STTUATION ESTIMATE FOR PROJEOR CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1962 and 1962 ‘CHAL~O9UE Se facentben ance emiinieniinlial Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02445A000200420002-0a ee Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 TOP SECRET CONTENTS I Introduction Le a 1 Le 2 3 i, L a i Se 6. tT 8. 25X1C8a aa a. ~~ 3. Purpose Background and Eistory Intelligence Requirements Target Selection ‘Tesk Targets Corollary Tesks Concept of Qperations Exployment Migsion and Mission Planning UtLlization Prinary Mission Capabilities Maintenance and Support Control. Sortie Rate Support Relationship to Other Foress Augnentation IIa Pre Hostilities Hostilities Vv Enelosures Le a 7 Idfe Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights Utilization of Bases Areraft and Equipaent Assignment Estimated U-2 Flying Hours Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0Sanitized - Approved For Release : QjAriQP23702415A000200420002-0 1 TWHRoDUCETON 1. PURPOSE 2) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of. project-operationa during the FY 1961-62 time period. Due to current: events the need for timely minor changes 4s recognized. This docuncnt wi11 be uttlized es a coimon reference and/or departure point for all eoheerned consistent vith the above. ;b) Upon approval of the concapt the document my be used as the bdois for Justification of the budgét. Aa such 4t vill be reviewed and r@vised as necessary and no later 1 dune 1961°in order that it cag egain bacoue the tasis for budgeting and long range’ planbing for F¥'1962 and 1963: This to include qperational effectiveness; the form~ igtion of policy, tactics end te ues, and the determination of Gferationsl and R&D requirenenta. | .¢) In addition, revisions wild! be made. consistent witli the latest | teclinologioal aavanconente, the curtient political end pconoiie situntion, new offensive and defensive coucepts as pertains to the ational + security, in order t6 provide tinelyj and effective. guidance for any foLiov-on progran. : 2) shone a menos I a) At the time the-Soviet Uniia end its satellites dedied norml agsess to ite territory, the need for a method to collect all kinds of tgtelligence became readtly epparent and the requirenont was of the highest priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Usion indicated; the need for prompt and aggtegsive ection in order to cbtdit a cepsbility” which would-gatisfy the intelligence. requirements. feb) At the request of the highst executive biench of the Goveranent ous studies were performe’ by the most capable scientific. groups in g country. All of the studies Validated the requirements emphasized ‘the need for prompt end aggressive section, and recotmended the utilization! of aixborne platforms. * 4 i ‘e) To provide the espability for relatively safe overfliguts, the Lepeos U-2 was developed in 1955. Built into the U-2 ves on altitude bility of epproxtnately 70,000 feet nich, et that tine, vas eonsiderat alpost certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically, interfere. Inttially, it wes expected that, although the Soviets could not intercept the U-2 with mumed aircraft or missiles of any type, they might have @ limited copability of tracking the U-2 with radar. Thte asgimption leter proved 'to be correct except for the overly optimistic snticipation that Soviet redar capability would be “limited”: Soviet ebility to detect and track the U-2 on penetration and during virtually CHAL~O914, Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000F90425002-9, . TOP sECRETSanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 TOP SECRET -2- ite entire flight in denied territory was conclusively established carly 4n the program and hes continued to be the case up to the present time with one notable exceptions i.¢., penetrations of the USSR in the vicinity of the Soviet~Afghanisten-Pakistan border. In the period July 1959 to February 1960 three such penetrations vere accouplished without, to ow knowledge, detection by the Soviet Air Defense system. On the basis of this experience, we can at least tentatively conclude that if penetration can be mde without detection, there is an excellent chance thet the entire mission can be completed without recognition by the air defense system. Tt 1o'reasonsble' to assune that Soviet capability to inter- cept the U-2 will inoreese during the period under discussion. However, it 4s believed thet vith careful Tight planning and target selection, ‘the use of dtapersal and deployment bases for deception, minimum tine on the ground, at pre ani post-strike bases, and other tactics designed. to decrease operations] hazards, the-U-2 will. continue to possess a significant overflight utility during.at least @ portion of this perioa.* a) Diplomtie protests. wiitcli the USSR has made as e result of the AQUATONE operations in the sumer of 1956 and egain in early 1958 mke Xt imperative that Project CHALICE operations be conducted in such a manner aa to reduce the probebility of protest. In the original protest of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was consid- ered to have been the primiy motivation for the USSR protest. This view contimes valid despite a Soviet protest 1m early 1958 concerning a light which, although 1t did not violate a third country, dia fly into ita redex screen with the resultant possibility that the thind country had knowledge that a penetration of ‘the USER hea Deen mae. In the period between the 1956 and 1958 protests..2 " total of 20 penatrations Were made of the USSR and setellite countries without diplomatic protest from eny source. Ta no instance, hovever, was the USSR and o