MEDIA LAW

SEMINAR PAPER

JUDICIAL TIGHTROPE: NAVIGATING IMPARTIALITY IN

THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA

“UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF:

MS. ANAMIKA SHUKLA

Assistant Professor of Law
Gujarat National Law University

“SUBMITTED BY:”
RAMACHANDRAN MURUGESAN – 19B200
Semester X
(Batch: 2019-24)
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the research paper titled “Judicial

Tightrope: Navigating Impartiality in the Social Media Era” is
an original work of mine and no part of the research paper has
been submitted for award of any degree or for any publication.

Ramachandran Murugesan

April 14, 2024

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 THE SUPERVISORS CERTIFICATE

CERTIFICATE

This “is to certify that Ramachandran Murugesan has pursued and

prepared the research paper for Elective Course (Seminar Paper) –
Media Law titled “Judicial Tightrope: Navigating Impartiality in the
Social Media Era” in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of Bachelor of Laws – B.S.W. L.L.B. under my
supervision. To the best of my knowledge, the research paper is the
outcome of his own research.”

Signature

Ms. Anamika Shukla

Assistant Professor of Law

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Page | 4
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction......................................................................................11
Research Problem.................................................................................13
Significance of the Study......................................................................13
Objectives of the Study.....................................................................14
Hypothesis........................................................................................14
Research Questions..........................................................................14
Scope of the Study...........................................................................15
Limitations of the Study........................................................................16
Research Methodology..........................................................................16
Tentative Chapterisation.......................................................................16
I. Judicial impartiality & freedom of expression..............................18
II. The ethical implications of social media......................................19
A. What makes Social media so risky yet inevitable for judges to
venture......................................................................................19
B. Should judges participate in social media – an unending
conundrum?..............................................................................20
III. How Should Judges Comport Themselves When Participating
“

In Social Media?” 22
A. “Should judges list lawyers appearing before them or
litigants as “facebook
friends/twitter followers”?”.........................................................22
B. “Should judges post/tweet about pending cases or their
careers/work on their personal profiles?”
24
C. “Should judges share through social media information and
comments about matters concerning/affecting the judiciary as an
institution?”
25
D. “Should judges share through social media information and
comments about matters concerning/affecting the judiciary as an
institution?”
26
E. “Like”, “dislike”, “follow”, “posting”, “comments ” - by the
user and by third party individuals , joining internet-based
distinct groups: what are the implications?

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 27
IV. Media Trial: Concerns...............................................................27
A. Right To Fair Trial V. Media Trial.............................................30
B. Media Trial Within The Ambit Of Freedom Of Speech And
Expression?...............................................................................32
V. Conclusion...............................................................................34
Bibliography.............................................................................36

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATI EXPANSION
ON
& And

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

ADR Association of Democratic

Reforms
AIIMS All Indian Institute of Medical
Science
AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

Art. Article

CBI Central Bureau of

Investigation
cl. Clause

CM Chief Minister

Co. Company

Consti Constitution

CPIO Central Public Information

Officers
DLT Delhi Law Times

Dr. Doctor

ECE Election Commission of

Eurekatia
ECI Election Commission of India

EDP Eurekatia Democratic Party

EFB
Electoral Finance Bond
HC High Court

Hon’ble Honourable

IC Information Commission

Page | 7
 ICCPR International Covenant on Civil
and Political
Rights
ICO Information Commission
Officer
IST Indian Standard Time

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

JRP Jagratha Raksha Party

KYC ‘Know Your Customer’

Ltd. Limited

Moh Mohammad
d.
Mr. Mister

MP Member of Parliament
NCRB National Crime Records
Bureau
No. Number
Org. Organisation

Ors. Others

Ors. Others

Para Paragraph

PIL Public Interest Litigation

PUC People’s Union for Civil

L Liberties
Pvt. Private

Ref. Reference

PIB Press Information Bureau

RPA Representation of the People

Act, 1951
RTI Right to Information

S. Section

S.C. Supreme Court Reports

Page | 8
 R
S.C. Supreme Court Weekly
W.
SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

Supp Supplementary
.
T.N. Tamil Nadu

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human

Rights
U.N.G. United Nations General
A. Assembly
U.N.T.S United Nations Treaty Series
.
u/a Under Article

u/s Under Section

UK United Kingdom

UOI Union of
India
U.S. United
States
Vs. Versus

W.P. Writ
Petition
WBIC West Bengal Information Commission

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INTRODUCTION

The cornerstone of a just legal system lies in the impartiality of

judges, who are tasked with rendering decisions solely based on
courtroom evidence, free from external influences. However, as
digital technology increasingly integrates into legal proceedings,
concerns arise regarding potential impacts on judicial impartiality.
The reliance on digital tools and platforms may introduce new
variables that could potentially compromise the neutrality and
objectivity expected from the judiciary.

Social media serves as a virtual nexus, uniting individuals from

diverse backgrounds around common interests for discussion and
debate. In the current digital era, catalyzed by the global
pandemic, social networking platforms like YouTube, LinkedIn,
Facebook, and Twitter foster a sense of global community. Social
media serves multifaceted roles: enabling creative expression in
various forms like art, dance, and drama, facilitating
communication and public relations, and shaping public opinion on
myriad issues. It reflects societal realities and cultural nuances, as

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portrayed in web series, films, and other media. Within the context
of the Indian Constitution, social media serves as a platform for
exercising the constitutional right to freedom of speech and
expression, as outlined in Article 19(1)(a).1 Social media has
fundamentally changed the way people communicate by enabling
quick access, frequent updates, and instant sharing of information,
ideas, pictures, and videos.2 According to research by the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India, a significant number of Indian
students and teenagers, approximately 164.81 million, spend
considerable time on social media.

Social “media has played a significant role in creating awareness

about various forms of abuse faced by individuals worldwide. For
instance, it has shed light on issues such as racial discrimination
and police brutality against African Americans in the United”

1 INDIA CONST. art. 19(1)(a).”

“

2 Dimitra Blitsa & Ioannis Papathanasiou, Judges & Social Media: Managing the Risks,
“

THEMIS COMPETITION 4 (2015).”

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States, “leading to the global #blacklivesmatter movement. 3 Social
media has also enabled the global spread of protests, as seen in
recent demonstrations in India opposing farm trade laws and
agricultural market liberalization. These protests garnered
international notice, with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau
expressing solidarity during a Facebook Video Conference hosted
by Canadian MP Bardish Chagger on Guru Nanak's birth
anniversary. Trudeau underscored the significance of dialogue and
citizens' rights to participate in peaceful demonstrations. This
instance highlights how social media elevates local concerns onto
the global platform for discourse.4 It demonstrates how social
media spreads awareness and enables people to express their
opinions on events happening in distant territories. Considering
these factors, it is reasonable to assert that social media has
democratized access to justice for countless individuals worldwide.
The influence of technology on socioeconomic, ecological, and
political systems has fundamentally altered societal dynamics and
structures. While technology undeniably enhances global
convenience, it's essential to acknowledge its potential for
exploitation, although perpetrators can often be swiftly identified
and traced.”

