on any issue in any
century.’’ Ante, at 1025, n. 2; ante, at 1027, n. State where they set foot. Supra, at 1026 –
3. But it has become a tired trope to criticize 1027. Yet the majority seems to recoil at even
any reference to the Constitution’s original entertaining the possibility the Constitution
meaning as (somehow) both radical and an- might tolerate similar results for ‘‘nationwide
tiquated. Seeking to understand the Constitu- corporation[s],’’ whose ‘‘business is every-
tion’s original meaning is part of our job. where.’’ Ante, at 1025; ante, at 1027, n. 3.

Ford V Montana 8th Judicial District

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FORD MOTOR CO. v. MONT EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIST.

decision rests on anything beyond an

, pealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals,

firmed. Certiorari was granted in both 3. Constitutional Law O3964

Justice Barrett took no part in the consid- 6. Constitutional Law O3964

activity or an occurrence that takes place as it must to adequately protect defen-

Syllabus * (a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

B state court may exercise specific jurisdic-

be understood as seeking to recreate in courts. No one seriously questions that the

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