satellite country penetrated on the same mission. Recorded reaction to these flights indicates that the violated coutries were, in most instences, evere at the very leoat that o prohibitive flight was being madd. It wes" further assumed that, in at least sone cases, the USER hed equal evidence of overflight by U.S. aircraft as it bad for both the 1956 ant 1958 protests. Tt should be noted that the 1958 protest vas not made ¥A seperate attachment to this report entitled "Life Expectancy of the U-2 on Overflighte" purposely has been oultted from general distribution because of its spectel classification. ‘This attechuent is evetleble in the Intelligence Section on a “need to know" basis. CHAL~O9U+ ZF 17 Sanitized - Approved FSPReIBE JURopss.oosidk 188268420002-0Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 TOP SECRET oo public. ‘the resultant implication 1s that the Soviets Lecking the physical capability to stop much overflights, are forced to use diplo~ matie measures. In both protest cases, high U. S. political authority directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. ‘the reaction to the Soviet diplomtie action vill probably continue throughout thie period end wi01 be taken into consideration for plenning and when ! submitting proposed overflignts for political approval. e). Tb fo felt thet the use of Aepersal and deployment bares in coxbination vith the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3 - 5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin, S termination, ete., and thereby degrade and/or weaken an official protest. This would eleo allow for more plausible U.S. denial. IX DWELLToMce REQUIREMENTS 2, TARGED SELEorToN Intelligence Requirements for penotration flighta by Project CUALICE have been established by the Ad Hoe Requirements Comittee which 4s couposed of representatives of the fray, Navy; Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. .Require~ ments encompasa the felds of photographic intelligence, electr 25X1X7 intelligence, ant communi 25X1X7 lists and established priorities Composite views of all the agencies represented on both committees and, es such, represent the consensus of the IMM Intelli~ 25X1X7 | gence Commnity aa a viole. Torgets end priorities periodically are reviewed by the comilttees and revisions are mde based on the most current intelligence available from oll sources. 2. TASK Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imuinence of @ voviet mclear attack on the United States is the requirement for relfeble information on the present ani future Soviet capabilities for such an ettack. Such information is also critical to cur national, defense policy end planning. During the past four years CHALICE TOP SECRET cHat-o92h Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-0241 sAgvO?A04Z0G02-0oo ——— - “Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 : POP SEORED - -he , coverage hes been by far the most Inerative sourcs of reliable Anformntdon on which we have based our estimates of the Goviet copabilittes for melear attack. At the present time, there 48 an urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas mown to be, or suspected to be, associated with the three i clenents (ballistic missile, airereft, ani muclear capability). a. The most oritical intelligence problem at this tine is the status of the Soviet ICBM program, an inherent threat of overriding mgnitwle. Studies over the past two years by the U.S. Intelligence Commmity have concluled that CHALIGE provides the only available means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on su imundiate basis the required intelligence on the deploynent of Soviet TcBie. Certain redi lines which lend themselves to rail leunch or logistic ~ support for fixed sites and test sites are prin scorch areas for this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deploy- went question by receut evidence of IGBM series production. Coverage of the mst suspect production facilities my help to confirm this.* ‘bd. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE odverage which are also critical to national. security ere set forth 4A the following paragraphs. (1) It te recognized that a part of the Goviet ballistic missile capability may be Inunched from submarines, molear powered or conventional. Our need 1a to determine the possible modification of existing craft, construction of new ballistic miccile submarines; ani exploynent of both. CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of ansvering ‘the questions.on profuction, characteristics, end exploynent ~ of submarines capable of lamehing ballistic misailes. (2) ‘The existence of a Soviet IREM capability is recog- nized as a fact, although this capsbility ts less critical ‘to the United States than the IOPM. It constitutes an dmaetiiete end continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage offers the best known means to ensver the question of what 4a the deployment concept ani should essist with information 2ex1Sy the eapebllity of these weapons as well as their protuction. ME 22002. het the most criticel question wou guided wisciles, though they Gia not seem to feel. it neceseary to istinguish between THM and ICEM. Further, they rate research and devolopuent and production as mch higher than deployment at thie time sizes evidence on these would permit a Judgment of whether there wes inleed a threat in existence; current thinking does not put deploy- mont Og probable in the case of the ICEM. eee vop stene® fee Got Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0Sanitized - Approved Fou Release 4CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 “3- (3) The Soviet heavy bonker