On the contrary, it can be contended that social media tends to

amplify stories or events favored by the societal majority. Take, for
instance, the case of Indian actor Sushant Singh Rajput's suicide,
where social media platforms were flooded with speculations and
amateur investigations, perpetuating hypothetical narratives of foul
play. This sensationalized coverage garnered widespread attention,
overshadowing more significant global issues. This phenomenon is
commonly known as the mirror effect, where social or mass media
selectively reflect narratives, molding public perception accordingly.

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This project aims to explore the challenges of maintaining judges’
impartiality in the digital age, and to identify strategies for ensuring
that judges remain unbiased and neutral in their decision-making.

3 Aleem Maqbool, Black Lives Matter: From social media post to global movement,
BBC NEWS (March 22, 2022 03:23 PM) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-53273381.
4 Elizabeth Roche, Farmers' protest: Canadian PM expresses concern, defends

'peaceful' agitation, MINT

(March 20 01:07 PM) https://www.livemint.com/news/india/farmers-protest-
canadian-pm-expresses- concern-defends-peaceful-agitation-
11606809801881.html.

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RESEARCH PROBLEM

The “impartiality of judges is one of the core principles of a fair and

just legal system. Judges are expected to be unbiased and neutral
in their decisions, and to base their judgments solely on the
evidence presented in court. However, with the increasing use

of digital technology in the legal system, concerns have been raised

about the potential impact on judges' impartiality.”
The use of digital technology, such as social media, online
“

research, and artificial intelligence tools, can potentially expose

judges to a range of external influences that may affect their
judgment. For example, judges may be influenced by their own
biases and prejudices, or by external factors such as public opinion,
political pressure, or even the algorithms used by digital tools.”

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This “project aims to contribute to a better understanding of the

challenges and opportunities of maintaining judges' impartiality in
the digital age, and to develop strategies and tools to support judges
in making fair and just decisions.”

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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1. “Examining the impact of digital technologies on judicial

decision-making processes and the potential for bias or
impartiality.”
2. “Analyzing the role of social media in shaping public
perceptions of judges and the potential for this to impact
impartiality.”
3. “Investigating the use of algorithms and machine learning
in judicial decision-making and their potential to introduce
biases.”
4. “Exploring how judges' personal beliefs and values may
influence their impartiality in the digital age.”
5. “Examining the extent to which judges are trained on the
potential biases introduced by digital technologies and
how to mitigate these biases.”
6. “Assessing the effectiveness of existing safeguards, such as
judicial codes of ethics, to ensure impartiality in the digital
age.”
7. “Identifying best practices for ensuring impartiality in the
digital age, including possible policy recommendations
and guidelines for judges and court systems.”

HYPOTHESIS

Judges “are expected to make decisions based solely on the

evidence presented in court, without being influenced by any
external factors. However, external factors in the digital age
creeps in to the decision-making process by the judges.”

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

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1. “What makes social media so risky yet inevitable for judges to
venture?”
2. “Should judges participate in social media?”
3. “Should judges list lawyers appearing before them or
litigants as “facebook friends/twitter followers”?”

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 4. “Should judges post/tweet about pending cases or their
careers/work on their personal profiles?”
5. “Should judges share through social media information and
comments about matters concerning/affecting the judiciary as
an institution?”
6. “Like”, “dislike”, “follow”, “posting”, “comments” - by the
user and by third party individuals, joining internet-based
distinct groups: what are the implications?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of this study is:

1. “The impact of digital technologies on judicial decision-

making processes, such as the use of online research, social
media, or algorithmic tools.”
2. “The potential for bias or impartiality introduced by digital
technologies, such as the impact of social media on judges'
reputation or the potential for algorithmic bias.”
3. “The training and education of judges on digital technologies
and their potential biases, including existing safeguards and
best practices.”
4. “The public perception of judges' impartiality in the digital
age, including the role of social media and other digital
platforms in shaping public opinion.”
5. “The legal and ethical implications of digital technologies on
judicial impartiality, including issues related to privacy,
confidentiality, and due process.”
6. “The effectiveness of existing legal and regulatory
frameworks in ensuring impartiality in the digital age.”
7. “Possible policy recommendations and guidelines for judges
and court systems to ensure impartiality in the digital age.”

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8. “It is important to note that the scope of the study may be
limited by practical considerations such as time, resources,
and access to data. Therefore, it is essential to define the
research questions and objectives clearly and to prioritize the
most relevant and feasible areas of investigation.”

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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

1. “Limited access to data: Access to judicial decision-making

processes and related data may be restricted, making it
difficult to analyze the impact of digital technologies on
judicial impartiality.”

2. “Reliance on self-reported data: Researchers may need to rely

on self-reported data from judges, which may not always
accurately reflect their behavior or attitudes.”

3. “Limited generalizability: The study may be limited to a

specific jurisdiction or sample size, which may not be
representative of judges' experiences in other regions or
countries.”

4. “Ethical considerations: The study may raise ethical concerns

related to privacy, confidentiality, and the protection of
personal data.”

5. “Lack of standardized measures: There may be a lack of

standardized measures to assess impartiality in the digital
age, making it difficult to compare results across studies.”

6. “Limited scope: The study may be limited to certain aspects of

digital technologies, such as social media or algorithmic
decision-making, while other aspects may not be addressed.”

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In “this project, a doctrinal method of research shall be applied. The

research conducted shall focus on the black letter of the law found
in statutes and judicial pronouncements. The research conducted is
both descriptive and analytical by nature. Secondary sources of
data such as websites, books and articles shall be referred to while

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making this project.”

TENTATIVE CHAPTERISATION

Chapter “ I: Introduction - This chapter will introduce the

research problem, state the research questions, hypotheses, scope
of the study, scheme of chapterisation, and

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provide a background of the study. It will also discuss the
significance of the study, the research objectives, and the research
methodology.”

Chapter “II: Literature Review - This chapter will review the

existing literature on judges’ impartiality in the digital age.”

Chapter “III: Judges Impartiality and Freedom of Expression -

This chapter will look in to how judges’ social activities manifest
the tension between judicial impartiality and freedom of
expression.”

Chapter “ IV: Ethical Implications of social media – This

chapter shall look into ethical implications of judges’ usage of
social media by looking into the extent of judges’ participation in
social media.”

Chapter “V: How should judges comport themselves when

participating in social media? - This chapter will critically
analyze how judges should comport themselves while participating
in in social media by looking in to questions such as whether judge
should comment on pending cases etc.”

