_ COMPO SITE STRUCT URES

DATA ANALYS IS

I This documsnt hC!.$ ~:iln approved j

for p<•blic rebc::::2 a:n.d ~o:k-; Ell I
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di~tribution is unlim:!lki.

Prepared by AIR-4111C3

15 September 1978

Naval Air Systems Command

Department of the Navy
. Washington, D. C. 20361

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111. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Conllnu• on r•v•r•• aide II n•c•••arr .,d lden!lfy bT blocJr n-b,•r)

'
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zo. ~"'ISTRACT (Conllnu• an •••er•• elde If neceeocy llind ldentlf7 e.,. bloelc - b e t )

The F-18 Hornet is the first Navy aircraft to use composi-.:e structural
materials extensively. It is the first aircraft to use certain combinations
of graphite epoxy lamination techniques. The Navy and the DoD have a special
interest in the i~act on supportability of this aircraft as a result of the
increased use of state-of-the-art advanced composite materials.
A listing of Navy aircraft which use or have used composite materials was
developed, the ability of the Navy 3M system to collect and report useful data
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/ on composite repairs
analysis was conducted.~
was/~~~~ composite structures risk

The study resulted i'il these recommendations:

(1) Historical 3M data should only be used to identify aircraft areas and
structures which are potential problem areas.
(2) Work uni~ codes should be assigned to all composite structures and
substructures. Work unit coding beyond the repairable assembly level
will be required. Two new malfunction description code adjectives
"water impregnation" and "disbanded" should be added to the coding
system.
(3) Maintenance personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated in the
increased susceptibility to damage of composite structures.
(4) The feasibility of restructuring the 3M coding system to allow for
coding of the cause, damage, and resulting symptom should be studied.

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 TABtE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Title Page

Executive Summary l.

1 INTRODUCTION 1-1

1.1 BACKGROUND 1-1

1.2 STUDY PURPOSE 1-1
1.3 STUDY APPROACH 1-1.

2 COMPOSITES MATERIAL USAGE

ON NAVAL AIRCRAFT 2-1

2.1 INTRODUCTION 2-1

2.2 EARLY COMPOSITES USE 2-1
2.3 RESEARCH PROJECTS 2-3
2.4 COMPOSITES IN ORIGINAL DESIGNS 2-4
2.5 COMPOSITES USAGE 2-5

3 ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL AVIATION

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL MANAGEMENT
3M) SYSTEM 3-1 .

3.1 INTRODUCTION 3-1

3.2 INFORMATION SOURCES 3-1
3.3 NORTHROP STUDY 3-2.
3.4 USE OF MALFUNCTION DESCRIPTION CODES 3-2

4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 4...;.1 ~

4.1 INTRODUCTION 4..;1

4.2 SELECTION OF AIRCRAFT FOR
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 4-1
4.3 DAXA COMPATIBILITY AND CONSTRAINTS 4-1
4.4 COMPOSITE MATERIAL FAILURE MODES 4-2
4.5 RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS 4-3
4.6 GROUND HANDLING RISKS SUMMARY 4-4
4.7 PLAN FOR F-18 COMPOSITE DATA COLLECTION 4-5 .
4.7.1 WORK UNIT CODES 4-5
4.7.2 MALFUNCTION DESCRIPTION CODES 4-5

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5-1

5.1 CONCLUSIONS 5-1

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 5-l

Appendices:
A COMPOSITE STRUC'l'URAL MATERIALS A-1
B BIBLIOGRAPHY B-1
c GLOSSARY OF TERMS C-1
D DETAILED DATA REPORTS D-1
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Title
2-1 Naval Aircraft Composite
Component(s) Osage 2-6

2-2 F-18 Composites Osage 2-8

2-3 Other Military Aircraft Composite

Component(s) Osage. 2-9

4-1 Expected F-18 Maintenance Impact

of Use of Composites. 4-3
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The F-18 Hornet is the first Navy aircraft to use composite structural
materials extensively. It is the first aircraft to use certain combinations
of graphite epoxy lamination techniques. The Navy and the Department of
Defense have a special interest in the impact on supportability of this
aircraft as a result of the increased use of state-of-the-art advanced
composite materials. The purpose of this study was to:

• review the use of composite materials in aircraft in the U.S. Navy

and U.S. Air Force inventory
• review the Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (3M)
system to determine if changes are needed to permit routine collection of
maintenance data on composite materials

• collect and analyze such data as is available in the 3M system or .

other data sources, and

• develop an assessment of risks from the use of composite materials as

supported by.that analysis.

The study approach encompassed a review of current literature on

developments in advanced composites and the tabulation of in-service Navy
aircraft which utilize composite structures, interviews with Government and
industry representatives for practical experience in utilizing automated
maintenance data collection systems for analysis of composite materials, and
the development of an initial data base to be used during later task efforts.
The data base was then revised during repeated contacts with various agencies
while investigating and verifying data during the study.

Initially, a thorough search of applicable literature was conducted in

order to update the investigators' knowledge on developments in advanced
composite applications. The result of the search was an understanding of the
technical aspects of advanced fiber reinforced composite materials and
theoretical failure modes. Additionally, a comprehensive listing of Navy
aircraft which use or have used composite materials was developed.

The 3M system was reviewed with the specific objective of developing an

assessment of the capability of the system for collecting and reporting useful
data on maintenance UDpact problems associated ·with the use of composite,
structures. Several Navy and Air Force agencies were contacted in order to
supplement the review with "real world 11 experience on the usefulness of data
collection systems for this application. The result of this review was a
recommendation for an expanded use of work unit codes and the addition of two
malfunction description codes.

The 3M and Adjustment of Scheduled Maintenance through Analysis (ASMRA)

systems were utilized to retrieve available data on composite structures. The
data was analyzed with the objective of assessing areas of risk resulting from
the use of composites on the F-18. The result of this analysis was the
development of a listing of F-18 structures in rank order based on expected
impact on maintenance resources.

i
The study resulted in the· following conclusions:

• Historical 3M data on composite structures is extremely l~ited and

data on graphite epoxy GR/EP structures is nearly nonexistent.
• Minor changes in work unit coding of repairable structures and the
addition of at least two new malfunction description codes will be
required t~ increase the usefulness of 3M data in the composites area.

• Damage caused during ground maintenance, servicing, and weapons

loading, etc., will be the predominant cause of composite structures
maintenance requirements.

• Amajor restructuring of the malfunction description coding system is

required to make the coded data ~f opt~ usefulness in describing
the cause, damage and symptoms associated with repair actions.
The study findings.lead to the following recommendations:

• Historical 3M data should only be used to identify aircraft areas and

structures whidb are potential problem areas.

• Work unit codes should be assigned to all composite structures and

substructures. Work unit coding beyond the repairable assembly level
will be required. Two new malfunction description code adjectives
"water impregnation" and "disbanded" should be added to the coding
system.
• Maintenance personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated on the
increased susceptibility to damage of composite structures.

• The feasibility of restructuring the lK coding system to allow for

coding of the cause, damage, and resulting symptom should be studied.
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The aerospace /industry uses the term composite or advanced composite

in reference to a class of structural materials sUnilar eo automotive
fiberglass. Actually, fiberglass is a composite material which combines glass
fibers with a polymer (resin) subs~ance. Advanced composites use special
types of fibers and resins to form v~ry strong materials which offer certain
advantages over other aircraft structural materials. These concepts are more
thoroughly discussed in the technical material attached as Appendix A.
The F-18 is a derivative of the YF-17 light weight fighter which was
designed to provide improved operational capability primarily due to a
significant increase in the aircraft thrust to weight ratio. The 8:1 class
thrust/weight·ratio of the F-18 was achieved partly through the increased use
of composite structural materials. The F-18 Hornet will be the first Navy
aircraft to utilize composite materials extensively. The Bernet is to replace
the. aging F-4 some of which use ,a composite rudder assembly which represents
0.1% of the aircraft weight. The other aircraft to be replaced by the Bornet
is the A-7, which has no composite structural surfaces. The newest in-service
Navy aircraft, the F-14, utilizes composite material horizontal stabilizers
which amount to 0.4% of aircraft weight. By comparison the F-18 is to have
graphite/epoxy vertical. tail fins, horizontal tail structures, speed brake
panel, fuselage central section, skins on the main wings and flaps, as well as
landing gear and other doors, which represents 9.5% of total aircraft weight.
The Navy and the Department of Defense have a special interest in the
impact on supportability of this aircraft as a result of this use of composite
materials·. Currently, the Project Manager for the F-18 aircraft is sponsoring
numerous studies concerning reliability, maintainability and supportability of
this weapon system. This report documents one of these studies.
l.Z Study Purpose

·The,purpose of this study was to review. the ·use ·Of composite

materials in aircraft in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force inventory; to review
the Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (lM) system to
determine if changes are needed to permit routine collection of maintenance
data on composite materials; to collect and analyze such data as is available.
in the lM system or other data sources; and to develop an assessment of risks
from the use of composite materials as supported by that data analysis.
1.3 Study Approach

The technical approach used in this. study was directed toward·

assessing the capability of the lM maintenance data collection syst~ for
collecting and reporting useful information an composite aircraft structures,
and analysing.currently available 3M and other data on composite and other
aircraft structures in order to identify potential risks as they might apply

1-1
to the F-18 aircraft. The approach established a technical documentation and
personnel liaison data source/base which was used in an iterative looping
fashion throughout the study.

The initial project activity involved an extensive literature search ·

performed to update the project team's knowledge on technological developments
in the composite materials field and to give the team an in-depth
understanding of the various aerospace applications of these materials. This
literature search was tailored to provide the investigators with a grasp of
the chronological developments and applications of composites in the aerospace
industry. The end result of this initial effort was a listing of composite
materials by type of Navy aircraft. currently in service. A by product of this
search of the literature was an updated technical understanding of current
composite materials production methods and theoretical failure modes.

The second major activity was the establishment of liaison between

the investigators and various Navy and Air Force agencies expected to have
experience and data sources concerning composite materials used in military
aircraft. The pr~ry data sources in this effort were the Navy intermediate
and depot repair activities supporting the F-14 aircraft, the Naval Air
Systems Command· Library containing Maint·enance Support Office Department
(MSOD) reports, the Air Force component repair and depot activities providing
support to the F-15 aircraft, and the Air Force Materials and Flight Dynamics
Laboratories at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. During initial discussions,
general data system and codes were covered as well as general composites
failure experience. During this time period McDonnell Aircraft Company
(MCAIR) was awarded a contract to do a somewhat parallel study on the
maintenance data collection system (3M). Their purpose was to investigate the
use of How Mal codes and to develop a new supplementary coding system
involving fault isolation and detection. Liaison was established between this
study group and the MCAIR. "code development team". During discussions,
preliminary findings were exchanged.

As anticipated, the investigation was handled as a building block

process where data gathered from one source required complementary data
collection and verification from other sources. For example, discussions with
Air Force depot representatives a·n failure modes and repairs raised questions
on data collection procedures which led to follow-on discussions with Navy
depot repair and data analysis personnel. The central project activity
involved numerous telephone interviews and follow-on data exchanges, visits to
Navy and Air Force~ctivities, and the review/analysis of 3M and Air Force
provided reports.

The data retrieval/analysis portion of the study effort was

individually documented by aircraft and is included in Appendix D. The
following chapters document the detailed findings of the study.