force today poses an immediate muclesr threat. Intelligence derived from sources other than 5 CHALICE hes provided a fairly qccurate measurement of the ment- tude and capability of this threat. Previous CHALICE coverage bes served to confirm end engnent this intelligence. However, We algo have evidence that the:Soviets are developing # follow~ on bouber afreraft which may replace the present boubex! foree. Tn order to establish the status and magnitude of the Spviet effort in the heavy bosber’ progres, to Glarity the tnters |” relationships of this and other Soviet wespotis delivery: eystens, ‘end thus to gain a nore accurate measurement of the overall Soviet miclear threst, both present end future, it 1s dlso critical that ve cover certain’ key Soviet bouber bases, bouber _ Production sites, and R & D facilities. (4), In addition ‘to Inovidage of Soviet delivery éyatem, 4nformation on the producticn ¢f fisstomable mteriols te essential to on accurate aid pdattive meaqurenent ofthe Soviet molear threat., Althoigl extensive coverage of Soviet ‘Atomic energy installations ‘hes already been acquired through : GHALICE operations, three of teh iurgest AE sites in the Soviet te Union renein uncovered and are {highest priority reqiirétionts. Production rates at these sites! are a major source of iihcertainty in estimates of Soviet plutonium production. Although vp concede an dmo(fate-Sowteh capsbility ‘to launch «, devastets lear attack against the U.8., We-do not bave oulfistent ction to gauge whether the Soviets have, or are producing suffictent fissionable materiel in onter: : (a) {o provide the required muclear werhesds for sir defense; (b) To mouit a sustained attacks (0) To arm alt or a great portion of their tectieal Weapons with miclear warheads. (5) the mmber end pattern of deployment of Soviet, surface- to air missile sites (SA-2) is of critical concern to the Strategic Air Command. CHALIOS photography has already pin- pointed approximately 50 of these sites including support facilities. Coverage of additional SAM defended areas remins a high priority requirenent. CHALICE coverage of one production area has ensbled us to sake a xeosonably accurate estimate of the plutonium end U~235 production from this location. Coverage of the remining key ion aites CHAL~O914 tad TOP SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release = CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0nL -Sanitized - ApproyasFor Relea ges GIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 -6- can muyply us with information for an estimte of the production of fisefonible miterisl at this tine and can also permit 6 projection of production for three or more years. Such information has never been obtained through other collection methods end, in addition to its critical urgency for estimates of immediate Soviet copability, ins~ cations of & program out of ol proportion to our estimate of Soviet needs vould be e most ofgnificent indication of possible soviet intentions and of inostimable use for political maneuvering, as well as military planning. 3. panoErs Photographic and electronic objectives (targets) to fulfi01 the needa outlined above are set forth in separate stings which are constently unler review en revision by the Ad Hoc Requirements Comt tte. 4. COROLLARY TASKS Yaluible intelligence by-products @lso can be anticipated as a result of the coverage of the primary systems herein discussed. Route photography can be expected to yield simnificent details of other Soviet afr instelletions, transportation system, industrial, fectiities, IREM and ICEM installations, and other economte and military targets vhich could be of a eignificence only slightly les ‘than the information we enticipate on primary objectives. One of the outstanding bomus effects that ve know will be derived from future exercise of the CHALICE capability will be an increase in our knowledge of Soviet air defense capabilities. Fairly precise data on the general deployment and characteristics of Soviet defensive electronic sites in otherwise inaccersible areas can be obtained through the capability of CHALICE equipment to detect and record electronic intelligence data, This increese in knowledge will result ine firmer bese for operationsl plens that involve employzent of cur muclear strike foree. It should also be noted that exercise of the CHALICE capability over otherwise Sergely inaccessible areas of the USER could roves] installations ani activities of a completely unknom but highly significant neture. As a specific by-product, CHALICE photography yields terrain information from which securate redar navigation and target charts, and rader prediction plates, can be constructed. It fs also anticipated that this photography will permit resolution of invaluable precise gecietic data which is 80 essential to the successful destruction of enouy targets by guided missiles. CHALO9U Lot 12 TOP BECRET Yar 60 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002.0Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 TOP SECRET -T- t TIT CONCEPT oF OPERATIONS 1. BAPLowenT a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability built into the airfvuns of me Ul) considerctle support Wit be aauntatned in the form of overseas ana ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and hove oli, alrborne collection eqiipsents In onder Sor Project CHALICE to have maximum capability, permanent overseas bases will be 25x’ —mitntainea tn urope ot Atom, Turkey, me 25°1462 ee b) In edaition, en air base facility within the ZI 4s necessary i to carry on continuing research and developnent, and, for further perfection of equipment ana techniques. Due to the fact that a follor- on afreraft will not be available for epproxinately 12 to 18 uonths every appropriate action will be taken to proiuct~improve the existing cxpe- vility ax pertains to airereft performance. Primary mission capabilities product inprovenent will be in the fon of increased reliability, weight Feduction, quantitative and qualitative inprovenent relating to the end product, In order to offaet "end product” degradation due to Increased performance, every effort will be mde to iaprove the existing and/or develop nev, primary mission capabilities to the extent that : ‘the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained. 