Chapter “VII: Media Trials - Concerns - This chapter shall

address the concerns of the effects of media trials on judicial
impartiality by looking into leading precedents.”

Chapter “VIII: Conclusion and Suggestions - This chapter will

identify the best practices for ensuring impartiality in the digital
age, including possible policy recommendations and guidelines for
judges and court systems.”

Chapter “IX: Bibliography - This chapter will provide a list of

references cited in the study. It will also include a list of additional
sources that the researcher finds useful.”

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 I. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY & FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The “ social activities of judges highlight the inherent tension

between judicial impartiality and freedom of expression. Therefore,
a discussion on social media etiquette must take into account these
traditional values. The request for impartial judges can be traced
back to historical roots, with references to impartiality dating back
to early Greek societies as an essential element of a fair trial and a
virtue of those responsible for delivering justice, as mentioned by
Homer and Hesiod.”5 In the same vein, Socrates, addressing some
judges, mentions, inter alia, that “[t]he purpose for which a judge
holds that position is not to favour but to judge”.6

In “modern times, the principle of judicial impartiality is enshrined

in international documents such as Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (1950), Article 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), all
emphasizing its significance in ensuring fair trials.”7

As “per the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), the

conduct of judges in their professional activities is crucial for
maintaining the credibility of the courts, and they are expected to
discharge their duties without any bias or favoritism.8 This
principle also extends to a judge's social life, as they are expected
to conduct themselves in a respectable manner in their private life
and avoid any impropriety or appearance thereof, in accordance
with articles 10 and 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).”9

While “judges, like any other citizens, enjoy freedom of expression

and are entitled to have a personal life and engage in social

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activities as per their rights, they must also maintain the dignity of
their office, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary, as
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Ethical duties
should not require”

5 “
Homer Odyssey Γ (3) 244 & D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens,
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS 10 (1993).”
6 “ Plato, The Apology of Socrates, 35c.”
7 “ Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”
8 “ CCJE Opinion No (2002) 3 on the Principles and Rules Governing Judges’

Professional Conduct, in
Particular Ethics, Incompatible Behavior and Impartiality, recitals 22-23.”
9 “ See also art. 1 & 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights &

art. 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”

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judges “to distance themselves from their community, as social
awareness and sensitivity are essential for effective judicial
duties.10 However, a balance must be struck between social
participation and avoiding any impropriety or appearance thereof,
in order to uphold the integrity of the judiciary.”11

II. THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The “widespread use of social media has made it challenging for

members of the judiciary to uphold their ethical duties. The instant
and ubiquitous nature of online social interaction has created
complexities and ethical dilemmas. In some cases, social
networking has led to disciplinary proceedings against judges. For
instance, there have been incidents where a French prosecutor and
a judge exchanged comments about an ongoing trial on Twitter
using pseudonyms, resulting in public outrage and disciplinary
charges.12 Similarly, in the United States, a judge was reprimanded
for sharing comments about pending proceedings with an attorney
appearing before him via Facebook.”13

A. WHAT MAKES SOCIAL MEDIA SO RISKY YET INEVITABLE FOR

JUDGES TO VENTURE

Understanding “the unique characteristics and risks of social media

is crucial before delving into the ethical issues surrounding judges'
participation in online social networking.”

Firstly, “information shared on social media can easily be accessed

and disseminated, even if strict privacy settings are in place. For
example, a Facebook user may choose to keep their friends list
private, but they have no control over their friends' decision to
make their list public, thereby exposing all their relationships on
social networking sites (SNSs).”

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Additionally, even if users are selective about whom they befriend
on SNSs, they cannot prevent their friends from sharing their
posted information with their own

10 D.Th. Tsatsos, Constitutional Law (in Greek), Vol. 2, A. Sakkoulas Athens-Komotini

“

552 (1993).”
11 “ United Nations Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Independence of the

Judiciary (1985), Sec. 8, available at

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.asp
x .”
12 “ Le Monde journal (29.4.2014), available at

http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/04/29/pour- lecsm-un-magistrat-ne-
doit-pas-tweeter-en-plein-proces_4409355_3224.html .”
13 “ Le Monde journal (29.4.2014), available at

http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/04/29/pour- lecsm-un-magistrat-ne-
doit-pas-tweeter-en-plein-proces_4409355_3224.html .”

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friends “or the general public.14 Maintaining personal information
as private on SNSs can be challenging, as some users may use
pseudonyms to avoid identification, but there is no guarantee of
maintaining anonymity.”

Secondly, “it is important to note that social media postings, unlike

spoken words, are written documents that persist over time (verba
volant, scripta manent). With the advancement of technology,
social media postings are permanent and can be retrieved,
circulated, and shared even after they have been deleted.”15

Thirdly, “users of social media must be aware of the risk of their

postings being taken out of context. Expressing views in a virtual
environment where information is exchanged rapidly is
fundamentally different from face-to-face interpersonal interaction,
which can lead to misinterpretation or miscommunication, even
with ill- intentions. Furthermore, despite exercising caution in
expressing personal views online, users may not always have
control over other users posting undesirable or inappropriate
comments on their social media page.”

It is possible that such comments, regardless of their endorsement

or deletion, may still be associated with the social media account
holder.16

B. SHOULDJUDGES PARTICIPATE IN SOCIALMEDIA – AN

UNENDING CONUNDRUM?

In“ today's rapidly evolving media landscape, a crucial question

that needs to be addressed is whether judges should be permitted
to use social networking sites (SNSs). According to judicial ethics,
upon taking the bench, a judge is required to ensure that their
conduct, both inside and outside the court, maintains and enhances
public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, the legal
profession, and litigants.17 Judges are also expected to avoid

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impropriety and any appearance of impropriety in all their
activities, while being mindful of their duty to uphold the standing
and reputation of the Court.”18

14 B.P. Cooper, Judges and Social Media: “Friends” with Costs and Benefits, ABA Vol. 22 No. 3
“

(2014), p.2-3.”
15 “ Id; CJEU, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de

Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzólez (2014).”

16 Id
17 “The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), Values 2.2 & 4.1. ENCJ, Judicial

Ethics Report (2009- 2010).”

18 “ ECHR, Resolution on Judicial Ethics (23.6.2008).”

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In “essence, judges, being prominent public figures, are required to
be mindful of the perception of their relationships and should
exercise caution in their interactions, both professionally and
personally, including on social media.19 Social media has become an
integral part of daily life and culture, and judges are encouraged to
maintain a social life while avoiding becoming isolated from their
communities, as understanding the public is crucial for effective
judging.”20

A “blanket ban on social networking for judges would conflict with

their freedom of expression and encroach on their private life,
including their right to develop a social identity and form
relationships, as protected by Articles 10 and 8 of the ECHR.21
Judges should be allowed to adapt to and utilize new technology
and cultural trends, while acknowledging the potential benefits that
arise from communication through new media.”