1-2
 CBAP1.'ER z
COMPOSITES MATERIALS USAGE ON NAVAL AIRCRAFT

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the e~olution of composites

usage and present a comprehensive listing of composite materials currently in
use on Naval aircraft. Until recently composite materials usage on military
aircraft was largely for purposes of research and data gathering. As will be
shown, large scale Navy use of composite materials has been limited almost
exclusively to the F-14 Tomcat. However, there are numerous other aircraft
which have had composite structures installed which may provide a somewhat
broader data base for use in later analysis tasks. In order to put this
subject in perspective, the following paragraphs will briefly describe the
chronology of using compos·ite .materials on military fighter aircraft similar
to the F-18.
2. 2 Early Composites Use ·

Written sources differ in .their. assessment of the. time span of composite

material usage in aircraft structures. Some sources mention that composites
have been in use for over twenty five years while others say that composite
materials technology has developed during the past decade. Both positions are
correct depending on whether one is discussing composites in general or
advanced composites as the_ l~ter developments are called.
Glass fiber reinforced plastic (GFRP), better knawn to the layman as
"fiberglass" was the composite structural material which was used in several
aircraft and missile applications between 1943 and 1963. The commercial
development and production of glass fibers during the 1930's together with the
invention of low pressure polymerizable polyester resine in 1939 made this
possible. (See Appendix~ for a definition of terms.) GFRP materials were
first developed and designed for aircraft structures in 1943. The Vultee
BT-15 had the first aircraft structures made of fiberglass. The first
fiberglass radomes were produced for the WII B-17 and B-29. The U.S. Air
Force Wright Air Development Center was pionee:dng this early work which
included the :fabrication. of ·reinforced plastic outer wing panels .for the AT-6
airplane in 1946. Epoxy resins were invented in 1950 and this development
overcame earlier problems with weather deterioration of the materiaL

The first production aircraft to use composite GFRP was the A-lE, for
which Grumman Aircraft Corp produced fiberglass vertical tail structures. The
A-lE used GFRP primarily to solve electronic radiation reflection problems in
this special purpose aircraft. This occurred_ during the mid 1960s which. was a
milestone period for composite technology development. Boron fibers were
developed during this period and this marked the beginning of the advanced
filamentary composites

Boron fiber reinforcement offered a. significant imp-rovement in the

strength of composite materials. Treatment of the chemical engineering and
structural engineering aspects of composite materials is considered beyond the

2-l
scope of this report. The following list of advantages of composites over
conventional structure materials is offered merely to demonstrate the
motivation which drove the developmental efforts in this area:

• Composites offered a potential for 50% reduction in weight for the

same strength.

• Composites offered a 100% improvement in fatigue life characteristics

over titanium which is the best of structural metal for fatigue
resistance.

• Composite aircraft structures generally could be manufactured using a

reduced number of individual parts which equated to lower tooling,
fabrication and handling costs and also to improved reliability due
to the reduced number of joints and discontinuities in the structure.

• Composites offered a significant improvement in corrosion resistance

since the· composite material is not susceptible to electrochemical
corrosion.

• Composites offered a s.tructural damping effect on vibration and noise

transmission.

• Composites offered an elastic behaviour which made it uniquely less

susceptible to battle damage and various types of material failure.
For example, projectile impacts are localized to an area very
slightly larger than the projectile itself. Projectile hits on metal
typically result in cracks, bent and shredded metal which are
vulnerable to further tearing due to air pressure and stress in
flight. Impact damage to automobiles provides an example of this
concept. Collision damage to metal auto parts typically results in a
deformation of the metal which is proportional to the impact force.
Collision damage to fiberglass auto parts typically gouges and cracks
the material but the component flexes back to its original shape and
is generally easier to repair rather than replace.

• ·composites offered a potential for improved flight performance due to

the' smooth drag· free·:-,surfaces.

• Composites offered less radar reflective surface. GFRP offered 50%

decrease in radar energy reflection.

With the impressive list of advantages presented above, one may

wonder why there wasn't a rush toward UDmediate large scale use of composites
in aircraft structures. As with many technological innovations there were
four factors which had to be dealt with. The first involved the cost of the
new advanced composites. The costly fibers even when mixed with the less
costly resin material (in the appropriate mix) were nearly $300 per pound in
the late 1960s; by contrast structural' aluminum cost was $10 per pound.
Careful trade studies were required in order to justify the expensive
composites. These studies were based primarily on weight savings factors and
the fuel savings resulting from the lighter weight. The second factor was the

2-2
unknown long term effects of the elements and stress on the composite
materials. The third factor was that while conventional metal structures
production procedures were well established, efficient cost effective
techniques for production of composite aircraft structures needed to be worked
out. The last factor was the problem of repairing composites under the
conditions reasonably achievable in non-depot military repair facilities.
This problem is of particular interest to the Navy because of the requirement
for repairs aboard ship.

2.3 Research Projects

Numerous research projects were undertaken between the mid 1960s and
1970s in order to gather data on these unknowns. Several of the projects will
be summarized in the paragraphs which follow.

A number of research projects involving commercial and transport

aircraft, missiles and aerospace applications, propulsion system applicatio~s
as well as VSTOL and fighter applications were sponsored by a variety of
agencies. In addition graphite and other fibers such as quartz crystals were
developed during the mid 1970s. For aircraft structures boron epoxy and
·graphite epoxy have demonstrated ·the ·optimum·.·strength and flexibility
characteristics and have therefore been the dominant materials used in
aircraft applications. Additionally, as usage has increased the cost of these
materials has decreased significantly and is projected to continue in this
direction while the cost of conventional metals has been increasing. Boron
and graphite epoxies had dropped from approximately $300 per pound in 1968 to
approximately $100 per pound in 1974. By 1976 boron epoxy had remained at
approximately $100 per pound while graphite epoxy had dropped to $45 per pound
and is projected to be less than $10 per pound in the 1980s.

During the 1960s at least ten flight test programs were performed on
military jet fighter type aircraft. None of these were production/prototype
development efforts, but were research projects to replace metal aircraft
structures with composites for experimental purposes.

Boron epoxy center ''wing box" sections were flight tested on a T-39
aircraft in order to accomplish relative weight studies and gather data on
strain/fatigue. Aluminum skin sections of an F-111 horizontal stabilizer box
were replaced with boron epoxy structures in order to demonstrate the effects
of flutter on this material. The F-111 component was made of boron-epoxy
skins, fiberglass spars and honeycomb core with ~ titanium root rib, pilot
fitting, and tip rib. Load to failure tests were conducted to demonstrate
strain relationships and compatibility of boron epoxy to titanium lamination.
Flight test articles were installed on an F-111 and a one year test program
began in March 1967. The test article demonstrated excellent serviceability
and a weight savings of approximately 30 percent. Three test programs were
conducted on F-100 wing skins over a two year period. Ground and flight
testing data was gathered on strength, weight, flutter, aeroelasticity,
stability/control and aerothermodynamics. Testing also demonstrated the
effects of various flight loads on structural integrity in the composite wing
design.

2-3
 In 1965 an OV-10 was modified with a full seven foot center wing
composite section which extended across the top of the fuselage. A weight
savings of 40 percent was achieved utilizing composite upper fuel cell door in
the wing skin, and adhesive bonded skin to spar tongue in groove joints. A
glass filament wound wing was produced for a T-ZB aircraft in 1969 to
demonstrate advanced manufacturing methods. The low cost wing section
exhibited a 40 percent weight savings while providing 165 percent of load
requirement. The fabrication cost was competitive with production costs for
metal structures.

The early 1970s were witness to continued feasibility demonstrations

in the use of composite aircraft structures .. Larger scale in-service testing
progra~ were conducted on the F-111 and F-4 aircraft. Forty five F-4s were
equipped with boron/epoxy rudders and accumulated some 51,000 flight hours.
Data on these structures was collected and analyzed by the Air Force Flight
Dynamics Laboratory at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. Twenty-two
boron/epoxy wing trailing edge panels accumulated over 32,000 flight hours on
F-111 aircraft. Additionally, 266 graphite/epoxy underwing fairing assemblies
accumulated 44,700 flight hours on selected F-llls.

"During the early to mid 1970s the Navy·· sponsored numerous evaluations
of the less costly Graphite/Epoxy (GR/EP) composite materials. Fourteen S-3s
were equipped with GR/EP spoilers, four F-4Js were equipped with GR/EP access
doors, GR/EP landing gear doors were tested on nine F-14s, and five F-14s were
fitted with GR/EP overwing fairings. These tests, coupled with the results of
previous research projects, firmly established the feasibility of advanced
composites for Navy aircraft. The Navy then desired to establish a sufficient
data base to establish confidence in the long term service durability of
composite aircraft struc~ures.

2.4 Composites In Original Design

The test programs discussed this far were conducted by replacing

structures originally designed using conventional metal materials with
composite replacement assemblies. Sufficient favorable findings had been
gathered by the t~e the F-14 and F-15 were being designed (at approximately
the 1969/1970 time frame) to warrant conceptual design of composite structures
"for these aircraft. The tail structures of both of· these aircraft were
designed to be produced using boron/epoxy. By 1976, 5,000 flight hours had
been accumulated on the F-15 empennage assembly when a decision was made to
replace the conventional metal speed brake with one of composite material
makeup.

Northrop Corporation invested in non metal structures technology

beginning in 1966 in preparation for the "Light Weight Fighter" competition.
While the General Dynamics F-16 utilized the costly boron/epoxy only in the
stiffness critical horizontal stabilizer structure, the twin engine YF-17 was
designed with more extensive use of graphite/epoxy. The original YF-17 was to
have GR/EP wing leading edge extensions (LEX), trailing edge flaps, speed
brake panel, vertical tail leading edges and rudders and various fuselage
access and engine bay doors. The F-18, which has been developed for Navy
aircraft carrier operations, weighs approximately 6,000 pounds more than its
nominal prototype, the YF-17. To counter this, GR/EP use was expanded to
include the leading edge flaps, wing .skin panels and the vertical and

2-4
horizontal stabilizers. When the YF-17 was originally conceptualized, GR/EP
offered the optimum performance versus cost alternative for composite use. As
the development of the F-18 evolved certain new lamination techniques were
incorporated in GR/EP strUctures, and trade studies have resulted in the
return to conventional metal for the LEX and engine bay doors.
2.5 Composites Usage

Figu're 2-1 reflects the current composite structures and materials to

be used on the F-18. Additionally, this figure also lists aircraft currently
in the Navy inventory which utilize or have utilized composite structures.
Figure 2-2 graphically portrays the extent of composites usage on the F-18.
Figure 2-3 is a listing of other military aircraft which use or have used
composite structures during test programs.

The literature review performed to develop the data presented in

Figures 2-land 2-3 has resulted in three findings which impact later study
tasks. First, while some ten aircraft currently in the Navy inventory have
used composite structures (during tests), not all of any one type of aircraft
can be expected to still have the composite structure currently on the ·
aircraft. The exception to this statement is the F-14, which uses a
production composite horizontal stabilizer assembly. Second, the ideal
p~o-cedure 'for accomplishment of the 'data colle'ction and anarysis would have
been to collect data on. graphite epoxy structures on existing Navy aircraft.
Figure 2-1 shows that very little such data is available since GFRP and Boron
Epoxy have been utilized predominantly. Third, it was concluded that a
variety of Navy and Air Force agencies have been involved in the review of
data related to composite structures. Contact was made with several of these
agencies to gain a bett~r perspective for this report.