25X1AGa Therefore, the facilities presently dn use at 1. Wid be mtsntained throughout the Lifetine of the U-2. | 25X1A6a c) the support of the facilities ot MMMM will be required for the entire period. Tneressed activity due to the follow-on program ‘ond prodnet improvement of CHALICE will have to be provided for. 1 4) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic eiaeing and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI end overseas bases. (Encl #2) 2,. MISSION AND MISSTON PLANNING | 8) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the National. Security, the following primary and secondary missions are stated: of 17 sor suenst feo Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0we Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 TOP SECRET -8- 1. Mo conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon- noissence (Photo end Elint) of the USSR and the USSR satellite comtries in order to obtain adequate and tinely intelligence consistent with the provisions mentioned in Section IT "Yntelligence Requirements". 2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial. recon- naissence (Photo and Elint) on a vorld-wide basis in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and edyance the national policies and interests of the U.S. as well os safeguard the security of the U.5. ww b) fo fulfil the above requirements the "Operational. Concept wil take cognizance of the lstest political considerations and intelligence requirements as outlined by the ARC. The coneept which hag evolved from experience, and which will be followed during the period will feature careful selection of highest priority objectives ‘end prudent application of all plenning factors to minimize the probability of protest. During the period ve have programed a maximm of 35 Photo-oversiighta. (20/1961-15/1962) Tlowever, a mumber vhich vill actually be accouplished will. be dependent upon executive opproval. ec) Since 4% 4a reasonably sure that the permanent overseas basés i are knova by the Russiens, ond their proximity to Russian territory allows for radar gurveiilance, and the fact that operations from these | ‘vases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, extensive { use of staging bases will be required. In addition, it can be assumed ‘thet these bases ere possfbly under visual surveillance. All of which ‘ points out the need for greater deception and mbility during this period. \e =e ds planned thet future Project CHALICE missions will be directed 1 ageinst areas dn which the Soviets have the least radar tracking cepability and in such © manner es to create naximm 6{fficulty for positive tracking. Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest | priority target coverage requirements. In addition, every effort wil). | ‘be mde to avoid the involvemrut of third countries (specifically, Soviet i Satellite Nations) either by wtveflying then on penetration or withdrawal, from the USSR, or by pernitting then to become knowledgeable, through { ‘their rater defenses, thet such e penetration 4s being wade, Tn all operationsl planning ani execution, the safety of the airereft will ve of prinary consideration. 3. UEILIZATroN a) ‘Training should be realistic in thet wherever possible the results obtained will be useful in the event that the beses and/or areas flown over are denied to the U.S. in the future. ona O91 cy £ of /? Sanitized - Approved Pdt Reie4sB FCIA-RDP33+024T3A580200420002-0a 25X1X3, ' 25X1X4 a 25X1A5a1 Sanitized,- Approved For Release ,.GlIA:RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 age ) Training will inclute the exercise of mobility plans utilizing edrlitt to support otaging to and from Qispercal and deployment bases. ‘Training exercises vill be accomplished on the fast move concept with minim U-2 ground tine at any of the bases utilized. c) tthe U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish peripheral electronic end photographie reconnaissance. ‘The sivantages in terns of training, econouy, availobility of a timely operational cepabt dononstrated during the past yeors in such areas as the Tt 46 felt ‘that we stand to lose more than we yO 50. The relative value of the exercise we give the Russion redars doen not outweigh the relative economic and operational rensons for doing 90. ‘The Russian radar operators are known to be proficient and’ the quili~ tative technical characteristics of their equipment ic uch that the ebove-nentioned flights - per se ~ would not induce greater Russian technological efforts in the redar field. In addition, it 1s felt that mextum utilization of the U-2 shold be plamed throughout the estiuated operational Mfe of the U-2 rather than walt for primary mission political approval that may never cone. Iu adaition, it is felt that knovledge of contimed end current successful operations by higher level would be conducive to obtaining political approval. 