Many “advisories addressing social media usage by judges suggest

that current ethical standards do not explicitly forbid it, as long as
judges fulfill their other ethical duties. For instance, the South
Carolina Ethics Commission (Opinion 17-2019) states that judges'
participation in social networking promotes public outreach and
confidence, allowing the community to better understand how
judges communicate.”22

It “is important to remember that it is the actual behavior of

judges, not just its online manifestation, that can violate ethical
duties. If ethical violations would be considered improper
regardless of whether they occurred online, over the phone, or in
person, then it is the content of the behavior, rather than the
medium (social media), that should be condemned.”23

Considering the above, I argue that judges should be allowed to

use social media, as long as they exercise caution and discretion

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to avoid compromising their duties of

19 A. Wilson, Let’s Be Cautious Friends: The Ethical Implications of Social Networking for
“

Members of the Judiciary, 7:3 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 228 (2012).”
20 “J.M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a Per Se Rule on Friendship

(Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 575, 578 (2012); United Nations-Office on

Drugs and Crime, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
(2007), § 31-32.”
21 “ ECHR, Harabin v. Slovakia (No 58688/11, § 149, 20 February 2017).”
22 “ J. Phillips, Best Practices in Training Judges and Prosecutors in Europe, EJTN’s

Conference of Directors
7 (2014), available
at: http://www.ejtn.eu/Documents/News
%20articles/J_Phillips_Conference_Directors_2014.pdf .”
23 “C. Estlinbaum, Social Networking and Judicial Ethics 14-15 (2020), available at:

www.ssrn.com; American Bar Association (ABA), Formal Opinion 462 (2013)”

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impartiality, “integrity, and propriety. In other words, while social
media usage by judges should not be outright prohibited, it should
be subject to certain limitations that are crucial for maintaining the
standards of the judicial profession. I will explore and elaborate on
these limitations in the following sections of this project.”

III. HOW SHOULD JUDGES COMPORT THEMSELVES

WHEN PARTICIPATING IN SOCIAL MEDIA?

In “this part, I analyse the problems related with the participation

of judges on social media platforms, how it can be regulated to give
maximum effect to the contending rights of free speech and
expression of judges and the right to judicial impartiality in a free
and fair trial. I will also look into probable solutions for the same.”

A. SHOULD JUDGES LIST LAWYERS APPEARING BEFORE THEM OR

LITIGANTS AS

“FACEBOOK FRIENDS/TWITTER FOLLOWERS”?

Considering “the prevalence of social media, it is not uncommon for

lawyers and opposing parties to search for information about the
judge on Facebook. During such searches, litigants may discover
that the opposing advocate or party and the judge are listed as
"friends" on social networking sites. While there are no explicit
ethical rules prohibiting judges from interacting with lawyers,
social contact between members of the judiciary and the legal
profession is generally considered appropriate and beneficial.”24

However, “the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct state that

judges should avoid situations that may raise suspicions of
favoritism or partiality in their personal relationships with lawyers
who regularly practice in their court. 25 This ethical duty is aimed at
preventing the appearance of bias or undue influence and prohibits
interactions with legal practitioners that could convey the
impression of a special ability to influence the judge to a

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reasonable observer.”

On the contrary, having a personal friendship with a party is often

seen as a compelling reason for disqualification, as friendship can
be perceived as synonymous with loyalty,

24 Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, Sec. 119-127, CCJE

“

Opinion No (2018) 16 on the Relations between Judges and Lawyers.”

25 “Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), Values 2.1, 2.5, 4.8 & Commentary

on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, supra at 23, Sec. 90.”

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which “goes against impartiality.26 According to the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), impartiality, as required
by Article 6.1 of the ECHR, is assessed based on two tests. The
subjective test considers the personal convictions and behavior of
the specific judge to determine if they hold any personal prejudice
or bias in a given case. The objective test, on the other hand,
evaluates whether the tribunal as a whole, including its
composition, provides sufficient guarantees to exclude any
legitimate doubts about its impartiality.”27

There “is no clear-cut distinction between the two tests, as a judge's

conduct may not only raise objectively held concerns about
impartiality from an external observer's perspective but also impact
the judge's personal convictions. When applying the subjective test,
it is presumed that a judge's personal impartiality exists unless
there is evidence to the contrary. As for the objective test, it must
be determined whether there are ascertainable facts, beyond the
judge's conduct, that may raise doubts about their impartiality. The
perspective of the person concerned is relevant, but ultimately, the
decisive factor is whether the fear of bias can be objectively
justified.”

The “Court has emphasized that appearances matter in ensuring

justice is not only done but also seen to be done 28, as it is essential
for the public to have confidence in the courts of a democratic
society. To apply standards related to the "appearance of
impartiality" to judges' social media connections, it is important to
understand the meaning of social media "friendship". As articulated
by the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline in
Opinion 2010-7, being a "friend" on social media does not
necessarily imply special affection, mutual trust, or esteem, and
may hold little significance.”29

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In “fact, some individuals have only a few Facebook "friends" while
others have thousands, indicating that a Facebook "friendship" may
simply be an acquaintanceship that may not warrant
disqualification. A blanket ban on Facebook "friending" could
overly encompass a wide range of individuals with whom the
judge may have had”

26 Supra note 23.

27 Supra note 21.
28 “ J. Phillips, Best Practices in Training Judges and Prosecutors in Europe, EJTN’s Conference of

Directors (2014) available at:” http://www.ejtn.eu/Documents/News

%20articles/J_Phillips_Conference_Directors_2014.pdf .
29 “ The Supreme Court of Ohio, Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline,

Opinion 2010.”

Page | 33
minimal real-world communication, leading to unreasonable
burdens on the judge's colleagues and potential public disfavor
towards the bench.

Considering “the above, I argue that the concept of Facebook

"friendship" should not be interpreted in the traditional sense of
the word. When evaluating whether a judge lacks impartiality
based on online "friendships", I believe that the judge's social
media connections must objectively demonstrate a close and
personal relationship in order to justify disqualification.”

As “emphasized by the ECHR, the mere fact that a judge has some
personal knowledge of an actor in the proceedings does not
automatically imply bias in favor of that person. 30
It must be
assessed on a case-by-case basis whether the familiarity in
question, such as a Facebook "friendship", is of a nature and
degree that would reasonably raise concerns about the judge's
ability to act impartially. Only when there are intimate
communications with a party or counsel who repeatedly appears
before the judge, would there be a justifiable reason for withdrawal
due to an actual or perceived problematic relationship.”

B. SHOULD JUDGES POST/TWEET ABOUT PENDING

CASES OR THEIR CAREERS/WORK ON THEIR PERSONAL

PROFILES?