2-5
 Naval Aircraft Composite Component(s) Usage

AIRCRAFT COMPOSITE COMPONENT COMPOSITE MATERIAL

BT-16 Aft Fuselage E Glass GFRP

AT-6 Wing E Glass GFRP

*E-2 Vertical Stabilizer S Glass GFRP

T-2 Tail Structure S Glass GFRP

RA-Se Leading Edge (Wing) S Glass GFRP

OV-lOA Wing Surfaces Boro~ Epoxy

*P-3 Tail Pod S Glass GFRP

*F-5 Landing Gear Doors Boron Epoxy

Leading Edge Flaps Graphite Epoxy

Trailing Edge Flaps Graphite Epoxy

Horizontal Stabilizer Boron Epoxy

*5-3 Spoilers Graphie Epoxy

*F-14 Horizontal Stabilizer Boron Epoxy

*A-4 Horizontal Stabilizer Boron Epoxy

Flaps Boron Epoxy

*F-4J Rudder, Boron Epoxy,

Ac.cess .Door.s Graphite Epoxy

YF-17 (F-18 Prototype) Wing Leading Edge Graphite Epoxy

Extensions
Speed Brake Panel Graphite Epoxy

Vertical Tail Leading Graphite Epoxy

Edges
Rudders Graphite Epoxy

Figure 2-1

2-6
 Fuselage/Engine Access Graphite Epoxy
Doors

Landing Gear Doors Graphite Epoxy

Leading Edge Flaps Graphite Epoxy

Trailing Edge Flaps Graphite Epoxy

Horizontal Stabilizer Graphite Epoxy

Cockpit Instrument Kelvar Epoxy

Panel Cover

Environmental Control Kelvar Epoxy

System Ducts

* denotes aircraft that are currently in the Navy inventory.

-
Figure 2-1 (Continued)
 F-18 MATERIALS DISTRI BUTIO N
•'

......
I
OJ

Percent of
Structural
Weight
-Aluminu m ............ 55.4
~Steel ............ .... 14.1
-Titanium ............ . 8.4
H833uraphite/Epox y ........ 10.3
c=t Other ............ .... 11.8
100.0

GPI·II--tl
Figure 2-2
•
 Other Military Composite Component(s) Usage

AIRCRAFT COMPONENT COMPOSITE MATERIAL

A-lE Vertical Tail Sections GFRP

T-39 Wing Box Boron Epoxy
F-111 Horizontal Stabilizer Boron Epoxy & GFRP
Box
F-111 Air Flow Deflector Boron Epoxy
Door
F-100 Wing Skin Boron Epoxy
Wing Structure Boron Epoxy
OV-lOA Wing Glass Filament
GFRP
F-15 Vertical & Horizontal Boron Epoxy
Stabilizer
F-15 Speed Brake Boron Epoxy
F-16 Horizontal Stabilizer Boron Epoxy
C-5A Wing Slat Boron Epoxy
C-141 Gear Pod Door Boron Epoxy
C-130 Center Wing Box Boron Epoxy

Figure 2-3

2-9
 CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL MANAGEMENT (3M) SYSTEM

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 provided a listing of aircraft from which to select

candidates for analysis in this portion of the study. The data to be
retrieved and analysed was to consist of data from the 3M System and from the
Adjustment of Scheduled Maintenance Through Analysis (ASMRA) System. Prior to
undertaking the data retrieval and 'analysis, a review of the data collection
system itself was performed.

The Navy's maintenance data collection system is designated the Naval

Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (3M) System. It was introduced
on 2 January 1965, to provide for maintenance data collection, man-hour
accounting and aircraft status reporting as a part of the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Program (NAMP). The primary purpose of data collection and
reporting is to ensure that basic data generated by maintenance/material
personnel are documented int·o ~a system.·data,ibase -'from-which tailored reports
can be produced for a variety of staff and management activities.

3.2 Information Sources

The literature review revealed that a number of agencies had

collected various types of data on composite structures. The first event of
this task was to contact several agencies to inquire into their use of the
automated Maintenance Data Collection (MDC) systems. On-site interviews were
conducted with engineering and analysis representatives from Naval Air Rework
Facility (NAVAIREWORKFAC) Norfolk, Virginia, the depot repair facility for the
F-14 (which has the composite horizontal stabilizer). On-site interviews were
also held with F-15 maintenance personnel at Langley Air Force Base. Next,
personnel from the Air Force F-15 Depot (Robins AFB, Georgia) were contacted
concerning their use of maintenance data collection systems for performing
analysis on the F-15 composite tail structure. Additionally, the Air Force
Materials Laboratory at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio was contacted in an inquiry
about the use of maintenance data col:lection ·systems during· their numerous
studies of composite structures.

In all cases the personnel interviewed stated a general

dissatisfaction with maintenance data collection systems (Navy 3M and Air
Force 66-1) as they applied to composites studies. The primary objection
stated was the lack of a detailed narrative on the nature and extant of the
failure as well as the lack of detail on the corrective action. Navy
personnel favored use of the Computerized Unsatisfactory Report Evaluation
System (CURES) because it provided the desired narratives. Navy analysts also
endorsed the Grumman Company's Reliability, Maintainability, Availability
Support Action Program (RMSAP) for the same reason. With the RMSAP, Grumman
personnel enter Navy Maintenance Action Form (MAF) data into the company's
data system including the narratives of malfunction and repair.

3-1
 3.3 Northrop Study

The Structures Division of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory

{AFFDL) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base sponsored a Northrop Corporation
study concerned with maintenance of advanced composite structures. One of the.
tasks of the study involved a historical survey and collection of available
data using the Air Force maintenance data collection system. The automated
data collection system proved less than completely satisfactory as reflected
in their second quarterly progress report:

''Maintenance data obtained from the AFM 66-1 system and from
YF-17 flight test records --- do not provide the desired amount
of detail concerning the severity of damage or the specific
causes of the damage. To supplement the documented historical
data, personal contacts have been made with knowledgeable
p.ersonnel at the - - (Air Force Depots)."

The objective of the Northrop study was to identifY design parameters

which will make composite structures less susceptible to ground handling
damage. The study was to be conducted in three phases; retrieval and analysis
o.f .historicaLdata on ,structures, damage assessments through laboratory
experiments and simulations, and developments of design criteria. Task one of
the Northrop study was there fore similar in some respects to this study.

AFFDL representatives reported that there were three primary

weaknesses in the 66-1 MDS which limited its usefulness in composite
structures analysis. First, the assignment of work unit codes (WUC) had not
been carried out to a sufficient level of indenture. The engineers desired to
identify failures to the substructural component such as· a. spar or
composite-to-metal bond joint. The WUC codes are assigned only to complete
repairable assemblies. Second, malfunction codes such as dented, cracked, or
punctured did not provide data on the dimensions of the damage. The third·
problem concerned the organizational maintenance man's selection of
malfunction codes. It appeared thatmaintenance technicians "favored" certain
codes and used them repeatedly for various similar discrepancies rather than
searching for the most applicable code in the work unit code manual •
., 3.4: Use of 'Malfunction Description Codes

The use of "favorite codes'' is also common in the Navy 3M system

according to a McDonnell Aircraft Company (MCAIR) study. The MCAIR studied
the use of ''how malfunction" codes by Navy maintenance organizations. They
found that while approximately 250 Row Mal codes are available, the vast
majority (over 90%) of all discrepancies are coded against only 46 of the
codes.

The Navy 3M system originally offered over 900 Bow Mal codes. Many of the
codes were very similar, which resulted in confusion at the organizational
level and diluted data as similar discrepancies were reported under a variety
of codes. Periodically, codes have been deleted and in some cases several
discrepancy nomenclatures have been g~ouped into one numerical code.
Currently some 250 Row Mal codes remain in the 3M system, over 120 of Which

3-2
are authorized to be used on airframe, fuselage, landing gear, and flight
control structures. Over SO of these codes are applicable to composite
material structures.

MCAIR representatives have stated that they intend to recommend

further deletions and consolidation in order to streamline the use of the How
Malfunction codes. During discussions with MCAIR, two informal
recommendations were made concerning the work unit code manual and its listing
of How Mal codes.

• The preface of the work unit code manual is generally used to explain
the use of the various codes, i.e., work unit code, when discovered
code, type maintenance code, support action code, and how malfunction
code. Typically, the how malfUnction code is divided into two
categories - ordinary "how mal codes" and conditional ''how mal
codes". A clear distinction between the two categories should be
provided in the explanations. Some WUC manuals currently in use
don't make the distinction sufficiently clear. For example, the F-4
WUC Manual (NAVAIR 01-245FD-8) explains that the malfunction
description code (Row mal codes) are "used to describe eguipment
malfunction," while "conditional malfunction codes are those which
describ.e a malfunction ,~e to causes by battle damage, improper
maintenance/handling, improper operation of associated equipment,
etc." The F-14 WUC Manual (NAVAIR Ol-F14AA-8) explains the
malfunction description code but makes no mention of conditional
malfunction codes. The following distinction was recommended: Non
conditional malfunction description codes should reflect damage or
symptoms during system/equipment operation where the resulting
malfunction was caused by the work unit coded item itself or is
unknown. Conditional malfunction descriptions should reflect the
cause of a damaged/inoperative system which is attributable to some
contributory factor. Examples of conditional malfunctions are: bird
strikes, FOD, ground handling, over torqued, missing parts, moisture
in the system, etc. This distinction is important in the case of
composite materials which will become more obvious in later report
sections.

• At least two new malfunction description code adjectives are

-required. One must describe damage 'caused by mois.ture penetration
into composite structures. The only code in the current 3M system
which could be used is 622-WET; however this is inadequate to
describe the unique effects of moisture on certa.in composite
materials. The recommended expansion to the code nomenclature is as
follows: 622 -WET, accumulation of moisture, water impregnation,
damage caused by moisture accumulation. The detailed explanation of
the need for this code will be provided in a later section of this
report. The second new malfunction description adjective should
describe separation of bonded materials. The current code most
closely related to this condition is delaminated which refers to the
separation of sheets. Therefore the term disbanded was recommended
to be added to the numerical coding of this category of damage. The
code expansion will likely be: 846 - Delaminated, Disbanded,
Separated.

3-3
 CHAPTER 4

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter documents the analysis of currently available 3M and

other data on selected fighter aircraft structures. The overall objective of
this analysis was to assess the risks from the use of composite materials in
F-18 structural components. The original approach planned for this effort was
to identify composite structures similar to F-18 components for which 3M data
exists on aircraft currently in the Navy inventory. However, it was
determined that, with the exception of the F-14 aircraft, the 3M system could
not yield a significant amount of data on composite structures with a high
degree of commonality (similar structure data) between the F-18 and in~service
aircraft.

An alternate approach was developed as a result of this finding.

Four aircraft were selected for a comparative analysis with a three fold risk
assessment objective. The first objective was to develop a rank ordered
listing of F-18 composite structures with respect to logistics resource
requirements, the second, a determination of the relative risk pertaining to
certain structures regardless of structural material, and the third to
correlate the potential failure modes of the structures with the adequacy of
malfunction description codes.