4, PRIMARY MISSION CAPABILINTES a) In ofaition to photographic and electronic collection equip- nent which would be carried on overflight migeiona, it will be necessary wsintain weather observation equipment for purposes of covers and during periods when overflights are not in progress fed equipment is etteched as Enclosure 3. , - 5. -MAINMENANCR AND SUPPORT a) In oer to mintain the high relfebility of atrereft and equipment, the concept of contractor maintenance will be continued. In addition, processing of overflight photography by Ml will be continued to insure maxim intelligence exploitation. (Personnel strength will reuain es stipulated in current 10's, with possibly minor adjustments.) 6. CONTROL a) the concept of overflights (and certain other missions) being controlled by Headquarters will be contdmued to insure efficient target coverage and compatibility of operations with national policy. Pet vor arenes ie” Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0CS Sanitized - Approveli For Refback °dla-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 -w- 7. SORTIE RATE a) Estimated sortie rate and flying hours by type of mission will. be a8 indicated in Enclosure i, Approximately 4076 flying hours wij i ve required to accomplish 1057 sorties in FY 61 and 3600 flying houre to accomplish 968 sorties in FY 62. i 8. guPPORT a) Support will be required from the folloving echelons os Andteated. ‘This support will be 4n accordance with current directives and agreanents. 1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, como logis- ~ ties, special airlift, and to serve os internediary on liaison matters, AFCIG-5 will be the channel for support to aJ1 subor~ @inate headquarters. 2) Theater Commnters for air bese facilities, logistic support, airlift requirements and for special lieison. 3) Strategic Air Commnd for certain air base facilities, personnel, logistics support and Meteson matters, 4) Atrvaya Air Commnieations System for comunientions ! ‘support. 5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for veather support. 6) National Security Agency for special intelligence reaction reports. 7) Notional Technical Processing Center for ELIN? readout. 8) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to ‘ operate from certain foreign countries. 25X1X7 IV RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES yu ‘CHAL-09: or Lot | ur 960 TOP SECRET Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-024154000200420002-0Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDB33-02415A000200420002-0 -n- 25X1X7 2, PrecHOSTTLTNES PERTOD a) If international relationships deteriorate to a point where hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct jon end peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a maximm rate vhich aveileble personnel, aircraft and equipment can suyyort. ‘Although the military services have photographic -end ELINT collection capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE are the only cepsbility in place overseas able to penstrate deeply end with tomparative physical immunity. b) During this period it vill be essential that the maxima amount of potential eneuy territory be photographed so as to provide ‘the: 2) Most probable tine when an enemy attack would be Inunched. 2) Size of the available enemy attack force. 3) Type and extent of probable enemy attack. %) Locations from where attacking forces end/or misiles would be launched. 5) Overall capsbility of the enemy to sustain an attack. 6) Most current target date for frienily attacking forces to use for retaliation. c) the need for current electronic intelligence will be very neceseary to mske available the frequencies ani locations of enemy radars so that: 1). Friently attacking forces can enploy jamming techniques most effectively. om of |: TOP SECRET x ee jt Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0Hoo Sanitized - Approved For Rgjease : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 2) Weak spots can be located through which attacking forces can penetrate with the least probability of interception, 3) Radar guidance of eneuy interceptors ani/or missiles can be interrupted. 4) During the pre-hostilities period operational control will. i remin with Project CHALICE Headquarters. Deploynent to prearranged rear bases my be necessexy as dictated by the existing situation (nck. #2). Project CHALICE resources will be utilized, on a first priority basis, to obtain reconnaissance coverage of SAC objectives 88 outlined in Appendix 1 to Annex "B" of SAC Operations Orier #1009. 3. * HOSTILTrTEs a) When hostilities break cit; Project overseas assets will revert to the operational control of the Strategic Mir Command under | the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This transfer of control and assigment will be 4n accordance with the provisions of a Joint Agreement (GHAL 0239), dated 19 July 1958, with USAF, DCS/0, concuryence date 2h Sept 1958, end in secordance with the CHALICE EWP Operational Plan, dated 20 Jamiery 1959. Upon execution of the SAC 50 series EVO, SAC Operations Order Nuxber 1009, Appendix 2 to Amex "D" contains the necessery instructions for utilization of CHALICE resources. bv) Military personnel will be effected in eccordanse with the arrangements conteined in the Personnel Annex of the above-mentioned. transfer egreenent. ) It 4 planed that civilian personnel will continue to function uitil relieved by military personnel. 7 * . : | = Colonel ‘UBAF 25X1A9a Grief, Operations Branch APPROVED: DED-DD/P Enclosures (i CBALO914 oy goes ix 60 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0—— Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0 TOP SECRET -B- Distribution: QBIQAABLALAIID oo » 25X1A2g Sanitized - Approved For Release : Cin-RoPoeeHthpo0z00420002-0 . TOP SECRET 960