There “are several matters related to a judge's career and working

environment that may require sharing with colleagues and
superiors. These can include legal discussions related to pending
cases, exchange of information and advice on internal
administrative matters, as well as complaints and allegations about
internal issues that are not of public interest. It is firmly
established that judges are prohibited from making public

Page | 34
statements or comments on pending cases, whether through social
media or any other public means of communication. Similarly,
judges must refrain from engaging in ex parte communications
concerning pending cases.”

I emphasize that when a judge discloses factual information or

engages in ex parte communications about pending cases, it can
disrupt the courtroom proceedings and potentially compromise the
fairness of the trial and the adversarial

30 Supra note 24.

Page | 35
principle.31Furthermore, I believe that it is best practice for
“

members of the judiciary to avoid public social media

communications when it comes to career and work-related matters.
This is because social media posts and comments intended for the
judge's online "friends" can be disseminated without consent,
leading to embarrassing consequences when disclosed to third
parties.”

Additionally, “social media profiles are not reliable in verifying the

true identity of users, as many individuals use pseudonyms. The
absence of an identification policy in social media discussions can
allow for interference by third parties. In my opinion, the need for
online communication among judiciary members regarding career
and work-related issues can be effectively addressed through a
secure online forum exclusively accessible to judiciary members.
Such a forum can be established alongside the official website of
judicial bodies and authenticate members' identities through a
registration process. This would enable judges to communicate
with colleagues and promote their professional interests without
the ethical risks associated with public social media use.”

C. SHOULD JUDGES SHARE PERSONAL INFORMATION THROUGH

SOCIAL MEDIA?

Articles “10 and 8 of the ECHR acknowledge that judges have the
right to express themselves and lead their personal lives, including
through social networking sites (SNSs), by sharing comments,
photos, and other personal and family-related information with
their loved ones and friends. However, judges' freedom of
expression is subject to ethical duties that aim to maintain public
confidence in the impartial and fair administration of justice.”

Striking “a balance between judges' personal expression and their

ethical obligations can be challenging. The visibility of a judge's

Page | 36
personal information to third parties can potentially compromise
their impartiality and integrity in various ways. For example, if a
judge's personal data is overly exposed, it may lead to situations
where parties in a case attempt to pressure or threaten the judge
to rule in their favor. For instance, if a”

31“
M. Harrison & K. Swisher, When Judges Should Be Seen, Not Heard: Extrajudicial
Comments Concerning Pending Cases and the Controversial Self-Defense Exception
in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, 64 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW,
559-581 (2009).”

Page | 37
judge's residential address is easily accessible to everyone, it may
facilitate attempts to contact the judge privately. Similarly, if a
judge posts real-time updates about their whereabouts or
comments on their daily activities, it may create a risk of partiality.

To “address such risks, it is important to limit the disclosure of

personal information on social media to individuals who belong to
the judge's social and family circle and whom the judge can rely on
for maintaining impartiality. Appropriate measures should be taken
to ensure that judges' personal information remains confidential
and is not misused or exploited to compromise the integrity of the
judicial process.”

D. SHOULD JUDGES SHARE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA

INFORMATION AND COMMENTS ABOUT MATTERS

CONCERNING/AFFECTING THE JUDICIARY AS AN INSTITUTION?

Judges should avoid expressing views that can potentially

undermine judicial independence, impropriety, or public
confidence. A case in point is the unprecedented press conference
held in 2018 by four sitting Supreme Court judges in which they
spoke against the CJI Dipak Misra that he allocated certain
politically controversial cases to such benches which gave
favourable judgments towards a political party. The only change
which happened after this conference was the Supreme Court
publishing the roster online. Furthermore, the Court was subject to
intense controversy and criticism which reduced the public
confidence in the judiciary.32

Page | 38
32Kevin James, A Year After Four SC Judges’ Press Conference, Is Democracy Still in
Danger?, THE WIRE, 12 January 2019, https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-judges-
press-conference-one-year#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20in
%202019,handling%20of%20high%2Dprofile%20cases.

Page | 39
 E. “LIKE”, “DISLIKE”, “FOLLOW”, “POSTING”, “COMMENTS ” - BY

THE USER AND BY THIRD PARTY INDIVIDUALS , JOINING

INTERNET-BASED DISTINCT GROUPS: WHAT ARE THE

IMPLICATIONS?

Social “media platforms provide new ways of expressing opinions,

interests, and engaging in discussions through features such as
"like," "dislike," and "follow" buttons, as well as the ability to post
comments on timelines or walls. However, it should be noted that
such online discussions have limitations. They are not live debates
but rather confined to written comments or single-word indications,
which can make it difficult to explain one's views and may result in
misunderstandings.”

The “ambiguity of "like," "dislike," and "follow" indications, which

lack commonly accepted meanings, poses risks for judges who use
them. For example, if a judge "likes" a webpage of a commercial
company on social media, it could be interpreted as an attempt to
promote the company's economic interests, raising concerns about
the judge's compliance with ethical duties. As a result, judges who
use such seemingly innocuous indications may be seen as
conveying the impression of influencing others or abusing the
prestige of their judicial office for personal or economic gain,
violating their ethical obligations.”33

Even “posts and comments, which may be more elaborate and clear
than simple indications, can still lead to misunderstandings.
Particularly, if a judge comments on politically charged issues of
public interest, third parties may interpret it as revealing the
judge's political bias or affiliation.34 This could inadvertently result
in breaching the judge's duties of impartiality and discretion, which
prohibit openly expressing approval or disapproval of specific
political parties or leaders.”

Page | 40
 IV. MEDIA TRIAL: CONCERNS

The definition of "trial by media" by the Supreme Court of India

encompasses the impact of television and newspaper coverage
on a person's reputation, creating a

33 Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, supra at 23, § 136,

“

B.P. Cooper.”
34 “ Moosavian, R, Jigsaws and Curiosities: The Unintended Consequences of Misuse of Private

Information Injunctions, 241

(4) COMMUNICATIONS LAW 104-114 (2016).”