4.2 Selection of Aircraft for Comparative Analysis

The four Navy aircraft selected for comparative analysis were the
F-14, F-4J, YF-17, and AV-8B. These aircraft were selected based on
availability of data, type aircraft commonality with the F-18, and use of
composite material. All aircraft selected had composite structures except the
F-4J. This aircraft was included simply because it is one of the aircraft to
be replaced by the F~l8.

In addition to . the 3M .data on the four Navy aircraft, AFM 66-1 data
was obtained from the Air 'Force on the F-111, F...;l04, A-37 and the A-7 which 1.s
the other aircraft to be replaced by the F-18. Structural component
commonality between the Air Force A-70 and the Navy A-7E was considered
sufficient to warrant use of the readily available Air Force data in lieu of
performing a redundant data collection effort. The AFM 66-1 data was
originally retrieved and tabulated for a Northrop Corporation study sponsored
by the Air Force.

4.3 Data Compatibility and Constraints

Navy aircraft historical data was extracted from 3M Aviation

Information Reports available in the NAVAIR technical library. The data,
which is tabulated in Appendix D, was extracted primarily from MSOD reports
A4104Z-Ol and A2107, has been filtered since numerous conditional malfunction
codes were screened from the failure history during preparation of these
reports.

4-l
 The AFM 66-1 data provided by the Air Force was also filtered but in
a different way. In order to satisfy the objectives of the Northrop study
specific malfunction codes were selected. "Only those 'Row Malfunction Codes'
pertaining to structurally related defects and damage criteria as applicable
to maintenance performed both on-aircraft and off-aircraft were considered".
Some of the codes used by the Air Force would fall into the conditional
category in the Navy. 3M system.

Consideration was given to the different data sources, somewhat

different filtering criteria and different operating environments of the
aircraft under consideration. Even with these constraints on the validity of
a comparative analysis the investigators felt that a useful assessment of
potential risks to the F-18 could be achieved.

4.4 Composite Material Failure Modes

Interviews conducted during the earlier phase of this study revealed

that the majority of repairs to composite structures were required as a result
of damage due to ground handling accidents rather than from material failure
during flight operations. This problem is of sufficient magnitude that the
Northrop Study had as :its primary- objective the development of design
approaches to reduce damage to composite structures from ground handling.

The interviews also revealed that material failure resulting from

moisture penetration through thin skin composite materials was significant and
produced several types of reactions. For example, moisture which had
penetrated composite skins and accumulated in aluminum honeycomb st.ructures
caused severe corrosive deterioration to the honeycomb. The Air Force now
bans the use of this combination of structures (aluminum honeycomb/thin skin
composite) as a result of their studies of the problem. In other instances
the accumulated moisture has expanded during flight operations causing large
ruptures in the composite skin material. Problems also resulting from
moisture accumulation in honeycomb structures beneath composite skins have
been the fluttering of flight surfaces due to the weight change and altered
aerodynamic characteristics of the structures.

Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory engineers assured the

investigators·.,that design -s.tudies are .underway .to solve potential material·
failure problems in composite structures and that the primary risk area was
that of ground handling caused damage. This problem poses a double threat in
that thin laminant structures are extremely susceptible to handling damage and
are therefore potential high consumers of maintenance manhours. Thick
laminants present a different risk in that damage resulting from impact is
usually most severe below the surface and not always easily detec.table by
surface damage.

As a result of the technical literature review and interviews the

investigators formed the following conclusions:

• 'nlree types of aircraft structures/surfaces will be most

susceptible to damage whether they are conventional metal or
composite material. These are doors, panels and surfaces
located on lower portions of the aircraft in proximity to the
majority of maintenance and aircraft servicing work, certain

4-2
e . ho~izontalskin eu~faces on top of the aircraft subject to
d~opped tool and damage resulting from walking o~ standing by
maintenance pe~sonnel, and certain edge surfaces subject to
bumping by maintenance stands or otb.er ground operations
equipment. Proportionally, composite structures will be higher
·in maintenance actions due to the greater susceptibility to
• ground handling damage.
• Aircraft control surfaces and doors/panels which are removable
will reflect a relatively high number of maintenance actions due
to damage caused on and off the aircraft.
I 4.5 Results of Data Analysis
Analysis of aircraft structures failure rates and maintenance.
manhours consumed during damage repair resulted in a tabulation of F-18
composite structures in order of expected maintenance impac~. The rank
ordered listing has been divided into relatively high, medium and low risk
groupings for presentation in figure 4-1 below. Column A is the listing Which
resulted from this study's analysis of the 3M and 66-1 data. (See
Appendix D~) Column B displays the rank ordering extracted from MCAIR
maintainability block diagrams as of June -J:977. Column C is the result of
considering only YF•l7 maintenance data.

EXPECTED F-18 MAIN'IENANCE IMPACT OF USE OF COMPOSITES

A B c
Consolidated Data MCAIR Data .YP'-17 Data
MLG Wheel Doors Horiz Stab Skin LEX Skin *
LEX Skin* Outer Wing Skin Speed Brake
High Hodz Stabilizer Ailer!Jn MLG Door
Speed Brake Rudder Wing Skin
Wing Skin Flap Roriz Tail Skin
Vert Fin Skin Inner Wing Skin Flap Skin
Aileron Speed Brake Vert Stab Skin
Medium Aft Wing Tip IN!D MLG Door Vert Stab I.E
Flap Skin OUTBD MLG DOor MLG Strut Door
L/R NLG Door L/R NLG Door Roriz Tail Act
Door

L/R. MLG Door LEX Skin* Aileron

Vert Fin I.E Vert Stab Skin NLG Wheel Door
Low Rudder Vert Stab I.E Rudder Skin
Vert Fin TE Vert Stab TE NLG Strut Door

* LEX included despite change to aluminum structure. See page 4-4

and Appendix D for the rationale.

Figure 4-1

4-3
 The first objective of the data analysis was to develop a rank
ordered listing of F-18 composite structures which is provided as column A of
figure 4-1. Comparing columns A, B and C supports a MCAIR conclusion that the
horizontal stabilizer skin and wing skin are high risk structures. MCAIR has
predicted that the rudder will be a high risk structure; however, this
structure did not demonstrate high failure/damage rates on Navy or Air Force
aircraft surveyed. MCAIR's prediction placed the main landing gear doors in
the medium risk category although they had experienced high failure rates on
Air Force, Navy and YF-17 aircraft. The leading edge skin on the YF-17 is a
GR/EP structure and has experienced at least ~elve instances of damage. Even
though the F-18 LEX will be an aluminum structure it is considered a high risk
structure for two reasons.. First it is highly susceptible to damage from
ladders used for cockpit entry and second it presents an ideal step during
maintenance work around the cockpit area. Such convenient surfaces are
generally walked on regardless of no step placards.

The main landing gear doors are vulnerable to tire thrown FOD as well
as ground damage due to close proximity to engine work and armament loading.
Main landing gear doors have experienced sufficiently high damage rates on
both Navy and Air Foree aircraft surveyed to warrant placing this structure at
the top of the high risk structures.

The second objective of the analysis was to determine the relative

risk to certain structures regardless of structural material. The key to this
objective is susceptibility to incidents/accidents during ground operation.
Structures which are low an the aircraft and in high traffic areas are more
susceptible to this type of damage. The antithesis of this is r.he rudder
assembly which experienced low incidence of damage on Navy and Air Force
aircraft as well as the YF-17. Main landing 'gear doors and the edges of
horizontal stabilizer structures on the other hand experienced high incidence
of damage both to composite and non-composite assemblies.

The third objective was to correlate the potential failure modes of

structur~s with the adequacy of malfunction descriptions. This objective
could not be investigated by reference to standard 3M reports. The nature of
this objective requires verification of the actual damage description on the
Maintenance Action Forms (MAF) with the coded description. The investigators
-reasoned that ,this subject had-- been :adequately covered during interviews to
warrant conclusions in support of the Northrop report (see paragraph 3.3).

4.6 Ground Handling Risks Summary

1 Data analysis, intervie:ws and documented sources resulted in the

follow1ng findings concerning risks to the F-18 aircraft.

• Neither specific information on relative severity of damage to

structures nor the cause of the damage can be expected from 3M
analysis.

• Historical records on in-service aircraft are predominantly concerned

with conventional metal structures and can be used only in a gross
sense in predicting failures of the F-18 composite structures. Only
failure areas can be predicted. ·

4-4
 • Components located in high traffic areas or low on the aircraft are
most vulnerable to damage during maintenance activity.

• Components which are removed from the aircraft present a higher risk
than those which are not·removed. Accidents and mishandling of
removable panels and doors can be expected to result in damage
particularly on edges and corners.

• Dents in the honeycomb structure of "No Step" structures can be

expected from maintenance personnel walking on these surfaces.

• Damage from dropped tools and other maintenance equipment can be

expected on their thin skin top surface structures.

• Damage to substructures of multilayer components can be expected to

be more severe than surface damage indicates.

• Substructure damage can be ~pected to result from accumulated

moisture unless specific remedies are designed into the structures.

4.7 Plan For F-18 Composite Data Collection

A requirement exists to identify what structures/materials are being

damaged, the nature of the damage and the extent .of the damage. To satisfy
these requirements certain minimum changes in the present work unit coding
philosophy and malfunction descriptions will be necessary.

4.7.1 Work Unit Codes

Currently work unit codes are assigned primarily to repairable

assemblies and subassemblies. The F-14 rudder provides a convenient example
of this. The rudder structure is coded (14311) and there are nine covers,
fittings and links which are repairable subassemblies to the structure which
are coded separately (14312 thru 1431B). If this rudder were a composite
structure with full depth honeycomb inner structure and monolithic laminate
skin then these rwo portions of the rudder structure would need to be coded
(143111, 143112) to enable identif~cation of the structure/material requiring
expenditure of logistics resources. A more extensive system of indentured
coding of composite structures will generally be required. This coding will
need to extend into portions of repairable assemblies.

- 4. 7 .2 Malfunction Description Codes

The evolutionary development of the present list of some 250

.malfunction description codes has resulted in a lack of any logical numbering
sequence. A Navy sponsored study is currently being conducted by MCAIR which
is expected to result in a further consolidation of code descriptions with a
new total of approximately 140 codes. As previously mentioned two new
adjectives applicable to composite structures are recommended. These two
descriptive terms (water impregnation and disbanded) are considered the
minimum required change to improve the description of the "nature of the
damage". These terms and the rational supporting their use was discussed with
the MCAIR study investigators.

4-S
 There are three different kinds of codes lumped under the heading of
malfunction description codes. They are: cause codes which are sometimes
called conditional malfunc~ion description codes, damage codes and malfunction
codes. Composite structures rarely "malfunction". They are normally
"damaged" due to some "cause". The problem is that only one code can be
used. When the "damage code" is used the 11 cause" is unknown and vice versa.
In either case the extent of the damage always remains an unknown quantity in
the 3M system.

An infinitely more powerful coding system could be devised, utilizing·

two digits to describe the cause, two digits to describe any damage, and two
digits to describe the resulting malfunction. However, development of such a
coding system is considered beyond the scope of this study.

In order to improve the consistency of 3M data concerning composite

structures only "damage" codes should be authorized in the applicable portions
of the F-18 work unit code manaul. The following codes are recommended:

CODE DAMAGE

780 Bent, buckled, collapsed, dented, distorted, twisted

050 Blistered, peeled," pitted

070 Broken, burst, cut, punctured, ruptured, torn sheared

020 Chaffed, 'stripped, worn, nicked, chipped

425 Scarred, scratched, burned, gouged

185 Corroded, contaminated, eroded, deteriorated

932 Does not engage, lock or unlock properly

846 Delaminated, disbanded, separated

374 Internal failure

622 Wet, water impregnation

In the strict sense code'622 is a cause code similar to 878 - weather

damage but was included as an exception due to its unique applicability to
composite structures.

4-6
 CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

The results of the study can be summarized in the following set of

conclusions:

• Although some inservice Navy aircraft have· or have had composite

structures installed, very little useful data on composites is
available in the 3M data files. Data on graphite/epoxy (GR/EP)
materials is practically nonexistent.

• The 3M system is generally adequate to collect data on composite

structures; however, certain minimum modifications to work unit
coding policy and use of malfunction description code usage will be
necessary to provide data which is useful for maintenance problem
identification.

• Damage caused during ground maintenance, servicing, weapons loading,

etc., will be the predominant cause of composite structures
maintenance requirements.

• The lack of a detailed narrative of the cause, effect, and extent of

damage to composites is a prLmary weakness in the 3M and other
maintenance data collection systems.

• A restructuring of the .present 3M malfunction description coding

system could significantly improve the level of detail provided by
the coded data without necessarily increasing the number of codes.

5.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations are made on the basis of the study

findings:

• Historical 3M data on Navy inservice aircraft should be used with

extreme caution when making predictions concerning GR/EP structures
on the F-18 aircraft. The data should primarily identify aircraft
areas and structures ·which are potential problem areas.

• NAVAlR should direct the individual work unit coding of each

individual subassembly of composite structures in order to permit
computer aided analysis of materials/design problems. Two new
malfunction (damage) description codes should be added to the 3M
system. The "How Mal" adjectives are: moisture penetration and
disbanding. These adjectives should be integrated with other
appropriately grouped terms under presently available codes.
• Damage susceptibility should receive increased emphasis during
maintenance technician indoctrination and training.

5-1
• The feasibility of restructuring the 3M coding system should be
studied with the objective of separating the cause, damage and
symptom categories of "How Mal Codes". A five or six digit code is
recommended where the first two digits describe the cause, the second
two digits describe any physical damage, and the third digit(s)
describe the resulting symptom.

5-2
 APPENDIX A

COMPOSITE STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

The information presented ~n this appendix has been summarized from Warren

E. Jamison's technical paper entitled "Chemical Bonding At The Polymer-Fiber

Interface In Structural Composite Materials", dated April 1969. This material

is .furnished to provide the reader with an overview of the nature of composite

materials with the intended objective of understanding some of the potential

failure modes of these materials.

\
Readers interested in a more in-depth

discussion in the chemical aspects of bonding and recommendations for

improvement in the mechanics of composite material bonding are referred to Mr.

Jamison's full report.

A-1
Introduction

A fiber reinforced polymer composite is a material in which fibrous type

reinforcing elements are imbedded in a compatible polymeric matrix to yield
superior structural properties. Composites employing glass fibers in polymer .
matrices have been widely used with both continuous fibers (filament wound
rocket motor cases and pressure vessels) and semi-continuous fibers (glass
cloth reinforced boat hulls, automobile bodies and radomes). However, glass
is an inferior reinforcing material for applications involving highly stressed
components, and the maximum potential for such applications lies in relatively
short, discontinous fibers of graphite, boron and quartz.

Polymer-Fiber Relationships

In order for a fiber composite to have high strenght, the fibers must
carry. a significant portioin of the load. The role that the matrix plays is
to space the fibers and keep them from abrading each other, to act as a
barrier against chemical attack by hostile environments, and to transfer and
distribute the applied loads to the individual fibers. Even assuming a
perfect interfacial bond, the properties of the ploymer and fibers must be ·
mat.ched in .accordance with the quantity .of fibers present in the matrix. The
advantage of using thin fibers, as opposed to relatively thick reinforcing
elements such as steel wire, lies in their extremely high strength, and their
high surface to volume ratio which reduces the interfacial shear stress.
Table I lists tensile strengths for various materials, showing that extremely
fine fibers of crystalline solids can have strengths approaching the
theoretical limit. This high strength can be attributed to near perfection in
the crystal structure, rather than to the high dislocation density which adds
strength to steel. A property of c9nsiderable importance in the application

!ABLE I. Ultimate Tensile Strengths of Materials

Material Condition Diameter Tensile Strength Ref.

(in.xlO -.3) (psi x 10 -.3)

Graphite Fiber 0.3 400 5

Graphite Whisker 0.04 .3500 6

Boron Fiber 4.0 500 5

S-glass Fiber 0.4 500 5

Steel. Wire 3.0 500 5

Iron Whisker 0.04 1900 6

Quartz Fiber 1000 3

Polyamide Fiber 120 3

Polyester Fiber 100 3

Tungsten Wire 0.21 391 7

A-2
of composite materials, and even greater significance to considerations of
interfacial bonding is the modulus of elasticity, the stress required to
produce unit elastic strain within the·proportional range of the material.
The influence of relative polymer-fiber elastic moduli on interfacial bonding
will be discussed in detail. later. In most design applications, it is desired
to maximize both strength and elastic modulus while minimizing weight. Glass
and quartz possess the necessary high strength, but are inferior to graphite
and boron in. terms of modulus.

The required relationships between properties of the fibers and the

polymer matrix are best seen through specific examples. If a perfect
interfacial bond is assumed, and the fibers are oriented in the direction of
the applied load, the following analysis results: An applied load will
produce a certain strain in the composite. If the fibers and polymer have the
same elastic modulus, the strain will produce equal stress in both materials,
regardless of the quantity of fibers present. As the load is increased, the
stress will increase equally until the ultimate strength of the polymer is
reached. At this point, the matrix will fail and the entire load will be
applied to the fibers in the region of the matrix failure. This places the
fibers under unsupportably high stresses and thus the composite strength is
not substantially ,·greater than the strength of the polymer matrix. To utilize
the maximum potential strength of the fibers, the fiber modulus must be
considerably higher than the polymer modulus. In this situation, the polymer
matrix acts to transfer the load uniformly between the fibers via a shear
stress at the fiber-polymer interface. The fibers thus carry the major
portion in the polymer is well below its ultimate strength. The fibers must
occupy a minimum critical volume of the composite; otherwise the composite
strength will be less than that of the polymer. ·Therefore repairs to
broken/deteriorated composites will not fully replace the original strength.
In all likelihood there will be an area between the original composite and the
main repair bulk that is deficient in fibers, i.e. primarily polymer.
Consider a polymer containing only a few fibers of extremely high modulus.
Under an applied load, the strain of the "composite" will be essentially that
dictated by the polymer modulus. That is, the fibers will be strained to
extremely high stresses and will fail either by fracture of the fiber or by
shear of the interface. The fibers thus add nothing to the strength of the
composite and act as holes which reduce the effective area of the polymer.
Thus, for maximum effectiveness the fibers must have a modulus considerably
higher than that of the polymer and must occupy a significant portion of the
composite in order to carry the load without imposing excessive stresses on
the bulk polymer of the interface. Under an applied load the fibers will
strain a ~11 amount and the polymer will deform to distribute the stresses
evenly.

In addition to the basic aspects of chemical bonding, factors which

influence the properties of the interface are listed below:

1. Residual contamination on the fibers - Contaminants which are not

removed prior to blending of the polymer resin and the fibers may act to creat
regions of poor adhesion, voids and bubbles, or they may dissolve in or react
with the polymer to alter the polymer properties in the region of the
interface. In the chemical sense, they may act as inhibitors, initiators,

A-3
catalysts or terminators; thus affecting polymer structure and composition,
particularly when the matrix is a copolymer. Contamination of composite
repair material (during storage and use) may add to this problem.

2. Residual stresses - Even without external applied loads, the

interface will be subjected to shear stresses caused by shrinkage of the
polymer during polymerization and differential thermal expansion. If the
polymer-fiber adhesive bonds are established prior to polymer gelation, as
will usually be the case, subsequent shrinkage of the polymer on curing will
establish compressive stresses on the fibers and will place the interface
under a shear stress. If the loads applied during use act to strain the
fibers in tension, the residual stresses will be additive to the service,
stresses and will reduce the useful strength of the composite. If the polymer
is cured at a high temperature, the subsequent contraction on cooling will
place the fibers in compression due to the ten-fold difference in thermal
expansion coefficients between polymer and fib-er materials. The resultant
shear stresses at the interface will be additive to the stresses induced by
shrinkage.

3. Permeation of the polymer - All polymers are permeable to various

'vapors to··some extent. Solvents, coatings· and other liquids applied to the
cured composite, and even atmospheric vapors may diffuse through the polymer.
Since the interface exists at a higher chemical potential than the bulk
polymer, the vapors will accumulate in this region. They can react
detrimentally with the fibers, cause localized swelling or otherwise modify
the interfacial state. Atmospheric moisture, absorbed while the aircraft 1s
on the ground, will freeze at altitude. The expansion may cause gradual
deterioration of bonding.

4. Incomplete penetration of polymer resin into fiber bundles -

Generally, to expedite manufacture of components, fibers are spun and woven
into a cloth which is then molded with the polymer resin. Unless precautions
are taken, the resin may not completely infiltrate the fiber bundles
comprising each strand of the cloth, thus leaving voids and reducing the
effectiveness of the reinforcement. This must be considered in the conduct of
repairs. This problem has been substantially reduced by precoating the cloth
or yarn prior to lay up of the cloth mats and by molding urtder high
pressures. However, the precoating can raise additional problems of polymer
homogeniety, absorption of impurities, etc. Since the quantity of polymer in
the precoat is much less than that in the matrix, the precoat will be affected
to a greater extent by soluable and reactive impurities remaining on the
fibers. The use of a precoat, however, provides a means of optimizing the
interface properties, since the polymer in the precoat need not have the same
composition or properties as the matrix polymer.
Adhesion

Adhesion between a polymer and an. inorganic solid surface can be effected
by a number of different mechanisms. Epoxy-graphite composites have
demonstrated exceptional strength. The composites are usually formed by
precoating graphite fiber mats with a resin and subsequently polymerizing the
mass with additional resin after the mats are properly positioned in a mold.
The p.recoating should ser:ve two functions in forming the adhesive bonds.

A-4
First, graphite has a layered crystal structure and absorbs water from the
atmosphere quite readily between the layers. The epoxy precoat can react with
this wa~er to form a glycol which can then be hydrogen bonded to the remaining
water absorbed in the graphite. Secondly, the precoating enhances the
orientation of the polymer molecules for optimum bonding.

The ability of graphite to absorb water has been a problem· in the

application of polymers that are sensitive to water. Since it appears that
hydrogen bonding may predominate in the adhesion of polymers to graphite, this
absor_ption capability can be used advantageously. It is possible to remove
much of the water through vacuum or thermal processing, and to intercalate
other polar species between the graphite layers.