Page | 41
widespread “perception of guilt, regardless of any court verdict.35
Notably, the definition acknowledges that even the publication of
true information can still constitute trial by media. It is important
to note that the impact of media trials can be both negative and
positive. In the following discussion, I will explore the main
concerns regarding media trials and the stance of the judiciary on
this issue.”

a. JESSICA LALL CASE

At “a party in New Delhi, Jessica Lall, a model-cum-bartender, was

tragically shot dead by a drunken gate crasher after she refused to
serve him alcohol. Multiple witnesses identified the attacker as
Manu Sharma, the son of a politician from the Indian National
Congress (INC) and a relative of a former President of India. 36
However, during Sharma's trial, almost all witnesses, including
Jessica's fellow bartender, recanted their initial statements given to
the police.37 Additionally, a police officer investigating the case
raised concerns that Sharma's family had colluded with some police
officials to destroy evidence, but his complaint was ignored.”38

As “a result, Sharma was eventually acquitted by a trial court due to

lack of evidence, which sparked public outrage. A nationwide
"Justice for Jessica" campaign gained momentum with support from
the media.39 A prominent journalist openly condemned Sharma as
"a craven killer,"40 and some sections of the press criticized the
trial court judge who acquitted Sharma.41 However, on appeal,
Sharma was found guilty of murder by the Delhi High Court, which
had expedited the case in response to the public outcry and media
campaign. The High Court criticized the trial court's decision as
"positively perverse" and referred to the revised statement of
Jessica's fellow bartender as a”

Page | 42
35 Anandv. Registrar, (2009) 8 S.C.C. 106 (Del.) 174.”
“

36
“ Vineet Khare and Harinder Baweja, Killers of Justice, TEHELKA, Oct. 7,

2006, available at
http://www.tehelka.com/stoiy_main20.asp?filename=Ne100706killers-of CS.asp.”
37
“BhavnaVij-Aurora, Deaf Mute Blind, OUTLOOK, March 13, 2006, available at
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?230514.”
38 Id
39
“ Somini Sengupta, Acquittal in Killing Unleashes Ire at India's Rich, N.Y. TIMES, March

13, 2006, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/asia/13india.html? r- 1.”
40
“B. Dutt, Ram and Manusmriti, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006,
http://httabloid.com/news/181_1835670,0008.htm.”
41“
Vij-Aurora, supra note 25; Harinder Baweja and Vineet Khare, Is There Any
Hope Jessica Will Get Justice?, TEHELKA, Mar. 25, 2006,
http://www.tehelka.com/storymainl7.asp?filename=Ne032506 Is thereCS.asp.”

Page | 43
"concoction."42 In April 2010, the Supreme Court of India upheld
the judgement of the Delhi High Court.43

b. PIYADARSHINI MATTOO CASE

In “the case of the rape and murder of a law student named

Piyadarshini Mattoo, Santosh Kumar Singh was accused as the
perpetrator. The Justice for Jessica campaigners also highlighted
the flawed trial of Santosh Singh, who happened to be the son of a
high- ranking police official. Singh had been acquitted by a trial
court due to lack of evidence, and the trial court judge made a
perplexing remark stating, "Though I know he is the man who
committed the crime, I acquit him, giving him the benefit of the
doubt."44 The judge criticized the police for their negligent
investigation and expressed disappointment that the rule of law in
India did not seem to apply to "those who enforce the law" and "the
children of such persons."”45

However, “on appeal, Singh was sentenced to death by the Delhi

High Court, which condemned the trial court for mishandling
justice.46 Similar to Manu Sharma's trial, this case had also been
expedited by the High Court in response to the public outcry and
media campaign for justice.”

c. SANJAY DUTT CASE

After the Supreme Court sentenced Sanjay Dutt to 5 years

“

imprisonment, he had to serve in jail due to his involvement in the

1993 Mumbai Serial Blast. In 1994, Sanjay Dutt was arrested at the
airport and he confessed that in January, in his statement, Sanjay
Dutt also said that these people along with ammunition had got
three AK-56 rifles with them, out of which one was kept by Sanjay
Dutt. According to him, he kept the gun in order to protect his
family because of the threats that he had received during the riots
in Mumbai which was followed by the Babri Masjid demolition in

Page | 44
December, 1992. After this, he was soon charged and arrested
under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA),
1987 for receiving ammunition from Abu Salem and his
involvement in the blasts.”

42 State v. Vashisht, (2009) 93 D.R.J. 145 30, 55.”

“

43 Sharma v. State, MANU/SC/0268/2010.”

“

44 TK Rajalakshmi, A Shocking Acquittal, FRONTLINE, Dec. 25, 1999,

http://www.hinduonnet. com/fline/fl1627/16270340.html.
45 “ State v Singh, (2006) 133 D.L.T. 393 52.”
46 Id.

Page | 45
Being “a famous actor, this case was highlighted by the media to an
extent, the media portrayed the picture of Sanjay Dutt as a
terrorist, which was later held by the Court that he was not
accused of those charges. After this incident, being an actor he had
to suffer a lot of problems and outrage and his reputation got
depleted.”

d. THE DELHI GANG RAPE CASE

The “horrific incident that occurred on the night of 16 December

2012 involved the gang rape, torture, and assault of a 23-year-old
physiotherapy intern who was traveling in a private bus with her
male friend. The bus had six men, including the driver, who
brutally raped her and attacked her friend. Despite being admitted
to the hospital, she succumbed to her injuries after two days of
being shifted for emergency treatment in Singapore.”

This incident garnered widespread national and international

“

attention, and it was widely criticized both in India and abroad. It

sparked numerous protests across the country, with people
expressing anger and frustration towards the central and state
governments for their failure to ensure the safety and security of
women. In response to the media outrage and public demand for
justice, several amendments were made to the laws, including the
Juvenile Justice Act, which lowered the age for punishment for
heinous crimes from eighteen to sixteen.”

A. RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL V. MEDIA TRIAL

In “many democratic countries that uphold the principles of

liberalism, conflicts often arise between the freedom of the press to
comment on pending trials and the right of the accused to a fair
trial. This conflict takes on interesting dimensions in the case of
India, the world's largest democracy. India's criminal justice
system has long been plagued by issues such as inadequate

Page | 46
protection of victims' rights and rampant corruption among law
enforcement officials, which allow for coercion and bribery of
witnesses to go unchecked.”47

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, anyone

charged with a criminal offense is entitled to a fair trial and has the
right to be presumed innocent until

47Subhradipta Sarkar, The Quest for Victims'Justice in India, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF
“

16 (2010); Seema Soni and Harish Sandhu, KTS Tulsi: If We Do Not Strengthen The
Criminal Justice System, Mafias Will Begin To Rule The Country, HALSBURY'S
LAW MONTHLY, Apr. 2009, available at http://www.halsburys.in/k-t-s-tulsi.html.”

Page | 47
proven guilty in a court of law.48 The Supreme Court of India has
recognized the right to a fair trial as a fundamental right of
citizens, protected by two articles of the Indian Constitution that
guarantee equality and personal liberty. It is precisely this right
that is often challenged by the phenomenon of trial by media.49

A “significant Indian case that dealt with the impact of biased media
coverage on trials was Pillai v. Kerala, where a defendant argued
that prejudiced media reporting could compromise the fairness of a
trial.50 In this case, a politician facing corruption charges petitioned
the Supreme Court of India to shift the trial venue, alleging that
"adverse publicity in the press" had made a fair trial impossible.
However, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that
judges cannot be assumed to be influenced by propaganda or
adverse publicity, either consciously or subconsciously. 51
This
perception of judicial impartiality was also the basis for the Delhi
High Court's rejection of the defense's plea for a retrial in the high-
profile Parliament Attack Case.”52

The “Parliament Attack Case refers to the December 2001 attack on

the Indian Parliament, which resulted in the deaths of 8 guards.
The Indian government blamed Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan
for the attack, and four Muslim Indian citizens, including
Mohammed Afzal, were arrested and charged with involvement in
planning the attack. Some argued that the media coverage of the
53

case had prejudiced Afzal's chance of a fair trial. The criticism was
triggered by the fact that the Delhi police had invited news
channels to record a confessionary statement by Afzal while he was
in police custody, which was inadmissible as evidence but was
broadcasted by several channels. Additionally, a leading news
channel aired a film reconstructing the conspiracy behind the
Parliament attack, which was accused of echoing the prosecution's
version of events. Afzal had sought a stay on the telecast of the

Page | 48
film, arguing that it would prejudice his trial. However, the
Supreme Court of India rejected the plea, stating that judges were
trained to not be influenced by pre-trial publicity.”

48 Universal Declaration of H.R., G.A. Res. 217A, art. 10, 11, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
“

1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).”

49 “ Maharashtra v. Shah (1982) 1 S.C.R. 299, 302; Agarwal v. Agarwal (2003) 6 S.CC.

230.”
50 “ Pillai v. Kerala, (2000) 7 S.C.C. 129.”
51 Id.
52 State v. Afzal, (2003) 107 D.L.T. 385.
53 “ PR CHARI, PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA AND STEPHEN P COHEN, FOUR

CRISES AND A PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

149-183 (2007).”

Page | 49
When “Afzal appealed his conviction to the Delhi High Court, his
lawyer sought a retrial, citing the observations made by the
Supreme Court in Pillai. However, the appeal was rejected, with
the High Court reasoning that judges in India were well-trained
and experienced enough to "shut their minds" and ignore media
reports,54 and that there was a clear separation of powers between
the executive and the judiciary in India. The only action taken by
the Court was to express concern over the practice of interviewing
those in police custody and deprecate it as "disturbing." 55When
Afzal appealed against his conviction to the Supreme Court, the
argument of media trial was not raised again, and the Supreme
Court upheld Afzal's death sentence.”

The “rulings in the Pillai and Parliament Attack Case, and to a

lesser extent, the Jessica Lall Case, have established that biased
media coverage cannot invalidate a trial in India, as judges are
seen as emotionally flawless. Thus, the Indian Judiciary holds that
there is no conflict between media trials and the accused's right to
a fair trial, as judges are perceived to be impartial. However, I
believe that this assumption is debatable.”

B. MEDIA TRIAL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREEDOM OF

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION?

John “Stuart Mill believed that free speech was essential for the
discovery of truth and societal progress.56 However, Mill also
acknowledged the harm principle, which allowed for limitations on
an individual's liberties to prevent harm to others through legal or
moral sanctions.57 Mill's philosophy has had a significant impact on
the development of constitutional free speech jurisprudence in
India58, where Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution grants citizens
the Fundamental Right to freedom of speech and expression, but

Page | 50
Article 19(2) permits the state to impose "reasonable restrictions"
on this right.59 This makes Article 19 prima facie less tolerant of
freedom of speech compared to the First Amendment60 of the
United States. This difference was noted by”

54 “
State v. Afzal, (2003) 107 D.L.T. 385.”
55 Id.
56 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33-4,63 (1859).
57 Id at 21-22.
58 “Arpan Banerjee, Political Censorship and Indian Cinematographic Laws: A

Functionalist Liberal Analysis, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 557 (2010).”

59 INDIAN CONST., art. 19(2).
60 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

Page | 51
Justice “Douglas of the US Supreme Court in the case of Kingsley v.
Regents.61 The debates of the Constituent Assembly of India,
responsible for framing the Constitution, reveal that the imposition
of restrictions on free speech was influenced by Mill's harm
principle.62 However, Mill's theory was formulated long before the
era of television and investigative journalism. In the context of the
free press-fair trial debate, Vincent Blasi has proposed a more
modern theory, arguing that free expression has value in checking
the abuse of official power, a concept he calls the "checking value"
of free speech.”63

However, using Blasi's theory to justify trial by media in cases

where public officials are being tried poses two apparent problems:

Blasi's “theory seems to justify trial by media only in cases involving

public officials.64According to Blasi, the checking value is based on
the premise that the abuse of official power is a more serious evil
than the abuse of private power. In cases where a public official is
being prosecuted, Blasi argues that "the public's need to learn as
soon as possible everything there is to know about the behavior of
the public official outweighs the risk that he will thereby be denied
a fair trial."65 Blasi adopts a Lockean reasoning and believes that a
democratic government is a result of a social contract between the
state and its citizens. Therefore, "the general populace must be the
ultimate judge of the behavior of public officials." 66 However, to
accept Blasi's checking-value theory, one must be at least a
Lockean democrat.”67

If “a wealthy non-state actor bribes a witness, it is not an abuse of

state power. Therefore, to justify trial by media in India, a
philosophy similar to Blasi's but more expansive in scope is needed.
The government-centric focus of the checking value must be
expanded to include private actors. This would also mean a

Page | 52
reduction in the power of the media to second-guess investigators,
as there is no social contract between the general populace and
private actors.”

61 360 U.S. 684, 698 (1959).

62 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES VOL XI-XII 727 Nov. 21, 1949 (AC Guha).
63 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND.

RES. J. 528 (1977).

64 “ C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 232

(1992).”
65 Id.

66 Id
67 Id

Page | 53
Blasi's theory heavily relies on the First Amendment 68, which is not
as liberal in the Indian Constitution as it is in the American
Constitution in matters of free speech. The Supreme Court of India
has also expressed that American judgments on freedom of speech
should not be blindly followed in India for this reason. 69 Blasi
argues that the checking value of the press was "the single value
that was uppermost in the minds of the persons who drafted and
ratified the First Amendment."70

The “framers of India's Constitution appeared to have a more

cautious approach towards the media. For instance, Article 19(2) of
the Constitution allows the state to enact laws related to contempt
of court, which can impose reasonable restrictions on freedom of
speech. During the deliberations on this provision, a Member of the
Constituent Assembly had predicted the possibility of trial by
media. The Member had expressed concerns that without the
power to proceed for Contempt of Court, anyone could start a
"newspaper trial" and thereby prejudice the fair and impartial trial
of a case.71 In light of this, it could be argued that media trial may
not be absolutely protected under the freedom of speech and
protection, given the restrictive views taken by the drafters of the
Indian Constitution.”

V. CONCLUSION

The “analysis conducted in this project underscores substantial

ethical considerations regarding judges' involvement in social
networking. In the contemporary landscape where social media
serves as a prevalent mode of communication, judges should not be
dissuaded from engaging in online communities. Doing so not only
upholds their right to freedom of expression but also enables them
to partake in societal interactions, thereby acquiring firsthand
insight into the challenges that may intersect with their

Page | 54
professional roles.”