A-5
 APPENDIX B
BIBLIOGRAPHY

"All Composites Fighter Design Forseen." Aviation Week and Space Technology,
January 26, 1976, pp. 130-31.

Aman, John K. Non Destructive Test (NDT) Terminology. Wilmington, Delaware:

Dupont Technical Publication A65271.

Broughtman, Lawrence J. and Krock, Richard H. Modern Composite Materials.

Rea~ing, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1967.

"Composites Linked to Fuel Efficiency." Aviation Week and Space Technology,

January 26, 1976, pp. 119-23.

Conference on Composite Materials: Testing and Design, 2d, Anaheim,

California, 1971. Philadelphia: American Society for Testing and Materials,
1972.

Conference on Composite Materials: Testing and Desig, 3d, Williamsburg,

Virginia, 1973. Philadelphia: American Society for Testing and Materials,
1974.

Ditmer, Walter D. and Hoffman, Paul R. "Boron Composites Status in the USA."
Interior, June 1973, p. 654.

Economy, James. "Boron Nitride Fibers." Research/Development, June 1967, pp.

28-31.

"F-18 Advanced Composites Application." Aviation, January 1978, pp. 35-48.

F/A-18 Hornet - Maintainable by Design. St. Louis: McDonnell Aircraft

Company Publication PS1018, March 1, 1978.

Fink, Donald E. "F-18 Blends Advanced Fighter Concepts." Aviation Week and
Space Technology, September S, 1977, pp. 38-43.

Gaylord, M. W. Reinforced Plastics - Theory and Practice. Boston: Cahners

Books, 1974.

Geddes, J. Philip. "The U.S. Navy's View of the F-18 HoTnet." International
Defense Review, 2/1978, pp. 164-68.

Goble, Ross L. "Composites Lighter and Cheaper." Astronautics and

Aeronautics, August 1972, pp. 44-48.

Harris, Leonard A. "Advanced Composites- An Assessment of the Future."

Astronautics and Aeronautics, March 1976, pp. 22-35.

Jaimson, WarTen E. Chemical Bonding at the Polymer - Fiber Interface in

Structural Composite Materials. Technical report, April 1969.

B-1
Jones, Robert M. Mechanics of Composite Materials. Washington, D.C.: Scripts
Book Company, 1975.
Krach, Richard H. anc;l Kelsey, Robert H. ''Whiskers- Promise and Problems."
Industrial Research, February 1965, pp. 47-57.

McBee, Owen. Advanced Composite Materials. McDonnell Aircraft Company

Publication, pp. 22-24.

Mohr, J. Gilbert; Olenski, S. S.; Shook, G. D.; and Meyer, L. S. SPI Handbook
of Technology and Engineering of Reinforced Plastics/Composites, 1973.

Mullen, James W. "Realizing the Potential of Boron 1Nhiskers."

Research/Development, September 1965, pp. 38-41.

"Primary Spacecraft Structures Studied." Aviation Week and Space Technology,

January 26, 1976, pp. 128-29.

Salkind, Michael S. and Rolister, Geoffrey S. Applications of Composite

Materials. Philadelphia: American Society for Testing and Materials, 1973.

Service/Maintainabilit y of Advanced Composite Structures. 10 vols. Northrop

Corporation Technical Report prepared for the Air Force Flight Dynamics
Laboratory, 1977-78.

Stambler, Irvin. "Bright Picture Forecast for Composites in Aerospace."

Interio~, December 1972, pp. 1363-65.

Stambler, Irvin. "Composites - Large Scale Use is ~tting Nearer."

Interviews, June 1977, pp. 621-23.

Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition. New York: William
Collins and World Publishing Company, 1974.

"Weight, Cost Cuts Spur Composite Work." Aviation Week and Space Technology,
January 26, 1976, pp. 73-77.

Wendt, F. W.; Liebowitz, H.; and Perrone, N.; ed. Symposium on Naval
Structural Mechanics, 5th, Philadelphia, 1967. Oxford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press,
1970.
"World News -USA, New Concern About.Composite Materials." Aviation,
February/March 1978, p. 2.

E-2
 APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Plastic: ( 1) Capable of being molded or shaped

(2) Any of the nonmetallic compounds synthetically produced,

usually from organic compounds by polymerization, which can
be molded into various forms and hardned, or formed-into
pliable sheets or films for commercial use.

Polymer: Synthetic substance consisting of giant molecules formed

from smaller molecules of the same substance.

Polymerzation: . The process of joining two or more like molecules to form a

more complex molecule whose molecular weight is a multiple
of the original and whose physical properties are different.

Epoxy: A compound in which an oxygen atom is joined to two carbon

atoms in a chain to form a bridge. A resin, containing
epoxy groups, that polymerizes spontaneously when mixed
with a diphenol, forming a strong, hard, resistant adhesive.

Diphenol: A chemical compound (C6Hs)2, the molecule of which

consists of two chemically combined phenyl groups.

Phenyl: Basis of Phenol

Phenol: White crystaline compound (C6HsOH) produced from coal

tar or by hydrobysis of chlorobenyene, and used to make
explosives, synthetic resins, etc. It is a strong
corrosive poison with a characteristic odor. Diluted it
becomes carbolic acid.

Fiber Glass: Fine spun filaments of glass made into yarn that is woven
into textiles, -- molded and pressed into plastic material.

Composite: To put together (Fibers & Polymer)

1
Websters New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (New York: William
Collins and World Publishing Company, 1974).

C-1
 APPENDIX D

DETAILED DATA REPORTS

• Analysis of Maintenance Data Pertinent to F-18 Composite Structures

(F~4J, F-14A, YF-17)

• Analysis of Mai'ntenance Data Pertinent to AV-8B Composite Structures

0-1
)
.i
...

Analysis of Maintenance Data Pertinent

to

F-18 Composite Structures

Enclosure (1)
 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide an assessment of

data related to maintenance parameters of composite and metal
components of the following weapon systems:
F-4J
F-14A
YF-17
The analysis of data will be used to perform a comparison study
for the F-19.
The approach to presenting the data and its analysis for
this report is as follows:
• Identification of composite structures for the F-18
• Com9arative data (3M) analysis of the F-4J, F-14A
and YF-17
• Narrative Analysis
The data presented in this r8.port was obtained from ASMRA and
MSO reports of the ap~licable weapon systems.
AV-BB data was analyzed in a separate report because of
the incompatibility of the data base used for this analysis.
The following table depicts the distributi~n of composite
and "other" type structure materials for the F-18. The table
does not address all structural areas, but shows all composite
structures and a representative sampling of non-composite areas
that are subject to a high degree of maintenance requirements.
•
F-18 COMPOSITE STRUCTURES

ITEM MATERIAL

Speedbrake Faces Composite

Horiz. Stab. Actr~ Door Composite
Vertical Stab. Skins Composite
Rudder Composite
Horiz. Stab. Skins Composite
Boriz. Stab. Root Rib Extensions Composite
Inner Wing Skins Composite
Inner Wing Spars Other
Outer Wing Torque Box Skins Other
T.E. Flap Lower Surface Composite
LEX Skins Other
Aileron Skins Other
Center Fuselage Doors (dorsal) Composite
NLG Door Skins Composite
MLG Door Skins Composite
Equipment Access coors Composite

TABLE l
 COMPARATIVE DATA (3M) ANALYSIS OF THE
F-4J, F-14A and YF-17

The data in the following tables was extracted from HSO

and ASMRA reports de9icting 3M data with respect to individual
components and historical maintenance data. This effort was
accomplished to assess the impact of maintenance requirements
on components that are comparable to those depicted in Table 1.
This data is contained in the following tables:
MSO Reoort A214~-0l MSO Report A2107 ASMRA
• F-4J Table 2 ., Table 4 Table 6
e F-14A Table 3 Table 5 Table 7
e YF-17 N/A N/A Table 8
There are no structural components made of composite material in
the F-4J. In the F-14A, only the Horiz. Stab. Control Surfaces is
manufactured from composites. On the other hand, a significant
number of YF-17 structural composites as shown in paragraph 4 in
the narrative, are composites.
\
I
 COMPAR ATIVE DATA
Reporting Period: JAN 75 Reporting Period: JuL 75 Reporting Perfod:.JAN 76 ~eporting Period:JAN ~~ :
Weapon System: . JuN 76 AVERAGE) JuN
F-LtJ
.
A1ght Hours: Lt3 ,
JuN -75 Flight Hours:
11 1 )~~c 75 A1ght Hours: 7,] l?iQ___ Aight Hours: 121 , LJJ2
375
().laval D-l ...... 0-laval 0-Lavel
Unochod. Tot.IMA llopolr Unoched. TotliiMA Rep11lr Un11ched.
Total MA Rapalr Unochod. TotaiMARepair
wuc Nomenclature P...-looo rn hilunra MMH/FH Par 1000 FH Follunoo- MMH/FH PM11DJFH nnurtn MMH/FH Por 1000 FH Foilurf.1'11 MMH/FH
Pur 1000 A Pur 1000 HI Po< 1000 Ftl
Par 1000 Ft-

'118 027 7;09 1. fifi .028. 7.73 1 78 07'> 7.QL 1 '1)4 .077
1LJ610 SPEFDRRAKE AssEMRI v 6.16
• • • • • • .LJS 0 .001 .45 0 .001
~198 SrABILAroR AcruATowAcce-ss DooR •
• • • • • • • • • • •
111822l VERTICAL fiN SKIN . -
.._.___ . • • • • • • --
• • • • • •
111825( VERTICAL
----
FIN LEADING EDGE
RunnER STRunuRF
14414 1,20 ?3 .005 '5fi 0? .005 .36 .11 .007 BL f--'J2 .006
6.53 1.13 ,0119 4.02 ,83 .033 4.39 .-62 .034 4'.98 .36 .039
STABILATOR SKIN
14317
.021 3.10 .LJ6- ~.34-
.022 e-i·~~ f - - - - e--..!QJ1_
2."61 .18 .OlLJ 2.33 .37
r--14212 ~ERON STRUCTURE
1. 98 .25 - ,005 1.15 .29 ~4 1. LJ5 .35 .30 JOII_
.004 1.52 -------
11232 AFT WING TIP ' --

2.10 .53 .005 _2_._lf.L ~L _.005 2.56 .LJ3 .003 _2,}1_ _ __ ,19__ JOJi
~327 AFT NosE LANDING GEAR DooR
1.96 .30 .007 2.29 .22 .011 1.99 .19 .005 2.29 .24 .DOd
13328 FoR~IARn NosE LANDING GEAR DooR
- - - ~2l
2.52 .43 .013 2.83 .LJ6 :o2s 4.31 .70 ;036 3.22. f - -.55
3234 GEAR STRur DooR <MLG>
-.51 ·.020 5.07 ~51 .023 5.79 .67 .029 ~~- ~56_ _._02_~
13235 OUTBOARD MLG DooR LJ.29
3.62 .92 .020 3.34 .58 .014 LJ.63 .65 .017 3.86 1-'-- .72 .017
13236 INBOARD MLG DooR ~--