Given “this pivotal recognition, this paper endeavors to advise

judges on the considerations they ought to bear in mind while
utilizing social media, thereby enabling them to conscientiously
discharge their ethical obligations. It is imperative to educate
judges about the distinct hazards linked with social media
communication, enhance their proficiency”

68 Id
69 Paratev. Maharashtra, (1961) 3 S.C.R. 423.
70 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
“

RES. J. 528 (1977).”

71 12 Constitutional Assembly Debates 399 (Statement of N Ahmad).

Page | 55
through training initiatives like social media workshops, case
analyses, and deliberations, and institute explicit regulations that
embody the collective comprehension of social media. These steps
are indispensable for upholding judicial impartiality and preserving
integrity.

Furthermore, “I have explored the phenomenon of media trials and

their repercussions on an individual's entitlement to a fair and
impartial trial. Within this study, I underscore how social media not
only impacts a judge's impartiality but also how media trials can
detrimentally affect the reputation of an accused, particularly in
the presence of judges who may inadvertently engage in
discussions within their social media circles and be influenced by
premature verdicts rendered on social platforms.”

Consequently, “the confluence of risks associated with judges'

participation in social media trials and the imposition of
unwarranted constraints on judges' freedom of expression presents
a grave concern, potentially compromising an individual's access to
an unbiased adjudicator. This issue is exacerbated when media
outlets sensationalize and prematurely pronounce guilt, as
evidenced in cases such as the trial of Rhea Chakraborty, further
skewing a judge's perception of the accused.”

Hopefully, “India will promptly address the challenges stemming

from judges' online social engagement and adopt transparent and
contemporary guidelines for ethical conduct in the digital age.
Alongside disciplinary measures, the enforcement of such
guidelines could be proactively overseen by independent ethics
committees within the judiciary. These committees would provide
guidance, education, and oversight on contemporary ethical

Page | 56
dilemmas, thereby deterring the misuse of online social networks. ”

Page | 57
 VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cases

Agarwal v. Agarwal (2003) 6 S.CC. 230”

“

Maharashtra v. Shah (1982) 1 S.C.R. 299”

“

Parate v. Maharashtra, (1961) 3 S.C.R. 423”

“

Pillai v. Kerala, (2000) 7 S.C.C.

“

129”

“ Sharma v. State,
MANU/SC/0268/2010”

State v Singh, (2006) 133 D.L.T.

“

393 52”
State v. Afzal, (2003) 107 D.L.T. 385”
“

State v. Vashisht, (2009) 93 D.R.J. 145 30”

“

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Le
“ Monde journal (29.4.2014),
available at
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/04/29/pour-lecsm-un-
magistrat-ne-doit- pas-tweeter-en-plein-
proces_4409355_3224.html .”
Somini Sengupta, Acquittal in Killing Unleashes Ire at India's Rich,
“

N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2006,

available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/asia/
13india.html? r- 1.”

Page | 59
Subhradipta Sarkar, The Quest for Victims'Justice in India, 17
“

HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16 (2010); Seema Soni and Harish Sandhu,

KTS Tulsi: If We Do Not Strengthen The Criminal Justice System,
Mafias Will Begin To Rule The Country, HALSBURY'S LAW
MONTHLY, Apr. 2009, available at http://www.halsburys.in/k-t-s-
tulsi.html.”
TK Rajalakshmi, A Shocking Acquittal, FRONTLINE, Dec. 25, 1999,
“

http://www.hinduonnet. com/fline/fl1627/16270340.html”
Vij-Aurora, supra note 25; Harinder Baweja and Vineet Khare, Is
“

There Any Hope Jessica Will Get Justice?, TEHELKA, Mar. 25,
2006, http://www.tehelka.com/storymainl7.asp?
filename=Ne032506 Is thereCS.asp”
Vineet Khare and Harinder Baweja, Killers of Justice, TEHELKA,
“

Oct. 7, 2006, available at

http://www.tehelka.com/stoiy_main20.asp?
filename=Ne100706killers- of CS.asp.”
Articles

Arpan Banerjee, Political Censorship and Indian Cinematographic

“

Laws: A Functionalist Liberal Analysis, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 557

(2010)”
B.P. Cooper, Judges and Social Media: “Friends” with Costs and
“

Benefits, ABA Vol. 22 No. 3 (2014)”

Dimitra Blitsa & Ioannis Papathanasiou, Judges & Social Media:
“

Managing the Risks, THEMIS COMPETITION 4 (2015).”

Homer Odyssey Γ (3) 244 & D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical
“

Athens, CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS 10 (1993)”

J.G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social
“

Media, 68 U. Miami L. Rev. 487 502-503 (2014).”

J.M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a
“

Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPPERDINE L.

REV. 575, 578 (2012)”
Lord Duce Hewart, “Justice should not only be done but should
“

manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” at N.

Mpouropoulos, The Notion of Jurisdictional Function (in Greek),
To Nomikon 98 (1951)”
M. Harrison & K. Swisher, When Judges Should Be Seen, Not
“

Heard: Extrajudicial Comments Concerning Pending Cases and

the Controversial Self-Defense Exception in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, 64 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW, 559-
581 (2009)”
Moosavian,
“ R, Jigsaws and Curiosities: The Unintended

Page | 60
 Consequences of Misuse of Private Information Injunctions, 241
(4) COMMUNICATIONS LAW 104-114 (2016).”
PR CHARI, PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA AND STEPHEN P COHEN, FOUR
“

CRISES AND A PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH

ASIA 149-183 (2007).”
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2
“

AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 528 (1977)”

Books and Treatises

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES VOL XI-XII 727 Nov. 21,

“

1949 (AC
Guha).”

Page | 61
D.Th. Tsatsos, Constitutional Law (in Greek), Vol. 2, A. Sakkoulas
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Athens-Komotini 552 (1993).”

HM SEERVAI, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA
710 (2004). “JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33-
4,63 (1859).”
United Nations Resolutions and Documents

United Nations Human Rights, Basic Principles on the

Independence of the Judiciary (1985), Sec.
8, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independen
ceJudiciary.aspx
Universal Declaration of H.R., G.A. Res. 217A, art. 10, 11, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).

International Cases

CCJE Opinion No (2002) 3 on the Principles and Rules Governing

“

Judges’ Professional Conduct, in Particular Ethics, Incompatible

Behavior and Impartiality, recitals 22- 23.”
CJEU, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia
“

Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzólez

(2014)”
Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, Sec.
“

119-127, CCJE Opinion No (2018) 16 on the Relations between

Judges and Lawyers”
ECHR, Harabin v. Slovakia (No 58688/11, § 149, 20 February
“

2017).”
Treaties and Conventions

ECHR, Resolution on Judicial Ethics (23.6.2008).

the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
Miscellaneous

The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), Value 4.1.

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