-- ---
---~- 1-'----

- ~--- ----- f - - - -

---

-- --
-
----
-

--

l
• DENOTES "NO DATA AVAILABLE" DUE 10 MSO POLICY TO "EXCLliDE FRa1 TillS REPORT ALL \'.O!lK CODE EN"ffiiESfOR W-HCU J2 OR lESS r1AINTENAI'-CE ACTIONS JV\VE BEEN
REPORTED TABL£ 2 SOURCI::: MSO Repor:t A2l42-
0l
r_
 COMPARATIVE DATA
I Weapon System;
F-141\
Aaporting Pariod:JAU 75
75
Reporting Pariod: ~~~ ~S Reporting Parlod:-~C~ ~g ReportinB Period:JAN
(~VERAGE JuN
75
76
Aight Hours:
9 1jgN . Flight Hours: l Lj , 532 Right Hours:
16 995 A1ght Hours: LJO lOS
0-level 0-Lorvel 0-Lavel 0-L.,vol
TomiMA Rapolr Unochad. TutaiMA Uno chad. TomiMA Repair Unochad. TomiMA Unochad.
wuc Nomenclature Repair
Fanu,.e:s
Ropair
Per 1000 fli Failurns MMH/fli Pet 1000 FH Fellurua MMH/FH Per 1000 FH MMH/FH Por 1000 Fll Failure !!I MMH/FH
Per 1000 Ft Par 1000 H p.,. 1000 FH P...- 1000 FH

1LJ710 SrEEDIDJVE BRAKE CoNTROL SuRFACE • • • 1.33 .62 .014 .88 .lJl .009 1.13 .52 .012
1133G STAB. AcrR. AccEss PANEL • • - • • • • • • • • • •
llSlO VERT I CAL s·rAB ILl ZER SIRJICTIIRF .3.27 .lJ3 .043 4.27 2 00 .OIJ6 . lJ .18 1.32 .057 _l.9_L - ·L_lll .049
11513 FIN lEADING EDGE
1--:--
• • • .96 .28 .003 • • • .96 .28 .003
14311 RuDDER 1.74 .lJ3 .015 2.06 .76 .023 1.65 .59 .013 1.82 .59 .019
Ch"':f''-~
... 14411 UORIZOtHAl STAB, CONTROL SURFACES 11.44 LJ.69 _._064 7 91 2 75 069 8.06 5.12 .097 9.1lJ lJ.19 076
11'114 UJNG FIXED lEADING EDGE • • • • • • .82 .18· .005 - -.81- - --.18 .005
11412 WING T1r AssEMBLY 3.05 .76 .031 2.20 .34 .012 3.33 ,lJ7 .044 -3,0LJ
- - --·-~ i - · .029
13411 NlG FoRWARD DooR r ''2 .33 ,010_ l Jj5_ .41 ,005 • • • LLJLJ L3l __ j}Qa
13413 NlG AFT DooRs 2.51 .98 .009 • • • • • • 2.51 .93 .009
U21L _ t1LG INBOARD DooR • • • 1.51 ,qg .002 .88 .lJl .003 1.20 .lJ!! .ov2
13212 Ml G OtJTROARn nooR • • • _2_._Qfi_ .73 .029. 1.24 ..6_5 _j)_QL 1. fil) ___._4fi .OlJ
13213 MLG AFT DooR 1.% .LJLJ .030 1.31 .07 .015 3.35 .71 .1LJ6 2.21 .lJ1 .064

1---- ----
--

r---
--- ----~- --- -

---

-- - --

LJENOTES "NO DAlA AVAILABLE" DUE ID MSO POLICY TO ~'EXCLUDE FR0'-1 TillS REPORT ALL \'.URK CODE ENlRIES FOR M-IlCH 12.._oo__t~ MAINTENANCE ACTIONS HAVE
BEEN REPORTED," TABLE 3 SOU~CE: "'SO Repol:'t A21<12-
. 01
 COMPARJ\TIVE DATA
Rllportlng Porlod: Roporting Poriod:
Weapon System: F-4J
JAN 75-DEC 75 JUL 75-JUN 76
Averega Total Avarega · Total
wuc Nomenclature Failures Failures Failures Failures
Per Month Par YBIIr Par Month Per Year

1ll610 SPEEDBRAKE AssEMBLY 11 131' 12 1'-15

llll9B STAB. AcTR. AccEss DooR 0 2 - -
1118220 VERTICAL FIN SKIN 1 7 0 4
1118250 VERTICAL FIN LEADING EDGE 1 7 0 4
14414 RuDDER STRUCTURE 1 11 0 5
14317 STABILATOR SKIN 7 85 5 57
14212 AILERON STRUCTURE 2 24 3 34
11232 AFT WING TIP 2 23 3 32
13327 AFT NLG DooR 3 37 2 29
13328 FoRWARD I~LG DooR 2 27 2 23
1323L; GEAR STRUT DooR CMLG> 7 34 8 91
13235 OuTBOARD MLG Doo~ 5 56 6 7l~

13236 INBOARD MLG DooR 7 33 6 72

TABLE 4 SOURCE: MSO Report A2107

 COMPARJ\TIVE DATA
c
Ropartlng Porlad: Roparting Porlod:
Weapon System: F-14A
JAN 75-DEc 75 JuL 75-JuN 76
Avelllge Total Average Total
wuc Nomenclature Failures Falluros Feiluras Falluraa
Per Month Per Yoar Par Month Per Year

14710 SPEED/DIVE BRAKE CONTROL SURF 0 2 1 10

1133G STAB. AcTR. AccEss PANEL 0 3 0 ?'-

11510 VERTICAL STAB. STRUCTURE 7

) 3LJ 5 60
11513 FIN LEADING EDGE 0 7 1 .7
14311 RUDDER 1 16 2 22
14411 HoRIZ. STAB. CoNTROL SuRF. 6 69 9 111
11414 WING FIXED LEADING EDGE 0 4 0 4
11412 WING TIP ASSEMBLY 1 15 1 13
13411 NLG FoRWARo·DooR 1 12 2 23
13413 NLG AFT DooRs 1 10 0 2
13211 ~1LG INBOARD DooR 1 11 1 ILl
13212 MLG OuTBOARD DooR 1 14 2 23
13213 MLG AFT DooR 1 1Lt 3 30

TI\I~l£ 5 SOURCE: MSO Report A2107

J
 --·
Weapon System: F-4J Roporting Pnricd: JAN 7G _
Ocr 7G
night Hours: 6LI 312
J

wuc Nomenclatu re
O·Loval 1-Level Veri ned
MA MA · Felluree

14nlO SPFFnRRAKE A.c;sFMRr v 4Ftq L! ~h7

1119B. STAB. AcTR. Access DooR 34 0 17
111~??n VERTICAL FrN SKIN 153 0 147
111 R?'in VERTICAl FIN t~EADING EDGE 16 0 16
14414 RUDDER STRUCTURE 55 0 48
14317 STABILATOR SKIN - 321 3 226
14212 AILERON STRUCTURE 147 5 96
11232 AFT WING TIP 160 q 60
13327 AFT NLG DooR 162 4 133
13328 FoRWARD NLG DooR 127 2 115
13234 GEAR STRUT DooR CMLG) 273 31 235
13235 OuTBOARD MLG DooR 390. 29 279
13236 INBOARD MLG DooR 297 24 224

TA.BL£ 6 SOURCE: ASMRA

 - .,

noportlng Poriod: 76 _
JAN
Wenpon System: F-14A
Ocr 76
Flight Hou~: 31 051
0-Level I- level Verlfled
wuc Nomenclature
MA · Failures
MA
'

14710 SPEEo/DrvE BRAKE CoNTROL SuRF. 11 0 6

1133G STAB. AcrR. AccEss PANEL 22 0 16
11 s1 n ~EBIICAL SI8E. SIBUCIUBE 105 0 38
11513 F·r N LEADING EoGE 26 1 23
ll.l'lll RunnER 50 1 23
14411 HoRIZ. STAB. CoNTROL SuRF. ..... 291 3 262
11414 WING FIXED LEADING EDGE 20 0 16
11412 WING TIP AssEMBLY 165 5 139
13.411 NlG FoRWARD DooR 51 1 39
13413 NLG AFT DooRs 15 0 9
13211 r·1LG INBOARD DooR 29 0 22
13212 MLG OuTBOARD DooR 45 2 . li3
13213 MLG AFT DooR 96 15 66

TABlE 7 · SOURCE: ASMRA

 COMPARATIVE DATA
Weapon Syatom: YF-17 Roporting Period:~uN ~,- Reporting Period: ·Reporting Period:- Reporting Period:
Aight Hours: 1126 AN Flight Hours: Right Hours: Right Hours:_
-
0-l.&vol 0-liiVol 0-I.Avul 0--Levol
ToiBI MA Rop~~lr Unodu,.l. TotRIMA Unoch&d. To!BIMA Rap61< Unoch...t. ToiBIMA Ropflir Unsched.
wuc Nomonclaturo Rop61r
MMH/flt Pur UUJ AI
p.,.. 1000 FH Failums I\IIMif/rll Por lOCO FH Follurao · MMtt/FH Pot lOCO FH failurM failure!l MMft/FII
Par 1000 Fl Per 1000 A P...-1000 Flf P...- 1000 AI

l'ILAO ' SPEEDBRAKE SKIN 16.lt 11.7 .mLt

llELG " HoRIZONTAL TAIL ACTR •. DooR 2.3 2.3· .OOLJ
llU\A
-- I VERTICAL STAB •. SKIN Q.7 lt 7 .005 r----
.!JLAC , VERTICAL STAB. 'LEADING fDGE 4.7 2.3 .005 ----
__: __
llJEAA · RuDDER SKIN 0 0 0 ..
1'lCAA lloRIZONTAL TAIL SKIN 9.4 7.0 .008
llJAA •· I~ING SKIN 16,LI 0 .020 -- ----~-

14HAA t
FLAP SKIN 7.0 0 .Oll
-----~---- - - · - - - ----- - - - - ---- ·---- ----- - - - -
llGAB I LEX SKIN 28.2. 28i2 _.031 -
-- - - - - . --~~ - - - r----
14AAI\ I
AILERON SKIN 2.3 2.3 .OOLJ
p· v
1-
' NLG STRUT DooR
- 0 0 0 -- - !-----·- ~--- 1----
llhLI' ' NLG WuEEL DooR
.-
2.3 2:3 .004 ··-- ------ - - -
llCLX • MLG \luEEL DooR 14.1 1!1.1 035
llCLY MLG S.rRUT DooR 2."3 2.3 005
r---
--~
---···

·--- --

.. -·
-- ----

1---
-
'---

TABLE 8 SOU~CE: J\SMRA

 NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

1. This section contains an assessment of the data presented

in the previous tables. Discussion will initially be divided
into sections pertaining to each weapon system's comparative
data. Finally, an assessment will be made comparing these
findings with respect to the F-18.

2. F-4J Analysis
Upon review of Tables 2, 4 and 6, the components are rank-
ed as follows (ranked from highest degree ~f maintenance re-
quirements to the lowest) :

1. Stabilator Skin
2. Outboard MLG Door
3. Inboard MLG Door
4. Gear Strut Door (MLG)
5. Aft NLG Door
6. Aft Wing Tip
7. Aileron Structure
8. Forward NLG Door
9. Vertical Fin Skin
10. Speedbrake Assembly (Skin)
11. Rudder Structure
12. Vertical Fin Leading Edge
13. Stab. Actr. Access Door

3. F-14A Analysis
Upon review of Tables 3, 5 and 7, the components are rank-
ed as follows (ranked from highest degree of maintenance require-
ments to the lowest) :

1. Horiz. Stab. Control Surfaces - Com9osite

2. Vertical Stabilizer Str~cture

3. MLG Aft Door

4. Wing Tip Assembly
' -

50 MLG Outboard Door

6. Rudder
70 NLG Forward Door
80 MLG Inboard Door
9 •. NLG Aft Doors
10. Fin Leading Edge
11. Wing Fixed Leading Edge
12. ·Speed/Dive Brake Control Surf.
13. Stab. Actr. Access Panel

4. YF-17 Analysis
Upon review of Table 8, the components are ranked as follows
(ranked from highest degree of maintenance requirements .to the
lowest) :

1. LEX Skin - Composite

2. Speedbrake Skin - Composite
3. MLG Wheel Door - Composite
4. Wing Skin
5. Horiz. Tail Skin
6. Flap Skin Composite
7. Vertical Stab. Skin
8. Vertical Stab. Leading Edge - Composite
9. MLG Strut Door - Composite
10. Horiz. Tail Actr. Door
Aileron Skin - Composite
NLG Wheel Door - Composite
11. Rudder Skin - Composite
NLG Strut Door - Composite

5. F-18 ~nalysis

MCAIR predicts the following ranking oL maintenance require-

ments of components shown in Table 1:
 ITEM 0-LEVEL MTBUMA
1. Horiz. Stab. Skin 94.3
2. Outer Wing Skin 125.0
3. Aileron 174.0
4. Rudder 243.0
5. T.E. Flap 266'. 5
6. Inner Wing Skin 480.3
7. Speedbrake Assy 651.0
8. Inboard MLG Door 1019.4
Outboard MLG Door 1019.4
9. Left NLG Door 2150.5
Right NLG Door 2150.5
10. LEX Skin 2252.3
11. Vert. Stab. Skin 3436.4
12. Vert. Stab. L.E. 5154.6
13. Vert. Stab. T.E. 5882 .·4

(SOURCE: MCAIR Maintainability Block Diagrams - 22 June 1976)

The rankings are based upon all of the data included in

Tables 2 through 8.

1. MLG Wheel Doors

2. LEX Skin
3. Horiz. Stabilizer
4. Speed Brake
5. Wing Skin
6. vert. Fin Skin
7. Aileron
8. Aft Wing Tip
9. Flap Skin
10. L/R NLG Door
11. L/R MLG Door
12. Vert. Fin LE
13. Rudder Assy
14. Vert. Fin TE
 .,

Analysis of Haintenance Data

Pertinent to

AV-88 Composite Structures

Enclosure (2)
 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide an assessment o~

data related to maintenance parameters of composite and metal
components of the following weapon system:

AV-8A
The analysis of data will be used to perform a comparison
study for the AV-88.
The approac·h to presenting the data and its analysis for
this report is as follows:
• Identification of composite structures for the AV-8B
• Comparative data (3M) analysis of the AV-8A
• Narrative Analysis
The data presented in this report was obtained fror.1. ASHRA and
MSO reports of the AV-SA.
The F-18 analysis was accomplished in another re~ort, due
to the incompatibility of the data base used for this analysis.
The following table depicts the distribution of composite
and "other" type structure materials for the AV-SB. The table
does not address all structural areas, but shows all composite
structures and a representative sampling of non-composite areas
that are subject to a high degree of maintenance requirements.
•

AV-OB COHPOSITE S'l'RUCTURES

ITEH MATERIAL
Airbrake Skin Other
Pitch Control Panel Other
Fin Skin Other
Rudder Other
Tail Plane Skin Other
Tail Plane Rib Other
Main Plan.e Skin Composite
Main Plane Spar Composite
.,
Flap Skin Composite
Flap Ribs Composite
Flap Spar Composite
Aileron Spar Composite
Aileron Skin Composite
Outrigger Gear Fairing Composite
Wing Tip (aft -structure) Composite
Nose Undercarriage Doors Other
Main Undercarriage Doors Other

TABLE 1
 COMPARATIVE DATA (3M) ANALYSIS OF THE AV-8A

The data in the following tables was extracted from MSO ·

reports depicting 3M data with respect to individual components
and historical maintenance data. This effort was accomplished
to assess the impact of maintenance requirements on components
that are comparable to those depicted in Table 1.
This data is contained in the following tables:

MSO REPORT A2142-0l MSO REPORT A2107 ASMRA

Table 2 Table 3 Table 4
 COMPARATIVE DATA
I Weapon System:
AV-8A
Reporting Period: JAN 75
l · ~t~N 75
Reporting Period:JUL
DEc 75
75 Reporting Porlod:"j~~ )g Reportin~ Period~ ~AN
~mE UN
r E
Right Hours: Flight Hours:. 14 532 - Right Hours: 16, 99 5 g t oun: lfO 705
0-Lovel 0-Lorvol 0-Lo~el 0-level
To btl MA Repair Unochod. l-IMA Unochod. Totnl MA Aopelr Un.ched. TotniMA
wuc Nomencleturo
Per 1000 Fll failuntt~
Ropelr RepaY. Uneched.
MMH/nl Par 1000 FH Fsllum11 MMIIIFH Per 1000 FH hlfures MMH/FH Par 1000 Fli foi1Uf011 MMH/FH
Por 1000 fl- Por 1000 A Per 1000 FH Por 1000 Fll

lllf26 PITCH REACT! ON CoNTROl PANFI • • • • • • • • • • • •

11615
111214
FIN SKIN
RuDDER SK 1N·
'J
•
•
oa
• '
•
6q .nm 'J .:n
• • •
p;
•
.OOLJ
..• •
• •
• 2.14
• •
.II? .. noll
•
_ll!115 TA iL&AML Rm • • • • • • • • • •
14316 TAIL PLANE SKIN ).ilfi ,q7 ,010 • • • • • --- ··-- "i ~llli qz
-----

~mn
• • • • •
11513
1'1511
MAINPLANE SKIN
WING FLAP SPAR
3.88
•
.28
• •
004
• • • • • ..• . . .-
3·,38
- ---
.za_
·-
.004_

1'1512 WING FLAP R1as -

.. • • • -· • • • • • • - -•- - •
----1
14514 r--
WING hAP SKIN - ----
•
.
• • • • • • r------• •
-----
-.
------:-=:---_ -~----1
-- 14111 AILERON SPAR • • • • • • • • • • - -•- - -
1lfll7 AILERON SKI.N • • • • • • • • •- • • •
r-----
13352 OuTRIGGER LEG LoHER fAIRING • • • 'J,lq 1.91 ..010 _'L59 2 ,1_2_ _J)2l_ __3__.ji9__ ___ 2_j}_}_ _.OJ_Q_
~14 MAIN PLANE TIP • • • 2,06 .88 .1l21 La& 72 -f-j)L{l __L_9_6__ ___.JQ_ ___.Jl31
13251 Nosi: UN~FRCARRLM.LDooR
.,..')7 28_ .OOLJ • • • • • • 7.77 23__ nnu
13252
13151
NosE UNDERCARRIAGE LEG DooR
MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE DooR •
• •
•
' •
•
•
•
·-•
' .
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• • •
• • •
•
------ ·----- ---
1315J · MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE LEG DooR •
- - - - -. • • • • • ...LBl 1 53 JH1l 2.87 __LS!L f----010..
-
.
.
---
--

--- - - f--- -~----

r----

'i. I
. I
I
- - ·-- - ----
!
-- --

DENOTES. "NO
- DATA AVAILABLE".
n .
DIJE TO MSO POLICY TO .."EXCLUDE fR<l1 THIS REPORT ALL t.URK CODE HlffiiES FOR WI-IICH 12 OR LES.S. MAINTENANCE ACTIONS
HAVE BEEN REPORTED. TABLE 2 SOURCE: MSO .REI>OR"l' A2142-0l
 COMPARATIVE DATA
Reporting Period: Reporting Period:
. Weapon System: .AV-8A
JAN 75-DEC 75 JuL 75-JuN 76
Average Total Average Total
wuc Nomenclature Failures Failures Failures Falluraa
Per Month Per Year Per Month Per Year-

_l_]_J,Q£_ PTTrH REACT I ON CnNTROl PANEL - - - -

11615 FIN "SKIN J 6 _Q l.!
14214 RUDDER SKIN 0 1 0 1
14315 TAIL PLANE RIB 0 1 - -
llt31G TAIL PLANE SKIN 1: 9 0 4
11513 ~1AIN PLANE SKIN 0 4 0 1
14511 . vJ rNG FLAP SPAR - - __Q_ 1
14512 HING FLAP RIBS Q 2 0 ?
14~14 \~I NG FLAP SKIN 0 1 _Q 1
14111 AILERON SPAR - - - -
14117 AILERON SKIN -- - - -
13352 OuTRIGGER LEG LowER FAIRING 2 24 3 30
11514 MAIN PLANE' TIP 1 9 1 14
13251 NOSE UNDERCARRIAGE DooR 0 5 0 4
13252 NosE UNDERCARRIAGE LEG DooR 1 7 0 3
13151 MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE DooR 1 14 2 1~
13153 MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE LEG DooR 1 9 2 19

TABlE 3
 COMPAnATIVE DATA
Weapon System: AV-8A Roportlng Poriod: JAN 76 _
Ocr 76
Alght Hours:
1 1 ?c::;

wuc Nomenclatu re
0-Lavel 1-Level . Ver1Hed
MA MA Failures

11475 PI rcH RF=ACT toN Corrr_eot PANF=t 1 n 1

11 ~1 ~ FIN SKIN 1 0 1
14214 RunnER SKIN 1 1 1
14315 TAIL PLANE RIB 0 0 0
14316 . TAil PLANE SKIN 22 0 19
11513 MAIN PLANE SKIN .. 35 0 21
14Sll \4 ING FLAP SPAR 1 0 1
14[)1? \~ I NG FLAp RIBs 0 0 0
14514 HING FLAP SKIN 21 0 10
14111 AILERON SPAR 0 0 0
14117 AI LERON SKI l·l 4 0 1
1~'3S? OuTRIGGER LEG LowER FAIRING 47 2 27
11514 MAIN PLANE TIP 19 2 9
1~?~1 NosE UNDERCARRIAGE DooR 6 2 5
13252 NosE UNDERCARRAIGE LEG DooR 0 0 0
13151 MAIN UNDERCARRAIGE DooR 18 0 17
13158 MAIN UNDERCARRAIGE L~G DooR 42 0 23

TARt£ LJ
..

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

This section contains as assessment of the data prese~ted

in the previous tables.

- AV-SA -

Upon review of Tables 2, 3 and 4 the components are ranked

as follows {ranked from highest degree of m~intenance requirements
to the lowest) :

l. Outrigger Leg Lower Fairing

2. Main Undercarriage Leg Door
3. Tail Plane Skin
4. Main Plane Skin
s. Main Undercarriage Door
6. :·tain Plane Tip
7. Nose Undercarriage Door
8. Wing Flap Skin
Fin Skin
9. Nose Undercarriage Leg Door
10. Rudder Skin
11. Wing Flap Ribs
Aileron Skin
12. Wing Flap Spar
13. Pitch Reaction Control Panel
Tail Plane Rib
14. Aileron .Spar
)